[Type text]
National Federation of Labor v. NLRC
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the NFL,
employed by private respondents in the Patalon Coconut
Estate in Zamboanga City. Pursuant to RA 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Patalon
Coconut Estate was warded to the Patalon Estate
Reform Association, of which petitioners are members
and co-owners. As a result of this acquisition, the
Patalon Estate shut down operations and the
employment of the petitioners were severed. Petitioners
did not receive separation pay. Petitioners became co-
owners of the land and subsequently filed complaints for
illegal dismissal. The Regional Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC dismissed the charge for illegal dismissal but
ordered the payment of separation pay. The NLRC
reversed the decision.
ISSUE: W/N an employer that was compelled to
cease its operation because of compulsory acquisition by
the government of its land purposes of agrarian reform
is liable to pay separation pay its affected employees.
HELD:  No. The peculiar circumstance in the case
at bar involves neither the closure of an establishment
nor a reduction in personnel as contemplated in Article
283. The closure contemplated in 283 is a voluntary act
on the part of the employer as may be gleaned for the
wording, “the employer MAY also terminate,” denoting
that it is directory in nature. The Labor Code does not
contemplate a situation where the closure is forced upon
the employer. As such, petitioners are not entitled to
separation pay as private respondents did not voluntary
shut down operation as they even sought to be
exempted from the coverage of RA 6657.
Notes:
 The use of the word MAY in Article 283 means that
the foreclosure by the employer is not obligatory,
but directory in nature.
 For whether a statute is wise or expedient is not
for the courts to determine.
 Courts must administer the law, not as they think
it ought to be but as they find it and without
regard to consequences.
 Where the words of a statue are clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
[Type text]
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, et al.
Case No. 90 G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997)
Chapter IV, Page 129, Footnote No.26
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with
Respondent Commission a petition to amend the
Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2, Art.
17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special
civil action for prohibition based on the argument that
the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress
and no such law has been passed. RA 6735 provides for
three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution,
on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III.
This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement
Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
NO. While the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that
the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No.
6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could
have provided for a subtitle therefore, considering that
in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
Notes:
 The Court may even depart from the language of
the statute if to do so will enable it to effectuate
legislative intent and purpose.
 RA 6735 did not provide for subtitles or initiative
on the Constitution.
 The delegation of authority is invalid because the
Act is incomplete and it did not fix a sufficient
standard.
 Provisions on initiative should be liberally
construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate
[Type text]
and not to hamper the exercise by voters of the
rights granted thereby.
Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b)
and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support
of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of
the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) 4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
“Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government.
Creating some sort of
a Federal government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended
Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v.
COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments
to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1.       The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
[Type text]
registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and
shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures –
that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition
with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as
their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this
Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of
26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11
October 2006.
2.       A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply
with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative
to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this
Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions”
to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA
6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments
to the Constitution.
[Type text]
Mayor Sarcos v. Gov. Castillo
Case No. 276 G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969)
Chapter IV, Page 136, Footnote No. 48
FACTS:
Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del
Sur, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in
office by Respondent, the Provincial Governor of
Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged
dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the
alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private
individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs
for their own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the public and of the government. And on
the basis of such administrative complaint, Petitioner
was placed under preventive suspension by
Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185,
otherwise known as the “Decentralization Act of l967”.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such
preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act
of l967.
HELD:
The new law explicitly stated that the power of
suspension was vested on the Provincial Board. The
purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations
by vesting the power on a board where no one person
may have monopoly over the power of suspension.
The Provincial Governor may no longer have the
power of preventive suspension over a Municipal
Mayor.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 6d, 7a, 9a, 36b, 49
Notes:
 All statutes must be construed in the light of
their purpose.
 Statutes should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to
be suppressed.
 In the case at bar, the purpose of RA 5185 is to
prevent partisan considerations. If the power
was vested on the Mayor, the Provincial Board
would have no power over him.
 In the case at bar, the light of the object to
be achieved is the prevention of partisan
considerations, while the evil to be
[Type text]
suppressed is the formation of monopolies
over the power of suspension.
US vs. Toribio
G.R. No. L-5060 – 15 Phil. 85 – Political Law – Police
Power – Limitations on Private Ownership – General
Welfare
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a permit
to have his carabao slaughtered for human
consumption. His request was denied because his
carabao was found not unfit for work. He
nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the
necessary license. He was eventually sued and was
sentenced by the trial court. His counsel argued that
the law requiring one to acquire a permit before
slaughtering a carabao is not a valid exercise of
police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC
explained that it “is not a taking of the property for
public use, within the meaning of the constitution,
but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of
the legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be
inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the
public. All property is acquired and held under the
tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the
public rights and interests of the community.” The
wisdom behind said law: the prohibition of the
slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so
long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a “reasonably necessary”
limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a
desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when
by so doing the productive power of the community
may be measurably and dangerously affected
Notes:
 At that time, carabaos and other animals fit for
agricultural work are indispensible and should be well
accounted for by the municipal treasurer for purposes
[Type text]
of determining the agricultural yield of a particular
municipality or town.
 The light of the object to be achieved is the
preservation and well-being of carabaos and other farm
animals while the evil or mischief to be suppressed is
the careless slaughter of these animals by improvident
owners who are driven by momentary greed.
 The construction of the statute favors the preservation
of the animals that are fit for agricultural work.
Jose Comendador v. Renato S. De Villa
Case No. 69 G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991) Chapter
IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61
FACTS:
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in
the failed coup d’etat on December l to 9, l989. In
connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation
Panel and a Court Martial was formed. During their
trial, petitioners invoked their right to peremptory
challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial
on the ground that the right was discontinued when
martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree.
ISSUE: 1. W/N there was substantial compliance in
the conduct of pre-trial investigation.
2. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to
deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory
challenge. 3. W/N there was a legal basis for the
Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the
release of petitioners.
HELD:
The right to peremptory challenge was
suspended when Martial Law was declared. But
when the same was lifted, the right to
peremptory challenge was effectively revived.
The reason being, the right was suspended due to the
creation of military tribunals to try cases of military
personnel and other cases that may be referred to
them, so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals
were abolished, the right to peremptory challenge was
revived.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a, 10
Notes:
 When the reason of the law ceases, the law
itself ceases.
[Type text]
 Where a later law has a purpose in conflict with
that of a prior statute on the same subject, the
latter has lost all meaning and function and has
ceased to exist.
 In the case at bar, the declaration of Martial
Law had rendered the right to peremptory
challenge by the petitioners. The right ceased
upon the introduction of a latter statute which
invalidates it as a consequence.
Lamb v. Phipps
Case No. 143 G.R. No. L-7806 (July 12, 1912)
Chapter 4, Page 144, Footnote No.78
FACTS:
Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper
account of all the funds of the government which
came to his possession as a superintendent of the
Iwahig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are
balanced. Petitioner thus filed an action for
mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the
Philippines to issue a clearance. However, it was
contended that the action for mandamus cannot
prosper since there is no showing that, as provided by
law, “there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary courts of law.”
ISSUE:
W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to
cases where there is no other adequate and speedy
remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law.
HELD:
There appears to be a typographical error in the
wording of Sec. 222 of Act No. 190 which reads in
part: “When the complaint in an action in a court of
First Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal, … it
may if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law.” The phrase
“courts of law” should read as “course of law”. Copied
verbatim from the Code of Civil Procedure of
California, the said section in the California Code
reads “course of law” instead of “courts of law”.
Spanish translation of said Sec. 222 more clearly
indicates what the legislature intended. In Spanish,
the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary “courts
of law”. On its face, this evident typographical error,
which, if uncorrected, would render the law
nonsensical. It is therefore the duty of the court to
give the statute a sensible construction, such as will
[Type text]

effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid injustice Paras v. COMELEC

or an absurd conclusion.
Case No. 196 G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11a, 11d, 12a, 36a, 36b, 36d, Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote No. 50
36f, 37
FACTS:
 What the courts may correct to reflect the real
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the
and apparent intention of the legislature are
incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was
only those which are clearly clerical errors or
deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec.
obvious mistakes, omissions and misprints.
74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within
 In the case at bar, Sec. 222 of Act No. 190
one year from the date of the official’s assumption to
exhibited a typographical error which reads
office or one year immediately preceding a regular
“there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
in the ordinary courts of law.” The word courts
election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no
of law should be replaced by “course of law”.
recall may be instituted.
 The existence of typos is the reason why the
literal meaning of the law cannot prosper over ISSUE:
its intent at all times. To do so would turn the
be a grievous fault, as it would make the law W/N the SK election is a local election.
absurd.
HELD:
 According to Justice Holmes, words are flexible.
It is a polite way of saying that words are No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with
unstable and are fallible. In short, words are not reference to its context, and it must be considered
free from error. together and kept subservient to its general intent.
 Laws should be interpreted not by the letters The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective
that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. local official to recall once during his term, as
provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather
[Type text]
than the letter of a law, determines its construction.
Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local
election” to include SK election will unduly
circumscribe the Code for there will never be a
recall election rendering inutile the provision. In
interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law. An
interpretation should be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38
Notes:
 In the case at bar, petitioner’s act of including
the SK election in interpreting the phrase
“regular local election” will unduly restrict the
Local Government Code.
 Petitioner’s too literal interpretation of the law
leads to absurdity which the court cannot allow.
 The too-literal reading of the law is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors.
 Statutes should be interpreted not by the letters
that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 245 G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997)
Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156
FACTS:
An American tourist raped a 12 year old girl. In order
to pay for moral damages, the Deputy Sheriff of
Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in
order to draw from the American’s bank account to
pay the fees. China Bank responded by invoking Sec.
113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that
“foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment or any other process of any
court. Respondent Bank states that though the law is
harsh, such is the law and stood firm on the policy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and
Section 8 of RA 6424, as amended by PD 1246 should
be made applicable to a foreigner.
HELD:
Central Bank contends that the reason for the
exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign
currency. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of
[Type text]

