“The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences presents an authoritative treatment of a signifi-

cant phenomenon. Simon Susen’s book is a real tour de force: it is remarkably comprehensive,
analytically rigorous, and it develops a thorough critique of postmodern thought.”
– Patrick Baert, University of Cambridge, UK

“Simon Susen has done a first-class job in bringing some order into postmodern thought,
which is notorious for its programmatic disorderliness. He has succeeded in doing so on the
basis of research that is of unprecedented width and depth. The resulting compendium of
thoughts and thinkers may well serve as a crucial point of reference for people contributing
to or affected by the ‘postmodern turn’ – that is, the rest of us.”
– Zygmunt Bauman, University of Leeds, UK

“More commonly associated with the humanities, postmodernism has also had major
impacts in the social sciences. Rather than choosing one narrow interpretation, Simon
Susen takes a broad and inclusive look at a whole series of important debates and shifts of
direction. The result is a timely account not just of past controversies but also of changing
presuppositions shaping future scholarship.”
– Craig Calhoun, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

“Simon Susen’s magisterial critical organization of diverse insights, ambiguities, and prob-
lems in the fields of both modern and postmodern thought is a great gift. He provides a solid
conceptual platform from which to launch tomorrow’s progressive (yes!) social theories,
policies, and practices.”
– Sandra Harding, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

“Simon Susen has written an original and comprehensive review and critique of the ‘post-
modern turn’ in the social sciences – an investigative project that is particularly important
in relation to current intellectual developments in the United States. This work’s depth and
systematicity promise to play a major role in reversing the unfortunate decline in interest
in, and attention to, postmodern thinking since the late 1990s. Early-21st-century social
science, especially sociology, needs the insights and correctives of postmodern thinking
more than ever. A careful reading of this book will make that clear and hopefully spawn a
much-needed revival of interest in this important body of work.”
– George Ritzer, University of Maryland, USA

“Postmodernism may no longer be the provocation it was two decades ago, but it remains a
profound challenge to the enlightenment dreams of ‘reason’ and ‘progress’. Simon Susen’s
The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences provides a smart and reader-friendly account of
this transformational shift in contemporary critical thought.”
– Steven Seidman, State University of New York, USA

“The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences offers a lucid account of relevant debates and
developments in epistemology, social research methodology, sociology, historiography, and
politics and provides an insightful discussion of the work of thinkers who have been closely
associated with postmodernism.”
– Barry Smart, University of Portsmouth, UK

“Simon Susen’s detailed, systematic, and precise description of the ‘postmodern turn’ in all
its dimensions – from identity politics to cultural studies – provides a diagnosis of where
we stand today in the social sciences. We all need this book in order to engage in a serious
assessment of our theoretical (and practical) predicament. There is no excuse – everyone
has to read it!”
– Slavoj Žižek, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia; The Birkbeck Institute
for the Humanities, UK; New York University, USA
Also by Simon Susen
THE SPIRIT OF LUC BOLTANSKI: Essays on the ‘Pragmatic Sociology of Critique’
(2014, with Bryan S. Turner)
THE LEGACY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU: Critical Essays (2011, with Bryan S. Turner)
CIUDADANÍA TERRITORIAL Y MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES: Historia y nuevas problemáticas
en el escenario latinoamericano y mundial (2010, with Celia Basconzuelo and Teresita Morel)
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL: Between Critical Theory and Reflexive Sociology (2007)
The ‘Postmodern Turn’
in the Social Sciences
Simon Susen
City University London, UK
© Simon Susen 2015
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with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2015 by
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Contents

Foreword vii

Introduction 1
(i) Social Theory: ‘Modern’ or ‘Postmodern’? 5
The Idea of a ‘Modern Social Theory’ 5
The Idea of a ‘Postmodern Social Theory’ 6
(ii) ‘The Modern’ 11
Key Dimensions of Modernity 13
The Ambivalence of Modernity 16
(iii) ‘The Postmodern’ 18
Who Are These ‘Postmodernists’? 22
The Intellectual Scope and Influence of Postmodern Thought 31
Key Dimensions of Postmodernity 34
(Post-)Modernity, (Post-)Modernism, and (Post-)Modernization 38
1 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology?
The ‘Relativist Turn’ 40
(i) Truth versus Perspective 40
(ii) Certainty versus Uncertainty 43
(iii) Universality versus Particularity 45
Summary 47
Towards a New Epistemology? 48
Positivism 49
Postpositivism 55
2 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology?
The ‘Interpretive Turn’ 64
(i) Explanation versus Understanding 65
(ii) Mechanics versus Dialectics 68
(iii) Ideology versus Discourse 69
Summary 72
Towards a New Methodology? 72
Poststructuralist Accounts of Discourse 73
Discourses of Discourse: Within and beyond Binary Tensions 76
3 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology?
The ‘Cultural Turn’ 83
(i) Industrialism versus Postindustrialism 84
(ii) Productivism versus Consumerism 87
(iii) Economism versus Culturalism 90
Summary 92

v
vi Contents

Towards a New Sociology? 93

The Self 110
Globalization 123
4 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography?
The ‘Contingent Turn’ 136
(i) Necessity versus Contingency 136
(ii) Grand Narratives versus Small Narratives 140
(iii) Continuity versus Discontinuity 143
Summary 145
Towards a New Historiography? 145
Reconstruction and Deconstruction 167
Epilogue on the History of the Post-Historical Moment 169
5 From Modern to Postmodern Politics?
The ‘Autonomous Turn’ 171
(i) Equality versus Difference 172
(ii) Society-as-a-Project versus Projects-in-Society 175
(iii) Clarity versus Ambiguity 178
Summary 179
Towards a New Politics? 180
Cosmopolitanism without and beyond Postmodernism 212
Cosmopolitanism with and through Postmodernism 219
Transnational Public Spheres: Towards Post-Sovereignty? 224
6 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought:
Limitations of the ‘Postmodern Turn’ 230
(i) Analytical Limitations: A Self-Critical Comment 231
(ii) Paradigmatic Limitations: The Continuing Presence of Modernity 233
(iii) Normative Limitations: A Critique of the Postmodern Project 242
Conclusion 258

Notes 282

Bibliography 341

Index of Names 399

Index of Subjects 418

Introduction

The main purpose of this book is to examine the impact of the ‘postmodern
turn’1 on the contemporary social sciences. More specifically, the study seeks to
demonstrate that the development of the social sciences in the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries has been substantially shaped by key assumptions
underlying theoretical approaches that defend both the epistemic validity and the
historical significance of the ‘postmodern turn’. Here, the ‘postmodern turn’ is
conceived of as a paradigmatic shift from the Enlightenment belief in the relative
determinacy of both the natural world and the social world to the – increasingly
widespread – post-Enlightenment belief in the radical indeterminacy of all material
and symbolic forms of existence. As shall be illustrated in the following chapters,
the far-reaching importance of this paradigmatic transformation is reflected in
five influential presuppositional ‘turns’, which have arguably been taking place
in the social sciences over the past few decades and which are inextricably linked
to the rise of postmodern thought:

I. the ‘relativist turn’ in epistemology;

II. the ‘interpretive turn’ in social research methodology;
III. the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology;
IV. the ‘contingent turn’ in historiography; and
V. the ‘autonomous turn’ in politics.

With the aim of shedding light on both the centrality and the complexity of these
normative transitions, the analysis is structured as follows.
The principal objective of the preliminary sections, succeeding the chapter
outline, is to reflect on three cornerstones of the following study: (i) social theory,
(ii) the modern, and (iii) the postmodern. (i) To what extent is social theory, by defini-
tion, a ‘modern’ undertaking? And to what extent is it possible to conceive of social
theory, in the contemporary era, as a ‘postmodern’ project? (ii) What does the
concept of ‘the modern’ stand for? What are the key dimensions of ‘modernity’?
And of what does ‘the ambivalence of modernity’ consist? (iii) What does the
concept of ‘the postmodern’ refer to? Who are the scholars whose works are

1
2 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

commonly associated with this concept? How can we make sense of the intel-
lectual scope and influence of postmodern thought? And, finally, what are the
key dimensions of ‘postmodernity’? In addition to responding to the previous
questions, these introductory sections will elucidate why, from a terminological
point of view, it is useful to distinguish between the concepts of ‘modernity’,
‘modernism’, and ‘modernization’, as well as – in parallel – between the concepts
of ‘postmodernity’, ‘postmodernism’, and ‘postmodernization’.
The first chapter explores the impact of postmodern thought on contemporary
debates in epistemology. Questions concerning the nature of knowledge (‘What is
knowledge?’), the possibility of knowledge (‘How is knowledge acquired?’), and
the validity of knowledge (‘To what extent is a particular type of knowledge reli-
able?’) have been pivotal to the development of the social sciences from the very
beginning of their existence. Arguably, contemporary conceptions of knowledge
have been profoundly influenced by what may be described as the relativist turn
in epistemology. According to epistemological relativism, the nature, possibility,
and validity of all knowledge are contingent upon the spatiotemporal specificity
of the sociohistorical context in which it emerges. This view can be regarded as
an attack on the Enlightenment trust in both the representational capacity and
the explanatory power of scientific knowledge and, therefore, as an assault on
one of the epistemic cornerstones of modern social theory. As shall be shown
in this chapter, the presuppositional differences between modern and postmodern
conceptions of knowledge become apparent in three epistemological tensions:
(i) truth versus perspective, (ii) certainty versus uncertainty, and (iii) universality versus
particularity. By means of a thorough enquiry into these antinomies, a distinc-
tion can be drawn between positivist and postpositivist conceptions of knowledge.
Offering an overview of the main presuppositions underlying these diametrically
opposed accounts of knowledge acquisition, the chapter examines the core rea-
sons for the gradual shift from positivist to postpositivist epistemological agendas in
the contemporary social sciences.
The second chapter looks into the impact of postmodern thought on central
issues in social research methodology. Without intending to do justice to the intri-
cacies attached to the elaboration of alternative – and, arguably, postmodern –
research strategies in the social sciences, this chapter shall be limited to focusing
on the principal dimensions of a methodological approach that has not only
gained increasing influence on contemporary forms of sociological investigation
but also shares a number of fundamental assumptions with postmodern thought:
discourse analysis. To a noteworthy extent, contemporary approaches to human
enquiry have incorporated insights obtained from what may be termed the inter-
pretive turn in social research methodology. Similar to postmodern approaches
in the social sciences, discourse analysts emphasize the normative significance
of the meaning-laden dimensions of everyday life. Although it would be simplis-
tic to portray the discrepancies between modern and postmodern approaches to
social research methods in terms of clear-cut conceptual separations, the follow-
ing three tensions are worth reflecting upon in some detail: (i) explanation versus
 Introduction 3

understanding, (ii) mechanics versus dialectics, and (iii) ideology versus discourse. By
virtue of a critical consideration of the pivotal premises that undergird these
antinomies, a distinction can be drawn between structuralist and poststructural-
ist conceptions of social research methodology. Based on a synoptic account of
a series of binary presuppositional tensions, the chapter aims to unearth the
principal grounds on which the gradual shift from structuralist to poststructural-
ist methodological agendas in the contemporary social sciences has sought to be
justified.
The third chapter scrutinizes the impact of postmodern thought on recent
developments in sociology. The influence of postmodernism on contemporary
debates and controversies in sociological analysis has manifested itself – perhaps,
most conspicuously – in the rise of cultural studies over the past few decades. If
there is such a thing as a postmodern sociology, its conceptual tools and pre-
suppositional frameworks are intimately intertwined with a significant paradig-
matic shift that has contributed to reaching across disciplinary divides within
the social sciences and the humanities: the cultural turn. Recent major trends
in sociology cannot be understood without taking into account the extensive
influence of cultural studies on cutting-edge variations of social and political
analysis. It would be erroneous, however, to regard the thinkers and scholars
whose writings are linked to the ‘cultural turn’ as proselytizing members of a
homogenous intellectual movement. Whatever one makes of the normative pre-
suppositions underlying the ‘cultural turn’, it is difficult to ignore its profound
impact on contemporary sociology, in general, and on numerous attempts to
develop a postmodern sociology, in particular. As shall be illustrated in this
chapter, at least three central tensions are at stake in the controversies over the
alleged differences between modern and postmodern conceptions of sociology:
(i) industrialism versus postindustrialism, (ii) productivism versus consumerism, and
(iii) economism versus culturalism. Aware of the fact that these antinomies desig-
nate major historical developments that have been taking place in recent decades,
a distinction can be drawn between materialist and postmaterialist conceptions of
society. Questioning the validity of the thesis that there has been a gradual shift
from materialist to postmaterialist sociological agendas in the contemporary social
sciences, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the degree to which the
rise of postmodern thought has significantly shaped present-day understandings
of culture, the self, and globalization.
The fourth chapter is concerned with the impact of postmodern thought on
present-day disputes in historiography. Critical interrogations regarding the nature
of history (‘What is history?’), the development of history (‘How does history
evolve?’), and the study of history (‘How can or should we make sense of his-
tory?’) have always been, and will always continue to be, vital to the elaboration of
research programmes in the social sciences, owing to their paramount interest in
the interplay between processes of reproduction and processes of transformation.
As explained in this chapter, the increasing popularity of postmodern approaches
to the study of social developments can be seen as an expression of the contingent
4 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

turn in historiography. In light of the postmodern emphasis on spatiotemporal

contingency, it appears that there is no underlying storyline that determines the
course of history. In fact, such a view suggests that there is no such thing as a
‘course of history’, since it conceives of temporal development as a conglomer-
ate of largely accidental, relatively arbitrary, and discontinuously interconnected
occurrences. From this vantage point, the collapse of state socialism in Eastern
and Central Europe at the end of the twentieth century is indicative of the deep
historical contingency and political questionability of all meta-ideological for-
mations. As argued in this chapter, the following three tensions are crucial for
assessing the relevance of postmodern thought to contemporary accounts of his-
tory: (i) necessity versus contingency, (ii) grand narratives versus small narratives, and
(iii) continuity versus discontinuity. With these antinomies in mind, a distinction can
be drawn between reconstructivist and deconstructivist conceptions of historiography.
The chapter scrutinizes the rationale behind the gradual shift from reconstructivist
to deconstructivist historiographical agendas in the contemporary social sciences. In
doing so, it aims to identify the key presuppositional components of a ‘postclassi-
cal historiography’.
The fifth chapter grapples with the impact of postmodern thought on contemporary
conceptions of politics. Arguably, the rise of the politics of identity – often characterized
as the politics of difference or, alternatively, as the politics of recognition – is symptomatic
of the increasingly widespread acceptance of the notion that the quest for human
autonomy lies at the heart of any societal project aimed at challenging the legiti-
macy of traditional ways of coordinating human practices. In this context, the
role of postmodern thought in the development of critical approaches to politics
is reflected in what may be referred to as the autonomous turn. As illustrated in
this paradigmatic shift, the discrepancy between modern and postmodern poli-
tics stems from three principal tensions: (i) equality versus difference, (ii) society-
as-a-project versus projects-in-society, and (iii) clarity versus ambiguity. Considering
these – as well as several other – antinomies, a distinction can be drawn between
traditional and post-traditional conceptions of politics. The chapter looks into the
reasons behind the gradual shift from traditional to post-traditional political agendas
in the contemporary social sciences. To this end, a detailed enquiry into the con-
stitutive ingredients of a postmodern politics will be undertaken. The chapter goes
on to formulate 15 theses on cosmopolitanism. In addition, it examines significant
points of convergence between cosmopolitanism and postmodernism, arguing that
the comparative analysis of these two intellectual traditions permits us to grasp
paradigmatic developments in present-day forms of social and political analysis.
The chapter draws to a close by suggesting that the principal issues at stake in cur-
rent debates on cosmopolitanism and postmodernism cannot be divorced from
the rise of transnational public spheres.
On the basis of the above-outlined investigation, the sixth and final chapter
offers various critical reflections on postmodern thought. While acknowledging the
important contributions made by, as well as the useful insights gained from, the
aforementioned paradigmatic turns, it is vital to provide a comprehensive account
of the shortcomings and flaws of postmodern approaches in the social sciences.
 Introduction 5

Conscious of the challenging nature of this task, the final chapter proposes to
question the validity of postmodern thought by bringing to light its (i) analytical,
(ii) paradigmatic, and (iii) normative limitations.
Before embarking upon an in-depth study of the ‘postmodern turn’, however, it
is essential to clarify the meaning of three concepts that are central to the follow-
ing enquiry: (i) social theory, (ii) the modern, and (iii) the postmodern.

(i) Social Theory: ‘Modern’ or ‘Postmodern’?

In mainstream sociological literature, social theory tends to be conceived of as a

‘modern’ endeavour. In recent decades, however, the view that social theory may
be – and, indeed, may already have been – converted into a ‘postmodern’ venture
has become increasingly influential. Let us, for the sake of conceptual clarity, con-
sider the presuppositional underpinnings of these two positions.

The Idea of a ‘Modern Social Theory’

Social theory is both a product and a carrier of modernity. As a product of
modernity, it can be considered as an analytical endeavour concerned with the
numerous structural transformations that led to the rise of modern formations of
society. As a carrier of modernity, it can be regarded as a discursive vehicle contrib-
uting to several debates on modern conceptions of society. In brief, social theory
is an integral component of both the real and the representational constitution of
the modern world.
What is social theory? Social theory is the attempt to provide a conceptually informed –
and, in many cases, empirically substantiated – framework designed to (1) describe, (2)
analyse, (3) interpret, (4) explain, and (5) assess the constitution, the functioning, and
the development of social reality, or of particular aspects of social reality, in a more or
less systematic fashion.
Just as ‘[s]ocial theory broadly encompasses the general concern with the nature
of the social in modern society’,2 ‘sociology is part and parcel of modernity’.3
Just as ‘[i]t is born in modernity, its mission is to theorize about modernity.’4 The
coming-into-being of social theory is due to the rise of modern society: the former
is a systematic attempt to grasp both the material and the ideological complex-
ity of the latter. Hence, the theoretical problematization of reality in contemporary
intellectual thought cannot be dissociated from the practical transformation of
society owing to the emergence of modernity.
One of the principal aims of modern social theory is to provide conceptual
tools and illuminating frameworks for examining both the processual and the
structural conditions underlying the construction of human reality. Over the
last few decades, however, ‘throughout the social sciences and humanities there
has been a profound change in the conceptualization of the social which in fact
reflects a deep uncertainty about the development of modern society’.5 This feeling of
doubt and ambiguity is – perhaps, most obviously – expressed in the crisis of the
trust and belief in the terminological adequacy and epistemic authority of social-
scientific enquiries. In light of this legitimacy crisis, it appears that ‘the status of
6 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

social theory vis-à-vis the social sciences has […] become increasingly uncertain
and needs to be reassessed’.6 It is important to emphasize, however, that the lack
of clarity regarding the purpose and function of social theory is not necessarily
a sign of its decline, let alone of its irrelevance for the creation of conceptually
sophisticated and empirically substantiated research agendas. Rather, it is indica-
tive of a paradigmatic shift concerning the analytical scope and elucidatory power
of sociological investigation:

Is sociology dead? As a grand theory, or set of theories that explain everything in a

particular society, probably yes. As an impulse to develop a critical understand-
ing of what makes human society possible, of how being human is constantly
being redefined, probably no.7

In other words, rather than conceiving of sociology as a scientific endeavour

aimed at providing a comprehensive account of both the constitution and the
evolution of the human universe, it is now widely perceived as a critical project
that is attentive to the complexity of relationally constructed realities. As such, its
defenders tend to be suspicious of conceptual models aimed at delivering catch-
all explanations of causal patterns that are believed to shape, or even determine,
the nature and development of human societies. As shall be demonstrated in the
following chapters, the crisis of the universalist ambitions of modern social theory
is inextricably linked to the advent of the ‘postmodern turn’8 in the contempor-
ary social sciences.9 In order to substantiate the validity of this claim, we need to
confront the challenging task of exploring the fundamental differences between
modern and postmodern forms of social analysis.

The Idea of a ‘Postmodern Social Theory’

It is far from uncontroversial whether or not there is such a thing as a ‘postmod-
ern social theory’.10 The defence of this project, however, tends to be based on
ten key assumptions.
(1) Postmodern social theory is an interdisciplinary endeavour. The ‘advocacy
of social theory’,11 inspired by the ‘critique of sociological theory’,12 is motivated
by the conviction that we need to overcome disciplinary boundaries and cross-
fertilize the knowledge generated within different epistemic comfort zones, in
order to do justice to the fact that there is no analytical approach that can claim
to possess a monopoly on ultimate representational adequacy, let alone on the
capacity to capture the entire complexity of human reality.13
(2) Postmodern social theory is a foundationless endeavour. There appears to be
more and more of a consensus among contemporary scholars in the social sci-
ences that ‘the quest for foundations and for a totalizing theory of society’14 is not
only pointless, but also potentially dangerous.15 The search for objective, norma-
tive, or subjective grounds on which to justify the possibility of modern science
turns out to be groundless, if we accept that – in the face of inescapable socio-
cultural diversity – we cannot identify, let alone endorse, context-transcending
standards of epistemic validity. Grand sociological theories, obsessed with the
 Introduction 7

system-building task of grasping the complexity of society by virtue of big-picture

explanatory ideologies,16 seem to have lost credibility in a world characterized by
multiplicity and heterogeneity, rather than by uniformity and homogeneity.
(3) Postmodern social theory is a directionless endeavour. To be sure, ‘directionless’ –
in this context – does not signify ‘meaningless’, ‘pointless’, or ‘clueless’. Rather,
it indicates that we, as critical researchers, should resist the temptation to invent
conceptual apparatuses that lead to the ‘false closure’17 of theoretical frameworks,
preventing us from ‘prying open present and future social possibilities’18 and
from ‘detecting fluidity and porousness’,19 rather than discovering determinacy
and eternity, in the daily construction of human reality. A social theory without
guarantees ‘carries no promise of liberation […] of a society free of domination’,20
thereby rejecting the teleological spirit underlying classical accounts of human
emancipation.21
(4) Postmodern social theory is a public endeavour. As such, it cannot make
any major claims about the constitution of society without empirically engaging
with the everyday processes that shape the development of reality. It will lose its
wider ‘social and intellectual importance’22 if ‘it is disengaged from the conflicts
and public debates’23 taking place on a daily basis. The ‘plea for a “public sociol-
ogy”, which uses expert knowledge to promote debate with and amongst various
non-academic publics’,24 is aimed at recognizing the following: to the extent that
sociological analysis ‘has turned inward and is largely self-referential’,25 it runs
the risk of degrading itself to an elitist language game, whose autopoietic con-
ceptual frameworks are disconnected from everyday concerns and experiences.
Postmodern social theory, however, is public not only in the sense that it engages
directly with quotidian realities ‘on the ground’, but also in the sense that it
rejects the clear-cut separation between ‘common sense’ and ‘expert knowledge’.
In this regard, the distinction between ‘traditional public sociology’ and ‘organic
public sociology’ seems useful.26 The former ‘addresses an amorphous, invisible
and mainstream public’, whereas the latter ‘actively engages with a specific, vis-
ible and politically organized group of people’.27 Not only do we need to avoid
a scenario in which ‘[s]ociological theory […] is produced and consumed almost
exclusively by sociological theorists’,28 and not only do we need to discard main-
stream notions of ‘professional sociology’ and ‘policy sociology’,29 but, moreover,
we need to take on the challenge of cross-fertilizing academic and non-academic dis-
courses. This can be achieved by doing away with the traditional division of labour
between the ‘scientific enlighteners’, who direct and control their epistemic inferi-
ors ‘from above’, and the ‘ordinary to-be-enlightened’, who follow and obey their
epistemic superiors ‘from below’.30
(5) Postmodern social theory is a situationist endeavour. Owing to its interest in
the spatiotemporal specificities of locally experienced realities, it ‘speaks the lan-
guage of particularity’,31 rather than obeying the logic of the search for lawfulness
and universality. In this sense, it is driven by ‘the more modest aspiration of a
relentless defense of immediate, local pleasures and struggles for justice’32 instead
of aiming ‘to uncover a logic of society’,33 ‘to discover the one true vocabulary
that mirrors the social universe’34 and ‘to find a universal language, a conceptual
8 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

casuistry that can assess the truth of all social languages’35 and thereby ‘articulate
humanity’s universal condition’.36 On this view, the cognitive and affective sen-
sibility for situational idiosyncrasy obliges us to face up to the irreducibility of all
life-worldly realities. What matters to the postmodern eye is what happens on the
groundless grounds of diversified social practices, rather than in the sterile and
abstract frameworks of foundationalist social theories. If we abandon the futile
project of defining ‘our principal task as providing foundations for sociology’,37
as ‘giving ultimate reasons’,38 and as delivering ‘a universal epistemic rationale
that provides objective, value-neutral standards’,39 then we are in a position
to recognize that the complexity of materially and symbolically differentiated
realities cannot be captured in terms of the context-transcending frameworks and
principles of grand sociological theories.
(6) Postmodern social theory is a pragmatic endeavour. Given its anti-founda-
tionalist and anti-universalist outlook, the ‘postmodern spirit’ – if we may char-
acterize it as such – ‘suggests that the search for ultimate or universal grounds
for our conceptual strategies should be abandoned in favor of local, pragmatic
justifications’.40 Such a pragmatist approach to social existence is interested
in discursive processes accomplished by ordinary actors capable of mobilizing
their cognitive resources in relationally constituted – and, hence, sociologically
diverse – contexts. A ‘pragmatic turn’41 in social theory has various significant
advantages, notably that ‘[i]t expands the number of parties who may participate
more or less as equals in a debate about society’42 and, therefore, permits us to do
justice to the fact that human actors – that is, both experts and laypersons – are
equipped with reflective, critical, and moral capacities.43 In fact, the analysis of
ordinary practices of justification reinforces the postmodern commitment to the
aforementioned principles:

• different academic disciplines and different intellectual traditions generate dif-

ferent standards of validity (interdisciplinarity);
• different life forms produce different language games sustained by incommen-
surable normative criteria (foundationlessness);
• different individual and collective actors are motivated by different interests
and aspirations, lacking a common denominator in terms of one overarching
telos shared by all of them (directionlessness);
• different societies are shaped by different struggles taking place in different
forms of public life (publicness);
• different objective, normative, and subjective concerns arise in different con-
texts (situatedness); and
• different grammars of justification emanate from – and, in turn, reinforce –
different regimes of action (usefulness).

In short, the ‘pragmatic turn’ draws attention to the existential significance of

social practices.
(7) Postmodern social theory is an ethno-conscious endeavour. To be aware of
the cultural specificity of one’s epistemic claims to validity requires recognizing
 Introduction 9

that the very attempt to overcome ethnocentrism confirms its inevitable impact
upon all forms of knowledge production. In this regard, the point is to take the
following insight into consideration: since human beings are socially situated
actors, their symbolically mediated encounter with the world is embedded in
spatiotemporally specific background horizons. Hermeneutics, in this sense, is not
exclusively a theoretical matter of scholastic interpretations, developed and codi-
fied by professional philosophers, but also, more importantly, a practical affair of
everyday understandings, constructed and mobilized by ordinary actors. Indeed,
all modes of knowledge generation – irrespective of whether they are scientific or
non-scientific, academic or non-academic, based on expertise or guided by com-
mon sense – represent culturally specific practices performed by spatiotemporally
embedded entities. If we accept the sociocultural particularity underlying all epis-
temic claims to validity, then we are obliged to face up to the structuring power
exercised by the ineluctable weight of historicity. ‘The notion that foundational
discourses cannot avoid being local and ethnocentric is pivotal to what has come
to be called postmodernism’.44 The major difference between foundationalist
and anti-foundationalist approaches, then, is not that the former transcend,
whereas the latter remain trapped in, the culturally specific background hori-
zons of their emergence; rather, they are divided by the fact that the former
deny, whereas the latter recognize, the spatiotemporal contingency of all epistemic
claims concerning the constitution of reality. To be ethno-conscious means to
be aware of the fact that all modes of cognition – including the most reflexive
ones – are influenced by context-dependent prejudices, preconceptions, and
presuppositions.
(8) Postmodern social theory is a socio-conscious endeavour. As such, it insists
not only upon the cultural specificity that shapes epistemic communities, but
also, in a broader sense, upon the relational contingency underlying the seemingly
most liberating forms of human agency. Indeed, it is due to this relational contin-
gency that the human condition is permeated by radical indeterminacy: highly
differentiated societies produce intersectionally constituted actors expected to
take on multiple roles, develop plural identities, and carry various coexisting –
and, often, conflicting – selves within themselves. In light of this relational con-
tingency, characterized by varying degrees of social intersectionality, one of the
key epistemological questions posed by the postmodern mind is the following:

How can a knowing subject, who has particular interests and prejudices by virtue
of living in a specific society at a particular historical juncture and occupying
a specific social position defined by his or her class, gender, race, sexual orien-
tation, and ethnic and religious status, produce concepts, explanations, and
standards of validity that are universally valid?45

The answer given by postmodernists in response to this query can be summar-

ized as follows: since all knowledge claims are relationally contingent in terms of
both their formulation, by a particular actor, and their reception, by other actors,
there are no universal criteria against which to judge the adequacy of epistemic validity.
10 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

Put differently, the attainment of epistemic validity cannot be divorced from the
assertion of symbolic authority emanating from the need for the recognition
of social legitimacy. To be sure, in the social world, recognition can be granted
explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvert-
ently; whatever their performative specificity, however, claims to epistemic valid-
ity are imbued with relationally constituted struggles over social legitimacy. The
question of whether we consider a statement right or wrong depends not only on
what is being said, but also on who says it when, where, and to whom. For objectiv-
ity (‘What?’) is – inevitably – a matter of social authority (‘Who?’), spatiotemporal
contextuality (‘Where and when?’), and interactional relationality (‘To whom?’).
The idea of abstract epistemic universality evaporates when confronted with the
multilayered constitution of normative – that is, value-laden, meaning-laden,
perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden, and tension-laden – realities.
(9) Postmodern social theory is a pluralist endeavour. To assume that ‘epistemic
suspicion is at the core of postmodernism’46 means to acknowledge that, far from
seeking to invent ‘a universally valid language of truth’,47 it is concerned with
the critical exploration of, and active involvement in, ‘heterogeneous struggles’48
around a multiplicity of sociological variables – such as class, gender, ethnic-
ity, age, and ability. Viewed in this light, one of the most serious limitations of
classical sociological thought is that its ‘flat, contentless general categories seem
inevitably to ignore or repress social differences’.49 Highly differentiated societies
are centreless formations in the sense that they lack a structural, ideological, or
behavioural epicentre from which all institutions, discourses, and practices derive
and upon which peripheral areas of interaction, or derivative forms of existence,
are parasitical. In the postmodern jungle of flows, networks, and diversified local
events, the human actor is ‘a self with multiple identities and group affiliations,
which is entangled in heterogeneous struggles with multiple possibilities for empower-
ment’.50 Given both the real and the representational complexity of materially and
symbolically differentiated societies, we need to abandon the modern project of
developing big-picture ideologies and face up to the existence of situation-laden
normativities created in response to relationally constituted realities. In the post-
modern universe, there is no such thing as an overriding agenda that can justifi-
ably declare to possess a normative monopoly in the landscape of decentred and
diversified subjectivities.
(10) Postmodern social theory is a historicist endeavour. One of the main limita-
tions of classical sociological thought, undermining its applicability to the study
of highly differentiated forms of sociality, is its ‘quest for foundations’,51 which
is expressed in ‘the project of creating a general theory’,52 understood as ‘an over-
arching totalizing conceptual framework that would be true for all times and all
places’.53 In this respect, three issues are particularly worth mentioning:

A. Ethnocentrism: ‘Human history in these modernist tales really meant Western

history.’54 Their capacity to conceal ‘the mark of their own national origin’55
permits them to present their explanatory insights into social developments ‘as
if their particular pattern were of world-historical importance’.56
 Introduction 11

B. Evolutionism: In classical sociological thought, ‘[n]on-Western societies [are] rel-

egated to a marginal position in past, present, and future history’.57 Following
this modernist logic, historical events and trends can be measured against the
teleological benchmark of ‘Progress’,58 which can be defined in numerous –
notably, social, cultural, political, economic, technological, scientific, religious,
demographic, and civilizational – terms. ‘The grand narratives of industrializa-
tion, modernization, secularization, democratization, these sweeping stories that
presume to uncover a uniform social process in a multitude of different societies
[…] should be abandoned.’59
C. Dichotomism: Teleological metanarratives are ‘stories with […] simplistic binary
schemes’,60 such as These versus Antithese (Georg W. F. Hegel), Gemeinschaft
versus Gesellschaft (Ferdinand Tönnies), Kapitalismus versus Sozialismus/
Kommunismus (Karl Marx), Wertrationalität versus Zweckrationalität (Max
Weber), or solidarité mécanique versus solidarité organique (Émile Durkheim) –
to mention only a few examples.61 Universalist evolutionary and binary cat-
egories artificially homogenize the heterogeneously constituted constellations
of historical realities. If, however, we acknowledge the sociohistorical specific-
ity underlying all epistemic claims to validity, then we are obliged to expose
the spatiotemporal relativity permeating the symbolic authority asserted by
universalist accounts of history.

(ii) ‘The Modern’

The concept of ‘the modern’ is not simply a recent – or, tautologically speaking,
an exclusively ‘modern’ – reference point; rather, it has a ‘premodern’ history.
‘The word modern is said to derive from the Latin word modo, meaning “just
now”. Thus, modern implies belonging to the present or to recent times, and the
word has been part of the English language since at least 1500.’62 ‘To be modern
was to be contemporary, to witness the present moment. The idea of “the moment”
is central to the time consciousness of modernity and expresses a tension between
present and past’.63
Just as it is important to be aware of the etymological roots of the word ‘modern’,
it is crucial to recognize that the idea of ‘the modern’ has been on the agenda
long before the rise of what is commonly described as ‘modern society’. In fact,
the members of any epoch may characterize themselves as ‘modern’ insofar as
they consider the historical phase in which they find themselves situated as a
contemporary period. In every spatiotemporal context, ‘the now’ is unavoidably
constructed within the temporal horizon of ‘the already’; ‘the present’ necessarily
exists in relation to ‘the past’; ‘being’ always develops in the lap of ‘the hitherto-
been’. ‘The word “modern” was first employed in the late fifth century in order to
distinguish the present, now officially Christian, from the pagan and Roman past.’64
‘For the Christian thinkers of the early medieval age, the modern referred to the
contemporary period of the early Church. Modernity was thus defined in opposition to
the pagan period, which had been overcome.’65 Hence, the present of modernity is
situated in relation to the past of antiquity. The self-consciousness of a new epoch
12 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

arises through its explicit disassociation from, and transcendence of, the historical
phase by which it is preceded. What distinguishes modernity from premodern eras,
then, is not its awareness of the present as such, but its awareness of a specific –
that is, unprecedented – kind of present. The question that poses itself, therefore,
is to what extent it is justified to characterize modernity as a historical stage based
on a set of unparalleled societal features.
In a broad sense, the concept of modernity ‘refers to modes of social life or organisa-
tion which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which
subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence’.66 In other words,
modernity is inextricably linked to the structural and ideological transformations
which began to take place in Europe towards the end of the seventeenth century
and which led to the gradual consolidation of a radically new type of society, not
only in Europe but, eventually, across the globe. One of the most challenging
ambitions in sociology has always been to make sense of this historical transition
by seeking to identify and examine the key factors that, eventually, resulted in
the rise of modernity.
Without a doubt, the founding figures of the sociological project – Karl Marx,
Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber67 – diverge substantially in terms of their inter-
pretation of modernity. Yet, they share not only the ontological assumption that
modern society is inherently dynamic and progressive, but also the methodological
conviction that the causal mechanisms shaping the course of modern history can
be systematically and empirically studied. Modern society may be driven by the
productive forces of capitalism, as maintained by Marx;68 it may be hold together by
the organic solidarity brought about by industrialism, as suggested by Durkheim;69 or,
it may be tantamount to an increasingly disenchanted world, owing to the prepon-
derance of bureaucratic rationalization, as claimed by Weber.70
Irrespective of the considerable differences between their explanatory
approaches, the three thinkers converge in their aim to shed light on the underlying
structural forces that govern the development of modern society. In doing so, their writ-
ings illustrate that, although previous epochs may also be characterized as con-
stantly developing historical formations, one feature of modernity is particularly
striking: namely, the fact that its transformative potential – in terms of its nature,
pace, scope, impact, and civilizational significance – is unprecedented.71
With this interpretation in mind, the postmodern critique of classical social
theory is not primarily concerned with the conceptual and methodological dif-
ferences that exist between the founding figures of sociology. Rather, it focuses
on their common presuppositional ground, notably by taking issue with the
assumption that the modern world is driven by a ‘big story’, which can be dis-
closed through the scientific study of social structures and social processes.
In general terms, the project of modernity72 stands for a normative endeavour in
that its advocates believe that the course of history can be both understood and
shaped by conscious subjects capable of purposive action and critical thinking. On this
account, reason enables human beings not only to reflect upon and interpret, but
also to act upon and change the world in accordance with individual and soci-
etal needs. The project of modernity is inextricably linked to ‘the project of the
 Introduction 13

Enlightenment’.73 In essence, the latter represents a discursive manifestation of the

former. From an Enlightenment perspective, the emancipatory potential of modern
society is rooted in people’s ability to take on their role as morally responsible entities
capable of replacing the prejudices permeating traditional and dogmatic worldviews
with insights gained from discursive forms of critical reasoning. ‘Modernity, as the self-
consciousness of the Enlightenment, was self-evidently the emancipation of human
beings from the prejudices of tradition. Modernity is thus defined by reference to
the critique of tradition.’74 Put differently, modernity can be conceived of as a his-
torical condition allowing for people’s emancipation from preconceptions based
on tradition and common sense and, hence, for the construction of a society
whose destiny is determined by the species-distinctive potential of rationality and
oriented towards the realization of human autonomy.
From a postmodern standpoint, however, intellectual thought that is inspired by
the Enlightenment project is problematic to the extent that it is motivated
by three key ambitions: (a) the ambition to uncover the underlying mechanisms
that determine both the constitution and the evolution of society; (b) the ambi-
tion to give a coherent account of the nature and the development of the human
subject; and (c) the ambition to explore the preconditions for the possibility of
social change, understood as a historical process steered by the species-constitutive
power of reason and expressed in the conscious transformation of human reality.75
Modern social theory is the systematic attempt to explore the extent to which
human actors are not only situated in, and constrained by, their social environ-
ment but, in addition, have the capacity to determine the conditions of their
existence by virtue of purposive reason (Verstand) as well as the ability to imbue
their lives in accordance with justifiable principles derived from normative rea-
son (Vernunft). Human beings, then, are confronted with the species-constitutive
task of coming to terms with both the intuitive ‘withinness’ and the reflective
‘beyondness’ of their tension-laden existence. Modernity is a historical condition
constructed by subjects capable of acting upon, attributing meaning to, and con-
stantly reinventing their unique place in the universe.

Key Dimensions of Modernity

Given the complexity of large-scale historical developments, it is no surprise that
different social theorists focus on different features of the modern condition.
Surely, some factors have been more significant than others in terms of their
overall impact upon the rise and development of modernity; indeed, it remains
open to debate how the historical role of each of these factors should be inter-
preted. Whatever the disagreements sparked by such a dispute may be, however,
the following six levels of analysis are particularly important for a comprehensive
understanding of the sociohistorical conditions that led to the rise of modernity.76
(1) On the economic level, the rise of modernity is inextricably linked to
industrialization. The rapid expansion of industrial capitalism, from the eight-
eenth century onwards, has been a key driving force of the modern age. As
an unprecedentedly dynamic economic system, industrial capitalism – notably
in terms of its capacity to generate constantly evolving production, distribution,
14 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

and consumption patterns – has had a profound impact upon the development
of modernity, directly or indirectly affecting every sphere of social life. The drive
for continuous invention, innovation, and transformation lies at the heart of
industrial capitalism, illustrating that its productive forces are more dynamic
and powerful than those of any previous economic system in the history of
humankind.
(2) On the epistemic level, the rise of modernity is intimately interrelated with
rationalization. Modern rationalization processes are inconceivable without the
unstoppable growth of systematic forms of knowledge production, epitomized in
the massive influence of science on both private and public dimensions of social
existence. The production, growth, and refinement of scientific knowledge have
several far-reaching implications for the development of modernity, essentially on
two levels: on the discursive level, the power of science allows for theoretical pro-
gress, based on logical arguments, empirical research, expert controversies, and the
testing of truth claims through methodical processes of verification and falsifica-
tion; on the material level, the power of science manifests itself in practical progress,
leading to technological advancements driven by the ceaseless transformation
of the means of production, forces of production, and relations of production.
Owing to both the theoretical and the practical impact of science, the influence
of traditional sources of authority – such as religion – has been undermined both
ideologically, in terms of interpretation and legitimation processes, and institution-
ally, in terms of ritualization and habitualization processes.
(3) On the political level, the rise of modernity is intimately interrelated with
ideologization. To be sure, this is not to contend that political ideologies did
not exist before the rise of modernity; nor is this to affirm that ‘politics’ can be
reduced to ‘ideology’. Rather, this is to recognize the fact that modernity – argu-
ably, more so than any previous historical period – has been crucially shaped by the
elaboration, justification, divulgation, application, institutionalization, and constant
revision of political programmes founded on ideological principles. Indisputably, the
dynamics arising from the theoretical and the intellectual rivalry, as much as from
the practical and the strategic competition, between different political ideologies
have left a pluralist mark on modern history. Rightly or wrongly, one may come
to the conclusion that liberalism constitutes the triumphant political ideology of
the early twenty-first century. Whatever one makes of this assessment, however,
there is little doubt that at least five major political ideologies have substantially
shaped the development of modern history: anarchism, communism/socialism,
liberalism, conservatism, and fascism. Of course, it is possible to identify significant
points of convergence and divergence, as well as noteworthy points of partial
integration and cross-fertilization, between these prominent ideologies.77 Notably,
they can be compared and contrasted in terms of their respective conceptions of
‘humanity’, ‘society’, ‘the economy’, ‘the polity’, and ‘history’, but also – more
fundamentally – in terms of the role they have played in the development of
modernity. However one may wish to evaluate, or even measure, their past and
present impact on society, recent history cannot be understood without the study
of modern political ideologies.
 Introduction 15

(4) On the organizational level, the rise of modernity cannot be divorced from
large-scale processes of bureaucratization. The modern quest for the control over
reality by virtue of instrumental rationality is epitomized in the spread of bureau-
cracies in various domains of society, particularly the economy and the polity.
Economic power is expressed in the control over the constitution of a particular
mode of production. Epistemic power manifests itself in the influence over the
composition of paradigmatic forms of cognition. Political power is reflected in
the capacity to shape real and representational structures, as well as material and
ideological resources, mobilized to determine the coordination of social practices.
Organizational power is crucial to the efficient, and more or less predictable, admin-
istration of institutional domains in large-scale societies. Regardless of whether
one conceives of modernity as an era characterized by the emergence of a partly
or totally administered world, the instrumental rationality underlying advanced
types of bureaucracy constitutes an integral element of modern societies.78 Surely,
bureaucracies have existed for a long time; it is due to the unprecedented degree
of systemic complexity that they reached in the context of modernity, however,
that powerful – that is, above all, authoritarian – political regimes in the twentieth
century succeeded in exercising totalitarian control over their societies.
(5) On the cultural level, the rise of modernity is accompanied by processes of
individualization. As Durkheimian scholars point out, the transition from ‘tradi-
tional society’ to ‘modern society’, expressed in the replacement of ‘mechanic
solidarity’ by ‘organic solidarity’, led to a shift in existential focus from ‘the cult
of God’ to ‘the cult of the individual’.79 With the emergence of the modern age,
the normative expectations thrown at human actors began to change dramatic-
ally. According to individualist parameters, people are not only allowed but also
required to pick and choose from a menu of identities and thereby develop a
sense of personality. There is a long list comprising sources of identity that are
crucial to the construction of personhood in modern society: class, gender, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, ‘race’, cultural preferences, life-style, religion, age, ability,
or political ideology – to mention only a few. Paradoxically, individualization
processes are inconceivable without socialization processes, and vice versa.80
A person can develop a sense of identity only in relation to society, just as society is
an indispensable resource for the creation of both individual and collective identi-
ties. Granted, the constraining power of social structures, institutions, norms, and
expectations continues to exist within the historical framework of modernity.
Compared to traditional life forms, however, modern societies – particularly
its liberal variants – offer substantially more room for individual freedom –
and, hence, for people’s capacity to convert themselves into protagonists of their
own destiny – than its premodern counterparts.
(6) On the philosophical level, the rise of modernity cannot be separated from pro-
cesses of emancipation inspired by the Enlightenment.81 ‘In the most general sense,
the concept of emancipation refers to an entity’s liberation from control, depend-
ence, restraint, confinement, restriction, repression, slavery, or domination.’82
Thus, in Enlightenment thought, emancipation processes are commonly associated
with ‘the transition from heteronomy to autonomy, from dependence to freedom, or from
16 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

alienation to self-realization’.83 The view that human beings have the capacity to con-
vert themselves into protagonists of emancipation, which is central to the project of
modernity, is expressed in several intellectual traditions that are based on different
notions of the subject. Among the most influential conceptions of ‘the subject’ in
modern social and political thought are the following: ‘the thinking subject’ (René
Descartes), ‘the rational subject’ (Immanuel Kant), ‘the recognitive subject’ (Georg
W. F. Hegel), ‘the working subject’ (Karl Marx), ‘the unconscious subject’ (Sigmund
Freud), ‘the linguistic subject’ (Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul
Ricœur), ‘the experiencing subject’ (Edmund Husserl), ‘the political subject’ (Hannah
Arendt), and ‘the communicative subject’ (Jürgen Habermas).84 As reflected in the
variety of these approaches, the question of what kind of processes can, or should,
be characterized as ‘liberating’ remains a cause of controversy. ‘[T]here is little doubt,
however, that one feature that all forms of emancipation have in common is that
they involve an individual or a collective entity’s assertion of sovereignty and its
exemption from one or various sources of relatively arbitrary control’.85 Although
there has never been a universal consensus on the nature of human emancipation
in Enlightenment thought, the attempt to create a society capable of giving its mem-
bers the opportunity to realize their species-constitutive potential can be regarded as
a normative cornerstone underpinning the project of modernity.

The above overview, which comprises the key factors that have contributed to the
rise of modernity, is far from exhaustive. It nevertheless illustrates the following:
in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the principal components
that led to the emergence, and allowed for the rapid development, of modern
societies, a multifactorial analysis of different, interrelated, and – to some extent –
overlapping dimensions is needed. Moreover, such a multilevel examination sug-
gests that, paradoxically, the aforementioned elements constitute both reasons
for and consequences of the rise of modernity: as contributing factors, the pivotal
role that they play in the unfolding of historical developments has made the
modern condition possible; as tangible outcomes, they have been shaped by
the historical circumstances that they have themselves brought about. Hence, the
dialectics of modernity emanates from the interplay between numerous – notably
(1) economic, (2) epistemic, (3) political, (4) organizational, (5) cultural, and (6)
philosophical – factors. These factors constitute, at once, the precondition for and
the result of the emergence of modern societal formations, which came into being
in Europe from the seventeenth century onwards and which, subsequently, began
to have a substantial impact upon civilizational developments across the world.

The Ambivalence of Modernity

As several commentators have pointed out, modernity is a historical condition
characterized by the existence of different levels of ambivalence.86 Three levels of
ambivalence are particularly worth mentioning when reflecting upon the condi-
tion of modernity.
(1) On the ontological level, we can distinguish between a modernity in itself and
a modernity for itself. The former describes modernity ‘as a historical event, a social
 Introduction 17

condition, an epoch in historical time’.87 The latter, by contrast, refers to modern-

ity ‘as an idea […] a cultural impulse, a time consciousness’.88 In other words,
modernity exists both as an objective mode of being, which comes to the fore in
the presence of substantive realities, and as a reflexive mode of being, which is
aware of its own constellation as a symbolically mediated and phenomenologi-
cally represented actuality.
(2) On the normative level, we can distinguish between a dark modernity and
a bright modernity. The former denotes the ensemble of the repressive facets of
modernity, which emanate from the quest for domination, epitomized in the
historical impact of instrumental reason. These are intimately associated with varia-
tions of control – such as power, authority, order, discipline, obedience, enclosure,
and heteronomy – and materialize themselves in social processes of domination,
regulation, exploitation, alienation, fragmentation, exclusion, and discrimina-
tion. The latter, on the other hand, designates the emancipatory aspects of the
modern condition, which can be uncovered by critical reason. These are expressed
in Enlightenment ideals – such as progress, tolerance, liberty, equality, solidarity,
dignity, sovereignty, and autonomy – and manifest themselves in social processes
of liberation, self-determination, and unification.89
(3) On the spatiotemporal level, we can distinguish between a backward-looking
modernity and a forward-looking modernity. The former is oriented towards the past: it
is imbued with ‘a nostalgia and sadness for the passing of an unretrievable organic
unity’90 and deeply suspicious of the ‘great faith in the promise of reason to bring
about freedom’.91 Conversely, the latter is oriented towards the future: indeed, ‘the
secular concept of modernity expresses the conviction that the future has already
begun: it is the epoch that lives for the future, that opens itself up to the novelty
of the future’.92 In light of this spatiotemporal ambivalence, which expresses a
schizophrenic idealization of both the past and the future, it appears that ‘[t]he
idea of modernity is […] a projection backwards as much as forwards’,93 as illus-
trated in the tension-laden impact of both conservatism and utopianism upon the
development of modern history. To conceive of modernity, first and foremost, as
a transformative historical condition that seeks to come to terms with the present
by retrieving seemingly lost elements from the past means to consider the restora-
tion of vanished social arrangements, practices, and values as a precondition for
the salvation of the present and for the avoidance of the decline of the West.94 By
contrast, to define modernity ‘as an epoch turned to the future conceived as likely
to be different from and possibly better than the present and the past’95 means to
interpret the orientation towards the yet-to-come as a key motivational ingredient
of a distinctive period.
The aforementioned levels of ambivalence are central to the era commonly
characterized as modernity. In ontological terms, modernity exists both as an
objective and as a reflexive condition. In normative terms, modernity exists both as
a disempowering and as an empowering condition. In spatiotemporal terms, modern-
ity exists both as a backward-looking and as a forward-looking condition.
Owing to this paradoxical complexity, and far from being reducible to a one-
dimensional historical reality, modernity can be conceived of as a tension-laden
18 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

age pervaded by existential ambiguity. In fact, the tensions arising from the con-
tradictory relationship between ‘being-there’ and ‘being-aware’, between ‘being-
dominated’ and ‘being-emancipated’, and between ‘being-as-always-already-been’
and ‘being-as-yet-to-come’ concern modernity not only as a collectively con-
structed moment of society but also as an individually experienced reference
point of historically embedded subjectivities. On this account, it appears that
every ordinary human entity is (1) both an objective being immersed in reality and
a subjective being aware of reality, (2) both a constrained being struggling with the
limitations imposed upon it by the world and a purposive being seeking to act upon
the world, as well as (3) both a regressive being yearning to retrieve the past and
a progressive being looking forward to the future. Existential ambivalence may be
regarded as a constitutive feature of human selfhood;96 in the context of modern-
ity, it is has been elevated to the status of a foundational condition permeating
the entirety of a historical era.

(iii) ‘The Postmodern’

For at least the past three decades, the concept of ‘the postmodern’ has been
a major source of debate in the social sciences.97 Taking into account that the
concept of ‘the modern’ is highly contentious, it is not difficult to imagine that
the concept of ‘the postmodern’ is hardly less controversial than its predecessor.
However one interprets the concept of ‘the postmodern’, there is little doubt that
it is generally associated with the idea of epochal change: ‘The discourse of the post
is sometimes connected with an apocalyptic sense of rupture, of the passing of the old
and the advent of the new.’98 The ‘postization’ of a whole variety of different socio-
logical concepts appears to have been a fashionable trend in social and political
thought from the late twentieth century until the present. Yet, the semantic crea-
tivity of contemporary academic discourses is not necessarily a sign of their intel-
lectual originality. The validity of the gradual ‘postization’ of the social sciences
should not be taken for granted; rather, it has to be critically examined in order
for its analysis to move beyond the status of provocative rhetorical speculation.
The list of the contemporary proliferation of neologisms that contain the
prefix ‘post’ is long: postmodernism, poststructuralism, postrationalism, post-
foundationalism, post-transcendentalism, postcolonialism, postmaterialism,
postindustrialism, post-Fordism, post-Keynesianism, postsocialism, postcom-
munism, post-Marxism, postutopianism, postsecularism, and posthumanism – to
mention only a few. The thriving multiplicity of these catch-all concepts seems to
suggest ‘that we […] live in a post-something era’99 or, in a more holistic sense, in
a post-everything100 period, characterized by a diffuse sense of afterness.101 The ontol-
ogy of the contemporary world, then, is frequently portrayed as a post-ontology.
Nevertheless, the prefix ‘post’ is problematic in at least three respects.
(1) There is a definitional problem. As a periodizing term, the prefix ‘post’ deline-
ates a concept negatively in terms of what it is not. Its only affirmative feature is its
temporal delimitation concerning a condition that succeeds – that is, comes ‘after’ –
something else. Thus, it defines a state of affairs in opposition to another – hitherto
 Introduction 19

existing – situation, yet without indicating what it actually stands for. As a result,
one gets the impression that ‘[w]e are living in a new world, a world that does not
know how to define itself by what it is, but only by what it has just-now ceased to
be.’102 Hence, the prefix ‘post’ tells us what the present age is not, rather than
what it is. ‘The post-mode is itself a temporal concept, implying a “before” and
an “after”.’103 This is not to posit that postmodern thought necessarily lacks a
conception of the present; this is to recognize, however, that its understanding of
the ‘here and now’ is based on the assumption that the contemporary era constitutes
a historical condition characterized by radical indeterminacy.
(2) Closely related to the previous point, there is an interpretive problem. If his-
torical periods are defined primarily on the basis of the prefixes ‘pre’ and ‘post’,
and thus in terms of a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, then the nature of the now is in dan-
ger of being systematically faded out. To historicize society by relying exclusively
on ‘post-istic’ readings of social reality is problematic to the extent that such a
prefix-dependent view ‘leaves unquestioned the position […] of the present from
which one is supposed to be able to achieve a legitimate perspective on a chrono-
logical succession’.104 A thorough analysis of the ‘after’, however, must imply an
equally conscientious study of the ‘now’. If the present is to be characterized in
terms of whatever form of ‘afterness’, we need to provide a systematic account
of what this alleged ‘afterness’ represents. A comprehensive reflection upon
‘the present’ must entail a thorough consideration of ‘the past’, just as a critical
examination of ‘the past’ is inconceivable without conscious attentiveness to the
historical conditions of ‘the present’. In order to understand what society is, we
need to grasp what society has become. A ‘post-istic’ conception of the present
must prove that it does not fall into the trap of interpreting the present exclu-
sively in terms of the future. History is imbued with the temporal continuum between
past, present, and future.
(3) There is a normative problem. Paradoxically, if we define one concept in
opposition to another concept, we run the risk of creating a sense of terminological
heteronomy. No matter how radical the transformation of the ‘now’ into the ‘after’
may be, the latter can emerge only within the temporal horizon of the former.
To define the present as ‘postmodern’ means to acknowledge the powerful status
of ‘the modern’. If the notion of ‘the postmodern’ is understood, literally, as a
condition characterized by an ‘after-now’, then the ineluctable dependence of
the ‘after’ upon the ‘now’ becomes evident. The concept of ‘the postmodern’ does
not discredit or undermine, but, on the contrary, implicitly acknowledges and
reinforces the continuing relevance of the concept of ‘the modern’.105 Of course,
contemporary thinkers may contend that we have moved beyond the condition
of modernity. Notwithstanding the question of whether it is real or imagined,
however, the epochal transition to postmodernity cannot be dissociated from its
intrinsic connection to modernity, for the former stands within the horizon of the
latter. The transcendent power of postmodernity is inseparable from its historical attach-
ment to the condition of modernity.
We have already briefly considered the meaning of the term ‘modern’. In a
similar vein, we need to take into account the etymological development of the term
20 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

‘postmodern’. Interestingly, the first instances of the use of the word ‘postmodern’
can be found not in sociology or social theory, but in art and literature. To be pre-
cise, the initial employment of this term in modern writings can be traced back
to the realms of visual art and poetry:

In the earliest usage unearthed thus far, around 1870 an English painter, John
Watkins Chapman, described as ‘postmodern’ painting that was supposedly
more modern than French impressionism […]. The concept was similarly
employed in literature in 1934 and again in 1942 to describe a related tendency
in Hispanic poetry […].106

Referring to experimental tendencies in Western arts and architecture from the

1940 or 1950s onwards, postmodernism stands for both the continuation and
the transcendence of modernism, representing an eclectic mixture of different
traditions of both the immediate and the distant past. By contrast, debates on
the nature of the postmodern in the social sciences constitute a relatively recent
phenomenon, that is, a discursive feature of the late twentieth century.107 As shall
be demonstrated in the present study, these disputes are crucial to understanding
the paradigmatic shifts that have significantly reshaped the social sciences over
the past few decades.
To the extent that conceptual definitions are supposed to be rationally justifi-
able and objective, and to the extent that postmodernists question the possibility
of providing epistemic foundations for the representational validity of rational-
ity and objectivity, the attempt to develop a non-modern description of postmodernity
appears to be a contradiction in terms. On the face of it, there is no conceptual
definition of postmodernism capable of escaping the presuppositional logic of
modern intellectual thought. The scepticism towards the idea of imposing ‘mod-
ern’ standards upon ‘the postmodern’, when conceptualizing the latter from the
viewpoint of the former, is reflected in statements such as the following:

Already in such a reading, modern values of clarity, consensus and convergence

are privileged over heterogeneous ways of thinking that accept and work with
ambiguities, uncertainties and complexity. The very idea that the postmodern
has to mean something, that this meaning is to be clear, and that any movement
that is postmodern in orientation is to be necessarily one and unified in aim is
already to work from modernist value presuppositions, and to promote these over
any alternative perspective.108

Post-modernists are loath to define […]. Definitions engage with those very
qualities of rationality and objectivity that post-modernists are at pains to
deny.109

It is difficult to avoid giving a modern definition of the postmodern; in fact,

virtually any definition of postmodernism will turn out to be modernist.110

Furthermore, it is striking that various critical commentators insist that, owing

to its eclectic intellectual roots and its diversified relevance to different areas of
 Introduction 21

study, it may be pointless to try to define the term ‘postmodern’ in a clear and unam-
biguous manner:

[…] the label ‘postmodern’ is problematic, lumping together often conflicting

theorists and practices.111

Postmodernism is a contemporary movement. [… I]t is not altogether clear what

the devil it is. In fact, clarity is not conspicuous amongst its marked attributes.112

[…] the term postmodern […] lacks any conceptual prevision, or any empirical
grip on so-called ‘reality’.113

‘Postmodernism’ is a term that defies simple definition.114

Postmodernity is The-Whatever-It-Is that succeeds that modernity.115

[…] postmodernism […] has no fixed meaning […].116

[…] postmodernism defies all simple definitions.117

In addition to this definitional problem, it is worth mentioning that, although –

for at least the last three decades – it has been common to make use of the term
‘postmodernism’, it seems to be unpopular to be classified as a ‘postmodernist’,
given that only very few theorists identify openly and explicitly with this label.

It is a dangerous provocation to be a post-modernist, in academic circles at least.

There are far more books and articles telling us what is wrong with post-modern
theory than there are statements in its favour.118

One of the curious features of the discussion which has developed around
the controversial idea of postmodern social and philosophical thought is that
the analysts most closely identified with the idea of the postmodern might be
described as, at best, reluctant participants.119

In short, as elucidated in the above passages, the concept of ‘the postmodern’

appears to be difficult – or, perhaps, impossible – to define in (a) non-modern and non-
logocentric, (b) unambiguous and concise, and (c) outspokenly favourable and unequivo-
cally sympathetic terms. Whatever one makes of these objections and reflections,
all definitional and methodical attempts to make sense of ‘the postmodern’ are
fraught with difficulties. Far from constituting a coherent ideological tradition or
clearly definable school of thought, ‘postmodernism’ has been shaped by an eclectic and
heterogeneous intellectual movement, whose supporters share one significant characteris-
tic: namely, radical scepticism towards beliefs and principles associated with the project
of modernity in general and with Enlightenment thought in particular. What advocates
of ‘postmodernism’ also have in common, however, is that – paradoxically – they
are intellectually and socially attached to the historical horizon from which they
seek to detach themselves: the condition of modernity. It is not the existence of
‘the postmodern’ that has given rise to the notion of ‘the modern’; rather, it is the
existence of ‘the modern’ that precedes the rise of the idea of ‘the postmodern’.120
22 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

To be sure, there is no point in denying the considerable influence that post-

modern thought has had, and continues to have, on key debates and controversies
in the contemporary social sciences. It is nonetheless important to acknowl-
edge that both the referential relevance and the discursive force of postmodern
approaches are largely due to their provocative – and, in many ways, intellectually
enriching – opposition to modern traditions of thought, notably those inspired
by, or representative of, the Enlightenment. As illustrated in the multifaceted his-
tory of intellectual thought, a crucial indicator of the impact of hegemonic discourses
on society is their capacity to trigger the emergence of counterhegemonic discourses.121 It
is because of, not despite, the fact that postmodern thought has been immensely
influential that it has been substantially criticized in numerous ways and by vari-
ous scholars with diverse disciplinary backgrounds. Thus, the multifaceted forms
of criticism levelled against postmodern thought should be regarded not only as
a sign of its substantive weaknesses and limitations, but also as a manifestation of
its considerable strengths and contributions.
The definitional elasticity of the term ‘postmodern’ is symptomatic of both the
theoretical complexity and the wide-ranging scope of the ‘postmodern turn’.122 In
fact, one may contend that the postmodern insistence upon the empirical indeter-
minacy of the contemporary world is reflected in the conceptual indeterminacy of
postmodern thought. Given its commitment to theoretical eclecticism and its oppo-
sition to the usage of ‘totalizing’ analytical straitjackets, it is difficult to offer a com-
prehensive – let alone a universally applicable – definition of postmodern thought.
Be that as it may, one of the key characteristics of postmodern approaches is to
be suspicious of seemingly coherent, exhaustive, and reliable definitions aimed at
offering adequate conceptual accounts of particular material or symbolic aspects
of reality. Since supporters of the ‘postmodern turn’ set themselves the task of
escaping the ‘totalizing parameters’ imposed by Enlightenment thought, their
provocative writings open up a discursive space for discussions on the social con-
ditions and hermeneutic presuppositions underlying the production of meaning.
Considering its subversive ways of destabilizing and deconstructing common-
sense knowledge and taken-for-granted assumptions, it comes as no surprise that
‘“[p]ostmodernism” was for a time a darling of the “Left”’123 and that various
commentators insist upon direct or indirect links between postmodernism and criti-
cal theory124 as well as – perhaps, less surprisingly – upon obvious or subtle con-
nections between postmodernism and feminism;125 some critics are even inclined to
argue that valuable insights may be gained from cross-fertilizing postmodernism
and Marxism.126 Whatever the theoretical or practical benefits from creating para-
digmatic alliances between postmodernism and other intellectual traditions may
be, we still need to address one central question: Who are these ‘postmodernists’?
The following section shall grapple with this issue.

Who Are These ‘Postmodernists’?

The list of scholars whose works are – directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly,
rightly or wrongly – associated with the rise of postmodern thought is long. In
alphabetical order, we may mention the following scholars who – in many cases,
 Introduction 23

contrary to their will, or, in some cases, posthumously and, hence, without their
knowledge – appear to have played a noticeable role in the construction and
development of postmodern thought:

Perry Anderson (1938–), Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007), Zygmunt Bauman

(1925–), Steven Best (1955–), Judith Butler (1956–), Gilles Deleuze (1925–95),
Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), Mike Featherstone (1946–), Michel Foucault
(1926–1984), Francis Fukuyama (1952–), Félix Guattari (1930–92), Donna J.
Haraway (1944–), Sandra Harding (1935–), Nancy Hartsock (1943–2015), David
Harvey (1935–), Ihab H. Hassan (1925–), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976),
Ágnes Heller (1929–), Linda Hutcheon (1947–), Andreas Huyssen (1942–),
Luce Irigaray (1932–), Fredric Jameson (1934–), Keith Jenkins (1943–), Douglas
Kellner (1943–), Ernesto Laclau (1935–2014), Scott Lash (1945–), Bruno Latour
(1947–), David Lyon (1948–), Jean-François Lyotard (1924–98), Michel Maffesoli
(1944–), Doreen Massey (1944–), Chantal Mouffe (1943–), Linda J. Nicholson
(1947–), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Richard Rorty (1931–2007), Steven
Seidman (1948–), Hugh J. Silverman (1945–), Edward Soja (1940–), Keith Tester
(1960–), John Urry (1946–), Gianni Vattimo (1936–), Robert Venturi (1925–),
Wolfgang Welsch (1946–), Ludwig Wittgenstein (i.e. the later Wittgenstein)
(1889–1951), Iris Marion Young (1949–2006), and Slavoj Žižek (1949–).

Of course, the above list is necessarily selective and, thus, not exhaustive. Since
the present study aims to provide a thematically organized, rather than an author-
focused, account of the key assumptions underlying the ‘postmodern turn’, there
is not much point in giving a comprehensive overview of the main intellectual
contributions made by the thinkers whose oeuvres are – rightly or wrongly –
considered to have played a central, or at least a marginal, role in the creation of
a postmodern tradition of thought. A wide range of useful introductions to their
works can be found in the literature, allowing us to appreciate the relevance of
their writings not only to the development of postmodern thought but also, more
widely, to contemporary forms of social and political analysis. The question that
poses itself in this context is to what extent the names of the critics and research-
ers whose works are inextricably linked to the rise of postmodern thought can
be classified in a meaningful manner, in order to capture the intellectual scope
and significance of their oeuvres. The following criteria appear to be particularly
important in this regard.
(1) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod-
ern turn’ in terms of their geographical origin:

• African (e.g. Hassan);

• Anglo-European (e.g. Anderson, Featherstone, Harvey, Jenkins, Lyon, Massey,
Soja, Tester, Urry);
• continental European (e.g. Baudrillard, Bauman, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault,
Guattari, Harvey, Heidegger, Heller, Huyssen, Irigaray, Latour, Lyotard,
Maffesoli, Mouffe, Nietzsche, Vattimo, Welsch, Wittgenstein, Žižek);
24 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

• North American (e.g. Best, Butler, Fukuyama, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock,

Hassan, Hutcheon, Jameson, Kellner, Lash, Nicholson, Rorty, Seidman,
Silverman, Soja, Venturi, Young);
• South American (e.g. Laclau).

Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of the most influential scholars associ-

ated with postmodern thought are continental European or North American.
(2) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod-
ern turn’ in terms of their national origin:

• Argentinean (e.g. Laclau);

• Austrian-British (e.g. Wittgenstein);
• Belgian (e.g. Mouffe);
• British (e.g. Anderson, Featherstone, Harvey, Jenkins, Lyon, Massey, Soja, Tester,
Urry);
• Canadian (e.g. Hutcheon);
• French (e.g. Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, Irigaray, Latour,
Lyotard, Maffesoli);
• German (e.g. Heidegger, Huyssen, Nietzsche, Welsch);
• Hungarian (e.g. Heller);
• Italian (e.g. Maffesoli, Vattimo);
• Polish (e.g. Bauman);
• Slovenian (e.g. Žižek);
• US-American (e.g. Best, Butler, Fukuyama, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Hassan,
Jameson, Kellner, Lash, Nicholson, Rorty, Seidman, Silverman, Soja, Venturi,
Young).

What is striking in this respect is that the majority of those widely considered as
‘founding figures’ or ‘reference figures’ of the postmodern project are French or
US-American.
(3) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod-
ern turn’ in terms of the linguistic specificity of their major writings, that is, on the
basis of their main working language(s):

• Anglophone (e.g. Anderson, Bauman, Best, Butler, Featherstone, Fukuyama,

Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Harvey, Hassan, Heller, Hutcheon, Huyssen,
Jameson, Jenkins, Kellner, Laclau, Lash, Lyon, Massey, Mouffe, Nicholson, Rorty,
Seidman, Silverman, Soja, Tester, Urry, Venturi, Wittgenstein, Young, Žižek);
• Francophone (e.g. Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, Irigaray,
Latour, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Mouffe);
• Germanophone (e.g. Heidegger, Huyssen, Nietzsche, Welsch, Wittgenstein);
• Hispanophone (e.g. Laclau);
• Italianophone (e.g. Vattimo).

What is noticeable in this regard is that it is, by and large, Francophone schol-
ars whose writings are regarded as the path-breaking works of the postmodern
 Introduction 25

tradition, whereas renowned Anglophone scholars appear to have taken on the role
of recyclers and creative interpreters of this intellectual current.
(4) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod-
ern turn’ in terms of their epochal situatedness. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish
between early modern, modern, and late modern or – tautologically speaking –
postmodern postmodernists:

• scholars whose works were produced in the early modern period (approx.
1600–1920), whose writings anticipated the rise of postmodern thought, but
who did not necessarily have the intention of doing so, let alone of using the
term ‘postmodern’ (e.g. Nietzsche);
• scholars whose works began to have an impact on social thought in the modern
period (approx. 1920–70) and whose writings appeared to indicate a conscious
move into a new and unprecedented intellectual or historical horizon (e.g.
Heidegger, Wittgenstein);
• scholars whose main works emerged in a historical context that some would
already characterize as late modern or postmodern (approx. 1970–present) and
who aim to radicalize the historical condition associated with postmodernity
(e.g. Anderson, Baudrillard, Bauman, Best, Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Featherstone,
Foucault, Fukuyama, Guattari, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Harvey, Hassan,
Heller, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Irigaray, Jameson, Jenkins, Kellner, Laclau, Lash,
Latour, Lyon, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Massey, Mouffe, Nicholson, Rorty, Seidman,
Silverman, Soja, Tester, Urry, Vattimo, Venturi, Welsch, Young, Žižek).

As illustrated above, some highly influential early modern and modern scholars are
posthumously – and, hence, without their knowledge – associated with postmodern
thought (notably Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the later Wittgenstein). Moreover, the
key recent or contemporary figures whose ideas are – rightly or wrongly – brought
into connection with postmodern thought have produced their major writings,
roughly speaking, from 1970 onwards.
(5) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod-
ern turn’ in terms of their generational belonging:

• those born in the first part of the nineteenth century (1800–1850) (e.g.
Nietzsche);
• those born in the second part of the nineteenth century (1850–1900) (e.g.
Heidegger, Wittgenstein);
• those born in the 1920s (e.g. Baudrillard, Bauman, Deleuze, Foucault, Hassan,
Heller, Lyotard, Venturi);
• those born in the 1930s (e.g. Anderson, Derrida, Guattari, Harding, Harvey,
Irigaray, Jameson, Jenkins, Laclau, Rorty);
• those born in the 1940s (e.g. Featherstone, Haraway, Hartsock, Hutcheon,
Huyssen, Jenkins, Kellner, Lash, Latour, Lyon, Maffesoli, Massey, Mouffe,
Nicholson, Seidman, Silverman, Soja, Urry, Welsch, Young, Žižek);
• those born in the 1950s (e.g. Butler, Fukuyama);
• those born in the 1960s (e.g. Tester).
26 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

As demonstrated above, most of the intellectual figures whose works are not
only linked to postmodern thought but, in addition, likely to remain influential
in decades, and possibly centuries, to come were born either in the nineteenth cen-
tury (e.g. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein) or in the 1920s or early 1930s (e.g.
Baudrillard, Bauman, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Rorty). Of course, this is partly
due to the fact that it can take decades until a scholar – insofar as he or she suc-
ceeds in making a groundbreaking contribution to his or her field of expertise and
happens to be widely recognized for this achievement – is commonly regarded as
a ‘big name’. More importantly, however, this illustrates that the late twentieth-
century ‘big names’ related to postmodern thought experienced their intellectual
upbringing in the post-War era and produced their principal writings in the period
leading to the end of the Cold War, which – in the context of the collapse of state
socialism – has led to the increasing delegitimization of ideological grand narra-
tives inspired by Marxism.
(6) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘post-
modern turn’ in terms of the context-specific impact of their main works, that is, in
terms of the period in which they were particularly prolific and began to have a
substantial influence on Western intellectual thought:

• in the late nineteenth century (e.g. Nietzsche);

• in the 1930s (e.g. Heidegger, Wittgenstein);
• in the 1960s (e.g. Venturi);
• in the 1970s (e.g. Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, Heller);
• in the 1980s (e.g. Bauman, Featherstone, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Harvey,
Hassan, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Irigaray, Jameson, Laclau, Lash, Latour, Lyotard,
Massey, Mouffe, Rorty, Urry, Vattimo, Welsch);
• in the 1990s (e.g. Anderson, Best, Butler, Fukuyama, Jenkins, Kellner, Lyon,
Maffesoli, Nicholson, Seidman, Silverman, Soja, Tester, Young, Žižek);
• in the first decade of the new millennium (see 1990s).

What is remarkable in this respect is that the most influential twentieth-century fig-
ures associated with postmodern thought published their masterpieces in the late 1970s
and 1980s. In other words, most of them – and this applies particularly to French
representatives of postmodern forms of analysis – produced their key writings in
the aftermath of 1968, which had led to a radical restructuring of both established
institutional arrangements and hegemonic ideological discourses in the West.
(7) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘post-
modern turn’ in terms of their discursive positioning. (a) Posthumous and unwitting
participants are those scholars whose works began to be linked to postmodern
thought long after their death. (b) Reluctant and non-proselytizing participants are
those thinkers who do not explicitly identify with the label ‘postmodern’, or – in
some cases – even reject it, but whose works are nevertheless associated with this
term. (c) Moderate sympathizers are those theorists who, while they do not neces-
sarily proclaim the advent of postmodernity or of the ‘postmodern turn’, endorse
the postmodern project, no matter how vaguely defined. (d) Enthusiastic supporters
 Introduction 27

and contributors are those who explicitly advocate, and actively participate in, the
creation of a postmodern paradigm and the construction of a postmodern society.
According to this categorization, it is possible to classify the scholars whose works
are associated with the ‘postmodern turn’ as follows:

• posthumous and unwitting participants (e.g. Heidegger, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein);

• reluctant and non-proselytizing participants (e.g. Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault,
Fukuyama, Guattari, Harvey, Heller, Irigaray, Jameson, Laclau, Latour, Massey,
Mouffe, Rorty, Urry, Young);
• moderate sympathizers (e.g. Anderson, Baudrillard, Bauman, Best, Haraway,
Harding, Hartsock, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Kellner, Lash, Lyon, Maffesoli, Tester,
Vattimo, Venturi, Welsch, Žižek);
• enthusiastic supporters and contributors (e.g. Featherstone, Hassan, Lyotard,
Jenkins, Lyotard, Nicholson, Seidman, Silverman, Soja).

What is noticeable when considering the above classification is the following:

although there are only a handful of posthumous and unwitting participants, given
that they are widely regarded as ‘classical figures’ of Western intellectual thought,
their works are of canonical significance to the postmodern project. Furthermore, the
vast majority of thinkers whose writings are linked to the ‘postmodern turn’ can be
described either as reluctant and non-proselytizing participants or as moderate sympathiz-
ers. Ironically, then, the principal intellectual figures whose names are associated with
postmodern thought do not unambiguously identify with this label. Critics may legit-
imately argue that, in this light, the ‘postmodern turn’ is a project that lacks explicit,
strong, and widespread support among those who are considered to be key repre-
sentatives of its intellectual spirit. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that self-declared,
open, and whole-hearted supporters of the ‘postmodern turn’ represent a clear minority.
(8) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod-
ern turn’ in terms of their oppositional attitude(s):

• the critique of anthropocentrism (e.g. Best, Foucault, Latour, Lyotard);

• the critique of binaries (e.g. Butler, Foucault, Haraway, Hartsock, Irigaray,
Latour, Nicholson, Rorty, Young);
• the critique of (and a certain fascination with) consumer capitalism (e.g. Best,
Featherstone, Harvey, Jameson, Kellner, Lash, Tester, Urry);
• the critique of disciplinary power and surveillance (e.g. Foucault, Lyon);
• the critique of essentialism (e.g. Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari,
Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Irigaray, Mouffe, Nietzsche, Seidman, Young);
• the critique of foundationalism (e.g. Butler, Foucault, Latour, Nietzsche, Rorty,
Seidman, Silverman, Young, Žižek);
• the critique of heteronormativity (e.g. Butler, Foucault, Haraway, Harding,
Hartsock, Irigaray, Nicholson, Seidman, Young);
• the critique of logocentrism and representationalism (e.g. Derrida, later
Wittgenstein);
• the critique of metanarratives (e.g. Lyotard, Seidman);
28 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

• the critique of metaphysics (e.g. Heidegger);

• the critique of modern reason (e.g. Foucault, Guattari, Heidegger, Lyotard,
Nietzsche, Rorty, Seidman, Silverman);
• the critique of modernity (e.g. Bauman, Foucault, Hassan, Heidegger, Hutcheon,
Huyssen, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Seidman, Tester, Vattimo, Venturi, Welsch, Žižek);
• the critique of orthodox Marxism (e.g. Anderson, Deleuze, Foucault, Fukuyama,
Guattari, Harvey, Heller, Jameson, Kellner, Laclau, Lash, Lyotard, Massey, Mouffe);
• the critique of traditional notions of sociality (e.g. Maffesoli, Seidman);
• the critique of teleologism (e.g. Foucault, Fukuyama, Jenkins, Laclau, Lyotard,
Mouffe, Nietzsche, Seidman, Silverman, Welsch);
• the critique of the instrumental organization of space (e.g. Harvey, Massey, Soja,
Venturi).
• the critique of the political economy of the sign (e.g. Baudrillard);
• the critique of the subject (e.g. Foucault, Heidegger, Laclau, Latour, Lyotard,
Mouffe, Nietzsche, Rorty, Seidman, Silverman, Žižek).

As illustrated in the above list, the cultivation of an eclectically minded ‘opposi-

tional attitude’ is crucial to the ‘postmodern spirit’. In this sense, the postmodern
endeavour is an attempt to break away from the canonical presuppositions of
Enlightenment thought. While the opposition to orthodox Marxism is vital to the
‘postmodern spirit’, it is striking that most Francophone thinkers whose writings are
brought into connection with the postmodern project come – both politically and
intellectually – from a Marxist tradition and are, as a result, often described as ‘post-
Marxists’. Of course, as demonstrated above, the subversive nature of postmodern
thought has many facets. Its opposition to the grand narrative of ‘scientific social-
ism’, however, is particularly important for the following reason: it indicates that the
crisis of Marxism and the rise of postmodernism, in the early 1990s, historically coincide.
(9) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod-
ern turn’ in terms of their thematic contributions:

• postmodern epistemologies (e.g. Best, Derrida, Foucault, Haraway, Harding,

Hartsock, Hassan, Heidegger, Irigaray, Kellner, Laclau, Latour, Lyotard,
Nicholson, Nietzsche, Rorty, Seidman, Silverman, Urry, Vattimo, Welsch, later
Wittgenstein, Young, Žižek);
• postmodern methodologies (e.g. Foucault, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock);
• postmodern sociologies (e.g. Baudrillard, Bauman, Featherstone, Foucault,
Haraway, Hartsock, Harvey, Heller, Jameson, Kellner, Lash, Lyon, Lyotard,
Maffesoli, Massey, Nicholson, Seidman, Soja, Tester, Urry, Vattimo);
• postmodern historiographies (e.g. Foucault, Fukuyama, Heidegger, Heller,
Jenkins, Lyotard, Nietzsche, Vattimo, Žižek);
• postmodern politics (e.g. Fukuyama, Haraway, Hartsock, Harvey, Heller, Irigaray,
Kellner, Laclau, Mouffe, Nicholson, Seidman, Soja, Young).

More specifically:

• postmodern theories of actor–network relations (e.g. Latour);

 Introduction 29

• postmodern theories of deconstruction (e.g. Derrida, Heidegger);

• postmodern theories of desire (e.g. Deleuze, Guattari);
• postmodern theories of gendered performance (e.g. Butler, Foucault, Haraway,
Hartsock, Irigaray, Nicholson);
• postmodern theories of hyperreality (e.g. Baudrillard, Lash);
• postmodern theories of literature (e.g. Hutcheon, Huyssen).
• postmodern theories of parody (e.g. Hutcheon);
• postmodern theories of power (e.g. Butler, Haraway, Hartsock, Laclau, Nietzsche,
Foucault, Lyon, Mouffe, Nietzsche, Seidman);
• postmodern theories of space (e.g. Harvey, Massey, Soja, Venturi);
• postmodern theories of the economy (e.g. Anderson);
• postmodern theories of the media (e.g. Tester);
• postmodern theories of the self (e.g. Bauman, Deleuze, Foucault, Guattari,
Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Irigaray, Maffesoli, Seidman, Tester).

The above list illustrates that the thematic areas covered by postmodern thought are
impressively wide-ranging. In fact, the ‘postmodern turn’ has shaped – albeit to different
degrees and with different results – key debates and controversies in almost every single
discipline in the social sciences and, arguably, also in the humanities. Moreover, it is
ironic that, despite their anti-foundationalist spirit, all postmodern approaches – in
any academic discipline and in any thematic area – share a foundational motiva-
tion: namely, the epistemologically inspired relativization of cognitive, normative,
and aesthetic standards. Put differently, epistemic relativism constitutes the paradig-
matic cornerstone of postmodern approaches in the social sciences.
(10) Somewhat more contentiously, one can classify the scholars whose works
are associated with the ‘postmodern turn’ in terms of their philosophical or ideologi-
cal positioning:
in terms of classical big-picture ideologies:

• anarchist (e.g. Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault);

• conservative (e.g. Fukuyama, Heidegger);
• fascist or quasi-fascist (e.g. Heidegger);
• liberal (e.g. Fukuyama, Hassan, Rorty);
• Marxist or post-Marxist (e.g. Anderson, Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Harvey,
Heller, Jameson, Kellner, Laclau, Massey, Mouffe, Vattimo, Žižek);
• social-democratic/Weberian (e.g. Bauman, Lash, Tester);

in terms of issue- or paradigm-specific ideologies:

• animal rights (e.g. Best);

• cosmopolitan (e.g. Derrida);
• differentialist (e.g. Butler, Featherstone, Harding, Seidman, Silverman, Soja,
Vattimo, Young);
• feminist (e.g. Butler, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Hutcheon, Irigaray,
Nicholson, Young);
• Freudian (e.g. Deleuze, Guattari);
30 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

in terms of anti-ideological ideologies:

• cynical ironist (e.g. Hutcheon, Latour, Rorty);

• nihilist (e.g. Nietzsche);
• relativist (e.g. Huyssen, Jenkins, Lash, Lyon, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Urry, Venturi,
Welsch, later Wittgenstein).

One curious paradox of various postmodern approaches in the social sciences –

and, arguably, in the humanities – is their post-Marxist anti-Marxism: heavily
influenced by Marxist thought, they question the validity of its key ideological
assumptions, thereby aiming to move away from this intellectual tradition. More
importantly, however, we are confronted with another paradox when reflecting
upon the philosophical or ideological underpinnings of postmodern thought:
although the rise of postmodern approaches tends to be associated with the
historical consolidation of a ‘postideological age’, an epoch in which classical
big-picture ideologies appear to have lost legitimacy, most thinkers associated
with the postmodern project have not only developed their approaches within,
rather than outside, particular ideological frameworks, but also continue to
endorse specific worldviews. Thus, the ‘postmodern spirit’ is permeated by a form
of pseudo-post-ideological anti-ideologism: it is thoroughly ideological, rather than
postideological, not only because even an intellectual paradigm that claims to
be opposed to ideological thinking remains – by definition – ideological,127 and not
only because postmodern thinkers emerged out of ideologically shaped intellectual
traditions, but also because – similar to other ideologies and intellectual ‘-isms’ –
postmodernism can, and has been, cross-fertilized with other ideological frameworks. Its
ideological elasticity is reflected in the various attempts at marrying postmodernism
with other ‘-isms’: postmodern anarchism; postmodern Marxism; postmodern social
democracy; postmodern Weberianism; postmodern liberalism; postmodern con-
servatism; postmodern fascism; postmodern feminism; postmodern Freudianism;
postmodern moralism; postmodern cosmopolitanism; postmodern globalism; post-
modern cynicism; and postmodern nihilism. In short, postmodern thought is as
adaptable as a living chameleon.
(11) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod-
ern turn’ in terms of their disciplinary background(s) or disciplinary speciality(ies):

• philosophy (e.g. Best, Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, Haraway,

Harding, Hartsock, Heidegger, Heller, Irigaray, Kellner, Laclau, Latour, Lyotard,
Mouffe, Nietzsche, Rorty, Silverman, Welsch, later Wittgenstein, Žižek);
• sociology (e.g. Baudrillard, Bauman, Featherstone, Irigaray, Jameson, Kellner,
Lash, Latour, Lyon, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Massey, Nicholson, Seidman, Tester,
Urry, Vattimo);
• historiography (e.g. Anderson, Foucault, Jenkins, Nicholson);
• politics and political theory (e.g. Anderson, Fukuyama, Foucault, Guattari,
Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Jameson, Kellner, Laclau, Mouffe, Nicholson,
Young, Žižek);
 Introduction 31

• economics (e.g. Fukuyama, Jameson);

• geography (e.g. Harvey, Massey, Soja);
• anthropology (e.g. Harvey, Latour);
• architecture (e.g. Venturi);
• literary theory (e.g. Butler, Derrida, Hassan, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Jameson,
Lyotard);
• cultural studies (e.g. Featherstone, Irigaray, Jameson, Lash, Latour, Žižek).

Most of the ‘founding figures’ of the postmodern project are French social
philosophers. More specifically, they tend to be regarded as scholars who are
philosophically trained, sociologically oriented, politically motivated, culturally
sophisticated, and rhetorically refined. It comes as no surprise, then, that the
disciplinary relevance of postmodern thought is concentrated in the areas of phi-
losophy, sociology, political science, cultural studies, and literary theory.
(12) More controversially, one can classify – and, indeed, rank – the scholars
whose works are associated with the ‘postmodern turn’ in terms of their intellec-
tual influence:

• highly influential (established ‘classics’, ‘paradigm inventors’, and ‘game chang-

ers’) (e.g. Foucault, Heidegger, Nietzsche, later Wittgenstein);
• very influential (very prominent contemporary scholars) (e.g. Anderson,
Baudrillard, Bauman, Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Fukuyama, Guattari, Jameson,
Laclau, Latour, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Mouffe, Rorty, Žižek);
• influential (prominent contemporary scholars) (e.g. Best, Featherstone, Haraway,
Harding, Hartsock, Harvey, Hassan, Heller, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Irigaray,
Jenkins, Kellner, Lash, Lyon, Massey, Nicholson, Seidman, Silverman, Soja,
Tester, Urry, Vattimo, Venturi, Welsch, Young).

Surely, league tables aimed at capturing the impact of particular scholars in

academic fields and subfields are not only contentious and relatively arbitrary,
but also potentially dangerous and counterproductive. If we are willing to accept,
however, that – for the right or the wrong reasons – some intellectual figures
are, overall, more influential than others, then we are confronted with a striking
phenomenon when examining the wider significance of scholars whose works are
associated with postmodern thought: only some of them may be characterized as
‘pioneering’ early modern or modern thinkers; quite a few of them may be conceived
of as ‘pioneering’ late modern or postmodern thinkers; yet, a noticeably large propor-
tion of postmodern advocates and sympathizers can be classified as influential
‘commentators’ and ‘recyclers’, rather than as ‘paradigm inventors’, within contem-
porary intellectual disputes.

The Intellectual Scope and Influence of Postmodern Thought

The variety of academic and non-academic approaches to ‘the postmodern’ is
overwhelming. One may go as far as to suggest that, over the past three decades,
the ‘postmodern spirit’ has succeeded in colonizing almost every discipline and
32 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

every research area in the social sciences, especially in circles of debate and con-
troversy dominated by Anglophone scholars: ‘the spectre of postmodernism spread
its wings over almost every subject imaginable […]: postmodern finance, postmodern
housing policy, postmodern algebra, the postmodern library, the postmodern
brain and the postmodern Bible’.128 We may now speak of a ‘postmodern Marx,
or Durkheim, or Simmel, or Parsons, or feminism’.129
Given this wide-ranging impact, most studies of postmodern thought empha-
size the conceptual elasticity, discursive multiplicity, and interdisciplinary applicability
that characterize their object of enquiry. The key question that remains in this
respect, then, is whether or not the engagement with postmodern thought can
still be regarded as a worthwhile investigative endeavour in the early twenty-first
century. When examining the sociogenesis of postmodernism, it appears that the in-
depth interest in postmodern thought within the social sciences and humanities
reached its peak in the mid-1990s:

[…] the flow of publications with postmodern/postmodernism/postmodernity

in their title increased from a tiny stream in the 1970s to a huge flood in the
1990s. It expanded from a total counted number of 37 publications in the
1970s to 534 in the 1980s and 4219 in the 1990s.130

One may speculate about the reasons why, ‘[f]rom the early 1980s into the
1990s, debates over the modern and the postmodern were the hottest theoretical
game in town’,131 and why, furthermore, postmodernism reached its most influential
point in time in the mid-1990s. Undoubtedly, ‘the intellectual crisis of Western
Marxism’,132 shortly before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, played a
pivotal role, as postmodernism appeared to fill an ideological and political ‘power
vacuum caused by the collapse of Marxism’.133 In the context of an increasingly glo-
balized world, in which, for many observers and commentators, viable alternatives
to the hegemony of liberal-capitalist systems had lost all credibility and legitimacy,
postmodernism was perceived, by many, as an attractive – and, allegedly, postideo-
logical – paradigm able to account for the chaotic and disorganized constitution of
an epoch in which teleological conceptions of history served, at best, as simplistic
templates for the reductive interpretation of fundamentally directionless and
unpredictable societies. The end of the Cold War – triggered by the collapse of
state-socialist regimes in large parts of the world – appears to have led to the crea-
tion of a postmodern jungle whose inhabitants are, consciously or unconsciously,
motivated by the slogan ‘anything goes’.134 The ‘anything-goes-world’135 is a uni-
verse of limitless social, cultural, and political diversity in which there is no room
for big-picture ideologies. Hence, announcements regarding the beginning of the
era of postmodernity are intimately interrelated with provocative proclamations
about ‘the end of ideology’.136
Just as one may hypothesize as to why the engagement with postmodern
thought peaked in the mid-1990s, one may wonder why ‘around 1997 or so
the tide started to turn’.137 In this respect, one may favour one of the following
explanations:
 Introduction 33

1. The social world is no longer ‘amenable to analysis as postmodern’.138

According to this contention, the idea of ‘the postmodern’139 is now an
anachronism.
2. Debates and controversies concerning postmodern forms of being may be
regarded as outdated because ‘we are all postmodernists nowadays’.140 On this
account, given that postmodernity has, by this point, become an omnipresent
reality and ‘our, more or less, universal condition’,141 the idea of ‘the post-
modern’142 has, in relation to most aspects of society, converted itself into a
tautology.
3. The obsession with postmodernism ‘was a publishing phenomenon and the
academic publishers pulled the plug on titles with the word because the profit
margin could not be guaranteed’143 and because every form of paradigm-
surfing, whether intellectually or commercially driven, has to come to an end.
From this perspective, since ‘[b]oredom was bound to come [and…w]e get tired
of buzzwords’,144 the idea of ‘the postmodern’145 is tantamount to little more
than an obsolete commodity.

In short, although the term ‘postmodern’ appears to have survived and is still
being used in the current literature, it is now essentially ‘superseded’146 and has
become somewhat of an outmoded catchword in the contemporary context.
Thus, on the face of it, ‘[t]he postmodern – at least in the social sciences –
has somehow disappeared from the view’.147 Even if, however, one is willing to
concede that, while ‘[p]ostmodernism in the social sciences expanded strongly
in the first half of the 1990s, but experienced a relative decline from 1995 to
2000’,148 and even if one comes to the conclusion that ‘the period of its greatest
influence is now over’,149 its continuing presence in recent and current academic
and non-academic discourses illustrates that its lasting impact upon cutting-edge
controversies – particularly in the areas of epistemology, methodology, sociology,
historiography, and politics – is undeniable. Indeed, as numerous recently pub-
lished investigations illustrate, postmodern thought continues to be relevant to a large
variety of epistemological,150 methodological,151 sociological,152 historical,153 and politi-
cal154 studies in the contemporary social sciences. Therefore, the following chapters
shall demonstrate that ‘the spectre of postmodernism’155 is still very much with
us and that, rather than prematurely announcing a ‘post-postmodern post mortem
to postmodernism’,156 we need to face up to the fact that recent paradigmatic
developments in the social sciences cannot be understood without considering its
overall impact upon present-day forms of critical analysis.
Of course, the ‘postmodern turn’ is not the first paradigmatic shift that has
been announced in the social sciences. In fact, it appears to be a common feature
of academic research to be constantly shaped and reshaped by the proclamation
of intellectual changes and transitions, which tend to be conceived of as ‘path-
breaking’ by those who endorse them. Not much may be gained from counting
the amount of paradigmatic ‘turns’ that have been proclaimed in the social sci-
ences over the past two centuries. It is nevertheless useful to mention at least
some of them, in order to illustrate that the invention of intellectual traditions
34 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

and presuppositional frameworks is a widespread characteristic of academic forms

of knowledge production.
Among the most influential paradigmatic ‘turns’ advocated in the social sciences
since the Methodenstreit157 are the following: the ‘interpretive turn’,158 the ‘linguistic
turn’,159 the ‘relativist turn’,160 the ‘deconstructive turn’,161 the ‘contingent turn’,162
the ‘liquid turn’,163 the ‘cultural turn’,164 the ‘autonomous turn’,165 the ‘identitarian
turn’, the ‘reflexive turn’,166 the ‘empirical turn’,167 the ‘spatial turn’,168 the ‘per-
formative turn’,169 the ‘pragmatic turn’,170 the ‘existentialist turn’,171 the ‘vitalist
turn’,172 the ‘affective turn’,173 the ‘postsecular turn’,174 and – more recently – the
‘digital turn’.175 As should become clear from the analysis developed in the remain-
der of this study, one of the noteworthy features of the ‘postmodern turn’ is that
it is intimately linked to at least five of the above-mentioned paradigmatic shifts.

Key Dimensions of Postmodernity

Considering the intellectual controversies sparked by the rise of modernity, it
is not difficult to imagine that even those who endorse the view that, over the
past few decades, we have been witnessing the arrival of the postmodern condi-
tion have not been able to reach a consensus regarding the defining features of
the contemporary age. Furthermore, to the extent that most commentators who
defend the idea of ‘the rise of the postmodern age’ stress the chaotic and disorgan-
ized constitution of this allegedly unprecedented historical period, it appears even
less viable to grasp the arbitrarily and irregularly arranged elements of the current
epoch in a systematic fashion. Nonetheless, following the thematic structure of
the preceding enquiry concerning the nature of modernity, it makes sense to
point out that six levels of analysis are especially important to exploring the prin-
cipal characteristics of postmodernity.176
(1) On the economic level, the rise of postmodernity is associated with deindustri-
alization. The emergence and unstoppable development of postindustrial capital-
ism can be considered as one of the central driving forces of the postmodern age. In
the context of postindustrialism, it is not the case that the ‘primary sector’ and the
‘secondary sector’ have disappeared. In other words, the agricultural and industrial
areas of production, distribution, and consumption have not ceased to exist. Owing
to the rapid growth of the tertiary sector since the second part of the twentieth
century, however, postindustrial modes of economic activity have become the pre-
ponderant productive force in the contemporary world. In postmodern societies,
informational, technological, and cultural goods are the main sources of economic
production, distribution, and consumption as well as the crucial resources at stake
in terms of economic expansion, competition, and development.
(2) On the epistemic level, the rise of postmodernity cannot be divorced from
the gradual derationalization of society in general and of people’s lifeworlds in par-
ticular. To be sure, derationalization processes under postmodern parameters do
not involve the weakening, let alone the disappearance, of science in terms of its
influence upon both the macro-organizational and the micro-experiential realms
of society. On the contrary, due to the pivotal role played by expert knowledge
and high technology in the economic and cultural developments of postindustrial
 Introduction 35

societies, it appears that, in the contemporary world, science is more influential

than ever before. One key feature of postmodern historical formations, however,
consists in the fact that, in terms of its epistemic validity, science is regarded as one
‘language game’ among others. The postmodern condition, then, is a polycentri-
cally constructed universe in which no particular type of meaning-laden horizon
of reference points – irrespective of whether it is institutional or ephemeral –
can claim to possess an epistemic monopoly on the interpretation of reality.
The derationalized world of postmodernity is shot through with competing dis-
courses: economic, political, ideological, cultural, philosophical, artistic, religious,
or scientific – to mention only a few. Each of these discourses is based on a set
of interconnected – yet, both irreducible and incommensurable – assumptions,
whose acceptability is contingent not upon the constraining parameters of logical
or evidence-based rationality, but upon context-specific criteria of validity emerg-
ing out of relationally assembled constellations that are sustained by relatively
arbitrary codes of social legitimacy.
(3) On the political level, the rise of postmodernity manifests itself in processes
of deideologization. Some would go as far as to assert that, because we have been
witnessing the decline of traditional political ideologies, we now effectively live in
a postideological age.177 To be clear, this is not to posit that individual and collective
actors have ceased to generate ideas or to mobilize more or less coherent sets of
background assumptions when attributing meaning to, and interacting with, the
world. Rather, this is to acknowledge that, in the context of postmodernity, big-
picture ideologies – such as anarchism, communism, socialism, liberalism, con-
servatism, and fascism – have lost the considerable influence they once had. The
delegitimization process of classical political ideologies is reflected – perhaps most
notably – in the historical events leading to the end of the Cold War: the deep
historical contingency and political questionability of all meta-ideological forma-
tions is epitomized in the collapse of state socialism in Eastern and Central Europe
at the end of the twentieth century. As a result of these major historical events, it
appears that, effectively, capitalism is ‘the only game in town’178 and that, para-
doxically, if there is any victorious worldview in the ‘postideological age’, it is a
political liberalism absolved from having to compete with its most challenging
historical rivals, namely socialism and communism. To put it bluntly, while the
modern period was the age of ideologies, the postmodern era is an epoch seeking
to move beyond ideologies.
(4) On the organizational level, the rise of postmodernity is expressed in the ten-
dency towards debureaucratization. This, of course, is not to maintain that bureau-
cracies have disappeared in recent decades or that they will dissolve in the near
future. On the contrary, bureaucratic forms of action coordination will continue
to be crucial to the organization of highly differentiated societies, particularly with
regard to their political, economic, and judicial spheres. What is striking, however,
is that, at least since ‘the end of organized capitalism’179 has been announced, we
have come to accept not only that the world is a less and less predictable place,
but also that, in postmodern societies, large-scale bureaucracies are perceived as an
obstacle to, rather than as a precondition for, the possibility of flexible, responsive,
36 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

and efficient forms of action coordination. The condition of postmodernity is an

extraordinarily dynamic social reality based on short-termism, risk-taking, and self-
responsibility, rather than a project based on long-termism, cautious planning, and
institutionally sustained solidarities. If the epitome of modernity is the idea of a
totally administered society, postmodernity is about facing up to the prospects and
opportunities, as well as to the limitations and risks, emerging within essentially
uncontrollable realities. The ‘strong states’ of totally administered societies appear
to have given way to ‘slim states’ assertive enough to protect, and adaptive enough
to tolerate, the playfulness of postmodern realities.
(5) On the cultural level, the rise of postmodernity emanates from, and mani-
fests itself in, processes of hyper-individualization. To the extent that, according to
Durkheimian parameters, the shift from premodern to modern society led to the
transition from ‘mechanic’ to ‘organic’ solidarity, in a post-Durkheimian sense, the
shift from modern to postmodern society is accompanied by the transition from
‘organic’ to ‘liquid’ solidarity.180 Put differently, we have moved from the premod-
ern ‘cult of God’ via the modern ‘cult of the unitary subject’ to the postmodern
‘cult of the fragmented individual’. Postmodern actors continue to draw upon
diverse sources of identity, enabling them to develop a sense of unique subjec-
tivity: class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, ‘race’, cultural preferences,
life-style, religion, age, ability, or political ideology – to mention but the most
important ones. What distinguishes the construction processes of postmodern
identities from hitherto existing modes of personhood formation, however, is
their degree of adaptability, changeability, diversity, and complexity, that is, their
polymorphous constitution derived from relationally defined forms of intersec-
tionality. In consumerist societies, postmodern individuals are not only expected
to pick and choose from different sources of personal and collective identity; in
addition, they are required to exist as radically contingent, fluid, plural, contradic-
tory, and knowledgeable selves:181

A. As contingent selves, they constantly develop and adjust in relation to rapidly

changing social, cultural, and historical contexts.
B. As fluid selves, they are in a ceaseless state of flux, lacking an ultimate and
context-transcending essence.
C. As plural selves, they have a multiplicity of selves living within themselves and
are, therefore, equipped with the capacity to take on a large variety of social
roles, the number increasing with the complexity of the interactional contexts
in question.
D. As contradictory selves, they are internally divided by mutually challenging and
conflicting selves and, hence, haunted by the experience of both circumstan-
tial and existential dilemmas triggered by objectively existing, yet subjectively
suffered, processes of psychosocial fragmentation.
E. As knowledgeable selves, they are confronted with the challenging task of being
able to mobilize both implicit and explicit, practical and theoretical, taken-
for-granted and discursive, intuitive and reflexive resources of action and
cognition.
 Introduction 37

(6) On the philosophical level, the rise of postmodernity cannot be understood

in separation from the task of deconstruction. In essence, the ‘deconstructive atti-
tude’182 endorsed by postmodern philosophy is suspicious of the Enlightenment
optimism vis-à-vis the assertive, regulative, and reflexive functions of modern science:

A. The assertive function of modern science concerns its representational capacity

to provide evidence-based – that is, epistemically adequate, analytically sound,
and argumentatively convincing – accounts of the underlying mechanisms
that govern both the constitution and the evolution of the natural world as
well as of the social world.
B. The regulative function of modern science designates its interventional capac-
ity to offer purposive – that is, empirically viable, practically sustainable, and
technologically ever more sophisticated – models permitting both individual
and collective actors to gain increasing control over their physical and cultural
environments.
C. The reflexive function of modern science refers to its critical capacity to develop
emancipatory – that is, conceptually insightful, intellectually enlightening,
and socially empowering – knowledge equipping ordinary actors with the abil-
ity to make use of their rational faculties with the aim of liberating themselves
from mechanisms of domination and, thus, from both the symbolic and the
material chains of power-laden realities.

By contrast, the age of postmodernity is characterized by radical incredulity towards the

assertive, regulative, and reflexive functions of methodical enquiries and, consequently, by
deep scepticism towards the representational, interventional, and critical capacities of sci-
entific epistemologies. The invention of the modern subject capable of epistemically
accurate representation, control-oriented intervention, and emancipatory reflection
appears to have lost credibility in the context of postmodernity. For the postmod-
ern universe is composed of a multiplicity of human and nonhuman actors, none
of whom occupies an epistemically privileged position. All attempts to obtain the
total and unequivocal mastery of a relationally constituted – and, hence, constantly
shifting – reality end up reproducing the stifling logic of ethnocentric, logocentric,
or anthropocentric claims to validity. From a deconstructivist point of view, then, a
world without essences amounts to a planetary context of existence that does not
allow for universal frameworks of representation, explanation, and emancipation.
For the spatiotemporal specificities of locally anchored realities are irreducible to epis-
temic models oriented towards the discovery of context-transcending generalizability.

Just as the foregoing overview of the main factors contributing to the rise of
modernity is far from complete, the above outline regarding the principal aspects
of the postmodern condition is not intended to be exhaustive. What such a
synopsis illustrates, however, is that the contention that we have entered a
‘postmodern era’ needs to be assessed in terms of its multifaceted presupposi-
tional underpinnings. Thus, similar to the critical examination of the ‘condition
of modernity’, we need to engage in a multifactorial analysis capable of grasping
38 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

the various interrelated – and, to some extent, overlapping – dynamics that have,
arguably, led to the emergence of postmodern societies.
It is imperative to be aware of the fact that, paradoxically, the aforementioned
elements can be considered as both reasons for and consequences of the rise of
postmodernity: as contributing factors, the central function that they serve in the
unfolding of historical developments has made the postmodern condition pos-
sible; as tangible outcomes, they have been shaped by the historical settings that
they have themselves brought into existence. In short, the dialectics of postmod-
ernity stems from the interplay between several – principally (1) economic, (2)
epistemic, (3) political, (4) organizational, (5) cultural, and (6) philosophical – fac-
tors. These factors constitute, at the same time, the precondition for and the result of
the emergence of novel – arguably postmodern – societal formations, which came
into being in the Western world from the late twentieth century onwards and
which, ever since their emergence, began to have an increasing influence upon
civilizational developments across the globe.

(Post-)Modernity, (Post-)Modernism, and (Post-)Modernization

Offering preliminary short-hand definitions of the terms ‘modern’ and ‘postmod-

ern’ involves the risk of giving a reductive account that distorts the complexity of
the analytical task that lies ahead of us in the remainder of this book. In essence,
this challenging – and, arguably, paradoxical – task consists in developing a system-
atic account of the eclectic nature of both modern and postmodern thought. For the
sake of conceptual clarity, it is useful to be aware of the following terminological
differentiation:

1. The term modernity shall be employed to refer to an epochal shift or break

from traditional societies, implying the consolidation of an unprecedented
social totality, with increasingly complex organizing principles, which began to
develop in Europe from the late seventeenth century onwards and, gradually,
spread around the globe.
2. The term modernism shall be used to denote any discursive – notably, aesthetic,
cultural, political, or academic – efforts to attach meaning to modernity and
capture its historical specificity.
3. The term modernization shall stand for any social and discursive processes that
shape both the constitution and the awareness of the historical condition
called ‘modernity’.

In summary: (1) The term modernity designates the historical formation succeed-
ing premodernity and preceding postmodernity. (2) The term modernism refers to
the discursive practices reflecting the historical specificity of modernity. (3) The
term modernization describes the relational processes – including the discursive
practices – generating the historical phase of modernity.183
Analogously, the following terminological differentiation is relevant to the
argument developed in this book.
 Introduction 39

1. The term postmodernity shall be employed to refer to ‘an epochal shift or break
from modernity involving the emergence of a new social totality with its own
distinct organizing principles’.184
2. The term postmodernism shall be used to denote any ‘aesthetic, cultural, politi-
cal, or academic attempts to make sense of postmodernity’185 and capture its
historical specificity.
3. The term postmodernization shall stand for any social and discursive processes
that shape both the constitution and the awareness of the historical condition
called ‘postmodernity’.

In summary: (1) The term postmodernity designates the historical phase succeed-
ing modernity. (2) The term postmodernism refers to the discursive practices pre-
vailing in postmodernity. (3) The term postmodernization describes the relational
processes – including the discursive practices – creating the historical phase of
postmodernity.
The main argument of this study, which weaves the following chapters
together, can be summarized as follows. The ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sci-
ences reflects a paradigmatic shift from the Enlightenment belief in the relative
determinacy of both the natural world and the social world to the – increasingly
widespread – post-Enlightenment belief in the radical indeterminacy of all material
and symbolic forms of existence. The far-reaching scope and considerable impact
of this paradigmatic shift manifests itself in five presuppositional ‘turns’ that
have substantially shaped the development of the social sciences over the past
few decades:

I. the ‘relativist turn’ in epistemology;

II. the ‘interpretive turn’ in social research methodology;
III. the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology;
IV. the ‘contingent turn’ in historiography; and
V. the ‘autonomous turn’ in politics.

It shall be the task of subsequent chapters to shed light not only upon the theo-
retical and practical complexity of these normative shifts, but also upon the wider
impact they have had, and continue to have, upon the contemporary social
sciences.
1
From Modern to Postmodern
Epistemology? The ‘Relativist Turn’

This chapter is concerned with the impact of postmodern thought on contem-

porary debates in epistemology. As shall be illustrated in the following sections,
present-day conceptions of knowledge have been profoundly influenced by what
may be described as the relativist turn1 in epistemology. From a relativist perspec-
tive, the validity of all knowledge claims is contingent upon the spatiotemporal
specificity of the sociohistorical context in which they are raised. On this view,
epistemic validity is – always and unavoidably – context-dependent. Given that it
obliges us to question both the representational adequacy and the explanatory
capacity of all cognitive claims to epistemic validity, the relativist position can be
considered as an attack on the Enlightenment belief in the civilizational mission
of reason, understood as a universal force shaping the development of human his-
tory. Epistemological relativism, then, constitutes an assault on the anthropologi-
cal optimism underlying modern intellectual thought. As such, its advocates are
wary of the – implicit or explicit – trust in the assertive, normative, and expressive
capacities of the ‘rational subject’,2 which features centrally in the project of the
Enlightenment. This chapter aims to demonstrate that the presuppositional dif-
ferences between modern and postmodern conceptions of knowledge are based
on three fundamental tensions: (i) truth versus perspective, (ii) certainty versus uncer-
tainty, and (iii) universality versus particularity.

(i) Truth versus Perspective

Owing to its concern with the systematic exploration of the preconditions for the
consolidation and organization of rationally constituted life forms, modern social
theory stands in the tradition of Enlightenment thought.3 Supporters of postmod-
ern conceptions of knowledge tend to be suspicious of the Enlightenment project
in that they distance themselves from the – arguably ‘modern’ – obsession with
the discovery of ‘truths’ about the functioning of both the natural and the social
realms of worldly existence. From a postmodern point of view, one of the main
problems arising from Enlightenment thought is that it portrays ‘truth’ as an
objective representational force, whose epistemic validity transcends the perspecti-
val contingency of its own spatiotemporal determinacy.

40
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 41

In order to give credibility to the explanatory capacity of an allegedly unmedi-

ated access to reality, we need to distinguish between ‘adequate representations’
and ‘inadequate representations’ – or, more concisely, between ‘representations’
and ‘misrepresentations’ – of the world. Following this dichotomous logic, in the
Enlightenment tradition, ‘truth’ is constructed in opposition to ‘untruth’. The
binary differentiation between ‘the true’ and ‘the false’ stems from the preten-
tious idiosyncrasy and self-referential authority of reason. Under the parameters
of modern social thought, the distinctively human faculty of reasoning is regarded
as an empowering cognitive force that enables subjects capable of critical reflection
and linguistic representation to succeed in their – supposedly emancipatory –
search for objective truths. Consequently, the province of standpoint is converted
into the Empire of Reason. The small business of perspective is sold as the
Kingdom of Truth.
If, by contrast, we follow a postmodern agenda, we need to call the conceptual
opposition between ‘true’ and ‘false’ into question. The paradigmatic significance of
this antinomy manifests itself in the construction of various – arguably ‘modern’ –
epistemological dichotomies: valid versus erroneous, accurate versus inaccurate, neu-
tral versus biased, genuine versus counterfeit, authentic versus inauthentic, and
real versus deceptive – to mention only a few of the most important epistemic
antinomies that continue to permeate mainstream intellectual thought. To the
extent that, in the social sciences, explanatory frameworks are profoundly marked
by binary conceptions of reality,4 it is the task of postmodern explorations to shed
light on the arbitrary nature of these analytical dichotomies. From a postmodern
point of view, we need to break out of the epistemic straitjacket of binary categor-
ies in order to free ourselves from the illusory nature of the quest for ultimate
truths. Thus, we need to recognize that the modern ambition to gain increasing
control over both the natural world and the social world through the search for
irrefutable truths – an endeavour that lies at the heart of the Enlightenment – is
in vain. For the construction of particular perspectives is never derived from the
revelation of universal truths; on the contrary, the invention of seemingly indis-
putable truths is, unavoidably, undertaken from a spatiotemporally specific, and
socially constituted, place in the world.
Given their ambition to engage in the search for universal truths, grand social
theories can be conceived of as ‘projects of “unmasking”’.5 As unmasking endeav-
ours, macrotheoretical approaches aim to uncover an underlying storyline, which
is believed to be inherent in the structural composition of society and the proces-
sual unfolding of human actions. Following these ambitious normative param-
eters, critical social scientists are expected to take on the enlightening mission to
unearth the causal mechanisms that, presumably, determine both the constitu-
tion and the evolution of worldly existence. With this large-scale challenge in
mind, grand social theories – notably their Marxist, functionalist, and systems-
focused variants – set themselves the task of identifying the constitutive features
and driving forces shaping the development of human life forms. The epistemic
project of uncovering the deep structures that are hidden behind the walls of
social surfaces reflects the modern desire to contribute to the enlightenment of
42 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

humanity: literally, light is to be thrown on the invisible structures that govern

the course of human history.
According to postmodern epistemological agendas, however, there ‘are no
deep structures, no secret or final causes; all is (or is not) what it appears on the
surface’.6 Hence, postmodern thinkers reject structuralist and causalist, as well
as dichotomist, conceptions of reality. In their eyes, the binary differentiation
between ‘essence’ and ‘appearance’ stems from the misleading modern obsession
with the attempt to discover and uncover the ‘truth’ about an underlying reality,
whose modes of functioning are not immediately perceivable by those who are
directly immersed in, and largely determined by, them.
Surely, the project of unmasking, which is central to modern social thought,
is not limited to exposing the material structures and driving forces of a causally
determined world; for, in addition, it is concerned with exploring the symbolic
structures and linguistic elements of a meaning-laden universe. Modern sociological
approaches, especially those developed in the spirit of Marxian and Durkheimian
analysis, aim to demystify the ideological reflections of the material conditions
that determine the constitution of social reality.7 On this view, one of the main
tasks of sociological enquiry is to uncover the underlying determinants of both
the material and the symbolic dimensions of reality. Postmodern thought, how-
ever, refuses to buy into the reductive logic of conceptual antinomies – such as
objectivity versus subjectivity, authenticity versus distortion, representation versus
misrepresentation, enlightenment versus false consciousness, and science
versus ideology. ‘Indeed, one of the conditions of postmodernist sensibility must
be the refusal to prescribe some discourses as essentially and unchallengeably
True, and to proscribe others as irredeemably False.’8
In order to resist the temptation to divide the symbolic world into an enlight-
ening sphere of ‘true’ discourses, derived from the eye-opening power of scientific
explanations, and a misleading domain of ‘false’ discourses, caught up in the doxic
realm of ordinary misrepresentations, postmodern thinkers turn classical social
theory against itself by drawing on one of its most central insights: namely, the
insight that the constitutive elements of human reality are – at least to a large
extent – socially constructed.9 On this account, the spatiotemporally specific consti-
tution of society hinges upon the ceaseless – material and symbolic – reinvention
of reality. Society is composed of structurally interrelated actors, who constantly
construct and reconstruct reality by virtue of their everyday performances.
Social objectivities are externally actualized subjectivities, just as subjectivities
are internally actualized objectivities. Put differently, human reality is a socially
constructed universe of subjectively internalized objectivities and objectively externalized
subjectivities.
In light of the spatiotemporally irreducible contingency of every society, we
are obliged to face up to the intrinsic relativity of all forms of knowledgeability.
Regardless of whether we draw upon implicit or explicit, practical or theoretical,
intuitive or discursive knowledge, we are caught up in the perspectival determin-
acy of a cultural community whose codified linguisticality defines the limits
of our epistemic capabilities. Knowledge is part of a reality created by human
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 43

beings. The most abstract epistemic representations cannot escape their creators’
embeddedness in history. To the extent that human reality is socially constructed,
human knowledge is relationally contingent: different cultures and different
epochs produce spatially and temporally situated conceptions of themselves and
of other contexts. In brief, the normativity of the perspective determines the
descriptibility of the object.10
If – following the constructivist view put forward by postmodern thinkers – we
recognize that human knowledgeability cannot escape its own sociocultural
determinacy, then we need to accept that ‘truth is made rather than found’.11 In
other words, truth is not primarily a matter of rational validity or enlightening
discovery, but, above all, a question of social legitimacy and cultural specificity.
According to postmodern parameters, therefore, every pretension of Truth is only
a version of truth, as there is a whole multiplicity of relationally constructed –
and, hence, diverging – truths out there. ‘Truth is, in other words, a social relation
(like power, ownership or freedom): an aspect of a hierarchy built of superiority-
inferiority units’.12 To the extent that knowledge is always socially constructed
and, correspondingly, to the extent that rational validity is contingent upon
relationally constituted forms of legitimacy, every assertion of truth takes place in
a power-laden horizon of perception and interaction. Put differently, every quest
for truth is an epistemic journey shot through with the context-laden power of
perspective.13

(ii) Certainty versus Uncertainty

From a postmodern point of view, modern intellectual thought is not only

obsessed with the quest for truth but also driven by the search for epistemic cer-
tainty. By contrast, the only postmodern certainty in the pursuit of knowledge is
epistemic uncertainty. Thus, the modern aspiration towards reassuring modes of
epistemic certainty stands in opposition to the postmodern insistence upon the
assumption that uncertainty is a constitutive element of all – including scientific –
forms of knowledge production. The former position is based on a foundationalist
conception of knowledge; the latter stance, on the other hand, reflects an anti-
foundationalist account of the way in which human actors can gain a symbolically
mediated access to reality. Epistemological foundationalism can be defined as ‘the
belief that we possess a privileged basis for cognitive certainty’.14 Epistemological
anti-foundationalism, by contrast, can be described as the notion that, far from
possessing any kind of reassuring source of representational adequacy for epis-
temic forms of judgement, we need to accept that, owing to the perspective-laden
and context-dependent contingency of all knowledge claims, we cannot escape
the limitations imposed by the ubiquity of cognitive uncertainty. From a postmod-
ern angle, then, the search for ultimate – rational, moral, or aesthetic – grounds
is deemed to be groundless.
In their numerous attempts to develop comprehensive explanatory frameworks
aimed at uncovering both the structural foundations of society and the rational foun-
dations of knowledge, modern social scientists tend to subscribe – consciously or
44 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

unconsciously – to foundationalist presuppositions, which undergird their inves-

tigative endeavours. The modern search for certainty hides away from ambiguity,
as the presence of the latter undermines the self-imposed illusions of the former.
Indeed, the foundationalist assertion of epistemic certainty aims to circumvent
cognitive ambivalence, pretending ‘that its non-ambiguity has unshakeable and
totally reliable foundations’.15 Rational foundations are supposed to serve as
steadfast epistemic grounds for the pursuit of scientific objectivity. Under modern
parameters, scientific objectivity allows for epistemic certainty, just as epistemic
certainty is a sign of scientific objectivity. Modern ‘philosophers seeking object-
ivity see themselves as reflectors, as mirrors, of reality; hence, they set out to
establish the “foundations of knowledge”. Foundational arguments are universals
that establish the grounds for truth in what are conceived of as objectively rational
ways’.16 Similar to the constructivist critique of epistemological realism, however,
an anti-foundationalist account of knowledge draws attention to the fact that the
formulation of universal grounds is – always and unavoidably – undertaken by
socially situated subjects.
The recognition of the social conditions of production underlying all processes
of action and cognition obliges us to face up to the intrinsic relativity and uncer-
tainty of all claims to epistemic validity. The relativity of knowledge is certain,
just as the certainty of knowledge is relative. In light of this view, the anti-
foundationalist position advocated by postmodern thought falls squarely in line
with a pragmatist conception of knowledge:

Rather than evaluating knowledge, […] we should explore its social origins.
Rather than criticizing society in light of universalist norms, we should
criticize universalist norms in light of their social base. Because ‘justification
is a matter of social practice’ […] we must explain ‘rationality and epistemic
authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the
former’ […].17

Knowledge is not the substructure of society, but, on the contrary, society is

the – constantly evolving – substructure of knowledge. To recognize that different
life forms produce different language games means to concede that historically
specific societal formations generate their own symbolic configurations. Certainty
can only appear to be justified within specific – that is, contextually contingent –
frameworks of socially constructed frameworks of symbolic reference. From a
postmodern perspective, then, the ‘founding figures’ of modern social theory can
be regarded as the ‘creating figures’ of modern foundationalism, since they have
literally invented, rather than discovered, the structural constitution of society
and the rational grounds of scientific knowledge. From a postmodern perspective,
foundations are not found but fabricated. Certainty, instead of being discovered,
has been constructed – that is, projected onto the world – by modern foundation-
alists. Modern thought believes itself to possess a privileged basis for cognitive
certainty. Postmodern thought, by contrast, accepts that, if anything, it is impreg-
nated with an unprivileged position of cognitive uncertainty.
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 45

To be sure, the modern belief in the power of cognitive certainty is not limited
to the sphere of theoretical interpretation, but it also affects various realms of
practical intervention. Reason, in the modern sense, represents a promising source
of civilizational seduction, which opens an entire horizon of possibilities nour-
ished by the belief in the viability of large-scale social change as well as human
emancipation. Certainty, understood in modern terms, is based on the insist-
ence upon the transformative and emancipatory power of human reason. As a
transcendental force, reason is an empowering source of existential certainty. For
reason permits us to capture the essential truths about the objective, normative,
and subjective dimensions shaping our lifeworlds. Reason enables us to subjugate
the underlying mechanisms of the physical, cultural, and personal realms of our
existence to the steering capacity of human rationality. The Enlightenment is a
historical expression of our – distinctively human – desire and capacity to gain
rational control over both the natural and the social components of our external
world and our inner world.18
From a foundationalist standpoint, reason constitutes ‘modernity’s engine’.19 For
the certainty of rationality equips us with the confidence to embark upon the
journey of human history by drawing upon accessible and reassuring resources
of knowledgeability. Rational entities are conscious and autonomous beings,
guided by their reflexive capacity to shape their lives according to their needs.
Epistemological foundationalism embraces an optimistic conception of reason,
assuming that rational entities are capable of creating and controlling the condi-
tions of their existence in purposive and meaningful ways. In other words, the
power of reason endows us with the hermeneutic certainty of ontological purpose
and everyday meaning.
Given its anti-foundationalist spirit, postmodern thought is suspicious of the
Enlightenment belief in the protagonist role and empowering force of reason.
The history of the twentieth century has illustrated how the ideal of the control
over the objective, normative, and subjective facets of our existence can be – and,
on multiple occasions, has been – converted into a brutal reality of material and
symbolic domination: great certainties have often led to major crimes; earth-shattering
scientific discoveries have allowed for the possibility of large-scale wars; and the quest
for ultimate ideological foundations has, in practice, contributed to the consolidation of
totalitarian political regimes. Considering the disastrous historical consequences of
the collective search for certainty in the modern age, it seems that critical enti-
ties, carrying the weight of the past on their shoulders, have no choice but to face
up to the deeply uncertain nature of human life. In other words, the deceitful
assurances of modern certainty are to be transcended by the only postmodern
certainty: uncertainty.20

(iii) Universality versus Particularity

The tension-laden relationship between the search for universality and the rec-
ognition of particularity is crucial for understanding the normative outlook of
postmodern thought. Of course, the debate on the significance of the opposition
46 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

between universality and particularity is not a recent phenomenon. On the con-

trary, the quest for universals, which is expressed in the belief in the possibility of
context-transcending epistemic validity, represents one of the most controversial
issues in the entire history of philosophy: ‘after 2500 years, philosophers still have
not agreed about what such universals are, or about how they can be proved’.21
Since the beginning of the Enlightenment, the quest for universals has gained
increasing importance: key normative principles – such as the main slogans of the
French Revolution (1789–99), namely: liberté, égalité, fraternité – lie at the heart
of the modern project. The collective pursuit of universal truths and principles
manifests itself in the construction of metadiscourses and metanarratives. At the same
time, the attack on the universalist ambitions of these influential discourses and
grand narratives may be regarded as the motivational cornerstone of the postmod-
ern endeavour. The assault on the universalist discourses and narratives that lie at
the heart of the Enlightenment project is – perhaps most famously – articulated in
Jean-François Lyotard’s famous definition of the terms ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’:

I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with
reference to a metadiscourse […] making an explicit appeal to some grand
narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the
emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth. […]
I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.22

Thus, the radical incredulity towards metanarratives23 is central to the postmodern rejec-
tion of the modern alignment towards universality. The calling into question of the
legitimacy of metadiscourses and metanarratives has profound implications not
only for the gap between modern and postmodern conceptions of knowledge, but
also for the normative discrepancy between modern and postmodern politics.24
Arguably, substantial parts of modern intellectual currents and traditions are per-
meated by the belief in universality, whereas a key characteristic of their postmodern
counterparts is the critical engagement with different expressions and experiences
of particularity. Yet, the in-depth focus on particularity cannot be reduced to a
merely philosophical position, as illustrated in the postmodern commitment to
political plurality, cultural heterogeneity, and interactional complexity, all of which can
be regarded as constitutive features of advanced – arguably polycentric – societies.25
Far from representing a merely scholastic perspective, then, the concern with
particularity has far-reaching practical consequences for the constitution of post-
modern values in general and postmodern politics in particular. The normative
significance of this position is reflected in the fact that advocates of postmodern
thought tend to defend – or, in some cases, even celebrate – the existence of
political plurality, cultural heterogeneity, and interactional complexity, which
they interpret as tangible manifestations of both the real and the representational
preponderance of particularity over universality in highly differentiated societies.
According to postmodern parameters, however, the modern obsession with the
pursuit of universality leads to the repression of particularity, epitomizing its failure
to account for the socio-ontological weight of behavioural, ideological, and insti-
tutional expressions of human differentiality.26 Just as the search for truth and
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 47

certainty, so too is the quest for universality driven by the illusion of order.27 From
a postmodern perspective, universals exist only as discursive illusions, mental
constructs, and self-referential fictions. The defence of universals is a constitutive
element of conceptual system building in modern social thought. Yet, the univer-
salist notion that analytical frameworks have to be able to rise above contextual
specificity in order to claim epistemic authority ignores the fact that linguistically
articulated assertions of validity are always embedded in power-laden struggles
over social legitimacy.
Throughout the course of history, the ideological construction of epistemic
universals has proven to represent a major source of political and symbolic power.
The real problem, however, is ‘not to abjure such hypostatized universals but to
explain why anyone had taken them seriously, and how they came to seem rel-
evant to discussions of the nature of personhood and of reason’.28 What worries
the postmodern mind is not simply the philosophical formulation of universals,
but, above all, their concrete manifestation in, and tangible impact on, human
history. The philosophical obsession with universality has substantial repercus-
sions for the political preoccupation with its individually or collectively pursued
realization. From a postmodern point of view, the former is just as illusory – and
yet, just as forceful – as the latter. Fierce critics of modern universalism hope that,
‘[o]nce the politicians abandon their search for empires, there is little demand for
the philosophers’ search for universality.’29 Postmodern anti-universalism aims at
the rigorous defence of ‘the non-universal’, ‘the particular’, and ‘the local’, as well
as – in some cases – of ‘the other’ and ‘the oppressed’. On this account, if anything
is universal, it is ‘the unique [that] is universal’.30 While the search for universality
can be considered a central concern in modern intellectual thought, the radical
defence and playful celebration of particularity can be regarded as essential to the
development of postmodern epistemological sensibilities.31

Summary

As elucidated in this chapter, the presuppositional differences between modern

and postmodern conceptions of knowledge are based on three epistemological
tensions: (i) truth versus perspective, (ii) certainty versus uncertainty, and (iii) uni-
versality versus particularity. On a metatheoretical level, these tensions may be
conceptualized in terms of the presuppositional differences between objectivist
and constructivist, foundationalist and anti-foundationalist, as well as universalist and
particularist epistemologies. Simplifying the theoretical complexity and practical
implications of the tensions arising from these paradigmatic antinomies, one
may suggest that postmodern approaches to knowledge share the following three
assumptions:

I. The only postmodern truth can be found in the plurality of diverging

perspectives.
II. The only postmodern certainty is expressed in its firm belief in uncertainty.
III. The only postmodern universality can be traced in the recognition of multiple
particularities.
48 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

As argued above, these three assumptions are central to the relativist turn in
epistemology. According to this paradigmatic shift, the modern ambition to prove
the relative determinacy of representational, foundational, and universalizable types of
knowledge production needs to be abandoned in favour of the postmodern readiness to
face up to the radical indeterminacy of all – implicit or explicit, intuitive or reflective,
unconscious or conscious – attempts to gain a symbolically mediated access to reality.

Towards a New Epistemology?

It is difficult to make sense of the aforementioned antinomies – that is, truth

versus perspective, certainty versus uncertainty, and universality versus particularity –
without considering the paradigmatic opposition between positivist and interpretiv-
ist approaches in the social sciences. The centrality of the controversies sparked
by the epistemological discrepancies between these two intellectual currents is
reflected in the development of the social sciences since the ‘methodological dis-
pute’ (Methodenstreit),32 not only in terms of the divide between the paradigm of
explanation (Erklären) and the paradigm of understanding (Verstehen),33 but also,
as illustrated in this chapter, in the subsequently emerging gap between modern
and postmodern approaches to knowledge.
It would be simplistic to reduce modern epistemologies to the paradigm of
explanation and postmodern epistemologies to the paradigm of understanding.
There is no doubt, however, that modern and postmodern approaches can be
distinguished in terms of their respective conceptions of scientific activity. The
former are, by and large, driven by the enlightening mission to uncover and explain
the underlying determinants of the world. The latter are, to a large extent, moti-
vated by the interpretive task to deconstruct and understand the sociohistorically
shifting meanings attached to empirical actualities, to which we have access as
symbolically mediated realities and to which we attribute meaning by virtue of
linguistically structured forms of rationality. Put differently, our encounter with the
world takes place as an encounter with language. This – phenomenologically inspired –
insistence upon the intimate relationship between sociality and linguisticality in
the construction of human realities is central to postmodern epistemologies, nota-
bly to their emphasis on the interpretive nature of all claims to epistemic validity.
Yet, due to their objectivist, foundationalist, and universalist ambitions, positivist
approaches to scientific enquiry appear to lack the capacity to account for the
meaning-laden dimensions permeating socially constructed realities.
It comes as no surprise, then, that the uncompromising opposition to positivist
approaches in the social sciences lies at the heart of postmodern theories of knowledge.
The centrality of this epistemological stance is reflected in the noticeable refer-
ential relevance of the explicit and radical critique of positivism articulated in
numerous writings concerned with postmodern conceptions of knowledge.34 To
be sure, far from constituting a unified epistemological project, there are numer-
ous competing approaches within the intellectual tradition generally described
as ‘positivism’. Yet, three variants of positivism have been particularly influential
in the philosophy of the social sciences: first, the early positivism, developed by
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 49

Auguste Comte; second, the logical positivism, also called ‘logical empiricism’,
endorsed by leading members of the Vienna Circle, notably Ernst Mach and Carl
Menger; and, third, the so-called standard positivism, to which one may refer as the
‘conventional-positivist’ view in the philosophy of science, defended by scholars
such as Rudolf Carnap, Carl G. Hempel, Ernest Nagel, and – perhaps, most famously –
Karl Popper.35 Although there are substantial differences between these three posi-
tivist currents, they have a number of key preoccupations and presuppositions in
common, especially with regard to their systematic engagement with the constitu-
tive features of scientific knowledge production. In essence, positivist approaches in
the social sciences share eight fundamental epistemological assumptions, which
shall be briefly elucidated in the following section.

Positivism
(1) Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of observation-based knowledge.
On this view, genuinely scientific knowledge is derived from experience. Rather
than relying on merely theoretical thought experiments, scientific knowledge – in
the positivist sense – stems from the practical engagement with, and the empirical
study of, reality. Scientific truth claims are provable by virtue of observation and
experiment, guided by the methodical experience of objectively existing elements
of the world. When sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, economists, or
political scientists affirm that their truth claims, in order to be verified, need to be
substantiated on the basis of empirical evidence, they assume that the most sophis-
ticated conceptual tools and the most thoroughly thought-through explanatory
frameworks are useless unless their epistemic validity can be proven by means
of the observation-based – that is, experiential and, if possible and necessary,
experimental – examination of reality.
(2) Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of testable knowledge. On this
account, genuinely scientific knowledge is falsifiable. This presupposition ties in
with the previous one: the whole point of scientific investigation is to be pre-
pared to look for both evidence and counterevidence when examining particular
dimensions of, and trying to make factual statements about, reality. Indeed, if we
take the principle of falsifiability seriously, then there is no such thing as a con-
clusive truth claim, understood as an irrefutable representation or explanation of
a particular aspect of the world. For, in principle, every assertion – regardless of
whether it is based on scientific or common-sense knowledge – is open to revision.
One central issue that has haunted philosophers of knowledge for a long time is
the question of how it is possible to distinguish between science and non-science,
as well as between science and pseudo-science. This epistemological preoccupation
is also known as the ‘demarcation problem’,36 as it concerns the question of where
the line between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ types of knowledge should be
drawn. Surely, one can come up with a long list of criteria that need to be met in
order for a particular approach to reality to count as ‘scientific’. The falsifiability
criterion implies that not only singular knowledge claims but also explanatory
frameworks – which are based on conceptually formulated, methodically organ-
ized, and logically interconnected premises – are scientific to the extent that they
50 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

are not immune to potential falsification. From this perspective, the empirical
testability and analytical falsifiability of truth claims are a sine qua non for the
production of scientific knowledge.
(3) Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of realist knowledge. According
to this principle, genuinely scientific knowledge is worldly, rather than other-
worldly. From a modern perspective, this point may appear somewhat trivial. At
the dawn of the Enlightenment, however, this was far from a taken-for-granted
assumption in intellectual thought, let alone in everyday discourses. The insist-
ence upon the worldly nature of scientific knowledge is central to positivist
thought, since it undermines the epistemic legitimacy of any kind of metaphysical
appeals to ‘nature’s purposes’, ‘God’s intentions’, or ‘history’s divinely predeter-
mined telos’. In traditional societies, it was common to invoke otherworldly –
notably, religious or spiritual – forces, in order to explain seemingly inexplicable
happenings, circumstances, and existential dilemmas – such as illness, tragic acci-
dents, natural catastrophes, and wars, but also, more fundamentally, birth and
death. Religion, in particular, served as a powerful collective imaginary, enabling
human actors to confront the worldly immanence permeating their existence by
constructing a sense of otherworldly transcendence. From a modern point of view,
however, scientifically defensible expressions of epistemic validity are derived not
from the social legitimacy of religious authority, but from the methodical and
empirical study of worldly realities.
This, of course, is not to suggest that scientists refer always and exclusively to
observable, rather than unobservable, entities or forces. On the contrary, in the
natural and social sciences, it is common to allude to forms of being whose exist-
ence is not immediately visible or discernible.
In physics, for example, it is impossible to ‘see’ gravity; at best, we can perceive
manifestations of it. Various other entities – such as atoms – were unobservable
for a long time; even now that the necessary instruments to prove their existence
have been developed, the ways in which natural scientists explore the function-
ing of atomic and molecular-level processes are impregnated with conceptually
constituted background suppositions about the nature of matter.
In sociology, to mention another discipline, there are numerous terminological
tools referring to facets of social reality that, although they cannot be directly
observed, are believed to be of crucial importance to the constitution and devel-
opment of society: states, social classes, public spheres, markets, languages, or
selves – to list only a few. Most sociologists would consider all of these elements to
be vital to both the structural and the processual composition of society, but even
the most conceptually sophisticated and empirically oriented researchers do not
find themselves in the epistemically privileged position of being able to observe
any of these forms of existence directly. To reiterate, all we have access to are mani-
festations of these constituents of social reality: states are composed of political
actors running governmental institutions; social classes are represented by group
members with similar incomes, lifestyles, status, and access to material and sym-
bolic resources; public spheres are constituted by interrelated subjects capable of
purposive realization and discursive communication; markets emerge through the
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 51

production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services; languages are

represented by semantically, syntactically, and grammatically organized symbols,
and they are used – in writing or in speaking – by communicatively competent
entities; human selves express themselves by mobilizing the rational, emotional,
ideological, behavioural, and dramaturgical resources of their subjectivity.
From a positivist perspective, then, scientific enquiry is concerned with the
empirical study of really existing phenomena.
(4) Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of generalizable knowledge.
Following this methodological maxim, genuinely scientific knowledge is univer-
salizable. In this sense, scientific truth claims are capable of asserting epistemic
validity regardless of the sociohistorical specificity that characterizes their context
of emergence. Scientificity, on this view, is derived from the systematic attempt
to establish a representationally accurate and analytically insightful relation to
a particular aspect, or to particular aspects, of reality. From this perspective, the
whole point of science is to uncover underlying mechanisms that determine both
the constitution and the evolution of natural and social domains of existence.
Arguably, it is one of the great accomplishments of modern science to have for-
mulated, and indeed accumulated, general statements about the existence of ‘uni-
versal laws’. Scientists may aim to disclose the laws of nature (astronomy, biology,
chemistry, earth science, physics), the laws of society (anthropology, economics,
political science, psychology, sociology), or the laws of history (historiography);
and philosophers may seek to shed light on the laws of knowledge (epistemology),
the laws of being (ontology), the laws of argument (logic), the laws of morality
(ethics), or the laws of forms (aesthetics). What is crucial to positivist modes of
enquiry, however, is to expose the underlying mechanisms of causality, whose
existence largely escapes common sense and everyday perceptions of reality, but
whose presence has a substantial – and, in some cases, determining – impact upon
the unfolding of history.
Marx’s famous dictum that there would be no point in producing scientific
knowledge if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coin-
cided37 is motivated by the assumption that, to a large extent, ordinary people see
without seeing through – and comprehend without actually comprehending – the
determinacy of reality. In other words, it is the task of scientific investigation to
enlighten us about the lawfulness permeating the organization of the universe.
On this account, genuinely scientific claims to validity are context-transcending
assertions, whose cognitive authority cuts across the epistemic boundaries that
are, consciously or unconsciously, imposed upon the world by particular –
cultural, linguistic, discursive, disciplinary, or paradigmatic – communities. Put
differently, a scientific statement is true not because of who formulates it, where
and when it is articulated, and to whom it is conveyed. Rather, a scientific state-
ment is true to the extent that its epistemic validity transcends the arbitrary
parameters of symbolically mediated, spatiotemporally situated, and relationally
constituted sources of legitimacy. The discovery of universal laws underlying the
constitution of reality can be regarded as one of the most ambitious elements of
the modern quest for scientificity.
52 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(5) Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of prognostic knowledge.

According to this tenet, genuinely scientific knowledge is – or, at least, has the
potential of being – predictive. To the extent that claims to epistemic validity
are based on the gathering of empirical evidence, on the corroborating force of
methodical testing, on the systematic study of really existing phenomena, and on
the discovery of universal laws, they permit us to make predictions about the future.
One of the key motivational driving forces behind the scientific examination of
reality is to equip human actors with both the theoretical and the practical tools
to gain an ever greater control over both the individual and the collective aspects
of their existence. Indeed, from a functionalist perspective, the development of
technology – from its most rudimentary expressions in ancient history to its most
advanced variants in highly differentiated societies – can be explained in terms of
its capacity to enable human actors to obtain an increasingly sophisticated power
over their environment. From a positivist point of view, the ambition to make pre-
dictions about future developments is central to both the natural sciences and the
social sciences. It is common to make calculations about forthcoming occurrences
in the natural sciences – notably in astronomy, biology, chemistry, earth science,
and physics. In a similar manner, it is not unusual to make prognostications about
the yet-to-come in the social sciences, especially in its key disciplines – that is,
anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology.
Nevertheless, the ambition to make predictions about future developments
is essential not only to scientific enquiry, but also to ordinary ways of engaging
with, and making sense of, reality. From an early age, human beings – through
habitualized and habitualizing modes of encountering different aspects of their
existence – learn to express expectations, and make future-oriented suppositions,
about the world. Every sociolinguist and every ordinary language philosopher will
be able to confirm that common-sense treasures of knowledge contain abundant
amounts of projective, and often predictive, assumptions about the future: in
relation to ‘the’ external natural world (such as sunrises, sunsets, spatiotemporally
specific temperature variations, etc.), ‘our’ external social world (such as culturally
codified types of action, people’s behaviour in particular social settings, including
their reactions to specific sets of circumstances, etc.), and ‘my’ internal subjective
world (such as culinary or sexual appetite, high and low energy levels, fluctuating
affective moods, etc.).
The predictions made by natural and social scientists are, however, fundamen-
tally different from those made by ordinary actors. Non-scientific predictions are
derived from quotidian experiences and tend to rely on taken-for-granted back-
ground horizons of common-sense knowledge. Scientific predictions, by contrast,
are founded on the methodical study of reality and entrenched in explanatory
frameworks capable of shedding light on underlying causalities that escape
people’s everyday perception of worldly actualities.
(6) Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of evolutionary knowledge.
According to this doctrine, genuinely scientific knowledge is cumulative and pro-
gressive. The developmental nature of systematic forms of knowledge production
is of vital importance to the possibility of intellectual, and indeed civilizational,
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 53

progress. To put it bluntly, the accumulation of scientific results, derived from

methodically rigorous and analytically insightful investigations, leads to ever
more accurate understandings of particular aspects of reality. Scientists need to
communicate with one another, cross-examine and cross-fertilize each other’s
knowledge claims, and engage in dialogically constituted discourses, in order
to enhance their own investigations and contribute to the development of con-
stantly shifting research agendas. By doing so, they are immersed in explorative
processes, encouraging them not only to revise already accepted truth claims but
also to invent conceptual tools and methodological strategies aimed at producing
increasingly accurate representations and explanations of specific facets of exist-
ence. In brief, as a collective and cumulative effort, scientific enquiry permits us
to get closer and closer to the discovery of truths about the mysteries of reality.
In this sense, evolutionary progress is both epistemologically and ontologically
relevant to the development of the human species: as an epistemological principle,
it entails the production of gradually more reliable, and increasingly insightful,
scientific truth claims; as an ontological reality, it manifests itself in the unstop-
pable advancement of both the material and the symbolic conditions of human
life. Put differently, evolutionary progress drives the development of human
cognition in particular and of the human condition in general. According to this
account, which may be described as a double-hermeneutics of evolutionary existen-
tialism, human beings are part of a sociohistorically constituted and teleologically
oriented universe. To be sure, the existence of progress (progress ‘in itself’) can
do without, but does not exclude, the possibility of the awareness of progress
(progress ‘for itself’). For it is the empirical unfolding of real and representational
developments, rather than the conceptual reflection upon their ontological force,
which undergirds the constant evolution of both scientifically developed epis-
temic frameworks and scientifically enlightened social settings.
(7) Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of factual knowledge. Based
on this premise, genuinely scientific knowledge can be regarded as objective,
or at least it should strive to be as objective as possible. The Weberian distinc-
tion between ‘facts’ and ‘values’38 is central to the sociology of knowledge.
The epistemological significance of this analytical differentiation is expressed
in conceptual antinomies such as ‘factual’ versus ‘judgemental’, ‘descriptive’ versus
‘prescriptive’, and ‘objective’ versus ‘normative’. The dilemma with which scientists
are confronted in this respect is far from trivial. On the one hand, the task of
scientific researchers is to produce information about reality that is factually
accurate, logically coherent, empirically reliable, and hence objective. On the
other hand, all forms of knowledge are produced from a spatiotemporally spe-
cific standpoint and within a sociohistorically contingent background horizon,
meaning that both prescriptive and descriptive statements are shaped by the
values implicit in the symbolic – notably linguistic – tools by virtue of which
they are formulated.
Positivist philosophers, however, insist that scientific enquiries, in order to be
objective, have to avoid relying on fictitious knowledge (as articulated in religious
beliefs and utopian programmes), ethical judgements (as conveyed in normative
54 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

statements about what is morally justifiable or unjustifiable), and subjective judge-

ments (as expressed in personal – such as affectively motivated – utterances).
From a positivist point of view, scientists, in order to engage in methodologically
trustworthy and conceptually insightful research, have to minimize the distortive
impact of these sources of bias and thereby contribute to generating objective,
rather than perspectival, knowledge.
(8) Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of rational knowledge. On this
account, genuinely scientific knowledge is obtained by virtue of reason. Positivists
are firmly embedded in the Enlightenment tradition of intellectual thought in
assuming that one of the species-constitutive features of human beings is their
cognitive capacity to establish a rational relation to the world. Social actors are
motivated by different – often overlapping, often competing – types of rationality,
depending on the situation in which they find themselves immersed. And scien-
tific researchers may give priority to specific kinds of rationality when examining
particular problems or justifying the validity of their conceptual tools and explan-
atory frameworks. Indeed, the historical emergence and the gradual development
of different types of rationality, which have been identified and problematized by
various intellectual traditions, are indicative of both the functional complexity
and the anthropological significance of the distinctively human ability to convert
reason into the guiding force of one’s interactions with, and one’s reflections
upon, reality. Different social scientists stress the importance of different forms
of rationality. Among the most fundamental types of rationality, distinguished
and discussed by modern sociologists, are the following: substantive rationality,
instrumental rationality, strategic rationality, purposive rationality, traditional ration-
ality, practical rationality, theoretical rationality, affective rationality, descriptive
rationality, communicative rationality, discursive rationality, analytical rationality,
and critical rationality – to mention but a few of them.39
Different paradigmatic approaches in the social sciences endorse different mod-
els of rationality. Irrespective of the question of what type of rationality is most
effective and reliable for undertaking scientific research, positivists assume that
human beings are rational entities, equipped with the capacity to mobilize their
cognitive resources in order to ensure that their actions and reflections are guided
by reason. In light of this – rationalist – view of human existence, it is the task of
scientists to draw upon different types of rationality in order to generate different
types of knowledge:

i. as representational beings, we are able to produce descriptive knowledge;

ii. as analytical beings, we construct systematic knowledge;
iii. as reflexive beings, we are capable of developing explanatory knowledge;
iv. as critical beings, we generate normative knowledge;
v. as communicative beings, we participate in the exchange of discursive
knowledge;
vi. as learning beings, we build on cumulative knowledge;
vii. as projective beings, we can even make assumptions about the future on the
basis of predictive knowledge.40
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 55

From a positivist point of view, it is the task of natural and social scientists to
make use of these cognitive capacities, since they permit us, with the help of
rigorous methods, to contribute to the development of enlightening knowledge.

Postpositivism
The above synopsis provides a schematic overview of the fundamental epistem-
ological assumptions shared by positivist approaches to the nature of scientific
knowledge production. Incontestably, there are substantial points of divergence
between the various currents of positivist thought. Moreover, advocates of intel-
lectual traditions subscribing to the aforementioned presuppositions diverge in
the sense that, depending on the particular set of principles they seek to defend,
they will consider some of these epistemological tenets more significant than oth-
ers. What is more important for the analytical purpose of this chapter, however,
is the following question: given that, as stated above, the opposition to positiv-
ist approaches in the social sciences lies at the heart of postmodern theories of
knowledge, what are the main points of criticism that the latter launch against the
former? It shall be the task of subsequent sections to respond to this question. In
order to do so, let us, for the sake of clarity, stick to the thematic structure of the
previous outline.
(1) The assumption that genuinely scientific knowledge is derived from experi-
ence is problematic in that it is epistemologically naïve. Surely, the view that scien-
tifically established forms of epistemic validity need to be substantiated through
the observation-based – that is, experiential and, if possible and necessary,
experimental – examination of reality appears both epistemologically and politic-
ally plausible. Epistemologically, it delegitimizes the scholastic activity of arm-
chair theorizing for the sake of playing intellectual thought experiments, which
lack a serious engagement with empirical reality. Politically, it undermines the
credibility of merely speculative arguments, which are not backed up on the basis
of substantive evidence.
Yet, despite the significant contributions made by empirical studies in the
natural and social sciences, and notwithstanding their constructive impact upon
standards of analytical substantiation and critical evaluation in both academic
and non-academic debates, empiricist conceptions of knowledge acquisition
are flawed in the sense that they disregard the fact that human actors – not only
as immersive and intuitive participants, but also as investigative and reflexive
observers – do not have direct access to the world. In this respect, it is worth recalling
three central epistemological convictions of postmodern thought:

i. every validity claim is a – perspectival – legitimacy claim;

ii. the only real certainty of which we dispose is epistemic uncertainty; and
iii. the quest for universality can never escape the parameters imposed by the
preponderance of context-specific particularities.

Put differently, we do not have direct access to the world because our relation
to the world is mediated by the world itself. As linguistic beings, we mobilize
56 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

semantically, syntactically, and grammatically organized symbolic resources

when relating to reality. As cultural beings, we project previously assimilated and
subsequently habitualized background assumptions upon both ourselves and
our environment. As subjective beings, we experience reality from a unique place
in society and through the senses of a biographically shaped body. As affective
beings, we perceive, appreciate, and act upon the world in accordance with shift-
ing moods and malleable emotional dispositions. As interpretive beings, we relate
to the universe as a phenomenally structured conglomerate of material and sym-
bolic relations, without any certainty as to whether or not our experience of the
visible manifestations of reality can be a reliable source of epistemic perspicacity.
In brief, the positivist criterion of empirical evidence is never quite as straight-
forwardly ‘empirical’ and unambiguously ‘evident’ as it may seem at first sight.
Even epistemologically reflexive and methodologically rigorous experiences of
the world are mediated by linguistically, culturally, subjectively, affectively, and
interpretively constituted frames of mind.
(2) The assumption that genuinely scientific knowledge is testable – and, in
principle, always falsifiable – is problematic in that it is epistemologically unsustain-
able. Of course, the view that scientifically established forms of epistemic validity
should meet the criteria of testability and falsifiability appears both epistemo-
logically and politically convincing. Epistemologically, it permits us to distinguish
between science and non-science, and thus between methodical conceptions and
authoritative explanations, on the one hand, and ordinary perceptions and anec-
dotal interpretations, on the other. Politically, it allows for discursive pluralism, as
opposed to ideological dogmatism, since every epistemic position is potentially
subject to critical revision.
It is far from clear, however, whether or not it is possible, let alone desirable, to
identify – or, as radical sceptics may argue, invent – demarcation criteria that enable
us to distinguish between ‘science’ and ‘non-science’. Indeed, from a postmodern
perspective, there are no universal epistemic criteria on the basis of which such a
hierarchization of different modes of knowledge can be justified. For postmodern-
ists, validity claims are constantly being shaped and reshaped by a multiplicity of
language games, none of which can legitimately declare to possess an epistemic
monopoly on representational accuracy and explanatory authority. Given the lack
of universal criteria for the assertion of context-transcending validity, no language
game is necessarily more insightful than any other. Social actors generate different
discourses in relation to specific contexts: cultural, political, economic, judicial,
artistic, scientific, religious, spiritual, and so forth.
According to postmodern parameters, therefore, the problem with the emphasis
on testability and falsifiability in positivist thought – particularly in its Popperian
versions41 – is that, despite its commitment to discursive pluralism and its cor-
responding rejection of ideological dogmatism, it presupposes that a distinction
can be drawn between ‘true’ and ‘false’. In the postmodern universe, however, the
very distinction between ‘correct’ and ‘erroneous’ is pointless, given that social
actors play multiple language games in accordance with diverging, and often
incommensurable, epistemic criteria in spatiotemporally contingent situations.
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 57

If, in a postmodern world, nothing can be affirmed with the possibility of epis-
temic certainty and an ultimate claim to universality, then there are no context-
transcending criteria of verifiability or falsifiability.
(3) The assumption that genuinely scientific knowledge has – and, in fact, must
have – an existing reality as its reference point is problematic in that it is based
on a short-sighted conception of epistemological realism. Undoubtedly, the view that
scientifically established forms of epistemic validity can claim legitimacy if, and
only if, they are derived from an investigative engagement with reality appears
reasonable, since it rules out the possibility of using metaphysical, mystical, and
religious belief systems as cognitive grounds for evidence-based methodologies.
Similar to the previous stances, such a position appears to be both epistemologic-
ally and politically prudent. Epistemologically, it guarantees that, because of
its intrinsic relation to empirical reality, epistemic validity cannot be reduced to a
matter of arbitrary authority expressed in appeals to spiritually or supernaturally
constituted abilities. Politically, it implies that, because of its ineluctable dependence
upon discursive acceptability, epistemic validity cannot be seriously asserted on the
basis of rationally unjustifiable resources of legitimacy.
The separation between ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’ modes of making sense of
the world, however, is not as clear-cut as the positivist commitment to epistemo-
logical realism may suggest. Particularly when reflecting upon the controversial
relationship between science and religion, it is crucial to acknowledge that reason
and faith are not as far apart as they may seem at first glance.42 Rationalists may
have a firm belief in the power of reason, just as spiritualists may have good rea-
son to believe in the power of faith. Owing to the presuppositional nature of all
knowledge, reason is impregnated with belief; due to the cognitive constitution
of all faith, belief cannot be divorced from reason. Neither reason nor faith can
monopolize the right to define epistemically universal criteria allowing for the
identification of representationally accurate, normatively defensible, and aes-
thetically superior modes of cognition. Rationally grounded claims to validity are
embedded in the implicit belief structure of sociocultural background horizons;
religiously motivated claims to validity are raised on the basis of communicative
rationality, which constitutes a precondition for the linguistically mediated and
discursively structured interaction between different members of society. In brief,
reason is unthinkable without an implicit or explicit belief in reason, just as belief is
inconceivable without a conscious or unconscious reason to believe.
Arguably, it is partly due to its interest in the creation of symbolically con-
structed imaginaries and technologically mediated hyperrealities in differentiated
societies that the postmodern mind is inclined to reject positivist endorsements
of realist and rationalist epistemologies. In addition, however, its epistemological
scepticism is motivated by the conviction that it is far from obvious how it is pos-
sible to reconcile the following two perspectives: on the one hand, the realist view that
science is the study of authentically existing phenomena; and, on the other hand,
the constructivist notion that science needs to invent ideal-types and conceptual
categories for the classification of non-observable forces and entities. Science may
claim to engage in the systematic examination of really – and only really – existing
58 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

dimensions of being; the question of whether or not it actually succeeds in doing

so is another matter.
(4) The assumption that genuinely scientific knowledge is universalizable, and
thus context-transcending, is problematic in that it is epistemologically pretentious.
The view that scientifically established forms of epistemic validity have the capac-
ity to uncover underlying causal mechanisms – which escape common-sense
perceptions – appears attractive, insofar as it conceives of methodical research
as an expression of our cognitive ability to gain valuable insights into the con-
stitutive elements of reality. Unsurprisingly, such a stance seems wise – both in
epistemological and in political terms. Epistemologically, it permits us to develop
explanatory frameworks whose epistemic validity transcends distortive sources of
contingency – such as language, culture, subjectivity, emotions, and ideology.
Politically, it offers the possibility of defining normative criteria capable of cutting
across perspectival horizons of contingency by providing universally defensible
standards of truth and justifiability.
Yet, from a postmodern angle, such an ambitious search for universal laws,
standards, and principles is pointless: if we recognize the contextual, relational,
and historical constitution of reality, then there are no ultimate criteria, grounds,
or essences to be discovered or uncovered through the scientific study of nature
and society. Contextually contingent realities differ, relationally contingent reali-
ties are arbitrary, and historically contingent realities change. Furthermore, at the
heart of the positivist obsession with the scientific discovery of universal laws lies
a paradigmatic contradiction. On the one hand, positivists maintain that human
beings are rational and conscious entities, capable of using reason as a driving force
motivating their actions and guiding their reflections. On the other hand, positiv-
ists presuppose that ordinary actors are largely unreflexive and unconscious entities,
unaware of the underlying causal mechanisms by which they are determined and
which only critical scientists have the privilege to uncover and understand.
It is possible to conceive of the social world either as a universe shaped by
reason-guided, conscious, and perceptive subjects or as a realm of stage per-
formance for inclination-driven, largely unconscious, and ingenuous puppets.
Whichever of these two accounts one may wish to endorse, one cannot have it
both ways. To the extent, however, that postmodernists posit that all empirical
and conceptual constructions of reality are contextually, relationally, and historic-
ally contingent, they contend that the quest for factual or moral universality is an
illusion based on an overly ambitious conception of scientificity.
(5) The assumption that genuinely scientific knowledge is prognostic – therefore,
permitting us to make predictions about the future – is problematic in that it is
epistemologically ostentatious. Certainly, the view that scientifically established
forms of epistemic validity enable us to formulate hypotheses about forthcoming
developments appears promising. For it implies that, as a learning species, we can
obtain an ever greater control over our natural and social environments, and even
over ourselves and our inner lives. Without a doubt, such an optimistic account
gives the impression of being both epistemologically and politically appealing.
Epistemologically, it requires us to realize the species-constitutive potential of
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 59

knowledge by using the power of cognition and explanation with the aim of acquir-
ing predictive control over our lives, expressed in advanced degrees of individual
and collective self-determination. Politically, it bestows us with the opportunity to
draw upon the insights gained from scientific theories in order to create a society
made up of rational beings, equipped with the ability to convert human agency
into a driving force of a future-oriented way of making history.
If, however, there are no ‘laws of nature’, ‘laws of society’, or ‘laws of history’,
then the positivist ambition to produce scientific knowledge capable of predicting
future developments is futile. To be sure, this is not to affirm that the projective,
and often predictive, statements that an ordinary actor can make in relation to
‘the’ external objective world, ‘our’ external normative world, and ‘his’ or ‘her’
internal subjective world are utterly illusory, let alone lacking in practical purpose
and existential function. On the contrary, our ability to make suppositions about
future developments of reality is central to our capacity to imbue our interaction
with the world with a sense of predictability. In fact, without such an everyday
trust in relative projective certainty, we would be haunted by constant existential
anxiety and lack a minimal amount of ontological security. We go about doing
things by holding expectations about the world.
Insofar as the predictions made by scientists are founded on the methodical
study, rather than a common-sense grasp, of reality, they are likely to be more
accurate than prognoses based on our quotidian – and, thus, merely phenomenal –
experiences of what we misperceive as expressions of an indisputably existing
objectivity. The question remains, however, whether or not predictions about
future occurrences and developments – even if they are substantiated by virtue of
scientific evidence – can be a source of irrefutable epistemic certainty. The post-
modern answer given to this question is unambiguous: if there are no underlying
causalities governing the development of contextually, relationally, and historic-
ally contingent realities, all predictions – irrespective of whether they are ‘ordin-
ary’ or ‘scientific’ – are illusory projections of discursively structured imaginaries,
which provide us with the misleading option of imposing a sense of theoretical
calculability and practical manageability upon a volatile world, whose telos-free
trajectory is characterized by radical indeterminacy.
(6) The assumption that genuinely scientific knowledge is evolutionary – in the
sense that it is both cumulative and progressive – is problematic in that it is epistemo-
logically rigid. Indubitably, the view that scientifically established forms of epistemic
validity are, and should be, organized in such a way that they enable us to make
increasingly precise, accurate, and insightful claims about the nature of particular
aspects of reality appears sound. For such a forward-looking attitude is aimed at
giving scientists the opportunity to feel part of a grand explorative project, which
not only cuts across disciplinary boundaries but also contributes to creating a uni-
fied science (Einheitswissenschaft), whose evolutionary development is driven by
the ideal of universal knowledgeability. Such a teleological conception of science
seems both epistemologically and politically useful. Epistemologically, it attrib-
utes a quasi-transcendental meaning to the pursuit of scientific activity, permit-
ting human actors to develop gradually more accurate conceptual tools for precise
60 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

representations and analytical models for cutting-edge explanations. Politically, it

infuses science with the civilizing mission of contributing to the progress of history
on the basis of humanity’s capacity to determine its own destiny by drawing upon
the numerous insights gained from path-breaking discoveries.
Postmodern philosophers point out, however, that they have every reason to
be suspicious of evolutionist accounts of scientific activity. In this respect, we can
identify four key sources of scepticism.
A first source of scepticism is the fact that scientific work is never value-free
but always value-laden. Far from being detached from the social structures, indi-
vidual or group-specific interests, and power struggles over symbolic and material
resources permeating the construction of human realities, scientific activity takes
place within relationally constituted horizons of normativity. Progress means dif-
ferent things to different actors.
A second source of scepticism is the fact that scientific work is never autopoi-
etic but always, at least potentially, impact-laden. Similar to other modes of activ-
ity, scientific research may have both intended and unintended consequences.
Although one may interpret the achievement of a particular scientific discovery
as a contribution to the progress of history, in practice it may have detrimental,
destructive, or pathological consequences for the development of society. It is due
to technological advancements brought about by scientific discoveries that the
annihilation of the entire planet has become an imminent possibility. Scientific
evolution can lead to civilizational regression.
A third source of scepticism is the fact that scientific work is never free from
presuppositions but always paradigm-laden. Different scientists investigate and
theorize within diverging research traditions, sustained by particular, and often
incommensurable, sets of underlying assumptions and criteria of validity. Specific
paradigm communities play idiosyncratic language games with corresponding
epistemic standards. What may be regarded as valid and insightful by scholars
subscribing to one belief system may be deemed invalid and useless by research-
ers advocating another – in some cases, diametrically opposed – doxa. Scientific
advancement means different things to different paradigm communities.
A fourth source of scepticism worth mentioning is the fact that scientific work
is never a free-floating activity but always context-laden. What counts as progress
in scientific knowledge depends not only on the presuppositions shared by a par-
ticular paradigm community, but also on the cultural standards, principles, and
values endorsed by different members of society. In line with postcolonial criti-
cisms launched against ethnocentric – that is, largely Eurocentric – conceptions
of knowledge,43 postmodern theorists reject positivist versions of scientific evo-
lutionism for failing to account for the sociocultural contingency of their own
claims to universality. The Western language game of ‘progress’ – notwithstanding
the question of whether it is defined in political, economic, philosophical, spirit-
ual, religious, cultural, or civilizational terms – neglects the fact that non-Western
societies may not fit, or may not want to fit, linear patterns of universalist –
but, ultimately, ethnocentric – teleologies. Development means different things to
different cultures.
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 61

(7) The assumption that genuinely scientific knowledge is value-free – in the

sense that it can be, and should strive to be, objective – is problematic in that it
is epistemologically untenable. Incontrovertibly, the view that scientifically estab-
lished forms of epistemic validity should aim to provide objective accounts of
reality appears worthwhile defending, since the analytical accuracy as well as the
conceptual generalizability of explanatory theories are subject to their capacity to
minimize the distortive impact of bias, prejudice, and partiality on the conditions
of worldly knowledgeability. Comparable to the aforementioned points of reflec-
tion, the quest for objectivity seems both epistemologically and politically justifi-
able. Epistemologically, the commitment to objectivity allows for the production
of knowledge whose validity is confirmed by the corroborative force of evidence,
testability, and generalizability, rather than being undermined by the distortive
influence of selectivity, normativity, and subjectivity. Politically, the ambition to
be as objective as possible has the advantage of increasing the likelihood of gen-
erating knowledge that serves the universal interests of humanity, rather than the
particular interests of individual or collective entities.
As postmodern critics insist, however, such an objectivist conception of knowl-
edge is deeply flawed for at least five main reasons.44 First, given that knowledge
is always socially embedded, it is necessarily normative (Erkenntnisnormativität).
Second, since knowledge is always generated from a specific position in
the social space, even so-called descriptive knowledge is situation-laden
(Erkenntnisstandpunkt). Third, to the extent that bodily actors, regardless of
whether they are laypersons or experts, take on particular roles in society,
knowledge is permeated by the relationally constituted functions fulfilled by
those who make use of it in accordance with their contextually defined interests
(Erkenntnisfunktion). Fourth, considering that cognitive actors are discursively
competing entities, the production of knowledge is permeated by scientific power
struggles (Erkenntniskampf). Fifth, because symbolic and informational resources
can be used in various ways and for multiple reasons, the production of knowl-
edge can be instrumentalized for extra-scientific – notably, economic – purposes
(Erkenntnisnutzung). In short, the positivist quest for objectivity loses credibility
when confronted with the relational constitution of epistemic enquiry. The
conditions of knowledgeability are impregnated with normativity, positionality,
functionality, conflictuality, and instrumentality.
(8) The assumption that genuinely scientific knowledge is rational – in the sense
that it can, and should, be guided by the reflexive force of reason – is problematic
in that it is epistemologically one-sided. Undeniably, the view that scientifically
established forms of epistemic validity should offer rationally grounded accounts of
noteworthy aspects of reality appears sensible, for it does justice to the fact that
human beings raise themselves above nature by drawing upon reason, which they
are capable of converting into the motivational driving force of their multifaceted –
that is, above all, purposive, normative, expressive, and reflective – interactions
with the world. In analogy to the previous considerations, it is worth mentioning
that the positivist endorsement of rationalist approaches to knowledge acquisi-
tion seems both epistemologically and politically defensible. Epistemologically,
62 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

it permits us to provide solid rational grounds for the methodical study of reality.
Politically, it enables us to escape the arbitrary power of nonbinding contingency
derived from emotion, inclination, or proclivity and, instead, create a kingdom of
reflexivity founded on critique, argument, and rationality.
From a postmodern perspective, however, such a rationalist conception of
knowledge production is problematic in at least five respects.
First, it is far from clear which of the various types of human rationality can
serve as a reliable cognitive, let alone normative, ground for methodologically
sound and conceptually reflexive scientific activity. Just as there are no ultimate
epistemic criteria to consider one idiosyncratic language game superior to other
language games, there are no universal standards that oblige us to regard one
type of rationality as epistemologically or morally superior to other types of
rationality.45
Second, since different actors mobilize different cognitive resources and since,
moreover, one actor can draw upon manifold – often conflicting and competing –
types of reason, it is not immediately obvious which particular kind of rational-
ity should be regarded as the foundational driving force of society. If, following the
Weberian tradition, we consider substantive rationality (Wertrationalität) and
instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) as two motivational cornerstones of
social practices, the intellectually more challenging task consists in understand-
ing how they are interrelated, and why, under changing conditions, each of them
can play a decisive role in shaping – if not determining – the course of an action.
Even with the best intentions in the world, purposive and cooperative forms of
action, motivated by substantive rationality, contain an instrumental dimension;
and, even with the worst intentions in the world, utility-driven and strategic
modes of action, driven by instrumental rationality, comprise a meaning-laden
dimension.46
Third, owing to their rationalist privileging of reason over other modes of pro-
cessing people’s multilayered encounters with the world, positivist approaches
to knowledge acquisition underestimate the value of subjective and intersubjective
experiences, understanding, and empathy for the study of the social world and, as one
may add, for the examination of our interactions with the natural world. As not
only postmodern theorists but also numerous feminist epistemologists insist, the
ethnocentric, androcentric, and logocentric obsession with reason leads positiv-
ist scholars – following the tradition of Enlightenment-inspired rationalism – to
disregard, or even deny, the epistemic value of non-rational ways of encountering,
interacting with, and attaching meaning to reality.47
Fourth, due to their dichotomist tendency to remain caught up in the Cartesian
mind–body dualism, along with their rationalist propensity to privilege the mind
over the body, positivist accounts fail to take seriously the unconscious dimen-
sions underlying people’s interactions with, as well as scientists’ study of, reality.
Ordinary actors are embodied entities driven by a large variety of motivational –
often non-rational – factors, and so are critical scientists. To treat actors – irrespective
of whether they are laypersons or experts – as quasi-disembodied carriers of
rationality means to ignore the corporeal constitution of human agency.48
 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? 63

Fifth, because of their patronizing tendency to draw a clear-cut line between

‘ordinary’ and ‘scientific’ modes of engaging with reality, positivist approaches
fail to provide a comprehensive account of the differences between ‘anthropological’
and ‘professional’ – that is, between ‘species-specific’ and ‘discipline-specific’ – epistemic
capacities. We may all agree that both experts and laypersons are able to produce
diverse forms of knowledge: descriptive, analytical, explanatory, interpretive, nor-
mative, discursive, cumulative, projective, predictive, and so forth. The question
that remains in this context, however, can be posed as follows: if we accept that
both scientific researchers and ordinary people are capable of producing several –
and, to some degree, similar – kinds of knowledge, on what cognitive or norma-
tive grounds can we assume that we should take the particular epistemic capacities
and general perceptibility of scientists more seriously than those of laypersons?
From a postmodern perspective, positivists fail to provide a convincing answer to
this question, since there are no universal cognitive criteria, let alone normative
foundations, that oblige us to consider ‘scientific’ language games as epistemo-
logically superior to ‘non-scientific’ language games. For this is what they are:
language games.49 Like all other games, they have arbitrary and self-imposed rules,
which can be changed depending on who has the upper hand to decide whether
we should continue to respect, or choose to subvert, them.50
2
From Modern to Postmodern
Methodology? The ‘Interpretive Turn’

This chapter is concerned with the impact of postmodern thought on contempor-

ary debates in social methodology. The question of whether social research meth-
ods have undergone a radical revision owing to the rise of postmodern thought
is intimately linked to the question of whether the social sciences have experi-
enced noticeable paradigmatic shifts over the past few decades. In order to assess
the influence of postmodern thought on social research methods,1 the present
chapter proposes to consider an investigative approach that has gained increasing
significance in the contemporary social sciences: discourse analysis.2 By definition,
the social sciences are in a constant state of flux. Their constitution and role vary
in accordance with the paradigmatic changes that shape the research strategies
employed in the pursuit of methodical knowledge production. Social research
methods play a pivotal role in conceptually informed and empirically supported
attempts to interpret or explain particular aspects of human reality. Their crucial
importance is reflected in the regulated circulation of truth claims in modern
public spheres, especially in realms of academic debate and controversy.3
Discourse analysis is one of the most useful examples to illustrate not only how
research methods are influenced by paradigmatic trends in the social sciences, but
also how these methods affect the ways in which social scientists examine their
objects of study. The overall impact of discourse analysis on the social sciences
manifests itself in what may be described as the interpretive turn4 in social research
methodology. In other words, discourse analysts are concerned, primarily, with
the systematic exploration of the meaning-laden dimensions of social life, insisting
that the hermeneutically oriented enquiry into social practices – including interpretive
activities – is one of the key tasks of critical social science. From this perspective,
critical social scientists need to understand people’s understandings of themselves
and of their environments, in order to do justice not only to the hermeneutically
structured constitution of the social sciences, but also to the symbolically medi-
ated performances accomplished by ordinary actors.
To be clear, this is not to contend that, among the large variety of available meth-
odological approaches in the social sciences, discourse analysis should be regarded
as the predominant, or most popular, research strategy in the early twenty-first
century. Nor does this imply that discourse analysis is the only methodological

64
 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology? 65

approach that is, directly or indirectly, related to the rise of postmodern thought in
the social sciences. Of course, it would be inappropriate to give the – misleading –
impression that all forms of discourse analysis are, implicitly or explicitly, ‘post-
modern’. As this chapter seeks to illustrate, however, it makes sense to conceive
of discourse analysis as a research method whose theoretical presuppositions and
practical implications are indicative of the paradigmatic shift from the search for
relative determinacy to the emphasis on radical indeterminacy in current social-scientific
debates and controversies. In short, the rise of discourse analysis is one among
other symptoms of the far-reaching impact of postmodern thought on the con-
temporary social sciences. In order to demonstrate the validity of this claim, the
present chapter shall argue that the presuppositional differences between modern
and postmodern conceptions of social research are reflected in three fundamental
tensions: (i) explanation versus understanding, (ii) mechanics versus dialectics, and
(iii) ideology versus discourse.

(i) Explanation versus Understanding

Discourse analysis is commonly conceived of as a relatively new approach, and

by some scholars even as ‘a new discipline’,5 in the social sciences. Given its rela-
tively short history, it is remarkable that it has established itself as a widely recog-
nized and increasingly influential methodology in the field of social and political
research. The ‘ubiquitous presence of the term “discourse” in the humanities, the social
sciences and even in the mass media’6 may be regarded as a sign of the substantial and
wide-ranging relevance of discourse analysis to systematic studies of contemporary soci-
eties. In fact, there is barely any kind of sustained academic or public controversy
that does not deploy the term ‘discourse’. What is even more striking, however,
is that, in addition to having acquired considerable referential weight in current
social and political debates, the concept of discourse has been transformed into a
new discourse itself. Particularly in academic circles, then, there has been a growing
discourse on discourse. The emergence of this new domain of research illustrates that
the critical examination of the discursive realms of human existence has become a
central matter of interest in the contemporary social sciences.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that, as stressed by its defenders, discourse
analysis is a multidisciplinary approach, aiming at the critical study of meaning-
laden practices from different theoretical angles. Thus, its scholarly richness
derives partly from its multiperspectival orientation. Rather than rigidly separat-
ing one discipline from another, discourse analysis seeks to overcome artificial
demarcation lines between academic disciplines and thereby contribute to engag-
ing in a fruitful dialogue between conceptually refined and empirically substan-
tiated frameworks developed within specific background horizons of diverging
epistemic comfort zones. In brief, discourse analysis constitutes a multidisciplin-
ary research method committed to the in-depth enquiry into the interpretive
dimensions of social life.
In essence, discourse analysis is concerned with the examination of three inter-
related spheres of social existence: ‘(a) language use, (b) the communication of beliefs
66 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(cognition), and (c) interaction in social situations’.7 This triadic account of levels
of investigation is indicative of the fact that discourse analysis borrows particularly
from three scientific disciplines – namely, from linguistics, psychology, and sociol-
ogy.8 It is possible to go one step further by conceiving of this multiperspectival
alignment as a sign of a firm commitment to interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity.
Such a pledge reminds us of the fact that, paradoxically, disciplinary boundaries are
both real and imagined:9 they are real, because they have a practical impact upon
the institutional and intellectual horizons underlying scientific variants of knowl-
edge production; at the same time, they are imagined, because both formal and
epistemic boundaries between different modes of academic knowledge genera-
tion are fabricated and, hence, always relatively arbitrary, rather than represent-
ing clear-cut and incontestable separations between isolated and self-sufficient
provinces of meaning. ‘If discourse analysis is to establish itself as a method in
social-scientific research it must move beyond a situation of multidisciplinarity and
pluralism towards interdisciplinarity, which entails a higher level of debate between
proponents of different approaches, methods and theories.’10 On this account,
discourse analysis does not strive for complete presuppositional convergence, let
alone disciplinary unity, between idiosyncratic epistemic comfort zones; rather, it
aims to gain valuable insights from encouraging a critical dialogue between differ-
ent scientific disciplines and hermeneutically mediated background horizons. In
this sense, discourse analysis strives to be a methodological paradigm that encour-
ages perspective-changing conversations across disciplinary boundaries, as well as
the transcendence of counterproductive antinomies, in social-scientific research
activities.
Discourse analysis constitutes a core element of the interpretive turn in the con-
temporary social sciences. As stated above, this is not to posit that all forms of
discourse analysis are necessarily ‘postmodern’; this is to recognize, however, that
their focus of enquiry – in particular, with regard to their methodological concern
with the meaning-laden dimensions of social life – falls in line with the postmod-
ern study of human existence in terms of radical indeterminacy.
To be precise, discourse analysis can be considered as both a carrier and a product
of the ‘interpretive turn’ in the social sciences. As a carrier of the ‘interpretive turn’, it
insists upon the normative centrality of the systematic deconstruction of cultur-
ally embedded discourses. As a product of the ‘interpretive turn’, it has always been
influenced by other traditions that explore the existential weight of the meaning-
laden constitution of the social world – notably, by hermeneutic,11 phenomeno-
logical,12 and microsociological13 modes of investigation.
The distinction between ‘positivist’ and ‘interpretivist’ approaches can be con-
ceived of as one of the most controversial classifications in the social sciences at
least since the ‘methodological dispute’ (Methodenstreit). Even if one comes to the
conclusion that the differences between these two traditions are, to a large extent,
artificial, there is little doubt that the division between positivist and interpretivist
schools of thought is reflected in the distinction between the paradigm of explan-
ation (Erklären) and the paradigm of understanding (Verstehen).14 While it seems
reductive to assume that discourse analysts necessarily take the relativist view that
 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology? 67

‘nothing can be explained’,15 it is fair to suggest that – owing to their primary inter-
est in the meaning-laden constitution of the social world – their methodological
undertaking is motivated, first and foremost, by the paradigm of understanding. This
happens without having to deny the significant role of the paradigm of explanation,
notably with respect to the challenging task of shedding light on the multiple causal
factors impacting upon the dynamic relationship between social structures and
social actions. The ‘interpretive turn’, however, should not be misrepresented as a
paradigmatic novelty in social research methods; rather, it reflects an investigative
outlook that has shaped the development of the social sciences for centuries and
gained renewed recognition over the past three decades – not least due to the spread
of intellectual writings inspired by, or associated with, postmodern thought.
To reiterate, what is crucial to all versions of discourse analysis is the socio-
ontological significance that they attach to the systematic study of the meaning-
laden constitution of human existence. As a methodological approach, discourse
analysis sets itself the task of scrutinizing the symbolic and epistemic dimensions
of social life in a systematic fashion. In order to highlight the reflective and decon-
structive nature of this endeavour, some of its most prominent advocates prefer
to use the term critical discourse analysis.16 Critical discourse analysis is aimed at
questioning the validity of taken-for-granted categories constructed on the basis
of both ordinary and scientific modes of language use. Since all linguistic dis-
courses are – unavoidably – embedded in social life forms, the particularity of the
former cannot be properly understood without taking into account the specificity
of the latter. In brief, the critical analysis of discourses must involve the comprehensive
study of the social contexts in which symbolic and epistemic expressions are generated.
Facing up to the historicity that permeates all forms of sociality, a contextualizing
spirit is an integral component of critical discourse analysis. Given their chief inter-
est in the interpretive aspects of human interactions, critical discourse analysts seek
to examine the constitution of society by decoding and deconstructing the struc-
tural idiosyncrasy of language. The intra-textuality of language (‘discourse in and
for itself’) is nothing but an expression of its intrinsic inter-textuality (‘discourse in
relation to other discourses’) and extra-textuality (‘discourse in relation to the non-
discursive’). Discourses are composed of open, interconnected, and interdependent
meaning-laden practices, rather than of closed, static, and entirely self-referential
semantic and grammatical systems. Therefore, critical discourse analysts emphasize
the radical contingency underlying seemingly consolidated modes of normativity.
To the degree that critical discourse analysis focuses on the deconstruction and
interpretation of texts, it falls squarely in line with the postmodern attack on lin-
guistic essentialism. According to this anti-essentialist position, meaning is never
transcendentally constituted but always socially constructed. To deconstruct the inter-
pretive messages conveyed by a text, however, does not imply depriving a text of
its meaning; rather, it requires acknowledging that meaning is always relationally
contingent. What can be socially constructed can be theoretically deconstructed
and practically reconstructed. In fact, the social world is composed of an ensemble
of reconstructable constructions. To put it bluntly, deconstructivism sets itself the
task of deconstructing the reconstructable.
68 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

To the extent that ‘[d]econstructionism is an integral part of the postmodern

project’,17 critical discourse analysis draws upon the deconstructivist spirit of
postmodern thought. Deconstructivist approaches are concerned, primarily, with
interpreting textual representations of the social world, rather than with explaining
its allegedly underlying ontological constitution. In this sense, discourse analysis
forms part of a methodological shift from explanatory to interpretive social enquiry. If
the postmodernization of methodology in the social sciences is driven by the inter-
pretive study of the symbolic representations of human life, then discourse analysis
plays a pivotal role in the process of this paradigmatic transformation.

(ii) Mechanics versus Dialectics

Critical discourse analysis can be conceived of as

both a theory and a method: as a method for analysing social practices with
particular regard to their discourse moments within the linking of the theoreti-
cal and practical concerns […], as bringing a variety of theories into dialogue,
especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic theories on the other,
so that its theory is a shifting synthesis of other theories […].18

As both a critical theory and a critical method it is committed to the dialectical,

rather than mechanical, study of society in at least three respects:

1. On the methodological level, critical discourse analysis aims to connect the

theoretical dimensions of its conceptual presuppositions with the practical
dimensions of its empirical explorations (dialectics of conceptual reflection and
empirical research).
2. On the theoretical level, critical discourse analysis bridges the gap between
‘positivist’ and ‘interpretivist’ approaches in the social sciences, insofar as
it seeks to scrutinize both the real and the representational dimensions of
society (dialectics of social structuration and textual representation).19
3. On the normative level, critical discourse analysis is consciously ‘“involved”
in the social practices it theorises in that it positions itself in relation to the
struggles within them, given its emancipatory knowledge interest’20 (dialectics
of critical theory and everyday practice).

In other words, critical discourse analysis is (1) methodologically committed to

cross-validating conceptual reflection and empirical research, (2) theoretically com-
mitted to cross-examining social structures and textual representations, and (3) nor-
matively committed to cross-fertilizing critical frameworks and ordinary activities.
Given this dialectical orientation on three levels, discourse analysis is opposed
to (1) detached theoreticism and crude empiricism, (2) materialist structuralism
and idealist interpretivism, and (3) self-referential intellectualism and unreflec-
tive activism. In short, critical discourse analysis proposes to overcome counter-
productive antinomies in the social sciences by advocating a dialectical engagement
with human reality.
 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology? 69

It comes as no surprise, then, that critical discourse analysts are keen to empha-
size the dialectical spirit permeating their investigative undertakings, as reflected
in the following statement:

Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between

a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social
structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship:
the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions, and social structures,
but it also shapes them.21

Put differently, the twofold power of discourse stems from the fact that it forms both
a reproductive and a transformative element of social reality. As such, it can be used
either to sustain and reproduce or to undermine and transform the legitimacy of a
set of social arrangements.
The simultaneous reproduction and transformation of social order is unthink-
able without the creation and negotiation of discourses, which make the existence
of symbolically mediated life forms possible in the first place. Society is inconceiv-
able without meaning-laden interactions between human subjects. To the extent
that social formations generate discursive practices, discursive practices contribute
to the construction of social formations. The relationship between society and dis-
course is dialectical in the sense that one never completely determines the other.
On the contrary, their ontological interdependence is rooted in the fact that no
society can exist without the production of discourses, just as no discourse can be
maintained without an intrinsic connection to society.22
Due to their critical engagement with symbolically mediated forms of coex-
istential complexity, critical discourse analysts are categorically opposed to
reductionist accounts of ‘the social’. Their rejection of monocausal explana-
tions falls in line with the postmodern insistence upon the radical indetermin-
acy of social arrangements. Similar to postmodern thinkers, critical discourse
analysts aim to explore different aspects of social reality in terms of their rela-
tional constitution. Thus, rather than privileging one causal factor over other
sources of influence,23 a central task of critical discourse analysis is to flesh out
the ways in which multiple elements simultaneously affect the development
of social constellations. From this perspective, there is no such thing as an
ultimate or preponderant causal force determining the constitution of society;
rather, we are confronted with a contingent and dynamic ensemble of inter-
related factors shaping both the material and the symbolic organization of
social arrangements, which can be conceived of as spatiotemporally variable
interactional constellations.

(iii) Ideology versus Discourse

The concept of discourse should not be confused with the concept of ideology.24
In the social sciences, those who prefer to employ the former term tend to avoid
making use of the latter term, and vice versa. This is not to suggest that the two
concepts are incompatible or even antagonistic; rather, this is to acknowledge
70 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

that they reflect diverging forms of studying the nature of symbolic realms
and of accounting for their pivotal role in the daily construction of social life.
Irrespective of whether one seeks to reconcile, or even integrate, these two con-
cepts, or whether one favours one of them over the other, it is worth remember-
ing that the systematic development of discourse analysis, as a methodological
approach, is a relatively recent phenomenon, which may be perceived as part of
an overall paradigmatic shift towards an increasing concern with different levels
of indeterminacy in the social sciences.
Those who endorse the concept of discourse may distance themselves from the
discourse of ideology, in order to reinforce the validity of the former, while insisting
upon the invalidity of the latter. By contrast, those who advocate the concept of
ideology may criticize the ideology of discourse, in order to defend the validity of the
former, while disclosing the absurdity of the latter. Those who seek to integrate the
two concepts may make a case for both the ‘discourse of ideology’ and the ‘ideol-
ogy of discourse’, or for both the ‘ideology of ideology’ and the ‘discourse of dis-
course’, in order to stress that the two concepts, far from contradicting each other,
may be cross-fertilized. Notwithstanding the question of which of these options
is the most convincing one, the complexity of the methodological issues that
are at stake in postmodern thought manifests itself in the analytical distinction
between ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse’. Whereas the concept of ideology emerged in
early modern social thought, the concept of discourse is widely used in explorative
approaches associated with, or influenced by, late modern or postmodern studies.
A canonical view of ideology is based on the following three presuppositions:

1. In terms of its epistemic value, the concept of ideology is diametrically opposed

to the concept of truth. A dualistic expression of this – orthodox Marxist –
account is the theoretical distinction between ‘false consciousness’ and ‘true
consciousness’. According to this perspective, ideological representations do
not describe but distort reality, thereby concealing the existence of underlying
determinants, rather than uncovering them. Thus, ideology forms a cognitive
framework capable of colonizing people’s perception of reality with symbolic
misrepresentations.25
2. In classical sociological – especially Marxist – approaches, the concept of ideol-
ogy is embedded in the notion of a collective historical subject – such as a particu-
lar social group, class, or movement. On this view, ideology can be produced,
appropriated, and instrumentalized by specific collective actors who seek to
protect, and justify the defence of, their interests in society.26
3. The concept of ideology tends to be used, notably by orthodox Marxists, to
refer to a symbolically mediated realm that stands in secondary position to the
material conditions, or economic infrastructure, of society. Following this epi-
phenomenalist account, in every social formation, an ideological superstructure
emerges as a direct reflection of an economic base.27

Given the power-laden nature of stratified societies, the dominant ideology is

a vehicle for the ruling ideas of the ruling class. In brief, ideology constitutes
 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology? 71

(1) a distortive cognitive framework, (2) an instrumental element of symbolic power

exercised by a collective historical subject, and (3) an epiphenomenal expression
of the economically constituted infrastructure of society. It is, therefore, the task
of ideology critique to uncover the distortive, interest-laden, and superstructural
nature of ideology.28
Advocates of the concept of discourse have sought to turn away from the con-
cept of ideology. The systematic defence of their view of symbolic mediations
creates a fundamentally different picture:

1. Discourses are neither true nor false. What makes them tremendously powerful
in any social formation is not their representational adequacy or inadequacy
but, instead, their relationally contingent practical force.
2. Unlike ideologies, discourses are not superimposed upon society by a macro-
historical subject. Rather, they reflect the diffuse and ephemeral nature of power
struggles over meanings and identities, which are shaped by a multiplicity of
individual and collective actors.
3. Discourses are not simply epiphenomenal manifestations of society’s material
determinacy. Their constitution cannot be reduced to a symbolic realm that –
as a ‘secondary’ or ‘derivative’ sphere of representations and misrepresenta-
tions – is parasitical upon economic relations. The fuzzy logic of discursive
practices escapes the structuralist hierarchy of primary and secondary domains.
Symbolic performances are both outcomes and vehicles of complex, circular, and
multifaceted power struggles.29

In short, discourses constitute (1) relationally contingent assemblages of meaning,

(2) symbolic resources of diffusely and ephemerally distributed social power, which
can be mobilized by a variety of individual and collective actors, and (3) both
products and carriers of intersectionally structured power struggles. It is, thus, the
task of critical discourse analysis to shed light on the positional, plural, and poly-
morphous constitution of discourses.
What, then, is the significance of the conceptual distinction between ‘ideol-
ogy’ and ‘discourse’, as well as of the methodological differentiation between
‘ideology critique’ and ‘discourse analysis’? Some of the most important points
of divergence between these two conceptual tools, and between these two meth-
odological approaches, have been summarized above. Given their concern with
the indeterminacy of relationally constructed realities, it should not come as a
surprise that postmodern thinkers, or those theorists whose writings are – rightly
or wrongly – associated with postmodern thought, tend to favour the concept of
‘discourse’ over that of ‘ideology’ and, consequently, the project of ‘critical dis-
course analysis’ over that of ‘ideology critique’. In the postmodern universe, there
are no ideologies, understood as distortive cognitive frameworks whose core sym-
bolic components and social functions can be dictated by a ruling class, capable
of defending its interests and privileged position by imposing the hegemony of
its own representational frameworks and normative principles upon every sphere
of society. From a postmodern perspective, the eclectic, dispersive, and diffuse
72 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

constitution of discourses is indicative of both the real and the representational

complexity generated in and by polycentrically organized social formations.

Summary

As suggested in this chapter, the impact of postmodern thought on social research

methods can be examined by considering a critical approach that has gained
increasing significance in the social sciences over the past three decades: discourse
analysis. The overall influence of discourse analysis on contemporary forms of
social enquiry manifests itself in what may be described as the interpretive turn in
research methodology. This is not to posit that discourse analysis has established
itself as the predominant methodological approach in the social sciences, let
alone that it represents the only type of critical investigation whose diagnostic
development is, directly or indirectly, related to postmodern thought. Moreover,
it would be misleading to imply that all forms of discourse analysis are, implicitly
or explicitly, postmodern.
As this chapter has aimed to demonstrate, however, discourse analysis can
be regarded as a social research methodology whose main theoretical presuppositions are
symptomatic of the paradigmatic shift from the search for relative determinacy to the
emphasis on radical indeterminacy in recent and present-day controversies in the social
sciences and humanities. In this sense, the far-reaching relevance of postmodern
thought to current forms of social research is revealed in the elaboration and
recognition of discourse analysis as a useful, and potentially insightful, approach
to the study of normatively established relations. As elucidated in the previous
sections, the presuppositional differences between modern and postmodern
conceptions of social research are reflected in three fundamental oppositions:
(i) explanation versus understanding, (ii) mechanics versus dialectics, and (iii) ideology
versus discourse.

I. The tension between explanation and understanding is expressed in the opposi-

tion between positivist and interpretivist research methodologies.
II. The tension between mechanics and dialectics is illustrated in the opposition
between monolithic and polycentric conceptions of ‘the social’.
III. The tension between ideology and discourse is epitomized in the opposition
between classical conceptions of ideology critique and contemporary forms of
discourse analysis.

Owing to its preoccupation with complexity, intrinsic to the constitution of

human reality, discourse analysis requires critical researchers to face up to the
radical indeterminacy of the social world.

Towards a New Methodology?

The aforementioned antinomies – that is, explanation versus understanding,

mechanics versus dialectics, and ideology versus discourse – cannot be properly
 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology? 73

grasped without considering the paradigmatic opposition between structuralist

and poststructuralist approaches in the social sciences. The former aim to explain
the mechanics of the social world in terms of the production of structurally
determined ideological frameworks. The latter, by contrast, seek to understand the
dialectics of social reality by studying constantly shifting horizons of discursive
constellations. In essence, then, we are confronted with the methodological gap
between the structuralist undertones of orthodox variations of ideology critique and
the poststructuralist presuppositions underlying most contemporary versions of
discourse analysis.
The conceptual distinction between ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse’ obliges us to
recognize that, as illustrated above, the methodological ambitions of ‘ideology
critique’ and ‘discourse analysis’ are fundamentally different. To be clear, both
approaches examine the symbolic organization of the social world. Yet, whereas
ideology critics are motivated by the uncovering mission of Enlightenment thought,
discourse analysts are guided by the contextualizing task of exploring the spatiotem-
poral contingency that permeates all claims to epistemic validity. Of course, given
the gradual abandonment of the project of ideology critique in the contemporary
social sciences, it is no surprise that, in the literature, we encounter numerous
competing versions of discourse analysis. In the face of this interpretive elas-
ticity, it would be erroneous to presume that there is a universal consensus on
the nature of discourses, let alone on the way in which they can, or should, be
studied. While the diversity of recently developed methodological approaches
aimed at scrutinizing the symbolic dimensions of social life is striking, it appears
that poststructuralist thought has had a particularly noticeable – and, arguably, the
most significant – influence upon contemporary forms of discourse analysis. Let
us, therefore, consider some of the key assumptions underlying poststructuralist
accounts of discourse.30

Poststructuralist Accounts of Discourse

To begin with, it makes sense to put the rise of poststructuralist accounts of dis-
course into context in order to understand the historical conditions under which
they gained increasing influence on research epistemologies and methodologies
in the social sciences.31 In this respect, five facets of poststructuralist thought are
particularly worth mentioning.
(1) There is the poststructuralist opposition to ideologism. The rise of new social
movements in the second half of the twentieth century – epitomized in the intel-
lectual climate of 1968 – led to a radical questioning of the relevance of classical
political ideologies to the unprecedented complexities faced under conditions
of late modernity. The delegitimization of big-picture ideological frameworks was
expressed in the fact that – especially among supporters of the political left – the
belief in the privileged sociohistorical role of the working class, the trust in
the steering capacity of highly bureaucratized states, and the enthusiasm about the
prospect of unlimited economic growth had lost credibility. This is not to suggest
that poststructuralists are categorically opposed to political ideologies; this does
imply, however, that they are suspicious of proselytizing dogmas that claim to
74 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

provide universal recipes for the successful and all-empowering organization of

large-scale societies.
(2) There is the poststructuralist opposition to orthodox Marxism. The rise of the
New Left in the second half of the twentieth century – embodied in the creation
of several neo- and post-Marxist currents, as well as in the repositioning of social-
democratic movements around the world – led to a sceptical re-examination of
the epistemic validity and political legitimacy of classical agendas of ‘scientific
socialism’, especially of its structuralist variants. The shift from structuralist to
poststructuralist Marxism is reflected in a paradigmatic transition on numerous
levels: from ideology critique to discourse analysis; from an obsession with principles
of universality to a concern with issues of particularity; from the foundationalist
belief in the preponderance of class conflict to an anti-foundationalist engage-
ment with multiple social struggles; from the search for the relative determinacy of
society to an interest in the radical indeterminacy of both human and nonhuman
forms of agency; and from the monological privileging of one historical subject to
the genealogical exploration of dispersed subject positions.32 In short, the decen-
tring of the subject lies at the heart of the revision of Marxist theory. Not only the
intellectual climate of 1968, but also – even more significantly – the collapse of
state socialism in Eastern Europe, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,
has triggered the comprehensive rethinking of Marxist approaches, particularly
with regard to their capacity to capture the complexity of highly differentiated
societies. Poststructuralist Marxism is, by definition, an ‘undogmatic’ and ‘open’
Marxism.33
(3) There is the poststructuralist opposition to fundamentalism. The rise of fun-
damentalist movements in the second half of the twentieth century – expressed
in the emergence of new ethnic and religious conflicts – led to a wider critical
interest in the normative legitimacy of political ideologies oriented towards the
assertion of collective identities. The reassertion of ‘non-negotiable moral values
and essentialist identities’34 – realized by discursive or, in some cases, violent
means – is central to fundamentalist movements and ideologies. Poststructuralist
approaches to discourse are based on a radically anti-essentialist stance, which
conceives of ‘fundamentalism as inherently anti-democratic and reactionary’35
due to its exclusionist implications. The anti-essentialist attitude advocated by
poststructuralists is embedded in the relationalist conviction that ‘the possibility of
self-enclosed particularist identities possessing uncontaminated moral values’36 is
an illusion, since ‘[a]ll identities and all values are constituted by reference to some-
thing outside them.’37 Owing to the relational contingency permeating all forms
of sociality, there is no such thing as ‘an ultimate fixity’38 underlying individual
or collective forms of identity. From this perspective, emancipatory identities,
assuming that they can exist, are fluid – and, thus, constantly changing – points
of reference, mobilized for the structured construction of reality in pursuit of
recognizing their own impossibility.
(4) There is the poststructuralist opposition to political reformism. The rise of rep-
resentational democracies in the second half of the twentieth century, inspired by
the ‘liberal democratic values of “freedom and equality for all”’,39 led not only to
 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology? 75

the political delegitimization of ‘authoritarian or even totalitarian rule’40 but also to

an increasing awareness of the normative limitations inherent in decision-making
processes in large-scale societies. The plea for the exploration of new horizons
oriented towards the construction of a ‘radical plural democracy’,41 on the other
hand, is motivated by the conviction that, ‘[e]ven in those countries where liberal
democracy does prevail, it is restricted to the public sphere of the political system
and suffers from a lack of active political involvement.’42 The question that arises, in
this respect, is to what extent it is possible to organize systemically differentiated
and highly bureaucratized societies in such a way that citizens are granted the real
opportunity to participate vigorously in democratic decision-making processes,
enabling them to coordinate their actions in meaningful ways and thereby con-
tribute to the empowering development of their lives. The idea of grassroots political
empowerment, derived from active participation in autonomous decision-making
processes, is commonly referred to in terms of direct democracy or deliberative
democracy.43 For poststructuralist discourse theorists, notably those inspired by the
writings of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe,44 the insistence upon the necessity
to explore the preconditions for the construction of radical democracy is aimed at
demonstrating that the consolidation of institutional structures – such as the state –
can barely be enough in the search for the possibility of human self-determination.
To put it bluntly, poststructuralists emphasize the normative significance of social
processes, rather than of social structures, for the daily struggle over material and
symbolic resources allowing for individual and collective empowerment.
(5) There is the poststructuralist opposition to determinism. The rise of postmod-
ern thought in the second half of the twentieth century, which arguably reached
its peak in the mid-1990s,45 led to a great deal of suspicion towards the project
of modernity in general and towards the Enlightenment project in particular.
To be sure, this is not to maintain that poststructuralists consider modern social
thought to be determinist per se; rather, this means that they seek to radicalize the
‘growing awareness of the limits of modernity’.46 This critical engagement with
the real and representational boundaries of the modern project manifests itself
in the poststructuralist emphasis on the conditions of ambiguity, contingency, and
indeterminacy:

A. The ‘recognition of the ambiguity of the constitutive traits of modern society’47

concerns the acknowledgement of the fact that, as critical researchers, we need
to face up to the intrinsic ambivalence of the contemporary age. On this view,
modernity contains both bright and dark sides, both an emancipatory and
a repressive potential, both empowering opportunities and disempowering
pitfalls.
B. The ‘recognition of the contingency of modernity’48 is based on the insight
that all cognitive, normative, or aesthetic claims to validity are sociohistorical
expressions of spatiotemporal specificities, rather than of context-transcending
universality.
C. The recognition of the indeterminacy of modern reality is inspired by the con-
viction that, far from providing ‘an ultimate starting point for social, cultural
76 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

or political analysis’,49 both the concept of the subject and the concept of
reason ‘are constructed in and through unmasterable power strategies taking
place within an undecidable discursive terrain’.50 Hence, the poststructuralist
landscape lacks the epistemic certainty derived from the traditional compass
of rationally guided and directionally oriented macrohistorical protagonists.

Given the far-reaching significance of these key elements underpinning the post-
structuralist spirit, it appears ‘increasingly difficult to address the social, cultural
and political problems of today from within a modern theoretical perspective’.51
Therefore, instead of imposing logocentric parameters upon arbitrarily assembled
realities, it is imperative to face up to the radical openness of history.
What, then, are the principal features of poststructuralist accounts of discourse?
In a general sense, we may suggest that a ‘discourse is a differential ensemble of
signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated’.52 A close reading
of this definition indicates that discourses are characterized by at least six central
elements.

A. Discourses are differential in that they are not monolithic but both internally
and externally heterogeneous, that is, they are composed of multiple meaning-
bearing components and can be distinguished from one another in terms of
their specific sets of values, assumptions, and principles.
B. Discourses are structural in that they constitute ensembles of assembled, inter-
related, and interdependent signs and symbols.
C. Discourses are sequential in that their contents are semantically formed, gram-
matically organized, and pragmatically mobilized by social actors capable of
speech and reflection.
D. Discourses are interpretive in that they allow for the meaning-laden construc-
tion of, and the hermeneutically mediated engagement with, reality.
E. Discourses are ineluctable in that human actors can relate to the world only as
a discursively constituted realm of existence.
F. Discourses are contentious in that they are consciously or unconsciously negoti-
ated and renegotiated by those who either endorse or subvert them.

Discourses of Discourse: Within and beyond Binary Tensions

If, on the basis of the above definition, we examine the constitution of discourses
in more detail, we are confronted with at least eight conceptual tensions. The sig-
nificance of these tensions for the elaboration of poststructuralist accounts of
discourse shall be elucidated in this section.
(1) There is the tension between the transcendental and the historical. Ironically,
‘the concept of discourse has distant roots in the transcendental turn in western phi-
losophy’.53 This paradigmatic shift in European intellectual thought is associated
with Kantian idealism, notably with its ambition to identify the a priori condi-
tions of human understanding. Thus, ‘classical transcendentalism conceives the
conditions of possibility as ahistorical and invariable’,54 in the sense that they rise
above the spatiotemporal contingencies of relationally constructed realities. On
 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology? 77

this view, all human subjects – at any time and in any context – need to mobilize
the predispositional cognitive resources of their mental apparatus in order to
establish a symbolically mediated relation to the world.
The key assumption that Kantian idealists and poststructuralist discourse theor-
ists share is the supposition that human entities do not have direct access to the
world when practically or theoretically relating to it. In other words, they both
contend that our interactions with reality are always mediated by phenomenally
organized and conceptually generated representations, which permit us to reduce
the infinite amount of information thrown at us by our natural and social envir-
onment to an absorbable ensemble of ideas created by, and processed within, our
inner world. Poststructuralists differ from classical transcendentalists, however, in
that they ‘insist on the historicity and variability’55 of discourses in particular and
of conceptual frameworks in general. From this perspective, ‘the transcendental
conditions are not purely transcendental, but continuously changed by empirical
events’.56 Every discourse, far from being detachable from the particular histori-
cal setting in which it emerges, is shaped by presuppositions of socioculturally
specific and linguistically constituted background horizons. Just as discourses
change over time and across different contexts, so do the ways in which social
actors attribute meaning to both the material and the symbolic constellations
permeating their existence.
(2) There is the tension between subject and structure. On the one hand, we are
confronted with the Enlightenment-inspired ‘idealist conception of the subject
as the creator of the world’,57 according to which human beings are purposive,
normative, and appreciative entities capable of shaping their lives by virtue of
reason. This anthropocentric account puts human beings at centre stage, portray-
ing them as conscious, rational, and civilizational creatures able to raise themselves
above nature by developing a sense of cognitive and moral autonomy in rela-
tion to material and symbolic elements that are constitutive of their inward and
outward reality. On the other hand, we are faced with the language-theoretic
emphasis on the ‘notion of structure’,58 which is based on the post-Saussurean
assumption that ‘our cognitions and speech-acts only become meaningful within
certain pre-established discourses, which have different structurations that change
over time’.59 To conceive of discourse as a ‘structural order’60 means to suggest that
discursive formations are ensembles of grammatically organized and hermeneutic-
ally interrelated signs and symbols.
Contrary to classical Enlightenment thought, then, agency and structure are
not opposed to one another; rather, agency is inherent in structures themselves. For
structures – notably social, cultural, political, economic, and linguistic ones –
make human entities act and reflect upon the world in particular ways, without
them being aware of the relational determinacy of their immersion in reality.
From this point of view, whenever a linguistically mediated and phonetically
expressed relation to reality is established, it is not the speaker who speaks, but,
on the contrary, the discourse that speaks on behalf of the speaker. Given the
noticeable – yet, usually unnoticed – power of structures, linguistic entities tend to
be unaware of the relational constitution underlying their discursively assembled
78 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

consciousness. While structuralists and poststructuralists converge in their attempt

to demonstrate that agency, far from being reducible to a species-constitutive privi-
lege of the subject, is inherent in different – that is, both human and nonhuman –
sets of structurality, they diverge in one crucial respect: the former tend to regard
structures as fairly stable and coherently organized sets of material or symbolic
arrangements; the latter interpret structures as fundamentally unstable, malleable,
and random assemblages of meaning. Such assemblages shape both our percep-
tion of and our interaction with reality, in accordance with relatively arbitrary and
power-laden codes of normativity.
(3) There is the tension between closure and openness. One of the key ambitions
of poststructuralist analysis is to deconstruct the notion that a set of structures
constitutes ‘a self-contained space unified by a fixed centre’.61 By ‘questioning
the idea of an ultimate centre, origin, foundation, ground’,62 or raison d’être, post-
structuralists conceive of discourses as assemblages of meaning, which are in a
constant state of flux and which lack the epistemic capacity to provide exhaustive
representations, let alone explanations, of reality.
Given the interpretive nature of all symbolically mediated depictions, ‘the
infinite richness of reality […] can never be exhausted by a finite discourse’.63 On this
account, the illusory orientation towards closure disregards the radically con-
tingent spirit pervading the discursive ‘play of meaning’:64 the fact that every
language game emerges in relation to a particular context implies that the rather
arbitrary imposition of closure is possible only as a temporary deception, brought
about by the grammatically organized and discursively sustained invention of
perfection. If, by contrast, we recognize that ‘[s]tructure is first the structure of
an organic or artificial work, the internal unity of an assemblage, a construction […]
governed by a unifying principle’,65 then we are able to appreciate the signifi-
cance of one of the key poststructuralist insights into the study of social reality: a
material or symbolic structure, insofar as it can be historically constructed, can be
theoretically deconstructed and practically reconstructed. We have no choice but to
face up to the radical openness underpinning the seemingly most consolidated
systems of closure.
(4) There is the tension between totality and partiality. Poststructuralists main-
tain that, although discourses may appear or claim to constitute coherent and
exhaustive systems of representation and explanation, they cannot transcend the
perspective-ladenness inherent in all epistemic modes of articulation. Indeed, ‘the
structure’s attempt to totalize and exhaust the field of identity, leaving no room
for a constitutive outside’,66 gives the misleading impression that the constitutive
inside forms a realm of all-encompassing enlightenment and ultimate discernment.
If ‘complete totalization, and thus closure, is impossible’,67 this is because every dis-
course derives its relative existential solidity and epistemic validity from its carriers’
capacity to immerse themselves in the daily cognitive exercise of establishing and
negotiating context-depending parameters for relationally defined codes of
legitimacy. Owing to the preponderance of normativity permeating every human
engagement with reality, we need to account for the fact that discursive impositions
of totality remain trapped in perspective-laden parameters of partiality. What is of
 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology? 79

political significance, however, is the fact that, due to its totalizing logic, the con-
struction of every discourse leads to the – deliberate or unintended – demarcation
between an inside and an outside, sustained by – overt or hidden – processes of
inclusion and exclusion. ‘The creation of a relative structural order is conditional
upon the exclusion of a constitutive outside which threatens the relative order of
the structure and prevents an ultimate closure.’68 In other words, the most authori-
tative discourse cannot annihilate the subversive potential that always already
undermines the legitimacy attributed to symbolically constituted realms of valid-
ity. Every striving for the realization of totality takes place within intersubjectively
negotiated and subjectively projected horizons of partiality.
(5) There is the tension between identity and difference. One of the key ambitions
of poststructuralist deconstruction is to demonstrate that symbolically constituted
identities can be created only on the basis of discursively articulated differences
between signs. To put it bluntly, ‘in language there are only differences, with no positive
terms’.69 Poststructuralist discourse analysis, then, is intimately interrelated with the
‘interpretive turn’: it rejects positivistically inspired forms of epistemological realism,
according to which, on the basis of our senses, we have direct access to the world;
furthermore, it discards correspondence theories of truth, according to which language
permits us to provide accurate representations of reality. Instead, it insists that the
meaning of linguistic concepts emerges from the relational and differential configur-
ation of signs and symbols, that is, from the multiple ways in which semantic signi-
fiers are related to, and can be differentiated from, one another.
‘All identities within the linguistic system of signs are therefore conceived in terms
of relational and differential values.’70 From this perspective, a signifier is neither an
endogenously sustained, independent, and self-contained carrier of meaning, nor
an exogenously triggered, fully accurate, and exhaustive representation of being;
rather, it is a relationally constituted, differentially assembled, and semantically
equipped medium for human interpretation. In a radical sense, there is no such
thing as a strict denotative meaning, since all constructions of linguistic identity
and all claims to representational accuracy are vehicles of signification only in rela-
tion to, and only through their differentiation from, other carriers of interpretation.
Discourses convert reality into a domain of relentless signifiability and unreachable
comprehensibility. Interpretation is an inventive activity, for the most denotative
representation of reality depends on the connotative relations established between
different manifestations of identity. The sociological significance of connotative –
and, hence, relatively arbitrary – relations generated on the basis of linguistic
signifiers is illustrated in the construction of binary categories: male/female, white/
black, rich/poor, young/old, able/disabled, nature/nurture, individual/society – to
mention only a few.71 The normative power of binary categories stems from their
capacity to have a substantial impact not only upon the organization of language
but also, more importantly, upon the regulation of social interactions.
(6) There is the tension between signified and signifier. At the heart of this tension
lies the linguistically mediated relationship between substance and form. Drawing
upon Saussurean linguistics, poststructuralists posit that ‘language is a form and
not substance’.72 This view is based on the assumption that the relationship
80 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

between language and reality is characterized by the preponderance of form over

substance and, consequently, by the prevalence of signifier over signified. Not only
do we need to recognize that our relation to the world is linguistically constituted
and conceptually organized; but, in addition, we need to acknowledge that every
symbolically mediated representation of reality is a reality in itself. Put differently,
linguistic realities are hyperrealities in the sense that, although they emerge in
relation to an objectively existing outside world, they constitute irreducible realms
of interpretation. To be sure, this is not to assert that signifiers exist in complete
isolation from the realities that they are meant to signify, nor that language
can be abstracted from the sociohistorical context in which it emerges. On the
contrary, symbolic forms cannot be detached from the empirical substances to
which they refer and which they are aimed to represent. This is to accept, however,
that the world of linguistic signifiers and symbolic forms enjoys a degree of relative –
legislate and executive – autonomy, which permits it to be governed by its own –
grammatically defined – rules and be used through the playful construction of its
own – pragmatically established – meanings.
If we concede that ‘[t]he linguistic elements are defined exclusively by the formal
rules of their combination and substitution’,73 this does not necessarily imply that
‘their substance does not count at all’.74 Yet, this does suggest that the key dimen-
sion of poststructuralist discourse analysis is not the relation between the signi-
fiers (that is, symbolic forms) and the signified (that is, empirical substances), but
the relation between signifiers themselves. Linguistic signifiers have the capacity to
construct a conceptually organized hyperreality, which enjoys relative autonomy
with respect to physically constituted realms of factuality. The signified world may
say: ‘I am the ultimate reference point of the most abstract forms of linguisticality.’
The signifying word replies: ‘Watch out; I am the one who determines how human
actors engage, or do not engage, with symbolically mediated realities.’
(7) There is the tension between the non-discursive and the discursive. In a strict
sense, it appears that, from a poststructuralist perspective, there are no non-discursive
realms. On this account, reality presents itself to human actors, unavoidably, as
a discursively mediated form of existence. Given that we are meaning-producing
entities able to relate to the world through the conceptualizing power of linguistic
reflection, our most immediate experience of reality cannot be separated from the
mediating function of interpretation. Put differently, our immersion in the world
is conceivable only as a discursive process oriented towards the interpretation of
the world. One of the key features of the species-constitutive idiosyncrasy charac-
terizing the human involvement in reality is the simultaneous engagement with
three spheres of existential interactionality:

a. ‘the’ physical world of objectivity,

b. ‘our’ social world of normativity, and
c. ‘his’ or ‘her’ personal world of subjectivity.

Every actor’s ineluctable participation in the three constitutive worlds of human-

ity illustrates that belonging to a particular community requires the capacity to
 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology? 81

develop a tripartite relation to reality. Unlike other entities, however, human

beings – as meaning-constructing carriers of symbolically structured actualities
and as meaning-exchanging members of communicatively maintained societies –
have created an existential condition whose reproduction requires worldly inter-
actions based on discursively constituted interpretations. Paradoxically, then,

the more we analyse the so-called non-discursive complexes […] the clearer it
becomes that these are relational systems of differential identities, which are
not shaped by some objective necessity (God, Nature or Reason) and which can
only therefore be conceived as discursive articulations.75

In brief, the preponderance of discursivity is an integral feature of society because

human actors relate to reality – including their own subjectivity – as a sym-
bolically mediated sphere, which is impregnated with conceptual patterns of
comprehensibility.
(8) There is the tension between discourse and the discursive, or, to be precise,
between discourse and discursivity. To the extent that ‘[d]iscourse is defined as a
relational ensemble of signifying sequences’,76 it is conceived of as a malleable,
but nevertheless relatively stable, conglomerate of epistemically interconnected
elements of meaning. To be sure, ‘[t]he multiplicity of mutually substituting cen-
tres only brings about a precarious order and only manages to produce a partial
fixation of meaning.’77 Yet, despite the polycentricity, partiality, and provisional-
ity that characterize symbolically constructed frameworks of validity, discourses
are sustainable on condition that they possess at least a minimal degree of fixity.
By contrast, to the extent that ‘the field of discursivity is precisely what makes pos-
sible the articulation of a multiplicity of competing discourses’,78 it constitutes a
relatively open horizon of meaning, in which symbolic frameworks meet, compete,
and sometimes overlap. In this sense, the field of discursivity can be regarded as a
‘theoretical horizon for the constitution of the being of every object’,79 that is, as
the ontological precondition for the coming-into-existence of the elements allow-
ing for the construction of human realities. The relationship between discourse
and discursivity is tension-laden only to the degree that the former seeks to escape
its dependence upon the latter and, correspondingly, to the degree that the latter
aims to undermine the relative autonomy of the former. The

distinction between discourse and the discursive should be made in terms of

differing degrees of fixity/unfixity. That is, while the unfixed elements of a dis-
integrated discourse clearly belong to the field of discursivity, the partially fixed
moments with concrete discourse do not.80

Whereas the most ephemeral discourse cannot come into being without at least
a marginal level of referential stability, the most perpetual realm of discursivity
cannot rise above the fluidity underlying the conditions of its own possibility.
The realm of discursivity designates ‘a terrain of unfixity’81 in which the ‘irre-
ducible surplus of meaning’82 escapes the incarcerating power of discourse-laden
82 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

logocentricity, thereby confirming that the seemingly most consolidated aspects

of socially constructed realities are situated in spatiotemporal horizons of radical
indeterminacy.

A dichotomist misreading of the aforementioned points can be avoided by taking

into account the fact that one of the chief ambitions of poststructuralist analysis is to
deconstruct binary categories, comprising the aforementioned – arguably artificial –
conceptual antinomies:

1. Ostensibly transcendental grammars of signification and interpretation

emerge out of, and evolve within, historical – and, hence, constantly
changing – contexts of action and realization.
2. Agency emanates from both subjects and objects, as both have the structuring
capacity to exercise a directional impact upon the unfolding of performatively
constituted realities.
3. The construction of discursive determinacy takes place within a horizon of rad-
ical indeterminacy. Just as nothing is wholly arbitrary, nothing is completely
determined. Human actors should be open to their enclosure in society, since
they are enclosed in the openness of history.
4. Every quest for totality is impregnated with the perspective-laden parameters of
partiality.
5. Identity and difference go together, as there is no affirmation of idiosyncrasy or
commonality without reference to other distinctive or generic entities.
6. While the signified has no currency without a signifier capable of transferring
empirical forms of being into the interpretive realm of discursive projection, a
signifier obtains relevance in relation to the signified providing an experiential
reference point for the construction of meaning.
7. Even seemingly non-discursive elements of human reality are situated within –
symbolically organized – contexts of discursivity.
8. Discourses emerge within horizons of discursivity, at the same time as horizons
of discursivity owe their existence to the production of discourses.

In short, the construction of society is inconceivable without the production of discourses.