economic crisis, where foreign investments Demafiles v. Comelec

were minimal. As, sometime has already passed
since the crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy
has now somewhat recovered from the financial
drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable
that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of
the innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be
followed, justice would be undermined, stating Art. 10
of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
LATIN MAXIM: 2, 14, 39
Notes:
 In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of law, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
 In the case at bar, it would be at the height of
injustice to apply the literal application of RA
9424 to the advantage of the accused.
 The said RA should be relaxed, as the reason of
its enactment (financial drought) has already
ceased to exist.
Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967)
Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159
FACTS:
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the
Provincial Board voting to reject returns. Petitioner
challenged the right of 2 board members to sit,
considering that they were reelectionists. Respondent
Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. Galido then
asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board
members in question were disqualified only when the
board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal.
In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its
previous decision.
ISSUES: 1. W/N this case is moot and the board had
the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7. 2.
W/N the board members who were candidates for
reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board
in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. 3.
W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of
canvassers to count a return.
HELD:
[Type text]

RA 4970 reads “the first mayor, vice-mayor and  In the case at bar, RA 4870’s last statement,
councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be “and shall have qualified” is considered a
elected in the next general elections for local officials surplusage or an unnecessary, extraneous
and shall have qualified.” The Supreme Court ruled matter. It failed to express a meaning.
that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of meaning.
The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st
day of January following their election, despite the
fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality.
No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns
due to whatever cause. However, since there is a
possibility of fraud, the canvass made and
proclamation should be annulled. The law states “any
member of a provincial board or of municipal council
who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be
incompetent to act on the said body.” Since
Respondent Commission has the power to annul and
illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason Chua v. Civil Service Commission
as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count
Case No. 60 G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
all returns which are otherwise regular.
Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146
LATIN MAXIM: 15, 35, 43, 26
FACTS:
Notes:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and
 Where a word or clause in a statute is devoid of voluntary separation as well as for involuntary
meaning in relation to the context or intent of separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers
the statute, the word, phrase or clause may be those who are qualified: • Sec. 2. Coverage. – This
rejected as surplusage and entirely ignored. Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees
[Type text]

of the National Government. The benefits authorized LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11e, 12a, 20a, 20b, 37
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees, regardless of age,
who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years of government service as of the
date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing
that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the
program, filed an application on January 30, 1989
with Respondent Administration, which, however,
denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to
Respondent Commission yielded the same result.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is

excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early
Retirement Law).

HELD: PNB vs. Office of the President

The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law FACTS:

would violate the equal protection clause of the
constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain
Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law
are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by the
said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary
implication in deciding this case.
Private respondents are buyers on installment of subdivision.
However, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lands in
favor of the petitioner even though the sale of land was
already executed. Unaware of the foregoing facts, the private
respondents continued to comply with their obligation as
buyers. The subdivision developer later on defaulted and PNB
foreclosed on the mortgage and became the owner of the
[Type text]

lots. A decision by the HLURB and OAALA ruled that PNB may *Section 18: Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot
collect from private respondents only the remaining shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written
amortization payment and cannot compel them to pay again approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted
for the lots they had already bought from the subdivision unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan
developer. The Office of the President affirmed this decision shall be used for the development of the condominium or
by declaring Presidential Decree 957*. subdivision project and effective measures have been
provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot
ISSUE/S: or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the
buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of
the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for
Whether Presidential Decree 957 applies to sale of land prior the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the
to its enactment payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness
secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a
HELD/DECISION: view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit
promptly after full payment thereto;
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive
effect of the law unless the contrary is provided. PD 957,
though implied, intended to include real estate mortgages
executed prior to its enactment and therefore must take
effect to protect the innocent purchasers from swindling and
fraudulent manipulations and illegal scheme of subdivision
developers. The court ascertained that they will not follow the
letter of the statue if it will not reflect the intent and purpose
of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the
protection of human rights. It would also be illogical if PD 957
which seeks to oust the fraudulent practices would not be
applied to existing mortgage contract due to some a
technicality.