3
From Modern to Postmodern Sociology?
The ‘Cultural Turn’

This chapter aims to shed light on the impact of postmodern thought on current
debates in sociology. In this respect, the shift from modern to postmodern forms of
analysis is paradoxical in that it attacks the heart of sociology: namely, its concern
with the constitution of ‘the social’. As shall be elucidated in the following sec-
tions, contemporary conceptions of ‘the social’ have been significantly influenced
by what may be described as the cultural turn1 in sociology. Sociology is a child
of modernity. From a postmodern perspective, recent paradigmatic trends in the
social sciences appear to have contributed to converting sociology into a mature
adult, aware not only of its own limitations but also of the unrealistic ambitions
that shaped its infancy. From a modern point of view, by contrast, the very idea
of a ‘postmodern sociology’ is a contradiction in terms. It is not only because of
its modern roots, however, that it seems implausible to treat sociology as a post-
modern discipline. Furthermore, it is due to two of its most basic assumptions
that it is difficult to conceive of sociology – understood in the classical sense – as
a postmodern endeavour: on the ontological level, the assumption that ‘the social’
actually exists; and, on the methodological level, the assumption that ‘the social’
can be scientifically studied.
The ideas of ‘modern sociology’ and ‘postmodern sociology’, then, give the
impression of being irreconcilable: modern sociology is, by definition, concerned
with the systematic study of ‘the social’; postmodern sociology, by contrast, is
suspicious of macrotheoretical attempts to provide coherent conceptual frame-
works capable of explaining the complexity of relationally constituted realities.
As shall be illustrated in this chapter, postmodern announcements regarding the
possible implosion of ‘the social’ – expressed in aphorisms such as ‘the crisis of
“the social”’2 or, in its more radical versions, ‘the death of “the social”’3 – ques-
tion the validity of the conceptual tools and methodological strategies developed
by classical sociologists. This delegitimization process manifests itself in the fact
that postmodern approaches have introduced a considerable amount of neolog-
isms, based on the premise that the terminology used by classical sociologists is
insufficiently up-to-date to account for the major structural and sociopolitical
transformations that the world has undergone in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries. This chapter aims to demonstrate that the presuppositional

83
84 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

differences between modern and postmodern conceptions of sociology emanate

from various fundamental tensions, three of which are particularly important: (i)
industrialism versus postindustrialism, (ii) productivism versus consumerism, and (iii)
economism versus culturalism.

(i) Industrialism versus Postindustrialism

Modern social theories – despite the significant differences that, on numerous

levels, separate them from one another – tend to share a number of core convic-
tions. These can be criticized on several grounds. The following three angles are
crucial to understanding the postmodern attack on traditional ways of ‘theorizing’
in sociology.
The first critical angle is based on the philosophical claim that modern social
theory is unconvincing because it remains caught up in the erroneous presuppo-
sitions of Enlightenment thought. Undoubtedly, there are substantial dissimilari-
ties between the manifold intellectual traditions of classical sociological analysis.
Most of them subscribe to the view, however, that one of the key tasks of modern
sociology is to uncover the underlying structural forces that shape, or even deter-
mine, both the constitution and the evolution of society. On this account, social
science fulfils the role of an illuminating force, capable of disclosing the hidden
causal mechanisms that operate behind the backs of ordinary actors. To the extent
that postmodernists reject the epistemological distinction between the enlighten-
ers, who are equipped with the terminological and methodological tools of critical
social science, and the to-be-enlightened, who remain trapped in illusory preconcep-
tions derived from common sense, they oppose the project of modern sociology
on philosophical grounds.
The second critical angle is centred on the historical argument that, although
modern social theorists may have been able to propose useful explanatory frame-
works for the study of early modern societies, their insights are rather limited
in the context of the current era. In other words, it is not the case that modern
social theorists have failed to provide accurate accounts of the various forces
governing the development of the modern period; the problem is, however, that
their conceptual models have little use value in light of the profound structural
and sociopolitical transformations that have reshaped the world over the past few
decades. If contemporary – that is, late modern or postmodern – societies are fun-
damentally different from previous – notably early modern and modern – ones,
then the theoretical outlines aimed at grasping the nature of the former do not
permit us to understand a great deal about the constitution of the latter. From this
perspective, analytical approaches developed in the spirit of classical sociological
thought can be considered as anachronistic, implying that the project of modern
sociology may be rejected on historical grounds.
The third critical angle is founded on a philosophico-historical contention, that
is, on a combination of the aforementioned philosophical and historical lines of
reasoning. This – possibly most radical – postmodern view suggests that modern
social theory is flawed due to both the epistemic pitfalls of Enlightenment thought
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 85

and the explanatory limitations of classical sociological theory, which – in the face
of the unprecedented degrees of systemic and interactional complexity shaping
highly differentiated societies – appears to be of peripheral significance to the
development of cutting-edge research in the early twenty-first century. On this
account, the project of modern sociology may be discarded on philosophico-
historical grounds.
Drawing on the presuppositions underlying all three angles, one may come
to the following conclusion: if, over the past few decades, we have undergone a
transition from the widespread existence of modern society to the gradual con-
solidation of multiple – less clearly definable – postmodern realities, then we need
to break out of the analytical straitjacket of ‘modern sociology’ by taking on the
challenge of developing a ‘postmodern sociology’.4
If ‘sociology is the study of modern societies’5 and modern societies have ceased
to exist, then the conceptual tools and explanatory frameworks of ‘classical soci-
ology’ need to be replaced by those of a ‘postclassical sociology’.6 To the extent
that sociology is committed to examining structural transformations occurring in
modern history, it is obliged to engage in the self-critical reflection upon its own
paradigmatic sets of assumptions. One of the main arguments supporting the plea
for the creation of a postmodern sociology is the insistence upon the fact that,
since the second part of the twentieth century, we have been witnessing the rise
of a postindustrial society7 on a global scale. To put it bluntly, we need to abandon
the modern concern with the material and ideological changes triggered by the
consolidation of industrial societies in favour of the postmodern engagement
with the various theoretical and practical challenges arising from the develop-
ment of postindustrial realities.
In essence, the affirmation that we live in a postindustrial society is based on the
assumption that the contemporary world is shaped by five key developments:

a. a shift in emphasis from the production of material goods towards the service
sector of the economy, expressed in the decline of ‘blue-collar’ work and the
rise of ‘white-collar’ work;
b. the constant growth of self-employed workers, combined with the structural
fragmentation of occupational groups and the gradual decomposition of the
working class as a collective historical subject;
c. the increasing importance of science for economic innovation and social
policy;
d. the intensifying significance of technology, driven by the need for the constant
and rapid restructuring of future-oriented and knowledge-based economies; and
e. the mounting influence of ‘intellectual technology’ as a new form of organized
complexity8 emanating from cybernetics and computer science.9

In short, the contemporary world is characterized by the arrival of postmaterial,

postproletarian, scientistic, innovation-driven, and cybernetic societies.10
The above tendencies form part of the historical transition from industrialism to
postindustrialism. The overall significance of this epochal shift is reflected in the
86 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

radical restructuring processes that Western societies have undergone since the
second part of the twentieth century and that have, subsequently, become pro-
foundly influential throughout the world. The development of modern societies
is governed, largely, by the productive forces of the industrial sector – especially,
machinery, technology, factories, and the processing of natural resources. The devel-
opment of postmodern societies, on the other hand, is shaped, primarily, by the
productive forces of the postindustrial sector – notably, knowledge, information,
science, and services.
Thus, the shift from ‘industrialism’ to ‘postindustrialism’ reflects a transi-
tion process that is driven, first and foremost, by economic factors. One may,
however, come to the cynical conclusion that, paradoxically, these economic
factors gradually undermine their own existence. ‘The idea of a society without
economy’11 suggests that the postmodern world is characterized by the con-
tradictory implosion of material productive forces upon themselves. Hence,
endogenous forces of the economy, rather than exogenous forces outside the
economy, have led to large-scale – structural and sociopolitical – transforma-
tions in the contemporary world. ‘Post-modernism can stand to post-industrial or
late-capitalist society as modernism stands to industrial society in its modern or
classically capitalist phase.’12
In Marxist terms, postmodern discourse can be conceived of as a superstruc-
tural expression of the postmodern condition. The complementarity between
the discursive manifestations and the structural circumstances of postmodernity
reinforce the idea that we are in need of a ‘postclassical sociology’, capable of
accounting for both the symbolic and the material changes occurring in contem-
porary societies. Following the Lyotardian research agenda, we may contend that,
in light of the aforementioned transformations, ‘[o]ur working hypothesis is that
the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial
age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age.’13
Ironically, the differentiation between ‘societal postindustrialization’ and ‘cul-
tural postmodernization’ is analytically equivalent to ‘the distinction between
societal modernization and cultural modernization’.14 Rather than separating
societal and cultural developments from one another, however, we need to recog-
nize that they go hand-in-hand. In fact, much of modern social theory is aimed
at ‘showing how the former is responsible for those pathological syndromes mis-
takenly attributed to the latter’,15 while challenging the erroneous supposition
that culture constitutes a realm of symbolically codified practices that are entirely
determined by economic forces.
Yet, even if we acknowledge that the emergence of postmodernism is inextric-
ably linked to the rise of postindustrialism, it is worth bearing in mind that the
notion that we have entered the ‘postindustrial age’ is controversial. The purpose
of the present study, however, is not to prove the empirical validity of this thesis
but, rather, to account for its discursive relevance to postmodern forms of social
and political analysis. To be sure, classical social theory cannot be reduced to a
unified project, whose advocates share one coherent, let alone monolithic, con-
ception of ‘the economic’. What most classical social theories, nevertheless, have
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 87

in common is that they aim to explain the material determinacy of the economy
in the context of modernity. Hardly any contemporary sociologist would chal-
lenge the view that there is ample empirical evidence to substantiate the claim
that the postindustrial sector plays an increasingly powerful role in shaping the
development of highly differentiated societies. In line with this assumption, most
postmodern accounts insist upon the historical significance of the shift from
industrialism to postindustrialism, thereby reinvigorating the idea that both the
conceptual and the methodological tools of classical sociology are increasingly
inadequate for a comprehensive understanding of recent and ongoing global
transformations.

(ii) Productivism versus Consumerism

The assertion that, since the second part of the twentieth century, Western
societies have experienced a transition from industrialism to postindustrialism is
intimately interrelated with the contention that these societies have undergone a
gradual shift from productivism to consumerism. This development obliges us to call
the productivist focus of orthodox Marxist theories into question, because the rise
of consumerist societies implies that ‘labor should no longer be privileged […] as
the basic source of value’.16
Consequently, the sociological significance of postindustrialism is reflected in a
theoretical shift from the modern – and, primarily, Marxist – emphasis on produc-
tion to the postmodern – and, arguably, post-Marxist – concern with consumption.
In the postindustrial era, the modern imperative ‘I work, therefore I am’ is increas-
ingly challenged by the postmodern motto ‘I shop, therefore I am’.17
Class-based identities have not necessarily disappeared, but, in the postindustrial
era, they seem to have become both socially and politically less significant. By
contrast, cultural identities focused on other sociological variables – such as gender,
sexual orientation, ethnicity, and life-style – appear to have gained in importance
in recent decades. The seductive power of consumption consists in its – real or
imagined – emancipation from the hitherto monolithic and ubiquitous presence
of production. In postmodern societies, people’s identities are shaped, first and
foremost, not by what they produce but, rather, by what they consume. It seems,
then, that the relative detachment of symbolic and cultural relations from material
and economic forces stems from the gradual disentanglement of consumption from
production:

In such a postmodern society, the sign becomes the autonomous source and
form of value, the signifier is detached from the signified. […] The representa-
tions are more real than the things represented. People are ‘exteriorized’ into
a techno-culture of ‘hyperreality’ where significance replaces reification and we
know only the simulacra of mass existence.18

In the postmodern context, the hitherto existing – ostensibly incontestable –

predominance of economic production, which orthodox Marxists regard as
88 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

the material foundation of social reality, is challenged by the growing power

of cultural representations, which Baudrillardian commentators interpret as
the symbolic expression of a new sense of hyperreality.19 To put it bluntly, the
postmodern condition is a reality of ‘re-present-ation’, that is, literally of ‘making-
present-again’. The autonomy of the signifier is embedded in only one reality:
the symbolic hyperreality of representation. Postmodern life is an existential
exercise in learning to live with people’s symbolic detachment from the mater-
ial conditions of their environment: the presentation of the self depends ever
more on the representation of the self, just as the power of reality to be present
in our lives rests on its capacity to ensure it is represented in and through our
discursive practices.
Symbolic representation always involves cultural codification. In the postmodern
world of hyperreality, culture is no longer a mere appendage of social determina-
tions; on the contrary, culture is the performative precondition for the coming-into-being
of all social arrangements, which are maintained through the constant creation and
negotiation of symbolic representations. In postmodern societies, culture acquires
the status of a relationally constructed realm that enjoys relative autonomy from
material and structural constraints. Culture, in this sense, appears to have eman-
cipated itself from traditional determinants, such as the economy and the polity,
which lie at the heart of the modern architecture of ‘the social’. Metaphorically
speaking, the ocean of postmodern simulation is an open sea in which all ships
have either sunk or cannot reach their harbours, as their destiny is to be exposed
to uncertainty. If we live in a postmodern age, in which a sense of hyperreality
has become the chief representational reference point, then the age of ‘the cultural’
has begun and ‘the era of “the social” is over’.20
The historical significance of the postmodern announcement that ‘the epoch of
“the social”’21 has ended can barely be overestimated. The centrality of this pro-
vocative claim is due to the fact that it attacks the very heart of sociology, robbing
one of the most influential modern disciplines of its raison d’être, which consists
in the systematic exploration of ‘the social’. If ‘the social’ has disappeared, sociol-
ogy is transformed into a project without an overriding purpose, that is, into an
endeavour whose principal object of study no longer exists. If, in the postmodern
era, the existence of ‘the social’ is an illusion, then sociology, in the classical sense,
attains the status of a pointless intellectual exercise: ‘bringing post-modernism into
the mainstream of sociological theory will produce the uncomfortable, and in
all likelihood unacceptable, imperative that we as sociologists confront the pos-
sibility of an end, and not simply a transformation, of social theory’.22 Indeed, the
proclamation of ‘the end of “the social”’23 degrades social theory to a meaningless
venture. To be precise, the belief in ‘the death of “the social”’24 converts modern
social theory into a worthless intellectual endeavour. Inspired by this apocalyptic
conviction, postmodern approaches in sociology insist upon the crisis, or possible
disappearance, of ‘the social’. In doing so, they posit that, while the project of
‘classical social theory’ needs to be abandoned, the idea of a ‘postmodern social
theory’, far from being pointless, is a fruitful undertaking in the attempt to face up
to the multifaceted complexities arising from relationally constructed realities.25
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 89

Of course, modern scholars tend to be suspicious of the provocative rhetoric

employed to declare ‘the dissolution of “the social”’26 in the contemporary world.
Postmodern analysts, on the other hand, are critical of the scientific spirit that,
they contend, permeates the illusory systematicity underlying most of modern
intellectual thought. ‘Postmodern social theory […] makes no attempt to formulate a
“science” called sociology. It argues that those who harbour such aspirations define
their subject matter in terms of something that cannot be pointed to (society)’.27
To the extent that it is based on the incredulity towards the existence of ‘the
social’, the consolidation of ‘postmodern sociology’ may be regarded as a contra-
diction in terms. If, however, there is such a thing as a postmodern sociology, it
advocates the abandonment of the – presumably deceptive – ambition to uncover
the underlying foundations of ‘the social’.
The ‘postization’ of a whole multiplicity of different facets of social reality is a
central feature of our times, reflecting a terminological shift that seems to indicate
that the conceptual tools used to make sense of the modern condition have lost
their validity. The ‘postization’ endorsed by postmodern commentators under-
mines the legitimacy of modern social science in general and of modern social
theory in particular. For the whole point of putting forward ‘post-istic’ accounts
of society is to overcome the pitfalls of classical sociological thought. In this
sense, ‘the crisis of social theory’ epitomizes ‘the crisis of “the social”’.28 Thus, to
confront the potential demise of social theory requires facing up to the possible
implosion of its main object of study: ‘the social’.
If ‘the crisis of “the social”’29 is inextricably linked to the decline of modern-
ity, then the assumption that we have entered a postmodern age in which the
analytical parameters of the modern world have lost all credibility appears to
be more and more powerful. The significance of this view is reflected in the
enormous referential relevance of the ‘modern-versus-postmodern debate’ in the
contemporary sociological literature.30 Proclaiming ‘the death of “the social”’ is
tantamount to announcing ‘the end of society’. If modern social theorists decide
to take radical declarations of this sort seriously, they will find themselves in the
position of having to reflect on both the strengths and the weaknesses of post-
modern thought:

• its strength lies, above all, in the recognition of the scope and significance of
recent and ongoing social transformations;
• its weakness lies, essentially, in its tendency to overemphasize rupture, rather
than continuity, which leads it to underestimate the persistent power – and,
thus, the enduring relevance – of the structural driving forces that brought
about the consolidation of modern societies.

What should be clear from the preceding reflections, however, is that the ‘posti-
zation’ of intellectual traditions and approaches has encouraged contemporary
scholars to reformulate, or even abandon, the conceptual and methodological
tools employed, and taken for granted, by protagonists and followers of the clas-
sical sociological tradition.
90 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(iii) Economism versus Culturalism

Postmodern sociology is concerned not only with the historical transition from
industrialism to postindustrialism and with the societal development from productivism
to consumerism, but also with the paradigmatic shift from economism to culturalism.
In essence, culturalist approaches insist upon the constructedness of the social world.
Consequently, they highlight the spatiotemporal contingency permeating all forms
of normativity and, hence, the relative arbitrariness underlying all symbolically
mediated or materially constituted modes of interrelatedness. Given its interest in
the alleged indeterminacy of social arrangements, postmodern thought undermines
the explanatory validity of one of the most influential, and also most controversial,
distinctions in Marxist theory: the distinction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’.31
The steady transition from ‘industrial productivism’ to ‘postindustrial consumerism’
manifests itself in the paradigmatic shift from the modern emphasis on material
and economic forces to the postmodern focus on symbolic and cultural relations. In
Marxist terms, the rise of postmodern sociology is expressed in a paradigmatic shift
from a concern with the foundational – that is, material and economic – determinants
of society to the increasingly widespread preoccupation with the superstructural –
that is, symbolic and cultural – epiphenomena reflecting the ideological, behavioural,
and institutional codes that allow for the normative construction of human reality.
Certainly, postmodern sociologists tend to be suspicious of conceptual dichoto-
mies, especially of those associated with modern intellectual thought.32 From a
postmodern point of view, conceptual antinomies have the misleading effect of
making us portray multifaceted, fluid, and malleable realities in terms of simple,
solid, and static binary categories. From this perspective, the model of ‘base’
and ‘superstructure’ fails to do justice to the ontological complexity underlying
the spatiotemporally contingent construction of social realities. This – arguably,
deconstructivist – position is illustrated in the postmodern scepticism towards the
development of macrotheoretical approaches in the social sciences.
Postmodern thought is deeply critical of the scientistic ambition to provide
catch-all accounts of human reality, capable of shedding light on the underlying
mechanisms that govern both the constitution and the evolution of society. It
aims to dismantle the assumption that we can take the existence of ‘the social’
for granted; it seeks to distance itself from the intellectual obsession with con-
ceptual system building; and, unsurprisingly, it proposes to discard pervasive
Enlightenment ideals – such as ‘order’, ‘rationality’, ‘consistency’, and ‘logic’.
In modern sociological traditions, society is put at centre stage. In postmodern
thought, by contrast, society is dragged into the whirl of endless deconstruction.
‘The crisis of “the social”’,33 a characteristic feature of the postmodern world, is
accompanied by the rejection of binary categories, which constitutes an essential,
but anti-essentialist, aspect of postmodern thought. In this sense, the postmodern
scepticism towards the Marxist distinction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ is
a reflection of the conviction that, in the contemporary era, the only sociologi-
cal certainty is radical indeterminacy. To the extent that all social arrangements
are contextually contingent and, hence, relatively arbitrary, the sole source of
determinacy is cultural specificity: ‘Culture can now hardly be regarded as “the
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 91

reflex and concomitant” of society and the economic system. In the late capitalist
stage, culture itself becomes the prime determinant of social, economic, political and
even psychological reality.’34 Thus, the preponderance of cultural contingency
permeating the condition of postmodernity undermines the Marxist assumption
that economic relations constitute the ontological foundation of society. In the
postmodern era, the ‘“superstructure” – knowledge and culture – seems to have moved to
the core of the society, if not indeed to have become its “base”’.35 In the context of post-
modernity, then, the distinction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ is analytically
untenable, because the rigid separation between ‘the economic’ and ‘the cultural’
fails to capture the complexity of polycentric societies. While Marxist scholars
may claim to have turned Hegel on his head, postmodern thinkers endorse the
idea of a ‘feetless’ and ‘headless’ social theory. In other words, in the postmodern
universe, there is no ‘below’ and no ‘above’, that is, there are no foundational determin-
ants and no epiphenomenal manifestations. ‘Base and superstructure are collapsed
into each other.’36 In fact, from a postmodern angle, the conflation of ‘the foun-
dational’ and ‘the epiphenomenal’ is a sign of the implosion of ‘the social’.
Postmodern sociology is a sociology without guarantees. Considering the unprec-
edented complexity that characterizes highly differentiated societies, postmodern
analysts see themselves obliged to abandon, or at least revise, the key conceptual
and methodological tools provided by classical social theorists. The intersectional
differentiation of polycentric realities destroys any illusions about the possibility
of relying on monolithic explanatory frameworks for grasping the intricacy of the
rapid historical developments shaping contemporary societies. Put differently,
the ‘postization’ of ‘the social in itself’ needs to be followed by the ‘postization’ of ‘the
social for itself’: a postmodern society requires a postmodern sociology. To be exact,
postmodern assemblages can be grasped only by postmodern sociologies, that is,
by sociologies that are sensitive and attuned to local particularities in a universe
composed of malleable realities.
If there is such a thing as a ‘postmodern sociology’, it can be defined as a post-
traditional discipline in that it refuses to take the existence of ‘the social’ for
granted. Of course, ‘the crisis of “the social”’37 does not have to be reflected in
the implosion of sociology upon itself. From a postmodern perspective, however,
sociology needs to call the very existence of its most central object of study – that
is, ‘the social’ – into question. One may wonder whether or not it makes sense to
continue theorizing about the nature of ‘the social’, if, at the same time, one is
prepared to speculate about its possible disappearance. If ‘the social’ has ceased to
exist, then modern sociology has lost its raison d’être. For there does not seem to
be much point in doing ‘socio-logy’, if we see ourselves obliged to proclaim ‘the
end of “the social”’.38 If, however, we come to the conclusion that ‘the social’ is
still with us, then postmodern sociologists will insist that we need to abandon the
modern ambition to develop a comprehensive theory capable of unearthing the
underlying mechanisms that – presumably – determine both the constitution and
the evolution of human life forms.
From a postmodern perspective, any kind of explanatory model that regards
‘the social’ as the cornerstone of human existence should abandon its macrothe-
oretical ambitions. Since, in the contemporary world, ‘the social’ appears to have
92 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

entered a deep crisis or – as some may claim – to have even disappeared, post-
modern theorists will contend that ‘the social’ has lost the privileged status of a
foundational paradigm in the human sciences. Put differently, the obsession with
relative determinacy, expressed in the scientific undertones of modern sociology,
falls short of epistemic legitimacy when facing up to the radical indeterminacy of
relationally constructed realities, recognized by those who endorse the idea of a
postmodern sociology.

Summary

As argued in this chapter, the alleged shift from modern to postmodern forms
of analysis is a paradoxical affair in that it attacks the very heart of sociology:
namely, its concern with the nature of ‘the social’. Contemporary conceptions of
‘the social’ have been significantly influenced by what may be described as the
cultural turn in sociology. The impact that this paradigmatic transition has had,
and continues to have, on contemporary sociology is reflected in the fact that
macrotheoretical attempts to provide coherent investigative frameworks capable
of explaining the complexity of relationally constituted realities have become
increasingly unpopular in recent years. Moreover, postmodern announcements
regarding the possible implosion of ‘the social’ appear to undermine the validity
of the conceptual tools and methodological strategies employed by classical soci-
ologists. A postmodern sociology is a post-traditional discipline in the sense that
it refuses to take the existence of ‘the social’ for granted.
Whatever one makes of provocative aphorisms proclaiming ‘the crisis of “the
social”’39 or ‘the death of “the social”’,40 there is little doubt that postmodern
sociologists are interested – particularly – in the critical study of the cultural,
symbolic, and representational construction of reality, rather than in uncovering
the economic, material, and structural determinants presumably underlying the
development of society. As demonstrated in this chapter, the presuppositional
differences between modern and postmodern conceptions of sociology stem from
various fundamental oppositions, three of which are especially significant: (i)
industrialism versus postindustrialism, (ii) productivism versus consumerism, and (iii)
economism versus culturalism.

I. The gradual shift from industrialism to postindustrialism designates the

paradigmatic transition from societies whose economic reproduction hinges
primarily on manufacturing processes to societies whose economic flows are
dominated by the exchange of knowledge, information, and services.
II. The gradual shift from productivism to consumerism is reflected in the para-
digmatic transition from the modern imperative ‘I work, therefore I am’ to the
postmodern motto ‘I shop, therefore I am’.
III. The gradual shift from economism to culturalism is epitomized in the para-
digmatic transition from the orthodox Marxist emphasis on the materially
sustained base of society to the neo- and post-Marxist concern with its sym-
bolically constituted superstructure.
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 93

In light of the aforementioned antinomies, postmodern sociologists insist upon

the radical indeterminacy that, in their view, pervades all culturally contingent
forms of reality.

Towards a New Sociology?

The aforementioned antinomies – that is, industrialism versus postindustrialism,

productivism versus consumerism, and economism versus culturalism – are crucial
to the critical examination of the main presuppositional differences between
modern and postmodern conceptions of sociology. Given the paradigmatic shift
from ‘the economic’ to ‘the cultural’ in contemporary sociology, the question
that arises may be formulated as follows: to what extent have we been witness-
ing the arrival of a postmaterialist sociology indicative of what is widely known
as the ‘cultural turn’? In essence, the ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences is based
on the assumption that ‘the cultural’ constitutes the defining element of social exist-
ence and, therefore, the central reference point of sociological enquiry. If one shares
this presupposition, which underlies most of the theoretical writings associated
with the ‘cultural turn’, one may go as far as to describe the ‘social sciences’ as
‘cultural sciences’, ‘social studies’ as ‘cultural studies’, ‘sociology’ as ‘culturology’,
and ‘social analysis’ as a form of ‘cultural analysis’. This radical methodological
plea goes hand-in-hand with the ontological supposition that the ‘human world’
should be conceived of, above all, as a ‘cultural world’. Inspired by this view, the
social sciences, from the late twentieth century onwards, have been significantly
shaped by an increasing interest in the role of ‘the cultural’. In light of this ten-
dency, even those scholars who are opposed to ‘the culturalization of the social
sciences’ will find it difficult to deny the profound impact this shift in emphasis
has had, and continues to have, upon contemporary forms of theoretical and
empirical research.
The paradigmatic significance of the sustained concern with the place of ‘the
cultural’ in the social sciences is reflected in its considerable referential relevance
in the recent and current literature.41 Similar to other key concepts in the social
sciences, the term ‘culture’ is given different meanings by different scholars situ-
ated in different disciplinary traditions. Its terminological elasticity makes the
‘cultural turn’ more, rather than less, complex. Owing to the fact that the concept
of culture can be interpreted from various angles and used to support diverg-
ing intellectual perspectives, it is far from clear what kind of paradigmatic shift
the ‘cultural turn’ exactly stands for and what precisely it seeks to accomplish.
With the aim of elucidating the main assumptions underlying the numerous
approaches associated with the ‘cultural turn’, it makes sense to distinguish five
fundamental meanings commonly attributed to the concept of culture. These shall be
considered in the following sections.
(1) Anthropology: In anthropology, the concept of culture refers to a collective
life form. In fact, if there is one key difference between sociology and anthropol-
ogy, it can be described as follows: the former examines human reality, first and
foremost, as a set of social relations; by contrast, the latter explores human reality,
94 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

above all, as an ensemble of cultural arrangements. To be sure, the two disciplines

share the assumption that social life is possible only as a collectively constructed –
and, hence, malleable – mode of existence. They differ, however, in that anthro-
pologists study societies as cultural groupings and social phenomena as cultural
expressions, whereas sociologists examine cultures as social constellations and cul-
tural phenomena as social manifestations. From an anthropological point of view,
then, one of the central characteristics of social formations is that, due to their
cultural constitution, they are spatiotemporally contingent. In other words, every
culture generates its own life form.
One need not be a professional anthropologist to recognize that human life
forms are both reproduced and transformed on the basis of culturally specific
norms, rules, and conventions. It is the task of anthropology – particularly
of its structuralist variants, inspired by the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss42 – to
shed light on ‘the deep structure of culture’.43 On this account, anthropologists
explore the ways in which the ‘codes and shared assumptions’44 of particular
communities can be either followed or transgressed by their members, who are
equipped with the capacity to develop both individual and collective identities
in relation to their social environments. Their actions, however, are always situ-
ated within a background horizon of largely unconscious standards and prin-
ciples, whose ubiquitous presence imposes a degree of normativity upon every
aspect of social reality.
To the extent that ‘[p]ostmodernists assume that the study of culture is a study
in multiple and competing realities’,45 they insist that there is no such thing as a
universal factual or moral reference point for the material and symbolic construc-
tion of socially specific communities. Culture, then, is a life form, rather than
a life essence. If there is anything essential about culture, it is its normalizing
capacity to make human actors treat socially contingent parameters of validity as
naturally given laws of facticity. Given its insistence upon the socio-ontological
preponderance of culture, anthropology teaches us that there is no essence to
the human condition, apart from people’s dependence upon culturally variable
arrangements, constellations, and interpretations. In other words, social history
constitutes an ensemble of constantly developing – and, thus, spatiotemporally
contingent – life forms.
(2) Philosophy: In philosophy, the following three areas of enquiry are particu-
larly important to the study of culture: (a) ontology, (b) epistemology, and (c) ethics.
(a) From an ontological point of view, culture can be conceived of as an existen-
tial source of species-constitutive transcendence. On this account, ‘[c]ulture refers,
in the first place, to the specificity of the relationship the human race entertains
with itself and the rest of the universe: a symbolic relation’.46 As a species, we
raise ourselves above nature through the creation of culture. Indeed, given its
ubiquity in the human universe, ‘“culture” has become a veritable “second
nature”’.47 The assumption that the human condition is essentially a con-
structed condition is based on the insight that we, as a species, have succeeded
in inventing, and in continuing to invent, the idiosyncrasies of our world by
drawing upon both the reproductive and the transformative potential of culture.
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 95

Yet, if we face up to the species-constitutive role of culture, we are confronted

with a curious paradox:

• on the one hand, the ‘[n]aturalization of culture’,48 derived from the largely
intuitive, implicit, and unconscious reproduction of relatively arbitrary – but
subjectively internalized – norms, rules, and conventions;
• on the other hand, the ‘culturalization of nature’,49 expressed in the reflexive,
purposive, and conscious transformation of our relation to the world.

It is because of culture that reality presents itself to us not as naked objectiv-

ity but, rather, as a domain of normativity, imbued with the symbolic power of
social imaginaries. Hence, the methodological distinction between ‘the natural
sciences’ and ‘the social or cultural sciences’50 stems from the ontological differ-
ence between nature and culture: the former are concerned with ‘the “hard and
fast” facts of nature’;51 the latter insist upon the species-constitutive distinctive-
ness of ‘human accomplishments’52 embedded in culture. To put it bluntly, nature
stands for ‘what humans must obey’,53 whereas culture represents ‘what humans
can do’.54 In this light, it appears that the ‘divine or natural order of things’55 is
fundamentally different from the ‘man-made, artificial’56 realm of social construc-
tions. In an ontological sense, then, we can distinguish between nature as a world
‘in itself’ (an sich), whose entities are unreflexively immersed in the conditions of
their existence, and culture as a world ‘for itself’ (für sich), whose inhabitants are
conscious of themselves as purposive, normative, and subjective beings.57
(b) From an epistemological perspective, culture can be regarded as a vehicle
allowing for symbolic mediation and interpretation. The categorical imperative of
epistemological constructivism is based on the assumption that we do not have
direct access to the world, because all our perceptions are symbolically mediated
and, therefore, our conceptions of reality are culturally specific. The ‘cultural turn’
is inextricably linked to the – epistemologically significant – crisis of representa-
tion.58 For the advent of this crisis appears to suggest that ‘[r]epresentation is no
longer possible’59 or that, in a more radical sense, it has never been possible in
the first place. The idea of a ‘positivist reflection of a world “out there”’60 is an
illusion, since epistemic representations are possible only as culturally specific – that
is, meaning-, value-, perspective-, interest-, power-, and tension-laden – interpretations.
Thus, we need to ‘read culture against itself’:61 culture is not simply ‘[a]nother
“social fact” […] to be “deconstructed”’;62 rather, it is a regulative force capable of
converting empirical realms of objectivity into symbolically constituted spheres
of normativity. Indeed, all social facts are cultural constructs. For culture constitutes
the sine qua non of both the realization and the representation of social acts and
social facts: there is no social act that can be abstracted from the cultural setting
in which it takes place, just as there is no social fact that can be described without
drawing upon a culturally specific background horizon of preactions and precon-
ceptions.63 In short, every form of knowledge that aims to correspond to reality
is embedded in sets of tacit presuppositions shared by culturally constituted
communities.64
96 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(c) From an ethical stance, culture can be considered as a locus of normative

regulation. Culture is not simply a realm of facticity but also a contested arena
of normativity. Cultural codifications of regulated sociality manifest themselves
in the emergence and constant negotiation of norms, rules, and conventions.
Interactional standards can be followed or transgressed, accepted or subverted,
reproduced or transformed by those who are supposed to obey them. Culture,
then, is not merely an ‘is’ but also, more significantly, an ‘ought to be’. It tells us
to do particular things in particular ways, but it does so without telling us, that is,
without converting its normative constitution into an object of problematization,
unless the unfolding of social life is interrupted by a performatively or discursively
triggered crisis of action or representation. Due to its capacity to transform realms
of objectivity into morally problematizable spheres of normativity, culture can
be regarded as a ‘shorthand for the human propensity to set apart the “is” from
[the] “can be”, the “ought” from the “is”, and for the inclination to rebel against
the “is” in the name of the “can be” and/or “ought”’.65 Thus, culture – because
of its normative constitution – plays a regulative function. Not only does it make
us relate to, interact with, and reflect upon reality in specific ways; but, more
importantly, it makes us believe that our normative standards are the right and
legitimate ones. It is through the constant internalization and externalization
of culture that we learn to naturalize our spatiotemporally contingent modus
operandi in such a way that we – for the most part, unconsciously – attach the
indisputable value of universal legitimacy to context-specific patterns of norma-
tivity. To be sure, ‘the idea of culture serve[s] the reconciliation of a whole series
of oppositions’,66 including the antinomy between freedom and necessity. While
the reality of its conformative and routine-driven reproduction bestows us with
a sense of existential security, the possibility of its subversive and will-dependent
transformation emanates from our ability to mobilize our creative resources when
immersing ourselves in everyday situations of interactional performativity. In
short, we are moral entities to the extent that culture converts reality into a value-
laden space of normativity.
(3) Sociology: The following areas of sociological investigation are especially
relevant to a comprehensive understanding of the ‘cultural turn’: (a) cultural soci-
ology, (b) economic sociology, (c) digital sociology, (d) critical sociology, and (e) political
sociology. Let us, therefore, consider the role that the concept of culture plays in
each of these fields of sociological enquiry.
(a) From the perspective of cultural sociology, culture constitutes the performa-
tive nucleus of social constructions. The significance of this assumption can be illus-
trated by considering the paradigmatic distinction between cultural sociology and
the sociology of culture.67 According to the former, culture constitutes ‘a thread that
runs through, one that can be teased out of, every conceivable social form’.68 On
this hermeneutic view, every social phenomenon is impregnated with the pres-
ence of culture. It needs to be understood as an ‘independent variable’,69 which is
not reducible to, let alone parasitic upon, other elements of social life. According
to the latter, culture can ‘be studied as a dependent variable to be explained by
external factors’.70 Following this ‘externalist approach’,71 ‘“hard” variables of
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 97

socio-economic structure shape, and are shaped by, cultural practices and belief
systems’.72 On this account, culture is a dependent variable, which is influenced –
or, in some cases, even determined – by other social forces, notably by economic
structures. From the standpoint of cultural sociology, then, we need to face up to
the socio-performative preponderance of culture: ‘[t]he recognition of cultural auton-
omy is the single most important feature of the “strong programme” of cultural
sociology’,73 which endorses ‘a “soft” conception of structure’74 permeated by the
daily construction of meaning. From the vantage point of the sociology of culture,
by contrast, we cannot escape the socio-relational determinacy of culture: every cul-
tural field constitutes an economy of cultural production, shaped by ‘the “hard”
aspects’75 of social structures, by struggles over material and symbolic resources,
and by competition over access to different forms of capital.
Unsurprisingly, it is the hermeneutically inspired programme of ‘cultural soci-
ology’, rather than the structuralist ‘sociology of culture’, which is crucial to the
‘cultural turn’. Following this ‘fundamental paradigm change in social-scientific
analysis’,76 what ‘needs to be given priority is not the social contingency of culture, but
the cultural contingency of social happenings. What is intended is a culturalization of our
conception of society.’77 This does not mean that we are left with a ‘post-societal soci-
ology’,78 which has ‘simply ontologized the cultural’,79 while claiming that modern
thinkers have ‘ontologized the social’.80 Rather, this implies that – owing to the
meaning-laden constitution of normatively regulated forms of existence – ‘the cul-
tural’ is preponderant over ‘the social’ in the daily construction of human reality.81
(b) From the standpoint of economic sociology, culture can be converted into a
commodity. To be precise, it is under ‘the cultural logic of late capitalism’82 that we
are confronted with ‘the penetration of cultural life by the commodity form’.83
Although idealists may portray culture as a pristine vehicle for self-realization
and creativity, it is far from immune to the systemic imperatives that colonize
all spheres of capitalist society. Thus, ‘the extension of capitalism into the cultural
sphere’84 is crucial to the postmodern logic of market principles, under whose
hegemonic influence ‘everything, including commodity production and high
speculative finance, has become cultural’,85 while ‘culture has equally become
profoundly economic or commodity-oriented’.86 If we accept that ‘[t]he com-
modification of culture cannot be dissociated from the culturalisation of com-
modities’,87 then ‘[b]ase and superstructure are collapsed into each other’.88 In the
face of this ‘culturalization of the economic’,89 one may go as far as to assert that,
under late capitalism, ‘culture itself becomes the prime determinant of social,
economic, political and even psychological reality’.90
The increasing interest in the rise of a ‘global culture industry’91 is indicative of
the fact that a comprehensive sociology of culture is conceivable only as a ‘politi-
cal economy of culture’.92 Similar to the cultural field, several other social fields –
notably, politics, science, art, language, and religion – are colonized by the func-
tionalist imperatives of capitalist markets. What gives the cultural field particular
power, however, is its foundational status: not only is every social field essentially
a cultural field, but, in late capitalist society, culture has been converted into the
primary commodity. In other words, not only is ‘the cultural’ preponderant over
98 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

‘the social’, but, under the condition of late capitalism, the aforementioned epis-
temological ‘crisis of representation’ goes hand-in-hand with an economic ‘tri-
umph of representation’, expressed in the victorious celebration of symbols, texts,
images, and appearances, which constitute the signifying carriers of culture.93 In
short, the hegemonic preponderance of ‘the sign’ over ‘the signified’ fuels the
commodifying logic of late capitalism.
(c) Through the lens of digital sociology, culture has been converted into a form
of hyperreality. In the Baudrillardian sense, the concept of hyperreality refers to ‘a
world of simulacra, of images’,94 in which ‘the copy (or fake) substitutes itself for
the real, becomes more real than the real itself’.95 On this view, ‘the hyperreal’ is
more real than ‘the real’ itself, in the sense that, in our daily lives, we have begun
to attach more importance to signifiers than to the things they signify.
Epistemologically speaking, representations of reality are always realities of rep-
resentation. To the extent that we engage with the world by engaging with ideas
that represent it, our interaction with reality is always an interaction with a par-
ticular social imaginary. In other words, representations of reality constitute reali-
ties of representation, insofar as they serve as the primary and ultimate reference
point of human actions and interpretations.
Sociologically speaking, the emergence of advanced media technologies – such
as the radio, the television, and the Internet – has resulted in the ‘digitalization
as ontology’96 reflected in the gradual dematerialization and deterritorialization
of society. To concede that ‘computing is not about computers any more [… but]
about living’97 means to acknowledge that, in the digital age, the immersion in
cyber-realities has become a cornerstone of social life. Thus, ‘being digitalizes’98 in
the sense that large parts of our engagement with reality are not only mediated
by but even founded upon cyber-technologies.
The cyberspace created by ‘computer-mediated communications systems and
virtual reality technologies’99 appears to undermine classical conceptions of com-
munity, ‘close-knit, intimate and held together by shared interests and values’100
and, above all, by spatial proximity. The unprecedented ‘impact of IT, telecommu-
nications and cyberspace on society’101 is a major object of study and a noticeable
subject of controversy in contemporary sociology. Digital technologies have sub-
stantially changed the relationship between ‘space’ and ‘time’, between ‘reality’
and ‘virtuality’, and between ‘society’ and ‘individual’, blurring the boundaries
established by means of traditional binary categories. Given the continuing pres-
ence of material and structural determinants, it would be erroneous to suggest
that the digital era is an epoch ‘free from real-world constraints’.102 Yet, the pres-
ence of an ever more powerful space of hyperreality – expressed in the prepon-
derance of volatility over stability, instantaneity over delay, disposability over
irreplaceability, and short-termism over long-termism – is a remarkable feature of
computerized societies.
(d) In the eyes of those endorsing the project of a critical sociology, culture consti-
tutes an epiphenomenal reality. As such, it is conceived of as a derivative expression
of an underlying ensemble of relations by which its constitution is shaped or even
determined. On this view, culture can be seen as a ‘soft’ reality that is contingent
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 99

upon an underlying ‘hard’ reality: the former is symbolically organized, implying

the construction of contestable codes of normativity; the latter is materially struc-
tured, entailing the existence of empirically relevant domains of objectivity. In
light of the analytical separation between a symbolically created ‘soft’ reality and
a materially formed ‘hard’ reality, the task of critical sociology consists in explain-
ing the constitution of society by uncovering its underlying causal determinants,
which largely escape a common-sense grasp of experienced actualities. Given the
scientistic ambitions of prominent intellectual projects in modern social thought,
it is not surprising that various ‘depth models’103 have had a significant impact
upon contemporary understandings of culture. At least five of these approaches,
motivated by the ‘uncovering mission’ of scientific thought, can be identified:

i. the dialectical ‘model of essence and appearance’,104 particularly important in

Marxist thought and expressed in its orthodox versions of ideology critique;
ii. the psychoanalytical ‘model of latent and manifest, or of repression’,105 devel-
oped by Freudian thought and articulated in its study of the unconscious;
iii. the existentialist ‘model of authenticity and inauthenticity’,106 advocated by
Heideggerian thought and epitomized in its concern with alienation from
genuineness;
iv. the poststructuralist ‘model of reality and representation’,107 defended by
post-Saussurean thought and based on the distinction between signified and
signifier;
v. the relationalist ‘model of field and habitus’,108 proposed by Bourdieusian
thought and founded on the epistemological division between science and
doxa.

Synthesizing the essence of their explanatory mission, the above-mentioned

‘depth models’ share the following assumption: while our everyday understand-
ing of reality is limited to our common-sense engagement with the multiple ways
in which the world presents itself to us as a phenomenally constituted domain of
appearances, a critical – that is, dialectical, psychoanalytical, existentialist, post-
structuralist, or relationalist – approach to reality permits us to uncover its under-
lying determinacy. The phenomenal preponderance of ‘the appearance of things’
over ‘the essence of things’ cannot do away with the ontological predominance
of structurally constituted realities over symbolically assembled representations.
(e) From the angle of political sociology, culture constitutes a symbolic realm
characterized by, and maintained through, a substantial degree of relative auton-
omy. One of the most central debates in both classical and contemporary Marxist
thought concerns the relationship between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’:109

• The former designates the economic foundation of society, which is essentially

composed of the forces of production, the means of production, and the rela-
tions of production.
• The latter refers to the ideological realm of society, which is comprised of cul-
tural, political, legal, philosophical, artistic, scientific, and religious discourses.
100 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

According to orthodox Marxist readings of this model of society, the main func-
tion of the ideological superstructure consists in reflecting the interests of the
dominant social class and, therefore, in stabilizing and legitimizing the established
order. Every time the material infrastructure of society is transformed by the –
constantly developing – productive forces, a process by which one mode of
production is replaced by another – technologically more advanced – mode
of production, the entire superstructure is adjusted in accordance with the inter-
ests of the newly emerging dominant social class, capable of imposing its view of
the world, and the institutions necessary to support it, upon the rest of society.
From a Marxist perspective, radical transition processes of this sort manifest them-
selves in economic and political revolutions.110
With the aim of defending this two-level architecture of society against reduc-
tionist interpretations commonly associated with economic determinism, one may
add five analytical clarifications to the above definition of the ‘base and super-
structure model’.

I. It serves as an ideal-typical model. As such, it draws a fundamental conceptual,

rather than ontological, distinction. Society, far from being reducible to a binary
macro-reality, constitutes the totality of various interactional spheres, whose
complexity escapes the schematic parameters of theoretical dichotomies.
II. It serves as a developmental model. As such, it describes no more than general
sociohistorical tendencies. Not every society will follow a teleological pattern,
dictated by the logic of linear economic and civilizational evolution. In fact,
as the history of the twentieth century has shown, Marxist predictions about
large-scale societal developments have, in most cases, been proven wrong.
III. It serves as a holistic model. As such, it may shed light on the underlying
logic of the social whole, but it is unable to account for various degrees of
interactional complexity. This is reflected in the fact that most constitutive
elements of society may be regarded as essential components of both ‘base’
and ‘superstructure’. Consider the following examples: economic relations
are conceivable only as cultural relations; technological progress is driven by
scientific developments; institutional arrangements – notably those adminis-
tered by the state – have both economic and ideological dimensions; different
languages generate not only particular worldviews but also symbolic econo-
mies, based on the exchange of signs and symbols; every field of materially
sustained economic production constitutes a field of symbolically mediated
cultural production. In brief, society is an ensemble of conceptually separable,
but empirically interconnected and practically overlapping, realities.
IV. It serves as a dialectical model. It refers to a societal relationship character-
ized by permanent reciprocity. Just as economic relations shape ideological dis-
courses, ideological discourses shape economic relations. The notion that, ‘in
the last instance’, economic forces determine all other aspects of society fails
to do justice to the fact that, far from being reducible to mere epiphenomena,
‘superstructural’ dimensions – such as cultural, political, legal, philosophical,
artistic, scientific, or religious discourses – shape ‘infrastructural’ – that is,
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 101

material – relations, and vice versa. Even if one is willing to give priority to
economic relations for the explanations of large-scale societal developments,
the interaction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ is a dialectical process.
V. It serves as a structuro-phenomenological model. As such, it captures the consti-
tution of society only insofar as it concedes that every superstructure enjoys a
substantial degree of relative autonomy. Ideological discourses – irrespective of
whether they are cultural, political, legal, philosophical, artistic, scientific, or
religious – are irreducible to economic relations. Language games are not reduc-
ible to life forms, because the former are an integral component, rather than an
epiphenomenal manifestation, of the latter. The human world is a symbolically
mediated and polycentrically organized universe, whose multiple discourses
and interactional spheres possess a degree of autonomy that escapes the binary
logic of economic determinacy and ideological epiphenomenality.

Contemporary Marxists whose works are associated with the ‘cultural turn’ are
likely to agree with most of the preceding analytical remarks and explanatory
specifications. While it is far from clear whether or not the idea of a ‘cultural
Marxism’ or ‘soft Marxism’ is a contradiction in terms,111 this paradigmatic shift
illustrates that contemporary political sociologists – including Marxist ones – are
keen to explore various degrees of indeterminacy that are present in highly dif-
ferentiated societies.112
(4) The arts: In the arts, the concept of culture is conceived of, first and fore-
most, as a source of aesthetic experience. On this view, one of the distinctive fea-
tures of the human world is people’s capacity to attribute aesthetic value to reality,
notably to the various elements that shape their bodily interactions with other
members of society.113 To be sure, the aesthetic dimensions attached to human
existence need to be understood in terms of our – species-constitutive – tripartite
immersion in the world:

A. Different aspects of reality possess different aesthetic attributes (objectivity).

B. Different societies generate different aesthetic standards (normativity).
C. Different individuals have different aesthetic perceptions (subjectivity).

The picture becomes more complex, however, if we seek to determine which

of these three worldly spheres of existence is the decisive one for the coming-
into-being of aesthetic dimensions.
In essence, we can distinguish three philosophical positions in this regard:

A. Aesthetic dimensions are built into objects and subjects; therefore, they are
historically transcendental.
B. Aesthetic dimensions are constructed by culturally specific communities; thus,
they are socially contingent.
C. Aesthetic dimensions are projected upon reality by individuals with personal
tastes, which are based on idiosyncratic patterns of appreciation and percep-
tion; hence, they are subjectively contingent.
102 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

In order to work out which of these three philosophical positions is the most con-
vincing one, one can find strong arguments both for and against each of them.
Key arguments in favour of each of these philosophical positions can be sum-
marized as follows:

A. Since all societies develop particular aesthetic standards and all individuals are
capable of acquiring an aesthetic appreciation of the world, all dimensions of
reality – although they may be perceived and interpreted differently – must
have inherent aesthetic properties (aesthetic objectivism).
B. Since different societies produce diverging aesthetic standards, all seemingly
transhistorical aesthetic properties, as well as all apparently subjective aes-
thetic projections, are embedded in culturally constructed – and, hence,
largely arbitrary – norms and conventions of aesthetic appreciation (aesthetic
constructivism).
C. Since different people have diverging aesthetic perceptions of reality, all ostensibly
transhistorical aesthetic properties, as well as all social norms and conventions
of aesthetic appreciation, are subjectively projected upon the world by individu-
als with unique life histories and idiosyncratic subjectivities, to which they
have privileged access (aesthetic subjectivism).

Key arguments against each of these philosophical positions can be summarized

as follows:

A. To the extent that aesthetic criteria vary both between different societies
(aesthetic constructivism) and between different individuals (aesthetic subjectivism),
there is no point in aiming to identify objective or transcendental aesthetic
standards (aesthetic objectivism).
B. To the extent that aesthetic criteria rise above the cultural specificity of a given
society (aesthetic objectivism), or to the extent that aesthetic criteria are pro-
jected upon reality from the perspective-laden position of subjectivity (aesthetic
subjectivism), there is no point in seeking to reduce aesthetic standards to an
expression of sociocultural contingency (aesthetic constructivism).
C. To the extent that aesthetic criteria rise above the cultural specificity of a
given society (aesthetic objectivism), or to the extent that aesthetic criteria are
shaped or even largely determined by the cultural standards of particular com-
munities (aesthetic constructivism), there is no point in attempting to interpret
aesthetic standards in terms of irreducible projections of subjectivity (aesthetic
subjectivism).

Finally, considering the pros and cons of each of these philosophical positions
on the nature of aesthetic experience, one may come to the conclusion that the
most sensible stance is one that it based on a combination of the aforementioned
arguments. In other words, rather than considering them as mutually exclusive
and incompatible perspectives, one may cross-fertilize them and thereby draw
upon their respective insights, while avoiding their respective pitfalls. When
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 103

pursuing this strategy in relation to the aforementioned lines of argument, four

options appear plausible:

I. [a/b] Aesthetic dimensions are both transcendental and social: they are transcen-
dental insofar as they exist in every society and for every individual, while they
are also social insofar as aesthetic criteria vary between different – that is, cul-
turally specific – communities, which shape the perceptive apparatus of every
individual (constructivist transcendentalism or transcendental constructivism).
II. [a/c] Aesthetic dimensions are both transcendental and subjective: they are
transcendental insofar as they exist in every society and for every individual,
while they are also subjective insofar as aesthetic criteria vary between different
individuals, whose personal projections ultimately shape the aesthetic criteria
established in a given society (subjectivist transcendentalism or transcendental
subjectivism).
III. [b/c] Aesthetic dimensions are both social and subjective: they are social insofar
as aesthetic criteria vary between different communities, while they are also
subjective insofar as they diverge between different individuals (subjectivist
constructivism or constructivist subjectivism).
IV. [a/b/c] Aesthetic dimensions are simultaneously transcendental, social, and
subjective: they are transcendental insofar as they exist in every society and
for every individual, while they are social and subjective insofar as aesthetic
criteria vary both between different communities and between different indi-
viduals (constructivist-subjectivist transcendentalism, or transcendental-subjectivist
constructivism, or transcendental-constructivist subjectivism).

The above options – (i) transcendental/social, (ii) transcendental/subjective, (iii)

social/subjective, and (iv) transcendental/social/subjective – reflect the complex-
ity attached to the task of providing a philosophically convincing account of the
nature of aesthetic experience. Given their anti-foundationalist nature, there is
little doubt that postmodern approaches associated with the ‘cultural turn’ will
tend to endorse option iii and reject the transcendental presuppositions attached
to options i, ii, and iv. Let us, therefore, consider the assumptions underlying
postmodern conceptions of aesthetics in further detail. The following ten aspects are
particularly important in this regard.
First, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-representationalist. While
they recognize the sociological significance of ‘the aesthetic experience of modern-
ity and postmodernity’,114 emphasizing the fact that both historical conditions
are characterized by high degrees of complexity and differentiation,115 they insist
that, in the contemporary age, we are confronted with the ‘loss of centre’116 and
the lack of a ‘supposedly privileged position of observation’.117 The application of the
epistemological position of ‘anti-representationalism’118 to the study of the cul-
tural realm is motivated by the conviction that there is no such thing as an accurate,
let alone complete, cognitive or aesthetic representation of reality. Thus, if art has any
purpose at all, it is purposelessness. On this view, the mission to provide enlight-
ening accounts of particular aspects of the world – an ambitious target, which
104 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

is deeply ingrained in the motivational infrastructure of modernity – is in vain.

Following the anti-representationalist parameters of postmodern aesthetics, ‘[t]he
image is the substance’,119 that is, symbolic representations are substantive reali-
ties in themselves. The preponderance of ‘the signifier’ over ‘the signified’ implies that
correspondence theories of truth, rightness, and truthfulness are doomed to failure. Art is
a creative cultural act performed through aesthetic expressions, rather than being
aimed at generating mirror-like representations. The purposeless purpose of art
is not to reflect reality, but to create one, that is, to mobilize human resources of
imagination and thereby move beyond the constraining limitations of logocentric
representations.
Second, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-determinist. Put differ-
ently, they are based on a strong sense of anti-teleologism, as illustrated in their
fierce opposition to the modern notion that history has an underlying story line
and that one of the main functions of art is to shed light on predetermined nar-
ratives, permitting it to contribute to civilizational progress. The postmodern
‘subversion of narrative’,120 by contrast, is inspired by a ‘symbolic politics of
transgression’,121 whereby ‘pastiche’ and ‘parody’122 are converted into playful
reference points of an ironic engagement with reality and of utter scepticism
towards the imposition of teleological frameworks upon the discontinuous devel-
opment of history. Modern aesthetics, particularly in its political versions of large-
scale ideological projects, remains caught up in the determinist idea that history
is a goal-driven process, oriented towards the realization of human potential.
According to this perspective, it is the task of emancipatory art to enlighten the
to-be-enlightened about the weight of the macrohistorical laws hidden behind
large-scale societal developments. Postmodern aesthetics, on the other hand, is
motivated by the anti-determinist notion that history does not go anywhere and
that, literally, l’histoire n’a pas de sens. Its lack of ‘sens’ – both in the Latin sense
of ‘direction’ and in the contemporary sense of ‘meaning’ – implies that history
is essentially a directionless and meaningless process. On this account, it is the
task of empowering art to replace the illusory attempt to uncover the lawfulness
of history by virtue of positive explanations with the provocative playfulness of
radical indeterminacy inspired by aesthetic improvisation.
Third, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-functionalist. This is – per-
haps, most clearly – expressed in the differences between modern and postmodern
forms of architecture. Whereas the former place the emphasis on the functionality
of space and physical arrangements, the latter are concerned with the plurality of
meaning and style.123 In this sense, the postmodern engagement with aesthetics
is characterized by a firm commitment to playful eclecticism and non-hierarchical
pluralism. One may even go as far as to suggest that this anti-functionalist atti-
tude is part of a radical rupture with the modern predominance of instrumental
rationality, which it seeks to challenge by virtue of the non-judgemental creativity
that permeates the spirit of postmodernity. In the postmodern landscape, then,
it is the symbolic value of a signifying imaginary, rather than the use value of a
signified reality, which constitutes the ultimate normative currency. To accept
that ‘objects […] have meanings independent of their functional uses’124 requires
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 105

acknowledging both the relative autonomy and the irreducibility of cultural con-
structions. Postmodern approaches to aesthetics, therefore, conceive of ‘culture as
“self-determined determination”’,125 that is, as a realm shaped in accordance with its
own needs and capable of bypassing the systemic imperatives thrown at it from
totally administered societies. In short, the function of postmodern aesthetics is
to lack function.
Fourth, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-rationalist. To be sure,
this is not to posit that postmodern theories deny the sociological significance, let
alone the existence, of different modes of rationality. Rather, this means that they
are deeply suspicious of the modern obsession with reason: to be precise, they are
wary not only of its instrumental variants, derived from the purposive power of
Verstand, but also of the civilizational role ascribed to its allegedly emancipatory
expressions, founded on the normative capacity of Vernunft. From a postmodern
standpoint, one of the main problems arising from rationalist frameworks in phi-
losophy is that they construct a binary hierarchy between the allegedly superior,
species-constitutive, and context-transcending force of rational sovereignty, on the
one hand, and the purportedly inferior, species-residual, and context-laden vig-
our of emotional contingency, on the other. Strongly rejecting both the theoretical
presuppositions that undergird this view and the practical consequences resulting
from it, ‘the postmodern cultural critic finds it easier to rely on intuitive, experi-
ential sensibilities in seeking a better world’.126 In other words, the postmodern
exploration of aesthetic realities is motivated by the spontaneous and affective
force of empathic creativity, whose playful curiosity for novelty and whose non-
judgemental openness to experimental ingenuity escape the stifling parameters
of modern rationalities.
Fifth, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-monist. What worries the
postmodern eye are unsettling sources of aesthetic experience derived from expo-
sure to fragmentation, discontinuity, heterogeneity, anomaly, and inconsistency, rather
than from the futile search for unification, permanency, homogeneity, regularity,
and perfection. ‘In postmodern culture, where the theme is irreverence, non-
conformity, noncommitment, detachment, difference, and fragmentation’,127
there is no such thing as one path, one lifestyle, one way of doing things, one
answer, let alone one predominant aesthetic doctrine. One of the great paradoxes
of consumerist culture industries consists in the fact that they are characterized by
both standardization and diversification processes. Their standardizing logic mani-
fests itself in the homogenizing tendencies of mass production. Their diversifying
character comes to the fore when considering their capacity to absorb, and often
reinforce, the individualizing tendencies of market-driven societies. On the one
hand, ‘[t]he market becomes a pastiche with an abundance of products, brands,
and images for consumers’,128 thereby following a regulated and regulating ration-
ality imposed upon society ‘from above’ by powerful companies. On the other
hand, ‘fragmented life experiences of the consumer are also represented in con-
temporary shopping environments’,129 reflecting the deregulated and deregulating
rationality employed by individuals ‘from below’ in search of a sense of unique
personal identity. This quest for non-conformative idiosyncrasy lies at the heart
106 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

of the postmodern celebration of aestheticized plurality. Put differently, in post-

modern societies, the aestheticization of ‘the personal’ goes hand-in-hand with
the individualization of ‘the aesthetic’.
Sixth, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-elitist. This position is vital
to the postmodern aim of ‘destabilising boundaries between high and low culture’.130
The centrality of this subversive attack on traditional demarcation lines in the
production and consumption of culture is reflected in its remarkable referential
relevance in the literature on postmodern thought.131 In the most general sense,
it forms part of the deconstructive spirit underlying the postmodern project: just
as hierarchizing classificatory schemes can be socially constructed, they can be
subversively deconstructed and playfully reconstructed, without a sense of self-
imposed fidelity to arbitrary criteria of epistemic or aesthetic legitimacy. In a more
particular sense, it forms part of the deliberative spirit underlying the postmodern
endeavour: truly liberating aesthetics cannot be abstracted from ordinary experi-
ences and grassroots activities, which constitute the breeding ground for autono-
mous art and self-empowering creativity. The anti-elitist defiance of postmodern
aesthetics manifests itself in various forms of legitimization:

i. the ‘promotion of “popular culture” as a challenge to “high art”’132 (legitimiza-

tion of simplicity);
ii. the endorsement of ‘pluralism in meaning and style’,133 based on the ‘post-
modern valorization of difference, heterogeneity, ambiguity and plurality’134
and illustrated in the ‘erosion of distinctions between high and low cul-
ture’,135 thereby contributing to the construction of a radically ‘pluralistic
world’136 (legitimization of multiplicity);
iii. the ‘post-avant-garde’137 attitude, according to which easy listening, easy
watching, and easy consuming are socially legitimate ways of engaging with
cultural forms (legitimization of triviality); and
iv. the ‘emphasis upon the effacement of the boundary between art and everyday
life, the collapse of the distinction between high art and mass/popular cul-
ture, a general stylistic promiscuity and playful mixing of codes’,138 expressed
in the recognition of art as an inclusive space of exchange, rather than as an
exclusivist place of privilege (legitimization of promiscuity).

In short, the anti-elitist spirit of postmodern aesthetics delegitimizes illegitimate

ways of legitimizing legitimacy.
Seventh, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-utopian. This does not
mean, however, that there is no place for imagination and projection in post-
modern culture. Rather, this indicates that postmodern settings are characterized
by the ‘aestheticization of everyday life’.139 Instead of relegating the empower-
ing experience of cultural creativity and aesthetic pleasure to a utopian future,
postmodern approaches to self-realization begin with the ‘here and now’. In this
sense, they assume that ‘the path is the goal’:140 what counts is not the ideologi-
cal or quasi-religious aspiration towards the construction of a distant past, but the
daily construction of social life, including its seemingly most mundane aspects.
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 107

‘Postmodernism is […] a more fully human world than the older one, but one
in which “culture” has become a veritable “second nature”.’141 On this view, the
‘cultural turn’ constitutes a sociocultural shift in the radical sense, implying that
it is driven by, and at the same time impacts upon, the daily lives of ordinary
people. Such a grassroots-oriented perspective suggests ‘that “culture” […] is itself
a postmodern development’,142 that is, an embodied process that emanates from
quotidian social practices, rather than from the privileged monopolizers of high-
brow art. If there is any utopian element to postmodern thought, it is the convic-
tion that the yet-to-come is always already present in the day-to-day construction
and appreciation of aesthetic forms.
Eighth, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-anthropocentric. Whereas
‘[t]he modernist project placed the human being at the center, as the subject’143
of the universe, ‘[p]ostmodernists see this narrative of modernity to be mythical
or illusory’.144 The project of decentring145 can be interpreted with different degrees
of deconstructive intensity. A moderate conception of decentring posits that the
universe is a polycentric ensemble of realities, that is, that there are various context-
dependent centres shaping the world. A radical conception of decentring implies
that the universe is a centreless ensemble of assemblages, that is, that there are
multiple realms of arbitrary constellations, none of which can claim to possess a
monopoly on the cognitive, normative, or aesthetic standards of validity. The intel-
lectual deconstruction of anthropocentric worldviews is reflected in the announce-
ment of various paradigmatic deaths: ‘the death of the author’, ‘the death of God’,
‘the death of metanarratives’, ‘the death of values’, ‘the death of truth’, and –
perhaps, most significantly – ‘the death of the subject’.146 Applied to the study of
aesthetics, this anti-anthropocentric stance has at least three major implications:

A. We need to recognize that, in principle, every element of the universe has an

aesthetic dimension, to the extent that actors are able to project their sensory
appreciation upon any object in the world.
B. We need to concede that, in principle, every living being in the universe has an
aesthetic dimension and that, furthermore, we are not the only living entities with
an aesthetic appreciation of the world, to the extent that the emotional state of
both humans and animals is influenced by the aesthetic dimensions of their
environments.
C. We need to acknowledge that standards of perception and appreciation vary
between different groups and societies. Hence, judgements about aesthetic
qualities are a matter of engaging with arbitrarily assembled realities from
the standpoint of relationally constituted subjectivities, rather than a matter
of uncovering transcendental properties, which are decipherable by virtue of
species-universal faculties.

In brief, aesthetic experience is irreducible to the cognitive capacities of the

human subject.
Ninth, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-productivist. Indeed,
the very idea of a postmodern society presupposes the ‘reversal of production
108 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

and consumption’.147 In the contemporary era of postindustrialism, the mod-

ern imperative ‘I work, therefore I am’ loses significance to the degree that the
postmodern motto ‘I shop, therefore I am’ gains increasing importance.148 One
does not have to refer to the extremes of Anglo-American consumerism – such as
Disneyland, Las Vegas, or the IMAX theatre149 – in order to face up to the fact that
‘the new postmodernism expresses the inner truth of that newly emergent social
order of late capitalism’.150 The concept of postmodernity designates a historical
formation in which culture has been converted into a potentially all-inclusive
commodity, allowing for people’s integration into society through the construc-
tion of consumerist identities. To be sure, the fact that postmodern conceptions of
aesthetics are anti-productivist does not mean that they deny the anthropological
need for material and symbolic modes of production. They stress, however, that,
for better or for worse, postindustrial network societies have generated global cul-
ture industries in which the consumption of symbolic commodities has attained
paradigmatic primacy over the reproduction of traditional – that is, class-based –
patterns of identity.

Global culture industry’s economy of difference makes sense […] as pattern and
randomness. The giving and getting of cultural objects in today’s global economy
of difference is the way we counter the noise of the flows. It is the way that we
put pattern into this noise.151

The spread of postmodern aesthetics can be seen as a way of elevating the con-
struction of postindustrial identities to the status of the raison d’être of a global
economy whose entire viability depends on its capacity to convert the consump-
tion of cultural products into the telos of its own destiny.
Tenth, postmodern conceptions of aesthetics are anti-ideological. This does
not imply that postmodern culture cannot have a political dimension; on the
contrary, it can, and does, have various political aspects, particularly its subver-
sive capacity to undermine the misleading legitimacy attached to hegemonic
patterns of an aesthetic currency. Yet, insofar as ‘the postmodern consumer
feels […] justified in playful enjoyment of the simulation’,152 thereby escaping
‘the somber reminders of “reality”’,153 the point of aesthetic experience is not
large-scale political transformation based on a big-picture ideology. Under the
banner of modern ideologism, the politicization of aesthetics serves as a vehicle
for the subject-centred engineering of society. Following the spirit of postmod-
ern scepticism, the aestheticization of politics expresses an openness towards the
subjectless construction of eclectic realities. To abandon ideology does not mean
to run out of ideas; rather, it means to cultivate ideas without the straitjacket of
dogmatic belief systems.
(5) Politics: In politics, the concept of culture has, especially in recent decades,
acquired the meaning of a relationally constructed and power-laden sphere,
which has the characteristics of a social battlefield. When examining the relevance
of the ‘cultural turn’ to a sociological understanding of the role of politics, how-
ever, we are confronted with a curious paradox:
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 109

• On the one hand, the ‘cultural turn’ is associated with the ‘aestheticization and
depoliticization of politics’.154 Some commentators even characterize its ‘new
intellectual agendas’155 as ‘postpolitical’.156 In the best-case scenario, it allows
for ‘a reconceptualisation of the political’;157 in the worst-case scenario, it
implies ‘a turn away from politics’.158
• On the other hand, the ‘cultural turn’ is brought into connection with what we
may describe as the ‘radicalization and repoliticization of politics’.159 Given that,
‘[b]y the end of the 1970s, the energy of the radical social movements of the
preceding period had dissipated’,160 it was the task of the ‘politics of difference’,
embraced by a large variety of new social movements, to invent alternative
normative agendas, aimed at challenging the institutionalism of mainstream
modes of representation, while developing genuinely empowering forms of
direct democracy and discursive deliberation.

This paradigm shift is intimately interrelated with ‘the diaspora of politics’,161 reflect-
ing not only ‘the homelessness of political and social theory’,162 but also the open-
ness of a new ‘politics of difference’. Such a differentialist approach is committed to
an intersectional understanding of society, according to which coexisting and inter-
related sociological variables – such as class, gender, ethnicity, age, and ability – are
culturally constructed and, therefore, have to be debated in culturally sensitive terms.
In essence, a culturalist conception of politics lacks a ‘hard’ conception of ‘the
political’, because it rejects a ‘hard’ conception of ‘the social’. In this context,
Baudrillard’s influential announcement regarding ‘the end of “the social”’163
is worth taking into consideration. Reflecting upon the validity of provocative
claims regarding ‘the demise of “the social”’,164 we can distinguish three possible
hypotheses:165

A. ‘The social’ has never existed (radical anti-social view).

B. ‘The social’ has always existed; in the present age, it exists even more and
more; thus, it becomes increasingly important (radical pro-social view).
C. ‘The social’ has well and truly existed, but it has entered a profound crisis – or
even ceased to exist – in the present (sceptical view of ‘the social’).166

Analogously, one may apply these three hypotheses to the transformation of the
political in recent decades:

A. ‘The political’ has never existed (radical anti-political view).

B. ‘The political’ has always existed; in the present age, it exists even more and
more; hence, it becomes increasingly important (radical pro-political view).
C. ‘The political’ has well and truly existed, but it has entered a profound crisis –
or even ceased to exist – in the present (sceptical view of ‘the political’).

Although there are different versions and interpretations of the ‘cultural turn’,
its core normative orientations tend to be associated with the third position
respectively. According to this stance, both ‘the social’ and ‘the political’ – while
110 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

they have played a pivotal role in the unfolding of modern history – have under-
gone profound transformations in recent decades. On this account, both ‘the
social’ and ‘the political’ have been substantially undermined – if not eradicated –
by the far-reaching material and symbolic shifts that Western societies have been
experiencing since the second part of the twentieth century until the present
day. The preponderance of ‘the cultural’ over both ‘the social’ and ‘the political’ reflects
the recognition of the deep relational contingency that permeates the seemingly most
solidified aspects of human reality. Even if cultural struggles are not considered to
be ‘the only game in town’, they have had an impact strong enough to ensure
that individual and collective actors, directly or indirectly involved in other social
conflicts, have had to learn to speak the intersectionalist language of the ‘politics
of difference’. In short, even though the ‘cultural turn’ does not necessarily advocate a
move away from politics, it endorses the creation of a culturalist political culture.

The Self

The concern with the constitution of ‘the self’ plays a central role in key areas
of contemporary sociological analysis.167 The numerous writings on ‘the post-
modern’ are no exception in this respect.168 It would be inappropriate to give
the impression that there is such a thing as a consensual view on the nature
of ‘the self’ among scholars whose works are, rightly or wrongly, associated with
the ‘postmodern turn’. It is striking, however, that, from a postmodern perspec-
tive, ‘the self’ possesses several constitutive features, some of which are especially
important in the context of an increasingly globalized society, shaped by rapidly
changing conditions and parameters. It shall be the task of this section to exam-
ine central features of ‘the self’, particularly those that are crucial to postmodern
conceptions of subjectivity.
(1) The contingency of the self: To assume that selves are contingent means
to recognize that they change in relation to different contexts. To be exact, selves
are shaped by (a) objective, (b) normative, and (c) subjective contexts.

A. Objective contexts are composed of the physical circumstances in which actors

find themselves immersed. Unavoidably, selves exist in spatial environments,
rather than in a metaphysical vacuum. More importantly, the possibilities and
limitations of people’s practices depend, to a large extent, on the material set-
tings in which they are situated.
B. Normative contexts are constituted by the social states of affairs in which actors
are placed. Selves, throughout their lives, participate in the construction of
intersubjective environments, whose specificity stems from the relations estab-
lished between socialized and socializing individuals. The possibilities and
limitations of people’s practices depend, considerably, on their structurally and
processually defined positions in the social space.
C. Subjective contexts designate ensembles of the dispositional conditions and
resources by which actors are affected when – consciously or unconsciously –
experiencing a particular spatiotemporal setting. Selves encounter the world
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 111

by relating not only to objective and normative environments, but also to

themselves, that is, to subjective conditions of experience. The possibilities
and limitations of people’s practices depend, significantly, on their disposi-
tional resources, which they both internalize and externalize while interacting
with the objective, normative, and subjective conditions of their existence.

In short, the construction of the self is possible only as a formative process that
is contingent upon the subject’s inevitable immersion in, and interaction with,
realms of objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity.169
(2) The fluidity of the self: To suggest that selves are fluid means to acknowl-
edge that they are in a constant state of flux. On this view, ‘subjectivity is a dynamic
process’.170 To the extent that ‘[s]ubjectivities are effects of historically contingent
and specific practices’,171 sociologists need to study the ‘genealogies of their con-
stituting practices’.172 From this perspective, the subject ‘is not a substance’,173 but
‘[i]t is a form’.174 As such, it is formable and reformable. The exploration of the
self in terms of the ‘socially situated practices’175 shaping its composition implies
that human subjects not only lack ‘an essence or substance’,176 but also have the
capacity to construct and reconstruct a unique sense of subjectivity. Arguably, this
creative ability is reflected in the fact that ‘[p]ostmodern consumers have no desire
for a stable self’177 and that ‘instead they reinvent themselves at will’.178 In the age
of global fluidity and fluid globality, ‘there are few solids to melt’.179 Rephrasing
Marx’s famous dictum concerning the dynamic nature of capitalism, one may go
as far as to claim that ‘[a]ll that is modern melts into postmodern’.180 Thus, ‘the
self is limited, contextual and temporal’,181 in the sense that its fluidity emanates
from its very indeterminacy: in the postmodern context, ‘[t]he world retains a
weakened ontological stability’,182 which manifests itself in the rise of increasingly
malleable social identities. The world of global movements is composed not only
of flowing objects but also of flowing subjects.183
(3) The multiplicity of the self: To affirm that selves are multiple means to
maintain that they are both internally and externally diversified. There exists a
plurality of selves within each self. The more differentiated a particular society,
the more roles its members are expected to play within changing interactional
settings. Pluralized societies require pluralized actors.184 In complex societal
formations, actors occupy ‘a broad range of subject positions’,185 which present
themselves as ‘combinations of class, race, ethnic, regional, generational, sexual,
and gender positions’.186 In the contemporary sociological literature, the concept
of ‘intersectionality’187 is frequently used to do justice to the fact that, in highly
differentiated societies, actors are not only allowed but also expected to take on
various normatively codified roles in specific – often overlapping – contexts and
thereby develop multifaceted identities. This ‘irreducible pluralism’188 obliges
us to abandon the Enlightenment idea of the rational, autonomous, and self-
conscious subject, able to ‘“stand aside” from actual social conditions and judge
them’189 from a quasi-detached and disinterested vantage point. Following the
poststructuralist currents within postmodern thought, one may go even further
by asserting that ‘[t]he subject is replaced by a system of structures, oppositions
112 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

and différances [sic] which, to be intelligible, need not be viewed as products of a

living subjectivity’,190 immersed in manifold social sites and shaped by numerous
relationally constituted processes. In the postmodern universe, then, the self is
constantly exposed to the conditions of ‘dispersion, disparity, and difference’.191
The experience of multiplicity, which is based on the construction of internally
and externally pluralized selves, constitutes an integral element of postmodernity,
which is characterized by the production of internally and externally pluralized
social spheres.192
(4) The contradictoriness of the self: To face up to the fact that selves are
contradictory means to accept that they are internally fragmented. To the extent
that every self carries multiple selves within itself, it is exposed to the tension-
laden experience of having to cope with the task of co-articulating mutually chal-
lenging, and often conflicting, interests and expectations thrown at it from the
external world and assimilated within the boundaries of its internal world. Our
heightened ‘awareness of the variety of roles we play’193 is triggered by the wide-
spread experience of both intra-role and inter-role conflicts, which are common
in highly differentiated societies. Intra-role conflicts stem from normative ten-
sions that arise due to behavioural discrepancies within the horizon of a particular
social role. Inter-role conflicts emanate from normative tensions that emerge due
to behavioural discrepancies between the horizons of diverging social roles. The
constant switching-back-and-forth between different social persona, sustained
through corresponding identities and context-dependent behavioural patterns,
constitutes one of the most challenging tasks with which individuals are con-
fronted in complex interactional settings. Given the prevalence of contradictory
and tension-laden personalities in highly differentiated societies, the postmodern
actor may be described as ‘the new non-subject of the fragmented or schizophrenic
self’.194 The rise of the non-subject, however, is a paradoxical affair. On the one
hand, ‘[p]ostmodernist theories […] view the self as decentered, fragmented
and only partially accessible or knowable to him/herself or the outside world.’195
On the other hand, the ‘postmodern valorization of difference, heterogeneity,
ambiguity and plurality […] promotes the reflective self’.196 Thus, ‘[t]oday’s culture
[…] is increasingly experienced as a collection of fragments and episodes’.197 The
multicausal complexity of this disjointed involvement in the world escapes
the explanatory capacity of common sense, while contributing to intensified
degrees of reflexivity among those who are trying to cope with the tangible con-
sequences of their bodily immersion in tension-laden realities.198
(5) The knowledgeability of the self: To contend that selves are knowledge-
able means to account for the socio-ontological significance of their epistemic
capacities. Selves, in order to participate in society, draw upon two key sources of
knowledgeability: implicit and explicit knowledge. ‘To exist as a fundamentally
knowledgeable self means to exist as a self that relies on both implicit and explicit,
unproblematised and problematised, practical and theoretical, taken-for-granted
and discursive, intuitive and reflexive knowledge.’199 From a sociological point of
view, know-how is effectively more significant than know-that. For the smooth
functioning of social life requires human actors to mobilize their practical
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 113

resources without constantly questioning the possibility, let alone the legitimacy,
of their existence. Yet, just as actors tend to become conscious of their subjectivity
when their habitualized performances are interrupted, their habitualized perfor-
mances can be disturbed the moment they become aware of their subjectivity.200
To the degree that crises and confrontations with the unexpected can prompt
reflexivity, self-awareness, and contemplation, these can be stifling and under-
mine one’s naturalized participation in different forms of sociality. This is not to
suggest, however, that reflexivity is necessarily disempowering; on the contrary,
it can be a crucial source of empowerment, enabling actors to become aware
of unconsciously internalized mechanisms contributing to the reproduction of
social domination. ‘Reflexivity refers to a relationship between subjectivity – the
Self – and Objectivity – the Other, the world – in which both are articulated along-
side each other. Reflexivity is essentially a category of mediation’.201
Thus, reflexivity permits us to convert habitualized processes of unconscious
immersion into objects of contemplative exploration. In highly differentiated
societies, ‘[r]eflexivity has become more important […] as a result of the multiple
bonds of belonging, roles and identities.’202 People’s immediate exposure to, and
intensified experience of, societal complexity cannot be dissociated from their
need to make choices in a world characterized by increasing uncertainty and
indeterminacy.

This is a learning process because in order to survive in a world of a high degree

of contingency and accelerated change and without cultural certainty the actor
must constantly be able to learn to learn, that is, to learn to make choices. It is no
longer merely a matter of making choices but of learning how to make a choice.203

The postmodern self has no choice but to choose between numerous choices.
Survival in a postmodern world requires the ability ‘to live a discontinuous, frac-
tured, episodic, consequences-avoiding life’,204 in which sociality ‘is increasingly
experienced as a collection of fragments’.205 Accordingly, we need to ‘analyse con-
temporary culture in terms of the ambiguity, ambivalence, flux, dread and turmoil
that shape the multilayered dynamics of modernity itself’.206 On this account, ‘the
self is already a rich plurality of contending discourses, practices, images, fantasies
and representations’;207 it is converted in a ‘discontinuous entity’208 based on ‘an
identity (or identities) constantly made and re-made’.209 In the context of postmod-
ernity, actors are confronted with the challenge of drawing upon their epistemic
capacities in order to permeate horizons of indeterminacy with realistic degrees
of reflexivity.210
(6) The narrativity of the self: To understand that selves are both narrating
and narratable means to comprehend that people’s need to attribute a sense of
purpose to their lives is central to their existence. One of the dimensions that
make the human experience of self-awareness distinctive compared to other
living entities is that selves are ‘constructed through language and narratives’,211
both of which ‘give intelligibility and meaning to lives’.212 What interests the post-
modern eye, however, is not the meaning-laden constitution of selfhood as such.
114 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

This integral element of personality formation, mediated by linguistic and non-

linguistic modes of interpretation, has been studied for a long time, notably by
phenomenologically and hermeneutically inspired researchers. Rather, postmod-
ern accounts of the self focus on the ways in which personal and biographical nar-
ratives permit us to impose a sense of coherence, unity, and directionality on essentially
incoherent, fragmented, and directionless life histories. ‘Narratives are based largely on
selective memories. The self is therefore constructed in such a way that there is a
semblance of coherence and unity […] over time.’213
The construction of seemingly coherent, unified, and teleological narratives
serves the existential function of converting an empirically encountered reality
into a source of symbolically organized comprehensibility. Yet, in addition to
transforming the universe of facts into an assemblage of meaning-bearing acts,
and as well as imbuing disenchanted realms of facticity with interpretively con-
stituted frameworks of validity, storytelling fulfils a major sociological function: it
equips actors with the ability to establish meaningful relations with other mem-
bers of their communities.

When constructing self-narratives, people draw from the cultural narratives that
are available to them in terms of plot, structure and characterisation. The narra-
tive continually gets altered as new occurrences and interpretations of events get
incorporated into the narrative. A narrative can thus be one of many possible
narratives.214

Every human actor’s lifeworld has three main components:

a. culture, which – through the intersubjective generation of intelligibility – con-

stitutes our interpretive background;
b. society, which – through the intersubjective construction of solidarity – forms
our integrative background; and
c. personality, which – through the intersubjective production of identity –
provides our individuative background.215

This tripartite background horizon of the lifeworld is central to any kind of col-
lectively constructed reality, irrespective of its spatiotemporal specificity. ‘People
entwine [c] their personal narratives around [a] familiar cultural narrative structures
available to them’216 in [b] particular societal contexts. To the extent that – particularly
in careerist interactional settings – ‘personal and autobiographical narratives are
largely rehearsals of public rhetoric’,217 we live in a historical era in which the
modern ‘cult of individuality’218 has been radicalized by the postmodern ‘cult of
orchestrated meritocracy’.219 The postmodern self is a purposive, competitive, and
creative ‘project’,220 that is, a bodily vehicle through which ‘the pursuit of risk-taking
and self-reinvention’221 becomes not only a possibility but also a necessity in the
struggle for recognition and legitimacy. The invention of narrativity, regardless
of its cultural contingency, enables us to cling on to the dream of success derived
from invaluable achievement and irreplaceable individuality.222
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 115

(7) The corporeality of the self: To state that selves are corporeal means to
insist upon the fact that human beings are immersed in the world as embodied
entities. Social actors do not exist as disembodied and free-floating subjects, as if
they were exclusively governed by reason, categorical imperatives, and logic. To
be sure, actors can be – and, arguably, tend to be – reasonable, morally consistent,
and inspired by what they consider to be accurate and truthful representations
of the world. Yet, as bodily creatures, they are often driven by emotions, inclina-
tions, and moods. Indeed, modes of affectivity can be infinitely more powerful
than modes of rationality when shaping the course of human agency by permeat-
ing someone’s subjectivity.
Postmodern approaches to the self reject the Cartesian mind–body dichotomy,
not only because they discard the clear-cut separation between disembodied spheres
of rationality and bodily experiences of affectivity, but also because they refuse
to construct a normative hierarchy between – evolutionarily inferior – hangovers
from pre-human societies and – civilizationally superior – elements of purpo-
sively, morally, and aesthetically organized realities. In this sense, they are not
willing to accept the Kantian dictum according to which emotionally motivated
actions lack moral value. Arguably, ‘embodied engagement in the reciprocal play of
interpretations and influences keeps us ethically attuned to the limits of reason’.223
This ‘heightened sensitivity towards the location of moralities in the concrete prac-
tices’224 of everyday life implies that ‘the body becomes both an object of knowledge
and a site where power is exercised’.225 Social power is conceivable only as a per-
formative capacity that pervades our bodies. Power without bodily performances is
bodiless, just as bodily performances without power are powerless. In the context
of post- or hypermodernity, however, we are confronted with a paradoxical reality:

Microelectronic technology – ‘virtual reality’ – disembodies the body. While the

advantages of the Internet are indisputable, virtual flirting and virtual sex
substitute for interpersonal relations and bodily encounters. It reduces love or
even personal encounter to figments of imagination.226

Postmodernity largely, albeit not fully, accomplishes the mind (spirit or

pneuma)–body separation by giving primacy or at least preference to the body.
The preoccupation with the body and corporeal processes is a strong indica-
tion that the body has become sacred, if not ‘the sacred’ but at least ‘a sacred’, in
hypermodernity.227

In other words, the context of post- or hypermodernity is characterized by both

dis-embodying and re-embodying processes. On the one hand, the increasing influ-
ence of microelectronic technology involves the dis-embodying experience of
creating virtual realities. On the other hand, the growing impact of capitalist
consumerism, epitomized in the rise of the global culture industry,228 manifests
itself in the re-embodying experience of the fact that ‘“freedom” over one’s own
body has expanded’,229 illustrating that the celebration of signs and appear-
ances under the banner of postmodernism constitutes an extreme form of liberal
116 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

individualism ‘culminating in a “hyper-subjectivity”’230 within radically atomized

social realities. In short, the postmodern self is both less and more embodied than
the modern subject.231
(8) The technology of the self: To accept that selves are technological means,
in the contemporary era, to confront the impact of the ‘digital age’232 on the con-
stitution of personhood. Far from being reducible to a state of affairs shaped by
technological developments, however, the rise of the ‘digital self’233 has profound
existential implications in that it epitomizes the emergence of a new, and increas-
ingly widespread, type of subjectivity:

Windows […] is the privileged metaphor for postmodern subjectivity – dispersed,

decentered, and constructed. Computer software windows open the subject not
only to the workworld of texts and word-processing, but also to the emerging
realms of simulation, cyberspace, and interactive multimedia culture. The result is
awareness of the variety of roles we play and dimensions to our subjectivity.234

In this regard, we are confronted with at least two paradoxes:

A. The digitization of subjectivity involves both the individualization and the

standardization of the self. On the one hand, digitized actors are increasingly
individualized, in the sense that they can use technological resources to develop
expressions of uniqueness and originality, through which they distinguish
themselves from the mainstream criteria of mass psychology and systemic
rationality. On the other hand, digitized actors are increasingly standardized,
in the sense that they learn to function within the boundaries and grammars
of generic operating systems – notably Windows, Mac, and Linux. Within
these operating systems, computer programmes – such as Word, Outlook, and
Internet browsers – have the normalizing power to define the rules and param-
eters of our symbolic interaction with reality.
B. The digitization of subjectivity contributes to both the integration and the
isolation of the self. On the one hand, digitized actors can use technology,
particularly social media, as a vehicle for integration based on the possibility of
global communication – not only across time and space, but also across social
divisions derived from class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability. On the other
hand, digitized actors can use technology as a vehicle for isolation by replacing
face-to-face encounters with cyber-relations, thereby adding – substantially –
to the gradual atomization of increasingly anomic individuals.

In brief, the technologization of subjectivity has both empowering and disempower-

ing consequences for the self.
Irrespective of whether one seeks to emphasize the bright and ‘liberating’235
or the dark and ‘reifying’236 aspects of digitized societies, one may insist that
‘personal computers […] generate postmodern selves – multiple, fragmented, con-
structed and provisional, subject to experiment and change’.237 If we come to the
conclusion that the ‘interesting thing about “netsex”’238 – and, more generally,
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 117

about ‘net-existence’ – ‘is that anything goes’,239 then we need to reflect on the
normative implications of technologization, which, as an almost ubiquitous
historical process, appears to spill over into every sphere of socialization. To the
extent that, following Baudrillard, ‘hyperreality’ constitutes ‘a world of simulacra,
of images’,240 and to the extent that ‘the hyperreal is becoming the condition of
the whole of the modern world’,241 ‘the copy (or fake) substitutes itself for the real,
becomes more real than the real itself’.242 The digital era of hyperreality, however,
not only constitutes a tension-laden field of diametrically opposed normativi-
ties – such as ‘standardization’ versus ‘individualization’ and ‘integration’ versus
‘isolation’ – but also opens up a horizon of unprecedented existential contingency.
‘The Internet provides the opportunity to mould and orchestrate the self. This
leads to psychological pressure, which weighs on individuals. The reservoir of
non-realized chances and opportunities is constantly growing.’243
In brief, the digital age constitutes a ‘realm of contingency’244 in which indi-
viduals, at least those living in ‘democratic-capitalist societies’,245 are expected
to cope with unprecedented degrees of liberty by shaping their own destiny. Put
differently, social actors need to face up to the challenge of developing sustainable
forms of subjectivity, while finding themselves immersed in the jungle of techno-
logical networks and infinite cultural variety. The pervasive technologization of
reality obliges us to revise traditional conceptions of agency: technology is not
only a product but also a source of agency to the degree that it exercises considerable
power over the practices through which selves establish a relation with reality.246
(9) The power-ladenness of the self: To concede that selves are power-laden
requires admitting that all social relations are power relations. Drawing on a
Foucauldian understanding of the self, postmodern approaches tend to assume
that social actors are caught up in networks of power. On this account, we should
‘not view power as a possession, a capacity or the property of people, socio-
economic classes or institutions, but rather as a complex matrix’,247 which is com-
posed of contestable – and, hence, malleable – social arrangements. To be precise,
the power-ladenness of selfhood has at least 15 significant implications.248

A. Power is ubiquitous. There are no social relations without power relations. The
distinction between ‘power-permeated’ and ‘power-motivated’ permits us to
differentiate between practices that are merely shaped by power and practices
that are essentially driven by power.
B. Power is productive. Just as power produces subjects, subjects produce power.
The distinction between ‘power-to’ and ‘power-over’ allows us to differentiate
between processes of emancipation and mechanisms of domination.
C. Power is relational. It emerges primarily through the networks established
between agents, rather than out of the properties allegedly inherent in subjects
and objects.
D. Power is intangible. Yet, while exploring both the micro-physics and the macro-
physics of power, we must resist the temptation to hypostatize a meta-physics
of power. As critical sociologists, we need to examine the tangible conse-
quences of intangible powers.
118 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

E. Power is habitual. As both a habitualized and a habitualizing force, power is

both a structured and a structuring motor built into our daily routines.
F. Power is discursive. As such, it permeates behavioural, ideological, and institu-
tional patterns of human sociality. Discourses can be orthodox and conserva-
tive, just as they can be heterodox and subversive.
G. Power is corporeal. It is due to the ineluctable preponderance of our bodily
immersion in the world that power is always already part of who we are, not
only as accomplices, but also as creative actors with a sense of authorship.
Power relations are inconceivable without interacting bodies.
H. Power is polycentric. No subject, structure, or institution in can claim to possess
a monopoly on the unfolding of worldly agency.
I. Power is performative. Our performances would be powerless if power were not
performative.
J. Power is normative. Given its regulative functions, it makes us relate to and
act upon the world in particular ways. Yet, power can also be a tool to subvert
hegemonic mechanisms of instrumental reproduction and to invent engaging
processes of resourceful transformation. What is problematic in this regard
are not normativities as such, but totally normalized and totally normalizing
normativities.
K. Power is spatial. The most deterritorialized realities cannot do away with the
spatially contingent constitution of power. It is, after all, because resources are
spatially distributed that power matters. The rise of the global network society,
however, obliges us to rethink traditional conceptions of spatiality.
L. Power is temporal. Although power will always remain an integral element
of the social world, its constitution is malleable and changes across different
contexts.
M. Power is disciplinary. The most libertarian society cannot survive without disci-
plinary practices. As cultural beings, we learn to discipline our bodies in order
to be able to function within our social environments.
N. Power is circular. Far from having a fixed point, power is in a constant state
of flux. As a dynamic and amorphous force, it moves from sphere to sphere,
no less mobile than the human and nonhuman agents who mobilize it when
navigating their way through the universe. Agents circulate by virtue of power,
just as power circulates by virtue of agents.
O. Power is quasi-transcendental. Owing to its foundational role in the symbolic
and material construction of reality, power constitutes a precondition for the
development of society.

In short, selves cannot exist without power, just as power cannot exist without
selves.249
(10) The reflexivity of the self: To consider selves as reflexive implies that
human actors are expected to be adaptable to several logics of existence.
(a) The reflexive self is expected to be adaptable to the logic of short-termism.
One of the most significant – and, arguably, pathological – consequences of
the transformation of work under late capitalism is ‘the corrosion of character’.250
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 119

The ‘personal costs of economic globalization’251 may not be easy to measure.

There is little doubt, however, that – under than banners of postindustrialism
and post-Fordism – ‘youth’ is associated with ‘flexibility’, ‘risk-taking behaviour’,
and ‘dynamism’, whereas ‘oldness’ is perceived to be related to ‘rigidity’, ‘safety-
oriented attitudes’, and ‘conservatism’. Critical interpretations of the paradig-
matic shift towards short-termism in ever more globalized societies suggest that
‘[t]he new economy undermines the qualities of trust, loyalty, commitment and
self-discipline’,252 while promoting individualistic virtues such as self-reliance,
self-interest, and self-centredness. Yet, the euphemistic vocabulary of flexibility
and creativity, employed to describe the categorical imperatives driving post-
Fordist economies, often translates into extreme forms of social precariousness,
based on existential insecurity and unpredictability. ‘The free market economy of
the early twenty-first century, with its obsessive emphasis on short-term goals and
flexibility, is putting an unbearable pressure upon the personal lives of those associ-
ated with it.’253
The house of modernity used to provide ‘a work world of rigid, hierarchical
organizations, in which self-discipline shaped the durability of the self’.254 The
jungle world of postmodernity, by contrast, is shaped by ‘a brave new economy of
corporate re-engineering, innovation and risk, in which the fragmented or dislocated
nature of self-experience moves to the fore’.255 Societal processes of ‘flexibiliza-
tion’ are characterized by profound normative ambivalence:

• On the one hand, there appears to be an unprecedented potential for the

empowering experience of self-realization.
• On the other hand, there seems to be an unparalleled danger of generating the
disempowering experience of disorientation.

Arguably, a major consequence of both personal and professional disembedded-

ness, combined with a lack of solid social and emotional connectedness, is the
increasingly widespread ‘corrosion of the self’256 seeking to cope with the daily
unpredictability with which people find themselves confronted in the jungle of
individualized arbitrariness. The postmodern world of multiple ‘short-terms’ turns
out to be a playground in which personal and professional activities tend to be
reduced to temporarily available – and, hence, transient and replaceable – ‘games
in town’. In the struggle for survival, actors are forced to buy into an instrumental
logic of utility, insecurity, and uncertainty, thereby giving up the search for mean-
ingful attachment, commitment, and loyalty.257
(b) The reflexive self is expected to be adaptable to the logic of individualism.
In individualist societies, ‘culture serves as a vehicle for self-management and
self-promotion’.258 ‘Postmodern individualism’259 both produces and is produced
by ‘postmodern individuals’.260 Hence, we can interpret not only the modern
condition but also ‘the postmodern condition as the assertion of the “sovereign
and autonomous” individual’.261 Postmodern formations differ from modern
societies, however, in that they both require and reinforce the creation of ‘poly-
individuality’262 expressed in ‘the explosion of subject-positions through the “zapping”
120 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

of practices’.263 Under the parameters of ‘postmodern culture, social identities

become more fluid, mobile, and protein than in the past’.264 Consequently, the idea
of the modern subject is undermined by the fact that, in the postmodern world,
‘[t]he economy of practices appears decentred, unpredictable, untotalizable’.265 The
‘contradictory sociality’,266 triggered by the tension between the freedom to be
free and the obligation to conform within the parameters of postmodern hyper-
individualism, lies at the heart of post-traditional life forms. ‘Individualization
takes place when the structures are dissolved and people are forced more and
more to shape their own biographies, choose and construct their own lives without
the compulsion/guidance of tradition.’267 In the postmodern universe, individu-
als are not only the protagonists and narrators of their own stories, but they are
the stories themselves. Put differently, the history of postmodernity is a narrative
based on the celebration of individuality.268
(c) The reflexive self is expected to be adaptable to the logic of autonomism.
This crucial facet of the ‘postmodern individual’269 has been discussed – perhaps,
most pertinently – in Inglehart’s influential analysis of the rise of postmaterialist
values.270 To the extent that ‘postmodernity references social norms of personal
fulfillment, flexibility and choice in life roles’,271 it conceives of postmodern selves
as entities with a strong desire to express their personal autonomy, as illustrated
in the following assertions:

[…] postmodernists [are] individuals who experience high levels of subjective

well-being and who prefer secular-rational authority over traditional authority.272

They have become disenchanted with and shift away from traditional author-
ity because they value independence and freedom. Postmodernists value tolerance
and interpersonal trust. They respect diversity, the environment, women’s rights,
and greater gender equality.273

Postmodernists place a high value on friendships, leisure time, personal responsi-

bility, and imagination.274

Postmodernists also tend to be postmaterialists, meaning they value the qual-

ity of life instead of economic gain. But these individuals tend to come from
wealthy, postindustrial countries.275

[They] focus on personal well-being and existential happiness rather than accruing
material wealth […].276

[…] in postindustrial societies, a more abstract notion of self-fulfilment and per-

sonal well-being is cherished instead of the material success valued in industrial
societies.277

In short, postmodern selves appear to be motivated, primarily, by value ration-

ality (Wertrationalität), rather than by instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität).
Irrespective of whether or not the pursuit of human autonomy is regarded as a
privilege of prosperous and democratic societies, the search for the possibility of
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 121

self-realization plays a pivotal role in post-traditional processes of meaningful

socialization.278
(d) The reflexive self is expected to be adaptable to the logic of consumerism. To
be sure, the tension between the quotidian immersion in hedonistic ‘materialism’
and the spread of value-rational ‘postmaterialism’ reflects the normative discrep-
ancy between ‘instrumental rationality’ and ‘substantive rationality’, which lies at
the heart of modernity as well as – in a radicalized manner – of postmodernity. In
fact, one may come to the cynical conclusion that, to the degree that value ration-
ality has itself become a commodity, its critical spirit has been colonized by the
monetary power of exchange values produced by late capitalist societies. Under
the reign of consumerist capitalism, selfhood is converted into a systemically
steered vehicle for the subjective assimilation of the instrumental logic underly-
ing commodity fetishism. ‘In contemporary social conditions durable selfhood is
replaced by a kind of supermarket identity – an assemblage of scraps, random desires,
chance encounters, the accidental and the fleeting.’279
From an unsympathetic point of view, the ‘cult of consumer hedonism’280 leads
to little more than the reproduction of commodity fetishism. From a sympathetic
perspective, the hegemonic power of consumerist pleasure-seeking activities is
fuelled by people’s creative desire to ‘reinvent themselves at will’281 and engage
in the empowering practice of ‘reflexive self-fashioning’,282 expressed in the con-
struction of ‘“hybrid” and playful subjectivities’.283 Economists grapple with the
question of how consumers make choices; sociologists wrestle with the question
of why consumers do not have a real choice. Whichever side of the argument one
may wish to defend, postmodern consumerism ties in with the presuppositional
underpinnings of philosophical, political, and economic liberalism: ‘Pick and
choose, and you will be free!’284
(e) The reflexive self is expected to be adaptable to the logic of pluralism. The
problem with radical cultural pluralism, however, is that individuals are presumed
to be equipped with the capacity to cope with constant existential ambiguity
derived from the absence of overarching points of reference and from the lack of
concern with reliable sources of solidarity.

Postmodernity appears to undermine social cohesion and socialization: Its

emphasis on cultural pluralism does not allow individuals to find points of
reference in relation to which their experiences can be defined as relative and
subordinate […]. As a consequence, organizations lack a legitimate means of
defining organizational behaviour beyond their participants’ spontaneous and
changing personal interests. The emphasis on freedom of personal choice not only
results in a lack of agreement about integrative social values that could be transmit-
ted through socialization, but also undermines any collective desire to transmit
values through socialization […]. Postmodernity, therefore, is perceived as being
associated with social disintegration.285

In other words, the celebration of ‘pluralism and heterogeneity’286 under the flag
of postmodernity manifests itself in the construction of a deeply paradoxical
122 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

reality: on the one hand, in the strengthening of individual freedom, choice, and
autonomy; on the other hand, in the weakening of social cohesion, integration, and
solidarity. In this light, pluralism is a double-edged sword: inasmuch as it can con-
tribute to human empowerment based on personal liberty, it can result in human
disempowerment triggered by a deficient engagement with the preconditions
for the establishment of solidified forms of sociality. Actors who fail to develop
a strong sense of belonging to particular communities, because they are caught
up in the self-centred cultivation of their individuality, are welcome in the post-
modern jungle of plurality, in which participation in ephemeral and replaceable
tribes287 amounts to little more than an opportunistic way of travelling back and
forth between transient places on offer in meritocratic societies.288
(f) The reflexive self is expected to be adaptable to the logic of dynamism. In
postmodernity, ‘identity becomes more mobile, fluid, multiple, self-reflexive, and
subject to change and innovation’.289 Hence, ‘the postmodern self no longer pos-
sesses the depth, substantiality and coherence of the modern self’290 and has
given up the hope of living in a ‘clear and crystalline world of rationality and
rational choosing’.291 The ‘articulation of social relations across wide spans of time-
space, up to and including global systems’,292 requires postmodern selves to be
able to cope with disembeddedness not simply as an occasional experience but,
rather, as an integral component of their very existence. In order to survive in a
world of hypercomplexity, hypermobility, and hypervelocity, individuals need
to develop contextualist strategies of ‘mapping’293 allowing for the possibility of
‘sense-making’.294

Different people use distinctive maps to make sense of the world, deploying
divergent ideas, models, and theories to organize their experience, to orient
themselves in their environment, and to reduce multiplicity and disorder to struc-
ture and order. Mappings also help construct personal identities, pointing to
ways of being in the world, existential options, and sense-making activities […].295

Cognitive maps permit us to convert exposure to endless complexity into an

experience of relatively organized meaning-bearing activities. Of course, ‘in our
own time of globalization and widespread social uncertainty’,296 the ‘capacity of
social actors for creative action’297 depends on their ability to cope with high lev-
els of existential insecurity. Indeterminacy has become the firm but shaky corner-
stone of social life under postmodernity, triggering the emergence of increasingly
diversified and dynamized human biographies.

The ‘multi-option society’ has become a catchphrase to describe the acceleration

of social life and the multiplication of choice under postmodernity. […] Nowadays
people dispose of electoral and experimental biographies, rather than of fixed bio-
graphic plans. Their biographies are differentiated into partial biographies and
personality traits. The more possibilities one has, the more one wants to rise to
the occasion, in order not to miss out on anything. Time-pressure and the fear to
miss out on something, about which many people complain these days, are by
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 123

no means necessary consequences of technological acceleration – on the con-

trary: time-savings – derived from new social media, automation in the house-
hold, and advanced mobility – are not only cancelled out but also overhauled
by the increase in volume per time unit. The pace of life increases, although we
gain more and more time in our social lifeworlds.298

The paradox with which we are confronted in this context can be described as
follows: because of advanced technology systems, we should have more time; yet,
because of our time-pressured perception of reality, we appear to have less time
than ever before. Our immersion in time illustrates the extent to which the pre-
ponderance of ‘for-itselfness’ (subjective immersion in time) over ‘in-itselfness’
(objective immersion in time) can have a distortive – but, nonetheless, immensely
powerful – impact on both our perception of and our interaction with reality.
Consequently, self-fulfilment becomes a never-realized – if not unrealizable –
dream, discredited due to the surplus of subjective and objective pressure put on
postmodern selves:

Multi-optionality implies that the newly acquired freedom of choice can become
burdensome. It creates uncertainty as to whether or not one has made the right
decisions. Hence, the freedom it promises turns out to be a pseudo-freedom: to the
extent that nothing is enduring, self-determination becomes a perennial impera-
tive, it becomes a constraint. […] People are exhausted, fatigued, because they are
exposed to a ‘superfluity’ of information, stimulation, and possibilities […].299

The excess supply of freedom, choice, and autonomy delivered by postmodern

society can lead to personal agony if individuals fail to develop a sense of purpo-
sive stability by mobilizing the symbolic and material resources available to them
within their horizons of possibilities. Contrary to the postmodern belief in bound-
less opportunities, a sense of limited possibilities can be the breeding ground for
contentedness and meaningful agency, expressed in one’s capacity to find one’s
place in society and, more fundamentally, in the universe that one experiences
as one’s reality.300

Globalization

The concepts of postmodernity and globalization are inextricably linked. Put

differently, the notion that we have entered a postmodern era is intimately inter-
related with the view that we live in an increasingly globalized and globalizing
world.301 Similar to the label ‘postmodernity’, the term ‘globalization’ can be
regarded as one of the most controversial concepts in the contemporary social
sciences. In recent decades, few issues have provoked as much controversy as the
contention that globalization constitutes the most powerful macrosocial dynamic
of the current epoch. In order to assess both the scope and the significance of
contemporary social transformations, this section will examine (i) the features of
globalization, (ii) the power of globalization, and (iii) the limits of globalization.302
124 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(I) The Features of Globalization

The multiplicity of diverging approaches to globalization is symptomatic
of the complexity underlying major social transformations in the contemporary
world. Surely, there are substantial explanatory and interpretive differences
between competing accounts of globalization. Irrespective of the various con-
troversies on the subject, we can identify at least seven essential features of
globalization. Paradoxically, these elements can be conceived of as both driving
forces and consequences of the profound changes that the world has undergone
in recent decades. Given their historical significance, let us briefly consider each
of them.
(1) Globalization is associated with the triumph of political liberalism in large
parts of the world. The downfall of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe and in the
former Soviet Union in the early 1990s,303 often referred to as ‘the collapse of com-
munism’,304 has led to a novel historical situation in which the political project
of liberal democracy represents the normative foundation of pluralist societies.
Ideologically, this tendency has been reinforced by the gradual consolidation of a
capitalist world market.305
(2) The ubiquity of capitalism across the world is due to the hegemonic power
of market forces, transforming economic liberalism into the predominant mode of
social reproduction. In the context of the triadization (North America, Western
Europe, and Southeast Asia) as well as the restructuration (reflected in the pivotal
role of NICs)306 of the global market,307 and in light of the expanding influence
of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China),308 the imple-
mentation of neoliberal policies has become the most widespread governmental
strategy deployed to confront the challenges of the international economy in the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The ‘funeral of Keynesianism’ con-
stitutes an integral component of neoliberal agendas, which are put into practice
through processes of privatization, denationalization, deregulation, decentraliza-
tion, debureaucratization, and flexibilization. In brief, globalization involves the
economic liberalization of society on an international scale.309
(3) It is widely acknowledged that, in the second half of the twentieth century,
the most advanced economies have witnessed the rise of postindustrialism. In
other words, large parts of the world have undergone a transition from ‘industrial
society’, founded on manufacturing, to ‘postindustrial society’, based on knowl-
edge and services. What may be described as a ‘postindustrial revolution’310 has
turned out to be an increasingly global phenomenon, epitomized in deindustri-
alization processes and reflected in the growing importance of science and tech-
nology, particularly of micro-technologies. Thus, globalization entails the gradual
dematerialization of the economy and society.311
(4) Arguably, the internationalization of economic capital has reached an
unprecedented scale, leading to the consolidation of nomadic capitalism, often
characterized as ‘casino capitalism’.312 The accelerated integration of the global
economy has given birth to an anarchic system in which the mobility of produc-
tive and financial capital, as well as of investments and commercial flows, has
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 125

escaped from the control hitherto exercised by national governments and central
banks. Both the rise of transnational companies (TNCs) and the growth of foreign
direct investments (FDIs) are empirical manifestations of the hypermobile inter-
nationalization of capital.313 This process is driven by four geo-economic dynam-
ics: (a) the creation of new markets of production, distribution, and consumption;
(b) the expansion of capital across the globe; (c) the borderless exploitation of
labour power as ‘human capital’; and (d) the tapping of raw materials and natural
resources in different parts of the world. In short, globalization involves the
disembedding of the economy, expressed in capital’s gradual detachment from
national structures and institutions.314
(5) The radical deregulation of economic systems and labour markets has con-
verted post-Fordism into the predominant model of production, distribution, and
consumption in advanced societies. The world of globalization is characterized
by the emergence of ever more flexible, autonomous, and specialized units of
production. The augmentation and normalization of part-time work are indica-
tive of this flexibilization process. Decentralised ‘lean production’,315 deregulated
working practices, and the growth of the informal sector constitute key traits of
‘post-Fordist’316 societies, whose labour markets are dominated largely by ‘white-
collar’, rather than ‘blue-collar’, workers.317 In this sense, globalization is shaped
by profound economic restructuring processes based on the deregulation of pro-
ductive systems and labour markets.318
(6) The rapid speed of technological change allows for an unparalleled scope
of interconnectedness, derived from the robotization and digitalization of com-
munication and transportation systems. The ‘microelectronics revolution’319 has
made instant data processing on a global scale possible, while high-technology
transportation systems have led to accelerated geographical mobility on an unpar-
alleled scale. In the ‘global network society’,320 spatial constraints are overcome by
the deterritorializing impact of advanced technologies. Put differently, globaliza-
tion comprises the simultaneous enlargement and shrinking of the world, which
appears to have been converted into an ever more rapidly developing entity of
increasingly interconnected – as well as interdependent – actors.321
(7) The rise of global consumerism has radically transformed supply-and-demand
patterns on an international scale. The emergence of a global consumer culture
epitomizes the rise of the ‘global village’.322 Standardized consumption patterns
tend to homogenize culturally diverse life forms. Globalization undermines cultural
differences, challenging the integrative power of local customs and imposing the
standardizing logic of transnational economic forces. In brief, globalization has
resulted in the gradual standardization of a socially and culturally hybrid world.323
When considering the aforementioned features of globalization, at least three
theoretical reservations should be taken into account.

A. Far from offering an exhaustive framework capable of doing justice to the

entire complexity of globalization, the above overview focuses only on a few
pivotal dimensions of recent macrosocietal transformations.
126 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

B. These dimensions, although they can be conceptually differentiated, overlap

empirically and are structurally interrelated.
C. Different sociological approaches emphasize different elements of globaliza-
tion. Therefore, they diverge in terms of their assessment of the nature, scope,
and intensity ascribed to recent and current global transformations.324

(II) The Power of Globalization

The impact of globalization on society obliges us to rethink the role of the state in
the contemporary era. To be exact, the key issue in this context concerns the ques-
tion of the extent to which globalization may have undermined the sovereignty
of the nation-state. The shrinking of the world – that is, the emergence of a single
social space – appears to have generated a condition of post-sovereignty, which is
characterized by the ‘virtual annihilation of space through time’,325 overcoming ter-
ritorial frictions and allowing for social interactions beyond national boundaries.
‘Globalisation can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by
events occurring many miles away and vice versa.’326 Hence, far from being deter-
mined by the spatial limitations prevalent in premodern and early modern socie-
ties, the epoch of globalization is an age of deepened interconnectedness between
different actors across the planet. The condition of post-sovereignty can be consid-
ered as a situation of extraterritoriality, which manifests itself in the emergence of
‘a space economy that goes beyond the regulatory umbrella of the state’.327 In the
post-sovereign world, the state suffers from ‘an external crisis of autonomy and an
internal crisis of legitimacy’.328 To put it bluntly, the nation-state appears to be too
small for the big problems of society and too big for the small problems of communities
and individuals. Its externally triggered crisis stems from the intensified power of
global forces, while its internally generated crisis is rooted in its relative incapacity
to meet its citizens’ demands and needs.
In a globalized world, the degree to which economic activities can be regulated,
or at least influenced, by the state is primarily a question of governance, rather
than of governments.329 In the contemporary age, the nation-state seems to have
degenerated into a hangover from the past, that is, into an institutional append-
age that has lost its protagonist position in a largely unpredictable and uncon-
trollable social environment. On this view, the state constitutes ‘just one of many
players in the international marketplace’.330 Consequently, its hitherto central
position in the international division of power has been fundamentally chal-
lenged by the unprecedented scope of recent and current global transformations.
Although, since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of military conflicts
between nation-states has far from vanished, in a world that is socially, economic-
ally, and politically ever more interconnected, it has become increasingly difficult
to provide credible justifications for the use of force to solve – meaning-, value-,
perspective-, interest-, and power-laden – tensions between large-scale actors. In
fact, in the post-sovereign order, violent clashes between nation-states, even if they
have not disappeared, are less likely to occur. In the supranational era of height-
ened interconnectedness and interdependence, states are ‘less likely to engage in
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 127

conflict’.331 One may suggest, however, that this new world order has turned out
to be ‘a new world disorder’.332 For, ‘[i]n the cabaret of globalization, the state goes
through a striptease’,333 stimulated by supranational integration and situated in
‘the theatre of coexistence and competition between groups of states, rather than
between the states themselves’.334 In the contemporary age, the ‘basic economic
decisions are made in and by the global economy rather than the nation-state’,335
reflecting a historical transition from ‘industrial capitalism’ to ‘casino capitalism’,
in which financial capital has become a seemingly uncontrollable force.
The considerable impact of (1) political liberalism, (2) economic liberalism, (3)
postindustrialism, (4) nomadism, (5) post-Fordism, (6) networkism, and (7) con-
sumerism upon numerous societies across the world is symptomatic of the trans-
formative influence of global capitalism. To be sure, one need not be a Marxist to
recognize that economic forces are fundamental to global developments. It would
be erroneous, however, to reduce globalization to a merely economic phenom-
enon. Rather, globalization is a complex process shaped by multiple factors, which
manifest themselves in a series of far-reaching societal transformations taking
place on different levels. For the sake of analytical clarity, it is worth pointing out
that the following seven levels of enquiry are particularly important to the critical
examination of globalization processes:

1. Historical level: The collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe – notably,
the breakdown of the Soviet Union – epitomizes the advent of a new his-
torical era, shaped primarily by liberalism, which, arguably, constitutes the
most influential global ideology of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.336
2. Economic level: The sovereignty of national markets – sustained by internally
unified systems of jurisdiction, taxation, redistribution, and administration
– has been undermined by the growing influence of multinational corpora-
tions and enterprises (MNCs/MNEs), as well as by the consolidation of a global
economy governed by supra-national institutions, such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World
Bank (WB).337
3. Political level: State sovereignty – based on the institutionalization of legal,
political, and social citizenship338 – has been destabilized by considerable
pressure both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, given that both supranational
organizations and new social movements339 play a pivotal role in shaping
governmental agendas in the present era. Furthermore, the power of global
economic players appears to escape the territorial control exercised by modern
nation-states.340
4. Cultural level: Classical conceptions of nationhood – inspired by slogans such
as ‘a state needs a nation, just as a nation needs a state’ – seem outdated in a
world that is characterized by two paradoxical processes: on the one hand, the
homogenization of societies, driven by the standardizing tendencies of global
transformations; on the other hand, the diversification of societies, caused by
growing flows of both intra- and inter-continental migration.341
128 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

5. Demographic level: The presence of massive streams of intra- and inter-continental

migration contributes to the globalization of the world population. While
both national and supranational institutions may seek to regulate migra-
tion processes, the cultural hybridity of highly differentiated societies –
epitomized in the demographic constitution of ‘global cities’ – undermines
traditional notions of identity and belonging.342
6. Military level: The very possibility of a nuclear war transcends the limited space
of national territories. The development of atomic and chemical weapons
involves the risk of the destruction of the entire planet.343
7. Environmental level: Global ecological risks require global solutions. In the face
of both the short-term and the long-term consequences of major environmen-
tal challenges – especially climate change, global warming, and the partial
destruction of the ozone layer – political strategies aimed at having a tangible
positive impact upon the future of humanity – and, more fundamentally, of
the earth – can be realistic and effective only to the extent that they succeed in
radically transforming production and consumption patterns in local contexts
and, at the same time, on a global scale.344

(III) The Limits of Globalization

It is difficult to deny that globalization represents a significant social process
with a decisive impact upon both small- and large-scale, as well as both short-
and long-term, developments in the contemporary world. A merely theoretical
analysis of globalization, however, is necessarily limited in terms of its explana-
tory capacity. Indeed, any study of globalization that remains entirely conceptual
should be treated with suspicion. Sceptics may contend that the alleged structural
disembeddedness of global forces emanates from the semantic creativity of rhe-
torical thought experiments. This is not to deny that globalization constitutes a
combination of powerful dynamics impacting – considerably – on the course of
history. This does mean, however, that we, as critical sociologists, need to explore
the degree to which there is sufficient empirical evidence to substantiate the key
claims made by alarmist accounts of globalization.
Paradoxically, the ‘globalization thesis’345 can be ideologically instrumentalized
from both sides of the political spectrum, as it appears to verify the interpretations
and predictions of both the New Right and the New Left. For the former, globaliza-
tion is a godsend that serves to reinforce the view that international competitiveness
can be sustained only by getting rid of Keynesian imperatives of state intervention-
ism based on ‘welfarist’ agendas and, hence, by introducing monetarist policies of
liberalization and privatization instead. For the latter, globalization is indicative not
only of the expansionist nature of the capitalist system but also of the deceptive
spirit underlying reformist and integrationist strategies, developed to sustain both
the legitimacy and the elasticity of the established order. In other words, one of the
ironies of our time is the fact that, for diametrically opposed reasons, both the New
Right and the New Left ‘can […] mutually celebrate the end of the Keynesian era’346
by referring to the multiple scenarios triggered by globalization.
It is worth mentioning that most sociologists who are, rightly or wrongly, asso-
ciated with postmodern thought consider globalization to be one of the central
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 129

processes shaping the contemporary world. Yet, it is vital to examine the extent
to which both the scope and the consequences of globalization have been overes-
timated – notably, by alarmist approaches to recent macrosocial transformations.
The following five dimensions are particularly important for developing a critical
account of globalization: (1) the contingency of globalization; (2) the ontology of
globalization; (3) the materiality of globalization; (4) the intensity of globaliza-
tion; and (5) the territoriality of globalization. The significance of each of these
dimensions shall be elucidated in subsequent sections.
(1) The contingency of globalization. The first critical comment concerns the
contingency of globalization. The open-ended nature of macro-social transforma-
tions undermines the validity of determinist accounts of globalization. The struc-
turalist assumption that globalization ‘embodies a teleology, or a predetermined
logic’,347 represents a fatalistic myth, ignoring the fact that ‘its course must be
resolved through the intervention of human agency’.348 Determinist perspectives
that portray globalization as a predestined phenomenon fail to account for the
relative autonomy of social processes. This autonomy is reflected, for instance,
in the influence of new social movements, many of which – by virtue of their
creative practices and critical discourses – challenge the legitimacy of hegemonic
forces and propose alternative models of globalization.349 Hence, globalization ‘is
neither a neutral process happening at a “global” level with the inevitable force
of gravity, nor is it merely about transnational corporations’.350 The development
of globalization is neither predetermined nor inevitable; rather, it emerges out of
a contingent process depending on the course of human agency.
(2) The ontology of globalization. The second critical observation relates to the
ontology of globalization. This point of reflection concerns the nature of globaliza-
tion, that is, the question of what globalization actually is. As explained above,
globalization constitutes a complex conglomerate of sociohistorical, economic,
political, cultural, demographic, military, and environmental transformations.
Despite its multifaceted nature, most sociological approaches to globalization
suggest that economic and technological forces are the motor of worldwide trans-
formations in the contemporary era. In this context, however, the scope of glo-
balization is often overestimated, since ‘the level of integration, interdependence,
and openness, of national economies in the present era is not unprecedented’.351
Far from representing a completely novel societal phenomenon, the expansion of
capitalism has always been driven by globalizing imperatives:

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoi-
sie over the whole surface of the globe, […] given a cosmopolitan character to
production and consumption in every country […] through its exploitation of
the world market.352

[…] it is the constant pressure on firms to grow in size and remain industry
leaders that provides the basic impulse, as well as the organizational capabili-
ties, to extend economic activity abroad through foreign production facilities
[…]; globalization is a continuous process of extending interdependent cross-border
linkages in production and exchange.353
130 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

In short, capitalism is inherently globalizing. To understand the ontology of

globalization requires uncovering the expansionist nature of capitalism.
(3) The materiality of globalization. The third criticism questions the alleged
immateriality of globalization, arguing that we need to account for its materiality,
that is, for the substantive constitution of both its causes and its consequences.
The growth of international financial capital and the accelerated dynamics of
financial transactions appear to have generated a disentanglement between the
monetary sphere and the productive sphere in advanced economies. The concept
of ‘casino capitalism’354 designates an economic system that is driven by the
deregulation and postindustrialization of international business.
Especially in light of the recent and ongoing global economic crisis and the
credit crunch,355 the gradual autonomization of financial capital is an economic
process whose historical significance can hardly be overestimated. ‘Since the
early 1970s, international banking has grown at about 20 per cent per year, con-
siderably faster than world output, trade, and FDI’.356 It is important to point
out, however, that this ‘monetary autonomy’ stems from real, rather than from
virtual or free-floating, capital accumulation. ‘A weighty part of monetary capi-
tal of the “casino capitalism” is not disentangled or autonomous at all, but it
continues to be the result of real capital accumulation.’357 The financial system
does not constitute an autopoietic system that is completely disconnected from
the constraints of material reality. The fancy rhetoric vis-à-vis the ‘intangibility’
and ‘omnipotence’ of financial capital lacks empirical substantiation and
fails to account not only for its entanglement with real capital accumulation
but also for its continuing dependence on governmental policies and state
interventions.358
As a historical reference, it should not be forgotten that the economic world
crisis of 1929 – the famous stock market crash of Black Friday – can be con-
sidered as a financial disaster with far-reaching consequences, at a time when
monetary capital did not enjoy the free-floating freedom of uncontrollable
mobility. One may come to the cynical conclusion that the disentanglement
between financial capital and productive capital derives from the unhelpful
separation between theoretical analysis and empirical investigation. In any case,
we must resist the temptation to employ the concepts of ‘casino capitalism’ and
‘cyber-capitalism’ if their usage prevents us from doing justice to the fact that
the most autonomous forms of financial capital remain embedded in materially
constituted social relations.
(4) The intensity of globalization. The fourth issue that needs to be critically
examined is the question of the intensity of globalization. This dimension is cru-
cial for at least three reasons. First, it represents the cornerstone of most theories
that conceive of globalization as a qualitatively new phenomenon (referential
relevance). Second, it has turned out to be one of the most controversial elements
discussed in recent and current debates on globalization (discursive relevance).
Third, it illustrates the discrepancy between theoretical and empirical studies of
globalization (explanatory relevance). For these three reasons, it is imperative to
reflect upon the question of the intensity of globalization in more detail.
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 131

When considering the distribution of trade and investment, it becomes clear

that both the novelty and the magnitude of global change have been overplayed
in exaggerated accounts of recent and ongoing worldwide transformations. It
is common to refer to the ratios of export, the rise of transnational companies
(TNCs), and the amount of foreign direct investments (FDIs) as indicators of
economic globalization. On closer examination of the empirical data, however,
it becomes evident that alarmist announcements concerning economic globaliza-
tion are premature and lack justification.
The first globalist overstatement concerns the ratios of export. Far from con-
verting global trade into the new raison d’être of production, ‘the ratios of export
trade to GDP were consistently higher in 1913 than they were in 1973. […]
OECD shares of exports in GDP (17.9 per cent) barely exceeded those estimated
for 1913 (16 per cent).’359 Even without this historical comparison, alarmist
accounts of the globalization of exports can hardly be empirically substanti-
ated: ‘In the main industrialized economies around 90 per cent of production is
still undertaken for the domestic market’.360 Hence, the current export rates are
far from unprecedented, and most of the production continues to be aimed at
domestic markets.
The second globalist exaggeration is due to an overestimation of the power
attributed to transnational companies (TNCs). These are frequently interpreted as
the protagonists of the internationalization of capital, particularly of allegedly
nomadic and hypermobile types of capital. Yet, in contrast to alarmist accounts
of globalization, ‘the number of genuine trans-national companies (TNCs) is
small; most major companies continue to operate from distinct national bases
and to wish to retain a distinct national identity, even though they trade in
world markets and locate a significant part of their operations abroad’.361 This is
not to deny the fact that TNCs occupy an influential position within the world
market system. This is to suggest, however, that we need to acknowledge that the
‘[e]xamination of realized globalization strategies […] has shown that there are,
as yet, very few transnational companies in Europe’.362 In short, the view that the
spectre of footloose companies haunts the world economy appears to be largely
unjustified, at least at this stage.

Especially important is the finding that most firms still concentrate their most
important value-adding activities at home, thus ensuring a strong contribution
to the nation’s standard of living. According to existing estimates, the extent of
value-added being produced at home is in the range of 70–75 per cent […].363

It appears, therefore, that the ‘footloose’ or ‘borderless’ constitution of transna-

tional companies is derived from the ‘footloose’ and ‘borderless’ rhetoric of hyper-
globalizers, rather than from the empirical study of reality.
The third globalist myth arises from a dubious interpretation of the influence
of TNCs: the ubiquitous global expansion of foreign direct investments (FDIs). The
temporal constitution (historicity), quantitative distribution (intensity), and geo-
graphical embeddedness (spatiality) of FDIs have to be critically examined.
132 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

• The historicity of FDIs: It is worth mentioning that even some of the most
extreme globalist accounts are prepared to concede that ‘[f]oreign direct invest-
ment is by no means a new phenomenon’.364 Indeed, ‘[i]t has been present
since the last century and has been a force behind much of the growth of the
international economy in this century as well.’365
• The intensity of FDIs: Considering the shifting constitution of world production
as a whole, FDIs did not reach the magnitude of 1913 until 1991.366 Between
1990 and 1993 the amount of FDIs even decreased, before increasing again
from 1994 onwards.367 The magnitude of FDIs remains relatively insignificant
even within the most developed economies.368
• The spatiality of FDIs: FDIs are, to a large extent, concentrated in the economic-
ally most developed countries:

Increasingly, capital flows became more concentrated within the

Triad between the three richest regions of the North: Japan and
the ‘four dragons’, Western Europe, and the United States. By the
end of the decade, more than 80 per cent of world’s foreign direct
investment originated from and went to the three regions of the
Triad.369

In the context of polarizing north–south divisions, world trade, production,

and investment remain highly concentrated in the OECD370 countries, lead-
ing to intra-regional, rather than inter-regional, trade patterns, which take place
within the hegemonic Triad. This suggests a disproportional concentration of for-
eign direct investment (FDI) in the national territories of economically highly
developed countries. In other words, the restructuration of international trade
and contemporary society is characterized by intra-regional concentration,
rather than by trans-national expansion.371

Far from being reducible to a recent phenomenon and far from having colon-
ized the entire planet, foreign direct investments already existed in the nineteenth
century, they constitute a relatively small part of advanced economies, and they
are geographically concentrated in the wealthiest regions of the world. To the
degree that the empirical study of foreign direct investments contradicts alarmist
accounts of globalization, their relative capacity to redefine the parameters of the
world economy needs to be put into perspective.372
(5) The territoriality of globalization. When analysing the substantial objec-
tions to, and inner contradictions of, alarmist versions of the globalization thesis,
there is a fifth dimension that has to be taken into consideration: the territoriality
of globalization. The issue arising in this context is the question of whether or
not globalization undermines the legitimacy of one of the most fundamental
institutions in modern society: the nation-state. The question of whether or not
contemporary societies can be characterized as post-sovereign realms, in which
the power of the nation-state has been drastically curtailed, is directly related to
the aforementioned disputes.
The most extreme globalist scenario can be described as follows: the uncontrol-
lable and omnipotent forces of globalization have created a post-sovereign world,
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 133

the emergence of which threatens both the autonomy and the legitimacy of the
nation-state. This alarmist view of globalization, however, seems unjustified given
that the political sovereignty of states has not been profoundly undermined.
Contrary to the popular rhetoric concerning the alleged ‘death of governance’,
states remain pivotal institutions in the international division of power for at
least three reasons: they can be conceived of as mediators, guarantors, and actors
of globalization.373
First, nation-states are mediators. They serve the function of mediating
between supra-national agencies and trade blocs, on the one hand, and domestic,
regional, and sub-national agencies of economic coordination and regulation, on
the other. Thus, the nation-state retains a pivotal role in the international divi-
sion of power. Far from having been completely eroded, let alone disappeared,
‘[a]cross most of the globe, nation-states are still maturing’,374 expressing a
‘crisis […] not of postmodernity but of insufficient modernity’.375 In this matur-
ing process, global transformations have not resulted in the elimination of the
nation-state; rather, they have created a situation in which both its constitution
and its key functions need to be reassessed. National immanence and interna-
tional transcendence can be interpreted as two mutually inclusive conditions
of the nation-state. The thesis that globalization tends to transform hitherto
strong states into weak ones cannot be empirically corroborated. On the con-
trary, strong states often facilitate structural transformation processes associated
with globalization. When mediating between global pressures ‘from above’ and
local pressures ‘from below’, competitive states promote economic strategies
aimed at the internationalization of their domestically embedded corporations,
thereby contributing to globalization.376 Instead of being crushed by globalizing
forces, nation-states remain influential mediators in the international division
of power.
Second, nation-states are guarantors. The assumption that we are confronted
with an antagonism between transnational companies and nation-states over-
looks the fact that economic and political players are interdependent. The relation-
ship between transnational economic forces and national governments is built
upon an alliance of mutual protection, rather than mere competition, let alone
mutual exclusion. Most transnational companies regard the state not as an enemy
but as a guarantor of free market economies, that is, as an indispensable apparatus
providing security and stability for financial markets, free trade, and commer-
cial rights. Even the most deregulated market systems cannot exist without the
regulatory umbrella of the nation-state, which is equipped with the capacity to
make deregulation possible in the first place. Paradoxically, nation-states regulate
deregulation processes. ‘Companies may want free trade and common regimes of
trade standards, but they can only have them if states work together to achieve
common international regulation.’377 The nation-state fulfils the function of a
mediator between global and domestic interests, as well as the function of a guar-
antor of international and national standards, which are put in place to regulate
the environment in which companies operate.
Third, nation-states are actors. As such, they constitute facilitators, rather than
victims, of globalization processes. To portray contemporary states as purely
134 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

passive, reactive, adaptive, and self-sufficient entities – or, more dramatically, as

institutional victims of exogenous structural shifts – means to neglect the fact
that the ‘state itself has been a key agent in the implementation of global processes’.378
Capitalism has not escaped the radar of the state; on the contrary, the state has
been a constitutive, affirmative, and creative element in the very process of glo-
balization. It is no accident, then, that globalization and neoliberalization are two
processes that share one crucial paradox: while both involve the rigorous deregu-
lation of market systems and the apparent erosion of domestic actors’ influence,
both are shaped by the steering capacity of the nation-state.379 At first glance, it
may seem that nation-states have disempowered themselves. Processes of politic-
ally regulated economic deregulation, however, are inconceivable without the
pervasive power of nation-states. Far from being at the mercy of the profound
societal transformations taking place in the world, nation-states act as facilitators
and promoters of globalization.
The view that states can be conceived of as mediators, guarantors, and actors of
globalization appears to be confirmed by another observation: varieties of capi-
talism produce varieties of state strategies aimed at confronting globalization.380
Globalization has not eradicated national differences; rather, it has provoked
diverging domestic adjustment strategies. These differences manifest themselves
both between diverging regional traditions (notably between Anglo-American,
continental European, and East Asian models)381 and between diverging national
traditions (in Europe, for example, between Great Britain with a neo-liberal ‘spec-
tator state’, Germany with a neo-corporatist ‘facilitative state’, and France with a
neo-statist ‘developmental state’).382
Paradoxically, it was the potential demise, rather than the triumph, of state sov-
ereignty that has reinforced the centrality of statehood. The renewed emphasis on
territory is an expression of two seemingly contradictory processes: on a suprana-
tional level, nation-states seek to reconsolidate their power; on an intranational
level, a rising number of nation-states tend to break up due to the political pres-
sure emanating from neo-nationalist movements.383 Thus, contemporary macro-
societal transformations can be conceived of as a combination of globalizing and
localizing dynamics.
The term glocalization384 may be employed to describe a curious paradox under-
lying the radicalization, rather than the end, of modernity.385 ‘Integration and
parcelling out, globalization and territorialization, are mutually complementary pro-
cesses.’386 In other words, glocalization constitutes a paradoxical process based on
a combination of globalization and localization dynamics. It designates a societal
development characterized by the confluence of tension-laden processes – such as
deterritorialization and reterritorialization, internationalization and regionaliza-
tion, or standardization and diversification.
The slogan think globally and act locally387 lies at the heart of the attempt to com-
bine a cosmopolitan reflexivity with situated practices. This challenging endeav-
our is central to the normative agendas of numerous new social movements.388
Their ‘glocalist’ conception of reality draws attention to the fact that, while the
global consequences of societal transformations may appear incomprehensibly
 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? 135

abstract and anonymous, ‘the local traces of their journeys are painfully tangible
and real’.389 The social tendencies towards peripheralization and pauperization are
often obscured by reductive accounts of globalization, thereby painting a picture
that ‘leaves out or marginalizes two-thirds of the world’s population’.390
The creation of a ‘planetary consciousness’,391 demanded by new social move-
ments, reflects an emancipatory aspect of globalization. In fact, such a ‘planetary
consciousness’ is the first step towards confronting the complexities of our ‘plan-
etary reality’. The possibility of a globalization with a human face is inconceivable
without the emergence of a cosmopolitan consciousness capable of recognizing
both the responsibility and the dignity of human beings. Nonetheless, the con-
cept of globalization is often employed to refer to a situation of increasing existen-
tial uncertainty: it appears that human actors have lost their ontological security
and that, therefore, they need to redefine the parameters underlying their identity
and subjectivity in the face of its exposure to unsettling experiences of globality.
Collective action can be a way of mobilizing resources of solidarity, permit-
ting those involved in it to confront the feeling of existential insecurity. Human
empowerment, based on the collective energy of social movements, can challenge
mechanisms of disempowerment, generated by multiple forms of domination. To
be sure, human autonomy can be undermined, but never annihilated, by hegem-
onic systems of power: collective action can be an expression of resistance by indi-
viduals who seek to challenge the systemic domination of their subjectivity and
thereby assert both their sovereignty and their dignity. The era of globalization,
then, is a sociohistorical context in which both individual and collective actors
can take on the challenge of reconstituting themselves.
Individuals make sense of the world through the eyes of the communities to
which they belong. To the extent that globalization produces the feeling of dis-
orientation and disembeddedness, new social movements enable their members to
attribute meaning to the common experience of existential insecurity in a world
of uncertainty.392 Social integration derived from processes of collective action can
be a vehicle of opposition to processes of communal disintegration and gradual
individualization. Global mechanisms of domination provoke embodied practices
of local resistance: while capitalism is ‘increasingly organised on a global basis,
effective opposition to capitalist practices tends to be manifest locally’.393 The
polarized dynamic of glocalization both weakens and strengthens social actors: on
the one hand, it involves the disempowering loss of human autonomy; on the other
hand, it entails the empowering challenge of contributing to its reconstitution.
4
From Modern to Postmodern
Historiography? The ‘Contingent Turn’

This chapter examines the impact of postmodern thought on contemporary

debates in historiography. Its paradigmatic influence, as shall be illustrated in
subsequent sections, is reflected in what may be described as the contingent turn1
in historiography. Postmodern thinkers call the validity of what they consider to
be mainstream conceptions of historical development into question. Irreducible
to an issue of peripheral importance, the interpretation of history forms an inte-
gral, albeit contentious, element of the social sciences and, more broadly, of the
humanities. Its significance is expressed in the basic insight that social realities
are – always and unavoidably – historically situated. Put differently, every form of
sociality is embedded in a specific horizon of historicity.
The assumption that social practices take place in particular historical contexts
is fairly uncontroversial. It is far from evident, however, how to identify and
interpret both the theoretical and the practical implications arising from the
spatiotemporal situatedness of human agency. In light of the postmodern empha-
sis on contextual contingency, there is no such thing as an underlying storyline
that determines the course of history. On this view, history is a conglomerate of
largely accidental, relatively arbitrary, and randomly interconnected occurrences.
As shall be demonstrated in this chapter, the following three tensions are pivotal
to the analysis of the main differences between modern and postmodern accounts
of history: (i) necessity versus contingency, (ii) grand narratives versus small narratives,
and (iii) continuity versus discontinuity.

(i) Necessity versus Contingency

Far from representing a perspectival discrepancy that is unique to the controversy

over the differences between modern and postmodern conceptions of history, the
tension between necessity and contingency constitutes a conceptual dichotomy
that has been a matter of debate in Western intellectual thought for a long time.
Thus, rather than describing a novel theoretical problem that has emerged out of
the various discussions regarding the differences between modern and postmod-
ern approaches in the social sciences, enquiries into the historical constitution of
society are as old as philosophical disputes concerning the very nature of human

136
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 137

existence. Indeed, the elaboration of a critical account of social reality is doomed

to failure if it is not informed by contextualizing reflections on the omnipresent
power of historicity. It is nevertheless worth noting that the question of the key
presuppositional differences between modern and postmodern approaches in the
social sciences has polarized the debates on the nature, development, and study
of history to a significant extent.
The divergence between modern and postmodern accounts of history manifests
itself – with striking clarity – in the antinomy between the concept of necessity and
the concept of contingency. The former is crucial to the modern desire to uncover
the underlying driving forces that determine the teleological course of history. The
latter, by contrast, is central to the postmodern commitment to facing up to the
directionless development of history. ‘The residents of the house of modernity had
been continuously trained to feel at home under conditions of necessity and to
feel unhappy at the face of contingency.’2 Inspired by the Enlightenment search for
meaning and direction, modern social theorists tend to conceive of ‘necessity’ as
a constitutive component of historical developments. Suspicious of the concep-
tual imposition of logical categories upon a fundamentally messy – and, in many
ways, illogical – reality, postmodern social theorists consider ‘contingency’ as an
ineluctable characteristic of historical processes. The existence of ‘historical neces-
sity’, in the modern sense, may be seen as indicative of the relative predictability
of social evolution. The existence of ‘historical contingency’, in the postmodern
sense, may be interpreted as symptomatic of the radical openness of spatiotempor-
ally diversified dynamics of unfolding. In essence, postmodern thought rejects
the – presumably modern – idea that ‘necessity’ constitutes a universal condi-
tion of human history. Instead, it embraces the notion – implicitly or explicitly
influenced by Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics, especially with respect to his
insistence upon the temporality permeating all forms of being3 – that ‘contin-
gency’ permeates the radical indeterminacy of the infinite ways in which humans
are thrown into, and act upon, the world. From a modern standpoint, necessity
is necessary. From a postmodern perspective, on the other hand, necessity is
unnecessary.
In modern intellectual thought, the view that the course of history is deter-
mined by necessity is founded on five central assumptions:

a. historical developments are products of underlying laws and, at least in terms

of large-scale and long-term trends, inevitable (historical lawfulness);
b. historical developments are structurally determined and, to a considerable
extent, predictable (historical predictability);
c. historical developments follow an evolutionary logic and are, in this sense,
inherently progressive (historical linearity);
d. historical developments are teleologically oriented and, therefore, directional
(historical teleology); and
e. historical developments, insofar as they are driven by the implicit rationality
of context-transcending patterns, can be global in scope and, thus, may have
universal significance for human evolution (historical universality).
138 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

In short, according to modern parameters, history constitutes a structured and

structuring horizon of unavoidable, predictable, progressive, directional, and uni-
versal developments.
The point of this chapter is not to prove that it would be analytically inappro-
priate to suggest that the whole of modern intellectual thought can be identified
with, or indeed reduced to, such a determinist reading of history.4 Rather, the
point is to emphasize that postmodern approaches define themselves in opposi-
tion to this determinist – and, presumably, modern – understanding of historical
development.
In postmodern thought, then, the view that history is shaped by contingency is
based on five main assumptions:

a. historical developments are intrinsically ephemeral and always relatively arbi-

trary (historical lawlessness);
b. historical developments are open and, hence, largely unpredictable (historical
unpredictability);
c. historical developments are neither progressive nor regressive, but rather cha-
otic, irregular, and incoherent (historical nonlinearity);
d. historical developments are not subject to a conscious or unconscious all-
encompassing purpose and, in this sense, are not aimed at fulfilling the
mission of bringing humanity gradually closer to an overarching or transcen-
dental goal (historical directionlessness); and
e. historical developments are composed of a plurality of irreducible and context-
dependent realities (historical particularity).

In brief, according to postmodern parameters, history can be interpreted as an

open horizon of arbitrary, unpredictable, chaotic, directionless, and irreducible
developments.
In light of the above account, the key presuppositional differences between
modern and postmodern conceptions of history manifest themselves in the fol-
lowing conceptual oppositions: (a) lawfulness versus lawlessness, (b) predictability
versus unpredictability, (c) linearity versus nonlinearity, (d) teleology versus direction-
lessness, and (e) universality versus particularity.
From a postmodern perspective, the lone historical ingredient of which we
can be certain is permanent uncertainty, the one historical reality about which
we can make predictions is the presence of constant unpredictability, the sole lin-
early emerging historical phenomenon is nonlinearity, the single transcendental
historical direction is directionlessness, and the only universal historical feature is
the preponderance of particularity. Consequently, if there is one socio-ontological
determinacy of which we can be sure, it is the radical indeterminacy of historical
developments.
Broadly speaking, postmodern accounts of history can be defended on two
analytical levels: on the philosophical level, one may argue that the aforemen-
tioned features characterize the very nature of history; on the sociological level,
one may contend that, in the contemporary context, it is the experience of the
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 139

postmodern condition that reveals the indeterminate constitution of history. To

accept the shift from the modern obsession with ‘necessity’ to the postmodern
concern with ‘contingency’ requires acknowledging that all that is solid melts
into air: postmodern thought invites us to face up to the radical indeterminacy of
the human condition.5
The normative significance of this understanding is crucial not only with respect
to the interpretation of the past but also in relation to the analysis of the present. A
‘feeling of anxiety, out-of-placeness, loss of direction […] constitutes the true refer-
ent of the concept of “postmodernity”’.6 The sensation of existential Angst, how-
ever, is not necessarily perceived as a negative, threatening, or even self-destructive
element of the present condition. Rather, it is considered as a promising opportu-
nity to incorporate the critical awareness of both individual and social forms of
uncertainty into contemporary discourses reflecting on the future of humanity.
From a postmodern standpoint, then, we need to overcome the illusions emanat-
ing from the paradigm of necessity by taking on the challenges arising from the
critical engagement with the condition of contingency. This, of course, presup-
poses that we are willing to step out of the ideological comfort zones designed
by Enlightenment thought: notably, the aforementioned quest for (a) certainty,
(b) control, (c) progress, (d) purpose, and (e) generalizability, as expressed in its
mechanistic conceptions of history, which are sustained by the determinist belief
in (a) lawfulness, (b) predictability, (c) linearity, (d) teleology, and (e) universality.
The historico-empirical implications of the above position could hardly be
more far-reaching. From a postmodern perspective, the collective experiences of
political totalitarianism in the twentieth century can be regarded as integral com-
ponents – rather than as failures of, let alone as deviations from – modernity. In
fact, the analysis of the spread of political totalitarianism in the twentieth century
corroborates the suspicion that the deceptive assurances of modernity are based
on the core ingredients of the Enlightenment menu: the obstinate pursuit of cer-
tainty, control, progress, purpose, and ‘the general will’ in the name of humanity,
or at least in the name of parts of humanity – irrespective of whether these prin-
ciples are justified on social, political, economic, geographical, cultural, ethnic,
‘racial’, sexual, religious, or ideological grounds.
‘Great crimes often start from great ideas.’7 Totalitarianism, in this sense, is
naked modernity.8 The chronic ideologism of modernity is inscribed in the dark-
est experiences of the twentieth century. The tendency to generate pathological
forms of social enclosure9 – based on determinist imperatives, such as lawfulness,
predictability, linearity, teleology, and universality – manifests itself in the numerous
barbarisms of modern history. Hence, from a postmodern stance, the only liber-
ating response to the self-imposed necessities of modernity is the preparedness
to confront the condition of radical contingency. We could make ‘an attempt at
transforming our contingency into our destiny’.10 In order for this to happen,
‘postmodernity in itself’ would have to be converted into ‘postmodernity for
itself’, that is, contingency as an objective and ineluctable reality would have to
be treated as the precondition for the creation of a self-critical and open society,
freed from the illusory belief in the guarantees of history.
140 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(ii) Grand Narratives versus Small Narratives

The opposition to grand narratives – or, as they are often described, metanarratives –
is a constitutive feature of postmodern thought. If postmodern thinkers subscribe
to any kind of narrative, it is the assertion that we should abandon the creation of
grand narratives, aimed at offering universal solutions on a global scale, and endorse
small narratives, informed by a sensibility to particular issues arising within local
contexts. The hostility towards metanarratives is a normative cornerstone of post-
modern approaches to history.11 Yet, what exactly is a metanarrative?
A metanarrative is a set of more or less logically interconnected assumptions made in
order to provide a coherent and comprehensive account of the underlying mechanisms
that shape, or are supposed to shape, both the constitution and the development of
human existence in a fundamental way. Given the variety of all-embracing explana-
tory frameworks that have been developed over the past few centuries, there are
multiple – that is, diverging and competing, but also, to some extent, overlapping –
metanarratives in modern intellectual thought. Inevitably, every typology of meta-
narratives is contentious. Nonetheless, from a historical point of view, five types
of metanarrative are particularly influential:

a. political metanarratives (such as anarchism, communism, socialism, liberalism,

conservatism, and fascism);
b. philosophical metanarratives (which are frequently conceived of in terms of
diametrically opposed epistemic frameworks – such as idealism versus materi-
alism, constructivism versus realism, interpretivism versus positivism, subject-
ivism versus objectivism, relativism versus absolutism, particularism versus
universalism, utilitarianism versus deontologism, contextualism versus foun-
dationalism, or voluntarism versus determinism);
c. religious metanarratives (for instance, faith-based interpretations of history
within Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism);
d. economic metanarratives (which are commonly conceptualized in terms of diametric-
ally opposed economic models – notably capitalism versus socialism, monetarism
versus fiscalism, or laissez-faire liberalism versus Keynesian interventionism); and
e. cultural metanarratives (as illustrated in the anthropological classification of
human life forms in terms of definitional antinomies such as ‘premodern’ ver-
sus ‘modern’, ‘primitive’ versus ‘complex’, ‘undeveloped’ versus ‘developed’,
‘tight’ versus ‘loose’, ‘horizontally structured’ versus ‘vertically structured’,
‘control-based’ versus ‘freedom-based’, or ‘collectivist’ versus ‘individualist’).

A metanarrative possesses both a projective and a substantive dimension: as an

ideological force, it can be endorsed in order to support the belief in a predeter-
mined civilizational development; as an empirical reality, it constitutes a driving
force of a predefined historical storyline. The distinction between ‘the projective
level’ and ‘the substantive level’ of metanarratives is significant in the following
sense: a metanarrative ‘in itself’ needs to be transformed into a metanarrative
‘for itself’, in order for both its projective and its substantive elements to have an
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 141

impact upon the course of history. Given the confluence of subjective and object-
ive components permeating human existence, the invention of metanarratives is
intimately interrelated with the idea of a ‘historical subject’.
A historical subject – regardless of whether it is conceived of as an individual
force or as a collective force – is the epitome of a metanarrative. It embodies not
only the substantive and objective features, but also the projective and subjective
resources necessary for both the theoretical and the practical construction of a
teleological storyline. It is, however, not only an individual or a collective carrier,
but also a discursive and purposive producer of a particular metanarrative, repre-
senting its socio-specific interests and its corresponding view of the world. Hence,
a metanarrative needs to be discursively and purposively embraced by a historical
subject in order to obtain the necessary symbolic and material power capable of
significantly shaping historical development in one way or another. The impact of
a metanarrative hinges upon its capacity to transform an individual or a collective
subject into an actual or an imaginary driving force of a given society, or at least of
a specific historical period in the development of that society. A subject converts
itself into a metanarrative by discovering its – real or imagined – potentiality as a
historically powerful source of human agency. History needs to take place before it
can be written. Only through both its conscious praxis in history and its practical
consciousness of history can a subject assert itself as a proper metanarrative, that
is, as a forceful source of human agency that exists both ‘in itself’ and ‘for itself’. A
metanarrative, understood as both a projective and a substantive force, constitutes
a precondition for the creation of a historical subject.
The idea of a metanarrative, which is both pursued by and epitomized in an
individual or a collective subject, claims legitimacy by seeking to leave its imprint
on the course of history. Following this logic, a key theoretical challenge consists in
uncovering the underlying potential of preponderant historical forces, while a cen-
tral practical challenge resides in realizing this underlying potential with the aim of
mobilizing the cognitive resources of human consciousness in order to overcome the
illusion of arbitrariness by insisting upon the empowering potential of critical self-
awareness. In light of the aforementioned typology of metanarratives, it should be
obvious that different relators invent different stories. Among the most influential
metanarratives are the following: ‘the Christian religious story of God’s will being
worked out on Earth, the Marxist political story of class conflict and revolution,
and the Enlightenment’s intellectual story of rational progress’.12 Although these
grand stories vary in terms of their chosen protagonists, their global mission, and
their conception of humanity, they share a rather rigid conception of history: his-
tory constitutes a structured and structuring horizon of unavoidable, predictable,
progressive, directional, and universal developments. In short, metanarratives are
based on the idea that history is a teleological process. In this sense, diverging met-
anarratives are united by their ambition to tell a ‘big story’.
Intellectual frameworks oriented towards the construction of metanarratives
privilege necessity over contingency and leave little, if any, room for historical
indeterminacy. In fact, the belief in indeterminacy undermines the very existence
of metanarratives. A metanarrative founded on the recognition of ontological
142 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

indeterminacy – and, hence, characterized by the preoccupation with uncertainty

and ambiguity – would be a contradiction in terms, as it would delegitimize its
search for existential determinacy, inspired by the quest for control, clarity, and
security. One may go as far as to affirm that metanarratives and contingency are
incompatible: the splendour of metanarratives is the mutilation of contingency,
just as the splendour of contingency is the mutilation of metanarratives. From a
postmodern perspective, it is the inescapable presence of contingency that under-
mines the deceptive pursuit of metanarratives.
To the extent that history is regarded as a structured and structuring horizon
of unavoidable, predictable, progressive, directional, and universal developments,
macronarratives embody the ubiquity of ontological determinacy. By contrast, to the
extent that history is interpreted as an open horizon of arbitrary, unpredictable,
chaotic, directionless, and irreducible developments, micronarratives epitomize
the inescapable preponderance of our real and representational indeterminacy. The
conditions of determinacy and indeterminacy can exist only against, rather than
with, each other. Indeed, the suspicion towards the modern quest for different
forms of determinacy – expressed in the radical critique of the invention of politi-
cal, philosophical, religious, economic, and cultural metanarratives – is essential
to the condition of postmodernity. If there is one postmodern metanarrative, it is
the conviction that we should be distrustful of metanarratives.
As famously announced by Lyotard, the ‘postmodern spirit’ is defined by ‘incre-
dulity toward metanarratives’.13 The idea is not, however, to replace the modern
order, in which metanarratives prevail in a discursive landscape of big-picture
ideologies, with a postmodern vacuum, in which the only viable alternative is
moral and political nihilism. If the postmodern condition has one defining fea-
ture, it is its vollkommene Unvollkommenheit, that is, its complete incompleteness.
Metaphorically speaking, the condition of postmodernity is tantamount to an
open sea sailed by an infinite number of boats and explored by inquisitive and
broad-minded navigators. These boats sometimes cross each other, sometimes col-
lide, sometimes even sink, but they coexist. The coexistence of multiple vessels
floating on the sea, then, is what makes up the picture of the postmodern condi-
tion, that is, of a sociohistorical set of circumstances characterized by complete
incompleteness. The open sea, with its horizon of projective infinity, represents
the sole metanarrative of the postmodern condition. The multiplicity of journeys,
with their exploration of existential diversity, is an illustration of the plurality of
postmodern micronarratives.
The conviction that we should be distrustful of metanarratives is embedded in
a doubtful attitude towards the quest for completeness. Yet, incompleteness is
not equivalent to nothingness. To follow the postmodern agenda by translating
radical contingency into our destiny requires facing up to the limitless amount
of autonomous storylines, none of which can claim to possess a monopoly of
ultimate insights into the tripartite understanding of the objective, normative,
and subjective realms of human existence. If narratives are to survive in the era of
postmodernity, then we need to explore the plurality of locally anchored, context-
sensitive, and self-critical storylines and, thus, give up the belief in the pompous
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 143

and pretentious universality of metanarratives. The quest for macrohistorical

projects has little currency in an age of microprojective engagements. Within
the historical formation of postmodernity, there is no such thing as a universal
macrosubject; rather, in the contemporary social landscape, we are surrounded by
various – coexisting and competing – microactors.14 In other words, the modern
utopia of the grand story appears to have lost all legitimacy in the face of the
postmodern attentiveness to, and playful celebration of, small stories.

(iii) Continuity versus Discontinuity

A crucial source of tension between modern and postmodern interpretations of

history is the question of whether the contemporary era can be described as ‘an
age of modernity’, as ‘an age of late modernity’, or even as ‘an age of postmodernity’.
Put differently, the challenge consists in examining whether the current epoch is
characterized, first and foremost, by continuity or by discontinuity in relation to the
modern age. Regarding this question, we can distinguish three possible scenarios.
(a) Modernity is still with us; yet, we have entered an age of late, second, or radical-
ized modernity.15 (b) Modernity has ceased to exist; we have moved into a distinctive
era, an age of postmodernity.16 (c) Modernity has partly ceased, and partly continues,
to exist; we now live in an age of postmodern modernity or modern postmodernity.17
The first standpoint emphasizes the continuity of the present age with the mod-
ern era. The second interpretation stresses the discontinuity of the current epoch
with the modern period. And the third account points at the coexistence of mod-
ern and postmodern elements in the contemporary context. A postmodern angle
can be identified either with the second or with the third scenario. The discrepancy
between modern and postmodern conceptions of the present is rooted in the ten-
sion between the first view, on the one hand, and the second and the third views,
on the other. It is striking, however, that most thinkers associated with, or explic-
itly defending, postmodern forms of social analysis tend to subscribe to the third
contention, emphasizing that the contemporary age is marked by the profound
ambivalence between its modern and its postmodern features.18
According to this third approach, ‘postmodernity is both internal to and inimi-
cal to modernity […], there is both a change and a continuity – and hence a series
of tensions – between the modern and the postmodern’.19 Just as every epoch
arises in the lap of the hitherto-been (im Schoße des Bisherdagewesenen), so does
postmodernity emerge within, rather than outside, the horizon of modernity.
Far from being ‘separated by an Iron Curtain or Chinese Wall’,20 modernity and
postmodernity are interconnected: their historical link is characterized by the co-
presence of aspects of continuity and signs of discontinuity.
One of the most noteworthy features of postmodernity, therefore, emanates
from the fact that, paradoxically, it is located both within and outside the horizon
of its historical predecessor, modernity.
This twofold condition, however, is not necessarily a sign of postmodernity’s
failure to consolidate itself as a genuine societal reality; rather, it may point to the
fact that postmodernity constitutes a normative challenge as much as a historical
144 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

opportunity. Indeed, following postmodern parameters, ambiguity can be con-

ceived of as a source of, rather than as an obstacle to, human empowerment:

Modernity is still with us. […] Postmodernity does not necessarily mean the
end, the discreditation or the rejection of modernity. […] Postmodernity is
modernity coming of age: modernity looking at itself at a distance rather than from
inside. […] Postmodernity is modernity coming to terms with its own impos-
sibility; a self-monitoring modernity, one that consciously discards what it was
once unconsciously doing.21

The analysis of the relationship between modernity and postmodernity is far

from straightforward. In light of the above reflections, it appears that, rather than
representing two separate eras, the condition of modernity and the condition of
postmodernity are two interpenetrating historical stages. On this account, the
current epoch is characterized by the reciprocity of two coexisting and overlap-
ping historical conditions. In this sense, the present age may be defined as an era
of both postmodernity and postmodernity. As postmodernity, its feet stand on the
ground of the modern condition. As postmodernity, its head is directed towards,
and already partly surrounded by, the postmodern condition.
In a metaphorical sense, one may suggest that the postmodern condition feeds
itself with modern humus, for its roots lie in the historical circumstances of the
recent past. At the same time, it inhales postmodern oxygen, for it is surrounded
by the atmosphere of a newly emerging period. As its leaves fall on the ground,
the postmodern condition will gradually grow out of the modern condition
and replace the modern past with a postmodern future. Put differently, the child
called modernity is in the process of becoming an adult capable of facing up to the
condition of postmodernity: ‘The postmodern condition can be therefore described,
on the one hand, as modernity emancipated from false consciousness; on the other,
as a new type of social condition.’22
Following this understanding, postmodernity represents both a conceptual and
an empirical condition: as a conceptual condition, it is aware of its own existence
and seeks to liberate itself from modern forms of ideological self-deception; as an
empirical condition, it stands for the consolidation of an unprecedented social
order. On the discursive level, the modern pursuit of measurability (expressed in
normative ideals of ‘universality’, ‘uniformity’, ‘identity’, ‘necessity’, and ‘clarity’)
is challenged by the postmodern sensibility towards incommensurability (articu-
lated in a critical exploration of ‘particularity’, ‘diversity’, ‘difference’, ‘contin-
gency’, and ‘ambiguity’). On the substantive level, the imposition of the modern
logic underlying rationalizing mechanisms (such as ‘generalization’, ‘unification’,
‘harmonization’, ‘totalization’, and ‘centralization’) is undermined by the post-
modern openness towards differentiating processes (such as ‘particularization’, ‘frag-
mentation’, ‘diversification’, ‘pluralization’, and ‘decentralization’). The awareness
of these conceptual and empirical limitations, which are intrinsic to the project of
modernity, forms the normative basis underpinning the postmodern condition. It
appears, then, that ‘modernity for itself’23 is ‘postmodernity in itself’.24 In other words,
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 145

postmodernity is characterized by the simultaneous continuation and transforma-

tion of modernity. The interpenetration of modernity and postmodernity poses a
key challenge to the critical interpretation of the contemporary age.

Summary

As illustrated in this chapter, the attempt to shed light on the impact of post-
modern thought on recent debates in historiography is far from straightforward.
Arguably, contemporary understandings of history have been profoundly influ-
enced by what may be described as the contingent turn in historiography. In view of
the postmodern emphasis on spatiotemporal contingency, the scientific ambition
to uncover an underlying storyline that determines the course of history appears
to be in vain. According to modern parameters, history constitutes a structured
and structuring horizon of unavoidable, predictable, progressive, directional, and uni-
versal developments. According to postmodern parameters, by contrast, history
can be interpreted as an open horizon of arbitrary, unpredictable, chaotic, direction-
less, and irreducible developments. As demonstrated in the previous sections, three
tensions play a pivotal role in the analysis of the principal differences between
modern and postmodern approaches to history: (i) necessity versus contingency,
(ii) grand narratives versus small narratives, and (iii) continuity versus discontinuity.

I. Postmodern approaches to history propose to abandon the obsession with

necessity in favour of a far more modest concern with contingency.
II. Postmodern approaches to history seek to discard the dogmatic preoccupa-
tion with grand narratives and instead advocate a critical engagement with
small narratives.
III. Postmodern approaches to history aim to give up any illusions about the
preponderance of continuity by facing up to the unavoidable presence of
discontinuity.

Confronted with the socio-ontological significance of these conceptual antino-

mies, postmodern theorists insist upon the fact that all modes of sociality are
embedded in irreducible horizons of historicity, whose spatiotemporal specificity
and multifaceted complexity escape the totalizing logic of modern rationalities.

Towards a New Historiography?

Undoubtedly, the aforementioned antinomies – that is, necessity versus contingency,

grand narratives versus small narratives, and continuity versus discontinuity – are cen-
tral to the critical analysis of the key presuppositional differences that separate
modern and postmodern approaches to history. It is important to recognize,
however, that various additional dimensions should be taken into consideration
when trying to make sense of the noteworthy points of divergence between mod-
ern and postmodern conceptions of historical development. Of course, the very
distinction between modern and postmodern accounts of history is controversial,
146 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

not only because there is a substantial amount of overlap between their sets of
underlying assumptions, but also because barely any historians explicitly sub-
scribe either to ‘modern’ or to ‘postmodern’ parameters in their attempts to elabor-
ate explanatory or interpretive frameworks. Yet, despite this difficulty in drawing
clear-cut distinctions with the aim of achieving a more fine-grained understand-
ing of recent and current trends in historiography, it is both possible and sensible
to differentiate between modern and postmodern approaches to history by reflect-
ing on the following conceptual antinomies.
(1) ‘Objective’ versus ‘normative’: Modern approaches to history seek to be
‘objective’, in the sense that they are meant to give factually accurate accounts of past
events. As such, they are supposed to be evidence-based and offer reliable descriptions of
previous occurrences. Postmodern approaches to history, by contrast, contend that
‘the notion of objective reconstruction according to the evidence is just a myth’,25 since all
‘meaning is generated by socially encoded and constructed discursive practices that medi-
ate reality so much that they effectively close off direct access to it’.26 On this reading,
it is not only undesirable but also futile to believe in the possibility of developing
impartial, neutral, or disinterested reports of past happenings. For every description
of the world (Weltbeschreibung) is impregnated with a particular view of the world
(Weltanschauung) articulated from a specific position in the world (Weltsituiertheit).
From a modern perspective, historiography should embrace the ideal of ‘objectivity’
by delivering truthful accounts of historical facts. From a postmodern standpoint, on
the other hand, historiography needs to face up to the omnipresence of ‘normativ-
ity’ by accepting that all narratives are ‘merely relative to the theoretical presuppositions
which constitute them, and to the interpretations which are made of them’.27
(2) ‘Found’ versus ‘invented’: Modern approaches to history seek to substanti-
ate their narratives on the basis of ‘findings’, in the sense that they aim to draw up
reports of past happenings that are not only factually accurate but also scientifically
verifiable. As such, they are motivated by the conviction that it is entirely possi-
ble to ‘tell true stories about the past’,28 insofar as ‘[t]he “real” can be said to exist
independently of our representations of it, and to affect these representations’.29 By
contrast, in a pragmatist-constructivist fashion, postmodern approaches to history
insist that truth is ‘more invented than found’,30 and that, more significantly, ‘there
are no criteria of truth in historical narratives’.31 Indeed, if ‘historical narratives’32 are
‘verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much invented as found and the forms of
which have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have
with those in the sciences’,33 and if, accordingly, history ‘is not discovered by the his-
torian’34 but ‘constructed by him’35 or her, then historiography is, first and foremost,
an imaginative matter of storytelling projected upon, rather than an uncovering
endeavour of scientific objectivity established in line with, reality.
(3) ‘Factual’ versus ‘fictional’: The leitmotif of modern approaches to history
is the firm belief in the existence, and potential impact, of past occurrences.
On this account, the whole point of historical research is to provide ‘objective’
descriptions of spatiotemporally situated ‘findings’ by embarking on the study
of historical ‘facts’. ‘The basic idea of postmodern theory of historiography’, on
the other hand, ‘is the denial that historical writing refers to an actual historical
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 147

past’.36 According to this conception, history constitutes ‘just another narrative,

whose paradigm structures [are] no better than fictional’.37 Hence, following the
postmodern view of historiography, ‘causal constructions and explanations are
essentially put together in the way that fictional narratives are’,38 that is, ‘histori-
cal narratives’ are ‘verbal fictions’,39 implying that – by definition – ‘[a]ll history
books tell you a story’.40 To put it more radically, postmodern historians – fol-
lowing Roland Barthes41 – deny that there is ‘any distinction between truth and
fiction’42 by asserting that history is ‘essentially a form of literature’.43 Regardless
of whether or not it is appropriate to characterize historiography as inspired by
fictional facts and by factual fiction, postmodern approaches to history reject the
notion that there is such a thing as an objective, truthful, and exhaustive account
of worldly – let alone extra-worldly – happenings.
(4) ‘Representational’ versus ‘perspectival’: Modern approaches to history
seek to be ‘representational’ – or, to be precise, ‘representationally accurate’ –, in
the sense that they are meant to provide homological accounts of past events. As
such, they are – deliberately or inadvertently – motivated by correspondence theories
of truth, according to which it is both possible and desirable to generate knowledge
that mirrors reality ‘out there’.44 Postmodern approaches to history, by contrast,
maintain that all knowledge produced about the hitherto-been is unavoidably
‘perspectival’ – or, to be exact, ‘perspective-laden’ –, in the sense that epistemi-
cally organized texts are inevitably generated from a particular point of view and
articulated within a spatiotemporally defined place in the world. According to this
interpretation, ‘[a]n exact correspondence between narrative and “the past” is not
possible’.45 For when we ‘describe the “same” event in many different ways, our
access to the evidence is always mediated, nothing is simply transparent, and there
are always absences and gaps and biases to be dealt with’.46 Thus, postmodernists
consider the ‘distinction between theory (social and historical) and social reality
(present or past)’47 to be misleading insofar as reality – while it is, to a large degree,
‘symbolically constructed’48 – cannot be adequately represented. Insisting upon
the normative, inventive, fictional, and perspectival dimensions permeating all
epistemic claims to validity, postmodernists accuse traditional historians of effect-
ively endorsing ‘a correspondence theory of truth holding that history portrays
people who really existed and actions that really took place’.49 From a postmodern
stance, however, it is far from clear whether or not that what historians assume to
have occurred has ever existed in the first place, since it may have been fabricated
by virtue of creative language games.
(5) ‘Social’ versus ‘cultural’: Modern approaches to history, particularly those
inspired by the social sciences, tend to focus on ‘the social’, in the sense that they
examine historical developments in terms of relational – notably societal – patterns.
Hence, they presuppose the existence of different – especially ‘national’ – ‘societies’,
which serve as an investigative reference point for the study of spatiotemporal
processes shaping the evolution of human life forms. Postmodern approaches
to history, which are heavily influenced by intellectual developments in cultural
studies, stress the socio-ontological significance of ‘the cultural’, in the sense that they
explore historical developments in terms of discursive and behavioural variations.
148 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

On this account, cultural specificity is symptomatic of the profound spatiotemporal

contingency pervading all forms of sociality. To the extent, then, that ‘[c]ulture
slowly replaced society as the key organizing concept for the historian’s material’,50
the rise of postmodern historiography reflects the impact of the ‘cultural turn’ on
paradigmatic sets of assumptions underlying considerable parts of contempor-
ary social-scientific enquiries. One may draw attention to several dimensions in
order to illustrate the socio-ontological preponderance of ‘the cultural’ in, liter-
ally, all human life forms: the inadequacy of language as a means of representation
(Ferdinand de Saussure,51 Roland Barthes,52 and Jacques Derrida53); the inevitability
of prejudice (Peter Novick);54 the nature of historical composition (Hayden White55
and Keith Jenkins56); the relevance of social and cultural context (Michel Foucault);57
and the inevitability of interpretation (Roland Barthes58 and Douglas Kellner59).60
(6) ‘Real’ versus ‘textual’: Modern approaches to history are concerned with
the study of ‘the real’, in the sense that they insist that there is a physically estab-
lished reality ‘out there’. According to this position, reality exists, just as existence
is real. The whole point of historiographical investigation, on this view, is to shed
light on, and engage with, the empirically constituted elements of spatiotempor-
ally situated actualities. Postmodern approaches to history, by contrast, place the
emphasis on the pivotal role of ‘the textual’, in the sense that they argue that both
the methodical examination and the very constitution of social constellations are
symbolically mediated. Given that neither as researchers of social life nor as par-
ticipants within social life can we escape the symbolically mediated constitution of
human reality, we need to face up to the fact that, both as scientific experts and as
ordinary people, we do not have direct access to the world. To put it in Derridean
terms, ‘[i]l n’y a pas de hors-texte’61 (‘there is no outside-text’, or ‘there is nothing
outside the text’, or ‘there is no outside to the text’). In other words, reality is
essentially textual. Historiography is a scholarly expression of organized textuality
based on the enquiry into symbolically mediated and symbolically transmitted
historicity. Postmodern historians, therefore, seek to contribute to a ‘better under-
standing of the rhetorical element in history’62 and thereby draw attention to the
ineluctable ‘dialectic between language and reality’.63 In brief, historians, when
interpreting history and producing historiography, cannot escape the preponder-
ance of ‘the textual’ over ‘the real’.
(7) ‘Explanatory’ versus ‘interpretive’: Modern approaches to history are
guided by the paradigm of ‘explanation’ (Erklärung or Begründung) in the sense
that they aim to shed light on underlying causal mechanisms that not only shape,
or even determine, the course of history, but also escape people’s common-sense
grasp of spatiotemporally evolving realities. Conversely, postmodern approaches
to history are guided by the paradigm of ‘interpretation’ (Deutung or Auslegung),
in the sense that they insist that both their object of study – history – and their
subject of study – historiography – constitute symbolically mediated processes, which
are imbued with culturally specific practices and presuppositions. The distinctive
significance of the opposition between these two paradigms is reflected in the fact
that it has taken on the function of a central discursive reference point in the liter-
ature on recent conceptual and methodological developments in historiography.
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 149

Modern accounts of history tend to be associated with the paradigm of ‘explana-

tion’. This can be elucidated by reference to various investigative levels:

a. the search for ‘an explanatory mechanism’,64 which – at least from a Darwinian
point of view – may oblige us to draw an analogy between natural evolution and
social development, that is, between environmental selection processes and the
constant transformation of human life forms (evolutionism);
b. the attempt to provide ‘long-term explanations’,65 which are not only capable
of identifying historical tendencies that ‘engulf the globe’66 but also – in their
most ambitious versions – aimed at unmasking ‘a single driving force or motor of
historical evolution’67 (monism);
c. the conviction that, essentially, ‘the subject matter of history, its data, and the
problem it deals with’68 concern the objective ‘explanation of change over time’69
(objectivism);
d. the concession that ‘explanations of change over time’70 need to account for ‘com-
plex interactions of material conditions, culture, ideology and power’,71 as well
as the persuasion that ‘[a]rguments about history “are not finally epistemologi-
cal, but empirical, involving disputes about the contents of knowledge, about
evidence and its significance”’72 (empiricism);
e. the effort to defend ‘a metanarrative or totalizing account […] to explain the entire
course of modern history’,73 epitomized in ‘[t]he belief[,] central to social science
history, that “a coherent scientific explanation of change in the past” is possible’74
and that, furthermore, only such an exploratory undertaking permits us to
uncover ‘causal agents of change’, notably hidden and ‘impersonal forces’75
(universalism).

Admittedly, the modern ambition to develop an ‘all-embracing scientific explana-

tion of historical change’76 does not have to be motivated by ‘logical-positivist’77
procedures of ‘abstract, formal, static models of explanation and justification’.78
It is based on the assumption, however, that serious historiographical research
involves three principal levels of enquiry: the descriptive level (‘What?’), the ana-
lytical level (‘How?’), and the explanatory level (‘Why?’).79 To this list of investiga-
tive stages one may add the critical level (‘So what?’), the normative level (‘Good
or bad?’), and the predictive level (‘What about the future?’). Regardless of the
answers that a historian – examining a specific event and period – may offer
in response to these questions, he or she will be motivated by the – implicit or
explicit – supposition that it is the task of scientific study to uncover the causal
patterns by which historical developments are shaped or possibly even deter-
mined. Particularly noteworthy, in this respect, have been three forms of modern
‘scientific historiography’:80

• the Marxist economic model,81 especially influential in the 1930s–1950s, accord-

ing to which ‘history moves in a dialectical process of thesis and antithesis,
through a clash of classes which are themselves created by changes in control
over the means of production’;82
150 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

• the French ecological/demographic model,83 remarkably significant in the

1950s–1970s, according to which ‘the key variable in history is shifts in the
ecological balance between food supplies and population’,84 reflecting an
approach that – in the painstaking attempt to highlight the epistemic value
of quantitative methods in historiographical investigations – seeks to cor-
roborate the suspicion that ‘history that is not quantifiable cannot claim to be
scientific’;85
• the American cliometric model,86 increasingly prominent in the 1960s–1970s,
according to which the exploration of history cannot be seriously undertaken
without developing, and drawing upon, economic models and advanced math-
ematical methods of data processing and analysis and, thus, without the use of
‘mathematical and algebraical formulae’.87

Undoubtedly, this ‘tripartite typology’88 – which distinguishes ‘three types of

“scientific history”’89 – represents a schematic, and hence simplified, overview
of major traditions of modern historical research. What this typology illus-
trates, however, is that these intellectual approaches share not only an implicit
or explicit attachment to the paradigm of ‘explanation’, but also a tendency to
develop causal – or, in their radical versions, causalist – hierarchies in historical
analysis. In other words, irrespective of whether modern historians concerned
with the study of large-scale social developments believe in the preponderance
of material or ideological, economic or cultural, demographic or intellectual
factors,90 they all tend to presume that some sources of influence are empiri-
cally more powerful – and, therefore, conceptually more significant – than
others. To be sure, this does not mean that they necessarily endorse ‘mono-
causal explanations’;91 this does imply, however, that they consider some
historical driving forces to be causally preponderant over others. According to
this stance, it is the historian’s task to scrutinize ‘the interconnected and mul-
ticausal’92 constitution of historical realities. Tautologically speaking, the point
of the paradigm of explanation is to explain the seemingly inexplicable in plausibly
explanatory terms.
Postmodern accounts of history, by contrast, draw upon the paradigm of ‘inter-
pretation’. This intellectual undertaking has several presuppositional implications:

a. the recognition of the fact that historiographical studies are based on the
examination of a ‘series of multiple interpretable texts’93 (textualism);
b. the acceptance of the fact that all historical narratives are ‘merely relative to
the theoretical presuppositions which constitute them, and to the interpretations
which are made of them’94 (pluralism);
c. the acknowledgement of the fact that ‘the inevitability of interpretation’95
permeates not only the researcher but also the researched, that is, not only
the historian, who imposes his or her presuppositional categories and sets of
assumptions upon past happenings when trying to make sense of them, but
also history itself, which is shaped by meaning-laden practices and symbolically
mediated interactions (subjectivism);
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 151

d. the willingness to take seriously the fact that, while ‘the interest of analytical
philosophers in the philosophy of history has been unduly narrow’,96 what is
needed is a ‘hermeneutics or the theory of interpretation’97 permitting us to do
justice to ‘the role of language itself in the production of historical knowledge’98
as well as in the construction of historical events as they unfold within spatio-
temporally specific contexts (perspectivism);
e. the insistence upon the fact that – drawing upon interpretivist insights from
micro-sociology, ethnomethodology, and social anthropology – ‘the attempt
to understand an earlier human culture or society first and foremost in terms
of its own self-conceptions and values’99 is crucial to conceding that there is no
such thing as ‘the “realistic” interpretation of the past’100 and that, as a con-
sequence, the ineluctable presence of interpretive elasticity obliges us to face
up to the ‘historical “unrepresentability”’101 inherent in the seemingly most
obvious facets of human historicity (particularism).

Indisputably, the ‘interpretive focus’102 of postmodern approaches to history may,

in its extreme variants, require ‘depriving historical knowledge-claims of any rela-
tionship to the actual past’,103 implying that ‘postmodernism dissolves history into
a species of literature and makes the past itself into nothing more than a text’.104 On
this view, it appears that ‘[h]istory, like anthropology, [is] an interpretive and not a
systematic science’105 and that – owing to the considerable influence of postmod-
ern thought on the social sciences and humanities – ‘[c]old analysis’106 has been
‘replaced by an immediacy difficult to put into words’,107 just as the idea of ‘the
self as a “knowing subject”’108 has been substituted by the notion of ‘the self as a
“decentred and destabilized interpreting actor”’.109
Yet, in light of the postmodern tendency to ‘regard everything as a text’,110 inspired
by the ‘postmodernist skepticism concerning the past as the referent of historical
statements’,111 it is important to stress that postmodernists may believe in the foun-
dational role of interpretive practices without endorsing a foundationalist conception
of interpretation. In other words, they may be willing to concede that ‘[l]anguage
has endowed humans with a unique ability to cope with their environment and to
understand the universe in which they live’.112 At the same time, they are eager to
emphasize that ‘[p]ostmodernism offers another interpretation of meaning, including
historical meaning, even as it claims to contest the foundations of all meanings’.113 In
this sense, it proposes a foundationless interpretation of interpretive foundations, that is,
an undogmatic enquiry into socioculturally contingent grounds on the basis of which
historically situated actors – including researchers – attribute meaning to the world.
Considering the inescapable presence of radical contingency and perspectival
variety in both ordinary and scholarly modes of telling stories about history, ‘can-
ons of orthodoxy in reading and writing’,114 which are driven by the ambition to
provide irrefutable and ultimate explanations, ‘give way to plural readings and
interpretations’,115 which are not only able but also willing to recognize their own
standpoint-laden elasticity and epistemic limitations. Tautologically speaking, the
point of the paradigm of interpretation is to interpret the seemingly non-interpretable in
openly and explicitly interpretive terms.
152 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(8) ‘Deductive’ versus ‘inductive’: Modern approaches to history tend to be

‘deductive’, in the sense that, in their explanatory analysis, they descend from the
general to the particular. Hence, they employ deductive methods to the extent that
they proceed from the formulation of ‘general premises’, which are embedded
within presuppositionally sustained systems of validity with implicitly or explic-
itly codified criteria of legitimacy, to the examination of ‘particular events’, to
which historians can attach meaning by employing conceptual and methodologi-
cal tools whose epistemic accuracy corroborates the scientificity of a globalist –
that is, big-picture – historiography. By contrast, postmodern approaches to history
tend to be ‘inductive’, in the sense that, in their interpretive analysis, they ascend
from the particular to the general. Thus, they are founded on inductive methods to
the extent that they proceed from the exploration of ‘particular events’, which
can be scrutinized on the basis of critical research, to the construction of ‘general
assumptions’, whose applicability is limited to the case-specific horizon of a local-
ist – that is, small-picture – historiography.
To be clear, the distinction between ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ is anything but
clear-cut. Indeed, all historians attribute meaning to past happenings by mobil-
izing discursive resources, thereby converting realms of seemingly indisputable
facticity into regions of spatiotemporally contingent signifiability. In this context,
therefore, we are confronted with the following paradox:

• On the one hand, ‘history (historical understanding) is the product, not of some
kind of inductive study of the course of events, but of the presuppositions that
determine it’,116 that is, of the deductive application of value-laden categories
and interest-laden principles within investigative processes.
• On the other hand, history (historical explanation) is the product, not merely of
some kind of deductive study of the semantic resources of theoretical imaginar-
ies, but of the events that shape it, that is, of the inductive consideration of value-
laden happenings and power-laden developments within social processes.

Whatever one makes of this antinomy, it remains imperative to remind histori-

ans of the interpretivist constitution underlying both deductivist and inductivist
research agendas:

[…] grand narratives (overarching philosophies of history like the Enlightenment

story of the steady progress of reason and freedom, or Marx’s drama of the
forward march of human productive capacities via class conflict culminating
in proletarian revolution) are a priori impositions on the past rather than being
based on the ‘objective facts’.117

The de facto preponderance of interpretation over the de jure scientific suprem-

acy of explanation obliges us to concede that ‘[t]he normativity of the perspective
changes the descriptibility of the object’.118 Tautologically speaking, we cannot
read too much into history because historiography is all about reading stories
into histories. If – as Foucauldian commentators point out – ‘theories cannot be
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 153

verified’119 because ‘standards of verification come from a modern scientific disci-

pline that “refamiliarizes” the past to make it conform to the terms of the present
rather than to those of the past’,120 then we need to concede that – as postmodern
historians are eager to emphasize – histories cannot be corroborated because can-
ons of validation derive from a modern system-building ambition that converts
seductively systematic interpretations of the hitherto-been not only into seemingly
objective explanations of the now but also into deceptively empowering predictions
about the still-to-come.
(9) ‘Macro’ versus ‘micro’: Modern approaches to history tend to focus on the
‘macro’, in the sense that they are driven by the ambition to grasp the ‘big pic-
ture’. Consequently, they aim to uncover macro-social – that is, particularly struc-
tural and systemic – driving forces underlying large-scale historical developments.
Postmodern approaches to history, on the other hand, tend to place the emphasis
on the ‘micro’, in the sense that they are motivated by the conviction that it is
crucial to engage with the complexities of – infinitely multilayered – ‘small pic-
tures’. Accordingly, they seek to study micro-social – that is, directly experienced and
quotidian – realities permeating small-scale historical occurrences. The profound
paradigmatic differences between macro- and micro-focused frameworks in histor-
iography can be demonstrated on several levels.
(a) There is the opposition between global and local. Macro-focused approaches in
historiography are associated with large-scale research programmes, epitomized
in ‘the resurrection of grand theory’121 and the possibility of making claims about
the nature of historical developments in terms of their potentially worldwide sig-
nificance. Micro-focused approaches in historiography, by contrast, seek to draw
insights from small-scale research programmes, expressed in the aphorism that
‘small is beautiful’122 and in the conviction that local happenings are irreducible to
an overarching logic of universal historical trends with global magnitude. Whereas
macro-oriented accounts of societal tendencies and transformations entail the
challenge of formulating theoretical theses concerning the ‘generalization of his-
tory’,123 micro-oriented accounts of spatiotemporally specific occurrences seek to
take on the methodological task of contributing to the ‘singularization of history’.124
Put differently, the former are concerned with ‘societal history and macrohistory
within the modern quest for ultimate insights’125 into global developments, while
the latter are committed to engaging with ‘social history and microhistory within
the postmodern state of knowledge’126 about local events.
(b) There is the opposition between systemic and hermeneutic. Macro-focused
approaches in historiography place particular emphasis on the impact of sys-
temic forces on historical developments. In line with this analytical focus, they
underscore the role of structural – notably economic, political, and institutional –
factors in shaping societal processes. Conversely, micro-focused approaches in
historiography explore the influence of meaning-laden interactions on the unfold-
ing of social life. Given this concern with everyday practices, history – far from
being conceived of as the result of abstract and anonymous forces – is regarded
as ‘the outcome of human action and of interhuman structures of action’,127
which – following the Diltheyan insistence upon the species-constitutive
154 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

significance of people’s daily search for meaning – need to be studied on the basis
of the methodological imperatives of ‘understanding (Verstehen)’128 and ‘re-living
(Nacherleben)’.129 Macro-oriented historical research seems necessary to the extent
that the complex and vigorous influence of systemic forces on societal develop-
ments appears to escape our common-sense grasp of the world, not only in relation
to the present but also, and even more so, in relation to the past. Conversely,
micro-oriented historical research appears justified to the extent that we need to
comprehend ordinary people’s perceptions of themselves and of their environ-
ment in order to do justice to the fact that the most powerful systemic forces are,
literally, meaningless without the meanings attributed to the multifaceted ways
in which their influence is both experienced and interpreted by ordinary actors.
Indeed, in hermeneutically inspired historiographies, there is not much point in
‘attending to material conditions without examining how these conditions were
experienced’,130 and made sense of, by those who were exposed to them. Put dif-
ferently, the ‘systematics’ of socio-structural forces can be grasped fully only by
exploring the ‘hermeneutics’ of everyday life.
(c) There is the opposition between logical and accidental. Macro-focused
approaches in historiography tend to be motivated by the ambition to construct
grand narratives, capable of uncovering an underlying storyline driven by causal
mechanisms that shape, or even determine, the course of history. Critical of
system-building projects, micro-focused approaches in historiography, on the other
hand, contend themselves with offering small narratives, based on ‘the history
of everyday life’.131 In this sense, both traditions of research endorse what may
be described as ‘the revival of narrative’.132 Yet, whereas macro-oriented accounts
conceive of ‘narrative’ as a teleological storyline that dictates the course of
world history, micro-oriented accounts refer to ‘narrative’ as a discursive device
employed by ordinary people to attach meaning, and often coherence, to the
discontinuous dynamics and happenings with which they are confronted in
their quotidian existence. It is no coincidence, then, that macrohistorical studies
tend to draw upon disciplines – such as sociology, economics, and demography –
which permit them to examine the ‘big picture’, while microhistorical studies
tend to borrow from disciplines – such as anthropology and psychology – which
enable them to draw attention to the multi-coloured complexities of the ‘small
pictures’ created both from outside and from within everyday life. The idiosyn-
crasy of grassroots realities escapes the logocentric schemes of large-scale historical
analysis. Considering its obsession with order, causality, and rationality, it is no
happenstance that historical accidents tend to be disregarded by the scholastic
gaze of metatheoretical logics. Taking note of its primary concern with day-to-day
matters, mundane experiences, and the immediately obvious, it is unsurprising
that the latent grammar of worldwide historical tendencies tends to remain unrec-
ognized by the common-sense grasp of practical realities.
(d) There is the opposition between social and individual. Owing to their interest
in the ‘big picture’, macro-focused approaches in historiography use the category
of ‘society’ – often defined in ‘national’ terms – in order to make sense of his-
torical developments. According to this socio-contextualist conception of human
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 155

reality, what is central to macro-oriented conceptions of history is the examina-

tion of ‘the circumstances surrounding man’.133 As illustrated in their meticulous
engagement with the seemingly irrelevant and mundane facets of everyday life,
micro-focused approaches in historiography attribute great importance to the
category of ‘the individual’, which they tend to portray as the nucleus of inter-
subjectively constructed – and, for this reason, community-based – environments.
This analytical priority permits microhistorians to shed light on people’s quotid-
ian experience of, and direct participation in, spatiotemporal developments. In
light of the paradigmatic prominence attributed to the socio-ontological role of
the individual, what is crucial to micro-oriented conceptions of history is the con-
sideration of ‘man in circumstances’.134 Cross-fertilizing the paradigmatic insights
gained from macro- and micro-historical studies, therefore, it is imperative to
face up to the ontological interdependence of society and individual, which lies at the
heart of all human life forms: individual life-stories are unthinkable without the
social history in which they are embedded, just as social history is inconceivable
without the individual life-stories from which it is derived.
(e) There is the opposition between central and marginal. Macro-focused
approaches in historiography aim to uncover the dominant – notably economic,
political, military, and demographic – forces in history. Thus, they tend to con-
struct what may be described as a scholarly history, a mainstream history, an official
history, or a history from above – that is, a history written by members of intel-
lectual elites, who are equipped with legitimate forms of cultural and symbolic
capital, enabling them to impose their views of history on the rest of society.
Micro-focused approaches in historiography, by contrast, consider it their task to
shed light on the peripheral – and, to a large extent, voiceless and disempowered –
actors in history. Hence, they tend to endorse what may be characterized as a
popular history, a grassroots history, an unofficial history, or a history from below –
that is, a history written not only by and for those with privileged access to edu-
cational and institutional resources, but also by and for those who live on the
margins of society and are, by and large, relegated to the forgotten realms of col-
lective memories.135 The opposition between ‘central’ and ‘marginal’ is expressed
in various socio-structural tensions, such as the following:

• ‘dominant’ versus ‘dominated’;

• ‘empowered’ versus ‘disempowered’;
• ‘privileged’ versus ‘underprivileged’;
• ‘voiced’ versus ‘voiceless’;
• ‘(over-) recognized’ versus ‘mis- or un-recognized’;
• ‘legitimate’ versus ‘illegitimate’;
• ‘orthodox’ versus ‘heterodox’;
• ‘conformative’ versus ‘subversive’; and
• ‘mainstream’ versus ‘alternative’.

Notwithstanding the question of which side of the spectrum one wishes to

join or represent, ‘[i]t is certainly not the least achievement of current debates
156 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

on the practice of history to have discredited the old notion that historians can
and should separate their work from their personal sympathies’.136 Put differently,
the ‘readmission of partiality into the historian’s performance’137 is beneficial, in the
sense that it reminds us of the fact that there is no such thing as a disinterested,
value-free, or unbiased representation of historical events and developments.
Irrespective of whether one seeks to engage in the ‘writing of history of power-
ful people’138 or in the ‘writing of history of ordinary people’,139 it is not difficult
to substantiate the suspicion that ‘the popular is perhaps the one field in which
intellectuals are least likely to be experts’.140 Given their tendency to remain
trapped in the ivory towers of academic elites, to breathe the protected air of
the privileged circles of society, and to detach themselves from the existential
difficulties encountered by those who are forced to experience the weight of the
weightless worlds inhabited by disempowered and misrecognized protagonists of
reality, most established historians continue to centre on the influential role of
the ostensibly dominant forces shaping history. It is one of the vital tasks of sub-
versive microhistoriographies to challenge this discriminatory doxa.
(f) There is the opposition between monocentric and polycentric. Macro-focused
approaches in historiography tend to assume that there is one ultimate centre
of power, upon which all social forms of action depend and by which they are,
to a large extent, shaped or even determined. Surely, macro-oriented historians
may differ in terms of the emphasis they place on the role of specific – notably
economic, political, military, institutional, scientific, charismatic, cultural, or ethnic –
forms of power. What most of their conceptual frameworks have in common,
however, is that they aim to explain historical developments in terms of an over-
riding source of power, by which all social forms of action – and, indeed, all social
relations – are inevitably and decisively influenced. Micro-focused approaches in
historiography, on the other hand, tend to suggest that power constantly circulates
and permeates the seemingly most mundane aspects of everyday life. In essence, it
is possible to distinguish two versions of this stance.

I. According to the moderate version of this view, power is a polycentric force, in

the sense that it possesses many different – competing – focal points, which are
embedded in diversified regimes of action.
II. According to the radical version of this perspective, power is a centreless force,
in the sense that it lacks any preponderant source of influence, both in society
in general and in context-specific realms of interaction in particular.

Expectedly, such a polycentric or centreless conception of power manifests itself

in a polycentric or centreless conception of history. Hence, postmodernists regard
‘history no longer as a unified process, a grand narrative in which the many indi-
viduals are submerged, but as a multifaceted flow with many individual centers’.141
The paradigmatic transition from ‘monocentric’ to ‘polycentric’ or ‘centreless’,
then, goes hand-in-hand with the aforementioned shift in emphasis from ‘the
central’ to ‘the marginal’. ‘The subject matter of historical studies moved, for the
historians of everyday life, from what they call the “center” of power to the “margins”,
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 157

to the many, and the many are for them overwhelmingly the disadvantaged and
the exploited.’142 As a consequence, society is conceived of not as a conglomerate
founded on a monolithic source of material structurality but, rather, as a ‘decen-
tered totality’143 composed of ‘“polytemporal” assemblies of diverse modes of
temporality’.144 In other words, society is the power-laden ensemble of infinitely
differentiated, interconnected, and irreducible histories.
(g) Last but not least, there is the opposition between scientific and ordinary. Let
us consider this apparent antinomy in further detail.
Macro-focused approaches in historiography tend to regard historical research
as an explicitly and unambiguously scientific endeavour, whose protagonists are
equipped with rigorous conceptual and methodological tools, enabling them to
produce (i) descriptive, (ii) analytical, (iii) explanatory, (iv) critical, and (v) norma-
tive knowledge about past happenings and their place in overarching societal
trends and tendencies. Similar to other disciplines concerned with the study of
the human world, historiography justifies its scientific status on the basis of the
assumption that underlying causal mechanisms and driving forces need to be
systematically uncovered, since they operate ‘behind the backs of people’145 and,
therefore, escape their common-sense grasp of reality. It is the task of ‘macrohis-
torical social science approaches’146 not only to shed light on – that is, (i) describe,
(ii) analyse, and (iii) explain – the hidden forces by which historical developments
are driven, but also to problematize – that is, (iv) question and (v) evaluate – their
legitimacy in terms of the historian’s – potentially universalizable – factual, moral,
and aesthetic standards of validity.
While micro-focused approaches in historiography do not necessarily deny the
scientific nature – or, at least, the enlightening mission – of historical research,
they insist upon the socio-ontological significance of vital elements of everyday
life, which have largely been ignored – or, at least, underexplored – by main-
stream historians: the cultural, emotional, ephemeral, anecdotal, and personal facets
of quotidian practices. What is crucial in microhistorical studies are the ‘life
experiences of concrete human beings’,147 who, as embodied and life-interpreting
actors, attribute meaning to their existence and to the world by which they
are surrounded. From this angle, the serious problem arising from mainstream
‘large-scale generalizations’148 consists in the fact that they have ‘distorted the
actual reality at the base’,149 that is, the socio-ontological centrality of people’s
lifeworlds, which can, and should, be understood – literally – as people’s lived
and experienced worlds (mondes vécus or erlebte Welten). In ‘microhistory’,150 ‘the
researcher’s point of view becomes an intrinsic part of the account’;151 in addi-
tion, the perspective of those being researched is converted into a focal point of
lifeworld-centred explorations.
This methodological stance is built on the assumption that ordinary people, no
less than experts, are equipped with the necessary epistemic tools permitting
them to generate (i) descriptive, (ii) analytical, (iii) interpretive, (iv) critical, and
(v) normative knowledge about past happenings and their status in relation to wider
sociohistorical trends and tendencies. Similar to other approaches interested in
the study of the lifeworldly dimensions of human existence – such as symbolic
158 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

interactionism, ethnomethodology, social psychology, and phenomenology –

microhistorical research programmes defend their epistemic value by reference
to the fact that the essence of structural relations, which may be hidden behind
potentially deceptive appearances, can be problematized (and be, at least partially,
made sense of) by ordinary actors capable of speech, reflection, and discursively
regulated interaction. It is the task of both ‘microhistorical studies’152 and micro-
historical actors themselves not only to expose – that is, (i) identify, (ii) scrutinize,
and (iii) decipher – the multiple material and symbolic forces by which historical
developments are shaped, but also to problematize – that is, (iv) reflect upon and
(v) assess – their legitimacy in terms of both the historian’s and ordinary people’s
cognitive, regulative, and evaluative standards of validity.
To be sure, ‘[t]here is no reason why a history dealing with broad social
transformations and one centering on individual existences cannot coexist and
supplement each other’.153 Indeed, the challenge consists in cross-fertilizing macro-
historical and microhistorical studies, rather than in treating them as mutually
exclusive. Macrohistorians have explained the world in various ways; the point is
to realize that, in order for it to be changed, it also needs to be interpreted. Micro-
historians have interpreted the world in numerous ways; the point is to recognize
that, in order for it to be changed, it also needs to be explained. In short, historians
have both explained and interpreted the world in countless ways; the point is to
accept that, in order for it to be transformed for the better, we need both interpre-
tive explanations and explanatory interpretations, without which neither scientists
nor ordinary people can radically change it.
(10) ‘Necessary’ versus ‘contingent’: Given its centrality for understanding the
differences between modern and postmodern conceptions of history, it is worth
reconsidering the presuppositional implications of this distinction, which has
already been mentioned in the opening section of this chapter.
Modern approaches to history tend to conceive of spatiotemporal develop-
ments in terms of ‘necessity’. As previously explained, in modern intellectual
thought, the view that history is determined by necessity is founded on five prin-
cipal assumptions:

a. historical developments are products of underlying laws and, at least in terms

of large-scale and long-term trends, inevitable;
b. historical developments are structurally determined and, to a significant
extent, predictable;
c. historical developments are symptomatic of an evolutionary logic and, in this
sense, inherently progressive;
d. historical developments are teleologically oriented and, therefore, directional;
and
e. historical developments are potentially global in scope and, thus, may have
universal significance for human evolution.

Postmodern approaches to history, on the other hand, tend to conceive of spatio-

temporal developments in terms of ‘contingency’. In postmodern intellectual
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 159

thought, the contention that history is shaped by contingency is based on five key
assumptions, which are diametrically opposed to the preceding ones:

a. historical developments are intrinsically ephemeral and always relatively

arbitrary;
b. historical developments are open and, hence, largely unpredictable;
c. historical developments are neither progressive nor regressive, but rather cha-
otic, irregular, and incoherent;
d. historical developments are scattered, fragmented, and directionless; and
e. historical developments are irreducible, context-dependent, and particular.

In summary: According to modern parameters, history constitutes a structured and

structuring horizon of unavoidable, predictable, progressive, directional, and universal
developments. According to postmodern parameters, on the other hand, history can
be interpreted as an open horizon of arbitrary, unpredictable, chaotic, directionless,
and irreducible developments. Consequently, when comparing and contrasting
modern and postmodern conceptions of history, we are confronted with the fol-
lowing conceptual oppositions: (a) lawfulness versus lawlessness, (b) predictability
versus unpredictability, (c) linearity versus nonlinearity, (d) teleology versus directionless-
ness, and (e) universality versus particularity.
Let us examine the presuppositions underlying these antinomies in more detail.
(a) Lawfulness versus lawlessness. According to modern parameters, historical
developments are products of underlying laws and, at least in terms of large-scale
and long-term trends, inevitable (historical lawfulness). This view can be described
as historicist, in the sense that it suggests that history constitutes a ‘developmental
process with a powerful, complex and intricate logic to it’.154 This process may be
interpreted in different ways, for example, as a dynamic that is driven by ‘strug-
gle and conflict’,155 by ‘the dialectic of forces and relations of production’,156 by
‘the dialectical relationship between subject and object’157 expressed in the trans-
formative potential of sublation (Aufhebung), or by the evolutionary power of the
‘World Spirit, the moving force of all development’.158 What the gradual unfold-
ing of the underlying logic of societal development appears to illustrate is that
‘history [is] not a chapter of accidents’,159 but, on the contrary, an ever changing
conglomerate of interconnected happenings governed by inherent laws and
causal mechanisms. In the modern context, this perspective is associated, above
all, with the ‘philosophy of history’,160 particularly in the tradition of Hegelian
social and political analysis.
According to postmodern parameters, by contrast, historical developments are
intrinsically ephemeral and always relatively arbitrary (historical lawlessness). This
view can be characterized as accidentalist, in the sense that it implies that history
is tantamount to ‘a dispersed, even chaotic, field of signifiers’.161 Correspondingly,
modern historiography is motivated by the desperate – but futile – attempt to
impose logocentric categories and conceptual stencils upon intersected, disor-
dered, and – tautologically speaking – evanescent events and occurrences. On
this reading, there is no underlying conflictual potential, social antagonism,
160 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

dialectical transcendence, or evolutionary driving force determining the course

of history. All there is, instead, is an ensemble of randomly interconnected hap-
penings, none of which obeys any immanent or ineluctable logic of functioning,
but all of which are united by their fundamentally fluid, unstable, and haphazard
constitution. If, according to this presuppositional framework, there is any room
for a ‘philosophy of history’, such a philosophy must abandon the ambition to
invent laws where there are none.
(b) Predictability versus unpredictability. According to modern parameters, his-
torical developments are structurally determined and, to a considerable extent,
predictable (historical predictability). This view can be referred to as determinist,
in the sense that it regards history as a developmental process that is not only
shaped but also, to a large extent, determined by underlying laws and causal
mechanisms. It is, on this account, the task of historians to uncover the imma-
nent rules and principles by which historical developments are driven, enabling
them to make not only factual, analytical, and critical statements about the past and
the present, but also fairly accurate predictions about the future. In a sense, then,
such an ambitious programme converts one of positivism’s key goals – namely, to
formulate prognostic hypotheses – into a tripartite endeavour: not only is this object-
ive to be achieved in the natural sciences, by making future-oriented calculations
about developments in the physical world; not only is this aim to be pursued
in the social sciences, by forecasting developments in the cultural world; but, in
addition, this aspiration is to be imported into the humanities, such as historical
studies, which are capable of raising substantial claims about the yet-to-come, by
examining the constitutive features and causal connections of the hitherto-been.
Irrespective of how mistaken and deceitful people’s predictions may turn out to
be, the desire to project ourselves into the near or distant future appears to be no
less fundamental to the human condition than to the modern quest for control
in relation to the circumstances of our existence.
According to postmodern parameters, on the other hand, historical develop-
ments are open and, hence, largely unpredictable (historical unpredictability). This
view can be called non-determinist, in the sense that it portrays history as a multi-
faceted process with no ultimate foundation, no underlying driving force, and no
decisive source of human or nonhuman agency. According to this understanding,
historians need to face up to the unavoidable unpredictability of spatiotemporal
realities. There is no point, then, in trying to make any reasonable, let alone
precise, prognoses about future developments of relationally constructed reali-
ties, since their polycentric – or even centreless – constitution cannot be reduced
to the ubiquitous logic of a centre of gravity. Certainly, it is both possible and
desirable to explore the constitutive components of ‘the’ objective world (notably
its physical, chemical, and biological features), of ‘our’ normative world (especially
its cultural, political, economic, and demographic characteristics), and of ‘my’
subjective world (particularly its psychological dimensions). Even if, however, it
were possible to make at least small-scale predictions about future developments
of these three worlds by drawing upon the systematic knowledge produced within
scientific disciplines, the infinite complexity of the multilayered ways in which
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 161

not only these realms of existence but also, more significantly, their multiple
constituents are interconnected would leave little, if any, room for assembling
credible prognoses about large-scale historical trends and tendencies. Regardless
of how seductive and challenging people’s predictions about the future may turn
out to be, the desire to project ourselves into the yet-to-come is no less an illu-
sion than the modern dream to be able to dominate all objective, normative, and
subjective aspects of our – in fact, rather limited – existence.
(c) Linearity versus nonlinearity. According to modern parameters, historical
developments follow an evolutionary logic and are, in this sense, inherently
progressive (historical linearity). This view can be labelled continuist, in the sense
that it conceives of history as a constantly developing process characterized by
‘unity, linearity, and homogeneity of a single, absolute historical time’.162 This stance
posits that history can be conceptualized in terms of a dynamic totality, which,
at least in the long run, permits social researchers to identify patterns of similarity,
regularity, and commensurability when examining developmental processes across
different – spatiotemporally situated – societies. On this account, it is the task of
a world historiography to uncover cross-situational patterns of progressive continu-
ity permeating world history and, eventually, leading to the rise of a world society.
Historians, therefore, are confronted with the challenge of discovering ‘unifying
principles of organisation and transformation’,163 which lie at the heart of global
developments converting ‘progress by continuous change’164 into the driving
force of incessant sociocultural evolution. ‘The “use of history to make history” is
substantially a phenomenon of modernity’,165 insofar as the systematic study of
the past can contribute not only to a more insightful understanding of the present
but also, crucially, to the construction of a future aware of the weight of the past
within its developing present.
According to postmodern parameters, historical developments are neither
progressive nor regressive, but rather chaotic, irregular, and incoherent (his-
torical nonlinearity). This view can be termed discontinuist, in the sense that it
interprets history as an irregularly constituted process marked by fragmentation,
rupture, and heterogeneity of a diversified, contingent historical time. Evidently, such
a discontinuist conception of history is intimately interrelated with the ‘crisis of
orthodox notions of progress and orthodox faith in science’s ability to deliver
it’.166 Far from portraying history as one straight line of civilizational advance-
ment, based on a global path towards scientific, moral, and aesthetic perfection,
‘a “discontinuist” interpretation of modern social development’167 in particular,
and of social development in general, suggests that a truly critical historiography
needs to work towards ‘[d]isplacing the evolutionary narrative, or deconstructing
its story line’.168 This, of course, does not necessarily ‘imply that all is chaos’;169 it
does mean, however, that we need to be prepared to accept that, in principle, it is
possible ‘that an infinite number of purely idiosyncratic “histories” can be written’170
and that there is no compelling reason why the multiple particularities of events
and occurrences could, or should, be reduced to a storyline of universal status and
worldwide applicability. The attention to detail – and, thus, to the ineluctable pres-
ence of assembled singularities – is a constitutive component of the ‘postmodern
162 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

spirit’. Its open-minded engagement with disordered, disjointed, and unclassified

elements of history can contribute not only to a more perceptive grasp of the con-
temporary but also, in a more radical sense, to the construction of a future that is
conscious of, and willing to explore, the infinite diversity of its own fragile reality.
(d) Teleology versus directionlessness. According to modern parameters,
historical developments are teleologically oriented and, therefore, directional
(historical teleology). This view can be thought of as teleological, in the sense that
it pictures history as a spatiotemporally constituted process oriented towards an
all-encompassing goal. Regardless of whether this ‘telos’ is implicit or explicit,
and irrespective of whether individual or collective subjects strive consciously
or unconsciously for its realization, its ineluctable presence in the unfolding of
history permeates every aspect of human and nonhuman forms of agency. The
idea that history has a direction means, literally, that it makes sense, that it goes
somewhere, and that it possesses an overarching path of global significance. A
teleological conception of history, then, raises some of the most fundamental
ontological questions faced by the whole of humanity:171

(i) ‘Does history have a meaning?’

(ii) ‘Is history going somewhere?’
(iii) ‘Is there something which can reasonably be categorised as a “historical
motor”?’
(iv) ‘Is it possible to identify a reason why the historical process has taken the
shape that it has?’
(v) ‘Can the term “progress” be legitimately applied to that process?’

The importance, relevance, and scope of these questions can hardly be

overestimated:

(i) The question about the meaning of history – central to existentialist or interpre-
tivist historicism – obliges us to reflect upon the value attached to, or presum-
ably inherent in, worldly forms of small-scale or large-scale development.
(ii) The question about the direction of history – crucial to teleological or purposivist
historicism – concerns the possibility of uncovering the direction-laden, goal-
oriented, and target-driven nature of historical developments – notably of
those with actually or potentially global impact.
(iii) The question about the engine of history – essential to actionalist or structuralist
historicism – relates to the challenge of identifying the principal driving forces
behind natural and social developments. Actionalist approaches emphasize
the historical role of human actions – which are commonly motivated by
intentions, desires, judgements, or ideas. Structuralist approaches, by con-
trast, stress the historical function of different sets of structures – especially,
of ensembles of cultural, economic, political, and civilizational structures.
(iv) The question about the reason of history – vital to causalist or determinist
historicism – may trigger the ambition to expose the roots of spatiotemporal
developments. Irrespective of whether multicausal accounts may provide
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 163

more accurate explanations than monocausal frameworks, modern historians

tend to be motivated by the desire to identify the main reasons behind par-
ticular happenings and actions, as well as behind general trends and tenden-
cies, and hence they follow a causalist – or, in some cases, determinist – logic
of analysis.
(v) The question about the progress of history – fundamental to evolutionist or pro-
gressivist historicism – touches on an issue whose significance is reflected in the
impact of evolutionist thought on the natural, social, and human sciences, all
of which grapple with the question of whether or not there is such a thing as
historical progress, no matter how broadly or narrowly conceived.

In short, teleological models of history are founded on ‘the assertion that there
are forces at work in history propelling it towards a predetermined outcome’.172 The most
secular versions of such teleological understandings of history cannot be dissoci-
ated from the impact that religious beliefs have had, and continue to have, upon
both ordinary and scientific conceptions of spatiotemporal developments. One
may insist that, in fact, ‘[t]he ancient Hebrews (or at least their literate classes)
must be credited with the invention of the idea of history as a sacred drama’,173
based on the collective experience of ‘domination by stronger powers, defeat,
exile and return to the sacred territory’.174 In addition, one may recall that deeply
ingrained in the ‘Christian consciousness’175 is ‘a grand narrative of a journey
through time from Eden to apocalypse and the final judgement’.176 Given the pro-
found influence of religious interpretations on European intellectual thought, one
may come to the conclusion that ‘all subsequent notions of historical progress are
secularised versions of the Judeo/Christian scheme’.177 Put differently, modern
conceptions of progress – particularly in its Kantian, Hegelian, Smithian, Saint-
Simonian, Comtean, Darwinian, Marxian, Durkheimian, and Weberian variants –
are entangled with religiously motivated interpretations of human development.
According to postmodern parameters, on the other hand, historical developments –
far from being subject to a conscious or unconscious all-encompassing purpose –
are not aimed at fulfilling the mission of bringing humanity gradually closer
to an overarching or transcendental goal (historical directionlessness). This view
can be conceived of as non-teleological, in the sense that it presents history as a
spatiotemporally constituted ensemble of random constellations, events, and
developments devoid of any all-encompassing direction. Irrespective of whether
individual or collective subjects think their actions are part of an all-embracing
progressive logic underlying the course of history, their daily practices cannot
transcend the lawless, unpredictable, nonlinear, and directionless constitution
of social reality. Teleological stories may be told, but this does not mean that
they are written. We may imagine, or even work towards, the realization of a
world-historical target; this does not guarantee, however, that a telos of univer-
sal historical significance actually exists. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,178
with whose complexity Schopenhauer grapples in his writings, is the experi-
enced reality of a realized and realizable world,179 to which human actors are
exposed in their everyday lives. Die Geschichte als Wille und Vorstellung, with
164 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

whose intricacy historians are confronted in their research, is the projected real-
ity of an unrealized and unrealizable world, with whose multiple – actual and
imagined – constellations the protagonists of the hitherto-been were confronted
when attending to the task of constructing the present of the past. The idea that
history has no direction means – literally – that it makes no sense, that it does
not go anywhere, and that it is hardly more than the sum of accidentally inter-
connected happenings. No less than a teleological account of worldly develop-
ments, a non-teleological view of history raises some of the most fundamental
ontological questions encountered – consciously or unconsciously – by every
member of humanity:180

(i) ‘Is history devoid of meaning?’

(ii) ‘Is history going nowhere?’
(iii) ‘Is there anything which cannot be categorized as a “historical accident”?’
(iv) ‘Is it possible to identify a reason why there are no ultimate reasons behind
historical processes?’
(v) ‘Can the term “assemblage” be legitimately applied to any historical process?’

Unsurprisingly, the answers given to these questions by postmodern scholars

differ radically from those provided by modern historians:

(i) The question about the meaninglessness of history – central to constructivist

or phenomenological historicism – requires us to recognize that meaning is not
built into objects or processes, but attributed to them by interpreting subjects,
capable of mobilizing their symbolic – notably expressive, such as linguistic
and artistic – resources, in order to project values and narratives upon worldly
existence in general and upon individual life stories in particular.
(ii) The question about the directionlessness of history – crucial to non-teleological
or non-purposivist historicism – invites us to face up to the essentially direction-
less, goalless, and aimless constitution of historical events, even of those that
appear to follow an underlying logic.
(iii) The question about the groundlessness of history – essential to polycentrist or
interconnectivist historicism – compels us to accept that there are no ultimate –
material or symbolic, economic or cultural, infrastructural or superstructural,
behavioural or ideological, institutional or ephemeral, individual or collective –
driving forces behind natural and social developments. All there is in history
is the arrival of events, the coming and going of happenings, none of which
is reducible to an epiphenomenon of a monolithically constituted, or foun-
dationally determined, reality.
(iv) The question about the reasonlessness of history – vital to coincidentalist or
accidentalist historicism – regards the viability of the ambition to search for
hidden origins or ultimate causes of spatiotemporal developments. Regardless
of whether one favours monocausal or multicausal explanations, postmodern
historians are deeply suspicious of any kind of causalist – and, even more so,
of determinist – modes of analysis.
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 165

(v) The question about the progresslessness of history – fundamental to performa-

tivist or processualist historicism – refers to an issue whose importance is illus-
trated in the influence of constructivist thought, which is interested primarily
in the performative aspects of social action in particular and of the social
world in general. Far from affirming that human practices are permeated by
an evolutionary logic, postmodern analysts highlight the performative poten-
tial inhabiting all sociohistorical constructions.

(e) Universality versus particularity. According to modern parameters, historical

developments, insofar as they are driven by the implicit rationality of context-
transcending patterns, can be global in scope and thus may have universal sig-
nificance for human evolution (historical universality). This view can be considered
universalist in the sense that it presents history as an accumulation of locally
embedded processes with potentially global significance. The universalist spirit
pervading modern conceptions of history is illustrated in the belief in the context-
transcending force of social evolution.
One may follow the Hegelian tradition of intellectual thought, by interpreting
‘historical development as the progress of mind becoming conscious of itself’181
and, hence, as the progressive realization of the Weltgeist (‘world spirit’) in the
gradual consolidation of a Weltgeschichte (‘world history’), leading – at least in
the long run – to the elaboration of a Weltgeschichtsschreibung (‘world historiogra-
phy’). Alternatively, one may subscribe to the Marxist mode of social and political
analysis by locating the powerhouse behind large-scale historical developments in
the progress of the productive forces. One may even go as far as applying Charles
Darwin’s ‘biological evolutionary theory’182 to the study of social developments;
according to a Darwinian understanding of history, ‘the purpose of evolutionary
change through the aeons of half a billion years or so since multi-cellular life
appeared on earth was to produce homo sapiens as its highest expression’183 and,
therefore, to generate ever more advanced civilizations shaped by struggle and
competition. Whatever one makes of the analogy between ‘natural evolution’
and ‘social evolution’, Darwinist theorists tend to assume that the former ‘occurs
blindly and without any conscious intent’,184 whereas the latter is shaped by
‘conscious action[s]’185 undertaken by ‘conscious beings’.186 In both cases, how-
ever, the explanatory framework is founded on the presupposition that selection
processes determine historical development, notwithstanding the spatiotemporal
specificity of context-bound activities.
According to postmodern parameters, by contrast, historical developments are
composed of a plurality of irreducible and context-dependent realities (historical
particularity). This view can be regarded as particularist, in the sense that it inter-
prets history as an assemblage of local happenings none of which is reducible to
any other. The particularist spirit pervading postmodern conceptions of history
manifests itself in the belief in the context-specific constitution of every occurrence.
This, then, literally means that no event is reducible to any other event, for each
occurrence is singular and unrepeatable. No matter how many substantial pat-
terns of similarity, homology, or comparability one may seek to uncover, the
166 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

most schematic framework of historical analysis will not be able to do away

with the irreducibility of each spatiotemporally embedded incident. If anything,
history is a collection of randomly interconnected happenings, and social his-
tory is an ensemble of embodied – and, thus, experienced – human practices.
On this account, every particular sociocultural event can be conceived of as
the realization of the Lebensweltgeist (‘lifeworld spirit’) in the gradual consoli-
dation of a Lebensweltgeschichte (‘lifeworld history’), leading – if we follow the
micro-oriented parameters of postmodern analysis – to the elaboration of a
Lebensweltgeschichtsschreibung (‘lifeworld historiography’).
Postmodernists may well have sympathy for modern scholars who proclaim that
they are ‘tired of ontological insecurity and epistemological chaos’,187 that they
‘need order’,188 and that they ‘miss metanarrative’.189 Yet, willing to face up to
the radical indeterminacy of social development and to the fragility of social reality,190
postmodernists insist that reinitiating the search for ontological security and epis-
temological certainty, articulated in the celebration of metanarratives, would be
a return to the illusory pursuit of total control and domination, epitomized in
the darkest episodes of twentieth-century history – notably the two World Wars,
as well as the experiences of fascism, authoritarian state socialism, and colonial-
ism. In the early twenty-first century, hardly any researcher working in the social
sciences and humanities would deny ‘the dissolution of evolutionism, the disappear-
ance of historical teleology, the recognition of thoroughgoing, constitutive reflexivity,
together with the evaporating of the privileged position of the West’191 – these are widely
accepted insights, which seem to ‘move us into a new and disturbing universe of
experience’192 based on categorical openness towards radical contingency.
In the face of this novel set of diversified and irreducible constellations, univer-
salist conceptions of history, which seek to identify context-transcending trends
and tendencies of law-like global significance, appear to have lost all credibility.
‘The principle of expressive causality, according to which nature, society, and the
mind are the visible manifestations, or expressions, of an invisible cause, essence,
or center of things, shaped the general positivist belief in an unfolding logic, or telos,
of history.’193 Conversely, the principle of non-purposive accidentality, according to
which there are no hidden ultimate foundations, substances, or epicentres, lies at
the heart of the postpositivist belief in a relatively arbitrary assemblage of events
commonly described as history.
Arguably, mainstream modern historians and positivists reduce ‘the specificity
of a historical event to that of a mere moment in a dynamic totality, unfolding
according to the dictates of a predetermined end’.194 By contrast, postmodern histor-
ians and postpositivists interpret the specificity of a historical event in terms of
an irreducible moment in a fluid and open reality, constructed by multiple inde-
terminate occurrences. From a universalist point of view, ‘[t]he unfolding essence,
or subject, of history impart[s] continuity to historical development and homogeneity
to the developing parts’.195 From a particularist perspective, on the other hand,
the multitude of both human and nonhuman actors accords discontinuity to his-
torical constellations and heterogeneity to ungrammatical networks of interstitial
movements. If the anti-universalist spirit underpinning postmodern approaches
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 167

to history is right, then ‘[n]o one observer can ever encompass the “truth” of a
situation’,196 let alone capture the mysteries of the universe that both surrounds
and permeates our lifeworlds, for there are no ultimate truths or mysteries to be
discovered in and through the study of spatiotemporally contingent realities.

Reconstruction and Deconstruction

In light of the above, it should come as no surprise that modern and postmodern
approaches to history are shaped by two related, but fundamentally different,
methodological paradigms: reconstruction and deconstruction.
Modern accounts of history are motivated by the investigative endeavour of
reconstruction to the extent that they seek to represent the past by symbolically –
that is, by and large, textually – rebuilding it. In this context, the term ‘represen-
tation’ is to be understood – literally – as ‘re-present-ation’, that is, as the task of
‘making something present again’. In accordance with this methodological maxim,
historians are expected to take on the challenge of being able to ‘deal with big
problems or seek to reconstruct or discover patterns in the past, as modern scientific
historiography’197 aspires to do. Historiography, comprehended in these terms,
may be regarded as the extension of the scientific ambition of early sociology: the
whole point of developing and applying a scientific method in sociology is to dis-
cover and, if possible, to reconstruct the underlying causal mechanisms that – while
they escape people’s common-sense grasp of reality – shape, or even determine,
social development. ‘Marx’s dictum that there would be no point in producing
scientific knowledge if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly
coincided’198 can be extended to the historiographical imperative that there
would be no point in generating historical knowledge if the accounts spontane-
ously provided by historical subjects and those painstakingly developed by pro-
fessional historians were homological. In short, the principal mission of modern
historiography is to reconstruct the past – not only by describing it, but also, more
significantly, by explaining how and why it came about in the first place.
Postmodern accounts of history are motivated by the exploratory undertaking
of deconstruction to the extent that they aim to interpret the past by symbolically –
that is, by and large, textually – breaking it into parts and thereby illustrating the
arbitrary constitution of seemingly natural, and commonly naturalized, constel-
lations. In this respect, the term ‘interpretation’ is to be understood – literally –
as ‘inter-pret-ation’, that is, as the task of ‘translating something into a meaningful
horizon’, thereby signifying and re-signifying it. Historical interpretation can be
defined as the epistemic practice on the basis of which people attribute meaning
to the past. In accordance with this methodological attitude, historians are invited
to take on the challenge of being able to grapple with small problems or seek to
deconstruct or reinterpret happenings of the past, as postmodern textual historiography
proposes to do. Historiography, conceived of in these terms, may be treated as the
extension of the culturalist ambition of postmodern sociology: the whole point of
developing and applying a culturalist method in sociology is to decentre and decon-
struct the material and symbolic arrangements through which spatiotemporally
168 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

embedded actors naturalize, and often legitimize, the relatively arbitrary param-
eters of their existence. Marx’s dictum that ‘[a]ll social life is essentially practi-
cal’199 just as ‘all human practices are essentially social’200 can be extended to the
historiographical imperative that there would be no point in generating historical
knowledge if historians failed to recognize the radical contingency permeating all
forms of human agency. In brief, the main purpose of postmodern historiography
is to deconstruct the past – not only by describing it, but also, more importantly,
by exploring how it can be interpreted by those who have already written, those
who still write, and those who continue to write and rewrite history.
Thus, following the postmodern agenda, we need to abandon the ideal of explan-
atory reconstruction and, instead, rise to the challenge of interpretive deconstruction:

History is no longer the reconstruction of what has happened to us in the vari-

ous phases of our lives, but a continuous playing with the memory of this. The
memory has priority over what is remembered. Something similar is true for histor-
iography. The wild, greedy, and uncontrolled digging into the past, inspired
by the desire to discover a past reality and reconstruct it scientifically, is no longer
the historian’s unquestioned task. […] The time has come that we should think
about the past, rather than investigate it.201

The paradigmatic shift from the modern ambition towards reconstruction to the
postmodern concern with deconstruction, then, implies a methodological transi-
tion from the realistic focus on the signified to the constructivist emphasis on the
signifier. What is recollected, therefore, is both epistemologically and methodo-
logically less significant than the recollection process through which the con-
struction of memory – in the form of historiography – becomes possible in the
first place. On this view, deconstruction and ‘meaning [are] more important than
reconstruction and genesis’,202 the interpretive contextualizing task of postmod-
ern historiography is to be favoured over the explanatory uncovering mission of
modern history, and the ‘[d]isplacing [of] the evolutionary narrative [by] decon-
structing its story line’203 inevitably ‘means accepting that history cannot be seen
as a unity’,204 let alone as a treasure containing pieces that, if examined in terms
of a totality, may illustrate the influence of hidden principles of universal validity
in the gradual development of human society.
In a radical sense, postmodern historiography is not only about the deconstruc-
tion of reconstructionism, but also, more fundamentally, about the ‘deconstruction of
deconstructionism’,205 that is, about being prepared to call the validity of the most
subversive signifiers into question. Indeed, the subversion of both conventional
and counterhegemonic meanings, codes, and practices may require the subversion
of subversion itself. Postmodern historiography ‘subverts the assumption that there
is one meaning or any meaning overall in a text’.206 If there is an infinite plurality
of meanings attributed to reality not only by social actors themselves, but also by
the historians who write their history, then we need to discard the modern desire
to discover concealed mechanisms of universality determining the development
of society. Consequently, what we are confronted with is not only ‘the end of
 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography? 169

man’, ‘the end of God’, ‘the end of metaphysics’, ‘the end of the subject’, or ‘the
end of society’; what we appear to experience, in the contemporary era, is – to
use Fukuyama’s famous expression – ‘the end of history’.207 To be sure, the ‘post-
historical world’208 is not a universe devoid of history, but a context in which the
modern certainties about the lawful, predictable, linear, teleological, and universal
development of history have lost all credibility, thereby obliging us to face up to
the ineluctable presence of radical contingency.

Epilogue on the History of the Post-Historical Moment

The emergence of postmodern thought cannot be dissociated from the profound

historical shifts that have shaped large parts of the world in the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries.209 Of course, when evaluating the wider implications
of the ‘postmodern turn’, one may come to the conclusion that – as mentioned in
the Introduction to this book – ‘the period of its greatest influence is now over’210
and that its obsolete character is reflected in the fact that ‘[i]ts founding fathers are
in their turn encountering the scepticism of a new generation’.211 Whatever con-
clusions one may draw from assessing the contemporary relevance of postmodern
analysis, it is striking that both its rise and its impact tend to be discussed in relation
to ‘a particular conjuncture of social-historical events’.212 In this respect, it may be useful
to distinguish three key historical phases leading to the development, and increasing
influence, of postmodern thought: (a) the early to mid-twentieth century, especially
from the 1930s to the 1960s; (b) the mid- to late twentieth century, mainly from the
late 1960s to the 1980s; and (c) the late twentieth century, notably from 1989 onwards.

A. In relation to the early to mid-twentieth century, key points of reference are

the experience of the Second World War, noticeably in Europe, and the advent
of totalitarianism, epitomized in fascism and state socialism, culminating in the
Holocaust and the Gulag.213
B. In relation to the mid- to late twentieth century, chief points of reference are
the political events – especially the student protests – of 1968, the Vietnam War
(1955–75), various decolonization processes around the world, along with ‘the
emergence of new forms of political activity and resistance’,214 illustrated in
the rise of new social movements.
C. In relation to the late twentieth century, noteworthy points of reference are
‘the collapse of communism’215 and ‘the end of the Cold War’,216 signalling ‘the
arrival of a postmodern world in which the lines separating friend and foe, Self
and Other, would become obscure’.217 In this opaque universe of flux and
uncertainty, ‘the ascendancy of affluent consumerism and information tech-
nologies’218 has led to the creation of a ‘global village’219 sustained by a ‘global
culture industry’,220 whose borderless constitution transcends the limited
parameters of national societies and parochial epistemic communities.

What is crucial about the aforementioned occurrences with respect to the repro-
duction and transformation of common values and principles in the contemporary
170 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

era is that their historical weight undercuts the credibility and legitimacy of the
normative cornerstones of the Enlightenment project. In other words, ‘[t]hese
events undermined the grip of certain Western beliefs including that reason,
emancipation, science, truth, progress, and centralized, legal-constitutional politics
are necessarily linked’221 and – more importantly – that the optimistic trust in the
civilizational triumph of these ideals will manifest itself in the development of an
ever more just and empowering society. Postmodern thought, however, expresses
‘a profound skepticism’222 about metanarratives, which appear to be ideologically
less powerful within a historical context characterized by ‘the absence of a shared
framework of meaning’.223 Thus, ‘the post-Cold War era’224 constitutes a period in
which societies, particularly those in ‘the West’, realize that they have lost their
narrative and, owing to this existential vacuum, their ‘rationale for intervention
and long-term ethical engagement’.225
Irrespective of whether one considers postmodernity as ‘a more modest modern-
ity, a sign of modernity having come to terms with its own limits and limita-
tions’,226 or as a discursive phantasy projected upon the world by those who are
eager to proclaim the demise of Enlightenment doctrines, it is difficult to deny
that – for good or for bad – ‘the spectre of postmodernism […] is still with us’227
and will remain with us for some time to come. In the ‘global network society’,228
ideological grand narratives, although they have not completely disappeared,
have ceased to be hypostatized into the normative force of gravity, due to having
lost a remarkable amount of credibility and legitimacy. While one may come to
the conclusion that it would be erroneous to proclaim ‘the end of history’ à la
Fukuyama, the thesis announcing ‘the death of metanarratives’ – notwithstand-
ing the question of its validity – represents a constitutive component of the post-
modern imaginary.
5
From Modern to Postmodern Politics?
The ‘Autonomous Turn’

This chapter proposes to reflect upon the impact of postmodern thought on

contemporary debates concerning the nature and purpose of politics. Within the
context of this study, the in-depth analysis of the differences between modern
and postmodern conceptions of politics is crucial in one respect: it illustrates the
normative implications of the paradigmatic shifts shaped by current controversies
regarding key issues in epistemology, methodology, sociology, and historiogra-
phy. Without a critical engagement with, and an idiosyncratic understanding
of, politics, postmodern thought would be tantamount to a free-floating and
self-referential language game based on rhetorical speculation. For there is not
much point in theorizing for the sake of theorizing. From an intellectual point
of view, little – if anything – can be gained from creating interpretive or explana-
tory frameworks without considering the substantive challenges arising from the
conscious coordination of human actions and from the meaningful organization
of social life.
In postmodern thought, the insistence upon the empowering potential of poli-
tics is based on a firm commitment to both the exploration and the construction
of radically contingent, open, and multiple social realities. More specifically, the
rise of the politics of identity – intimately related to the politics of difference and
the politics of recognition – is indicative of the increasingly widespread acceptance
of the idea that the quest for human autonomy should lie at the heart of any
societal project that aims to challenge the legitimacy of traditional politics. In
this light, the impact of postmodern thought on contemporary approaches to
politics manifests itself in what may be described as the autonomous turn,1 that is,
as a paradigmatic transition that underscores the normative significance of the
relentless search for different forms of autonomy, pursued by both individual
and collective actors. As expressed in this shift in emphasis, the discrepancies
between modern and postmodern conceptions of politics are reflected in several
tensions, three of which appear to be particularly important: (i) equality versus
difference, (ii) society-as-a-project versus projects-in-society, and (iii) clarity versus
ambiguity.

171
172 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(i) Equality versus Difference

The idea of a postmodern politics2 is closely associated with the rise of the politics
of identity,3 the politics of difference,4 and the politics of recognition.5 In opposition to
traditional conceptions of politics, which – presumably – strive for uniformity and
homogeneity, postmodern approaches to both the small-scale and the large-scale
organization of social life stress the importance of diversity and heterogeneity. Thus,
under postmodern parameters, both the appreciation and the celebration of group-
specific identities – derived from sociological variables such as class, ethnicity, gender,
age, and ability – are conceived of as a vehicle for, rather than as an obstacle to,
political autonomy and human empowerment. On this view, the existence of alterity
is part of the human condition, while the imposition of uniformity is central to the
totalizing logic underlying the project of modernity. According to this postmodern
account of the development of human society, the presence of alterity is ontological
and unavoidable, whereas the quest for uniformity is historical and episodic.
Cultural variety, then, constitutes an anthropological invariant. Owing to their
simultaneous attachment to different social groups, human actors are invariably
variable. Modernity, it seems, is a historical condition that privileges the pursuit
of uniformity over the recognition of diversity in the construction processes of
cultural and political communities. Postmodernity, by contrast, is a historical con-
text in which both the acknowledgement of alterity and the encouragement of its
quotidian creation are essential to the fruitful dialogue both within and between
culturally diversified and politically empowering communities.6 Attributing an
affirmative character to the challenge of living with, and indeed embracing,
the existence of alterity, postmodernity substantially diverges from modernity
because of its commitment to confronting the normative issues arising from the
development of highly differentiated – that is, both internally and externally
heterogeneous – societies.
As unsympathetic critics of the Enlightenment project contend, it appears that
modernity is largely indifferent – and, in some cases, even hostile – towards the
existence of difference. Postmodernity, on the other hand, defends and – and, if
regarded desirable, celebrates – the ubiquity of difference. For indifference towards
difference effectively means lack of attention towards an integral element of the
human condition. According to postmodern parameters, to do justice to the com-
plexity of anthropologically distinct modes of immersion in the world requires
acknowledging that the most rudimentary forms of civilization cannot exist
without a minimal degree of internal differentiation. Aiming to control potential
sources of unpredictability, modern rationalities – particularly their instrumental
forms – are designed to control differences between people by creating illusory
schemes of conformity. Such unifying agendas can be constructed in multiple ways –
that is, socially, politically, economically, geographically, culturally, ethnically,
‘racially’, sexually, religiously, or ideologically. As advocates of postmodern thought
are keen to emphasize, however, a vital mission of a politics oriented towards
human empowerment consists in acknowledging that the sociological differences
between human actors – unless they serve as the basis for hierarchical orders of
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 173

power or, in many cases, for divisive modes of symbolic and material domination –
are not to be undermined, but, on the contrary, deserve recognition. In other words,
the question is not how we can control, let alone eliminate, difference; rather, the
question is how we can accept and – if considered desirable or necessary – promote
it. In this sense, we need to treat difference not simply as an inevitable given, but,
rather, as an enriching and meaningful challenge built into the fabric of social life.
One of the main problems with the project of modernity is that its construc-
tion process is motivated by the faith in the possibility of commensurability.7 To be
exact, at the heart of modernity appears to lie the firm belief in the notion that –
in principle – all factual, moral, and aesthetic components of the social world
are both measurable and comparable in terms of universally applicable standards.
A key task arising from the condition of postmodernity, therefore, is the critical
engagement with incommensurability.8 This concern requires us to acknowledge
the fact that the existence of contingent cognitive and behavioural comfort zones –
sustained by constative, normative, and evaluative principles, which are una-
voidably variable, malleable, and negotiable – describes a constitutive feature of all
socially constructed realities. From this perspective, there are no nonsubjective,
intersubjective, or subjective parameters capable of transcending the sociohistori-
cal specificity of their own context-dependent determinacy.
Modern standards of commensurability are generated on the basis of the errone-
ous assumption that both the reproduction and the transformation of social life
can be examined in terms of one single human condition. The postmodern insist-
ence upon the inextricable link between the construction of sociality and the
existence of incommensurability, by contrast, is inspired by the conviction that
the intersectional constitution of social reality needs to be explored in terms of a
plurality of human conditions, that is, in terms of an infinite multitude of relation-
ally constituted realms, none of which can claim to possess ontological primacy.
Suspicious of monolithic accounts of social life, those subscribing to the eclectic
agendas proposed by the politics of identity, difference, and recognition9 aim to face up
to the normative challenges arising from the permanent construction and recon-
struction of humanity in terms of variety and multiplicity, thereby rejecting the
totalizing quest for universality. Thus, postmodern approaches require us to question
the legitimacy of universalist accounts of society and explore the possibility of differ-
entialist models of politics in general and of citizenship in particular.10 Considering
the sociological significance of group-specific differences and particularities, the
viability of differentialist models of citizenship depends on their ability to overcome
at least three crucial shortcomings inherent in universalist models of citizenship:

A. Universalist models of citizenship tend to treat equality as sameness

(totalization).
B. Universalist models of citizenship tend to homogenize the heterogeneous
(hegemonization).
C. Universalist models of citizenship, by seeking to transcend group-specific dif-
ferences, in practice tend to exclude and disempower particular social groups
(marginalization).11
174 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

This tripartite universalization process is profoundly contentious insofar as, in a

given historical context, it reinforces the privileged status of the most powerful
social groups and the unprivileged status of the least powerful – individual or
collective – actors. Far from being reducible to a neutral and disinterested state of
affairs, it constitutes a power-laden and interest-laden mechanism contributing to
the vertical reproduction of society. ‘To totalize sameness means to suppress the
other, not to recognize it. To hegemonize the heterogeneous means to colonize
difference, not to respect it. And to marginalize the disempowered means to fur-
ther exclude them, not to integrate them.’12
If we take these reservations and objections seriously, then we need to acknowl-
edge that the ideal of universal citizenship is a deeply controversial project. On the
one hand, owing to its categorical commitment to the principle of equality, it
appears to be theoretically appealing. It can be thought of as an ideological frame-
work oriented towards creating both the symbolic and the systemic preconditions
for processes of emancipation. On the other hand, considering its tendency to
strengthen – and, effectively, to legitimize – social processes dictated by mechan-
isms of totalization, hegemonization, and marginalization, it appears to be practi-
cally flawed. It can serve as an institutional framework that reinforces both the
symbolic and the systemic requirements for mechanisms of domination.
In light of the aforementioned normative ambivalence, which seems to be built
into universalist models of citizenship, the question that remains is whether or
not it is possible to develop a non-universalist approach to empowering forms of
participation capable of recognizing and promoting, rather than ignoring and
transcending, group-specific differences and particularities:

In a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insist-
ing that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and
experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce that privi-
lege; for the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate
this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups.13

Differentialist models of citizenship aim to do justice to the sociological sig-

nificance of group-specific beliefs, values, and practices. Arguably, such a project
involves the challenge of ensuring that the multiplicity of actor-specific par-
ticularities within highly differentiated societies is reflected in the construction
of a plurality of citizenships. This means that we are confronted with the task
of extending T. H. Marshall’s three-dimensional framework – founded on civil,
political, and social rights14 – to a multidimensional conception of citizenship –
based on a large variety of socio-specific rights –, thereby taking into account the
material and ideological complexities faced by individual and collective actors
living in highly differentiated societies.
Potentially, then, complex societies may generate numerous forms of citizen-
ship: civil, political, social, economic, cultural, reproductive, sexual, national,
transnational, and global – to mention just a few possibilities.15 Universalist mod-
els of citizenship may be accused of effectively subscribing to the motto ‘through
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 175

sameness and equality against difference’. Differentialist models of citizenship,

by contrast, advocate the principle ‘through difference against sameness and
inequality’.
Opposed to the totalizing logic of difference-blind political agendas, the
Zapatistas in Mexico – arguably the first postmodern guerrilla – are known to
have coined the following aphorism: ¡Queremos un mundo en el que quepan muchos
mundos! (‘We want a world in which many worlds fit!’).16 It is obviously a highly
controversial question whether or not the Zapatistas can be described as a post-
modern guerrilla. The point here, however, is not to discuss whether or not this
characterization is appropriate, but, rather, to illustrate the extent to which one
of their main slogans fits into the model of differentialist citizenship in particu-
lar and into the idea of a postmodern politics in general. In practice, this means
that postmodern approaches to politics do not ignore or transcend, but, on the
contrary, acknowledge and promote the sociological significance of difference,
thereby facing up to the challenge of attributing meaning to the multiplicity of
particularities that exist in all human realities, most notably in highly differenti-
ated societies.

(ii) Society-as-a-Project versus Projects-in-Society

Rather than pursuing the modern obsession of searching for large-scale utopias,
postmodern approaches to politics are concerned, first and foremost, with explor-
ing the viable conditions underlying individual and social forms of autonomy in
the construction of everyday life. Postmodern political agendas – when seeking to
account for what matters, in a fundamental sense, to the human experience of
reality – focus on the immediacy of people’s lifeworlds, rather than on the functional
rationality governing the reproduction of social systems. This is not to suggest
that systemic differentiation processes are irrelevant to the critical analysis of
society; this is to acknowledge, however, that ordinary social relations, rather than
abstract institutional entities, are the starting point of postmodern politics.
To the extent that the quest for human sovereignty is driven by the obsession
with hypothetical scenarios situated in a utopian future, the search for a politics
oriented towards the realization of emancipatory potential is doomed to failure.
Postmodern conceptions of autonomy emphasize the normative significance of
the ‘here and now’, rather than the imaginary power of the ‘there and tomorrow’.
From this angle, one of the key problems with traditional notions of politics is
their tendency to treat the existence of the multiple struggles over individual and
collective forms of autonomy as a relatively insignificant issue to be dealt with in
distant horizons of the yet-to-come. Such a reductive view, however, fails to take
into account that, in the social world, the search for autonomy is always already
part of the immediate present. The point is not, of course, to give the mislead-
ing impression that a tangible lifeworld is all that counts. Nonetheless, while a
critical engagement with both the past and the future is central to postmodern
conceptions of politics, their emphasis on the ‘here and now’ is motivated by the
conviction that we must avoid treating human actors as mere instruments for the
176 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

ideological pursuit of an abstract societal project situated in a hypothetical yet-

to-arrive scenario.
By locating the search for autonomy in the immediate present, postmodern
approaches to politics discard the teleological agenda of modernity. The telos
oriented towards a remote future is abandoned in favour of the preoccupation
with the seizable present. What matters is not an abstract goal in the yet-to-come,
but the concrete path in an always-already existing reality. In brief, what counts is
not the meta but the narrative. From a postmodern perspective, however, there
is no point in simply locating the project of the future in the present, since there is
no such thing as ‘the project’. One of the most ambitious undertakings attached to
the condition of modernity has always been the goal-oriented – and, ultimately,
evolutionary – development of society. Various major political ideologies whose
conceptions of history follow this teleological logic are obsessed with the notion
of society-as-a-project. This applies not only to socialism and to fascism, but – given
its optimistic belief in human progress – also to liberalism. The condition of post-
modernity, on the other hand, does not exist as a unified endeavour – not even for
those who seek to defend its historical significance. Rather, its eclectic discourses
are constituted by a multiplicity of concerns and ventures, as reflected in the
notion of projects-in-society.17 The centrality of these discourses manifests itself
in the commitment to putting the key conceptual ingredients of the postmod-
ern menu on the agenda: ‘alterity’, ‘autonomy’, ‘heterogeneity’, ‘idiosyncrasy’,
‘incommensurability’, ‘intersectionality’, ‘irreducibility’, ‘locality’, ‘multiplicity’,
‘particularity’, ‘plurality’, and ‘subjectivity’. All of these terms are vital expressions
of recent attempts to account for both the real and the representational complex-
ity of highly differentiated societies.
To be sure, the spirit permeating postmodern politics is not anti-projective but
multi-projective. It has always been one of modernity’s greatest dreams to treat
society as the central project of humanity. Yet, for supporters of the postmodern
Zeitgeist, this vision is a nightmare. The ideological motivations behind ambitious
endeavours inspired by the notion of society-as-a-project play a pivotal role in the
modern attempt to strive for ideological and organizational totality. By contrast,
the anti-totalitarian intuitions underlying the numerous undertakings associated
with projects-in-society allow for the possibility of facing up to the multifaceted
challenges arising from a social reality characterized by unprecedented degrees of
both discursive and interactional complexity.
It is worth mentioning that the substantial differences between the modern
politics of society-as-a-project and the postmodern politics of projects-in-society come
to the fore in the ideological and organizational points of divergence between
‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements. To put it simply, most ‘old’ social movements are
associated with the modern paradigm ‘society-as-a-project’, whereas ‘new’ social
movements tend to focus on the realization of multiple ‘projects-in-society’.
The normative tension between the determination – shared by old social move-
ments – to construct society ‘from the top down’ by taking control of the state, on the
one hand, and the ambition – pursued by new social movements – to reconstruct
society ‘from the bottom up’ by mobilizing civil society, on the other, illustrates that
there is a deep normative gap between the institutionalism of traditional politics
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 177

and the autonomism of postmodern politics. This substantial difference can be

conceived of in terms of the discrepancy between ‘early modern’ and ‘modern’ con-
ceptions of participation, predominant in industrial societies, on the one hand, and
‘late modern’ and ‘postmodern’ conceptions of participation, prevalent in postindus-
trial societies, on the other. Arguably, over the past two centuries, we have been
witnessing a paradigmatic shift from the ‘premodern’ and ‘early modern’ preoccu-
pation with the seizure of power and the ‘modern’ concern with the participation in
power to the ‘late modern’ or ‘postmodern’ search for the autonomy from power.18
In essence, modern politics is defined by its location within and orientation
towards the state, which constitutes the chief institutional apparatus through
which decision-making processes in large-scale societies are organized. Yet, both
the material and the ideological underpinnings of modern politics are called into
question by new social movements. The idea that ‘civil society’ serves as the social
realm in which autonomous re-empowerment takes place challenges the norma-
tive authority of the state, which is no longer regarded as a legitimate vehicle for
genuine political empowerment. ‘A reappropriation of citizenship must not sim-
ply be tied to an abstract set of rights guaranteed by the “rule of law”, but address
the deeper bases of social power.’19 Such a reconceptualization of social power
permits us to draw a useful analogy: ‘new’ social movements seek to overcome the
étatisme of ‘old’ forms of collective mobilization, just as ‘new’ forms of citizenship
aim to go beyond the étatisme of ‘old’ forms of collective representation.20 In this
sense, the rise of both ‘new’ social movements and ‘new’ forms of citizenship is
symptomatic of the unprecedented complexity with which both individual and
collective actors are confronted in highly differentiated societies.
In advanced pluralistic societies, public spheres21 are shaped by a remarkable
diversity of social movements: proletarian; ethnic; religious; feminist; environ-
mentalist; anti-racist; anti-fascist; peace; squatter; student; youth; lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender; civil rights; and animal rights – to mention only a
few.22 The thematic eclecticism of the political landscape in advanced societies
illustrates that increasing discursive and interactional differentiation is a constitutive
feature of the postmodern world. If we acknowledge the gradual complexification
of advanced societies, then we are obliged to call the universalist assumptions
underlying large parts of modern politics into question. New social movements
are divided by an infinite plurality of political and cultural projects, that is, by
diversified ‘projects-in-society’. At the same time, however, they are united by the
conviction that we need to give up the illusions of traditional modern politics,
notably any ambitions to pursue the dream of ‘society-as-a-project’, which is cen-
tral to the agendas of most old social movements. In this sense, it appears that new
social movements embrace the postutopian orientation of postmodern politics.
The postmodern suspicion towards societal projects is expressed – perhaps, most
poignantly – in one of Lyotard’s most influential politico-philosophical pleas: ‘Let
us wage a war on totality.’23 Modernity pervades society with the aim of narcis-
sistically imposing itself as the material and ideological centre of the universe.
By contrast, postmodernity is, first and foremost, characterized by the existence
of infinite particularities. While large parts of traditional modern politics are still
preoccupied with painting the big picture, postmodern debates on the possibility
178 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

of social change draw attention to the eclectic existence of small pictures or, if one
prefers, daily snapshots. Postmodern approaches to politics, then, challenge the
modern imposition of ideological and systemic forms of totality by cultivating a
situationist sensibility for the colourful landscape of countless particularities. Put
differently, in a politics oriented towards the realization of human autonomy and
the recognition of cultural particularities, there is no room for the narrow and
narrowing pursuit of social totality.

(iii) Clarity versus Ambiguity

Postmodern approaches to politics reject the allegedly modern obsession with the
search for clarity. Instead, they focus on the challenges arising from the profound
ambiguity of social life, which may be conceptualized – on different levels – in terms of
the intrinsic ‘contradictoriness’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘fragility’, ‘fluidity’, and ‘ambivalence’
of the human condition. From a postmodern perspective, the development of social
life cannot be predicted by virtue of scientific rationalities, which are – by and large –
inspired by the search for evidence-based clarity and whose advocates tend to
find it difficult to accept the ineluctable presence of countless forms of ambiguity.
Rather than presenting flawless solutions, the point of postmodern endeavours –
which endorse the idea of constantly inventing and reinventing politics – is to set
themselves the task of posing open questions. Instead of placing our raison d’être in
the clear-cut future of a utopia, postmodern thought locates the key normative chal-
lenges faced by individual and collective actors in the immediacy of the present.
It seems, then, that the grand panorama of systemic promises belongs to the
delimited and delimiting world of modernity, whereas the tangible realm of ordin-
ary experiences receives its well-deserved attention within the challenging horizon
of postmodernity. The self-centred and monolithic macrosubject of modernity has
passed away. The decentred and fragmented microactors of postmodernity have
entered the scene. Being determinedly undetermined, their only determination is
to overcome the self-invented determinacy of the modern subject.
At the centre of postmodernity lies the centrelessness of highly differentiated
societies. It appears that, in the current era, modern narratives about ‘emancipa-
tory subjects’ have lost credibility; the postmodern era is shaped by multiple
microactors, none of whom can claim to possess a monopoly on obtaining ultim-
ate insights into the nature of social developments. In the postmodern world, the
historical protagonists are ordinary actors, rather than political elites, proselytizing
enlighteners, or professional ideologists. For what is crucial to postmodern con-
ceptions of politics is people’s immediate experience of the challenges and contra-
dictions permeating their everyday lives, rather than abstract ideological dogmas
removed from quotidian realities.
The postmodern landscape, which requires us to live – that is, to be able and
prepared to live – with existential ambivalence, ‘simultaneously delimits and
opens our horizons’.24 It delimits our horizons in that it constitutes a space of pos-
sibilities whose real and imagined context forms the sociohistorical background of
our actions. It opens our horizons in that it represents a space of possibilities with
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 179

material and symbolic resources that we can mobilize in order to shape our own
history through the creative power inherent in human agency.
If the modern subject has ceased to exist, this is due to the radical decentredness
of the postmodern condition. There is no ‘last instance’ apart from the immedi-
ate present, nothing to ‘unmask’ apart from the modern mask, and nothing to
‘discover’ apart from the modern cover story. The search for the ‘revolutionary
subject’ through the monolithic construction of modernity has been widely
discarded in favour of the exploration of subjectivity in the centreless context of
postmodernity. The former is founded on the belief in the existence of a motor of
history, rather than on a critical engagement with contingency. The latter is based
on a genuine concern with the role of subjectivity, rather than on the ideological
invention of a subject-centred teleology.
Under the parameters dictated by the project of modernity, subjectivity exists
at best as a peripheral category, since the architects of large-scale ideological
projects appear to be interested in human actors only to the extent that they are
reducible to puppets of an essentially predetermined course of history. All of the
major political ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – notably,
anarchism, communism, socialism, liberalism, conservatism, and fascism – put
the human subject at centre stage. Modernity’s anthropocentrism is inconceiv-
able without the ideological construction of the subject. Under the condition of
postmodernity, by contrast, the subject is decentred, thereby placing subjectivity
at the centre of a centreless existence. In the face of postmodernity’s interstitial
constitution, we are left with no choice but choice, that is, with almost unlimited
exposure to ambivalence owing to our immersion in freedom:

Unlike science and political ideology, freedom promises no certainty and no

guarantee of anything. It causes therefore a lot of mental pain. In practice, it
means constant exposure to ambivalence: that is, to a situation with no decidable
solution, with no foolproof choice, no unreflective knowledge of ‘how to go
on’. […] Lacking modernity’s iron fist, postmodernity needs nerves of steel.25

Those subscribing to some of the most influential dogmas of modern politi-

cal ideologies will find it difficult to face up to the omnipresence of existential
ambivalence. Whereas modernity’s impossibility derives from its stubborn belief
in its own possibility, postmodernity’s possibility stems from its unpretentious
insistence upon its own impossibility. Postmodern thought urges us to be clear
about the ineluctable presence of the existential ambiguity that is built into the
very condition of humanity.

Summary

As demonstrated in this chapter, the impact of postmodern thought on recent

debates concerning the nature and purpose of politics must not be underestimated.
The critical analysis of the differences between modern and postmodern concep-
tions of politics illustrates the normative implications of the various paradigmatic
180 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

shifts that have shaped the development of the social sciences over the past
decades. The rise of the ‘politics of identity’ – inextricably linked to the ‘politics
of difference’ and the ‘politics of recognition’ – is indicative of the increasingly
widespread acceptance of the idea that the quest for human autonomy plays a
pivotal role in the construction of empowering social realities. This is reflected in
the fact that contemporary accounts of participation and representation processes
have been profoundly influenced by what may be described as the autonomous
turn in politics. As argued above, the discrepancy between modern and post-
modern politics manifests itself in several normative tensions, three of which are
particularly significant: (i) equality versus difference, (ii) society-as-a-project versus
projects-in-society, and (iii) clarity versus ambiguity.

I. Postmodern approaches to politics are categorically non-categorical, encour-

aging creative attentiveness to difference and alterity, rather than succumbing
to the stifling obsession with equality and uniformity.
II. Postmodern approaches to politics propose to abandon the pretentious idea of
society-as-a-project in favour of a far more modest concern with projects-in-society,
rooted in the implosion of ideological and systemic forms of totality and
inspired by the search for empowering sources of autonomy.
III. Postmodern approaches to politics, insofar as they dare to deconstruct the
romantic dream of utopian clarity and solutions, promote the recognition of
ambiguity and ambivalence, thereby moving away from the totalizing logic
of a transcendental subject and, instead, exploring the resourceful potential of
decentred subjectivities.

From this perspective, normative categories need to be decategorized, ontological

centres need to be decentred, and ideological myths need to be demythologized.
In a nutshell, postmodern thought seeks to overcome the pretentious determinacy
of modern politics by facing up to the radical indeterminacy of complex societies.

Towards a New Politics?

The aforementioned antinomies – that is, equality versus difference, society-as-a-

project versus projects-in-society, and clarity versus ambiguity – are crucial to the criti-
cal examination of the main presuppositional differences between modern and
postmodern approaches to politics. There are numerous further aspects, however,
which need to be taken into account in the attempt to grasp the principal points
of divergence between modern and postmodern conceptions of meaningful action
coordination in relation to the construction of ‘the political’. Surely, one may
object that the very distinction between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ notions of
politics is problematic, given that their respective conceptual frameworks overlap
to a significant extent and that, in addition, only few theorists overtly and whole-
heartedly endorse either explicitly ‘modern’ or explicitly ‘postmodern’ understand-
ings of politics. In other words, not only are the alleged differences between
these two camps blurred, but, moreover, the terms ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 181

can hardly be regarded as two popular labels used by scholars, intellectuals, or

laypersons to describe their ideological or discursive allegiances. Notwithstanding
the difficulties attached to the task of drawing analytical distinctions aimed at
contributing to an astute comprehension of recent and current trends in debates
concerned with the nature of politics, important insights can be obtained from
differentiating between modern and postmodern approaches to politics. This shall
be illustrated by reflecting on the following conceptual antinomies, the first three
of which have already been mentioned. In light of their paradigmatic centrality,
it makes sense to consider each of them in detail.
(1) ‘Equality’ versus ‘difference’: This antinomy has normative implications
on various levels, notably with regard to the following oppositions: ‘uniform-
ity’ versus ‘alterity’, ‘sameness’ versus ‘otherness’, ‘singularity’ versus ‘plurality’,
‘monotony’ versus ‘variety’, ‘homogeneity’ versus ‘heterogeneity’, and ‘universal-
ity’ versus ‘particularity’ – to mention only a few. The defenders of the project of
modernity tend to embrace an anthropocentric understanding of reality, founded on
a universalist conception of humanity. On this view, individuals should be treated,
first and foremost, as human subjects, irrespective of the multiple – notably social,
economic, cultural, ethnic, sexual, gender-specific, and ideological – differences that
separate them from one another. The advocates of the condition of postmodernity,
by contrast, tend to endorse a centreless understanding of reality, based on a particu-
larist conception of agency. On this account, there are both human and nonhuman
actors in the universe, and there is no reason why the former should be considered
more distinctive than, let alone superior to, the latter. According to this perspec-
tive, human beings should be conceived of as performative actors, whose subjec-
tivity is contingent upon the specificity of their socially constructed – and, hence,
both context-dependent and constantly shifting – sense of identity. Following the
parameters of modernity, a key function of emancipatory politics is to treat people
in terms of the a priori equality between all members of humanity. Following the
spirit of postmodernity, on the other hand, a vital purpose of empowering politics
is to account for the de facto differences between embodied carriers of sociality.
To the extent that ‘it is possible to have justice without truth’26 but with ‘the
recognition of heterogeneous language-games’,27 empowering politics cannot be
divorced from the construction of ‘discursively constituted’28 realms of normativ-
ity capable of including potentially excluded – individual and collective – mem-
bers of society. Arguably, such an ambitious task involves a shift from the modern
concern with ‘the self’ to the postmodern engagement with ‘the other’:

[…] if modernity was about the centrality of the Self, postmodernity reflects a
turning to the Other. From a concern with equality – a struggle for the recognition
of the sameness of the Self and Other – postmodernity is about the struggle for
the recognition of difference.29

Owing to its commitment to defending an ‘ethos of pluralization’,30 postmod-

ern politics invites us to embark upon ‘a search for the Other, or the Other in the
Self’.31 In an arguably Derridean spirit, postmodern approaches to politics are
182 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

embedded in a radically intersubjectivist ethics ‘defined as the infinite responsibility

of unconditional hospitality’,32 in which there is room not only for the legitimate
and empowered members of society, but also for the sidelined and disempowered
actors relegated to the fringes of vertically structured realities. ‘Postmodern ethics
is an ethics of proximity, of responsibility for the Other.’33 Analogously, postmod-
ern politics is a politics of immediacy, of practical engagement with the Other. Put
differently, it constitutes a politics of ‘particularized universalism’,34 in the sense
that its only principle of universality is its categorical commitment to the defence
of marginalized actors and unvoiced realities.
Postmodern politics, then, can be described – at the same time – as a ‘politics of
identity’, as a ‘politics of difference’, and as a ‘politics of recognition’:

A. As a politics of identity, it defends the right to individual and collective forms

of performative expressivity as long as this does not involve the discrimination
of other members of society.
B. As a politics of difference, it advocates the right to individual and collective
forms of sociocultural idiosyncrasy, irrespective of whether people belong, or
think they belong, to group-specific minorities or majorities.
C. As a politics of recognition, it endorses the right to individual and collective
forms of public visibility, sustained through both the quotidian and the insti-
tutional acknowledgement of relationally constituted identities constructed,
and constantly reconstructed, within spatiotemporally situated communities.

Arguably, ‘[t]he “struggle for recognition” is fast becoming the paradigmatic form of
political conflict in the late twentieth century’35 and, most likely, will continue to
be of great significance throughout the twenty-first century. The ‘recognition of
“different voices”’,36 different identities, different belief systems, different social
practices, and different life forms is central to demonstrating that – to recall an
influential aphorism of second-wave feminism – ‘the personal is political’.37 In
other words, the seemingly most private aspects of human existence are pro-
foundly public, in the sense that the struggle for recognition of one’s identity
cannot be reduced to the realm of subjectivity but takes place within the wider
context of society, which is pervaded by – relatively arbitrary – symbolic and
material hierarchies of legitimacy.
‘Postmodernist thought, in attacking the idea of a notional centre or dominant
ideology, facilitated the promotion of a politics of difference’,38 thereby drawing
attention to the dangers arising from marginalizing processes by means of which
members of discriminated or disempowered groups are ‘defined or “othered” as
inferior with respect to’39 members of dominant and empowered sections of soci-
ety. To be sure, both legitimization and delegitimization mechanisms can be real-
ized on multiple levels – in particular, on economic, political, ideological, cultural,
ethnic, sexual, gender-specific, generational, and physical grounds. It is open to
question whether or not power is – or, at least, can be – ‘used in all societies to
marginalize subordinate groups’.40 Yet, regardless of whether one considers social
marginalization processes to be a historical contingency or an anthropological
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 183

invariant, the detrimental – and, possibly, pathological – consequences of power

dynamics can be sought to be minimized by virtue of an inclusive ‘politics of
identity, difference, and recognition’.
What much of anti-classist, anti-elitist, anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-ageist, and
anti-ableist projects have in common with postmodernism is that they condemn
‘the legitimating metadiscourse’41 put in place to ensure that those who, in a par-
ticular realm of social life, have the upper hand in the present continue to do so in
the future. The ambition to seek both individual and collective forms of empower-
ment able to oppose this is vital to the idea of a postmodern politics. Rather than
conceiving of the self as ‘autonomous, rational, and centred, and somehow free of
any particular cultural, ethnic, or gendered characteristics’,42 we need to acknowl-
edge that an actor’s numerous dispositions internalized in relation to other mem-
bers of society, as well as an actor’s manifold positions occupied within different
spheres of an asymmetrically structured reality, need to be taken into account in
order to generate an empowering ‘politics of difference’. Hence, we are confronted
with ‘a new kind of emancipation, one of a liberation of difference’:43

Emancipation, here, consists in disorientation, which is at the same time also

the liberation of differences, of local elements, of what could generally be called
dialect. With the demise of the idea of a central rationality of history, the world
of generalized communication explodes like a multiplicity of ‘local’ rationalities –
ethnic, sexual, religious, cultural or aesthetic minorities – that finally speak up
for themselves.44

In other words, the struggle for the recognition of differences, expressed in the multi-
plicity of spatiotemporally constituted particularities, lies at the heart of postmod-
ern politics. Accordingly, postmodern politics can be characterized by reference to
various significant normative features:

a. its ‘deliberate open-endedness’45 (anti-dogmatism);

b. its ‘infinitely skeptical and subversive attitude toward normative claims, insti-
tutional justice and political struggles’46 (anti-conventionalism);
c. its advocacy of ‘trans-social networks of mutual recognition and arrange-
ment’47 (anti-parochialism);
d. its preparedness not only to appreciate but also to ‘celebrate diversity’,48 along
with its conviction that ‘plurality is preferable to singularity, difference to iden-
tity, otherness to sameness’49 (anti-universalism);
e. its critical engagement with the emergence of ‘a multi-cultural and fragmented
civil society’50 (anti-monoculturalism);
f. its willingness to challenge traditional ‘ideas of national commonality’51
insensitive to ‘the multiple parts of the marginalized’52 and voiceless
(anti-nationalism);
g. its ability to destabilize ‘the configuration and perceived transmission’53 of
dominant cultural identities reproduced on the basis of ‘hegemonic memory
politics’54 (anti-hegemonism);
184 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

h. its attack on mechanisms of ‘social exclusion, domination and subjugation’55

(anti-exclusionism);
i. its insistence upon the fact that complex societies require post-traditional
models of citizenship capable of ‘incorporating a sensitivity to “difference”’56
(anti-monism); and
j. its open-minded readiness to experiment with ‘multiple projects’57 embedded
in constantly shifting structures of ‘intersectionality’58 (anti-traditionalism).

In short, postmodern approaches to politics are committed to acknowledging the

distinctive normative weight, and power-laden implications, of social differences.
Given the ample use of metaphors in writings concerned with postmodern
thought, it may not be an enormous surprise to notice that the ‘politics of differ-
ence’ may be conceived of as a ‘politics of mapping’59 inspired by a ‘multiperspectiv-
ist’60 understanding of social existence.

Different people use distinctive maps to make sense of the world, deploying
divergent ideas, models, and theories to organize their experience, to orient
themselves in their environment, and to reduce multiplicity and disorder to
structure and order. Mappings also help construct personal identities, point-
ing to ways of being in the world, existential options, and sense-making
activities […].61

Such a multiperspectivist politics of mapping aims to do justice to the norma-

tive significance of the fact that, in order to attribute meaning to their exist-
ence and to the world by which they happen to be surrounded, people need
to mobilize their – socioculturally specific – symbolic resources. Indeed, they
need to develop the ‘ability to switch identities’,62 permitting them to survive
in the jungle world of multiple social roles, which they are expected to take
on within contexts of increasingly diversified realities. ‘Postmodern theory’,63
therefore, ‘seeks novel mappings to represent emergent social conditions, economic
shifts, sciences, technologies, experiences, and identities in the contemporary
moment’.64
‘Postmodern metacartography’65 derives from the various attempts to account
for the increasing complexity of highly differentiated societies. It is important to
remember, however, that – as illustrated in their scepticism towards ideological
blueprints and grand narratives – postmodernists do not seek to draw utopian
maps. ‘Utopian maps depart from the distinction between what is and what can
be, between actuality and potentiality, as they envision the realization of possibili-
ties for human freedom, charting the “not-yet”.’66 Postmodern maps, by contrast,
are based on the distinction between life forms and language games, between
world-inhabiting and world-viewing, as they picture the spatiotemporal contin-
gency underlying all symbolic representations of reality. Of course, one may fol-
low a Blochian conception of humanity by insisting that hope constitutes both
an anthropological invariant and an anthropological driving force.67 The fact
that ‘there are utopian longings in all the great philosophical, religious, and aesthetic
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 185

mappings, desires that yearn for a better world and sketch visions of a good life’68
appears to corroborate this assumption. Postmodern conceptions of politics, how-
ever, are postutopian in the sense that their motivational background horizon is
far more modest, focusing on the present, rather than on the future, on the path of
struggle and subversive resignification, rather than on the abstract goal of sublation
(Aufhebung), and on the critical engagement with friction and contradiction, rather
than on an illusory orientation towards complete – individual and collective –
self-realization.
In light of the postutopian spirit permeating not only postmodern politics
but also, in a broader sense, the postmodern condition, it is not surprising that
‘“[r]ecognition” has become a keyword of our time’.69 The paradigm of recognition,
however, has been defended not only by intellectuals whose work is – rightly or
wrongly – associated with postmodern perspectives, but also by scholars whose
writings are firmly situated in the tradition of the Enlightenment project, particu-
larly those drawing upon Hegelian70 ideas and, more recently, upon Honnethian71
and Taylorian72 forms of social and political analysis. One of the reasons for
this paradigmatic revival is the fact that ‘Hegel’s old figure of “the struggle for
recognition” finds new purchase as a rapidly globalizing capitalism accelerates
transcultural contacts, fracturing interpretative schemata, pluralizing value horizons,
and politicizing identities and differences’.73 In structurally fragmented, culturally
heterogeneous, and systemically differentiated societies, diversified struggles for
recognition are ‘interimbricated’,74 reflecting the impact of ‘crosscutting axes of dif-
ference’75 on conflicts over the distribution of material and symbolic resources. The
development of intersectionalist approaches to ‘the social’ has profound normative
implications for contemporary understandings of justice.76 Somewhat schematic-
ally, it is possible to distinguish two main types of justice claims, both of which
have had, and continue to have, a significant influence on contemporary concep-
tions of social struggle.

A. There are ‘redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution of resources
and wealth’77 – for instance, a fairer ‘redistribution from the North to the
South, from the rich to the poor, and (not so long ago) from the owners to the
workers’.78 Owing to the rise of neoliberalism and the corresponding revival
of free-market policies in large parts of the world, advocates of redistributive
models of justice have been ‘on the defensive’,79 finding themselves in an
increasingly weak position in recent decades.
B. There are recognitive claims,80 which aim for a more just recognition of identities
and differences, especially of those of relatively marginalized and disempowered
members of society, who may suffer the consequences of domination based
on class, ‘race’, ethnicity, culture, ideology, religion, gender, age, or ability – or
on other sociologically relevant variables.81 Given the growing impact of mul-
ticulturalism and the parallel resurgence of inclusivist policies in numerous
societies around the world, proponents of recognitive models of justice have
been on the offensive, benefiting from a gradually more influential position in
the contemporary era.
186 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

In short, whereas the former model endorses social-democratic politics oriented

towards the redistribution of income and wealth, the latter model advocates multi-
cultural politics oriented towards the recognition of group-specific identities and differ-
ences.82 Surely, it may be legitimately objected that this twofold categorization is
founded on a false opposition and that, more importantly, ‘justice today requires
both redistribution and recognition’.83 In other words, if it is the case that ‘neither
redistribution alone nor recognition alone can suffice to overcome injustice
today’,84 then it is also true that ‘they need somehow to be reconciled and com-
bined’,85 rather than being considered and treated as mutually exclusive. The shift
from modern to postmodern conceptions of politics is reflected in the transition from the
‘paradigm of redistribution’ to the ‘paradigm of recognition’ and, hence, from the univer-
salist concern with ‘equality’ to the particularist engagement with ‘difference’.
The challenging task that remains, however, is to explore the extent to which
the ‘paradigm of redistribution’ and the ‘paradigm of recognition’ can be theor-
etically and practically cross-fertilized, with the aim of contributing to both
individual and collective forms of empowerment in socially heterogeneous set-
tings generated within both small-scale and large-scale environments. In order to
take on the challenge of intersectionality, we need to accept that, in the age of
plurality, ‘we are never simply the member of a single community’,86 but, rather,
tension-laden participants of multiple – relationally constituted, spatiotemporally
contingent, and constantly shifting – networks of sociality.
(2) ‘Society-as-a-project’ versus ‘projects-in-society’: This antinomy has
normative implications on several levels, especially with regard to the following
oppositions: ‘power-oriented’ versus ‘power-sceptical’, ‘ideological’ versus ‘postide-
ological’, ‘purposive’ versus ‘expressive’, ‘functional’ versus ‘aesthetic’, ‘totalizing’
versus ‘fragmented’, and ‘futurist’ versus ‘presentist’ – to mention only a few. The
sociohistorical significance of these antinomies can be illustrated by comparing
and contrasting ‘old social movements’ and ‘new social movements’ in relation to
the following levels of analysis: (a) aims, (b) ideology, (c) social base, (d) orientation,
(e) organization, (f) power, and (g) context.87
(a) Aims: ‘Old social movements’ tend to be oriented towards the transforma-
tion of social order, thereby conceiving of society as a project. In this sense, they are
concerned with having a transformative impact on society as a whole, rather than
on particular elements or spheres of reality. ‘New social movements’, by contrast,
tend to be oriented towards the alteration of social values, thereby endorsing spe-
cific projects in society. They seek to challenge hegemonic norms and principles
by developing, and experimenting with, alternative discursive and behavioural
patterns of subversive legitimacy. Thus, they aim to break with widely accepted
orthodoxies by inventing interactional realms in which ordinary people are able
to mobilize their empowering – that is, purposive, cooperative, and creative –
resources, in order to contribute to the well-being of grassroots communities.
(b) Ideology: ‘Old social movements’ tend to be guided by metanarratives,
mobilized in order to capture the universality of the big picture of society. These
‘grand stories’ can be primarily political, philosophical, religious, economic, or
cultural. Regardless of their ideological specificity, however, they are driven by
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 187

the ambition to grasp the entire complexity of both the nature and the develop-
ment of society with the aim of transforming it in accordance with the universal
interests of humanity. ‘New social movements’, on the other hand, tend to be
motivated by micronarratives, advocated in order to do justice to the particularity
of small pictures within society. These ‘case-specific stories’ can focus on a variety
of issues: the environment; peace and war; nuclear power; civil rights; human
rights; animal rights; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights; indigenous
rights; rights of landless or nationless people; deliberative and direct democracy;
individual and collective autonomy – the list goes on and on. Hence, rather than
being motivated by grand-scale political ideologies, their practices and discourses
are issue-related, shedding light on the specificity and irreducibility of local hap-
penings and realities.
(c) Social base: ‘Old social movements’ tend to be homogenous and monolithic, in
the sense that their social base is defined by sociological variables such as ethnic-
ity, ‘race’, religion, class, or gender. Accordingly, they represent the group-specific
interests of collective – and, potentially, collectively organized – actors. In fact,
the ideological metanarratives that they endorse are largely shaped by the specific
interests that they possess, and seek to defend, as group-specific actors; at the
same time, however, they claim to pursue these interests in the name of human-
ity, rather than in the name of a minority. Conversely, ‘new social movements’
tend to be heterogeneous and hybrid, in the sense that their social base transcends
sociological variables such as ethnicity, ‘race’, religion, class, or gender. Generally,
they are able to draw support from socially diverse actors, thereby bypassing
traditional patterns of interest politics – commonly defined in terms of ‘left’ and
‘right’ and, correspondingly, in relation to specific economic, cultural, or ideologi-
cal interests.
(d) Orientation: ‘Old social movements’ tend to be oriented towards the state,
that is, they seek to generate – and, if required, steer – social transformations
from above. In this sense, they are willing to use conventional and institutional
means in order to organize themselves and pursue their political and ideological
goals. One key aspect of their strategic approach to triggering social change of one
sort or another may be to conquer the power of the state, in order to shape the
development of society ‘from the top down’. ‘New social movements’ tend to be
oriented towards civil society, that is, they endeavour to bring about social transfor-
mations from below. Accordingly, they endorse grassroots activities, rather than
mainstream politics, and they advocate self-empowering forms of deliberative and
direct democracy, rather than old-fashioned mechanisms of delegation and repre-
sentation. One central dimension of their attempt to ‘get their message across’ to
the public is to promote alternative values, lifestyles, and identities, with the aim
of having an impact on the development of society ‘from the bottom up’.
(e) Organization: ‘Old social movements’ tend to be organized in formal, bureau-
cratic, and vertical ways. They may be characterized as ‘institutionalist’ and ‘con-
ventionalist’ to the extent that they are not necessarily opposed to mainstream
forms of social and political organization, but, on the contrary, willing to accept
the existence of internal and external hierarchies in order to achieve their aims
188 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

and objectives. On this view, the general goal is more important than the particu-
lar means employed to realize it. ‘New social movements’ tend to be organized in
loose, flexible, and horizontal ways. They may be described as ‘autonomist’ or ‘alter-
nativist’ to the extent that they are suspicious of institutional and conventional
forms of social and political organization. Aiming to undermine the existence of
both formal and informal hierarchies, they seek to protect and defend people’s
individual and collective autonomy not only internally, within their own realms
of organization and mobilization, but also externally, in the multiple domains of
interaction within society as a whole. From this perspective, the means are no less
important than the various goals.
(f) Power: ‘Old social movements’ – in their moderate forms – aim to share
power with other major political players or – in their radical forms – seek to seize
power and thereby monopolize it. They are largely power-affirmative, in the sense
that they aim to gain power – notably state power – in order to defend the inter-
ests of their members and shape society in accordance with their goals and aspira-
tions. In line with this strategy, attaining structural and institutional power is the
only way of having a substantial impact upon the material and ideological devel-
opment of society. By contrast, ‘new social movements’ – in their moderate forms –
propose to avoid power, including the strategic games played in order to obtain
it, or – in their radical forms – opt to reject power altogether. They are essentially
power-sceptical, in the sense that they resist the idea that conquering, or even con-
fiscating, power – especially state power – is the way forward. What they contend,
instead, is that – in most cases – the instrumentally driven obsession with power
can have massively detrimental consequences, obstructing the construction of a
society in which as many people as possible have access to material and symbolic
resources for meaningful action. Following this approach, an emancipatory soci-
ety is a coexistential formation in which, in principle, all members are enabled to
develop their potential, permitting them to empower both themselves and others –
irrespective of their economic, ethnic, cultural, gender-specific, generational, or
physical background.
(g) Context: ‘Old social movements’ emerged in early modern and industrial
societies. In this sense, their existence is indicative of the ‘age of metanarratives’.
Indeed, they may be regarded as both products and producers of modern soci-
ety: not only do they reflect, but they have also contributed to, the arrival of
an unprecedented historical formation, inspired by the teleological spirit of the
Enlightenment and shaped by the materialist imperatives of industrialism. ‘New social
movements’ began to enter the scene in late modern and postindustrial societies.
Consequently, their existence epitomizes the ‘age of micronarratives’. In fact, they
may be considered as both products and producers of postmodern society: not
only are they a sign of, but they have also played a pivotal role in, the construction
of an unprecedented historical formation, impregnated with the ironic attitude of
radical scepticism and influenced by the postmaterialist priorities of postindustrialism.
The paradigmatic significance of the relationship between ‘old social move-
ments’ and ‘new social movements’ manifests itself in the major referential
relevance attributed to this conceptual distinction in the sociological literature
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 189

on contemporary forms of collective mobilization.88 Arguably, the shift from

‘old’ to ‘new’ social movements is symptomatic of a transition from ‘modern’
to ‘postmodern’ politics, most significantly in terms of the aforementioned
developments:

a. from society-as-a-project to projects-in-society;

b. from metanarratives to micronarratives;
c. from relatively homogenous and monolithic to increasingly heterogeneous and
hybrid social bases;
d. from an orientation towards the state to an orientation towards civil society;
e. from formal, bureaucratic, and vertical to loose, flexible, and horizontal forms of
organization;
f. from power-affirmative to power-sceptical;
g. from industrial to postindustrial relations and thus, arguably, from a modern to a
postmodern context.

(3) Clarity versus ambiguity: This antinomy has normative implications on vari-
ous levels, notably with regard to the following oppositions: ‘determinacy’ versus
‘indeterminacy’, ‘simplicity’ versus ‘complexity’, ‘transparency’ versus ‘opacity’,
‘straightforwardness’ versus ‘multifariousness’, ‘intelligibility’ versus ‘obscurity’,
and ‘certainty’ versus ‘uncertainty’ – to mention only a few. The normative cen-
trality of these antinomies derives from the fact that the difference between ‘mod-
ern’ and ‘postmodern’ politics tends to be conceived of in terms of the question
of the extent to which human actors are capable of coordinating their practices in
large-scale societies in objectively viable, normatively defensible, and subjectively
desirable ways. Indisputably, the pursuit of both individually and collectively
empowering politics has been a major theoretical and practical challenge faced by
human beings since the emergence of purposively motivated, communicatively
coordinated, and performatively generated modes of coexistence – that is, since
the rise of teleologically, morally, and dramaturgically constituted forms of action.
The construction of humanity is inextricably linked to the creation of political
normativities.
In the twenty-first century, it is far from obvious what the main discursive
and substantive problems arising from this age-old debate are, let alone how
they should be tackled. There is little doubt, however, that ‘[t]he question of the
politics of postmodernism has been the source of its greatest controversy’.89 One
may consider different social-scientific approaches, for instance, in the tradition
of Marxism,90 phenomenology,91 critical hermeneutics and critical theory,92 social
movement theory,93 or critical sociology.94 What these research canons have in
common is that – despite the various presuppositional differences that separate
them from one another – they illustrate that ‘there is today, after two decades of
political and cultural disappointment, an opening up of new theoretical positions’.95
Hence, in order to acknowledge the impact of postmodern thought on the con-
temporary humanities and social sciences, we need to grapple with the ‘increasing
commonalities between postmodernism and other approaches’.96 The multiple – and,
190 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

arguably, unexpected – similarities between postmodern and non-postmodern

accounts in the present era are – perhaps most significantly – expressed in the
gradually more widespread concern with issues described in terms of ‘ambiguity’,
‘indeterminacy’, ‘complexity’, ‘opacity’, ‘multifariousness’, ‘obscurity’, and ‘uncer-
tainty’, as well as in terms of ‘multicausality’ and ‘polycentricity’. All of these
characteristics are now widely perceived as constitutive features of highly dif-
ferentiated societies and, thus, of the political arrangements put in place in order
to regulate and coordinate people’s practices within pluralized regimes of action.
To put it simply, it appears that complex societies require complex forms of
citizenship.97 Owing to the intricacy attached to the construction processes
underlying the development of highly differentiated social settings, a postmod-
ern politics can be conceived of as a politics without guarantees. As such, it stands
for a postutopian politics, that is, a critical approach to the organization of social
life in which programmatic blueprints are largely discredited and, therefore, have
little – if any – place. The modern ‘politics of solutions’, motivated by the search
for control and clarity, appears to have been gradually replaced by a postmodern
‘politics of questions’, inspired by the recognition of uncertainty and ambiguity.
In such a postutopian climate, the emphasis has shifted from the modern obses-
sion with rationality and regulations to the postmodern defence of playfulness
and ambivalence:

I seem to have entered the ‘postmodernist’ discourse […]. I desperately sought

a generic name for a large set of intuitions: that despite modern ambitions the
war against human waywardness and historical contingency is unwinnable, that
the resistance of human modality to logic and rule is here to stay, and that the
modern crusade against ambivalence and the ‘messiness’ of human reality only
multiplies the targets it aims to destroy. ‘Postmodernity’ fit the bill nicely.98

The postmodern concern with the challenge of existential contingency is embed-

ded in ‘a commitment to human being as free possibility’,99 that is, it is motivated
by the belief in the ‘possibility of a rehumanization’100 based on the radicalization
of openness and acceptance of constant resignification. Postmodernity, in this
sense, constitutes ‘a castrated modernity’101 or ‘a disempowered modernity’,102
capable of ‘admitting its own impotence, a disempowered modernity stripped
of the confidence that the end is round the next corner or the corner after the
next’.103 Such a ‘noncommittal and open-ended’104 attitude is prepared to face up
to the profound normative ambivalence of modernity, especially with regard to its
simultaneous celebration and repression of freedom. From a postmodern perspec-
tive, ‘the guiding motif of the modern adventure was to deploy human freedom
in the construction of a world that would make freedom redundant’.105 One of
the great ironies of the modern project consists in the fact that, on numerous
occasions, it has effectively undermined the attainment of freedom in the name
of freedom. It is for this reason that various scholars concerned with the creation
of empowering forms of politics have ‘welcomed the advent of “postmodernity”
first and foremost as a blow against arrogance, as an act of debunking and disavowing
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 191

the replacement of the urge to transcendence and redemption with the marching orders
towards a managed history and the thousand-year kingdom of Reason’.106
Irrespective of whether or not one comes to the conclusion that, under the
condition of modernity, ‘[t]here is more impulse to destroy than to build’,107 it
is hard to overlook the fact that the productive forces created by technologically
advanced societies have often turned out to be destructive forces driven by instru-
mental modes of rationality. The experience of genocide on a mass scale and
environmental destruction on a global level belong to the condition of modernity
no less than its empowering civilizational achievements. If, however, we view ‘the
triumphant return of ambivalence from its modern exile as itself an ambivalent
affair’,108 then the analysis of the key features underlying the contemporary era
becomes even more complicated. The ‘stubbornly ambiguous world’109 in which
we live is a universe characterized by both freedom and constraint, hope and fear,
bright and dark sides.110 Put differently, ‘the present situation is a contradictory
amalgam of progressive and regressive, positive and negative, and thus highly
ambivalent phenomena, all difficult to chart and evaluate’.111
Of course, the point is not to suggest that the modern project is in any way
less shot through with degrees of ambivalence than the postmodern condition.
Rather, the purpose of this reflection is to emphasize that – arguably – both the
recognition and the problematization of existential ambivalence112 are more central to,
and more explicit within, postmodernity than in any hitherto existing historical
formation. Hence, it is the task of a postmodern politics not only to draw atten-
tion to this ambivalence but also to insist upon the need to grapple with, and
make us aware of, the consequences of its existence. One may, or may not, seek
to capture this historical transition in terms of a paradigmatic shift ‘from solidity
to liquidity’.113 Admittedly, the popularity of ‘flow paradigms’114 is not unique to
postmodern vocabularies, for the aphorism that ‘all that is solid melts into air’115
has been crucial to the attempt to capture the unprecedented dynamism inherent
in the spirit of the modern condition. ‘Liquid modern society is one that does not
hold any particular shape for long. Life in a “liquid” environment is such that one
cannot rely on anything to remain fixed: nothing lasts, nothing stays the same.’116
Another significant element of the postmodern context, however, is the increas-
ing liquidization, not only of society as a whole but also of individuals’ life stories
within radically disembedded and disembedding coexistential settings:

Individuals cannot use past events and experiences to navigate their

futures […].117

[…] liquid life is a precarious life, lived under conditions of constant uncertainty.118

The fleeting era of postmodernity – or, if one prefers, of liquid modern society119 –
describes a historical context in which ‘we do not want things to last’120 and in
which, more significantly, ‘we fear things that “stick” around’.121 The viability of
a postmodern politics depends on its capacity to minimize the disempowering
effects of this ‘liquid condition’, while maximizing its empowering potential in
192 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

the interest of everyone involved in, and affected by, the construction of a soci-
ety based on experiences of radical contingency and ineluctable ambiguity.122
(4) ‘Ideological’ versus ‘postideological’: Far from being associated exclu-
sively with postmodern conceptions of politics, the thesis that, from the late
twentieth century until the present day, we have been witnessing the gradual
end of ideology123 is widely known in the contemporary social sciences. According
to this contention, the development of the modern period cannot be divorced
from the sociohistorical impact of at least five ‘major’ political ideologies: anar-
chism, communism/socialism, liberalism, conservatism, and fascism. In addi-
tion to these five ‘major’ political traditions, there are several related, and often
cross-integrated, ‘sub-major’ political ideologies – notably nationalism, feminism,
and environmentalism, but also diverse religious belief systems. It is worth
pointing out that, in this context, ‘sub-major’ does not mean that these ideolo-
gies are, or have been, less influential than the ‘major’ political traditions of
modernity. Rather, the term ‘sub-major’ implies that they represent relatively
elastic and adaptable sets of normative thought, which can be incorporated in,
hijacked by, and cross-fertilized with the ‘major’ political ideologies of the past
two-and-a-half centuries.
Hence, we are confronted with the emergence of multiple hybridized political
ideologies. One can think of numerous combinations between ‘major’ and ‘sub-
major’ political ideologies:124

• anarchist feminism, socialist feminism, liberal feminism, or conservative

feminism;
• socialist nationalism, liberal nationalism, conservative nationalism, or fascist
nationalism;
• anarchist environmentalism, socialist environmentalism, liberal environmen-
talism, or conservative environmentalism;
• and so on and so forth.

Moreover, one may consider various combinations between ‘sub-major’ political

ideologies:

• feminist nationalism, environmentalist nationalism, or religious nationalism;

• nationalist feminism, environmentalist feminism/ecofeminism, or religious
feminism;
• nationalist environmentalism, feminist environmentalism, or religious
environmentalism;
• and so on and so forth.

Arguably, one of the distinctive features of the condition of postmodernity is

that the classical ‘big-picture ideologies’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centur-
ies have become relatively insignificant, both in terms of their contemporary
influence and in terms of their ability to adapt, and reinvent themselves, in the
face of recent and current global transformations. The rise of ‘[p]ostmaterialistic
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 193

values’125 – such as ‘freedom of speech, self-expression, experiences, tolerance, and

harmony’126 – reinforces the end-of-ideology thesis in the sense that the ideals and
principles associated with this normative shift are so elastic and open to interpre-
tation that they can be embraced by almost any political ideology.
To the extent that ‘the postmodern era is the time of a decentralized pluralism and
fragmentation’,127 it constitutes a historical period shaped by ‘individualistic individu-
als’128 who act in accordance with the motto ‘anything goes’.129 Hence, ‘in the post-
modern era all styles are permitted’130 and, both in theory and in practice, no mode
of existence can legitimately claim to be superior to any other. Just as there is an infi-
nite amount of life forms, there is an unlimited production of language games. The
postideological character permeating postmodern politics reflects the emergence of
an open-minded and playful Zeitgeist oriented towards overcoming the stifling and
self-imposed limitations of traditional normative yardsticks and imperatives.

Postmodern values are less or non-principled. The new values seem to be: irrever-
ence, nonconformity, noncommitment, detachment, anti-elitism, pragmatism, eclecti-
cism, and tolerance.131

In other words, rather than adopting a position of ideological dogmatism and

proselytism, inspired by the ambition to impose a particular – doctrinally moti-
vated – worldview upon all members of society, the postideological attitude of
postmodern politics seeks to do justice to the discursive heterogeneity of highly
differentiated societies and, consequently, to the multiplicity of constantly shift-
ing values and context-dependent standards embraced by actors with radically
decentred subjectivities. On this account, it appears that ‘[t]he modern era was a
time of rigid structures and consistency’,132 whereas ‘[t]he postmodern era requires
a kaleidoscopic sensibility and tolerance’,133 guided by ‘a taste for variety, incon-
gruity, heterogeneity, irony, double meaning, and paradox’.134 Undoubtedly, inso-
far as this absence of universal criteria of validity may be experienced as ‘shocking
for some and liberating for others’,135 it highlights the deeply ambivalent consti-
tution of the postmodern condition. The relentless going-back-and-forth between
the assertive quest for freedom and the accommodative search for security rep-
resents a constitutive feature of postmodern societies, which, to a large extent,
put the burden on individuals in having to navigate their way through highly
differentiated and heterogeneously structured realities, lacking universal reference
points and all-inclusive reference groups for the construction of one’s identity.
In fact, ‘[a]s a dominant ideology or style is absent, there is a demand in the
public sphere for lifestyle and identity information’,136 that is, there is a need to
provide a minimal degree of social regulation for individuals’ seemingly more and
more deregulated behaviours and beliefs. As a consequence, identity becomes a consum-
erist commodity – that is, a marketized attribute that can be shaped and reshaped, struc-
tured and restructured, signified and resignified by postmodern actors themselves.
The ‘politics of identity’ can be considered as symptomatic of this paradigm shift,
putting the increasingly personalized and individualized construction of selfhood
at centre stage. Surely, one’s identity may be based – primarily – on class, ethnicity,
gender, age, ability, religion, political ideology, status, or profession. One of the
194 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

pivotal points of a postmodern politics, however, is that it invites – and, indeed,

requires – actors to pick and choose when constructing a sense of who they are, or
who they want to be, in a given space and time.
In view of this preponderance of commodified freedom, fostered by capitalism,
it is no surprise that, ‘[i]n postmodern societies, marketing may play a key role in
giving meaning to life through consumption’137 and that, to a large extent, ‘market-
ing with its value realization [is] replacing ideologies and religion’.138 In fact, the
hyper-consumerist spirit may be interpreted as the principal ideology, or the chief
religion, of the postmodern era. Thus, ‘the cult of the individual’,139 crucial to
the modern project, has been radicalized by ‘the cult of identity’,140 central to the
postmodern condition. Consumerist individuals construct their identities by con-
verting the consumption of market-driven products into the raison d’être of their
immersion in reality. On this account, ‘life seems worth living’141 not ‘because
the world seems worth relating to’142 but, rather, because commodities seem worth
relating to. Of course, one may come to the cynical conclusion that in a society
in which ‘anything goes’143 one has to face up to the fact that, confronted with
the lack of unshakeable standards, ‘anything is at once acceptable and suspect’.144
In principle, anything is acceptable because there are no cognitive, normative, or
aesthetic criteria by virtue of which one set of validity claims can be considered
either superior or inferior to any other. In principle, anything is suspect because –
owing to this absence of direction, clarity, and commensurability – one easily gets
lost in the postideological jungle of playfulness and relativity.
‘In postmodernist terms, one might say that the end of the Cold War represented a
collapse of grand narratives’145 and, therefore, the beginning of the postideological era.
This epoch can be characterized as a historical period in which the major political
ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although they have not disap-
peared, have ceased to have significance in terms of their capacity to mobilize large
amounts of people and attract their explicit and unequivocal support. Irrespective
of whether, since the end of the Cold War, ‘the West has lost its cohesion because
it has lost its enemy’146 or whether, with the de facto disappearance of the systemic
competition between capitalism and communism, ‘the governing elites of societies
[…] have lost belief in any grand narrative of progress’,147 it is difficult to deny the
fact that mainstream political ideologies suffer from a ‘lack of credibility derived
from the absence of a shared framework of meaning’.148 In this light, one may
use various labels to define the spirit of the contemporary age: ‘post-teleological’,
‘postutopian’, ‘postsecular’, ‘postcolonial’, ‘postindustrial’, ‘postcommunist’, ‘pos-
trationalist’, ‘posthumanist’, or ‘postanthropocentric’. Whatever categorization
one may prefer to use in order to describe the character of the current era, the
assertion that ‘[p]ostmodernity is modernity devoid of its political project’149 seeks
to capture the essence of a major paradigmatic transition: the aforementioned shift
from ‘society-as-a-project’, central to the age of ideologies, to ‘projects-in-society’,
crucial to the age of decentred individual and collective subjectivities.
(5) ‘Liberalism’ versus ‘neoliberalism’: To be clear, there is no point in sug-
gesting that ‘modern politics’ is equivalent to ‘liberal politics’, while ‘postmodern
politics’ is tantamount to ‘neoliberal politics’. It is vital to acknowledge, however,
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 195

that the two components of each of these pairs are historically interrelated. It is
difficult to overlook the fact that the rise of modernity, along with the worldwide
influence of economic and political liberalism, was the most significant epochal
development from the eighteenth century until the late twentieth century. In a
similar vein, ‘[t]here is no doubt that postmodernism, along with neo-liberalism, was
the most influential theoretical development of the 1980s’.150 One may speculate
about the main reasons for the historical coincidence between modernity and
liberalism, on the one hand, and postmodernity and neoliberalism, on the other.
Furthermore, one may wonder to what extent terminological combinations such
as ‘liberal modernity’ and ‘modern liberalism’, on the one hand, and ‘neoliberal
postmodernity’ and ‘postmodern neoliberalism’, on the other, represent unhelpful
tautologies. Liberalism is an inseparable part of modernity, just as modernity is an
indivisible element of liberalism. Similarly, neoliberalism cannot be divorced from
postmodernity, just as postmodernity cannot be dissociated from neoliberalism.
At the same time as the triumph of liberalism in politics and economics reflects
modernity’s enchantment with society and individuality, ‘the victory of neo-
liberalism in politics and economics […] expresses that decade’s disenchantment
with the social’151 and the individual. Its celebration of networks of sociality draws
attention to culturally contingent and radically decentred subjectivities.
Arguably, neoliberalism is the most successful political project, with both
enthusiastic and cautious supporters – and postmodernism the most thriving
intellectual movement, with both passionate and reluctant participants – in the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Neoliberalism and postmodernism
may be regarded as two complementary endeavours in the sense that, while they
seek to revive the importance of ‘the economic’ and ‘the cultural’ respectively,
both are – for the right or the wrong reasons – associated with ‘the end of “the
social”’.152 ‘While neo-liberalism rejected the social for the economic, postmod-
ernism expressed the other side of the demise of the social: the turn to culture.’153
Paradoxically, then, the ‘economic turn’ and the ‘cultural turn’ represent two comple-
mentary paradigmatic transitions signalling ‘the crisis of “the social”’.154 The alliance
of mutual protection and cross-fertilization between these two discourses, how-
ever, has even deeper roots, in the sense that there are significant presuppositional
affinities between classical liberal and postmodern thought. ‘What liberalism and
postmodernism share is a strong privatism and a scepticism about the possibility
of universal validity and of foundations.’155 The neoliberal consolidation of consum-
erism, monetarism, and postindustrialism as well as the liberal defence of privatism,
pragmatism, and pluralism find a happy home in the postmodern celebration of play-
fulness, eclecticism, and relativism.
(6) ‘Society’ versus ‘culture’: By and large, the rise of cultural studies, par-
ticularly in Anglophone fields of the social sciences and humanities, has been
sympathetically received – and, in some cases, actively embraced – by advocates
of postmodern politics. As enthusiastic supporters of the ‘postmodern turn’ point
out, ‘cultural studies must work for an affirmative theoretical practice and a consti-
tutive political practice based on active and joyful passions’.156 More specifically,
‘politics is to be defined as, simultaneously, a constitutive and subversive dimension of
196 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

the social fabric’,157 that is, as a normative process capable of both constructing
and deconstructing, affirming and undermining, maintaining and destabilizing
established sets of social arrangements.
‘Transgression is now a cultural logic of recombination, discontinuities, fragmen-
tation’,158 and resignification. One may conceive of this tendency as ‘the political
neutralization of social content’,159 that is, as the depoliticization of ‘the social’ based
on the playful celebration of ‘the cultural’, thereby portraying the ‘postmodern
turn’ as an essentially ‘apolitical’160 and ‘uncritical’161 project. Alternatively, one
may interpret this development as the political re-problematization of social
content, that is, as the repoliticization of ‘the social’ motivated by the creative aes-
theticization of human life forms, thereby presenting the ‘postmodern turn’ as
a historical opportunity waiting to be realized by open-minded, reflective, and
self-empowered actors. Not dissimilar from paradigmatic tendencies in radical
modernism, in postmodernism ‘the aesthetic rebelled against the […] dimensions
of modernity’162 that were – imprudently and erroneously – ‘inspired by a belief in
the emancipatory power of technology’,163 by the triumphalist faith in the civili-
zational achievements of instrumental rationality, and by the scientifically driven
search for corroborative evidence in support of the forward-march of history.
One may make sense of the gradual unfolding of increasingly hybrid, frag-
mented, and decentred realities in terms of the preponderance of ‘the cultural’
over ‘the social’. In a similar vein, one may seek to give ‘the aesthetic’ a central
place within the resignification of coexistential arrangements under postmodern
parameters. Whatever understanding of the current condition one may wish to
support, however, it is imperative to reject naïvely optimistic conceptions of post-
modern politics. ‘As an autonomous institution, the aesthetic could enter everyday
life only either as a radical politics or as a depoliticized popular culture.’164 In other
words, just as the aestheticization of ‘the social’ can imply the radical politiciza-
tion and subversive problematization of coexistential relations, it can entail their
gradual depoliticization and conformative trivialization. Granted, ‘[p]ostmodern-
ism allows the aesthetic to enter everyday life’165 both with and ‘without political
implications’,166 in the sense that it can encourage both the politicization and the
depoliticization of ordinary interactions. The fact that postmodernism may stimu-
late the politicization of people’s lifeworlds, however, does not mean that its advo-
cates endorse the ideologization of everyday reality, in the strict sense of preaching
dogmas and utopian blueprints through the symbolic power of aesthetic forms.
Arguably, ‘[t]his is particularly apparent in the case of postmodern architecture’,167
which expresses a playful, but critical, concern with the spatial dimensions of
everyday life, rather than articulating a strategic interest in propagating specific
canons of ideological convictions.
The implosion of the rigid distinction between ‘high art’ and ‘low art’ – and, hence,
between ‘elitist’ and ‘popular’ cultural configurations – is central to the postmodern com-
mitment to the radical democratization of the production, distribution, and consumption
of aesthetic forms.168 Postmodern politics is committed to the questioning of tradi-
tional social hierarchies founded on class, ethnicity, gender, age, or ability. At the
same time, the ‘postmodern spirit’ is prepared to attack and ridicule established
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 197

symbolic orders based on distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low’, ‘sophisticated’

and ‘primitive’, ‘refined’ and ‘coarse’, and ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ expressions of
culture.169 Whatever one makes of the aestheticization of everyday life, which
manifests itself in the celebration of ‘the cultural’ and the apparent demise of ‘the
social’, postmodern conceptions of art, in particular, and of culture, in general,
tend to be more democratic and less elitist than those endorsed by its modern
predecessors.170
(7) ‘Reason’ versus ‘affect’: Of course, just as there are different types of reason,
there are different types of affect. Given the logocentric character of modern intel-
lectual thought in general and of modern politics in particular, however, it comes
as no surprise that, while the contemporary social sciences are equipped with a
whole arsenal of typologies of reason, this does not apply to the concept of affect,
although the latter has been given more attention in recent decades and, on
numerous occasions, been critically discussed in relation to the former, leading –
in some cases – to the announcement of the ‘affective turn’.171
Among the most common types of reason distinguished in modern social and
political theory are the following: substantive reason, instrumental reason, strate-
gic reason, purposive reason, traditional reason, practical reason, theoretical reason,
descriptive reason, communicative reason, discursive reason, analytical reason, and crit-
ical reason – to mention just a few. Perhaps, it is – above all – due to their seemingly
non-rational, non-systematic, and non-methodical nature that affects tend not to
be theorized in an equally typological fashion. This is not to suggest that it does not
make sense to distinguish different kinds of affect. Rather, this is to recognize that
the concern with the ontological significance of affect occupies, at best, a periph-
eral position on mainstream agendas of modern social and political thought. The
paradigmatic marginalization of the concept of affect in classical social and politi-
cal theory is – at least, partly – a result of the fetishization of reason,172 effectively
endorsed by scholars and analysts whose writings stand – implicitly or explicitly,
unwittingly or deliberately – in the tradition of the Enlightenment project.
One of the foundational – arguably, both anthropocentric and logocentric – pre-
suppositions underlying large parts of Enlightenment thought is the assumption
that human beings raise themselves above nature by virtue of reason. One may
draw upon Kantian, Cartesian, Hegelian, Leibnizian, or Habermasian frameworks
in philosophy. One may refer to Comtean, Marxian, Durkheimian, or Weberian
writings in sociology. One may allude to Smithian, Ricardian, Friedmanian, or
Keynesian models in economics. One may advocate Machiavellian, Hobbesian,
Lockean, Rousseauian, Saint-Simonian, or Schmittean approaches in political
theory. What all of these influential traditions of thought, despite the significant
differences that separate them from one another, have in common is that they
regard reason – however vaguely defined – as both a species-constitutive and a
species-generative capacity. As a species-constitutive capacity, it represents a distinctive
anthropological competence, that is, a civilizational resource of human beings –
and of human beings only. As a species-generative capacity, it stands for a produc-
tive anthropological competence, that is, an empowering resource mobilized in
order to shape the course of history – notably the development of modern society.
198 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

On this account, politics is the systematic attempt to draw upon the power of
reason with the aim of coordinating and regulating people’s actions, or in some
cases – particularly in dictatorial forms of government – with the objective of
controlling them. Certainly, this does not mean that presumably non-rational ele-
ments do not have a place in modern politics. On the contrary, emotions, feelings,
and sentiments can play a pivotal role in both the attainment and the exercise of
political power. In this respect, Max Weber’s tripartite typology of domination is
particularly useful:

a. traditional domination
(‘Obey me because this is what our people have always done’);
b. charismatic domination
(‘Obey me because I can transform your life’);
c. legal-rational domination
(‘Obey me because I am your lawfully appointed superior’).173

Undeniably, in all three forms of domination – particularly in the first and sec-
ond kinds of regime – affects do play a vital role. For people have to identify with
particular traditions, charismas, and legal systems in order to ‘feel’ that they are
legitimately represented by custom-based, personality-focused, or law-bound
forms of government. Yet, the Weberian prediction, and hope, that modern
societies would gradually shift towards the third – that is, legal-rational – type
of domination expresses the Enlightenment-inspired belief that reason-guided
modes of action would become increasingly influential in the construction of
both small-scale and large-scale normative realities.
Rejecting the teleological-rationalist spirit underpinning Weber’s tripartite
interpretation of domination, postmodern conceptions of politics emphasize
the central function of ‘affective forces and effects’174 in the construction processes
of highly heterogeneous, increasingly fragmented, and largely fluid modes of
existence. Such an affect-sensitive account of social life rejects not only ‘linear,
evolutionary models of agency and change’,175 but, in addition, rationalist and
logocentric conceptions of politics, leading to the establishment of utility-driven
normative regimes. Thus, in order to make sense of the relationship between
‘postmodernity and the political’,176 we need to be prepared to abandon founda-
tionalist approaches to human reality motivated by the modern obsession with
rationality. On this view, ‘the death of the foundational approach to political anal-
ysis’177 – that is, the need to push for a ‘political theory without foundations’178
and, hence, without the ‘scaffolding’,179 and without modernity’s logocentric
focus on reason – indicates that human beings are far more than the sum of their
rational thoughts and conscious considerations, just as social interactions are not
reducible to reciprocal encounters shaped by validity-oriented communication.
To the extent that ‘the postmodern self no longer possesses the depth, sub-
stantiality and coherence of the modern self’,180 we need to accept that the ‘clear
and crystalline world of rationality and rational choosing’181 constitutes little
more than a modern phantasy invoking the possibility of total control over
the multiple contingencies permeating our objective, normative, and subjective
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 199

realms of living. In a universe freed from the illusory belief in the kingdom of
an ultimately authoritative reason, there is ‘no cognitively privileged point of
observation, no “God’s Eye-View”’,182 no politics of whatever type of rational-
ity designed to relate the experiential force of affects to the margins of modern
history.
To accept, then, that ‘the personal is political’183 is to recognize that ‘the politi-
cal is emotional’.184 To make a case for ‘[e]xpressive and aesthetic conceptions of
the political’185 is to attribute central importance to the subjective and affective
dimensions of ‘the social’. In line with this conviction, ‘a reconceptualisation of
the political’186 requires accounting for the multiple ‘discursive, linguistic, psy-
chological and performative moments of political action’,187 which are irreducible
to epiphenomenal expressions of an underlying or overarching rationality to be
realized in the name of progress and civilization. Politics, understood in these
terms, is not only about ‘[r]easoning and community’188 but also, no less funda-
mentally, about ‘feeling and community’,189 that is, about every actor’s capacity to
develop a sense190 of belonging to, identification with, and responsibility towards
a particular social group. In the modern world, the philosophical obsession with
uncovering the transcendental laws of pure reason, practical reason, and aesthetic
judgement191 is translated into the political fixation on converting a particular
type of rationality into the ultimate arbiter of a perfectly organized society. In
the postmodern universe, by contrast, the purpose of taking affects seriously is to
acknowledge that there is no point in shaping normative realities unless their
inhabitants not only think but also feel that they are fully-fledged members of
their communities and societies.
(8) ‘Hegemonic’ versus ‘marginal’: It appears that, on balance, modern poli-
tics tends to be a politics of the powerful. Regardless of whether it is in the name of
democracy or by way of installing dictatorial regimes that the interests of those
able to impose their views upon the rest of society are defended, modern politics
is, by and large, driven by the determination to seize power or, at least, by the
ambition to participate in the distribution of power. Consequently, its protagonists
aim to hegemonize the discursive agendas and institutional mechanisms put in
place in order to regulate both the physical and the symbolic organization of real-
ity. Postmodern politics, on the other hand, seeks to be a politics of the powerless.
Irrespective of whether a particular social group is discriminated against on socio-
economic, ethnic, ‘racial’, gender-specific, sexual, generational, physical, or ideo-
logical grounds, postmodern politics tends to be motivated by the ambition to
empower people – particularly those belonging to relatively or almost completely
disempowered minorities – in their everyday lives. This mission is articulated in
the ‘politics of identity, difference, and recognition’, drawing attention to the fact
that individual and collective actors can be marginalized by the hegemonic forces
of society because of their identity, because they are different from the dominant
groups, and because they lack recognition and suffer from exclusionary processes
of misrecognition.
Given their critical engagement with the ongoing struggle between ‘the hegem-
onic’ and ‘the marginal’ in vertically structured forms of society, postmodern
scholars are concerned with the tension-laden ‘relationship between discourse
200 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

and power’.192 ‘A “discourse” here means a historically evolved set of interlock-

ing and mutually supporting statements, which are used to define and describe
a subject matter.’193 To be exact, a discourse constitutes a sociohistorically specific
ensemble of more or less logically interconnected validity and legitimacy claims, which
are implicitly or explicitly mobilized to attribute meaning to a particular – value-, power-,
and interest-laden – domain of reality from the point of view taken by an individual or a
collective actor occupying a relationally defined position within a given society.
Especially in highly differentiated societies, one may identify a large variety of
‘discursive practices’194 embedded in relationally constituted realms of interpreta-
tion and interaction: science, philosophy, religion, law, morality, medicine, art,
literature, education, economics, or politics – to list only a few of them. In every
discourse, ‘validity claims’ and ‘legitimacy claims’ are inextricably linked, since
the credibility attached to a particular set of assumptions depends on the context-
specific capacity to hold symbolic power exercised by the person defending them.195
Discourses, then, can have both a ‘power-enforcing function’,196 insofar as they can
confirm the hegemonic logic of particular coexistential arrangements, and a ‘power-
undermining function’,197 insofar as they can subvert established mechanisms of
domination by inventing and spreading counterhegemonic practices and beliefs.
In the human world, social life forms – no matter how hegemonic or marginal,
influential or peripheral, mainstream or unconventional, visible or invisible, domi-
nant or oppressed, recognized or misrecognized – generate language games, reflected
in ideological and behavioural discourses and serving either to reproduce or to
transform their existence. ‘The language game of the discourse expresses and enacts
the authority of those who are empowered to use it within a social group’,198 just as
it can challenge the legitimacy of those whose interests and convictions are at stake
in the eternal struggle for recognition. It seems that the creation of discourses inevi-
tably involves the construction of boundaries between hegemonic and marginal – that is,
between more empowered and less empowered – social groups:

Through discourse, power is transmitted and power in discourse serves to provide

co-ordinates of how people are situated in a social relations matrix. To construct
a self, one needs to determine how it is positioned in relation to the other [...].199

On this view, power should be conceived of not simply ‘as a possession, a capac-
ity or the property of people, socio-economic classes or institutions, but rather
as a complex matrix with its threads extending everywhere’.200 In other words, power
is relationally constituted.201 It is always in relation to one another that individual
and collective actors assert their position, and the power attached to it, within
society. A ‘dominant self’202 that is part of a dominant group may be defined, for
instance, as ‘middle or upper class’, ‘white collar’, ‘white’, ‘male’, ‘heterosexual’,
‘young’, ‘strong’, ‘healthy’, ‘independent’, or ‘able’ – or as an intersectional combina-
tion of some of these elements. A ‘serviceable other’,203 by contrast, may be character-
ized, for example, as ‘lower or under class’, ‘blue collar’, ‘non-white’, ‘female’, ‘bi- or
homosexual’, ‘old’, ‘weak’, ‘ill’, ‘dependent’, or ‘disabled’ – or as an intersectional com-
bination of some of these elements. Drawing upon key anti-essentialist and anti-sub-
stantialist insights from poststructuralist thought, the point of a radically relationalist
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 201

approach to politics is aimed at ‘[r]econceptualizing power’204 by acknowledging

that people’s capacity for action depends on their access to material and symbolic
resources, that is, on their relationally constituted position in society, rather than on
ontological attributes allegedly inherent in their subjectivity.
Expectedly, such a relationalist-discursivist conception of ‘the social’ contributes to
the complexification, rather than to the simplification, of explorative endeavours
oriented towards opening multiple possibilities for empowering forms of political
action. ‘The co-existence of multiple, overlapping and contradictory discourses
opens spaces for resistance, including liberating constructions of self.’205 It is by fac-
ing up to the contingency, fluidity, multiplicity, contradictoriness, and contestability
of ‘the social’206 that the relative arbitrariness of relationally established sets of coex-
istential arrangements can be exposed. One of the principal tasks of a postmodern
politics consists in undermining widely accepted codes of taken-for-grantedness, not
only by recognizing the radical openness of the most consolidated normativities
but also, more significantly, by challenging the hegemonic discourses put in place
in order to protect and legitimize the dominant positions occupied by the most
powerful groups in society, rather than drawing attention to the marginalized
sites inhabited by the relatively or completely powerless. ‘Where there is power,
there is resistance’;207 where there is domination, there is – at least potentially – the
possibility of struggle capable of opposing it; where there exists normativity, there
emerges the challenge to deconstruct and reconstruct it.
It is one of the paradoxes of the contemporary age, famously described in
terms of ‘the new spirit of capitalism’,208 that ‘the rhetoric of empowerment has
been used by conservatives to legitimate managerial and corporate policies and
practices’.209 Consequently, it appears that the empowering – that is, purposive,
cooperative, creative, and productive – potential inherent in labour,210 as well as
the reflective – that is, assertive, normative, expressive, and communicative –
potential inherent in language,211 are not suppressed but, rather, promoted and
re-appropriated by the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ and, hence, by the predominantly
neoliberal policies designed to defend and realize it. If we seek to ‘interrogate the
practice of empowerment from a postmodern critical perspective’,212 then we
are obliged to identify the mechanisms of disempowerment contributing to the
hegemonization of dominant normativities and to the further marginalization
of those already relegated to the fringes of society. A ‘new spirit’ that gives the
impression of universal – or, at least, widespread – empowerment, while effect-
ively furthering the interests of those in powerful positions and weakening the
capacity for action of those in relatively powerless situations, needs to be called
into question by a ‘postmodern spirit’ capable of converting the need for recogni-
tion into a political battlefield.
There is little doubt that ‘postmodern theorists raise important questions about
the nature of power, discourse, and writing in a global, networked cybersociety’213
shaped by diversified fields of action, each with its own logic of functioning, pro-
cesses of justification, and codes of legitimacy. The intersectionalist pursuit of a ‘pol-
itics of the powerless’ needs to be sufficiently realistic to accept the tension-laden
coexistence of hegemonic and counterhegemonic forces in society. Its pragmatic
realism, however, must allow for the possibility of questioning and, if necessary,
202 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

undermining consolidated normativities and, more importantly, of inventing new

experiential horizons with sufficient room for constructing counterhegemonic
modes of relating to, and acting upon, the social conditions of human existence.
There is no point in replacing one hegemonic set of relations with another; rather,
the challenge consists in subverting established meanings and practices by con-
stantly inventing new – and, potentially, more empowering – ones.
(9) ‘Ethnocentric’ versus ‘multicultural’: Large parts of modern politics can
be accused of being ethnocentric, in the sense that its advocates tend to portray
‘Western’ values and standards as if they were of universal significance and tran-
scended the spatiotemporal specificity permeating their context of emergence and
their scope of applicability. The project of a postmodern politics, on the other
hand, is multicultural, in the sense that its supporters are motivated by the attempt
to do justice to the codified contingency of all socially constructed realities and,
thus, to the situational relativity of all claims to normative validity. In the most
general sense, ‘the spirit of multiculturalism’214 concerns the idea of ‘cultures
moving closer together’.215 The socio-ontological centrality of cultures emanates
from the fact that they constitute ‘continuous modes of experience, action, and
thought’216 through which human beings mediate their relation to reality. To be
precise, culture can be regarded as both an anthropological specificity and an
anthropological invariant:

Culture constitutes an anthropological specificity:

Culture represents the human locus of existence, the place in which we need
to be immersed in order to be immersed in the world. In essence, culture
is an intersubjectively constructed realm of human encounter. We do not
only belong to the world and we do not only belong to our species, but we
also belong to different – temporally and spatially contingent – groups of
people that mediate our relation to the world and to ourselves as a species.
Intersubjective mediation is culture.217

Culture constitutes an anthropological invariant:

There is no society that could possibly exist without culture. What kind of
culture a specific social formation generates in a particular geographic and
historical context is anthropologically variable; that every social formation
generates culture in any geographic and historical context is anthropologically
invariable. […] Different human Lebensformen may have generated different
Kulturformen, but the construction of any human Lebensform is inconceivable
without the construction of a specific Kulturform. As cultural subjects, we are
society-generating subjects.218

The socio-existential significance of culture should be reason enough to take

multiculturalism seriously. One of the key functions of culture is ‘the satisfaction
of people’s material and mental needs’.219 This species-constitutive function, how-
ever, is far from unproblematic. For, given its codified contingency, culture can
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 203

provide us, at best, with an evanescent and arbitrary sense of ontological security:
‘Culture is always fallible […]. The possibilities of its realization depend on the
inexhaustible reciprocal mediation between subject and object. While an open
culture can fail, it can succeed only as an open one.’220 Culture, then, is a never-
ending process allowing human actors to establish a meaning-laden and value-
laden relation not only to their environments but also to themselves. Yet, insofar
as the meanings and values mobilized by interpretive creatures – when relating
to, and interacting with, the world – are in a constant state of flux, every cultural
arrangement, whether implicit or explicit, is contestable and malleable. Thus,
just as it is important to be aware of the fact that cultural arrangements are never
forever, it is crucial to take note of the fact that there are different – discipline-
specific – conceptions of culture:

The concept of culture can be given radically different meanings: for instance,
in sociology (culture as a social construction), anthropology (culture as a col-
lective life form), pedagogy (culture as education or Bildung), philosophy (cul-
ture as an existential source of species-constitutive transcendence), and the arts
(culture as an aesthetic experience).221

Irrespective of whether one favours sociological, anthropological, pedagogical,

philosophical, or artistic ways of defining culture, any genuinely critical approach
to multiculturalism needs to do justice to the manifold dimensions permeating
people’s meaning-laden and value-laden relations to the world. To the extent that
we need to conceive of ‘“contextuality” and “value-pluralism” as the core […] of
multiculturalism’,222 we need to accept that there are multiple social constructions,
multiple collective life forms, multiple models of education, multiple sources of
species-constitutive transcendence, and multiple aesthetic standards and experi-
ences. Hence, multiculturalism represents the explicit attempt to account for
performative multiplicity without ‘inferiorizing’ or ‘superiorizing’ particular life
forms and, hence, without endorsing the existence of arbitrary social hierarchies.
In accordance with the aforementioned meanings of culture, the following con-
ceptions of multiculturalism appear to be particularly important:

a. sociological multiculturalism
(concerning the multiplicity of social constructions);
b. anthropological multiculturalism
(concerning the multiplicity of collective life forms);
c. pedagogical multiculturalism
(concerning the multiplicity of models of education);
d. philosophical multiculturalism
(concerning the multiplicity of sources of human transcendence and self-
realization); and
e. artistic multiculturalism
(concerning the multiplicity of aesthetic standards and experiences).223

Surely, all of these types of multiculturalism are political in the sense that they
have to do with the normative organization of the social world. Speaking in terms
204 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

of an ideal-typical scenario, multiculturalism ‘in action’ (a) promotes a multiplicity

of social constructions, (b) incorporates a multiplicity of life forms, (c) accommodates
a multiplicity of educational models, (d) generates a multiplicity of purposive and crea-
tive modes of self-realization, and (e) provides room for a multiplicity of aesthetic
standards and experiences.
On a more critical note, however, one may object that, in recent years, the
label ‘multiculturalism’ has been converted into a commodity. Indeed, ‘the
consumption-focused multiculturality of a commodity-producing society’224 is not
informed by a postcolonial attitude opposed to ‘cultural claims to hegemony’225
with ‘Eurocentric and imperialist connotations’.226 Rather, it is driven by the
‘internationalization of the urban economy’227 and by the ambition to portray
‘the world as a multicultural happening’,228 enabling its inhabitants to pick and
select from a wide range of cultural and subcultural identities. On this view, the
multicultural universe constitutes a global supermarket of symbolic products.
Those who are granted the privilege of navigating their way through the global
village – by moving from city to city, from region to region, from country to coun-
try, or from continent to continent – resemble nomadic leisure tourists who hop
from restaurant to restaurant, trying out different menus and choosing different
dishes, with the aim of enriching their stock of experiential capital and without
solid ties to any particular place in the world. To be sure, this is not to contend
that exposure to cultural alterity through travelling and geographical mobility is
necessarily tantamount to a consumerist, superficial, and instant-gratification-
searching activity, lacking the capacity to bring about meaningful and formative
encounters with the complexities of socially hybrid realities. Rather, this is to
remark that, to the extent that both discourses and practices of multiculturalism
are degraded to consumerist commodities, the viewpoints of the unprivileged and
marginalized groups of society may be excluded from the picture, which is – in
fact – less harmonious, inclusive, and empowering than suggested by naïvely
romantic advocates of rainbow-like diversity.
Yet, it is not only the commodification of culture in general and the com-
modification of multiculturalism in particular that raise difficult normative ques-
tions when confronting the task of overcoming ethnocentric understandings of
politics. The ‘two-faced nature of the concept of multiculturalism’229 contains another
significant source of ambivalence, namely the ‘controversy regarding the tension
between particularist and universalist conceptions’230 of coexistential arrange-
ments. The normative tension between particularism and universalism – which is
intimately interrelated with the paradigmatic antinomies between relativism and
absolutism, contextualism and transcendentalism, pragmatism and deontologism –
permeates debates on the politics of culture no less than most other disputes con-
cerning the preconditions for the meaningful organization of social life. In this
respect, the ‘conflict between equality and difference’231 is especially important,
because it poses the challenge of conceiving of social actors as human beings, who
are – in principle – all equal (universalism), while, in addition, acknowledging that
they are cultural entities, who are – in practice – separated by positionally and
dispositionally contingent characteristics (particularism). Applied to the project of
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 205

multiculturalism, this presuppositional ambivalence requires us to reflect on the

following problem: the ‘demand for recognition of their specific cultural identity,
of their alterity’,232 is based on two central assumptions:

• first, on the universalist assumption that all human beings, regardless of their
background, have a right to cultural identity;
• second, on the particularist assumption that different human beings living in
different contexts and interacting with different environments develop differ-
ent cultural identities.

In its inclusivist forms, multiculturalism presupposes and endorses the ‘accept-

ance of multicultural diversity’233 as well as the ‘recognition of the potentially
equal value of different cultures’.234 In this sense, it is categorically opposed to
all variations of cultural chauvinism, including both hidden and overt modes of
hegemonic monoculturalism. The ‘specificity of individual and collective forms of
identity’235 needs to be not only appreciated but also promoted – and, if it is under
threat, even protected – by multicultural politics, to the degree that its supporters
are genuinely committed to constructing fair, inclusive, and non-discriminatory
societies.236 Yet, the project of constructing a well-functioning multicultural
society, sustained by empowering individual and collective practices, is far from
straightforward. Realistically, any multicultural society is shaped by at least three
crucial intercultural dynamics:

a. cultural protection (preservation and enclosure);

b. cultural interaction (contact and exchange);
c. cultural contestation (competition and conflict).237

These three intercultural dynamics can be described, in more detail, as follows:

A. In order to defend themselves from being influenced, or even colonized, by

other life forms, social actors can seek to protect their culture from being shaped
by other cultures, thereby aiming at the preservation – and, potentially, the
enclosure – of their own practices, norms, values, and standards.
B. In order to contribute to dialogue and engagement with other life forms, social
actors can seek to interact with members of other cultures, endorsing the crea-
tion of experiential realms based on direct contact and open exchange – as well
as, ideally, critical dialogue and intersubjective discourse – between members
with different backgrounds and identities.
C. In order to assert their civilizational superiority in relation to other life forms,
social actors can seek to hegemonize other cultures, targeting the imposition of
their own rules, conventions, and principles upon the codified lifeworlds of
extrinsic groups.

Of course, these are ideal-typical scenarios. As such, they give conceptually simpli-
fied accounts of empirically messy, multidimensional, and contradictory realities.
206 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

Dynamics of cultural protection inevitably contain dynamics of cultural interac-

tion and contestation. Dynamics of cultural interaction cannot claim to be entirely
isolated from dynamics of cultural protection and contestation. Dynamics of cul-
tural contestation involve, to varying degrees, dynamics of cultural protection and
interaction. Hence, in practice, these coexistential states of affairs unavoidably
overlap, constituting a continuum of possibilities for action and reaction.
Far from being reducible to merely micro-sociological modes of interaction,
however, these cultural dynamics represent – particularly in ethnically diverse
and systemically differentiated societies – processes shaped by macro-sociological
mechanisms, which are partly influenced – or even regulated – by interest groups,
organizations, institutions, governments, and states. Considering the above ideal-
typical scenarios, it is possible to distinguish three modes of cultural politics that
can be pursued in a given society:

a. segregation (separation, exclusion, and discrimination);

b. assimilation (absorption, adaptation, and adjustment);
c. integration (incorporation, negotiation, and communication).238

These three intercultural dynamics can be described, in more detail, as follows:

A. When following the paradigm of segregation, the cultural minority is kept separ-
ate from the cultural majority within a given society, or vice versa.239 In prac-
tice, segregationist models of cultural politics generate or reinforce policies of
separation, exclusion, and discrimination. In extreme cases, they are employed
by dictatorial, hyper-nationalist, fascist, and racist regimes. In moderate cases,
they are – at least partly – applied by democratic regimes whose governments
reject assimilationist and integrationist models of cultural politics and prefer
to introduce institutional mechanisms that prevent endogenous or exogenous
cultural minorities from interacting with members from the cultural majority
on a level playing field.
B. When following the paradigm of assimilation, the cultural minority is expected
to adapt to the cultural majority within a given society, or vice versa.240 In prac-
tice, assimilationist models of cultural politics trigger or strengthen dynamics
of absorption, adaptation, and adjustment. In extreme cases, they are imposed
by monoculturalist regimes. In moderate cases, they are – at least partly –
endorsed by democratic regimes whose governments reject segregationist and
integrationist models of cultural politics and favour institutional mechanisms
that oblige endogenous or exogenous cultural minorities to assimilate – and,
thus, learn to function in accordance with – the norms and conventions of the
cultural majority.
C. When following the paradigm of integration, the cultural minority is required
to coexist with the cultural majority within a given society, and vice versa.
In practice, integrationist models of cultural politics promote or support
processes of incorporation, negotiation, and communication. In extreme
cases, they are enforced by multiculturalist regimes. In moderate cases, they
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 207

are – at least partly – endorsed by democratic regimes whose governments

reject segregationist and assimilationist models of cultural politics and put
in place institutional mechanisms that require both cultural minorities and
cultural majorities not only to coexist peacefully but also, more importantly,
to engage with, learn from, and enter into critical dialogue with one another.

Yet again, it is imperative to stress that these three modes of cultural politics
represent ideal types, which overlap in reality and cannot escape the multilayered
constitution of society. The fiercest policies of segregation cannot obstruct the
emergence of processes involving social practices of assimilation as well as of
integration. The most consistent policies of assimilation cannot impede the occur-
rence of processes entailing social practices of segregation as well as of integra-
tion. The most effective policies of integration cannot do away with the existence
of processes implicating social practices of segregation as well as of assimilation.
Faced with the constraints, contradictions, and intricacies of empirical actualities,
these programmes of cultural organization necessarily intersect, constituting a
continuum of possibilities for social regulation and normative prescription.
It appears to be widely recognized that complex societies require complex forms of
citizenship241 and, more specifically, that – in light of ‘[t]he growing diversification
of ethnic groups, faiths, life forms, world-views’242 in multicultural societies –
we are confronted with the challenge of constructing a ‘multicultural citizen-
ship’.243 In other words, in order to create a sense of belonging and cohesion,
culturally heterogeneous life forms need to put in place institutional arrange-
ments capable of doing justice to the internal diversity of their materially and
symbolically differentiated realities. In this context, it comes as no surprise that
multiculturalism has become one of the most popular discourses in the contem-
porary social sciences.244
What has attracted remarkable attention, in this regard, is the globalization
of multiculturalism, that is, both its increasing practical relevance in relation to
numerous countries across the world and its growing theoretical relevance in rela-
tion to the conceptualization of key dimensions concerning transnational poli-
tics. It appears that ‘two levels at which multiculturalism is being globalized’245
play a pivotal role in the current era:

• first, the ‘global diffusion of the political discourse of multiculturalism’,246

owing to the fact that more and more societies consist of ‘multiethnic and
multicultural population[s]’;247
• second, the socio-legal ‘codification of multiculturalism’,248 expressed in the
formulation and defence of ‘international norms of minority rights’249 (UN,
UNESCO, etc.), transcending local, regional, and national boundaries.

Due to both the political and the socio-legal globalization of multiculturalism, the
aforementioned segregationist and assimilationist approaches are largely discred-
ited, whereas the integrationist modus operandi – epitomized in ‘newer “multi-
cultural” models of the state and of citizenship’250 – has gained in significance.
208 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

Surely, those who seek to defend the ‘ideal of liberal multiculturalism’251 empha-
size that ‘liberal multiculturalism is easier to adopt where liberal democracy is
already well established, and where the rule of law and human rights are well pro-
tected’.252 Indeed, the key ingredients of modern multiculturalism are constitutive
components of liberal democracy: diversity policies, cultural rights, community
rights, group rights, differentiated citizenship, pluralist constitutionalism, liberal
pluralism – to mention only a few.253
Crucial to such a liberal conception of multiculturalism is the recognition of the
ontological centrality of identity to the construction of both individual and soci-
etal narratives.254 Thus, not only is it important to acknowledge that ‘[p]ersonal
identity plays an indispensable role in human life’,255 but, moreover, it is impera-
tive to take note of the multilayered composition of identities, which is due to
the intersectional structuration of all – including relatively undifferentiated –
societies. The ontological interdependence of individual and society is powerfully
captured in the Meadian distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’.256 To the extent
that human actors develop contingent, fluid, pluralized, tension-laden, and nor-
mative selves,257 personhood constitutes an ensemble of interconnected character
traits, constantly shaped and reshaped in relation to particular social environ-
ments. ‘The human self is a vast continent inhabited by all kinds of desires,
memories, fears, anxieties, phobias, complexes, emotions and passions acquired
during the course of one’s life.’258 Not only would it be erroneous to reduce the
human self to a set of rational capacities, but it would also be misguided to ignore
its internally differentiated constitution. Multiculturalism reminds us of the fact
that the ‘[o]bsession with a single identity, be it religious, national or some other,
and the consequent subordination of all loyalties, relations and interests to it’,259
is potentially dangerous and politically undesirable. For the fetishization of one
sole aspect of one’s identity can lead not only to the subordination of other key
elements underlying one’s sense of selfhood but also to the reactionary exclusion
of typologically matching, but socially diverging, identities. Fundamental types of
identity are based on class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability; their significance,
however, is not only contextually contingent but also intersectionally constituted. In
other words, social selves are simultaneously shaped by the manifold components
of their identities. Since all sociological variables possess a cultural underpinning,
it is important to resist the temptation to essentialize any particular identity, let
alone any specific component of a particular identity, as if it represented a mono-
lithic and unchangeable given.260
Multiculturalist approaches, therefore, insist that, instead of ontologizing – let
alone ranking – different identities or components of these identities, it is vital to
recognize their social contingency. By definition, advocates of multiculturalism
are wary of the potentially disempowering consequences of establishing arbitrary
normative hierarchies aimed at ‘superiorizing’ or ‘inferiorizing’ individual or
collective actors within society. To put it bluntly, ‘marginalized and inferiorized
groups demand equal respect and treatment for their identities’,261 just as hegem-
onized and superiorized groups aim to assert – and, if necessary, defend – their
identities.
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 209

One of the pivotal issues widely discussed in recent debates on the challenges
faced by and within an increasingly ‘multicultural world’262 regards the question
of whether or not, in recent decades, global political developments have been sig-
nificantly affected – if not determined – by a ‘clash of civilizations’,263 as famously
claimed by Samuel Huntington.264 According to this thesis, ‘the quest for cultural
identity is a central human concern’;265 every society, in order for its members to
acquire both a feeling of belonging and an awareness of togetherness, ‘needs a
shared cultural basis, which gives it a sense of purpose and direction, shapes its
institutions and gives them legitimacy and vitality’.266 More specifically, we may
distinguish two levels of analysis in this respect.

• First, ‘[a]t the local level’,267 ‘cultural conflicts [take] the form of ethnic or tribal
conflicts’,268 presumably illustrating that the aforementioned integrationist and
assimilationist models have failed and that, in practice, segregationist dynamics
dominate the interaction between culturally diverse groups in ethnically het-
erogeneous social settings.
• Second, at the global level, cultural conflicts take the form of ‘a clash of civili-
zations’,269 ostensibly demonstrating that, in relation to the above-mentioned
three principal intercultural scenarios, the interactionist model – which is ori-
ented towards direct contact, open exchange, and critical dialogue between
cultures – has succeeded in establishing itself as the most viable option, but
that, at the same time, the protectionist model – oriented towards preservation
and enclosure of collectively habitualized criteria and practices – and the con-
testationist model – oriented towards competition and conflict between seem-
ingly incompatible modes of life – are effectively pursued by both small-scale
and large-scale political communities.

If one supports the thesis that, in recent decades, we have been witnessing a ‘clash
of civilizations’, then the obvious question arising is how many civilizations there
are in today’s ‘multicultural world’270 and on the basis of what criteria they can be
distinguished from one another. ‘A civilization is “the broadest cultural entity”,
the “highest cultural grouping of a people”, wider than tribes, ethnic groups and
national societies, but short of the species.’271 Following Huntington’s sociohis-
torical framework, we can identify ‘six and “possibly” seven civilizations’,272 which
can be compared and contrasted in terms of their culture-constitutive conven-
tions, norms, and values: ‘Western, Islamic, Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Latin-American
and “possibly” African’.273 According to this account, an idiosyncratic feature of
‘Western civilization’274 is that it is ‘deeply shaped by its Greco-Roman and Judeo-
Christian heritage’,275 that is, by a curious combination of secular and religious
influences. Given the history of this allegedly Western civilization, it appears, at
first glance, that the Judeo-Christian tradition is more elastic and open to modern
material and ideological transformations than other religious traditions. For not
only has it survived the profound secularization processes experienced by modern
societies, but, in addition, it seems that, in its recent past, it has gradually incor-
porated central principles associated with the Enlightenment project.
210 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

Particularly important in this respect is the tension-laden relationship between

reason and faith. In essence, when trying to make sense of this relationship, we
can distinguish two options.

• Option 1: One may claim that reason and faith are fundamentally incompatible,
in the sense that they represent two epistemically opposed ways of attributing
meaning to the world. On this view, reason is founded on principles of logic,
argument, and evidence – not only in scientific discourses, informed by rigorous
methods, but also, no less significantly, in ordinary discourses, constructed by
virtue of common-sense forms of interpreting and explaining different aspects
of reality. By contrast, faith is derived from projection, speculation, and belief. By
definition, it can do without the corroborating resources of critical rationality
mobilized in order to provide logical, convincingly argued, and evidence-based
accounts of particular aspects of reality.
• Option 2: One may assert that reason and faith are not only not as far apart
as they may appear at first sight, but that, furthermore, they are essentially
interdependent and – even if this may seem a counterintuitive insight – one
cannot exist without the other. Just as rationalists have a belief in reason,
believers may have good reason to believe and, indeed, spell out the grounds
on which to justify their convictions.276 Scientists subscribe – implicitly or
explicitly – to specific paradigms, sets of underlying assumptions, and belief
systems. Analogously, religious believers mobilize – deliberately or unwit-
tingly – reasons, arguments, and discourses with the aim of making a case for
their non-secular rituals and worldviews. According to this perspective, the
key challenge consists not only in exploring the extent to which reason and belief
presuppose one another, but also, more importantly, in opening a critical dialogue
between the two, with the objective of cross-fertilizing their respective civilizational
potential.277

Rejecting any kind of ‘cultural imperialism’278 that is disrespectful of the ‘rights

of ethnocultural minorities’,279 and opposing universalist pretensions underly-
ing ethnocentric conceptions of the world regardless of whether they are based
on reason or on faith, multiculturalist approaches insist on the sociohistorical
contingency of all attempts to assert objective, normative, or subjective intelligibil-
ity. Hence, ‘since every civilization has a distinct identity, none, including the
Western, can claim universal validity’.280 To the extent that every life form is an
expression of the spatiotemporal contingency permeating all modes of social-
ity, none – including those comprised of the seemingly most widely spread and
influential ones – can pretend to possess cross-cultural legitimacy with the right
to assert its own civilizational superiority. The mission of a multiculturalist poli-
tics, therefore, is to promote intercultural dialogue and diversity in the interest
of a humanity confronted with the task of redefining both its possibilities and its
limitations within the global network society.
(10) ‘Tribal’ versus ‘cosmopolitan’: In relation to postmodern approaches to
politics, this conceptual separation is far from straightforward. The main reason
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 211

for this is the following – normative – tension: on the one hand, cosmopolitan-
ism is committed to localism, in the sense that it seeks to take the specificities of
grassroots realities seriously; on the other hand, cosmopolitanism is committed
to globalism, in the sense that it insists on the context-transcending validity of
universal rights shared by all members of humanity.
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, there has been an explo-
sion of literature on cosmopolitanism.281 It is worth identifying key variants of
cosmopolitanism. Just as there are different currents and traditions within, or
associated with, postmodernism, there are several empirical orientations and
conceptual frameworks within, or linked to, cosmopolitanism. Arguably, four
cosmopolitan approaches are particularly important:282

a. ‘soft’ cosmopolitanism, which may be interpreted as a ‘consumer-driven cultural

appropriation’,283 central to branding-oriented modes of production, distribu-
tion, and consumption in the global culture industry;
b. ‘semi-soft’ cosmopolitanism, which demands ‘cultural awareness’284 and endorses
‘liberal multiculturalism’,285 placing the emphasis on ‘tolerance and rights’286
as well as on open-mindedness and inclusiveness;
c. ‘semi-strong’ cosmopolitanism, which encourages the idea of ‘mutual critical
evaluation’,287 notably in the Gadamerian sense of a ‘fusion of horizons’,288
expecting actors not to take a defensive attitude with regard to their own cul-
ture but, rather, to engage in democratic and empowering processes of ‘mutual
learning and recognition of diversity’289 with the aim of contributing to the
creation of an open society;
d. ‘strong’ cosmopolitanism, which supports the ambitious project of creating a
‘movement beyond diversity’290 embodied in the consolidation of a ‘common
normative world’291 shared by all human beings and sustained by adherence to
a number of first-order principles292 to which all morally conscious actors can
and should subscribe, irrespective of their sociocultural background, political
convictions, and ideological perspective on reality.

Unsurprisingly, advocates of postmodernism, or those sympathizing with it, tend

to embrace ‘soft’ as well as ‘semi-soft’ – and, possibly, ‘semi-strong’ – versions of
cosmopolitanism, while rejecting its ‘strong’ variants:

a. postmodernism’s playful celebration of cultural diversity not only fits into but also
promotes the commodifying logic of the global culture industry;
b. postmodernism’s provocative plea for the quasi-anarchic principle ‘anything goes’
finds a cosy home in the liberal universe of pluralist, perspectivist, and inclu-
sivist models of multiculturalism;
c. postmodernism’s categorical openness towards radical criticism – as the precondi-
tion for the construction of life forms based on mutual recognition, mutual
learning, and mutual respect – allows for the emergence of individual and
collective processes of empowerment capable of complementing, rather than
contradicting, one another;
212 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

d. postmodernism’s unambiguous refusal to embark upon the teleological search

for ‘context-transcending normative foundations’,293 transculturally applicable
criteria, and socio-ontological invariants, however, illustrates that there is not
much – if any – room for arguably futile inventions of universality within the
condition of postmodernity.

Of course, one may judge the respective merits and defects of the aforemen-
tioned forms of cosmopolitanism. When doing so, one may come to the conclu-
sion that the two soft variants of cosmopolitanism are somewhat ‘mainstream’
and ‘conventional’,294 in the sense that they do not advocate, let alone involve,
‘significant change’,295 whereas the two strong versions of cosmopolitanism may
‘entail stronger degrees of transformation’,296 implying not only the ‘possibility
of inter-cultural dialogue’297 but also, in a more radical sense, the necessity to
create a cosmopolitan culture in a multicultural universe, that is, a world culture
(Weltkultur) sustained by a minimum of context-transcending values, principles,
and conventions to which every human actor should adhere.
Moreover, it is possible to identify different nuances when comparing and
contrasting debates on cosmopolitanism in different regions of the world. In
particular, one may distinguish between ‘the American debate’,298 in which cos-
mopolitanism tends to be conceived of as a form of ‘transnationalism’,299 and ‘the
European debate’,300 in which cosmopolitanism tends to be discussed in terms
of the prospects for emancipatory models of ‘postnationalism’.301 In the former
context, the emphasis is placed on issues related to ‘hybridity and diasporic
identities’.302 In the latter setting, the interest is focused on the assumption that
‘national identity has been transformed by Europeanization’303 and that, as a
consequence, traditional models of state-bound citizenship have been eroded
and need to be revised in terms of the possibilities for generating postnational
forms of social and political participation. The question of whether or not it is
both possible and desirable in any of these two – or in any other – sets of circum-
stances to subscribe to the idea of cosmopolitanism with the aim of creating ‘a
global normative culture that transcends all rooted cultures, whether ethnic, local
or national’304 – oriented towards the construction of ‘a global commonwealth’305 –
remains open to debate. What is increasingly evident, however, is that any kind
of cosmopolitan politics – regardless of whether it is conceived of in universalist or
in post-universalist306 terms, and irrespective of whether it favours representational
and indirect or deliberative and direct models of democracy307 – needs to be ‘open to
a diversity of interpretations and applications’308 when seeking its own – perhaps,
ultimately unrealizable – realization.

Cosmopolitanism without and beyond Postmodernism

It is worth reflecting on the key presuppositional elements of cosmopolitanism,

particularly in terms of their relevance to contemporary developments in social
and political theory. Let us, therefore, consider 15 features of cosmopolitanism,
which, from a sympathetic point of view, merit being defended and which, in the
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 213

context of this study, are of vital importance insofar as they pose a serious chal-
lenge to the anti-foundationalist spirit underlying postmodern political agendas.
(1) Cosmopolitanism is a classical project. As such, it constitutes not only a central
but also a long-established tradition of intellectual thought within social and politi-
cal theory. Indeed, ‘[t]he idea of cosmopolitanism existed long before that of nation-
alism’309 and, while it can be found in the writings of prominent contemporary
intellectuals, it can be traced back to the works of classical Enlightenment thinkers.

• In the late eighteenth century, the suggestion to conceive of ‘the “cosmopoli-

tan condition” as a rational necessity linking nations’310 was central to Kantian
thought.
• In the early nineteenth century, the view that ‘a human being counts as such
because he [or she] is a human being, not because he [or she] is a Jew, Catholic,
Protestant, German, Italian, etc.’311 was essential to Hegelian thought.
• In the mid-nineteenth century, the search for the historical conditions underly-
ing the possibility of ‘human emancipation’,312 guided by the positive influence
of ‘a science of human association’,313 played a pivotal role in Marxian thought.
• In the early twentieth century, the plea for a ‘world patriotism’,314 capable of
challenging ‘the cult of the individual’315 as well as ‘the cult of the nation’,316
was crucial to Durkheimian thought.
• In the 1970s, the insistence on a discursive ‘move from a national to a human
frame of reference’317 was imperative to Aronian thought.
• Over the past few decades, the systematic attempt to replace ‘methodological
nationalism’318 with ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’319 has been fundamen-
tal to Beckian thought.

In brief, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, the idea of cosmopolitan-

ism has been around at least since the Enlightenment.
(2) Cosmopolitanism is a universalist project. Insofar as advocates of cosmopolitan-
ism seek to demonstrate that all human beings share a number of species-distinctive
features by means of which they set themselves apart from other entities and raise
themselves above nature, we are dealing with a normative approach committed to
what may be described as humanist universalism. Thus, what cosmopolitan theor-
ies have in common with foundationalist approaches to the nature of human
coexistence is that they are aimed at identifying at least three socio-ontological
conditions:

a. anthropological specificities, which are ‘derived from human nature and intrinsic
only to the human, but not the natural, world’;320
b. anthropological invariants, which are ‘present in any human form of coexistence
regardless of its temporal, spatial, and structural specificity’;321 and
c. anthropological grounds, which are ‘not only inherent in, but also fundamental
to the human social’,322 in that they shape, or even determine, ‘the nature of
human coexistence in a constitutive, rather than tangential, sense’323 and are
anchored in the reality of everyday life.
214 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

In short, ‘[c]osmopolitan social theory is a collective endeavour to build a science

of society founded on a claim to universalism’.324 This implies that it ‘understands
social relations through a universalistic conception of humanity and by means of
universalistic analytical tools and methodological procedures’.325 From a cosmo-
politan point of view, then, ‘issues of morality and ethics’326 need to be addressed
‘within a language of universalism’327 and of ‘universalistic solidarity’,328 accord-
ing to which we need to ask not ‘what we owe our fellow-citizens’329 but, rather,
‘what we owe our fellow human beings’.330
(3) Cosmopolitanism is a transcendentalist project. Certainly, this aspect ties in
with the previous dimension, but it adds one crucial element to the agenda: the
cosmopolitan commitment to taking social differences seriously, while rejecting their trib-
alistic celebration. Hence, since cosmopolitan theorists defend ‘the recognition of
differences within a universalistic frame’,331 they are concerned with ‘the critique
of methodological and political nationalism’,332 that is, with the analytical or
ideological tendency to conceive of society within the epistemic and cultural limi-
tations imposed by the habitualized preconceptions of a particular national – or
otherwise defined – community. In this sense, it ‘stands firm against approaches
to understanding and changing society grounded in nationalist, racist, sexist or
anti-Semitic presuppositions’,333 insisting that the whole point of advocating a
cosmopolitan spirit is to transcend exclusionist attitudes and discriminatory poli-
cies with the aim of contributing to the construction of universally empowering
life forms. According to the cosmopolitan critique of intellectual and institutional
tribalism, ‘[i]t is a nation-state outlook on society and politics, law, justice and his-
tory, which governs the sociological imagination’.334 Indeed, to the extent ‘that
traditional sociology has equated the idea of “society” with the nation-state and
[…] simply assumed that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of
nations’,335 it is the task of ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’336 to demonstrate
that a truly emancipatory sociological imagination is a global sociological imagina-
tion, which, by definition, seeks to reach beyond relatively arbitrary material and
ideological boundaries.337 Cosmopolitanism’s ‘simple but by no means trivial
claim is that, despite all our differences, humankind is effectively one and must be
understood as such’.338 For it is this common humanity that transcends all histori-
cal divisions based on socially constructed specificities.
(4) Cosmopolitanism is an empowering project. In order for this to be the case,
however, it cannot simply side with the powerful; rather, it has to draw attention
to the situation of the completely or relatively powerless. Arguably, cosmopolitan-
ism ‘is at its most powerful in addressing the needs of those who are outside or on
the margins of the nation’,339 that is, in engaging with the life forms and experi-
ences of those who live on the fringes of society. The ambition to give a voice to
the voiceless, and thereby break with the silence of the silenced sectors of society,
is crucial to the attempt to generate inclusivist life forms able to treat its partici-
pants primarily as members of humanity, rather than as partial representatives of
interest groups defined in terms of class, ethnicity, gender, age, or ability. On this
account, ‘the appeal of cosmopolitanism has to do with the idea that human beings
can belong anywhere, humanity has shared predicaments and we find our community
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 215

with others in exploring how these predicaments can be faced in common’.340

Cosmopolitan theorists, therefore, recognize that patterns of belonging – while
they are indispensable to the construction of society – are contextually variable.
(5) Cosmopolitanism is a natural-law project. ‘The roots of cosmopolitanism lie
in the tradition of natural law theory.’341 In this sense, it is intellectually embed-
ded in the presuppositional horizon of Kantian thought, considering pure reason
(reine Vernunft), practical reason (praktische Vernunft), and judgement (Urteilskraft)
as the most fundamental species-distinctive resources of humanity. Insofar as
cosmopolitan social theory ‘remains firmly within the premises of natural law’,342
it is committed to rejecting any kind of conceptual, methodological, cultural,
or political tribalism, thereby highlighting the socio-ontological significance of
species-constitutive features, which – by definition – transcend the historical
specificity of spatiotemporally situated individuals and communities.
(6) Cosmopolitanism is a practical project. To be exact, it constitutes a norma-
tive endeavour oriented towards the consolidation of social forms of rights.343 As
such, it is realized ‘in particular institutions, laws, norms and practices’,344 that is,
in ‘the sphere of inter-societal relations’.345 Far from being reducible to an intellec-
tual language game, the whole point of the cosmopolitan undertaking is to have
a tangible impact upon the purposive organization and normative regulation of
social life. Its commitment to contributing to the just and meaningful construc-
tion of human relations in accordance with context-transcending principles
manifests itself in the emergence of various empirical and ideological expressions
of humanist universalism: ‘international laws, international organisations such
as the UN, international courts, global forms of governance, the idea of human
rights, declarations and conventions on human rights, and mechanisms for secur-
ing peace between nations’.346 In short, cosmopolitanism is a practical venture
with empirically grounded and substantively oriented, rather than merely conceptual
or theoretical, ambitions.
(7) Cosmopolitanism is a rights-based project. Central in this regard is its belief
in ‘the universality of rights, that is, the right of all human beings to have rights’.347
This fundamental persuasion, however, is not reducible to a categorical imperative,
removed from everyday social practices; rather, it constitutes a vital conviction that
finds its substantive expression and normative force in ‘the establishment of politi-
cal conditions capable of supporting the universality of rights’.348 Paradoxically,
the demise of the right to have rights is inextricably linked to rise of the main
institutional body meant to protect this principle: namely, the nation-state. For the
construction of every nation-state involves as much the creation of the category of
‘the insider’ as the imposition of the category of ‘the outsider’. The former is asso-
ciated with concepts such as ‘citizen’, ‘fully-fledged member’, ‘native’, and ‘com-
patriot’. The latter, by contrast, is brought into connection with concepts such as
‘non-citizen’ or ‘second-class citizen’, ‘immigrant’, and ‘stranger’ or ‘foreigner’.
Within each nation-state, then, we are confronted with a normative division
between ‘the majority’ and ‘the minorities’ or, in some cases, between ‘the majori-
ties’ and ‘the minorities’. On the basis of this distinction, the latter have often
been ‘displaced and deprived of the political community’349 formed by the former
216 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

and, consequently, robbed of the right to have the same rights as those who are
considered to be ‘fully-fledged members’ of a particular society. If the right to
have rights constitutes a social privilege controlled, regulated, and monopolized
by ‘insiders’, it can be mobilized in order to weaken the position of ‘outsiders’.
As the history of the twentieth century has illustrated with great clarity and, in
many cases, with mass-scale brutality against minorities, ‘[i]t was but a short step
to ascribe their lack of rights to their own natural deficiencies’,350 thereby essential-
izing vertically structured social relations and divisions as if they reflected God-
given, or genetically constituted, determinations. In this light, it is not enough for
cosmopolitan citizens to resist and oppose segregationist practices ‘in the name of
“human rights”, which is today a particular sub-category of rights in general’;351
rather, they need to defend and cultivate inclusivist social processes ‘in the name
of the right of every human being to have rights’.352 Indeed, from a cosmopolitan per-
spective, the right to have rights is the ontological precondition for the possibility
of acquiring any rights at all.353
(8) Cosmopolitanism is a rights-sensitive project. Indeed, ‘[c]osmopolitan right
presupposes a complex network of already existing social forms of right’.354 In order
to make sense of this network of rights, we can distinguish the following levels.

A. At the differential-functional level, the ‘division into property rights, civil rights
and rights of political participation’355 guarantees that entitlements are not
reduced to a monolithic force but both conceptualized and realized in relation
to specific social realms and contexts. In particular, the fact that universalist
models of citizenship à la Marshall (which are based on legal, political, and
economic rights) have been extended to differentialist models of citizenship
(which make a case for a multiplicity of rights, notably human, civil, sexual,
and cultural ones) illustrates the sociological significance of the functional dif-
ferentiality of rights.356
B. At the moral level, the Kantian view that ‘individuals have the right to judge
for themselves’357 and that, by virtue of their critical cognitive competences,
they are equipped with the ability to ‘determine what is right and wrong’358
presupposes that human beings are subjects capable of reflection, judgement,
and reason-guided action.
C. At the private level, the socio-ontological centrality of relations between friends
and family members are founded on ‘rights of love and friendship’,359 express-
ing a universal right to – and, indeed, a general need for – quotidian interac-
tions sustained by trust, affection, empathy, and solidarity.
D. At the societal level, ‘the rights of civil society and its constituent elements – the
market, the system of justice and civil and political associations’360 – play a pivotal
role in regulating the interplay between systemic and deliberative – that is, in
Habermasian terms, between instrumental and communicative – realms of action.
E. At the national level, ‘the rights of the nation-state and its constituent ele-
ments’361 – especially its legislative, executive, and judicial power, commonly
defined within constitutional frameworks – are crucial to the assertion of both
internal and external sovereignty.
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 217

In short, the emergence of cosmopolitan realities is reflected in the development

of complex networks of rights. To be sure, the possibility of cosmopolitanism is
‘predicated, logically but not always historically, on the prior emergence of these
social forms of right’.362 In other words, there may be a profound discrepancy
between the ideal-typical (‘ought to exist’) and the empirical (‘do exist’) levels of
cosmopolitan approaches to rights.
(9) Cosmopolitanism is a tension-laden project. ‘The emergence of cosmopolitan
right is necessary because of the conflicts which tear apart all preceding forms of
right and it is possible because of developments in the sphere of inter-societal
relations.’363 The consolidation of cosmopolitan rights is indispensable insofar as
their presence is a precondition for constructing objectively viable, normatively
defensible, and subjectively desirable forms of coexistence. The consolidation of
cosmopolitan rights is achievable insofar as subjects capable of purposive, regula-
tive, and expressive action are, in principle, able to coordinate their practices in
such a way that, in addition to being able to understand one another, they are
equipped with the competence to reach agreements with one another. This chal-
lenging task, however, is an open-ended endeavour, devoid of the possibility of
arriving at ‘the synthetic moment within which all previous divisions and con-
flicts are resolved’.364 Thus, rather than conceiving of cosmopolitanism as a uto-
pian venture allowing for the establishment of a kingdom of universal freedom, it
constitutes a never-ending process oriented towards the rights-based betterment
of the human condition.
(10) Cosmopolitanism is a transformative project. To the extent that it ‘emerges
as a determinate social form, it transforms that which precedes it’.365 Hence, far
from reducing its mission to the normative duty of reflecting and commenting on
civilizational developments, its aim is to change the concrete conditions of indi-
vidual and collective existence for the better. It seeks to accomplish its quest for
social transformation by impacting on ‘the deployment of civil and political rights,
on the exercise of moral judgements, on the practices of love and friendship, on
the organisation of civil society and on the formation of the nation-state’.366 In
short, the aforementioned rights-specific – that is, (a) differential-functional, (b)
moral, (c) private, (d) societal, and (e) national – dimensions are all essential to
the cosmopolitan ambition to have a lasting and comprehensive influence upon
the construction of human life founded on universally empowering resources and
conditions of existence.
(11) Cosmopolitanism is a holistic project. Drawing on Kantian thought, we
may conceive of the ‘cosmopolitan condition’367 in terms of ‘the reconfiguration
of the whole system of right’.368 Far from constituting a relatively undeveloped, let
alone monolithic, ensemble of normatively codified relations, however, ‘[m]odern
political community is a complex and conflicted architectonic’,369 comprising ‘a
web of interrelated social forms’370 whose potentially contentious character is, in
principle, always open to debate and revision. Within the holistic universe of cos-
mopolitanism, every type of right – no matter how specific – has to be understood
in relation to other types of right, forming part of ‘this larger totality’371 called
human society.
218 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(12) Cosmopolitanism is a dynamic project. As such, it is conscious of the con-

stant interplay between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of rights, that is, of the necessity to
revise – and, potentially, to reform – those sets of rights that it considers worth
defending, while recognizing that they may have to be adjusted in accordance
with social developments. Indeed, in many cases, in order

to protect the old rights under current conditions, it is vital to construct new
guarantees of human rights, new forms of law, new fields of public life, new
political entities, new international institutions, new avenues of mobility and
not least new ways of thinking and acting in the world.372

In short, cosmopolitanism constitutes a normative endeavour under constant

revision and reconstruction inspired by its critical engagement with the develop-
ment of institutional processes and power-laden interactions.
(13) Cosmopolitanism is a socio-generative project. To be precise, it contains
both objective and subjective dimensions. In terms of its objective constitution, it
stands for a process ‘in itself’, that is, a normative reality that exists irrespective of
people’s awareness of its presence. In terms of its subjective constitution, it repre-
sents a process ‘for itself’, that is, a normative reality that exists because of people’s
awareness of its presence. The simultaneous ‘in-itselfness’ and ‘for-itselfness’ of
cosmopolitan thought suggests that, in order for rights to have an empowering
potential, they need to designate both an objectively existing and a subjectively
experienced constituent of social reality.
(14) Cosmopolitanism is a self-reflexive project. Willing to face up to, and prob-
lematize, its own limitations, it is aware of the fact that ‘[n]ot every critique of
methodological or political nationalism is cosmopolitan’.373 For the mere act of
objecting to different theoretical or practical forms of tribalism is not a guaran-
tee for embracing a cosmopolitan attitude. At the same time, the cosmopolitan
plea for a worldwide community of global citizens must avoid underestimating
‘the dangers of a world state’,374 which – in the name of humanity – conceals
the interests of a hegemonic power. It is because of, not despite, the experience
of totalitarianism – which hangs like a shadow over all modern metanarratives –
that cosmopolitanism needs to take seriously the challenge of demonstrating why
universalist approaches to social reality are opposed, rather than complementary,
to authoritarian and dictatorial modes of repressing the emancipatory resources
built into humanity.
(15) Cosmopolitanism is a constructive project. To the extent that it constitutes
a more or less systematically organized set of assumptions about the nature of
humanity, shared by various influential thinkers from the Enlightenment to the
present, it cannot be reduced to a historically episodic and ideologically eccentric
trend propagated by opportunistic scholars who, since they find themselves with
too much time on their hands, engage in the complacent activity of Zeitgeist-
surfing. Cosmopolitanism, then, ‘is not a fashion due to be abandoned as new
fashions enter the academic, intellectual or political marketplace’.375 Rather, it
forms an integral – largely implicit, but in some cases explicit – element of both
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 219

classical and contemporary social and political thought. Surely, there is the danger
of falling into the trap of believing in the validity of the seductive declarations
made by ‘new cosmopolitanism’,376 which ‘makes the inflated claim that human-
ity is entering a period of universal human rights, perpetual peace and global
governance’.377 Assertions of this kind are indicative of the failure to examine the
degree to which the political and economic powers defending this ‘new’ or ‘soft’
version of cosmopolitanism seek to conceal and protect their own hegemonic
interests behind the veil of cognitive and normative universalism.
Yet, genuine cosmopolitanism, as it is understood here, is not only suspicious
of hypocritical modes of furthering particular individual or collective interests in
the name of universal – that is, human – interests, such as ‘the common good’. In
addition, it is opposed to socio-ontological fatalism, epistemic nihilism, and ‘the
politics of disillusionment’.378 For all of them give the impression that there is not
much point in embracing cosmopolitan values and practices as long as we come
to the conclusion that – using Hegelian terminology – history continues to be a
‘slaughter-bench’,379 rather than a universal process oriented towards the better-
ment of the human condition. Expressed in its categorical rejection of sociopoliti-
cal cynicism, which – although it may be intellectually entertaining – is ultimately
destructive, cosmopolitanism is committed to conceiving of itself as a construc-
tive and empowering endeavour, enabling rational entities (vernünftige Wesen) to
convert reason, rather than violence, into ‘the true motor of human history’.380
In light of the ambivalence permeating the normative task of facing up to both
the bright and the dark sides of humanity, cosmopolitanism must be prepared to
acknowledge that ‘[i]t creates as many clouds as it clears’381 and that, in this sense,
it raises as many questions and doubts as it provides answers and solutions.

Cosmopolitanism with and through Postmodernism

Having considered principal variants of cosmopolitanism, their potential relevance

to postmodernism, as well as the key presuppositional elements underlying
cosmopolitanism, an intellectually more challenging – and, arguably, more fruit-
ful – task lies ahead of us: namely, to identify and examine significant points of
convergence between cosmopolitanism and postmodernism. Before embarking upon
this undertaking, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that, at first glance,
there is one striking similarity between the two approaches: the aim to reconcile
localist and globalist commitments. Such an ambition obliges us to reflect upon
the concept of ‘cosmopolitan community’,382 which is both locally embedded in
people’s lifeworlds and globally spread transcending spatiotemporal boundaries.
Put differently, a cosmopolitan community both is and ‘is not limited by space
or by time’:383 it is a community that remains territorialized and concentrated, for
the reason that its members are spatiotemporally situated and embodied actors;
at the same time, it is a community that ‘has become deterritorialized and scattered
in many forms and places’,384 to the extent that its participants are socially inter-
connected across the globe. In short, a cosmopolitan community is an ensemble
of locally embedded and globally interconnected actors existing both within and
220 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

‘beyond propinquity’.385 Insofar as cosmopolitanism, by definition, involves ‘the

mixing of the local and the global’,386 the cosmopolitanization of society entails
the increasing ‘glocalization’387 of human realities.
Despite their shared engagement with ‘the local’ and ‘the global’, irrespective
of their common interest in the possibility of cross-fertilizing ‘grassroots politics’
and ‘transnational politics’,388 notwithstanding their combined emphasis on the
growing and ‘overwhelming interconnectivity of the world’,389 and even after
acknowledging their central ambition to take seriously ‘cultural issues as well as
postcolonial questions’,390 it would be mistaken to presuppose the existence of a
straightforward ‘confluence of postmodernism and cosmopolitanism’.391 Indeed,
it would be no less erroneous ‘to see cosmopolitanism as a product of postmod-
ernism’,392 since the former’s ‘roots are much older’393 than the latter’s origins and
should be ‘situated in the context of modernity’394 and, arguably, even long before
then, rather than in the era of postmodernity.
We may suggest, however that the following dimensions are constitutive of both the
cosmopolitan and the postmodern imagination:

1. Glocalization: The ‘interaction of global forces with local contexts’395 as well as

the interaction of local forces with global contexts are central to the develop-
ment of contemporary societies. Critical attention to the interplay between
global and local dynamics in increasingly interconnected societies is a key
concern in both the cosmopolitan and the postmodern imagination.
2. Pluralization: Both the interest in and the defence of ‘cultural pluralism’396 have
become essential ingredients of most progressive political agendas in the present
world. The critical awareness of and reflective engagement with normative issues
arising from the presence of cultural multiplicity, diversity, and heterogeneity lie
at the heart of both the cosmopolitan and the postmodern imagination.
3. Intersectionalization: The exploration of intersectionality – notably in terms of
class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability – and its implications for the need
to transcend traditional conceptual boundaries (particularly those based on
binaries) are crucial to contemporary attempts to account for the complexity
of highly differentiated societies. The willingness to comprehend processes
of role-specific socialization and multilayered identification in terms of inter-
sectional dynamics characterizes both the cosmopolitan and the postmodern
imagination.
4. Deterritorialization: The transformation of the relationship between ‘place’ and
‘space’397 – especially in terms of the increasing influence of the latter upon
the former – appears to indicate that traditional territorial limitations are
gradually displaced by seemingly deterritorialized forms of interaction.398
Geo-social developments associated with tendencies towards deterritorializa-
tion can be regarded as a significant object of reflection in both the cosmo-
politan and the postmodern imagination.
5. Repoliticization: The ‘reinvention of political community around global ethics’399 –
expressed in the aim of simultaneously absorbing and ‘transcending the
immdiately given’400 – allows for the construction of a critical ‘epistemology of
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 221

a shared reality’,401 which is composed of an infinite number of particularities.

The repoliticization of micro-social and macro-social arrangements is funda-
mental to both the cosmopolitan and the postmodern imagination.
6. Communication: In highly differentiated societies, the communicatively
anchored exercise of perspective-taking is stimulated by continuous exposure
to cultural otherness. The quotidian experience of ‘cultural encounters,
exchange, dialogue’402 stimulates people’s preparedness to engage with new –
for them, often unknown – ‘orders of interpretation’,403 reflected in the emer-
gence of socio-hermeneutic processes that are essential to both the cosmopoli-
tan and the postmodern imagination.
7. Empowerment: The project of a ‘cosmopolitan politics’404 cannot be dissociated
from the idea of a ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’,405 just as the project of a ‘post-
modern politics’406 cannot be divorced from the idea of a ‘postmodern citi-
zenship’.407 Both endeavours are aimed at the empowerment of individual and
collective actors, especially of those who find themselves in disadvantageous
or marginalized positions and who are, directly or indirectly, discriminated
against – irrespective of whether this occurs on economic, ethnic, ‘racial’,
cultural, sexual, generational, physical, or ideological grounds. The normative
commitment to contributing to the creation of processes oriented towards
human empowerment is vital to both the cosmopolitan and the postmodern
imagination.
8. Agency: Tying in with the previous point, it is important to stress that, similar
to postmodernism, ‘[c]osmopolitanism indicates a transformative conception
of belonging whereby the citizen is neither a passive entity nor a pre-political
being but an active agent’.408 Hence, the belief in the capacity to transform
social and political arrangements for the better, by drawing upon people’s
self-empowering resources, is indispensable to both the cosmopolitan and the
postmodern imagination.
9. Relativization: ‘[T]he capacity for the relativization of one’s own culture or
identity, the capacity for the positive recognition of the Other, the capacity
for a mutual evaluation of cultures or identities, and the capacity to create
a shared normative culture’409 – all of these critical competences are deeply
embedded in an open-minded attitude embraced by decentred actors. As reflective
entities, perspective-taking actors are both able and willing to relativize their
own position in the universe by facing up to the uniqueness, irreducibility,
and incommensurability of every individual life story. The propensity towards
normative relativization, as the basis for patterns of identification developed
in processes of human socialization is a chief ingredient of both the cosmo-
politan and the postmodern imagination.
10. Denationalization: Confronted with the gradual ‘decoupling of nationality
and citizenship’,410 the tendency towards political, economic, and cultural
‘denationalization’411 – expressed in the ‘rise of non-territorial politics’412 and
epitomized in the emergence of ‘[g]lobal cities’413 – appears to be a pivotal fea-
ture of the ‘post-sovereign condition’,414 that is, of a ‘post-statist world of govern-
ance without government’.415 In other words, we are confronted with a rapidly
222 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

changing sociopolitical context in which the steering power of national

governments has been substantially eroded in the face of multiple – notably
political, economic, and cultural, but also environmental, technological,
and military – challenges of global governance. To the extent that ‘[t]he ero-
sion of nationality is an undeniable feature of the present day’,416 posing
unprecedented challenges not only within but also to an increasingly
interconnected world of globalization, different facets of denationaliza-
tion are part and parcel of both the cosmopolitan and the postmodern
imagination.
11. Complexification: In a world of ‘global citizenship’,417 in which ‘post-national
kinds of membership’418 appear to be proliferating, both cosmopolitanism –
motivated by ‘the concern for the world as if it were one’s polis’419 – and post-
modernism – inspired by the engagement with the world as if it were one’s
lifeworld – are ‘furthered by such multiple, overlapping allegiances which are
sustained across communities of language, ethnicity, religion, and national-
ity’.420 Put differently, recognizing the increasing interdependence of locally
embedded and globally interconnected realities requires acknowledging
the growing complexity permeating contemporary modes of sociality.421
Categorical openness towards complexification inhabits both the cosmopoli-
tan and the postmodern imagination.
12. Immanence/transcendence: Just as, at least potentially, ‘cosmopolitanism exists
within all societies and can be seen as a transformative process of immanent
transcendence’,422 the key existential challenges explored by postmodernism
pervade all societies and, in their interconnectedness, can be regarded as an
ensemble of pluralized practices of transcendent immanence. Cosmopolitanism
and postmodernism are immanent insofar as they unfold within and through
society and, at the same time, transcendent insofar as they have the potential
to step outside and go beyond the limits of reality. The capacity to recognize
people’s spatiotemporal situatedness, while hinting at the multiple possibili-
ties arising from the task of navigating through hitherto unexplored horizons
of beyondness, cannot be removed from the open-minded spirit of pluralized
togetherness. In other words, the desire to rise to the challenge of combin-
ing immanent and transcendent experiences of self-realization constitutes
a precondition for one’s ability to endorse both the cosmopolitan and the
postmodern imagination.
13. Resignification: ‘The power to name, create meaning, construct personal
biographies and narratives by gaining control over the flow of information,
goods and cultural processes is an important dimension of citizenship as
an active process’,423 as emphasized in both cosmopolitan and postmod-
ern thought. People’s capacity to attribute meaning to reality, by virtue of
signifying and resignifying forms of symbolically mediated intelligibility,
is as central to the cosmopolitan commitment to defending the empower-
ing attributes of a common humanity as it is to the postmodern engage-
ment with, and enthusiastic celebration of, multiple expressions of social
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 223

alterity. The critical reflection upon, and serious engagement with, constantly
shifting modes of signification can be considered as a sine qua non of both the
cosmopolitan and the postmodern imagination.
14. Ironization: ‘Irony’424 may be conceived of ‘as a key feature of cosmopoli-
tan virtue’425 and postmodern attitude, enabling reflexive actors to gain
‘distance from [their] homeland […], culture and tradition’,426 but ‘with-
out necessarily rejecting’427 their symbolic value, let alone their formative
impact upon social identities. The ability to distance oneself from one’s own
sociocultural background ‘requires irony, a capacity for self-reflexivity’,428
constituting not only ‘the basis of dialogue with other cultures’429 but also
the precondition for the creation of an open, pluralistic, and internally
heterogeneous society in the age of global interconnectivity. If it is true
that ‘[t]he ability to respect others requires a certain distance from one’s
own culture […], namely an ironic distance’,430 and if, therefore, it is fair
to contend that not only irony and cosmopolitanism but also irony and
postmodernism go hand-in-hand, then ‘the capacity to evaluate critically
both the culture of the Other as well as one’s own’431 is an insufficient but
necessary condition for the construction of societies sustained by dialogical
processes of mutual respect and recognition. The playful employment of
irony in judgemental practices emerging in everyday situations is a source
of stimulating world-encounters for both the cosmopolitan and the post-
modern imagination.
15. Self-Problematization: For advocates of both cosmopolitanism and postmodern-
ism, ‘[c]ulture must be seen as a learning process’,432 that is, as ‘a developmental
process entailing self-problematization and the discursive examination of
all claims’.433 Cosmopolitan and postmodern thinkers are united not only
by a firm commitment to ‘promoting openness and public contestation’,434
but also by the conviction that, especially in culturally diverse societies,
actors need to be willing to question themselves and the things they take for
granted – including the cognitive, normative, and aesthetic parameters mobil-
ized when attributing meaning to reality. Self-problematization constitutes
a motivational driving force of both the cosmopolitan and the postmodern
imagination.
16. Ambivalence: Both postmodernism and cosmopolitanism require us to rec-
ognize that ‘we are all positioned simultaneously as outsiders and insiders, as
individuals and group members, as self and the other, as local and global’.435 The
normative task of ‘relativizing our place within the global frame, position-
ing ourselves in relation to multiple communities, crossing and re-crossing
territorial and community borders’,436 presupposes the capacity to accept
the deep ambivalence of our positioning in the world. Indeed, two-faced
positioning – as outsiders and insiders, strangers and natives, observers and
participants, individual and collective actors, locally situated and globally
aware subjects – allows for critical perspective-taking encouraged by both the
cosmopolitan and the postmodern imagination.
224 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

Transnational Public Spheres: Towards Post-Sovereignty?

Confronted with the cosmopolitan challenge of developing an attitude based

on radical openness towards a multiplicity of worldviews and practices, we are
obliged to reflect upon the rapidly changing constitution of the public sphere in
contemporary societies. ‘It is commonplace nowadays to speak of “transnational
public spheres”, “diasporic public spheres”, and even an emerging “global public
sphere”.’437 It is no accident that, within contemporary social and political theory,
devotees of both cosmopolitanism and postmodernism strongly support the pro-
ject of creating ‘transnational public spheres’438 to the extent that ‘public opinion
in a post-Westphalian world’439 is increasingly shaped by globally interconnected
actors, who are capable of relativizing their own place in society by discursively
engaging with the views and experiences of people who – potentially – live thou-
sands of miles away from them, and vice versa.
Such a globalist understanding of discursive interconnectedness obliges
us to revise classical conceptions of the public sphere, in particular the most
influential one in modern social and political theory: namely, the conceptual
framework proposed by Jürgen Habermas.440 In essence, Habermas’s account of
the modern public sphere is based on the following six – arguably, evolutionist –
assumptions:441
(1) Public spheres in politically advanced societies are correlated with ‘a modern
state apparatus that exercise[s] sovereign power over a bounded territory’.442 In prin-
ciple, such a Westphalian state is supposed to exert a certain degree of control over
the population it claims to represent – particularly in terms of its capacity to put
in place social, political, economic, educational, and military regulation mechan-
isms aimed at overseeing the practices performed by its citizens.443
(2) Public spheres in judicially advanced societies are composed of subjects
capable of speech and action, that is, of linguistically equipped entities able
to engage in dialogical encounters oriented towards mutual understanding and,
potentially, the reaching of agreements. The idea that ‘fellow members of a bounded
political community’444 constitute the motivational driving force of the develop-
ment of modern public spheres implies that ‘the articulated general interest of a
demos’445 emanates from the underlying ‘telos’446 of modern social progress in the
collective effort to formulate ‘binding laws’447 epitomized in the emergence of a
Rechtsstaat448 (‘state of law’).449
(3) Public spheres in economically advanced societies are inconceivable without
discursive realms in which its members are – either implicitly or explicitly – con-
cerned with the administratively efficient coordination of purposive transactions
based on different use and exchange values of products and services. For ‘the
proper organization of the political community’s economic relations’450 is essen-
tial to its collective capacity to aim for, and achieve, short-term and long-term
prosperity. The political regulation and legal protection of the ‘capitalist market
economy’451 are central to the idea that modern public spheres provide democratic
spaces of debate, deliberation, and contestation permitting subjects capable of
speech and action to discuss the running of their ‘national economy’452 and its
place in the construction of their society.453
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 225

(4) Public spheres in technologically advanced societies are shaped by the influ-
ence of ‘modern media’,454 which, in principle, allow for ‘communication across
distance’.455 In this sense, they appear to have the capacity to ‘knit spatially
dispersed interlocutors into a public’.456 To the degree that the ‘national media,
especially the national press and national broadcasting’,457 are conceived of as the
basis of ‘a national communications infrastructure, contained by a Westphalian
state’,458 we are confronted with relatively confined realms of ‘territorialized pub-
licity’459 underlying the symbolic construction of large-scale societies.460
(5) Public spheres in culturally advanced societies presuppose the existence of ‘a
single shared linguistic medium of public communication’,461 giving its members the
opportunity to engage in disputes and controversies that are – at least in principle –
‘fully comprehensible and linguistically transparent’.462 In a strong sense, Habermas’s
paradisal view of the ‘ideal speech situation’463 informs his somewhat romantic con-
ception of public intersubjectivity, which is based on the civilizational force of com-
municative rationality and, hence, on people’s daily reliance on mutual intelligibility
and consensus-building wherever and whenever it is necessary. The presumption
that public debate is ‘conducted in a national language’464 is central to a Westphalian –
and, arguably, monoculturalist – understanding of the public sphere.465
(6) Public spheres in intellectually advanced societies cannot be divorced from their
‘cultural origins’,466 notably ‘the letters and novels of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century print capitalism’.467 The sociohistorical significance of these common –
symbolically constructed – vehicles of individual and collective representation stems
from the fact that they permit, and indeed encourage, people to ‘envision themselves
as members of a public’468 and thereby find themselves recognized both by and in
other citizens belonging to the same national society, leading to the construction of
an imagined community469 based on vernacular patterns of cultural identity.470

The above-outlined – early-Habermasian – account of the nature of modern public

spheres is problematic for various reasons, not least due to its underlying social
evolutionism.471 Some of the key insights provided by critical approaches inspired
by, or sympathetic to, cosmopolitanism and postmodernism permit – or, possibly,
oblige – us to call the principal assumptions that undergird Habermas’s influential
theory of the modern public sphere into question.
(1) In the age of post-sovereign governance, the state is only one among many other
institutional actors exercising a specific – albeit, in most cases, still considerable –
amount of regulative control over social practices. The ‘post-Westphalian model of
disaggregated sovereignty’472 aims to do justice to the fact that, in the transnational
age of intensified global interconnectedness, the power of the state is weakened
in a paradoxical fashion: in the post-sovereign world, the state suffers from ‘an
external crisis of autonomy and an internal crisis of legitimacy’.473 This applies in
particular to the nation-state, that is, to the idea that a state represents, and acts on
behalf of, a culturally or ethnically defined group of people defined as a ‘nation’.
In other words, the nation-state appears to be too small for the big problems of
society and too big for the small problems of communities and individuals.474 The
nation-state experiences, at the same time, an externally triggered crisis, due to the
increasing power of global forces, and an internally generated crisis, owing to its
226 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

relative incapacity to meet its local citizens’ demands and needs. Contemporary
public spheres are not reducible to a circumscribed territory controlled by political
states, since – because of their simultaneously localist and globalist constitution –
they transcend national boundaries both ‘from below’ and ‘from above’.
(2) In the age of post-sovereign citizenship, it can no longer be presumed that ‘a
public coincides with a national citizenry, resident on a national territory, which
formulates its common interest as the general will of a bounded political commu-
nity’.475 In systemically highly differentiated and culturally vastly heterogeneous
societies, traditional assumptions regarding ‘the equation of citizenship, nation-
ality and territorial residence’476 have lost credibility in the face of sociologically
significant phenomena, such as cross-national, cross-regional, and cross-continental
‘migrations, diasporas, dual and triple citizenship arrangements, indigenous com-
munity membership and patterns of multiple residency’477 – that is, a mixture of
complex developments suggesting that we have entered an era of cosmopolitan
post-nationality. Practically, this means not only that ‘[e]very state now has non-
citizens on its territory’478 but also that more and more citizens and non-citizens
‘are multicultural and/or multinational’479 and/or multilingual and that, as a con-
sequence, literally ‘every nationality is territorially dispersed’.480 Hence, it would
be both empirically inaccurate and normatively erroneous to assume that con-
temporary public spheres are ‘coextensive with political membership’,481 let alone
that they represent ‘the common interest’482 or ‘the general will of any demos’,483
whose shared principles and homological stakes could ‘be translated into binding
laws and administrative policies’.484 From both a political and a judicial perspec-
tive, then, it would be anachronistic, not to say reactionary, to pursue the ideal
of a Rechtsstaat in terms of a Westphalian – that is, culturally homogenous and
territorially fixed – Nationalstaat.
(3) In the age of post-sovereign economies, the ideal of ‘the proper regulation by
a territorial state of a national economy’485 appears to be largely off the agenda.
Granted, even in a post-sovereign world, governmental economic strategies may
differ in that they may favour either Keynesian policies of state interventionism
and welfarist agendas or monetarist policies of liberalization and privatization.
Yet, whatever their – both ideologically and pragmatically variable – preference
may be, governments are obliged to face up to the reality that, in the global era
of transnational governance, the classical ‘presupposition of a national economy is
counterfactual’.486 In a world market that is driven increasingly by the dynamics
of ‘outsourcing, transnational corporations, and offshore business registry’,487 as
well as by ‘the dismantling of the Bretton Woods capital controls and the emer-
gence of 24/7 global electronic financial markets’,488 the power of nation-states
to regulate and protect their economies, although it has not completely withered
away, is profoundly undermined. One need not be a Marxist to recognize that
‘the ground rules governing trade, production and finance are set transnation-
ally, by agencies more accountable to global capital than to any public’.489 The
most influential supranational financial institutions – such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank
(WB) – are equipped with the dictating power to define the terms and condi-
tions of production, distribution, and consumption in a global economy, thereby
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 227

effectively imperilling the ‘critical function of public spheres’.490 Under these con-
ditions, there is little, if any, scope for the emergence of subversive and potentially
empowering public spheres capable of challenging the hegemony of the global
market system in the contemporary era.
(4) In the age of post-sovereign mediatization, participants of technologically
advanced public spheres have been witnessing what may be described as ‘the
denationalization of communicative infrastructure’491 since the late twentieth
century. The ‘profusion of niche media – some subnational, some transna-
tional’492 – as well as the ‘parallel emergence of global media’493 imply that the
traditional supposition that ‘public opinion is conveyed through a national
communications infrastructure, centered on print and broadcasting’,494 does not
apply to contemporary public spheres. One may argue over the pros and cons of a
tension-laden public landscape that is divided between the emergence of ‘a more
independent press and TV’495 escaping the mainstream of the mass media, on the
one hand, and ‘the further spread of market logic, advertisers’ power, and dubious
amalgams like talk radio and “infotainment”’,496 on the other. Put differently, we
are confronted with some of the most fundamental normative tensions existing in
modern societies: autonomy versus heteronomy, substantive rationality versus instru-
mental rationality, communicative reason versus functionalist reason, lifeworld versus
system, enlightenment versus manipulation, socialization versus commodification,
empowerment versus disempowerment; in short, emancipation versus domination.497
Surely, one may interpret the sociological consequences of the transformation of
the media landscape in the ‘digital age’498 in numerous ways, notably in terms
of its bright and its dark sides. It is undeniable, however, that – owing to the rise
of ‘instantaneous electronic, broadband and satellite information technologies,
which permit direct transnational communication’499 – it has become possible to
bypass state controls, associated with the era of the nation-state, on an unprec-
edented scale. As a result, it is far from obvious to what extent – within ‘a field
divided between corporate global media, restricted niche media, and decentered Internet
networks’500 – the critical function of contemporary public spheres can be not only
guaranteed and protected but also promoted and realized.
(5) In the age of post-sovereign communication, it is untenable to assume that
public spheres are shaped by ‘a single national language’.501 In the global network
society, there is no such thing as a clearly defined ‘linguistic medium of public
sphere communication’.502 On the contrary, ‘national languages do not map onto
states’503 for two main reasons:

• First, all ‘national societies’ are marked by some degree of internal linguistic
diversity, irrespective of whether it is expressed in the division between an offi-
cial majority language (or, in some cases, various official majority languages)
and numerous unofficial minority languages spoken in a given country or
whether its linguistic diversity is – or, at least, key elements of its linguistic
diversity are – officially and institutionally recognized.
❍ The list of – officially or unofficially – multilingual countries is large.
Examples: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India,
228 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Kenya, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico,

Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Russia,
Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Uganda, United
Kingdom, Zimbabwe, and so forth.
• Second, ‘language groups are territorially dispersed’.504 Due to global migration, a
particular language may be used across the globe; in fact, it may be spoken –
officially – in several countries.
❍ For instance, English: Belize, Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Ghana, India,
Ireland, Kenya, Malta, Namibia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines,
Rwanda, Singapore, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and so forth – and of
course, as the de facto language, in Australia, UK, and USA.
❍ For instance, Spanish: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
❍ For instance, Portuguese: Angola, Brazil, East-Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Macau,
Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Principe.

Furthermore, nowadays ‘many more speakers are multilingual’505 than ever before,
developing cultural identities that cannot easily be mapped onto monocultural,
let alone mononational, categories. Another important development is the
hegemonic position of the English language worldwide – especially in terms of its
use and exchange value in economic, cultural, and scientific fields. Thus, ‘English
has been consolidated as the lingua franca of global business, mass entertainment,
and academia’,506 leading to the cross-border – predominantly Anglophone –
standardization of communication processes and, hence, weakening the status of
other national languages in the global context. To the extent that contemporary
public spheres are influenced by multiple languages, which can be ranked in
terms of their symbolic value and legitimacy, we need to abandon a monocul-
turalist understanding of small-scale and large-scale social settings sustained by
intersubjective processes oriented towards mutual intelligibility.
(6) In the age of post-sovereign imagination, it is erroneous to maintain that pub-
lic spheres continue to draw on ‘a national vernacular literature’507 capable of pro-
viding ‘the shared social imaginary needed to underpin solidarity’.508 Given ‘the
increased salience of cultural hybridity and hybridization’509 in highly differentiated
societies, characterized by diversity and internal pluralization, and given the grow-
ing influence of the ‘global culture industry’,510 driven by worldwide distribution of
cultural products and commodity-driven standardization, it is less and less plausible to
suggest that people’s sense of belonging to particular public spheres is based on
patterns of national identification. Irrespective of whether or not one wishes to go
as far as to claim that cultural globalization – epitomized in ‘the rise of global mass
entertainment’511 – represents, essentially, a form of worldwide Americanization,
there is no point in repudiating the fact that contemporary public spheres have
undergone multifaceted processes of trans- or post-nationalization. Considering
‘the spectacular rise of visual culture – or, better, of the enhanced salience of the
 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? 229

visual within culture, and the relative decline of print and the literary’512 – the
capacity of national literary cultures to provide solid frameworks of imagined soli-
darity and cultural identification has become less and less significant.

To the extent, then, that ‘public spheres are increasingly transnational or postna-
tional’,513 we need to revise our parameters for conceptualizing processes of large-
scale communication in highly differentiated societies.

A. In terms of the ‘who’514 of communication, the participants of contemporary

public spheres represent ‘a collection of dispersed interlocutors’,515 spatiotem-
porally spread across the globe.
B. In terms of the ‘what’516 of communication, the discussions and controversies
taking place in contemporary public spheres concern themes and issues whose
scope ‘stretches across vast reaches of the globe’517 and whose potential signifi-
cance is taken seriously by ‘a transnational community of risk’,518 sometimes
described as the ‘world risk society’.519
C. In terms of the ‘where’520 of communication, the discursive processes shaping
contemporary public spheres are situated in an increasingly ‘deterritorialized
cyberspace’521 constructed by embodied beings and tangible technologies,
but with apparently disembodying symbols and representations of digital
interconnectedness.
D. In terms of the ‘how’522 of communication, the real or imagined encounters
within contemporary public spheres comprise ‘a vast trans-linguistic nexus
of disjoint and overlapping visual cultures’,523 allowing for the exchange of
information, as well as for the potential fusion of historically specific horizons,
between diverse social groups and seemingly distant life forms.
E. In terms of the ‘to whom or for whom’524 – that is, if one prefers, in terms of
‘the addressee’525 – of communication, debates taking place in contemporary
public spheres are directed at, and indeed generated by, ‘an amorphous mix of
public and private transnational powers that is neither easily identifiable nor
rendered accountable’,526 leading to the emergence of unprecedented forms
of global agency, which lack any universally shared criteria of responsibility
or liability and which transcend traditional boundaries defined by national
parameters of state sovereignty.

In short, in a world characterized by the condition of post-sovereignty, public spheres are

shaped by discursive actors who are socially – that is, politically, judicially, economic-
ally, technologically, culturally, and intellectually – more and more interconnected. One
may argue over the question of whether – in light of the above – it makes sense to
describe contemporary public spheres as ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘postmodern’. What is
clear, however, is that contemporary approaches to politics will fail if they ignore
the fact that the civilizational challenges we face – both as citizens and as human
beings – in the twenty-first century need to be tackled by a ‘global civil society’,527
as they transcend the relatively arbitrary boundaries of national territories.
6
Critical Reflections on Postmodern
Thought: Limitations of the
‘Postmodern Turn’

The systematic analysis of the impact of the ‘postmodern turn’ on the social
sciences is a contradictory endeavour. Supporters of postmodern thought are
suspicious of the imposition of ‘logocentric’1 principles – such as ‘structure’,
‘coherence’, and ‘conclusiveness’. From their perspective, the attempt to give
a comprehensive and thematically organized account of postmodern thought,
permitting to draw rationally guided and conceptually sophisticated conclusions
from such a methodical undertaking, constitutes – at best – an amusing investi-
gative irony or – at worst – a misguided explorative venture whose motivational
starting point is little more than a contradiction in terms.
To put it radically, it seems impossible to examine ‘the postmodern inside’ from
‘the modern outside’ without alienating the authenticity of the former by apply-
ing the autopoietic rules of validity established by the latter. On the face of it, the
systematic study of postmodern thought can only turn out to be anti-postmodern,
unless it is prepared to abandon its – implicit or explicit – endorsement of the nor-
mative imperatives invented by the logocentric approaches of modern intellectual
traditions. If one takes a radical deconstructivist stance, one may contend that
the critical engagement with postmodern thought is a fruitful reflective exercise
to the extent that it attempts to break out of the rationalist straitjacket created by
the Enlightenment project.
In short, those who subscribe to, or sympathize with, the key presuppositions
underlying postmodern approaches in the social sciences may take the view that
an in-depth evaluation of the ‘postmodern turn’ is possible only to the degree that
one is willing to abandon the rigid rules of the corroborative search for logical and
evidence-based validity, effectively fetishized by mainstream forms of intellectual
enquiry. On this account, a truly insightful discussion of postmodern thought
would have to be postmodern itself.
Far from representing an incontestable paradigm, however, postmodern
thought contains numerous noteworthy features that have to be fundamentally
questioned. If the various paradigmatic shifts associated with the ‘postmodern
turn’ are motivated by a radical revision of the project of modernity, this does
not mean that postmodern forms of engaging with the world are immune to
criticism. On the contrary, just as the modern endeavour can be deconstructed by

230
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 231

virtue of postmodern language games, the postmodern venture can be scrutinized

by means of modern types of analysis. This chapter does not aim to do justice to
the entire complexity of the pitfalls inherent in postmodern thought; rather, it
deliberately focuses on some central dimensions that are particularly relevant to
the task of evaluating the persuasiveness of postmodern approaches in the social
sciences.
In the previous chapters, it has been argued that the far-reaching significance
of the rise of postmodern thought is reflected in five influential presuppositional
‘turns’ that have considerably shaped leading conceptions of social-scientific
investigation in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries:

I. the ‘relativist turn’ in epistemology;

II. the ‘interpretive turn’ in social research methodology;
III. the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology;
IV. the ‘contingent turn’ in historiography; and
V. the ‘autonomous turn’ in politics.

This final chapter offers a number of critical reflections that weigh up the valid-
ity of the ‘postmodern turn’. Of course, it is vital to acknowledge the important
contributions made by, as well as the useful insights gained from, the above-
mentioned paradigmatic turns. It is no less significant, however, to provide a
thorough assessment of the shortcomings and flaws of postmodern approaches in
the social sciences. With the aim of developing such a critical account, this final
chapter proposes to question the cogency of postmodern thought by examining
its (i) analytical, (ii) paradigmatic, and (iii) normative limitations.

(i) Analytical Limitations: A Self-Critical Comment

Before reflecting in detail on the weaknesses and pitfalls of postmodern thought,

let us briefly consider the limitations of the analysis carried out in the previous
chapters.

(a) A Definitional Problem

There is a definitional problem. As stated in the Introduction, the label ‘post-
modern’ is a fuzzy concept. If terminological precision is regarded as a premise
for diagnostic exactitude, then the recent and ongoing debates on postmodern
thinking can barely claim to be characterized by irrefutable lucidity based on
definitional clarity. This does not mean, however, that the systematic study of
postmodern arguments and themes is pointless only because the normative agenda
in which they are embedded is hard to capture in a succinct and straightforward
manner. On the contrary, the fact that postmodern thought is difficult to define poses
a worthwhile challenge and invites us to come to grips with its wide-ranging and
eclectic ways of engaging with both the material and the symbolic developments
of the contemporary world. Thus, instead of offering a simple and unambigu-
ous definition of postmodern thought, the preceding chapters have sought to
232 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

elucidate and problematize its complexity. Yet, to the extent that every – implicit or
explicit – definition involves the imposition of conceptual boundaries, the preced-
ing investigation is far from exhaustive, let alone conclusive.

(b) A Methodological Problem

There is a methodological problem. The theoretical exploration of the ‘postmod-
ern turn’ undertaken in this book is based on a thematic, rather than an author-
focused, examination. As such, it aims to provide an aspect-oriented account of
postmodern thought. To be exact, the previous chapters have sought to scrutinize
the impact of postmodern ideas on the contemporary social sciences by grappling
with five cornerstones of modern intellectual thought: epistemology, methodol-
ogy, sociology, historiography, and politics. The selection of these five dimensions
is deliberate in that it intends to emphasize the intricacy of the multifaceted chal-
lenges arising from the potential ‘postmodernization’ of the social sciences.
Paradoxically, the main strength of an aspect-oriented analysis is, at the same
time, its major weakness. Its strength lies in its capacity to illustrate the the-
matic complexity of the ‘postmodern turn’. Its weakness, however, consists in
its tendency to over-generalize. It is human beings – that is, individual thinkers,
authors, and researchers – who stand behind the issues discussed in a thematically
organized volume. Hence, to structure the argument in accordance with the five
aforementioned areas of concern and, furthermore, take them to represent the
most striking features of an overall paradigmatic shift means to impose a sense
of consistency and homogeneity on a remarkably amorphous and heterogeneous
landscape of paradigmatic transitions and contradictions. In other words, the risk
of making overgeneralizations, resulting from the attempt to provide a thematic-
ally structured overview of an internally diversified and fragmented intellectual
movement, constitutes a serious – albeit not untenable – methodological limita-
tion of the foregoing enquiry.

(c) An Interpretive Problem

There is an interpretive problem. While this book is thematically structured, it
draws upon the theoretical arguments put forward by numerous – and, in many
respects, diverging – scholars. Not all of these thinkers, however, regard them-
selves as advocates of, let alone participants in, a ‘postmodern project’. To a large
degree, postmodern thought appears to be an endogenous intellectual force with
an exogenously imposed label. In this sense, the key issues identified in this trea-
tise are not solely relevant to the disputes concerning the paradigmatic differences
between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ approaches in the social sciences. Rather,
they reflect the variegated nature of postmodern thought in terms of the specific –
and, by definition, contentious – analysis proposed in this book. Any thematically
structured interpretation of postmodern thought is unavoidably controversial.
None of the arguments and themes explored in the previous chapters should be
portrayed as indubitably, let alone exclusively, ‘postmodern’. Rather than consid-
ering these disputes and topics as uniquely and distinctively ‘postmodern’, the
point of this study is to demonstrate that the ensemble of the paradigmatic shifts
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 233

that have been taking place in the contemporary social sciences constitutes the
presuppositional basis of the ‘postmodern turn’.
As stated in the Introduction, the ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sciences can be
conceived of as a paradigmatic shift from the Enlightenment belief in the relative
determinacy of both the natural world and the social world to the – increasingly
widespread – post-Enlightenment belief in the radical indeterminacy of all material
and symbolic forms of existence. In brief, the main purpose of this investigation
has been to examine the impact of the ‘postmodern turn’ by demonstrating that
the paradigmatic shift from the search for patterns of relative determinacy to the
emphasis on radical indeterminacy manifests itself in the major epistemological,
methodological, sociological, historiographical, and political debates that have
crucially shaped the development of the social sciences in recent decades.

(ii) Paradigmatic Limitations:

The Continuing Presence of Modernity

As mentioned above, far from representing a homogenous and coherent ideo-

logical position, postmodern thought is a conglomerate of eclectic and internally
fragmented intellectual controversies and trends. The various criticisms launched
against it, however, are just as complex and multidimensional as postmodern
thought itself. Given that there are substantial continuities between modern and
postmodern approaches in the social sciences, it is anything but clear to what
extent the latter can claim to have made substantial contributions not already
provided by the former. It is no less obvious whether or not it would be fair to
suggest that postmodern forms of analysis have led to the creation of an entirely
new intellectual paradigm, that is, of a more or less coherent set of assumptions
that deserves to be described as a unique and innovative mode of thought. To be
precise, the originality of postmodern approaches in the social sciences can be
questioned by considering three fundamental dimensions relevant to the study
of modernity: (a) modernity as an unfinished project, (b) modernity as a self-critical
project, and (c) modernity as a path-breaking project.

(a) Modernity as an Unfinished Project

One problematic aspect of postmodern thought is the normative cornerstone
of its existence: the radical critique of modernity. Followers and adherents of post-
modern approaches tend to assume that the fundamental contradictions and
shortcomings of the modern project can be overcome only by transcending it
completely, both philosophically and socially. From a postmodern perspective,
then, the limitations and illusions inherent in large parts of contemporary social
and political thought can be left behind on condition that the entire project of
modernity is abandoned. On this interpretation, it seems that the self-referential
immanence of modernity needs to be challenged by the creative transcendence of
postmodernity in order for contemporary social actors to be ‘emancipated from
false consciousness’.2 To the extent that ‘false consciousness’3 is regarded as an
inherent feature of the modern project, its social power and distortive effects can
234 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

be challenged only by going beyond the historical conditions under which it is

permitted to colonize people’s cognitive dispositions and, therefore, their percep-
tions and conceptions of reality. Considering the spread of totalitarian ideologies
in twentieth-century large-scale societies, the historical emergence of systemically
organized genocide may be understood as an empirical expression of the tangible
consequences arising from the quest for totalizing forms of universality. On this
account, totalitarianism represents a direct outcome of the modern project, rather
than simply a failure of, let alone a deviation from, the historical condition widely
associated with the emancipatory promises of the Enlightenment. To put it suc-
cinctly, totalitarianism epitomizes the spirit of, rather than an inexplicable fiasco
within or a pathological aberration from, modernity.
Far from being reducible to a completed venture, however, modernity constitutes
an unfinished project, that is, a historical period that is still in the process of matur-
ing. Contrary to premodern formations of society, modernity is, by definition, a
condition of vollkommener Unvollkommenheit, that is, of complete incompleteness:
the impossibility of realizing itself fully and conclusively reflects the radical openness of
the modern project. The diagnostic engagement not only with its sociohistorical
limitations but also with its unfulfilled potential has always been an integral part
of modernity. To be critical of modernity does not necessarily mean to be opposed
to it; indeed, we must not ‘throw out the baby with the bath water’.4 If we seek
to step outside the horizon of modernity, then we expose ourselves to the risk of
dismissing its unprecedented emancipatory potential. The empowering nature
of the modern project is forcefully – that is, as its advocates may argue, both
competently and convincingly – articulated in Enlightenment thought. For the
human capacity to step out of self-imposed immaturity by mobilizing the critical
resources inherent in reason (Vernunft) is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition
for the possibility of both individual and social emancipation.5
The modern emphasis on the progressive role of reason is not totalizing in
itself, but only totalizing insofar as it pretends to deliver a blueprint for how
human emancipation is to be achieved. In fact, reason is not totalitarian per se;
rather, it is totalitarian to the extent that it is instrumentalized for the purpose
of undermining the possibility of human emancipation. Hence, the distinction
between substantive reason and instrumental reason is crucial to the development
of critical social thought.6 Advocates of postmodern approaches may argue that
the Enlightenment-inspired defence of modernity is tautological, and therefore
erroneous, in that it defends reason by relying upon reason itself. On this view,
the modern commitment to reason is justified – self-referentially – in the name of
reason. Postmodern thinkers, however, also fall back upon reason when launching
their criticisms against constitutive aspects of the modern project. To the extent
that defenders of postmodern thought aim to deploy rational arguments against
the normalizing functions of the modern endeavour, they are situated within,
rather than outside, the tradition of the Enlightenment. Ironically, and contrary
to their intentions, postmodern thinkers radicalize modernity’s critical spirit,
rather than transcending it. In short, postmodern critics of modernity are caught up
in the ‘performative contradiction’7 of raising rationally grounded validity claims against
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 235

the rational and rationalizing logic of modernity. To put it bluntly, postmodern schol-
ars use rational arguments against the argument of rationality.
Supporters of postmodern thought insist upon the totalizing nature of the mod-
ern project. Thus, they are wary of the detrimental consequences of modernity’s
drive towards realizing its totalitarian potential, which, in their eyes, is rooted
in its desire for domination in relation to both the natural world and the social
world. Defenders and partisans of normative approaches situated in the tradi-
tion of Enlightenment thought, on the other hand, are keen to emphasize the
incompleteness of the modern project, that is, its failure to fulfil the whole of its
emancipatory potential. Surely, the point is not to deny that both the rise and the
demise of totalitarian regimes represent important chapters in modern history;
rather, the point is to argue that modernity possesses the emancipatory capacity
to overcome the repressive potential that has shaped large parts of its own his-
tory. In this sense, modernity need not be transcended; on the contrary, it needs
to be radicalized, if we are prepared to accept that ‘there is no cure for the wounds of
Enlightenment other than the radicalized Enlightenment itself’.8
Moreover, it is mistaken to maintain that the premodern dogma about the cer-
tainty of divine law has simply been replaced by the modern belief in the reliability
of Reason and Progress. Put differently, it is misleading to posit that the transition
from ‘the premodern’ to ‘the modern’ is equivalent to the replacement of one type
of collective false consciousness by another. If postmodern thought is to be taken
seriously, then the only alternative to a premodern or modern Weltanschauung is
to possess no Weltanschauung at all. The postmodern actor is, consequently, left in
an ideological vacuum. Yet, the spirit of the Enlightenment is radically different
from the premodern preponderance of tradition precisely because of its categori-
cal rejection of dogmatic thought. If reason is misconceived as an omnipotent
and infallible force, then it can be converted into a core element of totalitarian
domination: collective empowerment as individual disempowerment founded
on the repression of critique as self-critique. If, however, reason is understood, and
mobilized, as self-critical reason, then it epitomizes a pivotal feature of human
emancipation: collective empowerment as individual empowerment based on the
articulation of critique as self-critique.9 It is this self-critical disposition of reason,
intrinsic to the Enlightenment project, which has to be radicalized in order to
recognize, and revitalize, the emancipatory potential of modernity.10

(b) Modernity as a Self-Critical Project

Modernity has always been critical of itself. The self-critical spirit of Enlightenment
thought is not a random product but a constitutive element of modernity. This
is not to claim that modernity can be conceived of as a merely emancipatory
era; rather, this is to recognize that it possesses the capacity to contribute to the
possibility of individual and social liberation from both material and ideological
forms of domination. Existential ambivalence is not a sociohistorical characteris-
tic emerging exclusively in the context of postmodernity. On the contrary, both
the practical experience and the theoretical problematization of the tension-
laden constitution of systemically differentiated societies have been crucial to
236 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

the modern condition long before the very idea of ‘the postmodern’ entered
the historical stage. In essence, the ambivalence of modernity consists in the fact
that, as a historical condition, it is divided between ‘the bright sides’ and ‘the
dark sides’ of post-traditional life forms.11 Although some postmodern accounts
may suggest otherwise, classical social theory has not been obsessed with the
one-sided celebration, let alone glorification, of modernity. Instead, it has always
highlighted the profoundly ambivalent nature of the modern age, exploring
the pathological consequences of social processes such as exploitation, alienation,
fragmentation, individualization, bureaucratization, and rationalization.12 In other
words, modernity has hardly ever been portrayed as a wonderland of pristine
intersubjectivity free from structural contradictions, systemic dysfunctionalities,
and social pathologies.13
Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of the ‘dialectic of Enlightenment’14 is one of
the most influential, and also most insightful, examples of modernity’s attempts
to come to terms with its own ambivalence. In fact, one may go as far as to assert
that the condition of modernity is essentially a condition of ambivalence. Any
critical study of modernity will find it difficult to ignore the fact that reason is not
per se a liberating force. Calculative expressions of Verstand – notably instrumen-
tal, strategic, and functionalist modes of rationality – tend to contribute to dis-
empowering mechanisms of social domination. By contrast, normative forms of
Vernunft – especially communicative, discursive, and substantive modes of ration-
ality – have the potential to generate processes of human emancipation.15 A more
balanced view of modernity – which takes into account not only its repressive and
disempowering dimensions, but also its expressive and empowering potential –
must not, however, take the self-declared mission of the Enlightenment at face
value. As astutely pointed out by modern critics such as Adorno and Horkheimer,
we must be wary of naïvely optimistic readings of the Enlightenment and instead
acknowledge its potentially authoritarian nature: ‘Enlightenment is totalitarian.
[…] Enlightenment treats things in the way the dictator treats people.’16
The sociohistorical preponderance of instrumental reason, hidden under the
mask of the Enlightenment, constitutes one of the darkest aspects of the condi-
tion of modernity. Nonetheless, the critique of instrumental reason can be con-
sidered as a central normative component of the modern project itself. ‘To speak
of modernity is […] to recognize the crisis of modernity. No sooner had the idea of
modernity been born than the critique of modernity emerged.’17 One of the great
ironies of modernity is that, while its rise has been inextricably linked to the
emergence of various detrimental and pathological features, its development has
always been accompanied – and, to a significant extent, shaped – by discursive
processes of critical reflection. In other words, the critique of modernity is part
of the very condition of modernity. Marx’s critique of political economy,18 Weber’s
critique of bureaucracy and large-scale organization,19 Durkheim’s critique of anomie
and the organic division of labour,20 Simmel’s critique of the abstraction of space,21
and Horkheimer’s critique of science22 are integral constituents of modern intel-
lectual thought. Far from representing hopelessly naïve and unjustifiably optim-
istic accounts of modernity, the works of these major scholars are expressions
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 237

of a remarkably fine-grained and critical engagement with the nature – and,

indeed, with the very possibility – of modernity. Thus, rather than painting a
harmonic and cosy picture of post-traditional settings, classical sociologists have
underscored the contradictory and problematic aspects of the modern condition.
In fact, critique – irrespective of whether one favours its moderate or its radical
versions – can be regarded as both a constitutive and a reflective element of the
modern project. Tantamount to a civilizational driving force, it is located within,
rather than outside, the horizon of modernity.
Marx’s assumption that ‘it is essential to educate the educator himself’23 or
herself implies that a genuinely reflective interpreter is a self-critical practitioner,
rather than a scholastic theoretician or socially detached enlightener.24 Far from
being liberated by an exogenous force, ordinary actors are equipped with the nec-
essary theoretical and practical capacities to emancipate themselves – both con-
ceptually and empirically – from mechanisms of social domination.25 Critique,
understood as both an interpretive and a purposive force, constitutes an emanci-
patory cornerstone of modernity. It is not simply an illusory invention of a crea-
tive individual or collective imaginary; rather, it belongs to the very condition of
modernity. Struggles for the construction of emancipatory social relations need
not be defined against and beyond modernity; on the contrary, they can – and,
indeed, should – be conceived of as tension-laden processes situated within and
realized through modernity.26

(c) Modernity as a Path-breaking Project

Some key features of the postmodern critique of modernity are as old as modern-
ity itself. Most importantly, this is the case with regard to modernity’s self-critical
spirit. The crisis of modernity has always been an integral part of the critique of
modernity, that is, of the modern critique of modernity. As the label ‘postmodern’
may indicate, ‘postmodernism is parasitic upon the defining problems of the
modernism it contests. It makes no breakthrough into new questions.’27 One
may even go as far as to contend that ‘there is nothing in postmodern social
theory that is not already central to modern social theory’.28 To a large extent,
postmodern approaches regurgitate previously developed critiques of modernity
and, thus, fail to make an original contribution to hitherto existing debates and
controversies in the social sciences. With the aim of illustrating this observation,
and following the thematic structure of the preceding analysis, let us briefly reflect
on five examples.
(I) The tensions between truth and perspective, certainty and uncertainty, and
universality and particularity represent vital sources of age-old discussions in
epistemology. At most, these epistemological disputes have been radicalized, but
they have not been introduced, by the postmodern agents provocateurs, who have
entered the scene in recent decades. ‘In the social sciences, there is a long tradi-
tion of thought that has been suspicious of claims to have direct and objective
access to the real world.’29 In a similar vein, ‘[r]elativism or scepticism itself – the
idea that objective truth does not exist or cannot be known – has a long tradi-
tion in Western philosophy’.30 For instance, the Humean notion of the ‘habits of
238 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

the mind’31 and the Nietzschean genealogy of ‘the will to power’32 anticipate the
perspectivist spirit that motivates postmodern scholars to deconstruct universalist
conceptions of knowledge. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the modern
sociological view that human reality is, or at least large parts of it are, socially
constructed undermines the metaphysical belief in the possibility of transcenden-
tal claims to epistemic validity. For the assertion of discursive authority is always
constrained by the relationally constituted power of social legitimacy.
(II) The tensions between explanation and understanding, mechanics and
dialectics, and ideology and discourse can be considered as axiomatic sources of
long-standing debates in social methodology. In particular, the emphasis on the
role of historical context in the symbolically constituted – and, to a large extent,
linguistically mediated – construction of meaning, which is central to postmod-
ern methodologies, is not unprecedented. Of course, critical discourse analysts
are right to insist upon the spatiotemporal contingency that permeates all sym-
bolically mediated modes of relating to an outside reality. We must not forget,
however, that hermeneutics has long stressed the importance of historicity for the
interpretation of language and meaning.33 One may contend that postmodern
textual methodologies have radicalized the philosophical interest in historicity.
One may also wonder, however, whether or not the systematic engagement with
the socio-ontological significance of spatiotemporal contingency can be more
radical than in the writings of influential modern philosophers such as Georg W.
F. Hegel,34 Martin Heidegger,35 and Hans-Georg Gadamer.36
(III) The tensions between industrialism and postindustrialism, productivism
and consumerism, and economism and culturalism have been highly relevant to
seminal controversies in sociology for a long time. Arguably, the analytical interest
in the shift from the paradigm of production to the paradigm of consumption,
which is fundamental to postmodern sociology, has always been a central concern
in the various studies undertaken by critical theorists. The term culture industry
captures the late capitalist tendency to consolidate a powerful form of societal
integrationism by creating standardized and standardizing consumer societies. To
be sure, postmodern thinkers tend to reject the functionalist implications of the
Marxist critique of the culture industry. Yet, both theoretical and empirical stud-
ies of the complex intertwinement of culture, consumption, and capitalism have
been key ingredients of modern social thought at least since the beginning of the
second half of the twentieth century.37
In a more fundamental sense, it is crucial to note the following:

What is currently being passed off as new under the rubric of ‘meta-change’
is already the key topic of classic sociological thought. The founding figures of
sociology always addressed the ambiguities associated with the development of
modern society as a central theme.38

Granted, one may come to the conclusion that the material and symbolic
transformations shaping the current era can be described as ‘reflexive moderni-
zation’,39 which manifests itself in significant tendencies such as the rise of ‘risk
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 239

society, forced individualization, [and] multi-dimensional globalization’.40 Yet, if

the constitutive commonalities between modernity and postmodernity are under-
estimated or even overlooked, while the differences between these two historical
conditions are overemphasized or even hypostatized, then one runs the risk of los-
ing sight of the fact that basic ideals and institutions of modern society continue to
exist in the contemporary age: ‘the core ideas of the nation-state, the nuclear fam-
ily, class conflict, international relations, the welfare state, nation-state democ-
racy and scientific knowledge’41 – to mention but a few of them. Modernity, in
other words, is far from over; its integral elements continue to be essential to the
constitution, the functioning, and the development of contemporary societies,
especially of advanced capitalist formations:

In the west, modernity remains entrenched. The chief signs of modernity have
not disappeared: for example, an industrial-based economy; a politics organ-
ized around unions, political parties, and interest groups; ideological debates
centered on the relative merits of the market and state regulation to ensure
economic growth, and the good society; institutional differentiation and role
specialization and professionalism within institutions; knowledges divided
into disciplines and organized around an ideology of scientific enlightenment
and progress; the public celebration of a culture of self-redemption and eman-
cipatory hope. Modernity has not exhausted itself; it may be in crisis but it continues
to shape the contours of our lives.42

Even globalization, which is often interpreted as an unparalleled phenomenon

of the contemporary era, constitutes a social process that has shaped human
history for a long time: ‘the phenomena of globalization have existed in every
age (intercontinental trading routes, conquests, colonialism, slavery, imperial
multi-ethnicity)’,43 leaving their unmistakable mark on developments in different
regions across the world. Thus, we need to avoid ‘falling into the trap of think-
ing that the phenomena of the new are more novel than they really are by over-
stylizing and simplifying the old’.44 Modernity has been with us for some time; it
is still with us, and it will remain with us for some time to come.
(IV) The tensions between necessity and contingency, grand narratives and
small narratives, and continuity and discontinuity have played a pivotal role in
developing explanatory frameworks employed in contemporary forms of histor-
iography. Most importantly, perhaps, it is worth spelling out that the tension
between necessity and contingency has always been a central object of discussion
in modern interpretations of history. Particularly in Marxist social theory, the rela-
tionship between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ factors, epitomized in the distinction
between ‘class in itself’ (Klasse an sich) and ‘class for itself’ (Klasse für sich),45 has
continuously triggered intellectual controversies. Let us, in this context, consider
only one of Marx’s most widely known aphorisms: ‘Men make their own history,
but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circum-
stances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered,
given, and transmitted from the past.’46 As illustrated in this assertion, the debate
240 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

on the complex relationship between necessity, imposed by the constraining force

of historical ‘circumstances’, and contingency, owing to people’s own ‘making’, has
always been a major issue in modern social theory.47
(V) The tensions between equality and difference, society-as-a-project and
projects-in-society, and clarity and ambiguity have affected normative agendas in
politics ever since the rise of modernity. Scepticism towards the practical implica-
tions and unintended consequences of political utopianism, stressed by postmod-
ern approaches to politics, is an element of critical reflection that has long been
anticipated by modern social thought. Indeed, ‘it must be pointed out that well
before it became what some now consider to be a hallmark of the postmodern,
incredulity concerning metanarratives was a familiar theme in Western thought’.48
Various influential modern thinkers – such as Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), Alexis
de Tocqueville (1805–59), Alexander I. Herzen (1812–70), Jacob Burckhardt (1818–
97), Hippolyte A. Taine (1828–93), and Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) – ‘rejected the
grand narrative of emancipation’49 in the conventional sense. Perhaps most elo-
quently, liberal and conservative thinkers have, for a long time, strongly opposed
utopian projects and questioned the seductive power of political blueprints.
This – arguably anti-utopian – perspective can be regarded as an indispensable
component of the Historikerstreit,50 as both liberal and conservative scholars tend
to interpret totalitarian regimes as products of utopian ideals, whether they are
fascist or communist. Hence, the anti-utopian character of postmodern concep-
tions of politics is not a novelty in intellectual thought.51 As any critical examina-
tion of the major political ideologies that have shaped the history of the past two
centuries will demonstrate, supporters of liberalism and conservatism have always
been suspicious of the utopian dimensions permeating the societal projects of
communism and fascism, respectively.52

As briefly elucidated above, some fundamental points of contention brought for-

ward by postmodern analysis are – metaphorically speaking – old problems in new
clothes. The fact that some of the focal issues that are at stake in the contemporary
social sciences have been points of contention in modern intellectual debates for
quite some time indicates that it would be premature to ascribe an unprecedented
paradigmatic status to the key criticisms launched – or, indeed, to the main propo-
sitions formulated – by postmodern thought. Some of the allegedly novel features
of the postmodern agenda were central to the development of the social sciences
long before the plea for a ‘postmodern turn’ became fashionable.53
In light of the preceding reflections, one may come to the conclusion that the
alleged ‘divide between modernity and postmodernity obscures the radicality of the mod-
ern itself’.54 In fact, a scrutinizing look at the intellectual history of the aforemen-
tioned issues and controversies will corroborate the suspicion ‘that the postmodern
impulse has been with us from the advent of modernity itself and that the discourses of
modernity began earlier than the conventional watershed of the Enlightenment’.55 Just
as we have never been entirely modern,56 we have never been fully postmodern.57
It would be naïve to ignore the fact that ‘postmodernity is deeply rooted in the
culture of modernity’58 no less than ‘modernity itself was rooted in the premodern
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 241

worldview’.59 In particular, critical attitudes based on ‘scepticism, discursivity and

reflexivity’60 have played a pivotal civilizational role not only in the development of
modern societies but also, more fundamentally, in the unfolding of world history.
It appears, then, that there is ample evidence to support the view that the pro-
claimed advent of postmodernity may be interpreted as follows:

[…] postmodernity describes the emergence of an intellectual climate charac-

terized by an increasing awareness of the limits of modernity as a blueprint for the
necessary development of society, as a privileged insight into our true condi-
tions of being, and as a subjectivistic and rationalistic reoccupation of the space
left by the demolishing of the belief in a divine grounding of the world. Hence,
what postmodern philosophy questions is not the legitimacy of modernity and
its emancipatory project, but its status as a fundamental ontology. In fact, what
is questioned is the very possibility of a fundamental ontology that can provide
an ultimate ground able to ensure the intelligibility of a world of objective,
social essences.61

In this context, the point is not to deny the general significance, let alone the
contemporary relevance, of the aforementioned questions and debates. Thus, as
elucidated above, three insights are crucial to a comprehensive understanding of
the modernity/postmodernity controversy:

A. As an unfinished project, modernity is far from completed: ‘despite the radi-

cal changes in modern societies, and in modes of thinking over the past few
decades, there seem to be few signs of an abandonment, or rejection, of
modernity’.62 As a historical phase of global significance, modernity – with all
its contradictions, paradoxes, fallacies, illusions, and tragedies – is still devel-
oping, unfolding, and maturing.
B. As a self-critical project, modernity is far from non-sceptical, non-discursive,
and non-reflexive: ‘the idea of a limit separating modernity from its equally
unified inversion fails to recognize that modernity has for long been sub-
jected to postmodern critiques’,63 or to those – rightly or wrongly – associated
with postmodern thought,64 as well as to critiques of scholars whose ideo-
logical convictions stand firmly within the tradition of modern intellectual
thought.65
C. As a path-breaking project, modernity is far from unoriginal, let alone outdated:
‘the conception of postmodernity as a new era coming after a modern epoch is
self-defeating, as it is caught up in modern historiography and its secularized
version of the theological eschatologies that describes history as a progressive
series of discontinuous epochs’.66 Put differently, ‘the simple, and unqualified,
addition of the temporal prefix “post-” to the notion of modernity runs the
risk of continuing the story modernity used to tell’.67 Enthusiastic support-
ers of postmodern thought tend to draw upon key insights that have always
already been provided by researchers and intellectuals whose writings stand
within, rather than outside, the horizon of modernity.
242 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

(iii) Normative Limitations: A Critique of the Postmodern Project

By definition, the social sciences are concerned with the systematic study of rela-
tionally constituted aspects of the human world. Recent and ongoing disputes
concerning the conceptualization of ‘the social’ are indicative of the fact that,
in the contemporary context, there is a deep uncertainty about the question of
whether or not it is possible to explore relationally constructed realities by means
of the explanatory frameworks developed by modern intellectual analysts.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the continuing relevance of the postmodern
endeavour to present-day academic and non-academic debates is inextricably
linked to current controversies regarding ‘the crisis of “the social”’.68 If postmod-
ern thought proclaims ‘the crisis “the social”’,69 rather than ‘the death of “the
social”’,70 then it needs to prove that it does not abandon the view that ‘the
social’ actually exists. More specifically, it needs to acknowledge that the dynamic
interplay between the occurrence of social practices and the presence of social
structures constitutes an ontological precondition for the possibility of human
existence.
The idea of a postmodern social theory remains a contradiction in terms to the
extent that it is based on the assumption that ‘the social’ has ceased to exist or
has never existed in the first place. The persuasive defence of ‘the social’, by con-
trast, is inconceivable without the epistemic capacity to prove both its conceptual
significance and its empirical existence. The methodical exploration of the condi-
tions underlying the possibility of social life has always been a fundamental con-
cern in the history of human thought. Thus, critical sociologists need to be able to
demonstrate that ‘the social’ – both as a discursive imaginary and as a substantive
reality – will continue to play a pivotal role in the construction of humanity in
the future. In light of this challenge, the epistemic validity and normative legitim-
acy of postmodern thought can be questioned on various grounds, as shall be
illustrated in the following sections.

(a) Textualism
One major problem with postmodern writings stems from the fact that, by and
large, their authors remain caught up in what may be described as a narrow-
minded posture of textualism. The ‘tendency to analyze all human life in terms of
texts and intertextuality’71 may easily lead to a reinterpretation of the history of
social changes as the accumulation of textual developments. If the history of spatio-
temporal processes is reduced to an oratorical task of storytelling on a meta-level
of mere discursivity, then sociology is converted into cultural studies and social
critique into literary criticism.
The ‘impulse towards reading culture as a text’72 and society as an ensemble
of interconnections based on textuality is central to the hermeneutics-inspired
programme of ‘cultural sociology’.73 As an investigative framework, it ‘begins by
analytically uncoupling culture from social structure (cultural autonomy) in order to
reach a textual understanding of social life’.74 Such a culturalist approach, however,
fails to provide conceptual and empirical tools for grasping ‘the economy of
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 243

cultural production, power asymmetries, and the cultural elites’ strategies for the
maintenance of their privileged positions’.75 In other words, it does not succeed
in shedding light on the materially conditioned, vertically structured, position-
ally arranged, and dispositionally assimilated mechanisms of social reproduction.
Cultural practices – irrespective of whether they are conformative or subversive,
conservative or progressive, reproductive or transformative, complicit or rebellious –
are not only meaning- and value-laden but also interest- and power-laden.
Postmodern thought tends to follow the tradition of culturalist textualism, inso-
far as it conceives of social life in terms of relationally contingent assemblages,
whose constitution – while providing a grammatically organized framework in
which performances take place – is relatively arbitrary, since it can be both decon-
structed and reconstructed. Yet, ‘by analysing everything as text and rhetoric’,76 or
as mere ‘cultural performance’77 embedded in a network of symbolically mediated –
but, ultimately, indeterminate – interactions, postmodern thought is in danger
of ascribing too high a degree of autonomy to discursively sustained expressions
of representationality, without accounting for their situatedness within, let alone
their dependence upon, overlapping domains of social reality.
To the extent that ‘postmodernism takes the reality as being structured like a
language’78 and, moreover, suggests that there is ‘no extralinguistic reality inde-
pendent of our representations of it in language or discourse’,79 thereby portray-
ing social life as ‘an endless process of signification’,80 it appears that every facet
of human existence is permeated by ‘the relativity of symbolic manifestations’,81
rather than by ‘the reality of social determination’.82 As a result, within postmod-
ern writings, we are confronted with the erroneous tendency to provide textualist
accounts of human life forms:

[…] the historicization of discourse has led to the ‘text analogy’ submitting
the ‘real’ or the ‘social’ in the discursive: in place of a necessary distinction
between the real and representations of it […] is the ‘intertextuality’ of ‘text’ and
‘context’.83

Society is not simply like language. It is language; and since we are all entrapped
in our language, no external standard of truth, no external referent for knowl-
edge, is available to us outside the specific ‘discourses’ that we inhabit.84

Notwithstanding the centrality of symbolically – notably, linguistically – organ-

ized forms of interpretation for the possibility of providing meaningful represen-
tations of reality, it is imperative not to ignore the fact that ‘the textual’ cannot be
divorced from ‘the extra-textual’.85 It is important to recognize, then, that every
form of textuality is socially constituted. Moreover, whereas textuality is social,
sociality is only partly textual. The most abstract versions of textual analysis can-
not conceal the social embeddedness of the discourses that they aim to examine.86
Rather than self-confidently proclaiming ‘the death of “the social”’,87 postmodern
thinkers need to take on the task of unearthing the relationally constructed condi-
tions of possibility that underlie all textually formulated claims to validity.88 In
244 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

other words, in terms of both production and reception, no writer and no speaker
can escape the social contingency permeating textuality. It is not society that
emanates from textuality, but, on the contrary, textuality that stems from society.
Therefore, textual analysis needs to conceive of itself as a social form of enquiry,
if it seeks to be more than a provocative exercise of rhetorical speculation based
on semanticist thought experiments. To reduce sociology to cultural studies and
social critique to literary criticism is tantamount to degrading society to a gram-
matical conglomerate of linguistically constituted textuality.89

(b) Ahistoricism
The second source of criticism is intimately interlinked with the previous issue:
the problem of ahistoricism. The ‘postmodern turn’ can be seriously defended
only to the extent that its advocates prove to be committed to sociohistorical
analysis. Yet, postmodern approaches to ‘the social’ are in danger of offering not
only purely textual but also ahistorical accounts of human reality.90 If postmodern
thought is particularly concerned with the discursive representations of reality, it
needs to engage in the critical examination of the sociohistorical conditions of
production that pervade people’s symbolically mediated access both to their envir-
onment and to themselves. Within a postmodern analytical framework, however,
one may get the – misleading – impression that ‘[t]exts have no history, because
they exist in a timeless, placeless space of intertextuality’.91 If textual interpreta-
tion is misunderstood as a linguistic process detached from the sociohistorical
conditions of production, then both the researcher and the researched are artifi-
cially removed from their habitat, that is, from the social contexts in which they
are spatiotemporally situated.92

There is no overarching coherence evident in either the polity, the economy or the
social system. What there are are instances (texts, events, ideas and so on) that
have social contexts which are essential to their meaning, but there is no under-
lying structure to which they can be referred as expressions or effects. Thus with the
notion of social totality goes the notion of social determination, so central to ‘social
history’.93

Granted, ‘[n]o historian, even of positivist stripe, would argue that history is
present to us in any but textual form’,94 although one may add that history can be
represented by virtue of symbolic forms that are not conventionally brought into
connection with ‘texts’ in the narrow sense: music and paintings, for instance,
can be powerful vehicles for both the prospective transmission and the retrospec-
tive interpretation of the past. Yet, to make a case for the ‘historical “unrepresent-
ability”’95 of social reality means to fall into the trap of fatalistic ahistoricism,
according to which researchers lack the capacity to provide illuminating accounts
of both ephemeral and structural elements shaping the unfolding of worldly
temporality.
To be sure, the point is not to deny that ‘history is never present to us in
anything but a discursive form’.96 Indeed, it is ‘vital to take the “linguistic turn”
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 245

seriously’97 by conceding that our meaning-projective access to the world, far

from being direct or immediate, is both symbolically mediated and socially con-
stituted. In fact, just as any other cultural practice, the interpretation of reality in
general and of history in particular is not only meaning- and value-laden but also
interest- and power-laden.
To take the discursive constitution of historiography seriously, however, does
not permit us to convert social analysis into a terminologically sophisticated
form of ‘science fiction’. If historiography is treated as a genre of ‘literature’,98
then it represents little more than a ‘fiction-making operation’99 inspired by crea-
tive language games and lacking any solid epistemic criteria by means of which
it is possible to distinguish between ‘accurate’ and ‘inaccurate’ accounts of past
happenings. Although historiography has ‘always assumed a narrative form’100
and will always continue to do so, it is both morally and politically dangerous to
propose ‘a theory of epochal change based on a denial of history’101 and, thus,
characterized by the absence of a critical examination of, rather than a merely
rhetorical speculation about, the spatiotemporally specific conditions in which
occurrences take place. It seems, then, that ‘postmodernist intellectuals reveal
their fundamental ahistoricism’102 to the degree that they fail, or even refuse, to
provide any substantial explanations concerning the spatiotemporal conditions
underlying the constitution, the functioning, and the development of reality.
Modern scholars subscribing to ideological metanarratives founded on the belief
in the epistemic validity of evidence-based enquiry may be inclined to assume
that a proper understanding of ‘totalizing systems’103 within society requires the
construction of ‘totalizing knowledge’104 about society. Yet, it is because of, not
despite, the fact that such a positivistically inspired and holistically oriented con-
ception of reality tends to end in crude forms of explanatory reductionism that
the critical engagement with the historical constitution of social reality is crucial.
While one does not have to go as far as to assert that ‘postmodernist philosophy
has little insight into historiography and nothing to contribute that clarifies or
illuminates its character as an inquiry or a body of knowledge’,105 one does have
to concede that ‘postmodernism is no longer the diagnosis’,106 but part of the
disease, to the extent that it trivializes the potentially context-transcending sig-
nificance of past happenings by equating them with fictional narratives that can
be fabricated in accordance with a storyteller’s perspective, mood, and personal
preferences in a given point in time.
‘If philosophy is to have a fruitful relationship with history, it must accept
the historian’s methods and ways of thinking as it finds them.’107 If postmodern
analysis intends to have a theoretically insightful and practically constructive
relationship with society, it must be prepared to face up to the fact that the com-
prehensive study of reality must entail a genuine search for objective, normative,
and subjective forms of existential authenticity, which – owing to its systematic
engagement with empirically constituted actualities – is irreducible to a language
game oriented towards the invention of narrative-based imaginaries. To replace a
context-blind conception of ‘History’ (in the upper case) with a context-sensitive
conception of ‘history’ (in the lower case)108 requires studying the unfolding of
246 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

happenings and developments without presupposing that they never occurred in

the first place and that – in accordance with such an ahistorical view – all there is in
the methodical reconstruction of events is fiction. Critical historiography, far from
being synonymous with an utterly self-referential form of ‘story-telling for its own
sake’,109 constitutes an inquisitive activity aimed at an insightful understanding
of the unfolding of – directly or indirectly interconnected – events that did occur,
even if the subsequent interpretations that they trigger may differ substantially
in terms of the cultural, political, and ideological resources mobilized in order to
attribute meaning to particular aspects of the past.
Postmodern commentators are right to draw attention to the totalizing features
of modernity, insisting that the historical atrocities of the twentieth century
have demonstrated the destructive potential of bureaucratized and industrialized
large-scale societies, rather than simply distorted the emancipatory resources of
the Enlightenment. Yet, the critical awareness of the ferocious happenings of the
‘age of extremes’110 requires a sociohistorical analysis, precisely because it would
be cynical to reduce real-life events to textual representations.

Auschwitz was not a discourse. It trivializes mass murder to see it as a text. The
gas chambers were not a piece of rhetoric. Auschwitz was indeed inherently a
tragedy and cannot be seen either as a comedy or a farce. And if this is true of
Auschwitz, then it must be true at least to some degree of other past happen-
ings, events, institutions, people, as well.111

To regard history as an accumulation of merely discursive representations means

to confine the task of sociohistorical examination to textual analysis.112

(c) Idealism
A third significant problem that emerges when reflecting upon the several impli-
cations of the ‘postmodern turn’ is the danger of falling into the trap of idealism.
If the frequently quoted Derridean contention that ‘[i]l n’y a pas de hors-texte’113 –
‘there is no outside-text’, or ‘there is nothing outside the text’, or ‘there is no out-
side to the text’ – is interpreted in idealist terms, according to the motto ‘reality is
essentially textual’, then we abandon the terrain of social enquiry, understood as
a form of critical investigation that is concerned with both the symbolic and the
material aspects of human life forms.

Many of those who have worked with the concept of discourse have ended up
seeing the social as nothing but discourse, i.e., in a ‘discourse idealism’, similar to
traditional philosophical idealism except that rather than seeing social life as
produced in thought, they see it as produced in discourse.114

If human reality is reduced to discourse, then social-scientific disciplines are

downgraded to variations of discourse analysis.115 Of course, critical discourse
analysts are aware of – and, indeed, insist upon – the fact that symbolically medi-
ated realities cannot be divorced from materially constituted societies.116 To be
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 247

exact, in the human universe, symbolic and material dimensions are, at the same
time, relatively independent and relatively interdependent. They are relatively
independent, because one cannot be reduced to the other; they are relatively
interdependent, because one cannot exist without the other. With such a holistic
conception of human reality in mind, critical discourse analysts should be able
to resist the idealist temptation to suggest that ‘the social’ is entirely dependent
upon ‘the textual’. Critical social research needs to explore both the textualization
of ‘the social’ and the socialization of ‘the textual’: the former highlights the linguis-
tic constitution of human society, and the latter illustrates the societal nature of
human language. By contrast, to consider linguistic discourse to be a ubiquitous
force that forms the ontological precondition for the existence of every facet of
human reality means to reduce ‘the social’ to ‘the textual’.
Given its endorsement of radically constructivist conceptions of knowledge,
‘postmodernist philosophy’117 tends to subscribe to ‘a species of linguistic idealism
which is opposed to realism and the ideas of truth and objective knowledge’.118 The
main problem with such an idealist understanding of knowledge in particular and
of reality in general is that it fails to provide epistemic criteria by virtue of which
the validity of objective, normative, and subjective claims to truth, rightness,
and sincerity can be assessed. In other words, we are left with an epistemological
vacuum in which there are no clear reference points, let alone yardsticks, by means
of which the rational defensibility of particular assertions can be evaluated.119

(d) Aestheticism
A fourth type of scepticism to be taken into account when assessing postmod-
ern approaches concerns their tendency towards aestheticism. The postmodern
interest in the representational and cultural dimensions of social life is indicative of a
tacit compliance with, rather than of a critical distance from, the commodifying
imperatives of late capitalism.120 The culturalist focus of postmodern meditations is
developed at the expense of a serious engagement with the material and economic
aspects of social reality.
If early critical theorists and postmodern sociologists have one thing in com-
mon, it is the fact that their oeuvres reflect a shift in emphasis from ‘the eco-
nomic’ to ‘the cultural’ in the social sciences. Hence, regardless of whether we
consider the various analyses of the ‘culture industry’121 offered by critical theor-
ists or the multifaceted approaches developed by postmodern scholars whose
writings stand firmly in the relatively recent tradition of ‘cultural studies’,122 it is
difficult to make sense of the hegemonic functioning of late capitalist societies
without providing a fine-grained account of the commodified and commodifying
role of culture in an age of consumerism.
If one takes a less sympathetic stance towards the ‘cultural turn’ in the social
sciences, however, one may come to the – admittedly cynical – conclusion that,
just as ‘[a]musement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work’,123 cultural
studies under the logic of a fashion-driven social science is the playful extension
of ‘punk sociology’.124 Yet, the aesthetic seductions of amusement and cultural
studies cannot substitute for a critical engagement with ‘the social’.
248 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

In the current era, both society and sociology appear to have succumbed to the
imperatives of the market. A commodified sociology is in danger of producing
knowledge for the sake of selling catchy language games, just as a commodified
social analysis is exposed to the risk of being converted into an aesthetic theory
with the aim of downplaying the material conditions shaping the nature of
human experience. Critical social science should seek to overcome this threat of
opportunistically motivated reductionism by committing itself to the dialectical
understanding of society, that is, to an investigative approach anchored in the
comprehensive study of multiple – notably, cultural, political, psychological, eco-
nomic, and demographic – dimensions of social life.
To replace critical sociology with a form of ‘decorative sociology’125 means to
liquidate the reflexive spirit embedded in the social sciences. ‘Today’s paid theorists
[…] are obliged to invent movements because their careers […] depend on it. The more
movements they can give names to, the more successful they will be.’126 If mar-
ketized in an effective way, the constant invention of seemingly unprecedented
academic discourses literally buys into the commodifying logic, and suits the con-
sumerist imperatives, of late capitalist societies. Thus, the development of new the-
oretical approaches and the announcement of numerous paradigmatic turns in the
social sciences appear to be driven by the need to create and circulate new aestheti-
cized discourses subjugated to the systemic functioning of late capitalist markets.
Under these conditions, systemic sources of structural heteronomy undermine
critical resources of individual and collective autonomy. Normatively speaking,
one may contend that social science needs to mobilize its endogenous resources
of criticism in order to be able to challenge exogenous sources of consumerism.
Even if, however, one shares the view that social science has an emancipatory
mission, it is far from obvious how this challenging task is to be accomplished.
Large parts of modern social theory – especially those developed in the diversified
traditions of Marxian, Durkheimian, and Weberian thought127 – are characterized
by the attempt to grasp the systemic sources of structural heteronomy imposed by
capitalist society, in particular by examining its most severe pathological conse-
quences. Postmodern social theory, on the other hand, seems to be utterly absorbed
by the commodified and commodifying logic of the capitalist market; therefore,
one gets the impression that its aestheticized discourses are generated for the sake
of lucrative sale, rather than for the worthwhile purpose of critical analysis.128
As pointed out especially by Weberian and Habermasian approaches, modern
society is characterized by the functional separation between three ‘cultural value
spheres’: (i) science and technology, (ii) law and morality, and (iii) art and art
criticism.129 These three major ‘discourses of modernity’, which permeate the
polycentrically organized Lebensgesellschaft, are derived from increasingly ration-
alized lifeworlds, which consist of people’s experience of Lebensgemeinschaft.130
Thus, they are anchored in every ordinary subject’s capacity to raise, differenti-
ate between, and – if required – problematize three validity claims: (i) truth, (ii)
rightness, and (iii) truthfulness.131 Postmodern thought poses a challenge to this
tripartite architecture of modern society, calling the continuing relevance of its
differential logic into question:
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 249

[…] postmodernity comes about as these domains undergo de-differentiation,

for the blurring of the borders between these orders of discourse is commonly held
to be the chief feature of the postmodern. But postmodernity accords primacy to the
aesthetic, which forces itself into the normative and the cognitive, bringing
about an aestheticization of everyday life […], a sense of postmodern culture as one
that prioritizes the symbolic, and that […] leads to the over-determination of the
normative and cognitive dimensions by the aesthetic, which becomes the central
category of everyday life.132

However one interprets the alleged implosion of the tripartite architecture of

modern society in recent decades, it is far from clear whether or not the postmod-
ern aestheticization of everyday life constitutes an empowering source of social
transformation or a self-perpetuating force of social reproduction. ‘As an autono-
mous institution, the aesthetic could enter everyday life only either as a radical
politics or as a depoliticized popular culture.’133 In other words, just as the aestheti-
cization of ordinary existence can contribute to the unfolding of social processes
oriented towards individual and collective emancipation, it can be a vehicle for
perpetuating material and symbolic structures put in place in order to legitimize –
and, if necessary, conceal – mechanisms of domination. Those who sympathize
with postmodern thought will insist upon the former: the postmodern aestheti-
cization of everyday life can provide a realm of inspiration, imagination, and
motivation for resourceful grassroots actors seeking to escape the systemic logic
imposed by the market and the state. Those who are suspicious of postmodern
thought will draw attention to the latter: the postmodern aestheticization of
everyday life – whatever its self-declared intentions and ambitions – amounts
to little more than a playful, but ultimately complicit, way of buying into the
instrumental logic of an almost totally commodified and administered world, in
which there remains little – if any – room for genuine human creativity capable
of bypassing the functionalist imperatives underlying money-driven and state-
regulated societies.
On this – rather critical – account, ‘[p]ostmodernity is modernity devoid of its
political project’,134 that is, it stands for a historical condition that is shaped by
patterns of consumption, rather than by practices of resistance,135 and thus by
‘the political neutralization of social content’,136 rather than by its radical prob-
lematization. According to this unsympathetic perspective, then, ‘[p]ostmodern-
ism allows the aesthetic to enter everyday life without political implications’,137
that is, without the willingness to call the fundamental parameters underpinning
the functioning of productivist and consumerist, as well as technocratic and
managerialist, societies into question. Its playful ways of undermining the classi-
cal distinction between ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’138 forms of cultural expression
may, at first glance, appear progressive and empowering. Owing to its advocates’
unpreparedness to endorse a set of clearly defined values, assumptions, and prin-
ciples, however, it fails to permit human actors – either as social participants or as
critical observers – to distinguish between emancipatory and non-emancipatory
practices.
250 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

If the aestheticization of everyday life is tantamount to the trivialization of

struggles for and over universally defensible moral and political standards, then
the postmodern ‘ethics of aesthetics’139 amounts to little more than an entertain-
ing language game lacking any long-term normative project, to which actors can
contribute – above all – as humans, that is, regardless of their numerous social
identities and affiliations. To be sure, in principle there is nothing wrong with
‘expressive and aesthetic conceptions of the political’;140 yet, they need to be
embedded in critical frameworks in which ‘the cognitive’ and ‘the normative’ are
cross-fertilized with, rather than colonized by, ‘the aesthetic’.141

(e) Conservatism
A fifth problem that emerges when reflecting critically upon the ‘postmodern
turn’ concerns a normative dimension: its tacit conservatism. The suspicion that
advocates of postmodern thought ‘are passively conservative in effect’142 and
that their project may represent the ‘Trojan Horse’143 of ‘new conservatism’144 or
‘neo-conservatism’145 is triggered by its opposition to the progressive elements
and civilizational achievements of the project of modernity in general and of the
Enlightenment in particular. In essence, the implicit conservatism of the postmod-
ern agenda is illustrated in three problematic tendencies: first, the integrationist
depoliticization of the economy, based on the effective acceptance of capitalism;
second, the postutopian deideologization of society, linked to the crisis of Marxism;
and, third, the differentialist neotribalization of politics, expressed in the celebra-
tion of difference. Given their crucial significance for a critical assessment of post-
modern thought, it is worth examining these tendencies in further detail.
First, postmodern thought ‘does not in fact repoliticize capitalism, because the
very notion and form of the “political” within which it operates is grounded in
the “depoliticization” of the economy’.146 Indeed, the postmodern agenda does
not call the dehumanizing, destructive, and exploitative nature of capitalism
into question.147 Thus, it signals both a theoretical and a practical retreat from
the critique of social domination sustained by capitalist relations.148 This view
ties in with the conservative assumption that we live in a postutopian world, in
which there is no viable alternative to capitalist forms of social organization on
the horizon. In fact, however, this seemingly postideological stance underlying the
postmodern project is an ideological position, that is, it constitutes a set of norma-
tive assumptions concerning the raison d’être of the economy in particular and of
society in general. Irrespective of how eclectic and internally fragmented it may
be as an intellectual movement, postmodernism is an anti-ideological – and argu-
ably post-Marxist – ideology of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
Second, the rise of postmodern thought is intimately intertwined with pro-
vocative announcements vis-à-vis the gradual deideologization of society. Yet, the
conservative alignment of the postmodern imagination needs to be contextualized
if the sociohistorical background in which it has been able to thrive is to be fully
understood: ‘The roots of postmodernism lie in the intellectual crisis of Western
Marxism. […] Postmodernism did not start a revolution. Rather, it filled a power
vacuum caused by the collapse of Marxism’.149 Postmodern thought emerged
not ‘in and through itself’ but in the context of the crisis and demise of utopian
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 251

paradigms. The postutopian interpretation of history cannot be divorced from the

apparently postutopian situation of contemporary society: the collapse of the meta-
ideological project of state socialism. Considering the impact of totalitarian
regimes upon the history of the twentieth century, there can be little doubt
about the repressive character of state socialism. At the same time, there is not
much room for uncertainty concerning the repressive tendencies of capitalist
societies, especially in periods in which their economic and administrative insti-
tutions enter profound legitimacy crises.150 If we regard the contemporary age as
a ‘postutopian era’, freed from the deceptive character of ambitious big-picture
ideologies, then we run the risk of leaving the totalizing nature of late capitalism
unquestioned, by effectively treating it as the only viable economic system.
Third, postmodern thought has extensively contributed to, and has in turn
been affected by, the neotribalization of politics. In most versions of postmodern
thought, the emphasis on the need to recognize the normative significance of
social and cultural differences features centrally. Accordingly, it appears that, in
order to overcome the principal types of discrimination that are linked to the
institutional or ideological repression of alterity, we need to abandon the modern
pursuit of universality. The problem with this position, however, is that it hinges
upon a short-sighted conception of differentialist politics: to the extent that the
defence of alterity is radicalized in terms of a celebration of difference, the exclu-
sionary character of universalist mainstream politics is not eliminated but replaced
by differentialist forms of exclusion. Universalist politics classify; postmodern
politics reclassify; emancipatory politics declassify. If postmodern approaches seek
to convert the meaning of difference into a political battlefield, then they fail to
emancipate themselves from the totalizing chains that they aim to deconstruct
and transcend.151 Postmodern thinkers are right to point out that the project of
modernity cannot be dissociated from the historical experience of totalitarian
tribalism on a grand scale in the twentieth century. This should make us even
more aware of the fact, however, that the postmodern celebration of difference
can be instrumentalized to reinforce and to justify, rather than to undermine and
to delegitimize, the emergence of neotribalism in the contemporary world.
‘The irony of the logic of identity is that by seeking to reduce the differently
similar to the same, it turns the merely different into the absolutely other.’152 If
postmodern approaches to politics are based on the absolutization of ‘the other’
as ‘the Other’, their agendas and practices will turn out to be just as totalizing,
hegemonizing, and marginalizing as the programmes and institutions of their
universalist precursors.153 If, by contrast, postmodern approaches to politics take
seriously the insight – which they themselves advocate – that difference must
never be essentialized, then they possess the potential of overcoming the pit-
falls of the abstract and disempowering universalisms endorsed by their modern
predecessors.154

(f) Nihilism
A sixth issue arising when reflecting upon the pitfalls of postmodern thought is
the problem of nihilism.155 In the most general sense, the term ‘nihilism’ desig-
nates the philosophical doctrine that negates the possibility of demonstrating that
252 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

human life as a whole is, or particular aspects of it are, inherently meaningful.

On this perspective, all attempts to identify levels of meaning that are intrinsic
to natural or social forms of existence are ultimately futile. Applied to the key
areas of philosophical enquiry, such a – nihilistic – position has the following
implications: meaning is not inherent in knowledge (epistemology), being (ontol-
ogy), argument (logic), morality (ethics), or forms (aesthetics). Human actors may
have the interpretive and desiderative capacity to attach meaning to both central
and peripheral elements of their existence. This does not prove, however, that
meaning is an underlying property of these elements. Put differently, meaning is
projected upon, rather than built into, the world: it is attributed to the world by its
meaning-generating inhabitants. Stripped of all phenomenologically assembled,
psychologically embedded, and intersubjectively sustained carriers of significa-
tion, life – viewed through the demystifying lenses of radical deconstruction – is
devoid of any intrinsic meaning.
Advocates of postmodern thought tend to endorse this philosophical stance,
commonly described as ‘nihilism’, insofar as they contend that all meaning,
because it is constructed by individual or collective actors, is spatiotemporally con-
tingent. On this account, it appears that, owing to the ineluctable preponderance
of spatiotemporal contingency in all forms of relationally constituted realities,
any ambition to formulate universalizable objective or normative criteria for the
assessment of the epistemic validity of a specific statement or the social legitimacy
of a particular human action is doomed to failure. Thus, it is no accident that an
accusation frequently made against postmodernists – notably against ‘deconstruc-
tor postmodernists’156 – is ‘that they are just sceptics who cannot make significant
moral or political commitments’.157 For they refuse to endorse a set of universal nor-
mative principles to which all human actors – irrespective of their group-specific
affiliations and ideological convictions – can, and should, subscribe. To be sure,
advocates of postmodern thought have good reason to be suspicious of moral and
ideological absolutism: such a project – reflected in the attempt to defend particular
sets of values, assumptions, and principles, treat them as if they had universal sta-
tus, and impose them upon others – is problematic in the sense that it ignores the
spatiotemporal specificity permeating the construction of normativity.
Yet, the difficulties attached to the task of identifying universally defensible rules
and conventions do not permit us to draw the nihilistic conclusion that ‘anything
goes’158 – that is, that any kind of behavioural, ideological, or institutional pat-
terns have moral worth or, if one prefers, that none of them can possess any moral
value whatsoever. Irony may be a powerful weapon used in order to expose, and
burlesque, different versions of dogmatism.159 If, however, it is converted into the
raison d’être of an ideological programme that claims to be non-ideological, then
it is tantamount to a self-fulfilling prophecy of a playful attitude that is at its best
when preventing both laypersons and experts from taking themselves too seri-
ously and at its worst when evaluated in terms of its capacity to provide meaning-
ful criteria for the pursuit of morally defensible forms of agency. Negation is both
theoretically fruitful and practically effective when accompanied by affirmation,
rather than when being left to, let alone sustained by, itself.160
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 253

(g) Relativism
A seventh issue emerging when grappling with the limitations of postmodern
thought is the problem of relativism. Supporters of the ‘postmodern turn’ are eager
to insist upon the spatiotemporal contingency of all claims to objective, norma-
tive, or subjective validity. Indeed, from a postmodern point of view, ‘the relativity
of representation’,161 regulation, and appreciation permeates all human attempts
to attribute symbolically mediated meanings to their worldly immersion. At the
heart of the postmodern project, then, lies an endorsement of relativism based on
the assumption that there are no universal standards capable of transcending the
sociohistorical specificity of the conditions of production allowing for their own
emergence within a particular domain of reality. One of the principal problems
arising from such a relativist position, however, is that it becomes impossible to
distinguish between context-transcending principles, to which all human beings
should subscribe, and context-dependent principles, to which human beings may
or may not subscribe, depending on the spatiotemporally specific circumstances
in which they find themselves situated as well as on their personal preferences,
convictions, and dispositions:

[…] if we turn our back on the possibility of distinguishing between first-order

principles, to which everybody should adhere regardless of their cultural back-
ground, and second-order principles, which are by definition socio-culturally
contingent, we find ourselves immersed in an ocean of cognitive and moral
relativism, in which we function in accordance with opportunistic consid-
erations of parochial localism and situationist short-termism and in which
we make both individual and collective decisions in merely context-specific
terms.162

Of course, those advocating ‘postmodernist relativism’163 will point out that dif-
ferent life forms generate different standards of objective, normative, or subjective
validity: ‘the way they do things over there’164 may differ fundamentally from
‘the way we do things round here’.165 Yet, the ‘superficial irony that characterize[s]
some versions’166 of postmodern thought has little more to offer than a firm, but
ultimately short-sighted, commitment to ‘the relativist assertion that “everything
goes”’.167 Since, according to this account, ‘[t]ruth cannot be out there – cannot
exist independently of the human mind’168 –, it is pointless to search for ulti-
mate foundations by means of which it may appear possible to identify context-
transcending standards for raising objective, normative, or subjective claims to
validity. On this view, to the extent that reality – including symbolically mediated
representations of it – can be conceived of as a ‘social construction’,169 ‘there are
no facts’170 in the strict sense and, in the human sphere of embodied reflexive
performances, ‘everything is a reading’,171 implying that – in principle – all aspects
of existence are open to interpretation.
Yet, ‘relativism is an extremely weak foundation’172 of a seemingly foundation-
less project: the relativist opposition to the search for epistemic foundations does –
contrary to its self-declared anti-foundationalism – constitute a foundationalist
254 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

position, whose ultimate presuppositional ground is located in its futile quest for
ontological and methodological groundlessness. Surely, postmodernists may be
applauded for having ‘pulled the rug out from beneath a number of complacent
certainties, prised open some paranoid totalities, tainted some jealously guarded
purities, bent some oppressive norms, and shaken some rather solid-looking
foundations’.173 Their radical scepticism can serve as an effective medicine against
dogmatically followed and unreflexively reproduced convictions about the consti-
tution of reality. Given their insistence upon the utter contingency of all claims to
epistemic validity or social legitimacy, however, postmodern relativists endorse a
normative position that suffers from ‘leaving itself with no more reason why we
should resist fascism than the feebly pragmatic plea that fascism is not the way
we do things in Sussex or Sacramento’.174 Ultimately, postmodern relativism is
epistemologically untenable, methodologically counterproductive, sociologically
unimaginative, historically ignorant, and politically dangerous.175

(h) Identitarianism
An eighth issue that needs to be confronted when examining the limitations of
postmodern thought is the problem of identitarianism.176 This matter concerns the
postmodern tendency not only to recognize but also to celebrate – if not, to fetishize –
the normative significance of cultural identities. The irony of the postmodern
emphasis on ‘difference’ is that it runs the risk of essentializing cultural identi-
ties by converting them into the main reference point of social struggles. In the
postmodern universe, transforming identity into a political battlefield, notably in
relation to the position of relatively or completely side-lined individual or collect-
ive actors, involves creating a ‘cult of marginality’,177 which – in its most radical
forms – ‘come[s] down to a simpleminded assumption that minorities [are] positive
and majorities oppressive’.178
Yet, just as it would be fallacious to contend that minorities represent an intrin-
sically emancipatory social force, it would be erroneous to assert that majorities
embody an inherently repressive form of relationally constituted power. Indeed,
the ‘fetishizing of “otherness”’,179 which manifests itself in the construction of
‘rigid oppositions of “inside” and “outside”’,180 contributes to the hypostatization
of identitarian thinking, rather than to its deconstruction, let alone to the pos-
sibility of overcoming mechanisms of social segregation based on binary separ-
ations between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Thus, postmodernism’s ‘rampantly culturalist
discourse’,181 while it is supposed to be aimed at giving a voice to the voiceless
and at empowering relatively or almost completely disempowered actors, in fact
legitimizes social practices whose primary function consists in reinforcing, rather
than undermining, the stratifying power that permeates the dynamics of separa-
tion between asymmetrically positioned actors, who are divided by unequal access
to material and symbolic resources.

(i) Theoreticism
A ninth issue that needs to be tackled when exploring the limitations of post-
modern thought is the problem of theoreticism, which is due to a lack of a serious
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 255

engagement with the constitution of empirical realities. Perhaps, one of the most
obvious examples illustrating this point is the provocative rhetoric concerning
the alleged ‘end of metanarratives’. Contrary to the postmodern contention that
we have entered a ‘postideological age’, we need to recognize that, in the contem-
porary world, a large number of individual and collective actors continue to be
motivated by metanarratives. ‘It is obvious to any reader of the newspapers that
men and women are still more or less willing to kill one another in the name of
grand narratives every day’.182 Especially when examining the role of political,
philosophical, religious, economic, and cultural metanarratives in terms of their
capacity to affect current social trends, it becomes evident that ‘big stories’ and
‘worldviews’ remain crucially important in motivating people’s actions in the
twenty-first century.
In addition, it appears that, owing to their focus on theoretical debates, ‘post-
modernist critics of science often grossly fail to understand the empirical claims of
science’,183 let alone the substantive impact of institutionalized forms of research
on both the constitution and the development of diverse dimensions of social
reality. Surely, ‘scientific metanarratives’184 belong to the most powerful sources
of innovation and transformation in the modern age. To the extent that they con-
tinue to play a pivotal role in shaping behavioural, ideological, and institutional
patterns in contemporary societies, it seems – at best – erroneous or – at worst –
cynical to proclaim the ‘end of scientific metanarratives’185 in the present era. As
illustrated in the rise of science and technology studies (STS) in recent decades,186
‘modern metanarratives’187 that are based on forms of systematic enquiry and
knowledge acquisition may be regarded as a sine qua non of the ‘global network
society’.188 Any serious engagement with the structural underpinnings of highly
differentiated large-scale social settings will demonstrate that merely theoretical
thought experiments about the alleged disappearance of metanarratives in the
current epoch suffer from a lack of empirical substantiation.189

(j) Oxymoronism
A tenth issue that needs to be addressed when scrutinizing the limitations of
postmodern thought is the problem of oxymoronism due to several performative
contradictions.190 This point concerns various levels of analysis.
First, there is the performative contradiction of anti-rationalist rationality.191 The
paradoxical nature of this problem can be described as follows: on the one hand,
postmodernists tend to be suspicious of rationalist conceptions of the human
subject, on the ontological level, and of human enquiry, on the methodological
level; on the other hand, postmodernists are obliged to draw upon rationality
when calling the validity of rationalist approaches into question. The performa-
tive contradiction of which postmodernists are culpable in this respect, then, is
that they seek to undermine the power of rationality by virtue of rationality.
Second, there is the performative contradiction of the anti-metanarrativist meta-
narrative.192 The paradoxical nature of this problem can be characterized as fol-
lows: on the one hand, postmodernists express a deep sense of incredulity towards
metanarratives – notably towards political, philosophical, religious, economic,
256 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

and cultural ones; on the other hand, the postmodern opposition to metanarra-
tives is a metanarrative itself.

Do these postmodern thinkers really manage without metanarratives?193

[…] the idea that the grand narratives established by modernity are at an end
is itself contradictory since this itself is a grand narrative.194

[Postmodernism] seems itself to be based upon a metanarrative or totalizing

account of purporting to explain the entire course of modern history […].195

Postmodernism offers another interpretation of meaning, including historical

meaning, even as it claims to contest the foundations of all meanings.196

The performative contradiction of which postmodernists are guilty in this regard,

therefore, is that they aim to deconstruct the power of metanarratives by constructing
an alternative metanarrative.
Third, there is the performative contradiction of anti-universalist universality.197
The paradoxical nature of this problem can be depicted as follows: on the one
hand, postmodernists are sceptical of any attempt to raise claims to universal
validity; on the other hand, the postmodern programme of anti-universalism
hinges upon universalist assumptions about the nature of universality itself.

There is in any case a crippling contradiction at the heart of the analysis – if

anyone says that everything is ‘really’ just constituted by a deceiving image,
and not by reality, how does he or she know? They presuppose the very distinc-
tions they attack.198

Postmodern writers problematize reference, which they take to be ‘reality’,

but they presuppose access to the real in order to make their claims about the
postmodern world […].199

The performative contradiction for which postmodernists are responsible in this

context, in other words, is that they propose to challenge universalisms on the basis
of disguised universalist presuppositions.
Fourth, there is the performative contradiction of anti-political politics.200 The
paradoxical nature of this problem is due to the following tension: on the one
hand, postmodernists appear to endorse ideas, principles, and projects that can
be characterized as ‘political’, in the sense that they are concerned with the
normative parameters underlying the meaningful, empowering, and democratic
coordination of people’s actions – both in small-scale and in large-scale social
settings; on the other hand, postmodernists seem to favour beliefs, values, and
practices that can be characterized as ‘anti-political’, in the sense that they refuse
to subscribe to clearly and systematically defined frameworks for the normatively
regulated coordination of individual and collective actions.

[…] it also has to deny the possibility of proposing a system of its own, with-
out betraying its own premises. Hence the accusation frequently made against
 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought 257

deconstructor postmodernists, that they are just sceptics who cannot make
significant moral or political commitments.201

[…] effective political action needs something more than this rather prelimin-
ary sense of a dissentient identity.202

The post-modern condition of plural and provisional perspectives, lacking any

rational or transcendental ground or unifying world-view, is our own, given to
us as an historical fate, and it is idle to pretend otherwise.203

The performative contradiction that permeates postmodern discourses, in the

above sense, is that, although they are deeply political, their advocates do not
wish to be associated with methodically structured and logocentrically organized
normative agendas. Postmodern politics is devoid of politics in the purposive, coordina-
tive, and projective sense.
Fifth, there is the performative contradiction of uncritical critique.204 The para-
doxical nature of this problem can be characterized as follows: on the one hand,
postmodernists seem to be committed to the exercise of social critique, particu-
larly when proposing to deconstruct the apparent naturalness of historically
contingent realities; on the other hand, postmodernists fail to provide genuine
critiques of major sources of social inequality in the contemporary era, notably
the rise of neoliberalism and post-Fordism. It appears, then, that postmodern-
ism not only represents ‘the cultural side of what is more sociologically known
as post-Fordism’205 and, as such, ‘is part of the rise of neo-liberalism’,206 but also
‘serves to legitimate, while claiming that legitimations are no longer possible, the
ruthless face of capitalism’.207 Postmodernism, scrutinized in this light, stands
for a highly questionable approach in that ‘it avoids confronting the realities of
the post-Fordist economy and new forms of global power’,208 thereby giving the
impression that it fulfils the ideological function of a new opium of the people. Its
tendency to contribute to ‘an anesthetization of poverty, ghettoization and home-
lessness’209 contains little in the way of offering conceptual and methodological
tools designed to uncover the underlying factors shaping – or, in some cases,
determining – the structural disempowerment of individual and collective actors,
especially of those who are relegated to coping with the difficulties and dilem-
mas of their existence on the fringes of society. Arguably, one may go as far as to
suggest that, in essence, postmodernism can be conceived of ‘as a reflection of a
cultural crisis in late capitalism’210 or, in a more radical sense, as the manifestation
and ‘institutionalization of anomie’211 in increasingly individualized and atom-
ized societies. However one seeks to explain and assess the continuing presence
of major social pathologies in the early twenty-first century, ‘the arrival of a post-
modern world in which the lines separating friend and foe, Self and Other, [have]
become obscure’212 appears to form a constitutive component of the present era.
The normative integrity of postmodern thought is compromised to the extent that it fails
to unearth and to criticize, rather than to accept and to legitimize, the principal sources
of human disempowerment and mechanisms of social domination.
Conclusion

The systematic study of the impact of the ‘postmodern turn’ on the contempor-
ary social sciences constitutes a complex endeavour. As the foregoing analysis
has demonstrated, modern and postmodern approaches are divided by profound
presuppositional differences. More importantly, however, it should be evident
from the preceding chapters that the development of the social sciences in the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been significantly shaped by
key assumptions underlying postmodern forms of relating to and making sense
of the world.
Let us recall that, in this book, the ‘postmodern turn’ is essentially conceived of
as a paradigmatic shift from the Enlightenment belief in the relative determinacy
of both the natural world and the social world to the – increasingly widespread –
post-Enlightenment belief in the radical indeterminacy of all material and symbolic
forms of existence. As has been argued in the previous chapters, the far-reaching
significance of this paradigmatic shift is reflected in five pervasive presuppositional
‘turns’ that have been taking place in the social sciences over the past few decades:

I. the ‘relativist turn’ in epistemology;

II. the ‘interpretive turn’ in social research methodology;
III. the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology;
IV. the ‘contingent turn’ in historiography; and
V. the ‘autonomous turn’ in politics.

This five-dimensional account has sought to shed light on both the centrality and
the complexity of the normative challenges arising from the rise of postmodern
thought.
To be sure, this is not to assert that most academic disciplines, as well as most
currents and traditions in the contemporary social sciences, have been trans-
formed into postmodern endeavours. Rather, this is to acknowledge that, as stated
above, recent paradigmatic developments in the social sciences have been sub-
stantially influenced by the various controversies sparked by both advocates and
adversaries of postmodern thought. Following the thematic structure of the pre-
ceding enquiry, the main issues at stake in the numerous discussions concerning

258
 Conclusion 259

the differences between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ approaches in the social sci-
ences can be summarized as follows.

I. Epistemology

The first chapter has explored the impact of postmodern thought on contempor-
ary debates in epistemology. Recent disputes regarding the social conditions of
knowledge production have been considerably affected by what may be described
as the relativist turn in epistemology. The presuppositional differences between
modern and postmodern conceptions of knowledge are based on three fundamen-
tal oppositions: (i) truth versus perspective, (ii) certainty versus uncertainty, and (iii)
universality versus particularity.
(i) The tension between truth and perspective is central to the epistemological
opposition between objectivism and constructivism. Postmodern theorists accuse
modern social science of endorsing a binary distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’
representations of reality. This reductive binarization of knowledge acquisition
processes is illustrated in the conceptual creation of epistemological dichotomies –
such as objectivity versus subjectivity, authenticity versus distortion, representa-
tion versus misrepresentation, enlightenment versus false consciousness, and sci-
ence versus ideology. The epistemic distinction between essence and appearance
is crucial to the modern aspiration to generate scientific knowledge capable of
uncovering the underlying structural forces that, while escaping every ordinary
actor’s common-sense perceptions of reality, are thought to determine the course
of history. Postmodern scholars are suspicious of positivist conceptions of science,
particularly of the Enlightenment belief in the civilizational role of systematic
forms of knowledge production. From a postmodern point of view, ‘truth’ is
invented, rather than found. Given the perspectival constitution of all claims to
epistemic adequacy, the search for context-transcending validity cannot escape
the boundaries of spatiotemporal specificity.
(ii) The tension between certainty and uncertainty is articulated in the epistemo-
logical opposition between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. The former is
built on the assumption that, as rational beings capable of reflection and represen-
tation, we possess a privileged basis for cognitive certainty. The latter, by contrast,
endorses the view that there is no such thing as an ultimate epistemic ground on
which to justify objective, normative, or subjective claims to validity. Indeed, the
only significant postmodern certainty is uncertainty. According to postmodern
parameters, relativity is certain, just as certainty is relative. The modern subject,
however, is seduced by the power of reason, misperceived as a seemingly omnipo-
tent force, which can be mobilized in the quest for certainty. The cross-fertilizing
functions of Verstand and Vernunft appear to allow for the construction of a soci-
ety whose development is contingent upon emancipatory considerations and
empowering interventions.
(iii) The tension between universality and particularity lies at the core of the
epistemological opposition between universalism and particularism. The epitome
of modern universalism is the invention of metanarratives. At the heart of
260 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

postmodern thought, by contrast, lies the incredulity towards metanarratives. In

order to sustain the modern illusion of order, metanarratives need to embrace the
ideal of universality and oppress the reality of difference. Postmodern thought,
on the other hand, is characterized by the insistence upon the existential prepon-
derance of manifold particularities, which are given a voice by means of – locally
situated – construction processes of multiple knowledges. The quest for universality
through the transcendence of particularity is a vital ambition of anthropocentric
currents within Enlightenment thought. Conversely, the recognition of particu-
larity through the rejection of universality is a crucial element of postmodern
agendas. According to postmodern parameters, then, we need to abandon the
search for the transcendental scope of categorical imperatives and embark upon a
journey guided by the relational force of social particularities.
On the basis of a thorough enquiry into these epistemic antinomies, a distinc-
tion can be drawn between positivist and postpositivist conceptions of knowledge.
Providing a synoptic view of the main presuppositions underlying these dia-
metrically opposed accounts of knowledge acquisition, this chapter has sought
to elucidate the core reasons for the gradual shift from positivist to postpositivist
epistemological agendas in the contemporary social sciences. The key dimensions
of this paradigmatic transition in cutting-edge forms of epistemology can be syn-
thesized as follows:

1. Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of observation-based knowledge,

that is, of knowledge derived from experience. Even epistemologically reflexive
and methodologically rigorous experiences of the world, however, are medi-
ated by linguistically, culturally, subjectively, affectively, and interpretively consti-
tuted frames of mind.
2. Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of testable knowledge, that is,
of knowledge that is – at least in principle – falsifiable. To the degree that
epistemic standards are spatiotemporally contingent, however, it is difficult – if
not, impossible – to identify context-transcending criteria of verifiability or
falsifiability.
3. Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of realist knowledge, that is, of
knowledge that is founded on a worldly, rather than otherworldly, engagement
with particular aspects of reality. The separation between ‘rational’ and ‘non-
rational’ modes of making sense of the world, however, is far from clear-cut:
reason is unthinkable without an implicit or explicit belief in reason, just as belief
is inconceivable without a conscious or unconscious reason to believe.
4. Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of generalizable knowledge, that is,
of knowledge capable of being universalizable. To the extent that all empirical
and conceptual constructions of reality are contextually, relationally, and historic-
ally contingent, however, the quest for factual or moral universality appears to
be an illusion based on an overly ambitious conception of scientificity.
5. Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of prognostic knowledge, that is,
of knowledge that is – or, at least, has the potential of being – predictive. If,
 Conclusion 261

however, there are no ‘laws of nature’, ‘laws of society’, or ‘laws of history’ in

the strict sense, the effort to raise irrefutable validity claims capable of foresee-
ing future developments with incontrovertible exactitude is futile.
6. Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of evolutionary knowledge, that is,
of stocks of knowledge built on cumulative and progressive processes of examin-
ing the validity of different truth claims. Yet, evolutionist accounts of scientific
activity are problematic for several reasons:
(a) Scientific work is never value-free but always value-laden. Progress means
different things to different actors.
(b) Scientific work is never autopoietic but always, at least potentially, impact-
laden. Scientific evolution can lead to civilizational regression.
(c) Scientific work is never free from presuppositions but always paradigm-laden.
Scientific advancement means different things to different paradigm communities.
(d) Scientific work is never a free-floating activity but always context-laden.
Development means different things to different cultures.
7. Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of factual knowledge, that is, of
knowledge that is objective or that should at least strive to be as objective as pos-
sible. The quest for objectivity loses credibility, however, when confronted with
the relational constitution of epistemic enquiry. The conditions of knowledge-
ability are impregnated with normativity, positionality, functionality, conflictual-
ity, and instrumentality.
8. Scientific enquiry allows for the formulation of rational knowledge, that is, of
knowledge obtained by virtue of reason. Yet, rationalist accounts of knowledge
production tend to underestimate the importance of the following issues:
(a) It is far from obvious which of the various types of human rationality can
serve as a reliable cognitive, let alone normative, ground for methodologic-
ally sound and conceptually reflexive scientific activity.
(b) Given that different actors mobilize different cognitive resources and that,
moreover, one actor can draw upon different – often conflicting and compet-
ing – types of reason, it is open to question which particular kind of rational-
ity should be regarded as the foundational driving force of society.
(c) In light of their socio-ontological significance in everyday life, it is vital to
recognize the value of subjective and intersubjective experiences, understanding,
and empathy for the study of people’s non-rational ways of encountering,
interacting with, and attaching meaning to reality.
(d) Rather than following the rationalist propensity to privilege the mind over
the body, it is imperative to take seriously the unconscious and corporeal
dimensions permeating people’s interactions with, as well as scientists’
study of, reality.
(e) Instead of succumbing to the patronizing tendency to draw a clear-cut line
between ‘ordinary’ and ‘scientific’ modes of engaging with reality, it is cru-
cial to take on the challenging task of providing a comprehensive account
of the differences between ‘anthropological’ and ‘professional’ – that is, between
‘species-specific’ and ‘discipline-specific’ – epistemic capacities.
262 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

II. Methodology

The second chapter has examined the impact of postmodern thought on central
issues in social research methodology. To this end, it has focused on the principal
dimensions of a methodological approach that shares a number of fundamen-
tal concerns and assumptions with postmodern thought: discourse analysis. As
argued above, contemporary approaches to human enquiry have incorporated
several significant insights obtained from what may be termed the interpretive
turn in social research methodology. The rise of discourse analysis is one among
other symptoms of the wider impact that postmodern thought has had on the
contemporary social sciences. This chapter has aimed to demonstrate that the
presuppositional differences between modern and postmodern conceptions of
social research manifest themselves in three fundamental tensions: (i) explanation
versus understanding, (ii) mechanics versus dialectics, and (iii) ideology versus discourse.
(i) The tension between explanation and understanding is expressed in the oppo-
sition between positivist and interpretivist research methodologies. Rather than
seeking to explain the functioning of social order, discourse analysis sets out to
make sense of the interpretive accomplishments of human actors, who, on the
basis of their symbolically mediated encounters with the world, have a deep-seated
need to attach meaning to their existence. Although it represents a theoretical
approach that has been developed only relatively recently, discourse analysis
has gained a noticeable presence in both academic and non-academic circles. Its
profound impact upon the ways in which society is studied and conceptualized
is reflected in the fact that it has transformed itself into a new discipline.
Discourse analysis can be characterized as an interpretive endeavour, that is, as
a methodological approach that seeks to explore the social world by scrutinizing
the meaning-producing practices accomplished by ordinary actors. Hence, dis-
course analysis constitutes an integral component of the ‘interpretive turn’.
(ii) The tension between mechanics and dialectics is illustrated in the opposition
between monolithic and polycentric conceptions of ‘the social’. Critical discourse
analysts insist upon the dialectical nature of their investigative approach, of which
they conceive as both a theory and a method. To be exact, critical discourse analy-
sis is (1) methodologically committed to cross-validating conceptual reflection
and empirical research, (2) sociologically committed to cross-examining social
structures and their textual representations, and (3) normatively committed to
cross-fertilizing critical frameworks and ordinary activities. In light of this three-
fold dialectical orientation, discourse analysis is opposed to detached theoreticism
and crude empiricism, to materialist structuralism and idealist interpretivism, as
well as to self-referential intellectualism and unreflective activism. In brief, criti-
cal discourse analysis stresses the contingency of social reality, thereby denying
the existence of ultimate causal factors that determine the constitution of society.
(iii) The tension between ideology and discourse is epitomized in the opposi-
tion between classical conceptions of ideology critique and contemporary forms of
discourse analysis. From an orthodox Marxist point of view, ideology constitutes (1)
a distortive cognitive framework, (2) an instrument of symbolic power used by a
collective historical subject, and (3) an epiphenomenal expression of the material
 Conclusion 263

base of society. It is, consequently, the mission of critical social science to uncover
the distortive, interest-laden, and superstructural nature of ideologically driven per-
ceptions and representations of the world. Supporters of the concept of discourse,
on the other hand, have sought to turn away from the concern with ideology.
Their methodological approach is based on a fundamentally different picture,
according to which discourses constitute (1) relationally contingent assemblages
of meaning, (2) symbolic resources of social power mobilized by a variety of indi-
vidual and collective actors, and (3) both products and carriers of intersectional
power struggles. It is, accordingly, the task of critical social science to shed light
on the positional, plural, and polymorphous constitution of discourses.
Considering the pivotal premises that undergird these diametrically opposed
conceptions of social enquiry, a distinction can be drawn between structuralist
and poststructuralist conceptions of research methodology. Based on a synoptic
account of a series of binary presuppositional tensions, this chapter has aimed to
unearth the principal grounds on which the gradual shift from structuralist to post-
structuralist methodological agendas in the contemporary social sciences has sought
to be justified. The key insights obtained from this paradigmatic transition from
structuralism to poststructuralism can be synthesized as follows:

1. Seemingly transcendental grammars of signification and interpretation eman-

ate from, and develop within, historical – and, thus, ceaselessly evolving –
contexts of action and realization.
2. Agency stems from both subjects and objects, given that both have the structur-
ing capacity to shape – or, in some cases, even determine – the unfolding of
actions and reactions.
3. While they cannot escape their enclosure in society, human actors are – inevit-
ably – exposed to the openness of history.
4. No quest for totality is devoid of the perspective-laden parameters of partiality.
5. Identity and difference are indivisible, since there is no affirmation of idiosyn-
crasy or commonality in isolation from other distinctive or generic entities.
6. The signified acquires meaning by dint of a signifier capable of transferring
empirical forms of being into the interpretive realm of discursive projection,
just as a signifier attains relevance in relation to the signified providing an exper-
iential reference point for the construction of meaning.
7. Even ostensibly non-discursive elements of human reality are embedded within –
symbolically organized – contexts of discursivity.
8. The production of discourses takes place within horizons of discursivity, at the
same time as horizons of discursivity cannot come into existence without the
production of discourses.

III. Sociology

The third chapter has centred upon the impact of postmodern thought on recent
developments in sociology. The relevance of postmodernism to contemporary
debates and controversies in sociological analysis manifests itself in the rise of
cultural studies. Both sympathetic and hostile critics of postmodernism will find
264 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

it difficult to deny that the cultural turn constitutes a paradigmatic shift that
has extensively contributed to reaching across disciplinary divides in the social
sciences as well as in the humanities. There may be noteworthy disagreements
about the validity of the normative presuppositions underlying the ‘cultural turn’.
Whatever one makes of these disputes, it is vital to acknowledge the far-reaching
significance of the ‘cultural turn’ for contemporary sociology in particular and
for numerous attempts to develop a postmodern social science in general. As illus-
trated in this chapter, three pivotal tensions are at stake in the discussions over
the alleged differences between modern and postmodern conceptions of sociol-
ogy: (i) industrialism versus postindustrialism, (ii) productivism versus consumerism,
and (iii) economism versus culturalism.
(i) The tension between industrialism and postindustrialism arises when grap-
pling with the qualitative differences between societies whose economic repro-
duction depends primarily on the secondary sector, based on manufacturing, and
societies whose economic flows are located predominantly in the tertiary sector,
sustained by the exchange of knowledge, information, and services. The idea that
we live in an increasingly postindustrial world is founded on the assumption that
contemporary society can be described as a postmaterial, postproletarian, scien-
tistic, innovation-driven, and cybernetic historical formation. From a postmodern
perspective, the decomposition of the industrial economy is indicative of the
contradictory implosion of ‘the social’ upon itself. In the course of the transition
process from industrialism to postindustrialism, the relative predictability of mod-
ern societal developments appears to have been degraded to an obsolete illusion,
owing to the relative unpredictability of postmodern realities. The postmodern
picture of a human world characterized by radical indeterminacy undermines
the modern invention of a universe shaped by the irrefutable laws of natural and
social determinacy.
(ii) The tension between productivism and consumerism is articulated in the para-
digmatic divergence between the modern imperative ‘I work, therefore I am’ and the
postmodern motto ‘I shop, therefore I am’. Most contemporary sociologists agree
that, since the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, large parts of
the world have been witnessing a steady transition from ‘industrial productivism’
to ‘postindustrial consumerism’ on a grand scale. The consumption of products
always implies the absorption of culture. In other words, capitalist types of con-
sumerism generate the large-scale assimilation of standardized and commodified
ways of perceiving, appreciating, and acting upon the world. Different modes of
production generate different life forms. In the context of the postmodern era, it
seems that – both in conceptual and in empirical terms – more and more societies
have undergone a shift from a focus on production to an emphasis on consumption.
In the postmodern world, people’s identities are defined – primarily – not by what
they produce, but by what they consume. Moreover, the postmodern reality is a
condition of hyperreality, that is, a reality of representation and appearance, rather
than a reality of authenticity and substance. Under the parameters of hyperreal-
ity, the existence of ‘the social’ can no longer be taken for granted. If ‘the social’
is declared dead, sociology is transformed into a project devoid of its raison d’être.
 Conclusion 265

The crisis of social theory epitomizes the demise of traditional forms of coexisting-
in-the-world. Regardless of the question of whether the advent of a new historical
era is real or imagined, in order to acknowledge the crisis of modernity, we need
to unearth the transformative potential of postmodernity.
(iii) The tension between economism and culturalism is epitomized in the
Marxist distinction between base and superstructure. Postmodern sociologists, most
of whom are unmistakably in favour of abandoning the quest for determinacy,
have embarked upon a journey guided by the recognition of indeterminacy. On
this view, if the social world is determined by anything, it is the ubiquity of radi-
cal indeterminacy. As a consequence, postmodern thinkers urge us to discard the
search for a comprehensive social theory. Arguably, catch-all models of society –
due to their ambition to provide exhaustive conceptual frameworks capable of
explaining the consolidation, reproduction, and transformation of historical for-
mations – end up delivering remarkably little in terms of their potential insights
into the constitution of human coexistence. Postmodern thinkers maintain that
overly systematic accounts of society tend to misrepresent the highly unsys-
tematic composition of relationally constituted realities. Yet, the architecture of
social theory must not be confused with the construction processes leading to
the emergence of diversified social realities. Postmodern thought drags society
into the whirl of endless deconstruction. The dissolution of modern conceptual
integrity seems inevitable when immersing ourselves in the semantic playful-
ness of postmodern conceptual hybridity. In light of this playfulness, ‘base’ and
‘superstructure’ are collapsed into each other. The binary distinction between
‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ can hardly be sustained when seeking to do justice to
the complexity of polycentrically organized realities. From a postmodern perspec-
tive, conceptuality is, at best, a symbolic representation of an ungraspable – and,
possibly, not even existing – ontology. The search for relative determinacy seems
pointless when confronted with the ubiquity of radical indeterminacy in highly
differentiated societies.
In light of these diametrically opposed paradigms, a distinction can be drawn
between materialist and postmaterialist conceptions of society. Questioning the
validity of the thesis that there has been a gradual shift from materialist to post-
materialist sociological agendas in the contemporary social sciences, this chapter
has provided an in-depth analysis of the degree to which the rise of postmodern
thought has significantly shaped present-day understandings of culture, the self,
and globalization.
Culture: The paradigmatic transition from ‘the economic’ to ‘the cultural’
has had a substantial impact upon large areas of sociology in recent decades.
As explained in this chapter, the ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences is based
on the assumption that ‘the cultural’ constitutes the defining element of social
existence and, therefore, the central reference point of sociological enquiry. In
order to elucidate the main assumptions underlying the theoretical approaches
associated with the ‘cultural turn’, this chapter has proposed to shed light on
the concept of culture from five disciplinary angles: first, anthropology (culture
as a collective life form); second, philosophy (culture as an existential source of
266 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

species-constitutive transcendence, as a vehicle allowing for symbolic mediation and

interpretation, and as a locus of normative regulation); third, sociology (culture as
the performative nucleus of social constructions, as a commodity, as a form of hyper-
reality, as an epiphenomenal reality, and as a sphere of relative autonomy); fourth,
the arts (culture as a source of aesthetic experience); and, fifth, politics (culture as
a social battlefield). The detailed examination of each of the aforementioned
dimensions illustrates the wide-ranging relevance of the ‘cultural turn’ to recent
and ongoing paradigmatic developments in the social sciences as well as in the
humanities.
The self: The concern with the constitution of the self plays a pivotal role in
key areas of contemporary sociological investigation. In this respect, the numer-
ous writings on ‘the postmodern’ are no exception. Yet, it would be misleading
to suggest that scholars whose works are, rightly or wrongly, associated with
the ‘postmodern turn’ put forward a consensual view on the nature of ‘the self’.
Nonetheless, from a postmodern perspective, ‘the self’ possesses several constitu-
tive features, some of which have acquired particular significance in the context
of an increasingly globalized society, characterized by unprecedented degrees of
accelerated change. Seeking to do justice to the complexity of the construction of
personhood, this chapter has focused on examining the sociological centrality
of the following features of ‘the self’: (1) contingency; (2) fluidity; (3) multiplicity;
(4) contradictoriness; (5) knowledgeability; (6) narrativity; (7) corporeality; (8) technology;
(9) power-ladenness; and (10) reflexivity.
Globalization: As argued in this chapter, the concepts of postmodernity and glo-
balization are inextricably linked. In other words, the notion that we have entered
a postmodern era is intimately interrelated with the view that we live in an
increasingly globalized and globalizing world. Similar to the label ‘postmodern-
ity’, the term ‘globalization’ represents one of the most controversial concepts
in the contemporary social sciences. Indeed, the contention that globalization
constitutes the most powerful macrosocial dynamic of the current epoch has
sparked many controversies in recent decades. With the aim of assessing both the
scope and the significance of contemporary social transformations, this section
has examined (i) the features of globalization, (ii) the power of globalization, and
(iii) the limits of globalization.

I. In order to allow for a comprehensive understanding of the manifold features

of globalization, the following characteristics need to be taken into consid-
eration: (1) political liberalism, (2) economic liberalism, (3) postindustrialism,
(4) nomadism, (5) post-Fordism, (6) networkism, and (7) consumerism.
II. In order to allow for a thorough engagement with the far-reaching power of
globalization, the following levels of analysis need to be taken into account:
(1) historical, (2) economic, (3) political, (4) cultural, (5) demographic, (6) military,
and (7) environmental.
III. In order to allow for the critical reflection upon the noteworthy limits of glo-
balization, the following dimensions need to be given particular attention:
(1) contingency, (2) ontology, (3) materiality, (4) intensity, and (5) territoriality.
 Conclusion 267

Finally, the term glocalization may be employed in order to describe a curious

paradox of the current era: namely, the convergence of globalizing and localizing
dynamics. These dynamics are characterized by the confluence of tension-laden
processes, such as deterritorialization and reterritorialization, internationalization
and regionalization, as well as standardization and diversification. What is crucial
from a normative perspective, in this respect, is to recognize that the polarized
dynamic of glocalization both weakens and strengthens social actors: it involves
the disempowering loss of human autonomy, while entailing the empowering chal-
lenge of contributing to its reconstitution.

IV. Historiography

The fourth chapter has been concerned with the impact of postmodern thought on
present-day disputes in historiography. Key questions regarding the nature of history
(ontological level), the development of history (explanatory level), and the study of
history (methodological level) have always been, and will never cease to be, central
to the elaboration of research agendas in the social sciences. As elucidated in this
chapter, the considerable popularity of postmodern approaches to history can be
seen as an expression of the contingent turn in contemporary social and political
thought. Given their emphasis on the spatiotemporal contingency permeating all
forms of society, postmodern thinkers are eager to assert that there is no such thing
as an underlying story line that determines the course of history. According to this
interpretation, history is essentially a conglomerate of largely accidental, relatively
arbitrary, and discontinuously interconnected occurrences. As demonstrated in this
chapter, three tensions are particularly important for assessing the relevance of post-
modern thought to cutting-edge accounts of history: (i) necessity versus contingency,
(ii) grand narratives versus small narratives, and (iii) continuity versus discontinuity.
(i) The tension between necessity and contingency has always been a major
source of controversy in social and political theory. The rise of postmodern
forms of analysis, however, has polarized the debate to a significant extent. In
essence, postmodernists reject the assertion that spatiotemporal developments
are determined by historical necessity, claiming instead that human societies are
impregnated with the unpredictable power of contingency. From a postmodern
perspective, then, it is vital to recognize the ubiquity of contingency in society,
in order to avoid being seduced by the misleading reliance on the belief in the
universal laws of necessity. In modern thought, the view that the course of history
is determined by necessity is founded on five assumptions: lawfulness, predictability,
linearity, teleology, and universality. Thus, according to modern parameters, history
constitutes a structured and structuring horizon of unavoidable, predictable, pro-
gressive, directional, and universal developments. In postmodern thought, the
view that history is shaped by contingency is based on five assumptions, which are
diametrically opposed to the preceding ones: lawlessness, unpredictability, nonlin-
earity, directionlessness, and particularity. Hence, according to postmodern param-
eters, history can be interpreted as an open horizon of arbitrary, unpredictable,
chaotic, directionless, and irreducible developments. To put it bluntly, the only
268 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

postmodern determinacy is indeterminacy. Political totalitarianism is a historical

response to societal indeterminacy. In essence, totalitarian regimes seek to impose
the ideological invention of determinacy upon the ontological condition of inde-
terminacy. The preponderance of indeterminacy may be challenged, but never be
extinguished, by the episodic imposition of the illusory quest for determinacy.
From a postmodern angle, totalitarianism is naked modernity. The anti-totalitarian
stance of postmodern thought is a radical plea for the critical awareness of the
radical indeterminacy permeating the human condition.
(ii) The tension between grand narratives and small narratives has been the
subject of intense debate in the social sciences over the past few decades. Grand
narratives, invented by modern thinkers, appear to offer universal epistemic and
ideological solutions on a global scale. By contrast, small narratives, endorsed by
postmodern scholars, are informed by a sensibility to particular social and politi-
cal issues arising within local contexts. If postmodernists subscribe to any kind of
narrative, it is the contention that we should abandon the creation of grand nar-
ratives, to which we may also refer as metanarratives. Postmodern interpretations
of history are characterized by an unambiguous hostility towards metanarratives –
irrespective of whether these grand storylines are primarily political, philosophi-
cal, religious, economic, or cultural. A metanarrative possesses both a projective
and a substantive dimension:

• as a projective or ideological force, it can be endorsed in order to support the

belief in a predefined historical storyline;
• as a substantive or empirical reality, it is supposed to be a driving force of a pre-
defined historical storyline.

In order for both its projective and its substantive elements to have an impact
upon societal developments, a metanarrative ‘in itself’ needs to be transformed
into a metanarrative ‘for itself’. The modern invention of individual and collective
historical subjects is the epitome of a metanarrative. The impact of a metanar-
rative depends upon its capacity to convert an individual or a collective subject
into a real or imagined driving force of history – or at least of a specific period in
history. A subject can assert itself as a proper metanarrative through both its con-
scious praxis in history and its practical consciousness of history, thereby trans-
forming itself into a forceful source of human agency, which exists both ‘in itself’
and ‘for itself’. Under the postmodern condition, however, radical contingency
becomes the existential basis of our destiny. The postmodern world is composed
of the multiplicity of autonomous storylines, none of which can claim to possess
a monopoly of ultimate insights into the nature of human existence. In other
words, whereas modernity is an era invented by a few catch-all stories told ‘from
above’, postmodernity is a condition characterized by the playful celebration, and
tangible experience, of endless grassroots stories narrated ‘from below’.
(iii) The tension between continuity and discontinuity is pivotal to the question of
whether the contemporary era can be described as an age of late modernity or even
as an age of postmodernity. To be sure, most postmodern perspectives interpret the
 Conclusion 269

present epoch as an ambivalent combination of modern and postmodern features.

According to this account, one of the great paradoxes of postmodernity consists
in its simultaneous immanence in and transcendence of modernity. Yet, metaphori-
cally speaking, it appears that only by passing through the historical stage of
postmodernity have the children of modernity sufficiently matured to deserve to
be regarded as proper adults. In essence, ‘postmodernity in itself’ is a ‘modernity
for itself’, that is, a historical condition aware of its own limitations. The simulta-
neous continuation of and break with modernity lie at the heart of the postmod-
ern condition. Contrary to modernist defenders of the Enlightenment project,
however, this ambivalence is seen as the nucleus of an empowering potential:
the interpenetration of modernity and postmodernity may be conceived of as an
unprecedented historical opportunity, enabling social actors to convert the condi-
tion of radical contingency into their destiny.
With these antinomies in mind, a distinction can be drawn between reconstruc-
tivist and deconstructivist conceptions of historiography. This chapter has scruti-
nized the rationale behind the gradual shift from reconstructivist to deconstructivist
historiographical agendas in the contemporary social sciences. In doing so, it has
aimed to identify the key presuppositional components of what may be described
as a ‘postclassical historiography’. Despite the difficulties attached to the task of
drawing clear-cut distinctions with the prospect of achieving a more fine-grained
understanding of recent and current trends in historiography, this chapter has
argued that it is both possible and sensible to differentiate between modern
and postmodern approaches to history by reflecting on the following points of
divergence:

1. Modern approaches to history strive to be objective, in the sense that they aim
to give factually accurate accounts of past events. Postmodern approaches to
history, by contrast, insist that they are unavoidably normative, in the sense
that the construction of event-based narratives is always contingent upon
culturally specific – that is, meaning-, value-, perspective-, interest-, and power-
laden – interpretations.
2. Modern approaches to history seek to substantiate their narratives on the
basis of what they have found, in the sense that they aim to provide reports
of past happenings that are not only factually accurate but also scientifically
verifiable. Postmodern approaches to history, on the other hand, maintain
that all narratives are – by definition – invented, in the sense that preceding
events are discursively constructed, rather than scientifically discovered, by
historians.
3. Modern approaches to history claim to be factual, in the sense that their
accounts are informed by the evidence-based study of genuine happenings.
Conversely, postmodern approaches to history are fictional, in the sense that,
according to their parameters, the textual description of past occurrences –
irrespective of its degree of systematicity – amounts to little more than a
pseudo-scientific variation of literature.
270 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

4. Modern approaches to history are intended to be representational – or, to be

precise, representationally accurate –, in the sense that they are motivated by
the ambition to provide homological accounts of past events. In opposition
to this endeavour, postmodern approaches to history posit that all knowledge
produced about the hitherto-been is unavoidably perspectival – or, to be exact,
perspective-laden –, in the sense that epistemically organized texts are inevitably
generated from a particular point of view and articulated within a spatiotem-
porally defined place in the world, thereby rendering the possibility of an exact
correspondence between a (historiographical) ‘narrative’ and a (historical)
‘past’ untenable.
5. Modern approaches to history, especially those inspired by the social sciences,
tend to focus on the social, in the sense that they examine historical develop-
ments, above all, in terms of relational – notably societal – patterns, which
are believed to be determined by an underlying logic of structural necessity. By
contrast, postmodern approaches to history, notably those that are directly
influenced by intellectual developments in cultural studies, stress the socio-
ontological significance of the cultural, in the sense that they explore historical
developments, first and foremost, in terms of discursive and behavioural varia-
tions, which are interpreted as being subject to spatiotemporal contingency.
6. Modern approaches to history are concerned with the study of the real, in the
sense that they insist that there is a physically established reality ‘out there’.
Postmodern approaches to history, on the other hand, place the emphasis
on the pivotal role of the textual, in the sense that they argue that both the
methodical examination and the very constitution of social constellations are
symbolically mediated.
7. Modern approaches to history are explanatory, in the sense that they aim to
shed light on underlying causal mechanisms that not only shape, or even deter-
mine, the course of history, but also escape people’s common-sense grasp of
spatiotemporally evolving realities. Conversely, postmodern approaches to
history are interpretive, in the sense that they insist that both their object of
study – history – and their subject of study – historiography – constitute symbolic-
ally mediated processes, which are imbued with culturally specific practices and
presuppositions.
8. Modern approaches to history tend to be deductive, in the sense that they
descend from ‘the general’ to ‘the particular’. They employ deductive methods
to the extent that they proceed from the formulation of ‘general premises’
to the examination of ‘particular events’. The former are embedded within
presuppositionally sustained systems of validity with implicitly or explic-
itly codified criteria of legitimacy; the latter can be systematically studied
by virtue of conceptual and methodological tools whose epistemic accuracy
corroborates the scientificity of a globalist – that is, big-picture – historiog-
raphy. By contrast, postmodern approaches to history tend to be inductive,
in the sense that they ascend from ‘the particular’ to ‘the general’. They are
founded on inductive methods to the extent that they proceed from the
exploration of ‘particular events’ to the construction of ‘general assumptions’.
 Conclusion 271

The former can be explored on the basis of critical historical research; the
latter’s applicability is limited to the case-specific horizon of a localist –
that is, small-picture – historiography.
9. Modern approaches to history tend to focus on the macro, in the sense that
they are driven by the ambition to grasp the ‘big picture’: they aim to uncover
macro-social – that is, particularly structural and systemic – driving forces under-
lying large-scale historical developments. Postmodern approaches to history,
on the other hand, tend to place the emphasis on the micro, in the sense that
they are motivated by the conviction that it is crucial to engage with the
complexities of – infinitely multilayered – ‘small pictures’: they seek to study
micro-social – that is, directly experienced and quotidian – realities permeat-
ing small-scale historical occurrences. The paradigmatic differences between
macro- and micro-focused frameworks in historiography can be demonstrated
by examining the following oppositions: (a) global versus local; (b) systemic ver-
sus hermeneutic; (c) logical versus accidental; (d) social versus individual; (e) central
versus marginal; (f) monocentric versus polycentric; and (g) scientific versus ordinary.
10. Modern approaches to history tend to conceive of spatiotemporal develop-
ments in terms of necessity; on this view, history constitutes a structured and
structuring horizon of unavoidable, predictable, progressive, directional, and
universal developments. By contrast, postmodern approaches to history tend
to conceive of spatiotemporal developments in terms of contingency; on this
account, history constitutes an open horizon of arbitrary, unpredictable, cha-
otic, directionless, and irreducible developments.

As argued in this chapter, it should come as no surprise that, in light of the

above, modern and postmodern approaches to history are built upon two related,
but fundamentally different, methodological paradigms: reconstruction and decon-
struction. The principal mission of modern historiography is to reconstruct the past –
not only by narrating it, but also, more significantly, by explaining how and why
it came about in the first place. The main purpose of postmodern historiography,
on the other hand, is to deconstruct the past – not only by describing it, but also,
more importantly, by exploring how it can be interpreted by those who have
already written, those who still write, and those who continue to write and rewrite
history. Whatever one makes of Fukuyama’s famous contention that we have
reached ‘the end of history’, the assertion that, in recent decades, an increasing
number of societies across the globe have been witnessing ‘the death of metanar-
ratives’ represents a constitutive component of the postmodern imaginary.

V. Politics

The fifth chapter has grappled with the impact of postmodern thought on con-
temporary conceptions of politics. The role of postmodern thought in the develop-
ment of critical approaches to politics is reflected in what may be characterized
as the autonomous turn. This paradigmatic shift articulates the view that the quest
for human autonomy should lie at the heart of any societal project that aims
272 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

to challenge the legitimacy of traditional politics. If there is such a thing as a

postmodern set of norms, it draws upon the conceptual resources developed by
advocates of the ‘politics of identity’, the ‘politics of difference’, and the ‘politics
of recognition’. As explained in this chapter, the discrepancy between modern
and postmodern politics is rooted in several tensions, three of which are particu-
larly important: (i) equality versus difference, (ii) society-as-a-project versus projects-in-
society, and (iii) clarity versus ambiguity.
(i) The tension between equality and difference lies at the heart of the opposi-
tion between political egalitarianism and political differentialism. In contrast to
traditional conceptions of action coordination between responsible subjects,
presumably striving for uniformity and homogeneity, postmodern approaches to
politics emphasize the importance of diversity and heterogeneity. From a post-
modern perspective, both the recognition and the celebration of group-specific
identities – based on sociological variables such as class, ethnicity, gender, age,
and ability – are a vehicle for, rather than an obstacle to, political autonomy and
human empowerment. Postmodern thinkers are committed to confronting the
normative challenges arising from the development of highly differentiated, and
both internally and externally heterogeneous, societies. In fact, most of them
insist that we need to treat difference not only as an inevitable given, but also
as an enriching and meaningful challenge inherent in the everyday unfolding of
social life. In the context of postmodernity, defenders of the ‘politics of identity,
difference, and recognition’ conceive of the construction of human life forms in
terms of variety, multiplicity, and the absence of universal standards. As argued in
this chapter, postmodern approaches require us to question the legitimacy of uni-
versalist accounts of society and explore the possibility of differentialist models of
politics in general and of citizenship in particular.
(ii) The tension between society-as-a-project and projects-in-society is central to
the opposition between utopianism and quotidianism. According to postmodern
agendas, it is the engagement with everyday life and human autonomy, rather than
the obsession with utopia and totality, which should be regarded as the basis of an
empowering politics. Thus, questioning both the practical viability and the theor-
etical legitimacy of the search for large-scale utopias, postmodern approaches to
politics are concerned, above all, with exploring the viable conditions underlying
individual and social forms of autonomy in the construction of day-to-day exist-
ence. In this sense, postmodern conceptions of self-government emphasize the
normative significance of the ‘here and now’, rather than the imaginary power of
the ‘there and tomorrow’. Whereas major political ideologies whose conceptions
of history follow a teleological logic are obsessed with the notion of society-as-a-
project, the eclectic discourses produced in the context of postmodernity express
a sensibility towards a multiplicity of projects-in-society. The substantial differ-
ences between the ‘society-as-a-project politics’ of modernity and the ‘projects-
in-society politics’ of postmodernity manifest themselves in the ideological and
organizational points of divergence between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements. To
put it simply, whereas ‘old’ social movements are associated with the modern
paradigm ‘society-as-a-project’, ‘new’ social movements tend to fit the postmod-
ern paradigm ‘projects-in-society’.
 Conclusion 273

(iii) The tension between clarity and ambiguity arises when reflecting upon the
opposition between modern realism and postmodern scepticism. According to
postmodern parameters, the subject can be salvaged only by abandoning it. The
invention of big-picture ideas has hardly ever led to the construction of emancipa-
tory realities. The existence of radical ambivalence, on the other hand, leaves the
postmodern actor with no choice but choice. The point of postmodern approaches
to politics is to set themselves the task of posing open questions, rather than of pre-
tending to be able to come up with flawless solutions. The delimited and delimiting
world of modernity is a universe of systemic promises. The challenging horizon
of postmodernity, by contrast, invites us to explore, and focus upon, the tangible
realm of ordinary experiences. For what matters to human actors are not abstract
ideological dogmas, removed from quotidian realities, but the immediate experi-
ence of the challenges and contradictions permeating their everyday lives. To the
extent that there are no universal recipes for the construction of an emancipatory
society, the postmodern condition requires us to accept that what is built into the
very condition of humanity is the ineluctable presence of existential ambiguity.
In light of the aforementioned, and several other, normative antinomies, it is
possible to draw a distinction between traditional and post-traditional conceptions
of politics. This chapter has provided an in-depth examination of the reasons
behind the gradual shift from traditional to post-traditional political agendas in the
contemporary social sciences. More specifically, a comprehensive account of
the constitutive ingredients of a postmodern politics has been given in this chapter.
To be sure, the task of drawing analytical distinctions aimed at contributing to
an astute comprehension of recent and current trends in both academic and
non-academic debates concerned with the nature of politics is far from straight-
forward. As demonstrated in this chapter, however, important insights can be
obtained from differentiating between modern and postmodern approaches to
politics. Here, this has been illustrated by reflecting on ten conceptual antino-
mies, the first three of which have already been mentioned:

1. The shift from the universalist concern with equality to the particularist engage-
ment with difference is illustrated in the transition from the paradigm of redistri-
bution to the paradigm of recognition.
2. The shift from the paradigm society-as-a-project to the paradigm projects-in-society
is reflected in the transition from old social movements to new social movements.
3. The shift from the search for programmatic clarity to the recognition of existen-
tial ambiguity is expressed in the transition from the politics of solutions to the
politics of questions.
4. The shift from the quest for the ideological to the spread of the postideological
stands for the transition from the age of big-picture ideologies, comprising uto-
pian ones, to the age of post-ideological ideologies, including issue-focused ones.
5. The shift from the era of liberalism to the era of neoliberalism is indicative of the
transition from Fordist productivism to post-Fordist consumerism.
6. The shift from the investigative focus on society to the explorative emphasis on
culture is symptomatic of the transition from the politicization of the social to the
politicization of the cultural.
274 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

7. The shift from the rationalist insistence upon the species-specific significance
of reason to the postrationalist engagement with the sociocultural role of
affect is crucial to the transition from the philosophical obsession with the
allegedly transcendental laws of rationality to the sociological concern with
the genuinely contingent – notably non-rational – elements that shape the
development of human communities.
8. The shift from the fixation on the hegemonic to the exploration of the marginal
can be conceived of as the transition from the pursuit of a politics of the power-
ful, dictated by and oriented towards the dominant forces of society, to the
plea for a politics of the powerless, run by and committed to empowering those
who find themselves on the fringes of history.
9. The shift from ethnocentrism to multiculturalism can be regarded as a transition
from the ambition to portray ‘Western’ values and standards as if they rep-
resented carriers of civilizational universality, transcending the spatiotemporal
specificity that pervades both their context of emergence and their scope of
applicability, to the attempt to do justice to the codified contingency of all socially
constructed realities, including the situational relativity of all claims to norma-
tive validity. Multiculturalism is based on the assumption that it is both possible
and desirable to (a) promote a multiplicity of social constructions, (b) incorporate
a multiplicity of life forms, (c) accommodate a multiplicity of educational models,
(d) generate a multiplicity of purposive and creative modes of self-realization, and (e)
provide room for a multiplicity of aesthetic standards and experiences. To be sure,
all multicultural societies are shaped by power-laden dynamics of segregation,
assimilation, and integration. The key question that arises in this context, how-
ever, concerns the extent to which a multicultural politics can be mobilized in
order to contribute to processes of human emancipation.
10. The shift from tribalism to cosmopolitanism can be interpreted as a transition
from the exclusivist creation of ethnic citizenship to the inclusivist construc-
tion of global citizenship. It is important to point out, however, that cosmo-
politanism is itself a tension-laden project:
• on the one hand, it is committed to localism, seeking to take the specifici-
ties of grassroots realities seriously;
• on the other hand, it is committed to globalism, insisting on the
context-transcending validity of universal rights shared by all members of
humanity.
Owing to their playful celebration of cultural diversity, promoters of post-
modernism tend to endorse ‘soft’ – that is, particularist – and reject ‘strong’ –
that is, universalist – versions of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, their unequivocal
rejection of the modern quest for context-transcending teleologies suggests
that there is not much – if any – room for the pursuit of universality within
the condition of postmodernity.

In addition, 15 theses on cosmopolitanism have been defended in this chapter.

On the basis of these theses, the project of cosmopolitanism can be characterized
on various levels.
 Conclusion 275

1. As a classical project, it stands not only for a central current but also for a
long-established tradition of intellectual thought within social and political
theory.
2. As a humanist-universalist project, it is based on the assumption that all
human beings share a number of species-distinctive features by means of
which they set themselves apart from other entities and raise themselves
above nature.
3. As a transcendentalist project, it is committed to taking social differences seri-
ously, while rejecting their tribalistic celebration.
4. As an empowering project, it seeks to draw attention to the situation of the
completely or relatively powerless, rather simply siding with the powerful.
5. As a natural-law project, it rejects any kind of conceptual, methodological,
cultural, or political tribalism, emphasizing the socio-ontological significance
of species-constitutive resources – such as Verstand, Vernunft, and Urteilskraft –
instead.
6. As a practical project, it denotes a pragmatic endeavour oriented towards the
consolidation of social forms of rights, which are realized in institutions, laws,
norms, and everyday practices.
7. As a rights-based project, it is founded on the belief in the right of all human
beings to have rights.
8. As a rights-sensitive project, it draws attention to the constant development of
complex networks of rights.
9. As a tension-laden project, it is tantamount to a never-ending process oriented
towards the rights-based betterment, rather than ultimate perfection, of the
human condition.
10. As a transformative project, it strives to have a lasting and comprehensive influ-
ence upon the construction of social life founded on universally empowering
resources and conditions of existence.
11. As a holistic project, it insists that every type of right has to be understood
in relation to other types of right, all of which form part of the larger totality
commonly described as human society.
12. As a dynamic project, it constitutes a normative endeavour that is under
constant revision and reconstruction, since it engages directly with the inces-
sant development of behavioural, ideological, and institutional patterns of
interaction.
13. As a socio-generative project, it depends on the confluence of objectively
existing (‘rights in themselves’) and subjectively experienced rights (‘rights for
themselves’).
14. As a self-reflexive project, it represents a critical endeavour aware of its own
normative limitations, notably the pitfalls of crude forms of moral and political
universalism.
15. As a constructive project, it is opposed to socio-ontological fatalism, socio-
epistemic nihilism, and sociopolitical cynicism, while seeking to have a posi-
tive impact on historical developments in accordance with people’s interests as
members of humanity, rather than as members of a particular social group.
276 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

Furthermore, the chapter has proposed to identify and examine significant

points of convergence between cosmopolitanism and postmodernism, arguing that the
comparative analysis of these two intellectual traditions permits us to grasp para-
digmatic developments in contemporary social and political analysis. More spe-
cifically, it has been suggested that the following dimensions are constitutive of both
the cosmopolitan and the postmodern imagination: (1) glocalization; (2) pluralization;
(3) intersectionalization; (4) deterritorialization; (5) repoliticization; (6) commu-
nication; (7) empowerment; (8) agency; (9) relativization; (10) denationalization;
(11) complexification; (12) immanence/transcendence; (13) resignification; (14)
ironization; (15) self-problematization; and (16) ambivalence.
Finally, the chapter has demonstrated that the principal issues at stake in cur-
rent debates on cosmopolitanism and postmodernism are reflected in the rise of
transnational public spheres. Habermas’s conceptual framework remains central to
most sociohistorical accounts of the public sphere in the contemporary social
sciences. It appears that, from a Habermasian point of view, six levels of analysis
are particularly important for a comprehensive understanding of modern public
spheres:

1. the political level, notably with regard to the role of modern state power;
2. the judicial level, especially with respect to the idea of the ‘state of law’;
3. the economic level, above all in terms of the administrative coordination, politi-
cal regulation, and legal protection of purposive transactions based on different
use and exchange values of products and services;
4. the technological level, first and foremost in relation to the influence of the
modern media and an increasingly advanced communications infrastructure;
5. the cultural level, concerning the existence of a shared linguistic medium of
public communication, allowing for the emergence of national imaginaries
based on the belief in common histories; and
6. the intellectual level, mainly with reference to the sociohistorical role of the
letters and novels of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century print capitalism, per-
mitting – and, in many ways, encouraging – people to conceive of themselves
as culturally equipped citizens and, hence, to envision themselves as members
of a public.

As elucidated in this chapter, however, the above-outlined – early-Habermasian –

account of the nature of modern public spheres is far from uncontroversial.
Drawing upon key insights provided by critical approaches inspired by, or sympa-
thetic to, cosmopolitanism and postmodernism, it becomes imperative to call the
principal assumptions underlying Habermas’s theory of the modern public sphere
into question. In this respect, the aforementioned levels of analysis are crucial.
1. The political level: In the age of post-sovereign governance, which is character-
ized by disaggregated institutional autonomy and intensified degrees of global
interconnectedness, the state is only one among many other institutional actors
exercising regulative control over social practices.
2. The judicial level: In the age of post-sovereign citizenship, the notion that a
public is tantamount to a national citizenry, occupying a national territory and
 Conclusion 277

united by its common interest expressed in the general will of a bounded political
community, is no longer defensible, primarily due to unprecedented degrees of
demographic heterogeneity and cultural diversity within geographically defined
and institutionally sustained large-scale societal entities, represented by national
polities.
3. The economic level: In the age of post-sovereign economies, which function
within a global network of actions and interactions, the ideal of full-scale regula-
tion – exercised by a nation-state in relation to a territorially defined society, with
an internally protected and potentially self-sufficient market – appears obsolete.
4. The technological level: In the age of post-sovereign mediatization, the spread
of instantaneous electronic, broadband, and satellite information technologies
manifests itself in the gradual denationalization of ideological and institutional
infrastructures, involving the rise of relatively flexible, increasingly powerful, and –
in many cases – interactive communication systems capable of transcending ter-
ritorial boundaries.
5. The cultural level: In the age of post-sovereign communication, it is erroneous
to presume that public spheres are shaped, let alone monopolized, by a single
language, since – due to both the internal and the external linguistic diversity per-
meating different countries and regions of the global network society – national
tongues do not map onto states.
6. The intellectual level: In the age of post-sovereign imagination, which is charac-
terized by the salience of cultural hybridity and hybridization, as well as by the
worldwide distribution of cultural products and commodity-driven standardiza-
tion, it is implausible to maintain that people’s sense of belonging to particular
public spheres is based predominantly – if not, exclusively – on patterns of
national identification.
In short, in a world characterized by the condition of post-sovereignty, public spheres
are shaped by discursive actors whose lives are increasingly interconnected on numerous
levels: politically, judicially, economically, technologically, culturally, and intellectually.
Of course, one may argue over the question of whether it makes sense to describe
highly differentiated public spheres as ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘postmodern’. As illustrated
in the preceding reflections, however, there is no point in denying that contempor-
ary approaches to politics are doomed to failure if they disregard the fact that the
major civilizational challenges we face – both as citizens and as human beings – in
the twenty-first century transcend the relatively arbitrary boundaries of national
territories and, consequently, need to be tackled by responsible – that is, purposive,
cooperative, creative, and far-sighted – members of a ‘global civil society’.

VI. Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought

The comprehensive account developed in the previous chapters has examined the
impact of the ‘postmodern turn’ on the contemporary social sciences by consider-
ing five paradigmatic shifts:

I. the ‘relativist turn’ in epistemology;

II. the ‘interpretive turn’ in social research methodology;
278 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

III. the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology;

IV. the ‘contingent turn’ in historiography; and
V. the ‘autonomous turn’ in politics.

This five-dimensional approach has illustrated both the centrality and the com-
plexity of the normative challenges arising from the rise of postmodern thought.
Regardless of whether one takes a sympathetic or a hostile stance in relation to
the ‘postmodern turn’, it should be obvious from the foregoing analysis that the
controversies it has sparked oblige us to dwell upon both the constitution and the
limitations of the contemporary social sciences. Far from representing an uncon-
troversial endeavour, however, the ‘postmodern turn’ can be, and has been, called
into question on several counts. Therefore, the final chapter has offered a num-
ber of critical reflections that assess the cogency of the assumptions and claims
made by postmodern theories. While it is essential to acknowledge the invaluable
contributions made by, as well as the useful insights gained from, the above-
mentioned paradigmatic turns, it is important to be aware of the shortcomings
and flaws of postmodern approaches in the social sciences. With this in mind,
the final chapter has scrutinized the validity of postmodern thought by grappling
with its (i) analytical, (ii) paradigmatic, and (iii) normative limitations.
(i) In order to avoid overestimating the explanatory scope of the preceding
study, it is important to be explicit about its analytical limitations.

• First, a definitional problem arises owing to the fact that the term ‘postmodern’
is a fuzzy concept. Aware of this terminological elasticity, the foregoing treatise
has sought to contribute to engaging in an open discussion with, rather than
to developing an unambiguous definition of, postmodern thought.
• Second, a methodological problem emerges to the extent that, within the frame-
work of an aspect-oriented analysis, the heterogeneity of postmodern thought
is somewhat artificially homogenized. Hence, the thematic structuration and
homogenization of an eclectic and internally fragmented intellectual move-
ment constitutes a methodological limitation of the preceding study.
• Finally, an interpretive problem appears due to the fact that its thematically
organized overview draws upon the theoretical arguments put forward by
numerous – and, on various levels, diverging – scholars. Hardly any of these
thinkers, however, identify explicitly with the label ‘postmodernism’. Indeed,
postmodern thought may be regarded as an endogenous intellectual force with
an exogenously imposed label.

In other words, it should be kept in mind that the thematically structured account
of postmodern thought developed in this book is unavoidably controversial. As
explained above, the analytical focus of this study consists in shedding light
on the ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sciences in terms of a paradigmatic shift
from the Enlightenment belief in the relative determinacy of both the natural world
and the social world to the – increasingly widespread – post-Enlightenment belief
in the radical indeterminacy of all material and symbolic forms of existence.
 Conclusion 279

(ii) There are some fundamental paradigmatic limitations attached to postmod-

ern thought. The epistemic boundaries of its intellectual horizons are indicative
of the continuities between modern and postmodern ways of theorizing. Hence,
far from offering a path-breaking programme for cutting-edge developments in
the social sciences, most of the key insights of postmodern agendas are anything
but unprecedented. To be exact, the originality of postmodern approaches in the
social sciences can be questioned by considering three fundamental dimensions
relevant to the study of modernity: (a) modernity as an unfinished project, (b)
modernity as a self-critical project, and (c) modernity as a path-breaking project.

A. Modernity can be considered as an unfinished project, that is, as an endeavour

that is still maturing. To the extent that postmodernists aim to overcome the
historical condition of modernity, however, the former fail to do justice to
the latter’s emancipatory potential. Reason is not simply a totalizing resource
mobilized in the interest of the evil forces of the universe; rather, it is totalizing
only to the degree that instrumental reason has become a hegemonic source of
functioning in systemically differentiated societies.
B. It is important to remind ourselves of the fact that modernity has always
been a self-critical project. As such, it is critical of itself as a historical condi-
tion and of its multifaceted material and institutional components, as well as
of its eclectic ideological and symbolic elements. From the very beginning,
modernity has been concerned with sceptical reflection upon itself, includ-
ing both its bright and its dark sides. For self-critique constitutes a normative
cornerstone of Enlightenment thought. Modernity’s astute reflections on the
profound ambivalence of its own historical condition anticipate key aspects
of the postmodern critique of the modern era in general and of modern intel-
lectual thought in particular. Classical social theorists have barely portrayed
modernity as an unambiguous project, free from contradictions and dysfunc-
tionalities. On the contrary, they have always emphasized the existence of
both its empowering and its disempowering aspects.
C. Modernity can be regarded as a path-breaking project. Therefore, it is fair to
remark that postmodern thought deals, to a considerable extent, with old
problems in new clothes. In fact, we can easily identify a large variety of issues
that have always already been part of the discursive landscape of modernity:
the epistemological view that all assertions, as well as all interpretations, of
knowledge claims are spatiotemporally situated; the methodological empha-
sis on the socio-ontological significance of the production of meaning; the
sociological exploration of the commodification of culture in late capitalist
formations; the historical interest in the contingent and unpredictable nature
of social developments; and the political – notably conservative – critique of,
and attack on, utopian thought.

(iii) A comprehensive critique of postmodern thought needs to expose its norma-

tive limitations. If postmodern thought aims to be an integral and constructive part
of critical social science, it has to prove that it does not fall into the trap of several
280 The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in the Social Sciences

problematic ‘-isms’. The normative significance of these ‘-isms’, which have been
considered above, can be synthesized as follows.

A. Textualism: To reduce social theory to textual analysis means to degrade society

to a coexistential expression of textuality.
B. Ahistoricism: To regard history as an accumulation of merely discursive rep-
resentations means to convert the social-scientific commitment to historical
investigation into a language game of textual interpretation.
C. Idealism: To consider discourse to be a ubiquitous ontological category whose
existence is a sine qua non of both the symbolic and the material facets of
human reality means to equate social relations with discursive codifications.
D. Aestheticism: To abandon normative agendas in favour of decorative aesthet-
ics means to fail to mobilize the critical resources developed over centuries by
modern social science.
E. Conservatism: To consider capitalism as the only, and possibly ultimate, mode
of economic organization means to shy away from the task of thinking about
constructive alternatives able to challenge the destructive potential of highly
advanced and competition-driven productive forces. To conceive of the con-
temporary age as a postutopian era means to fail to explore the extent to
which, at least in the long run, there may be – and, perhaps, there has to be –
room for viable alternatives to the hegemony of capitalist society. To celebrate
difference and transform it into a political battlefield means to run the risk of
reproducing the totalizing logic of the quest for universality in the name of
social struggles concerned with both the recognition and the misrecognition
of cultural particularities.
F. Nihilism: To refuse to make any significant moral or political commitments
means to be incapable of proposing a constructive agenda permitting actors
to defend a set of emancipatory behavioural, ideological, and – if necessary –
institutional arrangements, whose legitimacy is irreducible to a historical acci-
dent and whose civilizational value cannot be grasped in terms of the cynical
force of postmodern irony.
G. Relativism: To assert that ‘anything goes’ means to fail to provide epistemic
criteria by means of which it is possible to distinguish between ‘true’ and
‘false’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’, ‘desirable’ and ‘non-
desirable’, ‘defensible’ and ‘non-defensible’.
H. Identitarianism: To fetishize the normative significance of cultural identities
means to fail to do justice to the stratifying logic permeating intersectionally
structured societies, in which actors are asymmetrically related to each other
insofar as they are divided by the unequal access to material and symbolic
resources.
I. Theoreticism: To make assumptions about the constitution and functioning of
the social world without engaging with empirical realities means to endorse
a model of social enquiry that is based, above all, on speculative thought
experiments.
 Conclusion 281

J. Oxymoronism: Postmodern thought is caught up in numerous performative

contradictions: it seeks to undermine the power of rationality by virtue of
rationality; it proposes to deconstruct the power of metanarratives by effect-
ively constructing an alternative – postmodern – metanarrative; it challenges
universalisms on the basis of disguised universalist presuppositions; it opposes
overtly visionary politics by means of surreptitiously visionary politics; and,
finally, it criticizes symptoms of social pathologies without uncovering, let
alone making diagnostic judgements about, their underlying causes.

To the extent that the normative issues arising from the above-stated critical
reflections are confronted, the paradigmatic shifts advocated by supporters of the
‘postmodern turn’ may play a fruitful role in shaping the social sciences in the
interest of their main object of study: humanity.1

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to William Outhwaite for reading the entire manuscript very care-
fully and commenting on it in great detail.
Notes

Introduction
1. On the ‘postmodern turn’, see, for example: Best and Kellner (1997); Brown (1994b);
Hassan (1987); Quicke (1999); Seidman (1994a).
2. Turner (1996), p. 1.
3. Hollinger (1994), p. 124.
4. Ibid., p. 124. On this point, see also Delanty (1999), p. 7: ‘Sociology and its concept of
modernity were products of the “great transformation”’.
5. Turner (1996), p. 5 (italics added).
6. Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 285. On this point, see also Susen (2013b), p. 88.
7. Porter (2008), p. viii (italics added).
8. On the centrality of the ‘postmodern turn’, see, for instance: Best and Kellner (1997); Brown
(1994b); Hassan (1987); Quicke (1999); Seidman (1994a).
9. The impact of the ‘postmodern turn’ on contemporary intellectual thought is reflected
in the idea of developing a ‘postmodern social theory’. On this point, see, for example:
Boyne and Rattansi (1990b), esp. p. 24; Davetian (2005); Porter (2008), esp. pp. viii–xxiv
and 69–77; Seidman (1994c). For an excellent overview of the key historical and sociological
challenges faced by social theorists in the context of the early twenty-first century, see Baert and
da Silva (2010 [1998]), chapters 8 and 9. See also, for example: Allan (2013 [2007]); Beck
(2012 [2010]); Elliott and Turner (2012); Inglis and Thorpe (2012); Jones, Le Boutillier,
and Bradbury (2011 [2003]); Turner (2013); Turner (2014).
10. Until the present day, one of the most illustrative examples of the idea of a ‘postmodern
social theory’ can be found in Seidman (1994c).
11. Ibid., p. 119.
12. Ibid., p. 119.
13. On the conceptual differentiation between ‘sociological theory’ and ‘social theory’, see also, for
example: Allan (2013 [2007]); Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 287; Susen (2013b),
pp. 81 and 88–9.
14. Seidman (1994c), p. 119.
15. On this point, see also, for instance, Baert (2005), pp. 126–45 and 146–69, and Baert and
da Silva (2010 [1998]), pp. 285–307. For a critique of this position, see Susen (2013b),
pp. 95–8.
16. On this point, see, for example, Susen (2014e).
17. Seidman (1994c), p. 120.
18. Ibid., p. 120.
19. Ibid., p. 120.
20. Ibid., pp. 119–20.
21. On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2015a).
22. Seidman (1994c), p. 119.
23. Ibid., p. 119.
24. Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 302.
25. Seidman (1994c), p. 119.
26. On this point, see Burawoy (2005) and Burawoy et al. (2004).
27. Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 302.
28. Seidman (1994c), p. 119.
29. See Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 302.
30. On the distinction between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’, see, for exam-
ple: Boltanski (1990b); (1998), esp. pp. 248–51; (1999–2000), esp. pp. 303–6; Bourdieu

282
 Notes 283

and Eagleton (1992), esp. p. 117; Celikates (2009), esp. pp. 12, 25–8, 39–40, 56, 72–81,
89–92, 116–22, 138–52, 159–60, and 187–247; Cronin (1997), esp. pp. 206–7; Mesny
(1998), esp. pp. 143–90; Susen (2007), esp. pp. 25, 102, 135–7, 138, 139, 140, 146 n. 8,
153, 156, 157, 204, 205, 224, and 311; Susen (2011a), esp. pp. 448–58; (2011e), pp. 8,
27, 33–6, and 40.
31. Seidman (1994c), p. 121.
32. Ibid., p. 120.
33. Ibid., p. 120.
34. Ibid., p. 120.
35. Ibid., p. 121.
36. Ibid., p. 121.
37. Ibid., p. 122.
38. Ibid., p. 122.
39. Ibid., p. 122.
40. Ibid., p. 123.
41. Ibid., p. 125. Cf. Susen and Turner (2014a).
42. Seidman (1994c), p. 125.
43. The significance of this point is reflected in the recent impact of Luc Boltanski’s ‘prag-
matic sociology of critique’ on contemporary understandings of processes of justifica-
tion. On this point, see, for instance: Blokker (2011); Boltanski (1990b, 1999–2000,
2009); Boltanski and Honneth (2009); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Boltanski
and Thévenot (1991, 1999); Celikates (2009); Susen (2011a). More recently, the wider
significance of Boltanski’s approach has been discussed in Susen and Turner (2014a),
which contains numerous critical essays concerned with his writings: Adkins (2014);
Basaure (2014); Blokker (2014); Bogusz (2014); Boltanski and Browne (2014); Boltanski,
Honneth, and Celikates (2014 [2009]); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]);
Browne (2014); Eulriet (2014); Fowler (2014); Fuller (2014); Karsenti (2014 [2005]);
Lemieux (2014); Nachi (2014); Nash (2014b); Outhwaite and Spence (2014); Quéré
and Terzi (2014); Robbins (2014); Silber (2014); Stones (2014); Susen (2014b, 2014c,
2014d, 2014 [2012], 2014 [2015]); Susen and Turner (2014b); Thévenot (2014); Turner
(2014a, 2014b); Wagner (2014).
44. Seidman (1994c), p. 123 (italics added). On this point, see also, for example: Rorty (2009
[1979], 1982, 1991b, 1997a, 1997b).
45. Seidman (1994c), p. 123 (italics added).
46. Ibid., p. 124.
47. Ibid., p. 125.
48. Ibid., p. 126 (italics added). See also ibid., pp. 131 and 136.
49. Ibid., p. 127 (italics added). On this point, see also, for example: Di Stefano (1990);
Susen (2010a, 2010b); Yeatman (1990); Young (1994 [1989], 1990a, 1990b). The norma-
tive implications of this issue will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.
50. Seidman (1994c), p. 136 (italics added).
51. Ibid., p. 127. See also ibid., p. 119, and Seidman (1994b), p. 12.
52. Seidman (1994c), p. 127 (italics added). On this point, see also Seidman and Wagner (1992).
53. Seidman (1994c), p. 127 (italics added). On modern and postmodern conceptions of ‘time’,
see, for instance, Nowotny (1994 [1987]).
54. Seidman (1994c), p. 129 (italics added).
55. Ibid., p. 129.
56. Ibid., p. 130 (‘world-historical’ appears without the hyphen in the original version).
57. Ibid., p. 129.
58. On this point, see, for example, Kumar (1978) and Rorty (1998a).
59. Seidman (1994c), p. 130 (italics added).
60. Ibid., p. 130.
61. On this point, see, for instance, ibid., p. 130. See also, for example, Jenks (1998) and
Susen (2009b).
284 Notes

62. King (1998b), p. 4 (italics in original).

63. Delanty (2000b), p. 9 (italics added). On this point, see also Bennington (2001), Friese
(2001a, 2001b).
64. Habermas (1996 [1981]), p. 39 (italics added). See also Smart (1990), p. 17: ‘The term
“modern” derives from the late fifth century Latin term modernus which was used to
distinguish an officially Christian present from a Roman, pagan past […]. Thereafter the
term is employed to situate the present in relation to the past of antiquity, appearing
and reappearing “exactly during those periods in Europe when the consciousness of a
new epoch formed itself through a renewed relationship to the ancients”.’ Quoted pas-
sage taken from Habermas (1981 [1980]), pp. 3–4. On this point, see also Lyon (1999
[1994]), p. 25.
65. Delanty (2000b), p. 9 (italics added).
66. Giddens (1990), p. 1 (italics added). On Giddens’s conception of ‘modernity’, see ibid., esp.
pp. 1–17 and 45–54. Cf. Outhwaite (2014).
67. See, for example: Craib (1997); Giddens (1996 [1971]); Hawthorn (1987 [1976]);
Morrison (2006 [1995]); Sayer (1991). See also Susen and Turner (2011b).
68. See Marx (2000/1977 [1859], 2000/1977 [1857–58/1941]).
69. See Durkheim (1966/1951 [1897], 1984 [1893]).
70. See Weber (1991 [1948]), esp. pp. 196–244.
71. On this point, see Giddens (1990), pp. 6 and 53–4.
72. On the project of modernity, see, for instance: Habermas (1996 [1981]); Passerin d‘Entrèves
(1996b); Passerin d’Entrèves and Benhabib (1996).
73. On the project of the Enlightenment, see, for example: Honneth et al. (1992a, 1992b);
McLellan (1992).
74. Delanty (1999), p. 3 (italics added).
75. On this point, see, for instance, Wagner (1992), pp. 470–8.
76. For useful accounts of the multidimensional constitution of modernity, see, for example:
Corfield (2010), esp. p. 391; Delanty (2000b), esp. pp. 1–31; Giddens (1990), esp. pp.
1–17 and 45–54; Lyon (1999 [1994]), esp. pp. 25–45; Rose (1991), esp. p. 1; Torfing
(1999), esp. pp. 57–61. On the concept of modernity, see also, for instance: Bauman
(1991); Beck (1992); Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994); Beck and Lau (2005); Beilharz
(2000); Berman (1983); Bernstein (1985); Bhambra (2007); Craib (1997); Delanty (1999);
Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson (1995); Giddens (1996 [1971], 1991); Habermas
(1987a [1985], 1996 [1981]); Hall and Gieben (1992); Hall, Held, and McGrew (1992);
Hawthorn (1987 [1976]); Kellner (1989a); Lichtblau (1999); Morrison (2006 [1995]);
Outhwaite (2014); Sayer (1991); Thomas and Walsh (1998); Wagner (1994, 2001, 2008,
2012); Walter (2001); Wellmer (1993); Zima (1997, 2000).
77. On this point, see, for instance, Heywood (2007 [1992]). See also Susen (2014e).
78. On this point, see, for example, Beetham (1987). See also Weber (1991 [1948]), esp. pp.
196–244. Cf. Gane (2002, 2006) and Koshul (2005).
79. Durkheim (2010 [1924]), p. 59.
80. On this point, see, for instance: Habermas (1987d [1981], 1992 [1988]); Honneth (1995
[1994], 2012 [2010]); Susen (2007), pp. 90–94 and 192–198; Susen (2010d).
81. On the concept of Enlightenment, see, for example: Adorno and Horkheimer (1997a
[1944/1969]); Friedrich (2012); Goldhammer (2001); Gordon (2001a, 2001b); Habermas
(1987a [1985], 1996 [1981]); Hawthorn (1987 [1976]); Harding (1990); Honnethet
al. (1992a, 1992b); Kant (2009 [1784]); McLellan (1992); Osborne (1998); Passerin
d’Entrèves (1996a); Racevskis (1993); Rengger (1995); Saiedi (1993). On the concept
of emancipation, see, for example: Antonio (1989); Apter (1992); Bensussan (1982);
Harding (1992); Laclau (1992, 1996);  Lukes (1991 [1983]); Nederveen Pieterse (1992a,
1992b);  Nuyen (1998); Pease (2002);  Ray (1993);  Santos (2006, 2007);  Slater (1992);
Susen (2009a, 2011a, 2015a); Weiss (1997b); Wertheim (1992).
82. Susen (2015a), p. 1024.
83. Ibid., p. 1025 (italics added).
 Notes 285

84. On this point, see Susen (2009a), pp. 84–5. See also Susen (2015a), p. 1025.
85. Susen (2015a), p. 1026 (italics in original).
86. On the social and political challenges arising from the experience of ambivalence under mod-
ern and/or postmodern conditions, see, for instance: Bauman (1991); Bauman and Tester
(2007), esp. pp. 23–5 and 29; Hammond (2011), pp. 305, 310, 312, and 315; Iggers
(2005 [1997]), pp. 146–7; Jacobsen and Marshman (2008), pp. 804–7; Kellner (2007),
p. 117; Mulinari and Sandell (2009), p. 495; Quicke (1999), p. 281; Susen (2010d), esp.
pp. 62–78; van Raaij (1993), esp. pp. 543–6, 551–5, and 559–61.
87. Delanty (2000b), p. 10.
88. Ibid., p. 10.
89. On this point, see Adorno and Horkheimer (1997a [1944/1969]). See also Susen
(2009a, 2015a).
90. Delanty (2000b), p. 16.
91. Ibid., p. 16.
92. Habermas (1987a [1985]), p. 5. On this point, see also Delanty (2000b), p. 10, and
Therborn (1995), p. 4.
93. Delanty (2000b), p. 9.
94. Perhaps, the most influential view of this position can be found in Spengler (1973
[1918/1922]).
95. Therborn (1995), p. 4 (italics in original).
96. On this view, see, for example, Susen (2010d).
97. See Lyotard (1984 [1979]).
98. Best and Kellner (1997), p. 3 (italics added).
99. Wagner (1992), p. 467 (italics added).
100. See Ashley (1994), p. 55 (italics added).
101. See Jones, Natter, and Schatzki (1993b), p. 1 (italics added).
102. Anderson (1996), p. 6 (italics added).
103. Corfield (2010), p. 385.
104. Ashley (1994), p. 55. On this point, see Lyotard (1991 [1988]), p. 24.
105. For this reason, the term ‘postmodern’ is often deliberately hyphenated in the litera-
ture (appearing as ‘post-modern’).
106. Dickens and Fontana (1994b), p. 1 (italics added). See also Gibbins and Reimer
(1999), p. 12: ‘Abridging her history, we can chart the first usage of the postmodern
to Federico de Onís in 1934, meaning the anti-modernist current in some Spanish
and Latin American poetry between 1905 and 1914, a term repeated by the editors of
one anthology of such poetry in 1942’. On this point, see also, for example: Corfield
(2010), pp. 387 and 394–6; Köhler (1977), pp. 8–18; Petit (2005), p. 18; Rose (1991),
pp. 12–13; Sim (2002), p. 15.
107. See Boyne and Rattansi (1990b), p. 9: ‘First apparently used in Spanish by Frederico
de Onis [Federico de Onís] in the 1930s, it is in the literary commentaries […] that
the term gained currency in the 1950s and 1960s, then acquiring both prominence
and notoriety in the 1970s and 1980s, especially through the architectural criti-
cism of Charles Jencks and the philosophical intervention of Jean-François Lyotard’s
The Postmodern Condition.’ On this point, see also Mouffe (1993), p. 9: ‘discussion
of the postmodern, which until now had focused on culture, has taken a political turn’.
108. Gane and Gane (2007), pp. 127–8 (italics added; except for ‘mean’, ‘clear’, and ‘unified’,
which are italicized in the original version).
109. Kumar (1995), p. 104 (italics added).
110. Nederveen Pieterse (1992b), p. 26 (italics added). On this point, see also Kumar (1995),
p. 104. In addition, see Alexander (1994), p. 182 n. 35, and Turner (1990b).
111. Flax (2007), p. 74 (italics added).
112. Gellner (1992), p. 22 (italics added).
113. Gane and Gane (2007), p. 127 (italics added).
114. Patton (2004), p. 11872 (italics added).
286 Notes

115. Ermarth (2004), p. 68 (italics added; italics removed from ‘that’).

116. Coole (1998a), p. 349 (italics added).
117. Wilterdink (2002), p. 191 (italics added).
118. Kumar (1995), p. 139 (italics added).
119. Smart (1998), p. 61 (italics added). See also Smart (1996), p. 472.
120. See Bertens (1995).
121. For an excellent sociological analysis of paradigmatic developments in modern intellectual
thought, see, for instance, Collins (1998).
122. Cf. Mongardini (1992), p. 55: ‘It has been said that the term “postmodernity” is as
fascinating as it is difficult to define.’
123. Bauman and Tester (2007), p. 26.
124. On this point, see Lyon (1999 [1994]), p. 100. On the relationship between postmodern-
ism and critical theory, see also, for example: Benhabib (1993); Landry (2000); Malpas
(2005); Meštrović (1993); Norris (1990); Poster (1989); Soja (1989); Wellmer (1985).
125. On the relationship between postmodernism and feminism, see, for example: Ashenden
(1997); Benhabib (1990); Bordo (1990); Butler (1990, 1994 [1990]); Comack (1999);
Coole (1998b); Di Stefano (1990); Flax (1990); Fraser and Nicholson (1994 [1988]);
Harding (1990); Hartsock (1990); Hawkesworth (1999); Huyssen (1990); Jagger (2005);
Malpas (2001), chapters 10, 11, and 12; McGraw, Zvonkovic, and Walker (2000);
Mulinari and Sandell (2009); Nicholson (1990b, 1990a); Owens (1993); Salleh (2009);
Seibold (2000); Sheehy (2012); Yeatman (1990, 1994); Young (1990b).
126. On the relationship between postmodernism and Marxism, see, for example: Butler (1998);
Callari and Ruccio (1996a, 1996b); Callinicos (1989); Carver (1998); Cloud (1994);
Cole (2003); Daly (1999); Eagleton (1995); Foster (2006 [1997]); Geras (1987); Kellner
(1989b, 1989a); Landry (2000); Malpas (2001), chapters 8 and 9; Malpas (2005);
McMahon (1999); Mulhern (2006 [1997]); Rundell (1990); Smart (1992), chapter 6;
Vakaloulis (2001); Wood (2006 [1997]); Wood and Foster (2006 [1997]).
127. On this point, see, for example, Susen (2014e).
128. Wilterdink (2002), p. 190 (italics added). On this point, see also, for instance, Jameson
(2007), p. 215.
129. Gane and Gane (2007), p. 130.
130. Wilterdink (2002), p. 192.
131. Kellner (2007), p. 102.
132. Rojek and Turner (2000), p. 635. See also Turner and Rojek (2001), p. 16.
133. Rojek and Turner (2000), p. 636. On this point, see also, for example: Callinicos (1989),
p. 7; Huyssen (1990), p. 253; Zima (1997), p. 82.
134. On the slogan ‘anything goes’, see, for instance: Beck and Lau (2005), pp. 540–4;
Boghossian (2006), p. 23; Butler (2002), p. 35; Clicqué (2005), esp. p. 29; Cole (2003),
p. 493; Eickelpasch (1997), pp. 18–19; Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 141; Gane and Gane
(2007), p. 131; Matthewman and Hoey (2006), p. 536; Mcevoy (2007b), p. 399; Nola
and Irzik (2003), p. 395; Rose (1991), pp. 3 and 60; Sokal and Bricmont (1998), pp.
78–85; Torfing (1999), pp. 275–6; van Raaij (1993), p. 560.
135. See previous note, esp. Clicqué (2005).
136. On the ‘end of ideology’ thesis, see, for example: Bell (2000 [1960]); Donskis (2000);
Rubinstein (2009); Waxman (1968).
137. Bauman and Tester (2007), p. 25.
138. Ibid., p. 25.
139. See Bertens (1995).
140. Bauman and Tester (2007), p. 25.
141. Vattimo (2007), p. 32.
142. See Bertens (1995).
143. Bauman and Tester (2007), p. 25.
144. Ibid., p. 25.
145. See Bertens (1995).
 Notes 287

146. Vattimo (2007), p. 32.

147. Gane and Gane (2007), p. 127.
148. Wilterdink (2002), p. 193.
149. Butler (2002), p. 127.
150. On the relevance of postmodern thought to studies in epistemology and philosophy (published
between 2000 and 2012), see, for example: Appignanesi and Garrett (2003 [1995]);
Belsey (2002); Benton and Craib (2001), esp. chapter 10; Best and Kellner (2001);
Boghossian (2006); Brnzeu and Sznyi (2011); Browning (2003); Butler (2002); Clark
(2006); Delanty (2000b); Dods (2004); Frank (2000); Gane (2001); Gordon (2001a,
2001b); Goulimari (2007a, 2007b); Haddock (2004); Hewison (2010); Jørgensen (2002);
Kersenboom (2000); Lehman (2011); Mcevoy (2007b); McGowan (2007); McKenzie
(2007); McLaughlin and White (2012); Murrey (2011); Nola and Irzik (2003); Patton
(2004); Peat (2007); Salleh (2009); Smith (2006); Vattimo (2007); Venturi (2007
[2001]); Welsch (2002); Zima (2000); Zižek (2000).
151. On the relevance of postmodern thought to studies in social research methodology (published
between 2000 and 2012), see, for example: Bartsch, DiPalma and Sells (2001); Corroto
(2011); Ermarth (2004); Fendler and Tuckey (2006); Fielding (2009); Fox (2003); Janich
(2006); MacLure (2006); Raese (2011); Seibold (2000); Somerville (2007); Stead and
Bakker (2010); Urrutia Elejalde (2012).
152. On the relevance of postmodern thought to studies in sociology (published between 2000
and 2012), see, for example: Agger (2002); Appignanesi and Garrett (2003 [1995]);
Arpin (2006); Atkinson (2002); Bauman (2000b); Bauman and Tester (2007); Behrends
(2005); Beilharz (2000); Broekaert, Vandevelde, and Briggs (2011); Burawoy (2000);
Burstein and Negoita (2011); Butler (2002); Carp (2010); Clayton (2002); Cole (2003);
Cresswell (2011); Davis (2008); Delanty (2000b); Doja (2006); Duvall (2002a, 2002b);
Elliott (2000, 2007 [2001]); Evans (2011); Featherstone (2007 [1991]); Fernando (2003);
Fforde (2009); Gane (2001, 2002, 2006); Gane and Gane (2007); Gillison (2010);
Hammond (2011); Harrod (2011); Hoogheem (2010); Hornung and Kunow (2009);
Hutcheon (2002); Ivashkevich (2011); Jacobsen and Marshman (2008); Jagger (2001,
2005); Jameson (2007); Jay (2010); Kelemen and Peltonen (2001); Kerr (2009); Kotarba
and Johnson (2002a, 2002b); Koshul (2005); Landry (2000); Lash and Lury (2007);
Lommel (2011); Lyman (2002); Matthewman and Hoey (2006); McGraw, Zvonkovic,
and Walker (2000); McKinley (2003); Mohren (2008); Mouzelis (2008); Mulinari and
Sandell (2009); Nemoianu (2010); O’Connor (2000); Oliver, Flamez, and McNichols
(2011); Petit (2005); Pinheiro (2012); Porter (2008); Prior (2005); Rojek and Turner
(2000); Rømer (2011); Schneider (2004); Sewlall (2010); Seymour (2011); Silverman
(2012); Sim (2002); Slott (2002); Spinks (2001); Toews (2003); Vakaloulis (2001); van
Reijen (2000); Walmsley (2000); Watson (2011); Welsch (2002); Wernet, Elman, and
Pendleton (2005); Wernick (2000); Wilterdink (2002); Woodward, Emmison, and
Smith (2000); Zižek (2000).
153. On the relevance of postmodern thought to studies in historiography (published between 2000
and 2012), see, for example: Appignanesi and Garrett (2003 [1995]); Bentley (2006);
Blackburn (2000); Burns (2003); Butler (2002); Carmichael (2002); Corfield (2010);
Delanty (2000b); Douzinas (2007); Eaglestone (2001); Evans (2002); Flax (2007); Foster
(2006 [1997]);  Friedrich (2012); Gane (2001); Iggers (2005 [1997]); Kellner (2007);
Joyce (2010); Laclau (2007); Macfie (2010); Magnússon (2003); Mcevoy (2007b);
Osamu (2002); Pieters (2000); Raese (2011); Spiegel (2007); Thompson (2000); Welsch
(2002); Williams (2010); Wood (2006 [1997]); Wood and Foster (2006 [1997]); Zagorin
(2000); Zammito (2010); Zižek (2000).
154. On the relevance of postmodern thought to studies in politics (published between 2000
and 2012), see, for example: Braddick (2009); Brantlinger (2011); Brants and Voltmer
(2011a, 2011b); Carretero Pasín (2006); Chevallier (2008 [2003]); Coleman (2011);
Cornis-Pope (2012); Depoortere (2008); Friedrich (2012); Fukuyama (2002); Hidetaka
(2002); Ivic and Lakicevic (2011); MacKinnon (2000); Malik (2006 [1997]); Meschonnic
288 Notes

and Hasumi (2002a, 2002b); Mulhern (2006 [1997]); Parekh (2008); Paulus (2001);
Poulain (2002); St Louis (2002); Taylor and Trentmann (2011); Welsch (2002); Yar
(2001); Zižek (2000).
155. See Ruiter (1991), p. 27. See also Wilterdink (2002), p. 190.
156. Domańska (1998b), p. 173.
157. On the ‘Methodenstreit’, see, for instance: Lachenmann (1995); McCarthy (2001);
Neemann (1993/1994).
158. On the ‘interpretive turn’, see, for example: Apel (1971a, 1979); Bourdieu (1993); Delanty
(1997); Delanty and Strydom (2003); Dilthey (1883); Garrick (1999); Habermas
(1970); Hiley, Bohman, and Shusterman (1991); Iggers (2005 [1997]); Lehman (2011);
Maffesoli (1996 [1985]); Outhwaite (1986 [1975], 1987a, 1998, 2000); Susen and
Turner (2011d).
159. On the ‘linguistic turn’, see, for example: Apel (1976); Bohman (1996);  Bourdieu
(1982a, 1992, 1993 [1984]); Fairclough (1995); Fillmore (1985); Gebauer (2005);
Goldhammer (2001); Habermas (1988a [1967/1970], 1976a);  Hacking (1975, 1982);
Jäger (2002); Kirk (1997 [1994]); Krämer (2002); Krämer and König (2002); Lafont
(1993, 1997, 1999 [1993]); Lee (1992); May (1996); Rigotti (1979); Rorty (1967a,
1967b); Rossi-Landi (1974 [1972]); Schöttler (1997); Susen (2007), chapters 1–4; Susen
(2009a, 2010c, 2013a, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f); Taylor (1991 [1986]); Wellmer (1977
[1976]).
160. On the ‘relativist turn’, see, for example: Bernstein (1983); Boghossian (2006); Dickens
and Fontana (1994a); Gellner (1982); Hacking (1982); Haddock (2004); Hollis and
Lukes (1982); Laudan (1990); Lukes (1982); Margolis (2007 [1986]); Norris (1997);
Rorty (1991b, 1997a); Rossi-Landi (1974 [1972]); Schroeder (1997).
161. On the ‘deconstructive turn’, see, for example: Delanty (2000b), p. 138; Denzin (1994);
Feldman (1998); Inayatullah (1990); Leledakis (2000); McCarthy (1991); Michelfelder
and Palmer (1989); Norris (1997); Rorty (1991c); Smith (2006); Thompson (1993).
162. On the ‘contingent turn’, see, for example: Bauman (1991, 1992, 1997, 2000b, 2007);
Bauman and Tester (2007); Beilharz (2000); Butler (1994 [1990]); Butler, Laclau, and
Zižek (2000); Cole (1994); Davis (2008); Gane (2001); Kamper (1988 [1984]); Rorty
(1989); Sloterdijk (1988); Smith (1999); Veeser (1989); Zižek (2000).
163. On the ‘liquid turn’, see, for example: Bauman (2000b, 2007); Gane (2001); Gane and
Gane (2007), p. 136; Jay (2010); Taylor and Trentmann (2011).
164. On the ‘cultural turn’, see, for example: Bauman (1999 [1973]); Bell (1991 [1976]);
Bonnell and Hunt (1999); Bonnell, Hunt, and Biernacki (1999); Bouchet (1994);
Butler (1998); Duvall (2002a); Eickelpasch (1997); Featherstone (2007 [1991]); Foster
(1985 [1983]); Franklin, Lury, and Stacey (2000); Gillison (2010); Harvey (1989);
Hassan (1987); Hoogheem (2010); Huyssen and Scherpe (1993); Jacob (1999);
Jameson (1991, 1998); Kellner (1997); Lash and Lury (2007); McGuigan (2006 [1999]);
McMahon (1999); Morawski (1996); Nemoianu (2010); Polan (1988); Rademacher
and Schweppenhäuser (1997);  Ramazanoglu (1997); Rojek and Turner (2000); Sarup
(1996); Sewell (1999);  Sim (2002); Smith Maguire and Matthews (2014); Solomon
(1998); Toews (2003); Vattimo (1988 [1985]); Wernick (2000).
165. On the ‘autonomous turn’, see, for example: Agger (2002); Brants and Voltmer (2011a,
2011b); Delanty (2000b); Good and Velody (1998a, 1998b); Habermas (1986); Laclau
(1996); Rancière (2002); Smart (1992), pp. 176–82; Squires (1998).
166. On the ‘interpretive turn’, see, for example: Apel (1971a, 1979); Bourdieu (1993); Delanty
(1997); Delanty and Strydom (2003); Dilthey (1883); Garrick (1999); Habermas (1970);
Iggers (2005 [1997]); Lehman (2011); Maffesoli (1996 [1985]); Outhwaite (1986 [1975],
1987a, 1998, 2000); Susen and Turner (2011d).
167. On the ‘reflexive turn’, see, for example: Adkins (2003); Bassett (1996); Beck, Giddens,
and Lash (1994); Bourdieu (1990, 2001); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992); Burkitt
(1997); Gane and Gane (2007), p. 136; Gingras (2004); Kögler (1997); Noya (2003); Pels
(2000); Sandywell (1996a, 1996b); Wacquant (1989).
 Notes 289

168. On the ‘spatial turn’, see, for example: Bourdieu (1991); Butler (2012); Corbridge,
Thrift, and Martin (1994); Featherstone and Lash (1995); Goonewardena et al. (2008);
Gregory and Urry (1985); Harvey (1989, 2001); Hubbard, Kitchin, and Valentine
(2004); Jameson (2007), p. 215; Lefebvre (1991 [1974]); Massey (2005); Robertson
(1995); Simmel (1997 [1903]); Soja (1989); Susen (2013c); Thrift (1996); Urry (1985);
Wiley (2005); Woodward, Emmison, and Smith (2000); Zieleniec (2007).
169. On the ‘performative turn’, see, for example: Alexander (2004); Bourdieu (1977 [1972]);
Butler (1990, 1997, 1999); Butler and Athanasiou (2013); Carlson (2004 [1996]);
Goffman (1971 [1959]); Lovell (2003); Wulf (2003).
170. On the ‘pragmatic turn’, see, for example: Aboulafia, Bookman, and Kemp (2002);
Alexander (2004); Apel (1979); Baert (2003); Baert (2005), pp. 126–45 and 146–69;
Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), pp. 285–307; Baert and da Silva (2013); Baert and
Turner (2007); Blokker (2011); Boltanski (1990b, 1999–2000, 2009); Boltanski and
Honneth (2009); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Boltanski and Thévenot (1991,
1999); Celikates (2009); Margolis (2007 [1986]); McLaughlin and White (2012); Susen
(2011a, 2012b, 2013b); Susen and Turner (2014a). An influential contemporary exam-
ple that is worth mentioning in this context is Luc Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of
critique’. On the wider significance of Boltanski’s work, see, for instance: Adkins (2014);
Basaure (2014); Blokker (2014); Bogusz (2014); Boltanski and Browne (2014); Boltanski,
Honneth, and Celikates (2014 [2009]); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]);
Browne (2014); Eulriet (2014); Fowler (2014); Fuller (2014); Karsenti (2014 [2005]);
Lemieux (2014); Nachi (2014); Nash (2014b); Outhwaite and Spence (2014); Quéré and
Terzi (2014); Robbins (2014); Silber (2014); Stones (2014); Susen (2014b, 2014c, 2014d,
2014e, 2014 [2012], 2014 [2015], 2015b); Susen and Turner (2014b); Thévenot (2014);
Turner (2014a, 2014b); Wagner (2014).
171. On the ‘existentialist turn’, see, for example: Kotarba and Johnson (2002a, 2002b).
172. On the ‘vitalist turn’, see, for example: Colebrook (2010); Fraser, Kember, and Lury
(2006); Greco (2005); Marks (1998).
173. On the ‘affective turn’, see, for example: Adkins (2013); Burkitt (2014); Clough and
Halley (2007); Colebrook (2010); Davetian (2005); Flatley (2008); McCalman and
Pickering (2010); Thompson and Hoggett (2012).
174. On the ‘postsecular turn’, see, for example: Abeysekara (2008); Baker and Beaumont
(2011); Blond (1997); Dostert (2006); Habermas (2010 [2008]); Hamilton (2008); Martin
(1996); Mavelli (2012); Milbank (1992); Mohamed (2011); Molendijk, Beaumont and
Jedan (2010); Nynäs, Lassander, and Utriainen (2012); Rubinstein (2009); Smith and
Whistler (2011); Vries and Sullivan (2006).
175. On the ‘digital turn’, see, for example: Athique (2013); Baym (2014 [2010]); Belk and
Llamas (2013); Burda (2011); Junge et al. (2013); Negroponte (1995); Runnel et al.
(2013); Westera (2013); Zhao (2005).
176. For useful accounts of the multidimensional constitution of postmodernity, see, for exam-
ple: Anderson (1998); Ashley (1997); Bauman (1992, 1997, 2007); Bauman and Tester
(2007); Bertens (1995); Best and Kellner (1997); Boisvert (1996); Boyne and Rattansi
(1990a); Burawoy (2000); Butler (2002); Corfield (2010); Delanty (1999, 2000b);
Engelmann (1990a); Gane and Gane (2007); Goulimari (2007a, 2007b); Harvey
(1989); Hutcheon (2007); Jameson (2007); Kaplan (1988); Kellner (2007); Kumar
(1995); Laclau (2007); Lyon (1999 [1994]); Montag (1988); Rose (1991); Scott (1991);
Smart (1993); Tester (1993); Thompson (1992); Wagner (1992); White (1989); Vattimo
(2007).
177. See previous note on the ‘end of ideology’ thesis.
178. On this point, see Susen (2012a), esp. pp. 296 and 307. See also, for instance, Browne
and Susen (2014), esp. pp. 218–20 and 228–9.
179. See Lash and Urry (1987).
180. Cf. Evans (1997a); Gafijczuk (2005); Inglis and Robertson (2008); Maffesoli (1996
[1988]); and Meštrović (1991).
290 Notes

181. On this five-dimensional account of the self, see Susen (2007), pp. 92–4.
182. See Butler (2002), p. 16.
183. See ibid., pp. 8–11.
184. Featherstone (1988), p. 198. See also Featherstone (2007 [1991]), p. 3. Cf. Giddens
(1990), pp. 45–6.
185. Gibbins and Reimer (1999), p. 15 (‘and’ before ‘academic’ replaced by ‘or’; the Oxford
comma does not appear in the original version).

1 From Modern to Postmodern Epistemology? The ‘Relativist Turn’

1. On the ‘relativist turn’ in epistemology, see, for example: Bernstein (1983); Boghossian
(2006); Dickens and Fontana (1994a); Gellner (1982); Hacking (1982); Haddock (2004);
Hollis and Lukes (1982); Laudan (1990); Lukes (1982); Margolis (2007 [1986]); Norris
(1997); Rorty (1991b, 1997a); Rossi-Landi (1974 [1972]); Schroeder (1997).
2. See, for instance: Altvater (1994); Apel (1979); Beckermann (1985); Beer (1999); Bhaskar
(1998); Bruce (1999); Celikates (2009); Cooke (1994, 2000); Dupuy and Livet (1997);
Føllesdal (1985); Freundlieb and Hudson (1993); Gane (2002, 2006); Habermas (1970,
1971 [1968/1969], 1986, 1987 [1968], 1987a [1981], 1987b [1981], 1987a [1985],
1996 [1981], 1996a [1992], 2001, 2002 [1981, 1991, 1997], 2008 [2005], 2010 [2008]);
Habermas and Ratzinger (2006 [2005]); Hacking (1982); Heath (2001); Hollis and Lukes
(1982); Koshul (2005); Locke (2001); Lukes (1982); Müller-Doohm (2000); Newton-
Smith (1981); Outhwaite (1986 [1975], 1987a, 1987b, 1996, 2000); Pellizzoni (2001);
Rorty (1998b); Reynaud (1997); Schrag (1989); Stockman (1983); Susen (2007, 2009a,
2009b, 2010c, 2011e, 2011a, 2011d, 2013e, 2013f); Thompson (1983); Weber (1980
[1922], 1978 [1922]); Weiß (1985); Wellmer (1985); Weyembergh (1995); Wilson (1970).
3. On this point, see, for instance: Hawthorn (1987 [1976]); Osborne (1998); Saiedi (1993).
4. On this problem, see, for example, Jenks (1998).
5. Rorty (1985), p. 161.
6. Kumar (1995), pp. 147–8 (italics added).
7. On this point, see Susen (2011a), pp. 450–3.
8. Boyne and Rattansi (1990b), p. 34 (italics added).
9. On this point, see Berger and Luckmann (1967).
10. On this point, see Susen (2007), pp. 166–7. See also Susen (2011e), pp. 49–51, 69, and 73–4.
11. Rorty (1989), pp. 7 and 53 (italics added). See also ibid., p. 3: ‘truth as made rather than
found’. On this point, see also, for instance: Anderson (1996), p. 8; Evans (2002), p. 81;
White (1978), p. 82.
12. Bauman (1991), p. 232 (italics in original).
13. On the epistemological tension between truth and perspective (especially in terms of the
opposition between objectivism and constructivism), see, for example: Boghossian (2006);
Delanty (1997); Denzin (1994); Farrell (1994), pp. 245–50; Fielding (2009), pp. 428–35
and 442–3; Fox (2003), pp. 84–5 and 88; Gane and Gane (2007), pp. 128–31; Hacking
(1982), pp. 48–66; Hewison (2010), pp. 589–93; Inayatullah (1990), pp. 115–41; Jacob
(1999), pp. 95–120; Krishna (2007), pp. 814–15; Lee (1992); Osborne (1998); Rorty
(1991b, 1997b, 1998a); Schwandt (1994), pp. 118–37; Thompson (1993), pp. 325–38;
White (1997 [1992]), pp. 392–6.
14. Margolis (2007 [1986]), p. 33 (italics added).
15. Bauman (1991), p. 253.
16. Alexander (1992), p. 342 (italics added).
17. Ibid., p. 343 (italics added). The passages in quotation marks are taken from Rorty (2009
[1979]), pp. 186 and 174 respectively. On pragmatist conceptions of knowledge, see, for
example: Baert (2003); Baert (2005), pp. 126–45 and 146–69; Baert and da Silva (2010
[1998]), pp. 285–307; Baert and Turner (2007); Margolis (2007 [1986]); McLaughlin and
White (2012); Susen (2013b), esp. pp. 95–8. See also, in particular: Rorty (1985, 1989,
1991b, 1991d, 1991a, 1991c, 1997b, 1997a, 1998a, 1998b, 2009 [1979]).
 Notes 291

18. On this point, see, for instance: Boyne and Rattansi (1990b), p. 3; Callinicos (1989),
p. 8; Schrag (1989), esp. pp. 81–93.
19. Racevskis (1993), p. 65 (italics added).
20. On the epistemological tension between certainty and uncertainty (especially in terms of the
opposition between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism), see, for example: Alexander
(1992), pp. 322–68; Ashley (1994), pp. 53–75; Bauman (2007); Baert and da Silva (2010
[1998]), pp. 266 and 287–305; Brown (1994a), pp. 12–37; Butler (2002), pp. 119–21;
Butler (1994 [1990]), pp. 153–70; Delanty (2000b), pp. 1 and 148–9; Gane (2006), pp.
590–1; Junge (2001), pp. 108–9 and 117; Kelemen and Peltonen (2001), pp. 151 and
161–4; Margolis (2007 [1986]); Paulus (2001), pp. 731–2; Peat (2007), pp. 920–9; Torfing
(1999), pp. 274–80 and 286–8.
21. Alexander (1992), p. 340.
22. Lyotard (1984 [1979]), pp. xxiii and xxiv (italics in original).
23. On the postmodern ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’, see, for example: Benhabib (1990),
pp. 107–30; Benhabib (1993), pp. 103–27; Boisvert (1996), p. 47; Browning (2003),
pp. 223–39; Butler (2002), pp. 13–14; Clark (2006), pp. 391–405; Coole (1998b), pp. 107–25;
Fraser and Nicholson (1994 [1988]), pp. 244–7; Friedrich (2012), pp. 31–78; Haber
(1994), pp. 113–34; Hutcheon (2002), p. 204; Kellner (2007), 102–26; Kumar (1995),
pp. 131–7; Lyotard (1984 [1979]); Nola and Irzik (2003), pp. 391–421; Patton (2004),
pp. 11874–5; Pefanis (1991); Petit (2005), pp. 22–3 and 32; Pieters (2000), pp. 21–38;
Raese (2011), pp. 169–73; Rojek and Turner (1998a), esp. introduction; Rorty (1985),
pp. 161–75; Rouse (1991), pp. 141–62; Sim (2002), pp. 6, 27, 31, 151–3; Smart (1992),
pp. 169–76; Smith (2006); Thompson (1993), pp. 325–38; Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 49–64;
Wilterdink (2002), pp. 197 and 214; Zagorin (1999), pp. 1–24.
24. See Chapter 5.
25. On this point, see Susen (2010b), esp. pp. 268–74.
26. On this point, see Young (1990a), esp. pp. 98–9.
27. On this point, see Beilharz (2000), p. 107.
28. Rorty (2009 [1979]), pp. 68–9. On this point, see also Alexander (1992), p. 341.
29. Bauman (1991), pp. 254–5.
30. Ibid., p. 235 (quoting Edmond Jabès). Cf. Jabès (1989), pp. 112–15.
31. On the epistemological tension between universality and particularity (especially in terms
of the opposition between universalism and contextualism), see, for example: Benhabib
(1990), pp. 107–30; Benhabib (1993), pp. 103–27; Boisvert (1996), p. 47; Browning
(2003), pp. 223–39; Butler (2002), pp. 13–14; Clark (2006), pp. 391–405; Coole
(1998b), pp. 107–25; Delanty (2000b), p. 142; Elliott (2000), p. 338; Fraser and
Nicholson (1994 [1988]), pp. 244–7; Friedrich (2012), pp. 31–78; Gellner (1982),
pp. 181–200; Haber (1994), pp. 113–34; Hacking (1982), pp. 48–66; Hollis and Lukes (1982);
Hutcheon (2002), p. 204; Jullien (2014 [2008]); Kellner (2007), 102–26; Kumar (1995),
pp. 131–7; Laclau (2007), pp. 203–6; Laudan (1990), esp. pp. 121–45; Lukes (1982),
pp. 261–305; Lyotard (1984 [1979]); Margolis (2007 [1986]); Nola and Irzik (2003),
pp. 391–421; Norris (1997); Patton (2004), pp. 11874–5;  Pefanis (1991); Petit (2005),
pp. 22–3 and 32; Pieters (2000), pp. 21–38; Raese (2011), pp. 169–73; Rojek and Turner
(1998a), esp. introduction; Rorty (1985), pp. 161–75; Rorty (1991b); Rorty (1997a),
pp. 173–7; Rossi-Landi (1974 [1972]); Rouse (1991), pp. 141–62; Schroeder (1997),
pp. 124–37; Sim (2002), pp. 6, 27, 31, 151–3; Smart (1992), pp. 169–76; Smith (2006);
Thompson (1993), pp. 325–38; Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 49–64; Wilterdink (2002), pp. 197
and 214; Zagorin (1999), pp. 1–24.
32. On the ‘Methodenstreit’, see, for instance: Lachenmann (1995); McCarthy (2001);
Neemann (1993/1994).
33. On the distinction between ‘the paradigm of explanation’ (Erklären) and ‘the paradigm
of understanding’ (Verstehen), see, for instance: Apel (1971a, 1979); Bourdieu (1993);
Delanty (1997); Delanty and Strydom (2003); Dilthey (1883); Habermas (1970);
Outhwaite (1986 [1975], 1987a, 1998, 2000); Susen (2011e, 2011a).
292 Notes

34. For excellent overviews of postmodern approaches to, and attacks on, positivist accounts
of scientific knowledge, see, for instance: Alexander (1992), pp. 322–68; Boron (1999),
pp. 57–8 and 61; Lehman (2011), p. 795; Mcevoy (2007a), pp. 384–95.
35. For useful and critical accounts of positivist accounts of scientific knowledge, see, for instance:
Ayer (1946 [1936], 1956); Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), pp. 288 and 295; Beck and
Lau (2005), pp. 527–8 and 537; Benton and Craib (2001), pp. 13–49; Bernstein (1983),
p.  198; Best and Kellner (2001), pp. 103–4 and 108–10; Butler (2002), p. 32; Delanty
(2000b), p. 15; Durkheim (1982 [1895]); Factor and Turner (1977), pp. 185–206; Fishman
(1995), pp. 301–2; Giddens (1990), pp. 15–16; Habermas (1987 [1968]), pp. 65–9; Hempel
(1966); Keat (1971, 1981); Keat and Urry (1982 [1975]); Kellner (2007), pp. 102, 109;
Laudan (1990), pp. 131–40; Latour (1993 [1991]), p. 36; Mouzelis (2008), pp. 175–90;
Newton-Smith (1981); Outhwaite (1987a), pp. 5–18; Outhwaite (1996), pp. 47–70; Peat
(2007), p. 920; Petit (2005), pp. 22–3; Seidman (1994b), p. 7; Sokal and Bricmont (1998),
pp. 63–8; Stockman (1983); Susen (2011e), pp. 69–82; Szahaj (1995), p. 559; Thompson
(1993), p. 330; van Reijen (2000), p. 226; Wellmer (1969); Weyembergh (1995), p. 575.
36. On the ‘demarcation problem’, see, for instance: Lakatos, Feyerabend, and Motterlini
(1999); Laudan (1983); Lloyd (1983); Resnik (2000).
37. On this point, see Susen (2011a), p. 451.
38. On the Weberian distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’, see, for example: Beckermann
(1985); Bhaskar (1998); Føllesdal (1985); Weber (1978 [1922]), pp. 24–6, 33, 36, 37, 41,
and 217; Weber (1991 [1948]), pp. 145, 148, 150, 152–3, 243, 245, 247, and 267; Weiß
(1985). See also, for instance: Boltanski (2009), p. 19; Susen (2012b), pp. 694–5.
39. On the concept of rationality, see, for instance: Altvater (1994); Apel (1979); Beckermann
(1985); Beer (1999); Bhaskar (1998); Bruce (1999); Celikates (2009); Cooke (1994, 2000);
Dupuy and Livet (1997); Føllesdal (1985); Freundlieb and Hudson (1993); Gane (2002,
2006); Habermas (1970, 1971 [1968/1969], 1986, 1987 [1968], 1987a [1981], 1987b
[1981], 1987a [1985], 1996 [1981], 1996a [1992], 2001, 2002 [1981, 1991, 1997], 2008
[2005], 2010 [2008]); Habermas and Ratzinger (2006 [2005]); Hacking (1982); Heath
(2001); Hollis and Lukes (1982); Koshul (2005); Locke (2001); Lukes (1982); Müller-
Doohm (2000); Newton-Smith (1981); Outhwaite (1986 [1975], 1987a, 1987b, 1996,
2000); Pellizzoni (2001); Rorty (1998b); Reynaud (1997); Schrag (1989); Stockman
(1983); Susen (2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2010c, 2011e, 2011a, 2011d, 2013e, 2013f);
Thompson (1983); Weber (1980 [1922], 1978 [1922]); Weiß (1985); Wellmer (1985);
Weyembergh (1995); Wilson (1970).
40. On these points, see, for example: Susen (2013e), p. 224; Susen (2012b), pp. 714–15.
41. See, for instance, Popper (1966 [1934], 2002 [1959/1934]).
42. On this point, see, for example, Susen (2010c), p. 117. On the place of religion in con-
temporary social and political thought, see, for instance: Berry and Wernick (1992); Berry
(1992); Clicqué (2005); Furseth (2009); Gellner (1992); Habermas (2002 [1981, 1991,
1997], 2008 [2005], 2010 [2008]); Habermas and Ratzinger (2006 [2005]); Heelas (1998);
Heelas and Martin (1998); Hoogheem (2010); King (1998a, 1998b); Milbank (1992);
Mohamed (2011); Molendijk, Beaumont, and Jedan (2010); Nemoianu (2010); Nynäs,
Lassander and Utriainen (2012); Plüss (2007); Raschke (1992); Rubinstein (2009); Smith
and Whistler (2011); Smith (2006); Taylor (1992); Turner (2011, 2013b); Vries and
Sullivan (2006); Ward (1998); Weber (2001/1930 [1904–05]).
43. On critiques of ethnocentrism in general and Eurocentrism in particular, see, for example:
Bhambra (2007); Brantlinger (2011); Buzan, Held and McGrew (1998), p. 391; Carp
(2010); Cornis-Pope (2012); Delanty (2000b), pp. 154–5; Doja (2006), pp. 157, 159,
165–6, and 177–9; Eadie (2001), pp. 577 and 580; Evans (1997a), pp. 231–4 and 241;
Hutcheon (2002), pp. 199–205; Krishna (2007), pp. 814–15; Laclau (2007), p. 203; Lyon
(1999 [1994]), pp. 99–103; Outhwaite (2014), p. 524; Paulus (2001), p. 733; Spiegel
(2007), p. 17; Zagorin (1999), p. 22.
44. On this point, see Susen (2007), pp. 164–5, and Susen (2013e), p. 224.
45. On this point, see Susen (2007), pp. 118–25.
 Notes 293

46. On this point, see Susen (2012a), pp. 324–5 n. 165.

47. On this point, see Susen (2007), pp. 118–21.
48. On this point, see ibid., pp. 118–21, 161–2, 181–2, and 256.
49. Cf. Bourdieu (2002); Nagl and Mouffe (2001); Pleasants (1999); Schatzki (1996);
Wittgenstein (1982 [1953]).
50. On this point, see Susen (2007), pp. 135–7, 204–6, and 221–6. See also, for instance: Susen
(2011e), pp. 72–82; Susen (2012b), pp. 713–15; Susen (2013e), pp. 205–6 and 223–4.

2 From Modern to Postmodern Methodology?

The ‘Interpretive Turn’
1. On the impact of postmodern thought on social research methods, see, for instance: Ashley
(1994); Bartsch, DiPalma, and Sells (2001); Denzin (1994); Dickens and Fontana (1994a,
1994b); Fielding (2009); Fishman (1995); Katovich and Reese II (1993); MacLure (2006);
Patton (2004); Scheurich (1997); Schwandt (1994); Seibold (2000); Simons and Billig
(1994); Somerville (2007); Stronach (1997); Tierney (1996, 1999); Urrutia Elejalde (2012).
2. There is a vast amount of literature on discourse analysis. See, for example: Alcorn (1994);
Bracher et al. (1994); Brown (1995); Brown and Yule (1983); Chiapello and Fairclough
(2002); Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999); Fairclough (1995, 2002); Fairclough and
Wodak (1997); Fendler and Tuckey (2006); Fillmore (1985); Howarth (1995); Janich
(2006); Kasher (1985); Lee (1992); Macdonell (1986); Rajagopalan (1999); Rossi-Landi
(1974 [1972]); Schiffrin (1994); Stead and Bakker (2010); Torfing (1999); van Dijk
(1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1985d, 1997c, 1997b, 1997a, 1998).
3. For useful discussions of the concept of the public sphere, see, for instance: Calhoun (1992);
Fraser (2007a); Geuss (2001); Habermas (1989 [1962]); Kögler (2005); Nash (2014a);
Rabotnikof (1998); Steinberger (1999); Susen (2011d); Volkmer (2014); Weintraub and
Kumar (1997).
4. On the ‘interpretive turn’ in social research methodology, see, for example: Apel (1971a,
1979); Bourdieu (1993); Delanty (1997); Delanty and Strydom (2003); Dilthey (1883);
Garrick (1999); Habermas (1970); Hiley, Bohman, and Shusterman (1991); Iggers (2005
[1997]); Lehman (2011); Maffesoli (1996 [1985]); Outhwaite (1986 [1975], 1987a, 1998,
2000); Susen and Turner (2011d).
5. On the idea of discourse analysis as ‘a new discipline’, see, for example: Kasher (1985),
p. 231; van Dijk (1985c), p. 4; van Dijk (1985d), p. 1: ‘One of the prevailing features of
this new discipline of discourse analysis appears to be the explicit account of the fact
that discourse structures, at several levels, may have multiple links with the context of
communication and interaction.’
6. Van Dijk (1997a), p. 1 (italics added).
7. Ibid., p. 2 (italics in original).
8. See ibid.
9. On this point, see Susen (2011e), pp. 62–4 and 79–80, and Susen (2013f), pp. 352–3.
10. Fairclough (1995), pp. 189–90 (italics added) (‘social-scientific’ appears without the
hyphen in the original version).
11. See, for instance, Grondin (1994).
12. See, for instance, Chelstrom (2013).
13. See, for instance, Roberts (2006).
14. On the distinction between ‘the paradigm of explanation’ (Erklären) and ‘the paradigm
of understanding’ (Verstehen), see, for instance: Apel (1971a, 1979); Bourdieu (1993);
Delanty (1997); Delanty and Strydom (2003); Dilthey (1883); Habermas (1970);
Outhwaite (1986 [1975], 1987a, 1998, 2000); Susen (2011e, 2011a); Susen (2012b),
pp. 693–6. See also Susen (2013f), p. 326.
15. On this view, see, for example: Bernstein (1983); Boghossian (2006); Dickens and
Fontana (1994a); Gellner (1982); Hacking (1982); Haddock (2004); Hollis and Lukes
294 Notes

(1982); Laudan (1990); Lukes (1982); Margolis (2007 [1986]); Norris (1997); Rorty
(1991b, 1997a); Rossi-Landi (1974 [1972]); Schroeder (1997).
16. See Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), p. 1.
17. Denzin (1994), p. 185.
18. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), p. 16.
19. Cf. ibid., p. 1.
20. Ibid., p. 31.
21. Fairclough and Wodak (1997), p. 258 (italics added).
22. As stated above, most discourse theories emphasize that they are concerned with a ‘dia-
lectical’ and ‘relational’ analysis of the relationship between discourse and society. Regarding
this point, consider the following statements: Alcorn (1994), p. 27: ‘The subject oper-
ates upon discourse, and discourse operates the subject.’ (This contention refers to a
Lacanian view of discourse. It illustrates that a dialectical view of discourse is widespread
in the literature.) Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), p. 17: ‘the dialectic of the semiotic
and the social’. See also ibid., p. 30: critical discourse analysis ‘by contrast develops a
theoretical practice which is simultaneously oriented to the analysis of communicative
events (a hermeneutic task of interpretation) and the analysis of their structural condi-
tions of possibility and structural effects.’ See also ibid., p. 31: ‘What is specific about
critical theoretical practice is that (a) it maintains a weak boundary between theoretical
practice and the social practices it theorises, and (b) it applies a relational/dialectical
analytical logic to the practices it theorises.’ See also ibid., p. 32: ‘The recontextualiza-
tion of social practices with a critical theoretical practice entails applying to them both
a relational logic, and a dialectical logic.’ See also ibid., p. 126: ‘We therefore believe that
there is a need for two distinctions […]: structures versus what we call “conjunctures”
(the domain of the contingent), and a discourse (meaning semiosis) versus other ele-
ments of the social such as physical actions.’ Denzin (1994), pp. 196–7: ‘deconstruction
is an effort to penetrate the world of lived experience where cultural texts circulate
and give meaning to everyday life. […] Our problem is working from text to experi-
ence.’ Fairclough (1995), p. 73: ‘Also inherent to discourse is the dialectical relation of
structure/event […]: discourse is shaped by structures, but also contributes to shaping
and reshaping them, to reproducing and transforming them. […] The relationship of
discourse to such extra-discoursal structures and relations is not just representational
but constitutive: ideology has material effects, discourse contributes to the creation
and constant recreation of the relations, subjects […] and objects which populate the
social world.’ (On this point, see also ibid., pp. 209–13.) Fillmore (1985), p. 11: ‘The
organization of users’ knowledge of their language can be seen as having intertextual,
intratextual, and extratextual dimensions.’ In this sense, the notion of ‘the extratextual’
reflects the profoundly social nature of language in general and of discourse in particu-
lar. The dialectical relationship between ‘the textual’ and ‘the social’ is an ontological
precondition for the very possibility of discursive formations. Howarth (1995), p. 119:
‘The social meaning of words, speeches, actions and institutions are all understood in
relation to the overall context of which they form a part. Each meaning is understood
in relation to the overall practice which is taking place, and each practice in relation
to a particular discourse.’ (In this passage, Howarth is referring to Mouffe and Laclau’s
neo-Marxist conception of ‘discourse’.) Macdonell (1986), p. 2: ‘discourses are set up
historically and socially’. Van Dijk (1985d), p. 1: ‘Discourse analysis, thus, is essentially a
contribution to the study of language “in use”. Besides – or even instead – of an explica-
tion of the abstract structures of texts or conversations, we witness a concerted interest
for the cognitive and especially the social processes, strategies, and contextualization
of discourse taken as a mode of interaction in highly complex sociocultural situations.
[… T]he social role of discourse analysis as a discipline’.
23. From a postmodern perspective, classical social theorists can be accused of committing
this methodological fallacy. Regardless of the question of whether ‘the rationalization
of a disenchanted world’ (Weber), ‘the organic solidarity of industrialism’ (Durkheim),
 Notes 295

or ‘the productive forces of capitalism’ (Marx) are considered to be the main features
underlying the modern condition, the writings of classical social theorists offer ‘big
stories’ based on ‘grand theories’ of society.
24. On the concept of ideology, see, for instance: Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980, 1990);
Apel (1971a, 1971b); Arnason (2000); Bohman (1986); Boltanski (2008); Bourdieu and
Boltanski (2008 [1976]); Chiapello and Fairclough (2002); Conde-Costas (1991); Disco
(1979); Eagleton (2006 [1976], 2007 [1991]); Gadamer (1971); Habermas (1971 [1968]);
Hartmann (1970); Honneth (2007); Jakubowski (1990 [1976]); Larrain (1991b [1983]);
Lee (1992); Marx and Engels (1953 [1845–47], 2000/1977 [1846]); Mongardini (1992);
Overend (1978); Quiniou (1996); Rehmann (2004); Reitz (2004); Simons and Billig
(1994); Thompson (1984, 1990); van Dijk (1998); Wacquant (2002 [1993]); Weber
(1995); Wolff (2004); Žižek (1989, 1994).
25. On the concept of false consciousness, see, for example: Corallo (1982); Dannemann
(2008); Haug (1999); Larrain (1991b [1983]).
26. On this account, in class societies, the ruling ideas express the interests of the ruling class and,
hence, constitute a form of ‘false consciousness’ created to conceal the underlying structures of
class antagonism. On this point, see Marx and Engels (2000/1977 [1846]), p. 180: ‘in all
ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura’. See also
Giddens (1996 [1971]), p. 42. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to examine simplistic
conceptions of ideology. Against determinist readings of Marx’s account of ideology, see, for
example, Hartmann (1970), esp. pp. 193–205. See also Conde-Costas (1991).
27. For excellent discussions of the Marxist distinction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’, see,
for instance: de Lara (1982); Hall (1977); Labica (1982); Larrain (1991a [1983]); Weber
(1995).
28. On the concept of ideology critique, see, for example: Apel (1971a); Reitz (2004); Simons
and Billig (1994).
29. To be sure, this definition is based on a Foucauldian conception of ‘discourse’. Yet, most
contemporary theories of discourse (including non-Foucauldian versions) are suspicious
of orthodox conceptions of ideology critique.
30. On poststructuralist accounts of discourse, see, for instance: Brown (1994b), pp. 229 and
238–9; Butler (2002), pp. 44–61; Fielding (2009), 428, 430–5, and 442–3; Fishman (1995),
pp. 303 and 308; Fox (2003), pp. 81–8; Gane and Gane (2007), p. 135; Hawkesworth
(1999), pp. 148–51; MacLure (2006), pp. 223–4 and 235; Mouffe (1996); Patton (2004),
p. 11874; Slott (2002), pp. 414–23; Somerville (2007), pp. 225–6, 236, and 239–40; Stead
and Bakker (2010), pp. 48–9; Torfing (1999), esp. pp. 1–8, 84–100, and 290–2.
31. For an excellent overview of the historical context in which poststructuralist theories of dis-
course began to emerge, see Torfing (1999), pp. 1–8. See also, for instance, Lash (1991) and
Peters (1999).
32. On this point, see Susen (2012a), pp. 287–91.
33. On the idea of ‘open Marxism’, see, for instance: Bonefeld, Gunn, and Psychopedis (1991,
1992); Bonefeld et al. (1995); Browne and Susen (2014), esp. pp. 224–9; Holloway (2005
[2002], 2010); Holloway and Susen (2013), pp. 31–2 and 36; Susen (2012a), esp. pp. 283–91.
34. Mouffe (1993), p. 6.
35. Torfing (1999), p. 6.
36. Ibid., p. 6.
37. Ibid., pp. 6–7 (italics added).
38. Ibid., p. 7.
39. Ibid., p. 7.
40. Ibid., p. 7.
41. Ibid., p. 7. On this point, see Browne and Susen (2014), pp. 224–8.
42. Torfing (1999), p. 7 (italics added).
43. For excellent discussions of direct and deliberative models of democracy, see, for example:
Cooke (2000); Eriksen and Weigård (2003); Festenstein (2004); Habermas (1996b
[1992]); Habermas (2005); Pellizzoni (2001); Young (1997b).
296 Notes

44. See, for example: Butler, Laclau, and Zižek (2000); Laclau (1989, 1992, 1996, 2007);
Mouffe (1993); Torfing (1999).
45. On this point, see the Introduction. See also Wilterdink (2002), esp. p. 192.
46. Torfing (1999), p. 7 (italics added).
47. Ibid., p. 7 (italics added).
48. Ibid., p. 7 (italics added).
49. Ibid., p. 8.
50. Ibid., p. 8 (italics added).
51. Ibid., p. 8.
52. Ibid., p. 85 (italics added).
53. Ibid., p. 84 (italics in original). On this point, see Laclau (1993), p. 431.
54. Torfing (1999), p. 84 (italics in original).
55. Ibid., p. 84 (italics in original).
56. Ibid., p. 84 (italics added).
57. Ibid., p. 84 (italics in original).
58. Ibid., p. 84 (italics in original).
59. Ibid., pp. 84–5 (italics added).
60. Ibid., p. 86.
61. Ibid., p. 85.
62. Ibid., p. 85.
63. Ibid., p. 86 (italics added).
64. Ibid., p. 86.
65. Derrida (1976 [1967]), p. 15 (italics added; except for ‘construction’, which is italicized
in the original version). On this point, see Torfing (1999), p. 85.
66. Torfing (1999), p. 85.
67. Ibid., p. 86.
68. Ibid., p. 86.
69. Ibid., p. 87 (italics in original). On this point, see also de Saussure (1978 [1916]), p. 120.
70. Torfing (1999), p. 87 (italics added).
71. On this point, see, for example, Jenks (1998).
72. Torfing (1999), p. 87 (italics in original). On this point, see also de Saussure (1978
[1916]), p. 113.
73. Torfing (1999), p. 87.
74. Ibid., p. 87.
75. Ibid., p. 90 (italics in original). On this point, see Laclau and Mouffe (2001 [1985]),
pp. 105–14, esp. p. 107.
76. Torfing (1999), p. 91 (italics in original).
77. Ibid., p. 92.
78. Ibid., p. 92 (italics added).
79. Laclau and Mouffe (1987), p. 86. On this point, see also Torfing (1999), p. 92.
80. Torfing (1999), p. 93 (italics added).
81. Ibid., p. 92.
82. Ibid., p. 92 (italics removed from ‘surplus of meaning’).

3 From Modern to Postmodern Sociology? The ‘Cultural Turn’

1. On the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology (and on the emphasis on ‘the cultural’ in contempor-
ary sociological analysis), see, for example: Bauman (1999 [1973]); Bell (1991 [1976]);
Bonnell and Hunt (1999); Bonnell, Hunt, and Biernacki (1999); Bouchet (1994); Butler
(1998); Duvall (2002a); Eickelpasch (1997); Featherstone (2007 [1991]); Foster (1985
[1983]); Franklin, Lury, and Stacey (2000); Gillison (2010); Harvey (1989); Hassan
(1987); Hoogheem (2010); Huyssen and Scherpe (1993); Jacob (1999); Jameson (1991,
1998); Kellner (1997); Lash and Lury (2007); McGuigan (2006 [1999]); McMahon (1999);
Morawski (1996); Nemoianu (2010); Polan (1988); Rademacher and Schweppenhäuser
 Notes 297

(1997); Ramazanoglu (1997); Rojek and Turner (2000); Sarup (1996); Sewell (1999); Sim
(2002);  Smith Maguire and Matthews (2014); Solomon (1998);  Toews (2003);  Vattimo
(1988 [1985]); Wernick (2000).
2. On the ‘crisis’ rhetoric in contemporary social thought, see, for instance: Agger (2002),
p. 192; Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), pp. 248–9; Bauman (1994 [1988]), pp. 189–95;
Beck and Lau (2005), p. 526; Butler (2002), p. 13; Delanty (2000b), pp. 8, 19–21, and
146; Dolgon (1999), p. 130; Featherstone and Lash (1995), p. 1; Fforde (2009) (see title);
Hammond (2011), p. 310; Kellner (2007), p. 104; Kumar (1995), p. 141; Mulinari and
Sandell (2009), p. 495; Patton (2004), p. 11874; Ruby (1990) (see ‘Première Partie: La
société contemporaine en crise’); Sim (2002) (see title); Smart (1993), p. 20; Somerville
(2007), p. 226; Torfing (1999), pp. 1–2, 6, and 57–61; Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 106 and 220;
Wilterdink (2002), pp. 206–7.
3. On the ‘death’ rhetoric in postmodern thought, see, for example: Agger (2002), pp. 195–7;
Bogard (1987), p. 208; Butler (2002), pp. 23–4; Cooper (1998), pp. 61–3; Delanty
(2000b), p. 56; Gane and Gane (2007), pp. 128–31; Good and Velody (1998b), pp. 1–9;
Jameson (2007), pp. 214–15; Kellner (1989b), p. 85; Kumar (1995), p. 129; Latour (1993
[1991]), p. 13; Rose (1991), p. 71; Sim (2002), p. 7; Susen (2013b), p. 83; Torfing (1999),
pp. 55–6; Turner (1996), p. 5; Vattimo (2007), pp. 32–8; Wernick (2000), pp. 67–8.
4. On this point, see, for instance, Bauman (1994 [1988]) and Stones (1996).
5. Giddens (1990), p. 13.
6. In opposition to this view, see, for instance, Susen and Turner (2011b). See also
Outhwaite (2009).
7. On the concept of postindustrial society, see, for instance: Bell (1973); Kumar (1978, 1995);
Lee and Turner (1996); Rose (1991).
8. Cf. Bell (1973).
9. See Zima (1997), pp. 67–8.
10. It is striking that the historical relationship between the ‘postmodern condition’ and the
‘postindustrial age’ is emphasized in various contemporary sociological accounts. See, for
example: Bertens (1995), p. 220; Boyne and Rattansi (1990b), p. 18; Gibbins and Reimer
(1999), pp. 22–34.
11. Mongardini (1992), p. 63.
12. Kumar (1995), p. 113 (italics added).
13. Lyotard (1984 [1979]), p. 3 (italics added).
14. Passerin d’Entrèves (1996b), p. 3 (italics in original) (the words ‘societal’ and ‘cultural’
are italicized in the original version).
15. Ibid., p. 3.
16. Calhoun (1995b), p. 102.
17. On this point, see, for instance: Bauman (2005); Bouchet (1994); Cova and Svanfeldt
(1993); Davis (2008); Duvall (2002a); Featherstone (2007 [1991]); Firat and Venkatesh
(1993); Jagger (2001, 2005); Jameson (1988); Lash and Lury (2007); Lury (2004); Urry
(1995); van Raaij (1993); Woodward, Emmison, and Smith (2000).
18. Calhoun (1995b), pp. 102–3 (italics added).
19. On the Baudrillardian concept of hyperreality, see, for instance: Boron (1999), p. 54;
Clayton (2002), p. 840; Farrell (1994), pp. 245–6; Firat and Venkatesh (1993),
pp. 229–31; Harvey (1989), p. 288; Horrocks (1999), pp. 5–6, 10, 41, 54, and 62; Kellner
(1989b); Mohren (2008); Nel (1999), p. 741; Newman and Johnson (1999), pp. 80–2;
Norris (1989); Patton (2004), p. 11872; Pefanis (1991); Rojek and Turner (1993); Ruby
(1990), p. 32; Sarup (1996), pp. 108–17; Smart (1993), p. 51–62; van Raaij (1993),
pp. 549–51; Wernick (2000), pp. 55–75.
20. Kellner (1989b), p. 85 (italics added).
21. On this point, see, for instance, Wernick (2000).
22. Bogard (1987), p. 208 (italics added). On this point, see also Dickens and Fontana
(1994b), p. 2.
23. On the announcement of ‘the end of “the social”’, see, for instance: Bogard (1987), p. 208;
Butler (2002), p. 31; Delanty (2000b), p. 137; Kellner (1989b), p. 85; Smart (1993),
pp. 51–62; Toews (2003); Wernick (2000).
298 Notes

24. See previous note.

25. On this view, see Seidman (1994c).
26. See n. 23.
27. Denzin (1994), p. 187 (italics added).
28. See n. 2.
29. See n. 2.
30. See, for example: Bertens (1995), p. 234; Boyne and Rattansi (1990b), p. 57; Calhoun
(1995b), p. 107; Clark and Lipset (1996), p. 69; Delanty (1999), pp. 3–7; Dickens and
Fontana (1994a), pp. 11, 70, and 187; Featherstone (1988), p. 201; Heller and Fâehâer
(1988), p. 5; Kellner (1989b), pp. 61, 64, and 84–7; Kumar (1995), p. 137; Smart (1996),
pp. 459–61; Turner (1996), p. 5; von Beyme (1991), p. 180; Wagner (1992), p. 478.
31. For excellent discussions of the Marxist distinction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’, see,
for instance: de Lara (1982); Hall (1977); Labica (1982); Larrain (1991a [1983]); Weber
(1995) (already referred to above).
32. On core sociological dichotomies, see, for example, Jenks (1998).
33. See n. 2.
34. Kumar (1995), p. 115 (italics added).
35. Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
36. Ibid., p. 119.
37. See n. 2.
38. See n. 23.
39. See n. 2.
40. See n. 2.
41. On the interest in the role of ‘the cultural’ in the contemporary social sciences, see, for exam-
ple: Agger (2002), pp. vii, 149–52, 164–70, 192, and 195; Anderson (1998), esp. foreword;
Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), pp. 82–86; Bauman (1999 [1973]), esp. pp. ix–xiii;
Bauman and Tester (2007), pp. 22–3; Bonnell and Hunt (1999); Bonnell, Hunt, and
Biernacki (1999); Bouchet (1994), pp. 410–13; Butler (2002), p. 116; Carmichael (2002),
pp. 23–9 and 33–7; Delanty (2000b), pp. 143–53; Duvall (2002b), pp. 1–9; Eagleton
(1995); Eickelpasch (1997); Evans (1997a), p. 241; Evans (2002), pp. 80–1; Farrell (1994),
pp. 245–50; Foster (1985 [1983]); Franklin, Lury, and Stacey (2000); Gillison (2010), pp.
243–63; Halttunen (1999); Huyssen and Scherpe (1993); Jacob (1999); Jameson (1991),
esp. pp. ix–xxii, 1–54, 55–6, and 297–418; Jameson (1998), esp. pp. 1–20, 33–49, 50–72,
and 73–92; Joyce (2010), pp. 215–16 and 220–7; Kellner (1997), pp. 153–4; Kumar
(1995), esp. pp. 101–48; Lash and Lury (2007); Lichtblau (1999), pp. 1–2, 8, 15–16, and
20; Lury (2004); Mulhern (2006 [1997]); Rademacher and Schweppenhäuser (1997);
Schweppenhäuser (1997); Sewell (1999); Smart (1993), esp. pp. 17–18; Squires (1998),
pp. 126–35 and 144–5; Susen (2011b); Susen (2013b), pp. 92–3; Taylor and Trentmann
(2011), p. 202; Tierney (1996), pp. 372–4; Turner and Rojek (2001); Wernick (2000), pp.
67–8.
42. See, for example, Lévi-Strauss (1968 [1949], 1955).
43. Gillison (2010), p. 253.
44. Tierney (1996), p. 372.
45. Ibid., p. 374.
46. Bouchet (1994), p. 413 (italics added).
47. Jameson (1991), p. ix.
48. Bauman (1999 [1973]), p. x.
49. Ibid., p. x.
50. On the distinction between ‘the natural sciences’ and ‘the social or cultural sciences’, see, for
instance: Apel (1971a, 1979); Bourdieu (1993); Delanty (1997); Delanty and Strydom
(2003); Dilthey (1883); Habermas (1970); Lachenmann (1995); McCarthy (2001);
Neemann (1993/1994); Outhwaite (1986 [1975], 1987a, 1998, 2000); Susen (2011e,
2011a).
51. Bauman (1999 [1973]), p. x (italics added).
 Notes 299

52. Ibid., p. x (italics added).

53. Ibid., p. x (italics added).
54. Ibid., p. x (italics added).
55. Ibid., p. xi.
56. Ibid., p. xi.
57. On this point, see Eickelpasch (1997), pp. 12–13.
58. On the ‘crisis of representation’, see, for instance: Agger (2002), p. 192; Elliott (2002),
p. 310; Smart (1993), pp. 17 and 20; Somerville (2007), p. 226; Vakaloulis (2001), p. 220.
59. Agger (2002), p. 192.
60. Ibid., p. 192.
61. Ibid., p. 170.
62. Bauman (1999 [1973]), p. ix.
63. On this point, see, for example, Farrell (1994), p. 249.
64. On correspondence theories of truth, see, for example: Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]),
pp. 288–301; Baert and da Silva (2013); Bentley (1999), pp. 140–3; Benton and Craib (2001),
pp. 161–2; Best and Kellner (2001), p. 103; Boghossian (2006), p. 29; Boron (1999),
pp. 53–4; Butler (2002), pp. 16–17; Ermarth (2004), pp. 71–3; Fox (2003), pp. 84–5;
Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 118; Kumar (1995), p. 103; Mcevoy (2007b), p. 400; Mouzelis
(2008), pp. 178–83; Nola and Irzik (2003), p. 396; Patton (2004), p. 11874; Pile and
Thrift (1995b), pp. 48–50; Seidman (1994c), p. 125; Seidman (1994b), pp. 6–7; Singh
(1997), p. x; Smith (2006), p. 34; Somerville (2007), p. 226; Stead and Bakker (2010),
p. 48; Susen (2007), pp. 75–85, 140, 210, 257, and 283–87; Susen (2011e), pp. 77–8;
Susen (2012b), p. 698; Susen (2013e), pp. 206, 211, 212, 216, 224, and 226; Susen
(2013f), p. 368; Susen (2013b), pp. 90–2; Szahaj (1995), p. 560; Thompson (2000),
pp. 102 and 180; Weyembergh (1995), p. 575; Wood (2006 [1997]), p. 5.
65. Bauman and Tester (2007), p. 23.
66. Bauman (1999 [1973]), p. xiii.
67. On this point, see, for instance, Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), pp. 82–6. See also, for
example: Alexander (1996, 2003); Alexander, Giesen, and Mast (2006).
68. Alexander (2003), p. 7.
69. Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 84 (italics added).
70. Ibid., p. 84.
71. Ibid., p. 84.
72. Ibid., p. 84.
73. Ibid., p. 84.
74. Ibid., p. 85.
75. Ibid., p. 85.
76. Eickelpasch (1997), p. 11 (my translation); original text in German: ‘einen grundle-
genden Paradigmenwechsel sozialwissenschaftlicher Analysen’.
77. Ibid., p. 11 (italics added; except for ‘culturalization of our conception of society’, which
is italicized in the original version) (my translation); original text in German: ‘Nicht
die soziale Bedingtheit der Kultur […] darf künftig im Vordergrund stehen, sondern die
“kulturelle Bedingtheit des sozialen Geschehens”. Angestrebt wird eine Kulturalisierung
der Gesellschaftsauffassung’ (italics in original).
78. Joyce (2010), p. 225.
79. Ibid., p. 220.
80. Ibid., p. 221.
81. On this point, see ibid., pp. 220–1 and 225–7.
82. See Jameson (1984, 1991).
83. Eagleton (1995), p. 67.
84. Delanty (2000b), p. 143 (italics added).
85. Jameson (1998), p. 73.
86. Ibid., p. 73 (in the original version, ‘commodity-oriented’ appears without the hyphen).
87. Susen (2011b), p. 198 (italics in original). On this point, see also Jameson (1998), p. 73.
300 Notes

88. Kumar (1995), p. 119. See also ibid., p. 116.

89. On this point, see Jameson (1998), p. 73.
90. Kumar (1995), p. 115.
91. See Lash and Lury (2007). On this point, see also, for instance: Franklin, Lury, and
Stacey (2000); Lury (2004).
92. Kellner (1997), p. 153.
93. On this point, see Delanty (2000b), pp. 143–4.
94. Kumar (1995), p. 124 (italics in original).
95. Ibid., p. 124. On this point, see also Walmsley (2000), pp. 9–13, and Urry (1995), p. 177.
96. See Agger (2002), pp. 164–5. See also Orgad (2012).
97. Negroponte (1995), p. 6. See also Agger (2002), p. 164.
98. Agger (2002), p. 152.
99. Walmsley (2000), p. 7.
100. Ibid., p. 5.
101. Ibid., p. 7.
102. Ibid., p. 8.
103. Jameson (1991), p. 12.
104. See ibid., p. 12.
105. Ibid., p. 12.
106. Ibid., p. 12.
107. See ibid., p. 12.
108. See, for instance: Susen (2007, 2011b, 2011c, 2011e, 2013a; 2013d, 2013e, 2013f);
Susen and Turner (2011a, 2011d).
109. See Marx (2000/1977 [1859]).
110. For excellent discussions of the Marxist distinction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’, see,
for instance: de Lara (1982); Hall (1977); Labica (1982); Larrain (1991a [1983]a); Weber
(1995).
111. While the labels ‘cultural Marxist’, ‘soft Marxist’, and ‘disco Marxist’ are controversial,
the following names are, rightly or wrongly, associated with this – arguably postmodern –
‘intellectual brand’: Anderson, Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Harvey, Heller, Jameson,
Kellner, Laclau, Massey, Mouffe, Vattimo, Žižek.
112. On this point, see, for example: Carmichael (2002); Eagleton (1995); Eagleton (2006
[1976]); Eickelpasch (1997).
113. On this point, see, for example, Adorno (1997 [1970]).
114. Lichtblau (1999), p. 15.
115. See ibid., esp. pp. 19–20.
116. Lichtblau (1999), p. 20 (italics added).
117. Ibid., p. 20 (italics added).
118. Delanty (2000b), p. 133.
119. Firat and Venkatesh (1993), p. 231.
120. Delanty (2000b), p. 133.
121. Ibid., p. 133.
122. On this point, see, for instance: Duvall (2002b), esp. pp. 1–9; Firat and Venkatesh
(1993), p. 228; Mcevoy (2007b), p. 401; Parusnikova (1992), p. 23; Rose (1991), p. 4;
Smart (1993), p. 17; Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 61–3.
123. On this point, see, for instance, Delanty (2000b), pp. 131–7.
124. Firat and Venkatesh (1993), p. 234.
125. Bauman (1999 [1973]), p. xiii (italics added).
126. Firat and Venkatesh (1993), p. 231 (italics added).
127. Ibid., p. 234.
128. Ibid., p. 233.
129. Ibid., p. 233.
130. Prior (2005), p. 132 (italics added). On this point, see also Wynne and O’Connor (1998).
131. On the postmodern attack on the distinction between ‘high art’ and ‘low art’ (and ‘high
culture’ and ‘low culture’), see, for example: Clark (2006), p. 393; Cova and Svanfeldt
 Notes 301

(1993), pp. 297–8; Delanty (2000b), pp. 136–7; Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 157; Prior
(2005), p. 132; Smart (1993), p. 19; Wilterdink (2002), p. 199. On this point, cf.
Friedman (2011, 2012, 2014).
132. Smart (1993), p. 19.
133. Delanty (2000b), p. 136.
134. Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 157.
135. Ibid., p. 157.
136. Ibid., p. 157.
137. Delanty (2000b), p. 136.
138. Featherstone (1991), p. 65. On this point, see also Cova and Svanfeldt (1993), p. 297.
139. See Cova and Svanfeldt (1993), p. 298, and Delanty (2000b), p. 153.
140. Arguably, this is an idea postmodernists share with autonomist Marxists. On the mean-
ing of this idea in autonomist Marxism, see, for instance, Susen (2008a), pp. 76–80,
and Susen (2008b), pp. 149–64.
141. Jameson (1991), p. ix.
142. Ibid., p. xv.
143. Firat and Venkatesh (1993), p. 236.
144. Ibid., p. 236.
145. On the concept of decentring, see, for example: Benton and Craib (2001), p. 161; Bouchet
(1994), p. 406; Butler (2002), p. 56; Delanty (2000b), p. 11; Fielding (2009), pp. 433–5
and 442–3; Firat and Venkatesh (1993), pp. 236–7; Fraser and Nicholson (1994
[1988]), p. 246;  Habermas (2001); Kelemen and Peltonen (2001), pp. 161–3; Kumar
(1995), pp. 128 and 130–1; Lemert (1994 [1990]), p. 265; Matthewman and Hoey
(2006), p. 539; Mcevoy (2007b), pp. 405–6; Murrey (2011), pp. 75–100; Parusnikova
(1992), pp. 35–6; Quicke (1999), p. 281; Rose (1991), p. 4; Seidman (1994b), pp. 5–6
and 8; Singh (1997), pp. 3, 9–10, and 16; Solomon (1998), pp. 35–50; Smart (1993),
p. 21; Torfing (1999), esp. pp. 1–8 and 89; Vakaloulis (2001), p. 214; van Raaij (1993),
pp. 549–55.
146. See n. 3.
147. See Firat and Venkatesh (1993), pp. 235–6.
148. On this point, see ibid., pp. 235–6.
149. See ibid., p. 230.
150. Jameson (1998), p. 3.
151. Lash and Lury (2007), p. 206 (italics added).
152. Firat and Venkatesh (1993), p. 231.
153. Ibid., p. 231.
154. On this point, see, for instance: Agger (2002), p. 150; Cova and Svanfeldt (1993),
297–8; Delanty (2000b), p. 132; Jameson (1991), p. x; Rojek and Turner (2000).
155. Agger (2002), p. 150.
156. Ibid., p. 149.
157. Squires (1998), p. 126.
158. Ibid., p. 126.
159. On this point, see, for instance: Alexander (1995), p. 23; Delanty (2000b), p. 147;
Squires (1998), p. 126.
160. Alexander (1995), p. 23.
161. Agger (2002), p. 151. See ibid., pp. 149–77.
162. Ibid., p. 151.
163. See n. 23.
164. See n. 23.
165. On this point, see Wernick (2000), pp. 67–8.
166. See ibid., pp. 67–8.
167. See, for instance: Besley (2005); Elliott (2007 [2001]); Frank (2000); Giddens (1991);
Goffman (1971 [1959]); Jenkins (2008 [1996]); Lahire (2004); Lawler (2008); Nuyen
(1998); Seigel (1999); Stead and Bakker (2010); Susen (2007), pp. 90–4 and 192–8;
Susen (2010d); Thompson and Hoggett (2012).
302 Notes

168. See, for example: Agger (2002); Benhabib (1992); Cresswell (2011); Delanty (2000b);
Lyman (2002); Miller (1993b); Rolfe (1997); Schrag (1997).
169. On the contingency of the self, see, for example: Farrell (1994), pp. 245–55; Kelemen and
Peltonen (2001), pp. 151, 161–3; Susen (2007), p. 92; Susen (2010d), esp. pp. 64–6 and 74–8.
170. Flax (2007), p. 75 (italics added).
171. Ibid., p. 75.
172. Ibid., p. 75 (italics added).
173. Foucault (1997 [1984]), p. 290. On this point, see Flax (2007), p. 75.
174. Foucault (1997 [1984]), p. 290. On this point, see Flax (2007), p. 75.
175. Flax (2007), p. 75.
176. Ibid., p. 75.
177. Walter (2001), p. 25 (italics added).
178. Ibid., p. 25 (italics added).
179. Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 144.
180. Ibid., p. 144.
181. Kelemen and Peltonen (2001), pp. 161–2.
182. Farrell (1994), p. 250.
183. On the fluidity of the self, see, for example: Flax (2007), pp. 75–7; Elliott (2007 [2001]),
pp. 143–53; Kellner (2007), p. 106–21; Susen (2007), p. 92; Susen (2010d), esp.
pp. 68–70; Walter (2001), pp. 25–7 and 35; West (2013).
184. On this point, see, for instance: Boltanski (1993); Boltanski and Thévenot (1991);
Lahire (1998, 2004); Thévenot (1990, 1992); Thompson (1992).
185. Butler (2002), p. 56.
186. Ibid., p. 56 (italics added).
187. On the sociological significance of the concept of intersectionality in feminist research,
see, for instance: Chow, Segal, and Tan (2011); Das Nair and Butler (2012); Doetsch-
Kidder (2012); Fraser and Nicholson (1994 [1988]); Grabham (2009); Krizsán, Skjeie,
and Squires (2012); Lutz, Herrera Vivar, and Supik (2011); Lykke (2010); MacDonald,
Osborne, and Smith (2005); Nicholson (1990b); Oliver, Flamez, and McNichols (2011);
Taylor, Hines, and Casey (2011); Young (1994 [1989], 1997a).
188. Butler (2002), p. 60 (italics in original).
189. Ibid., p. 51.
190. Benhabib (1992), p. 209. On this point, see also Butler (2002), p. 51.
191. Besley (2005), p. 368.
192. On the multiplicity of the self, see, for example: ibid., pp. 368–9; Butler (2002),
pp. 50–61; Kelemen and Peltonen (2001), pp. 151 and 161–4; Susen (2007), pp. 92–3;
Susen (2010d), esp. pp. 76–8; Susen (2012b), p. 716.
193. Kellner (2007), p. 106.
194. Carmichael (2002), p. 33 (italics added).
195. Kelemen and Peltonen (2001), p. 161 (italics added).
196. Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 157 (italics added).
197. Ibid., p. 142.
198. On the contradictoriness of the self, see, for example: Carmichael (2002), p. 33; Elliott
(2007 [2001]), pp. 138–61 and 162–72; Kelemen and Peltonen (2001), pp. 151 and
161–4; Kellner (2007), pp. 106, 109, 113–16, and 120–1; Kumar (1995), pp. 101–48;
Susen (2007), p. 93; Susen (2010d), esp. p. 75.
199. Susen (2007), p. 93.
200. On this point, see ibid., pp. 93–4.
201. Delanty (2000b), p. 159 (italics added). On this point, see also Celikates (2009),
pp. 116–22, and Susen (2011a), p. 455.
202. Delanty (2000b), p. 161.
203. Ibid., p. 161 (italics added).
204. Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 142.
205. Ibid., p. 142.
 Notes 303

206. Ibid., p. 148.

207. Ibid., p. 148.
208. Kumar (1995), p. 147.
209. Ibid., p. 147.
210. On the knowledgeability of the self, see, for example: Delanty (2000b), pp. 1, 61, 131–2,
159–67; Elliott (2007 [2001]), pp. 142–8; Giddens (1991), pp. 1–2 and 20–3; Kumar
(1995), p. 147; Susen (2007), p. 93; Susen (2010d), pp. 63 and 79; Susen (2011a),
pp. 450–8; Susen (2012b), pp. 713–15.
211. Stead and Bakker (2010), p. 50 (italics added).
212. Ibid., p. 50 (italics added).
213. Ibid., p. 50 (italics added). On this point, see also McAdams (1995).
214. Stead and Bakker (2010), p. 50 (italics added).
215. On this point, see Susen (2007), pp. 62–3.
216. Stead and Bakker (2010), p. 51 (italics added).
217. Ibid., p. 51.
218. Cf. Durkheim (2010 [1924]), p. 59.
219. Cf. Stead and Bakker (2010), p. 51. Cf. also Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 252.
220. See Elliott (2007 [2001]), esp. p. 139: ‘the self as a project’.
221. Ibid., p. 140.
222. On the narrativity of the self, see, for example: ibid., p. 140; Stead and Bakker (2010),
pp. 49–53; Susen (2007), pp. 40–2 and 62–7; Susen (2010d), pp. 62–4.
223. Kelemen and Peltonen (2001), p. 151 (italics added).
224. Ibid., p. 164 (italics added).
225. Besley (2005), p. 368 (italics added).
226. Varga (2005), p. 228 (italics added).
227. Ibid., p. 231 (italics added; except for ‘pneuma’, which is italicized in the original version).
228. See Lash and Lury (2007) and Lury (2004).
229. Varga (2005), p. 227.
230. Ibid., p. 227.
231. On the corporeality of the self, see, for example: Besley (2005), p. 368; Kelemen and
Peltonen (2001), pp. 151 and 161–4; Susen (2007), pp. 156, 161, 180, 181, 182, 186,
188, 212, 213, 256, and 311; Susen (2010d), pp. 64–6; Susen and Turner (2011d),
pp. xviii and xxiii–xxix; Susen (2011c), pp. 374–5, 381–2, 385, 392, and 394–7; Turner
(2006), esp. p. 223; Varga (2005), pp. 210 and 227–31.
232. On the ‘digital age’, see, for instance: Belk and Llamas (2013); Burda (2011); Junge et al.
(2013); Negroponte (1995); Runnel et al. (2013); Westera (2013); Zhao (2005).
233. See, for example, Zhao (2005). See also Belk and Llamas (2013).
234. Kellner (2007), p. 106 (italics added).
235. Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 142.
236. Elliott (2000), p. 335.
237. Kellner (2007), p. 106.
238. Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 141.
239. Ibid., p. 141.
240. Kumar (1995), p. 124 (italics in original).
241. Ibid., p. 124.
242. Ibid., p. 124.
243. Lommel (2011), p. 75 (my translation); original text in German: ‘Mehr noch bietet
heute das Internet die Möglichkeit, das multiple Ich zu modellieren und zu insze-
nieren. Dadurch entsteht ein psychischer Druck, der auf den Individuen lastet. Das
Reservoir der nicht realisierten Chancen und Gelegenheiten wächst ständig an.’
244. Ibid., p. 75 (my translation); original text in German: ‘Reich der Kontingenz’.
245. On this concept, see, Boltanski (2009), p. 190: ‘sociétés capitalistes-démocratiques con-
temporaines’ (italics in original). See also, for instance, Susen (2012b), pp. 707–8. Cf.
Boltanski and Chiapello (1999).
304 Notes

246. On the technology of the self, see, for example: Best and Kellner (2001); Elliott (2000),
pp. 335–9; Elliott (2007 [2001]), pp. 140–6; Evans (2011); Kellner (2007), pp. 106, 109,
113–16, and 120–1; Kumar (1995), pp. 123–6 and 129–31; Lommel (2011), pp. 68–84;
Negroponte (1995); Salleh (2009); Schroeder (1997); Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 123–36,
207–15 and 217–21.
247. Stead and Bakker (2010), p. 51 (italics added).
248. For an in-depth examination of these implications, see Susen (2014a).
249. On the power-ladenness of the self, see, for example: Kelemen and Peltonen (2001),
pp. 151 and 161–4; Stead and Bakker (2010), pp. 51–3; Susen (2007), pp. 10, 13, 21, 34,
25, 32, 33, 34, 37, 50, 53, 54, 56, 57, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 76, 77, 79, 81, 85, 87, 88,
89, 90, 94, 97 n. 54, 103, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 117, 118, 119, 121, 124,
125, 127 n. 22, 134, 135, 143, 144, 147 n. 33, 155, 161, 226, 236, 242, 255, 256, 261,
263, 268, 286, 304, 306, 307, and 314; Susen (2008a, 2008b, 2009a); Susen (2010d),
pp. 68–70; Susen (2012a), pp. 283–91 and 308–14; Susen (2012b), pp. 690–8, 705–10,
and 715–19; Susen (2014a).
250. On this point, see Sennett (1998).
251. Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 274.
252. Ibid., p. 276.
253. Ibid., p. 275 (italics added).
254. Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 139 (italics added).
255. Ibid., p. 139 (italics added).
256. Ibid., p. 140.
257. On the reflexivity of the self and short-termism, see, for example: Baert and da Silva
(2010 [1998]), pp. 274–9; Browne and Susen (2014), pp. 218–23; Elliott (2007 [2001]),
pp. 138–61 and 162–72; Sennett (1998).
258. Vester (1993), p. 34 (italics added) (my translation); original text in German: ‘Kultur
dient dem Self-Management und der Self-Promotion.’ On this point, see also
Eickelpasch (1997), p. 16.
259. See Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 207–15.
260. See ibid., p. 208. See also Wernet, Elman, and Pendleton (2005).
261. See Vakaloulis (2001), p. 207 (italics added) (my translation); original text in French: ‘la
condition post-moderne comme affirmation de l’individu “souverain et autonome”’.
262. Ibid., pp. 208–9 (italics in original) (my translation); original text in French: ‘une plur-
individualité’ (italics in original).
263. Ibid., p. 209 (italics added) (my translation); original text in French: ‘l’éclatement des
positions-de-sujet à travers le “zapping” des pratiques’.
264. Ibid., pp. 213–14 (italics added) (my translation); original text in French: ‘la culture
post-moderne, les identités sociales deviennent plus fluides, plus mobiles et protéi-
formes que dans le passé’.
265. Ibid., p. 214 (italics added) (my translation); original text in French: ‘L’économie des
conduites de la vie apparaît décentrée, aléatoire, intotalisable.’
266. Ibid., p. 214 (my translation); original text in French: ‘socialité contradictoire’.
267. Mulinari and Sandell (2009), p. 495 (italics added).
268. On the reflexivity of the self and individualism, see, for example: Eickelpasch (1997),
pp. 10–19; Lahire (2004); Mulinari and Sandell (2009), pp. 493–6; Sennett (1998);
Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 207–15 and 217–21; Wernet, Elman, and Pendleton (2005).
269. Wernet, Elman, and Pendleton (2005) (see title). See also Vakaloulis (2001), p. 208.
270. On this point, see, for instance: Abramson and Inglehart (1995); Inglehart (1977, 1990,
1997); Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
271. Wernet, Elman, and Pendleton (2005), p. 340 (italics added).
272. Ibid., p. 342 (italics added).
273. Ibid., p. 342 (italics added).
274. Ibid., p. 342 (italics added).
275. Ibid., p. 342 (italics added).
 Notes 305

276. Ibid., p. 342 (italics added). On this point, see Inglehart (1997).
277. Wernet, Elman, and Pendleton (2005), p. 342 (italics added) (the word ‘well-being’
appears without the hyphen in the original version).
278. On the reflexivity of the self and autonomism, see, for example: Abramson and Inglehart
(1995); Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994); Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997); Inglehart and
Welzel (2005); Vakaloulis (2001), p. 208; Wernet, Elman, and Pendleton (2005), pp.
339–43 and 350–1.
279. Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 140 (italics added).
280. Elliott (2000), p. 335.
281. Walter (2001), p. 25.
282. Jagger (2001), p. 47.
283. Ibid., p. 54.
284. On the reflexivity of the self and consumerism, see, for example: Bouchet (1994); Davis
(2008); Duvall (2002a); Elliott (2000), pp. 335–9; Elliott (2007 [2001]), pp. 2, 4, 8, 12,
19, 22, 26, 77–80, 104–6, and 140; Featherstone (1991, 2007 [1991]); Jagger (2001),
pp. 43–54; Jagger (2005); Jameson (1988); Urry (1995); van Raaij (1993); Walter (2001),
p. 25; Woodward, Emmison, and Smith (2000).
285. Plüss (2007), p. 270 (italics added). On this point, see also, for instance: Bruce (1999),
pp. 165 and 180; Heelas (1998), esp. pp. 11–15; Sennett (1998).
286. Plüss (2007), p. 270.
287. See Maffesoli (1996 [1985]) and Maffesoli (1996 [1988]). See also Evans (1997a).
288. On the reflexivity of the self and pluralism, see, for example: Boltanski (1993); Boltanski
and Thévenot (1991); Lahire (1998, 2004);  Plüss (2007); Thévenot (1990, 1992);
Thompson (1992).
289. Good and Velody (1998b), pp. 4–5 (italics added). On this point, see Kellner (1992).
See also, more generally, Lash and Friedman (1992).
290. Good and Velody (1998b), p. 5.
291. Ibid., p. 5.
292. Giddens (1991), p. 20 (italics added).
293. On the concept of mapping in postmodern and poststructuralist thought, see, for example:
Kellner (2007); Pile and Thrift (1995a); Pile and Thrift (1995b); Žižek (1994).
294. Kellner (2007), p. 116 (italics added).
295. Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
296. Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 172.
297. Delanty (2000b), p. 162.
298. Lommel (2011), p. 74 (italics added; except for ‘necessary’, ‘overhauled’, and ‘although’,
which are italicized in the original version) (my translation); original text in German:
‘Die “Multioptionsgesellschaft” ist zum Schlagwort für die Beschleunigung der
Lebensformen und die Vervielfachung von Wahlmöglichkeiten in der Postmoderne
geworden. […] Statt über einen festen biographischen Entwurf verfügen viele Menschen
heute über Wahl- und Bastelbiografien. Ihre Biographien differenzieren sich in
Teilbiografien und Persönlichkeitsfacetten aus. Je mehr Möglichkeiten man hat, desto
mehr will man verwirklichen, um ja nichts zu verpassen. Zeitnot und Verpassensangst,
über die heute viele klagen, sind aber keineswegs notwendige Folgen der technologischen
Beschleunigung – im Gegenteil: Die Zeitgewinne, die neue Kommunikationsmedien,
Automatisierungen im Haushalt und Mobilitätserleichterungen freigesetzt haben,
werden durch Mengensteigerung pro Zeiteinheit nicht nur wettgemacht, sondern
überholt. Das Lebenstempo erhöht sich, obwohl wir in der sozialen Lebenswelt immer
mehr Zeit gewinnen’ (italics in original).
299. Ibid., pp. 75 and 76 (italics added; except for ‘constraint’, which is italicized in the
original) (my translation); original text in German: ‘Multioptionalität bedeutet
dann, dass die dazu gewonnene Wahlfreiheit auch belastend sein kann. Sie schafft
Unsicherheit, ob man sich für das Richtige entschieden hat. Die Freiheit, die sie
verspricht, ist eine Scheinfreiheit: Wenn nichts Bestand hat, wird Selbstbestimmung
zum Dauerimperativ, zum Zwang. […] Die Menschen sind erschöpft, ermüdet, weil
306 Notes

die einem “Zuviel” an Informationen, Reizen und Möglichkeiten ausgesetzt sind […]’
(italics in original).
300. On the reflexivity of the self and dynamism, see, for example: Delanty (2000b), p. 163;
Elliott (2007 [2001]), pp. 138–61 and 162–72; Giddens (1991), pp. 1–2 and 20–3; Good
and Velody (1998b), p. 5; Kellner (2007), pp. 106–21; Lommel (2011), pp. 74–5; Pile
and Thrift (1995a, 1995b).
301. On the centrality of the concept of globalization in the literature on ‘late modernity’, ‘second
modernity’, and ‘postmodernity’, see, for instance: Axford (2013); Baert and da Silva (2010
[1998]), pp. 248–84; Bauman (1998); Beck and Lau (2005), pp. 525–33; Boron (1999),
pp. 53 and 63; Burawoy (2000), pp. ix–xv, 1–40, and 337–73; Burchardt (1996); Butler
(2002), pp. 116–18; Buzan, Held, and McGrew (1998), pp. 388–91; Centeno and Cohen
(2010); Chirico (2013); Delanty (2000b), pp. 145–6; Dicken (2011 [1986]); Dolgon
(1999), pp. 129–30 and 139–40; Drake (2010); Elliott (2000), pp. 336–9; Featherstone
and Lash (1995), pp. 1–4; Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson (1995); Franklin, Lury,
and Stacey (2000); Fraser (2007b); Friedman (1995); Gane and Gane (2007), pp. 131–6;
Giddens (1990), esp. p. 64; Giddens (1991), pp. 1 and 20–3; Hammond (2011), pp.
305 and 310–15; Harvey (1989), esp. pp. 293–6; Hawthorne (2004), p. 244; Hirst and
Thompson (1995, 1996); Hoogvelt (1997); Horrocks (1999), pp. 41 and 62; Hutcheon
(2002), p. 205; Hutcheon (2007), p. 16; Huyssen and Scherpe (1993); Ianni (1999
[1995, 1996]); Jacob (1999); Jameson (1984, 1988, 1991, 2007), pp. 215–16; Janos
(1997), p. 122; Jogdand and Michael (2003); Jones (2010); Kellner (2007), pp. 103–15;
Lash and Lury (2007); Latour (2005), pp. 173–90; Lury (2004); Martell (2010); Mayo
(2005); McKenzie (2007), pp. 150–1; Mittelman (1996b); Mouzelis (2008), pp. 159–61;
Nederveen Pieterse (1995); Paulus (2001), p. 745; Petrella (1996); Piketty (2013);
Redner (2013); Ritzer (2013 [1993]); Robertson (1995); Sassen (2004); Sklair (1995
[1991]); Slott (2002), pp. 420–2; Sloterdijk (2013 [2005]); Smart (1993), pp. 62, 74–7,
and 127–53; Spiegel (2007), pp. 14–19; Susen (2010a), pp. 182–97; Susen (2010b), pp.
260–2; Tomlinson (1999); Torfing (1999), p. 7; Turner (2006), p. 226; Vakaloulis (2001),
pp. 153–72; Williams et al. (2013).
302. A similar analysis of globalization can be found in Susen (2010a), pp. 182–97.
303. See Boyer (1996a), p. 85.
304. See, for instance, Delanty (2000b), p. 146. It may be argued, however, that the expres-
sion ‘the collapse of communism’ is somewhat inappropriate, since it tends to be used –
deliberately or unwittingly – to discredit the idea that an alternative to capitalism
is possible. Although most regimes of the ‘Eastern Bloc’ were ruled by ‘communist
parties’, none of them claimed to have reached a societal stage called ‘communism’.
Hence, it seems proper to speak of ‘the collapse of really existing socialism’, rather than
of ‘the collapse of communism’.
305. On the global influence of political liberalism and the impact of the end of the Cold War,
see, for example: Blackburn (2000), p. 267; Boron (1999), p. 63; Davies (2014); Delanty
(2000b), pp. 145–6; Eagleton (1995), esp. pp. 59–60 and 69–70; Gane and Gane (2007),
pp. 134–5; Hammond (2011), pp. 305–6 and 310–15; Paulus (2001), p. 745; Sloterdijk
(2013 [2005]); Susen (2012a), pp. 294, 303, and 307–8; Torfing (1999), pp. 1–2.
306. Newly Industrialized Countries (such as Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Mexico,
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey).
307. See Petrella (1996), p. 69.
308. On this point, see, for instance: Borodina and Shvyrkov (2010); O’Neill (2001); Sujatha
(2006).
309. On the global influence of economic liberalism, see, for example: Boron (1999), p. 53;
Burawoy (2000), esp. pp. 34–5 and 345–9; Centeno and Cohen (2010); Davies (2014);
Delanty (2000b), pp. 145–6; Dicken (2011 [1986]); Dolgon (1999), pp. 129–30 and
139–40; Featherstone and Lash (1995), pp. 1–15; Harvey (1989), esp. pp. 292–6;
Hawthorne (2004), p. 244; Hutcheon (2002), p. 205; Jameson (1984); Jameson (2007),
pp. 215–16; Kellner (2007), pp. 103–6; Lash and Lury (2007); Piketty (2013); Ritzer
 Notes 307

(2013 [1993]); Sloterdijk (2013 [2005]); Slott (2002), pp. 420–2; Smart (1993), p. 62;
Susen (2012a), pp. 294, 303, and 307–8; Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 103–21 and 153–72;
Williams et al. (2013).
310. On this point, see, for instance: Abramson and Inglehart (1995); Inglehart (1977, 1990,
1997); Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
311. On the global influence of postindustrialism, see, for example: Baert and da Silva (2010
[1998]), pp. 269–70; Butler (2002), pp. 116–18; Harvey (1989), esp. pp. 292–6; Jameson
(1984); Kellner (2007), pp. 103–6; Kumar (1995), esp. pp. 6–35; Lash and Lury (2007);
Slott (2002), pp. 420–2; Smart (1993), pp. 62, 74–7, and 127–53; Williams et al. (2013).
312. See, for instance, Strange (1997 [1986]).
313. On this point, see Lane (2000), p. 207: ‘What most concepts share in common, how-
ever, is the claim that globalization leads to companies’ disembedding from their home site
and to a loosening of ties with domestic institutions and actors relevant to factor creation
and reproduction’ (italics added).
314. On the global influence of international capital, see, for example: Boron (1999), p. 53;
Buzan, Held, and McGrew (1998), pp. 388–91; Centeno and Cohen (2010); Dolgon
(1999), pp. 129–30 and 139–40; Harvey (1989), esp. pp. 292–6; Hawthorne (2004),
p. 244; Jameson (1984); Jameson (2007), pp. 215–16; Kellner (2007), pp. 103–6; Lash
and Lury (2007); Piketty (2013); Slott (2002), pp. 420–2; Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 103–21
and 153–72; Williams et al. (2013).
315. On the concept of lean production, see, for instance: Bruun and Mefford (2004); Seddon
and Caulkin (2007); Womack, Jones, and Roos (2007 [1990]).
316. On the concept of post-Fordism, see, for example: Bernard (2000); Bonefeld and Holloway
(1991a, 1991b); Dolgon (1999); Jessop (1991, 2001). See also, for instance: Dolgon
(1999), pp. 129–30 and 140; Harvey (1989), pp. 141–72 and 284–307; Jameson (1991),
pp. ix–xxii.
317. See Hyman (1983).
318. On the global influence of deregulated production systems and labour markets, see, for
example: Bonefeld and Holloway (1991b); Boron (1999), p. 53; Dolgon (1999),
pp. 129–30 and 139–40; Harvey (1989), esp. pp. 292–6; Jameson (1984); Jameson (2007),
pp. 215–16; Kellner (2007), pp. 103–6; Piketty (2013); Slott (2002), pp. 420–2;
Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 103–21 and 153–72; Williams et al. (2013).
319. On the concept of microelectronics revolution, see, for instance: Cressler (2009); Forester
(1980); Molina (1989).
320. On the concept of global network society, see, for example: Castells (1996, 1997, 1998).
See also, for instance: Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), pp. 249–55; Beck and Lau
(2005), pp. 525–33; Burawoy (2000), esp. pp. 34–5 and 345–9; Buzan, Held, and
McGrew (1998), pp. 388–91; della Porta et al. (2006); Featherstone and Lash (1995),
pp. 1–15; Giddens (1990), p. 64; Giddens (1991), pp. 1 and 20–3; Kali and Reyes (2007);
Latour (2005), esp. pp. 247–62; Ruby (1990), p. 35; Toews (2003), p. 82.
321. On the global influence of advanced communication and transportation systems, see, for
example: Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 268; Butler (2002), pp. 116–18; Delanty
(2000b), pp. 145–6; Elliott (2000), pp. 335–40; Gane and Gane (2007), p. 136; Horrocks
(1999), p. 62; Hutcheon (2007), p. 16; Kellner (2007), pp. 103–6 and 115; McKenzie
(2007), pp. 150–1; Negroponte (1995); Orgad (2012); Smart (1993), pp. 62, 74–7, and
127–53; Torfing (1999), p. 7; Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 123–36; Webster (2005).
322. See Ianni (1999 [1995, 1996]).
323. On the global influence of capitalist consumerism, see, for example: Gane and Gane
(2007), p. 132; Lash and Lury (2007); Lury (2004); Slott (2002), pp. 420–2; Smart
(1993), pp. 74–7.
324. We can distinguish three currents in globalization theory: (i) the ‘hyperglobalizers’ (for
example, Reich, Strange, Streeck); (ii) the ‘transformationists’ (for example, Castells,
Giddens, Held); and (iii) the ‘sceptics’ (for example, Hirst and Thompson, Ruigrok and
van Tulder, Wade, Weiss).
308 Notes

325. Hoogvelt (1997), p. 120 (italics in original).

326. Giddens (1990), p. 64 (italics added). On this point, see also Hoogvelt (1997), p. 120.
327. Sassen (1996), p. 8.
328. Morris (1997), p. 193.
329. On this point, see Hirst and Thompson (1995), p. 422.
330. Rosecrance (1996), p. 60.
331. Ibid., p. 56
332. Bauman (1998), p. 68 (italics in original).
333. Ibid., p. 66. On this point, see Marcos (1997).
334. Bauman (1998), p. 63 (italics in original).
335. Drucker (1997), p. 163.
336. On the historical level, see, for instance: Blackburn (2000), p. 267; Boron (1999), p. 63;
Delanty (2000b), pp. 145–6; Eagleton (1995), esp. pp. 59–60 and 69–70; Gane and
Gane (2007), pp. 134–5; Hammond (2011), pp. 305–6 and 310–15; Paulus (2001),
p. 745; Susen (2012a), pp. 294, 303, and 307–8; Torfing (1999), pp. 1–2.
337. On the economic level, see, for instance: Aghion and Williamson (1998); Akhter (2004);
Bernard (2000); Borodina and Shvyrkov (2010); Burchardt (1996); Centeno and Cohen
(2010); Dicken (2011 [1986]); Gritsch (2005); Hall and Soskice (2001); Hancké (2009);
Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher (2007); Hirst and Thompson (1996); Hoogvelt (1997);
Kali and Reyes (2007); Lahiri (2001); Li and Reuveny (2003); Lury (2004); Miller (2005);
Mittelman (1996b); O’Neill (2001); Petrella (1996); Piketty (2013); Rassekh and Speir
(2010); Ritzer (2013 [1993]); Sloterdijk (2013 [2005]); Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny
(2005); Sujatha (2006); Tabb (2004); Turner (2008); Urpelainen (2010); Wade (1996,
2005); Went (2004); Williams et al. (2013).
338. On this point, see Marshall (1964 [1963]) and Marshall (1981). See also, for instance:
Susen (2010b), pp. 262–8; Turner (1994 [1990]), p. 202; Turner (2009).
339. See Susen (2010a).
340. On the political level, see, for instance: Akhter (2004); Boyer (1996b); Boyer and Drache
(1996); Burchardt (1996); Crouch, Eder, and Tambini (2001a, 2001b); Drake (2010);
Gritsch (2005); Hirst and Thompson (1995); Li and Reuveny (2003); Morris (1997);
Nayar (2009); Orgad (2012); Sassen (1996); Sloterdijk (2013 [2005]); Tabb (2004);
Urpelainen (2010); Wade (2005); Weiss (1997a, 1998); Went (2004).
341. On the cultural level, see, for instance: Bauman (1999 [1973]); Bridges (1994);
Castells (1997); Delanty (2003); Featherstone (2007 [1991]); Featherstone, Lash, and
Robertson (1995); Foster (1985 [1983]); Franklin, Lury, and Stacey (2000); Fraser
(2007a); Giddens (2000); Gillison (2010); Inglehart (1990); Isin and Wood (1999);
Jameson (1988, 1998); Kelly (2002); Kymlicka (2007); Lahire (2004); Lash and Lury
(2007); Nemoianu (2010); Oliver, Flamez, and McNichols (2011); Orgad (2012); Parekh
(2008); Phillips (2007); Pile and Thrift (1995a); Ritzer (2013 [1993]); Sarup (1996b);
Sassen (2007); Sewell (1999); Sim (2002); Sloterdijk (2013 [2005]); Solomon (1998);
Spinks (2001); Susen (2010b, 2011b); Tomlinson (1999); Turner and Rojek (2001); West
(1994); Young (1994 [1989]).
342. On the demographic level, see, for instance: Baker and Beaumont (2011); Betts (2009,
2011); Brah, Hickman, and Mac an Ghaill (1999); Cohen (2006); Elliott, Payne, and
Ploesch (2007); Elliott and Urry (2010); Giddens (2000); Hatton and Williamson (2008
[2005]); Harvey (2006); Khory (2012); King et al. (2010); Morris (1997); Moses (2006);
Sassen (1996, 2001 [1991], 2007, 2008 [2006]); Soja (2000).
343. On the military level, see, for instance: Brauer (2009); Cimbala (2010); Cerutti (2007); Inoue
(2007); Makhijani, Hu, and Yih (1995); Ödün (2003); Walker (2012); Zarzecki (2002).
344. On the environmental level, see, for instance: Baer (2012); Beck (1992 [1986], 1995
[1988], 1999, 2009 [2007]); Beck and Lau (2005); Brah, Hickman, and Mac an Ghaill
(1999); Brauer (2009); Cerutti (2007); Elliott (2002); Frankel (2003); Harvey (1996);
Jorgenson and Kick (2006); Kroll and Robbins (2009); Lehman (2011); Newell (2012);
Robertson and Kellow (2001); Speth (2003).
 Notes 309

345. See Burchardt (1996) and Nielsen (2005).

346. Hirst and Thompson (1995), p. 414.
347. Mittelman (1996a), p. 232.
348. Ibid., p. 232.
349. On this point, see, for example: della Porta et al. (2006); Hamel et al. (2001a);
Jogdand and Michael (2003); Mayo (2005); Sklair (1995); Smith and Johnston (2002a);
Waterman (1998); West (2013).
350. Bernard (2000), p. 152.
351. Hoogvelt (1997), p. 115.
352. Marx and Engels (1987/1945 [1848]), p. 49 (italics added) (my translation); origi-
nal text in German: ‘Das Bedürfnis nach einem stets ausgedehnten Absatz für ihre
Produkte jagt die Bourgeoisie über die ganze Erdkugel. Überall muß sie sich einn-
isten, überall anbauen, überall Verbindungen herstellen. Die Bourgeoisie hat durch
ihre Exploitation des Weltmarkts die Produktion und Konsumtion aller Länder kos-
mopolitisch gestaltet.’ On this point, see also Laxer (1995), p. 289.
353. Kozul-Wright (1995), pp. 138–9 (italics added).
354. See, for example, Strange (1997 [1986]).
355. On the recent and ongoing economic crisis and the credit crunch, see, for instance: Adkins
(2011); Browne and Susen (2014); Brummer (2009 [2008]); Doyran (2011); Lascelles
and Carn (2009); Piketty (2013); Turner (2008).
356. Kozul-Wright (1995), p. 143.
357. Burchardt (1996), p. 746 (my translation); original text in German: ‘Ein gewichtiger
Anteil des Geldkapitals des “Kasinokapitalismus” ist darum keineswegs entkoppelt
oder autonom, sondern statt dessen immer noch Ergebnis realer Kapitalakkumulation.’
358. On this point, see Altvater (1994). See also, for instance, Hirst and Thompson (1995),
p. 425: ‘the evidence that world financial markets are beyond regulation is by no means
certain, for example, extreme volatility in exchange rates is in the interest only of short-
term speculators and periods of turbulence have been followed by more or less success-
ful attempts at stabilization and regulation, as with the efforts of the G7 in the 1980s
with the Louvre and Plaza accords or current debates on the need for a new Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates within broad bands’. In contrast to this view,
see, for example, Menzel (1995). See also Wade (1996), p. 64: ‘But the most dramatic
multinationalization of all has come in finance. The stock of international bank lending
[…] rose in just ten years from 4 percent of OECD GDP in 1980 to 44 percent in 1990.’
359. Weiss (1998), p. 171.
360. Weiss (1997a), p. 11. See also Wade (1996), p. 86.
361. Hirst and Thompson (1995), p. 424.
362. Lane (1998), p. 479. Hence, it is highly debatable whether or not an increasing number
of MNCs (multinational corporations) are being transformed into TNCs. See also ibid.,
p. 463: ‘The paper challenges the view that European MNCs are largely globalized
and better viewed as transnational companies, but it also recognizes that some more
globalized structures and strategies have begun to emerge in the 1990s.’
363. Weiss (1998), p. 185. On this point, see also Hirst and Thompson (1996), esp. chapter
4, and Wade (1996). In addition, see Slott (2002), pp. 420–2.
364. Petrella (1996), p. 73.
365. Ibid., p. 73.
366. See Kozul-Wright (1995), p. 141. See also ibid., p. 157: ‘the stock of FDI has not yet
passed the high point of 1914’.
367. See Burchardt (1996), pp. 743–4.
368. See Wade (1996), p. 70: ‘But taking the FDI figures at face value we find that despite
fast growth over the 1980s, outgoing FDI is still quite small in the major northern
economies as a proportion of net domestic business investment. The typical order of
magnitude is between 5 and 15 percent over the 1980s.’ On this point, more generally,
see Berger and Dore (1996).
310 Notes

369. Petrella (1996), p. 69. Petrella goes on to say (ibid., pp. 69 and 77): ‘By contrast, the
share of the world’s capital stock going to poor countries had been reduced from about
14 per cent in 1982 to zero in 1989 […]. During the 1980s, the Triad accounted for
around four-fifths of all international capital flows!’
370. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
371. On this point, see Patel and Pavitt (1991), p. 1: ‘In most cases, the technological activi-
ties of these large firms are concentrated in their home country.’ See also Ruigrok and
Tulder (1995), p. 151: ‘In conclusion, what is often referred to as “globalisation” is
perhaps better described as “Triadisation”. The 1980s internationalisation of trade and
investments was largely limited to the United States, the European Community and
Japan as well as East and South East Asia. […] It is worthwhile recalling that in 1987 the
Triad population accounted for only around 15 per cent of the total world’s population
[…]!’ In addition, see Hamel et al. (2001b), p. 2: ‘much of globalization can still be
understood through the concentration of power and geography, not its unbounded-
ness: 91.5% of foreign direct investment, and 80% of trade take place in parts of the
world where only 28% of the population resides.’ See also Kozul-Wright (1995), p. 148:
‘In general, intraregional investment intensities are higher than extraregional intensi-
ties’. See also Weiss (1998), p. 186: ‘As of 1991, a good 81 per cent of world stock of
FDI was located in the high-wage (and relatively high-tax) countries’. For a detailed
critique of alarmist accounts of globalization, see ibid., esp. pp. 173–6.
372. For recent debates on economic globalization, see, for instance: Amin-Khan (2012);
Berberoglu (2010); Böss (2010); Di Mauro, Dees, and McKibbin (2010); Farrar and
Mayes (2013); Gritsch (2005); McLaren (2013); Mimiko (2012); Nissanke and Mavrotas
(2010); Piketty (2013); Rajaiah and Bhaskar (2013); Rassekh and Speir (2010); Sahoo
(2013); Singh (2010); Sokol (2011); Suranovic (2010); Urpelainen (2010); Visser (2011);
Vos (2011); Went (2004).
373. For recent debates on the relationship between the state and globalization, see, for example:
Amin-Khan (2012); Ashford and Hall (2011); Baraith and Gupta (2010); Berberoglu
(2010); Böss (2010); Boyer (1996b); Boyer and Drache (1996); Carlson (2012); Chernilo
(2007a); Chernilo (2008); Cohen (2006); Crouch, Eder, and Tambini (2001a); de
Larrinaga and Doucet (2010); Farrar and Mayes (2013); Gritsch (2005); Herrschel (2014);
Hirst and Thompson (1995); Holton (2011 [1998]); Jessop (2007); Lachmann (2010);
Löhr and Wenzlhuemer (2013); Morris (1997); Nayar (2009); Piketty (2013); Reid, Gill,
and Sears (2010); Ripsman and Paul (2010); Rosecrance (1996); Weiss (1997a, 1998).
374. Mann (1993), p. 116.
375. Ibid., p. 139.
376. This applies especially to Japan and the East Asian NICs (Newly Industrialized
Countries). On this point, see Weiss (1997a), pp. 4–5.
377. Hirst and Thompson (1995), p. 426.
378. Sassen (1996), p. 28 (italics added).
379. On this point, see Cerny (2000), p. 300: ‘states and state actors are themselves among
the greatest promoters of further globalization as they attempt to cope more effectively
with “global realities”. In undermining the autonomy of their own “national models”
[…] by chasing international competitiveness, they disarm themselves.’
380. On varieties of capitalism, see, for instance: Hall and Soskice (2001); Hancké (2009);
Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher (2007); Miller (2005); Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny
(2005); Susen (2012a), p. 306.
381. On this point, see Weiss (1997a), pp. 16–17.
382. On this point, see Dunning (1997), pp. 244–82 (on Great Britain), pp. 335–8 (on
Germany), and pp. 313–34 (on France).
383. See Petrella (1996), p. 67: ‘Nation-states have played a crucial role in the development
of capitalism and are not about to disappear. Far from it. Their numbers have increased
as a result of decolonization and recently following the collapse of the Soviet Union.’
Cf. Malešević (2013) and Yeĝenoĝlu (2005).
 Notes 311

384. On this concept, see, for instance, Robertson (1995). See also Susen (2010a), pp. 196–7,
and Susen (2012a), p. 306.
385. On this point, see, for example, Giddens (1990), p. 3.
386. Bauman (1998), p. 69 (italics in original).
387. On this point, see, for instance, Roseneil (2001) and Sassen (2004).
388. See, for instance, Susen (2010a).
389. Bauman (1998), p. 75.
390. Ibid., p. 71 (quoted from Balls and Jenkins (1996)).
391. On this point, see, for example, Chesters and Welsh (2005) and Melucci (1996).
392. On this point, see, for example, Susen (2010a), esp. pp. 163, 169, 197, 202, and 212. On
this point, see also, for instance, Bauman (2007); Browne and Susen (2014); Peat (2007).
393. Sklair (1995), p. 495.

4 From Modern to Postmodern Historiography?

The ‘Contingent Turn’
1. On the ‘contingent turn’ in historiography, see, for example: Bauman (1991, 1992, 1997,
2000b, 2007); Bauman and Tester (2007); Beilharz (2000); Butler (1994 [1990]); Butler,
Laclau, and Zižek (2000); Cole (1994); Davis (2008); Gane (2001); Kamper (1988
[1984]); Rorty (1989); Sloterdijk (1988); Smith (1999); Veeser (1989); Zižek (2000). On
the impact of postmodern thought on historiography, see, for instance: Ankersmit (1997
[1989]); Appignanesi and Garrett (2003 [1995]); Ashley (1997); Bauman (1991, 1992,
1997, 2000b); Bauman and Tester (2007); Beilharz (2000); Bentley (1999, 2006); Bertens
(1995); Best and Kellner (1997); Blackburn (2000); Braun (1997 [1994]); Browning
(2003); Burns (2003); Butler (1994 [1990]); Butler, Laclau, and Zižek (2000); Calhoun
(1995b); Carmichael (2002); Cole (1994); Coole (1998b); Corfield (2010); Dickens and
Fontana (1994b); Domańska (1998b, 1998a); Duvall (2002a, 2002b); Eley and Nield
(1997 [1995]); Ermarth (2004); Evans (1997b, 2002); Feierman (1999); Foster (2006
[1997]); Friedländer (1997 [1992]); Friedrich (2012); Fukuyama (1992); Gane (2001);
Gibbins and Reimer (1999); Giddens (1990); Halttunen (1999); Hassan (1987, 1993);
Heelas and Martin (1998); Hobsbawm (2002); Iggers (2005 [1997]); Jacob (1999); Jencks
(1996); Jenkins (1997a, 1997b); Jones, Natter, and Schatzki (1993b); Joyce (1991, 1997
[1995], 1997 [1996], 1998, 2010); Kellner (2007, 1987); Kelly (1991); Kienel (2007);
Kirk (1997 [1994]); Köhler (1977); Kronenberg (2008); Lang (1997 [1995]); Latour
(1993 [1991]); Lorenz (1999); Lyotard (1984 [1979]); Macfie (2010); Magnússon (2003);
Mcevoy (2007b); McLennan (1981, 1984); Milner (1999); Mongardini (1992); Nola and
Irzik (2003); Nowotny (1994 [1987]); Peper (1977); Pieters (2000); Raese (2011); Rouse
(1991); Rorty (1989); Sloterdijk (1988); Smart (1996); Smith (1999); Spiegel (1992, 2007);
Stone (1979, 1992); Stones (1996); Strauss (1991); Thompson (2000); von Beyme (1991);
Wagner (1992, 2008); White (1997 [1992]); Williams (2010); Wood (2006 [1997]); Wood
and Foster (2006 [1997]); Zagorin (1997 [1990], 1999, 2000); Zammito (2010); Zižek
(2000).
2. Bauman (1991), p. 233 (italics added).
3. See Heidegger (2001 [1927]). See also Heidegger (1992 [1989/1924]).
4. The problematic implications of such a determinist view of history shall be considered
in Chapter 6.
5. The emphasis on the concept of contingency in the literature in relation to the debates
on the concept of postmodernity is overwhelming. This thematic focus reflects the dis-
cursive centrality of the idea of ‘contingency’ for the ‘postmodern turn’. Consider, for
example, the following assertions: Barrett (1967 [1958]), p. 65: ‘The bomb reveals the
dreadful and total contingency of human existence. Existentialism is the philosophy of
the atomic age’ (on this point, see also Best and Kellner (1997), p. 7); Crook, Pakulski
and Waters (1992), p. 3: ‘the shock of postmodernization is that directionality is totally
312 Notes

unclear’ (on this point, see also Gibbins and Reimer (1999), p. 35); Giddens (1990),
p. 47: ‘To speak of post-modernity as superseding modernity appears to invoke that very
thing which is declared (now) to be impossible: giving some coherence to history and
pinpointing our place in it’; Stones (1996), p. 24: ‘postmodernists tend to strongly insist
that we privilege disorder, flux and openness and, conversely, that we reject accounts
focusing upon order, continuity and constraint’; Wagner (1992), p. 468: ‘in describing
contemporary society the ephemeral, the fugitive, the fleeting, the contingent nature
of the postmodern condition is emphasized. The present is distinguished from the past
by being more in motion, less fixed, what was bound is set free, what was orderly and
perspicuous becomes chaotic and undecipherable, what was taken for granted and for
undoubtedly real has to be questioned and, often enough, assumes an air of “pervasive
unreality”’ (on this point, see also Norris (1989), pp. 366 and 375).
6. Bauman (1992), p. 101.
7. Bauman (1997), p. 5.
8. On this point, see, for instance, Alexander (2013); Hobsbawm (1994); Mazower (1998).
9. On the problem of ‘enclosure’, both as a sociohistorical condition and as a conceptual
imposition, see, for instance, Susen (2012a), esp. pp. 282, 287–91, 306–7, 314, 318 n.
71, 322–3 n. 130, and 323 n. 139.
10. Heller (1989), p. 321. On this point, see Bauman (1991), p. 231.
11. The centrality of the concept of metanarrative in recent debates on postmodern thought
can hardly be overestimated. See, for example: Best and Kellner (1997), p. 6; Honneth
(1995), p. 292; Kvale (1996), pp. 20–1; Schrag (1989), p. 90; Sloterdijk (1988), pp. 272–3;
Smart (1996), pp. 456–7.
12. Anderson (1996), p. 4.
13. Lyotard (1984 [1979]), p. xxiv.
14. This view is expressed, for instance, in Bruno Latour’s actor–network theory, which shares
various assumptions with postmodern approaches, particularly with regard to the rejec-
tion of traditional notions of the human subject and the plea for a non-anthropocentric
exploration of the concept of agency. See Latour (1990) and Latour (2005). For an excel-
lent discussion of this issue, see, for example, Wilding (2010).
15. See, for instance: Beck (1992, 1992 [1986], 1999); Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994);
Beck and Lau (2005); Elliott (2002); Giddens (1987, 1990, 1991, 2000); Mulinari
and Sandell (2009). More generally, on the defence of the concept of modernity, see, for
example: Bernstein (1985); Callinicos (1989); Delanty (1999, 2000b, 2009); Eagleton
(1996); Habermas (1989 [1962], 1996 [1981], 1987a [1985], 2010 [2008]); Hall,
Held, and McGrew (1992); MacKinnon (2000); Nola and Irzik (2003); Norris (1990);
Outhwaite (2003 [1993], 2006, 2012); Passerin d’Entrèves (1996b); Passerin d’Entrèves
and Benhabib (1996); Poulain (2002); Susen (2009a, 2010b, 2010a, 2010c); Susen and
Turner (2011b, 2011c); Therborn (1995); Turner and Susen (2011); Wagner (1992, 1994,
2001, 2008, 2012).
16. See, for instance, Lyotard (1984 [1979]). See also, for example: Ashley (1997); Berger
(1998); Best and Kellner (1997, 2001); Boisvert (1996); Carretero Pasín (2006); Firat and
Venkatesh (1993); Hassan (1987, 1993); Huyssen and Scherpe (1993); Kellner (2007);
Peat (2007); Pinheiro (2012); Rolfe (1997); Roseneil (2001); Schrag (1997); Seidman
(1994c); Seidman and Wagner (1992); Solomon (1998); Vattimo (2007); Ward (1998).
17. See, for instance: Bauman (1991, 1992, 1997, 2007); Bauman and Tester (2007);
Goulimari (2007b); Inglehart (1997); Jones, Natter, and Schatzki (1993b); Kumar (1995);
Meschonnic and Hasumi (2002a, 2002b); Mouzelis (2008); Nederveen Pieterse (1992a);
Nederveen Pieterse (1992b); Nowotny (1994 [1987]); Osamu (2002); Petit (2005);
Rademacher and Schweppenhäuser (1997); Raulet (1993); Rojek and Turner (1993,
1998a); Rose (1991); Rundell (1990); Schrag (1989); Singh (1997); Smart (1990, 1992);
Swanson (1992); Thomas and Walsh (1998); Thompson (1993); Torfing (1999), esp.
pp. 57–61; Turner (1990a); van Reijen (2000); Wellmer (1985); Welsch (1988, 2002);
Wernick (2000), esp. pp. 67–68; White (1989); Zima (1997, 2000).
 Notes 313

18. The ambiguous coexistence of continuity and discontinuity, based on the interpenetration
of modern and postmodern historical dimensions, is stressed in the literature. Consider, for
example, the following passages: Bertens (1995), p. 236: ‘If there is a postmodernity,
[…] it is still engulfed by a much larger modernity’; Dickens and Fontana (1994b),
p. 3: ‘The advent of postmodern society is thus located by most observers sometime
after World War II. In the advanced capitalist countries, though they disagree whether
this constitutes a decisive break or some sort of continuity with the modernist era’;
Gibbins and Reimer (1999), p. 8: ‘“Post” is sometimes used to mean a “break from”
or as a “continuation of its modern components, or as an amalgamation, or dialectic,
of break and continuation”’ (Gibbins and Reimer are quoting from Rose (1991), p. 2):
Jencks (1996), p. 30: ‘To reiterate, I term Post-Modernism that paradoxical dualism, or
double coding, which its hybrid name entails: the continuation of Modernism and its
transcendence’ (it must be taken into account, however, that Jencks speaks of ‘post-
modernism’, rather than of ‘post-modernity’); Jones, Natter, and Schatzki (1993b), p. 1:
‘diffuse senses of “afterness” […], an essential break from modernist worlds […], [o]ther
accounts, however, see these shifts through the lens of continuity’; Mongardini (1992),
pp. 55, 56, 57, and 61: ‘postmodernity is to be seen not as a negation of modernity but
as its extreme expression […], postmodernity is the latest ideology of modernity. […] The
postmodern condition is the idea of modernity which has become a problem. […] In the
postmodern condition modernity is not produced in new forms but is experienced and
reproduced with unease, […] postmodernity is merely an off-shoot of modernity’ (italics
in original); Smart (1998), p. 37: ‘a radicalization of the reflexive potential of modernity,
a radicalization which has served to alert us to both the limits and the limitations of the
modern project, a radicalization which sometimes goes under the name “postmodern”’
(see also Smart (1996), p. 449); von Beyme (1991), p. 181: ‘In vieler Hinsicht sind die
nachmodernen Denker nicht die Überwinder, sondern die Vollender der Moderne.’
19. Rundell (1990), p. 157 (italics in original).
20. Hassan (1993), p. 277.
21. Bauman (1991), pp. 270 and 272 (italics added) (text modified; in the original version, one
passage reads as follows: ‘the discreditation of [rather than ‘or’] the rejection of modernity’).
22. Bauman (1992), p. 188 (italics added).
23. Ibid., p. 187 (italics in original).
24. See ibid., p. 188: ‘Postmodernity is […] a self-reproducing, pragmatically self-sustainable
and logically self-contained social condition defined by distinctive features of its own’ (italics
in original). On this view, postmodernity constitutes a distinctive social formation ‘in itself’.
25. Butler (2002), p. 33 (italics added to ‘reconstruction’; ‘objective’ is italicized in the
original version).
26. Ibid., p. 33 (italics added).
27. Ibid., p. 34 (italics added).
28. Corfield (2010), p. 382 (italics added).
29. Joyce (1991), p. 208 (italics added). On this point, see also Stone (1992), p. 190.
30. Evans (2002), p. 81 (italics in original). On this point, see also, for example: Iggers (2005
[1997]), p. 118; White (1978), p. 82.
31. Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 118 (italics added).
32. White (1978), p. 82. On this point, see also Iggers (2005 [1997]), pp. 119 and 180 n. 3.
33. White (1978), p. 82 (italics added; except for ‘invented’ and ‘found’, which are italicized in
the original version). On this point, see also Iggers (2005 [1997]), pp. 119 and 180 n. 3.
34. Macfie (2010), p. 226 (italics added).
35. Ibid., p. 226 (italics added).
36. Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 118 (italics added). On this point, see also Evans (2002), p. 80.
37. Butler (2002), p. 32 (italics added).
38. Ibid., p. 33 (italics added).
39. Butler (2002), p. 33 (italics added). On this point, see White (1978), esp. p. 82. See also
Beckjord (2007), esp. pp. 9–10.
40. Butler (2002), p. 33 (italics added).
314 Notes

41. See, for instance, Barthes (1973).

42. Evans (2002), p. 80.
43. Ibid., p. 80.
44. On this issue, see, for instance, Susen (2013b), pp. 90–2.
45. Butler (2002), p. 36 (italics added).
46. Ibid., p. 36 (italics added).
47. Mouzelis (2008), p. 181.
48. On this point, see ibid., pp. 11, 16, 29, 31, 178, 185 n. 11, 189, 192, 273, 274, and 275.
49. Evans (2002), p. 81 (italics added).
50. Ibid., p. 80 (italics added).
51. See, for example, de Saussure (1995 [1916]) and de Saussure (1978 [1916]).
52. See, for example, Barthes (1973).
53. See, for example, Derrida (1967) and Derrida (1976 [1967]).
54. See, for example, Novick (1988).
55. See, for example, Domańska (1998b); White (1973a, 1973b, 1973c, 1980, 1982, 1984,
1986, 1987, 1988a, 1997 [1992]); and White and Doran (2010).
56. See, for example, Jenkins (1995, 1997a, 1997b, 2003, 2003 [1991]); and Jenkins,
Morgan, and Munslow (2007).
57. See, for example, Foucault (1978 [1976], 1979 [1975], 1980, 1985 [1984], 1988, 1988
[1984], 2001 [1961], 2002 [1966], 2002 [1969]).
58. See, for example, Barthes (1973).
59. See, for example, Kellner (1989b, 1989a, 1997, 2007).
60. On this point, see Macfie (2010), p. 220.
61. Derrida (1967), p. 227.
62. Macfie (2010), p. 223.
63. Ibid., p. 223.
64. Thompson (2000), p. 139 (italics added).
65. See ibid., p. 154 (italics added) (italics added; in the original version, the word ‘explana-
tion’ appears in the singular).
66. Ibid., p. 154 (italics added).
67. Ibid., p. 156 (italics added).
68. Joyce (1991), p. 204.
69. Ibid., p. 204 (italics added).
70. Stone (1992), p. 191 (italics added).
71. Ibid., p. 191 (italics added).
72. Fish (1989), p. 313 (italics added); Fish’s quoted passage is taken from Horwitz (1988),
p. 798. On this point, see also Stone (1992), p. 191.
73. Zagorin (1999), p. 7 (italics added).
74. Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 97 (italics added). Iggers quoted passage – ‘a coherent scien-
tific explanation of change in the past’ – can be found in Stone (1979), p. 19. On this
point, see also Iggers (2005 [1997]), pp. 118, 134, and 135. In addition, see Wood (2006
[1997]), p. 13.
75. Stone (1979), p. 9. On this point, see Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 97.
76. Stone (1979), p. 7 (italics added).
77. See Mcevoy (2007b), p. 394.
78. Ibid., p. 394.
79. On this point, see Stone (1979), p. 5.
80. See ibid., pp. 5–7.
81. Among the most influential historians advocating the Marxist economic model are the fol-
lowing: Yoshihiko Amino (1928–2004); Helmut Arndt (1928–); Leôncio Basbaum (1907–
69); Moses Beer (1864–1943); Isaac Deutscher (1907–67); John Edward Christopher Hill
(1912–2003); Eric Hobsbawm (1917–2012); Cyril Lionel Robert James (1901–89); Arthur
Rosenberg (1889–1943); Eugen Rozvan (1878–1938); Maximilien Rubel  (1905–96);
Karl Schmückle (1898–1938); Albert Soboul (1914–82); Dirk Jan Struik  (1894–2000);
Christopher John Wickham (1950–).
 Notes 315

82. Stone (1979), p. 5.

83. Among the most well-known historians defending the ecological/demographic model
are the following: Ranjan Chakrabarti (1959–); David Victor Glass (1911–78); Tomand
Griffiths (1957–); Gilbert LaFreniere  (1935–); Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1929–);
Thomas Peter Ruffell  Laslett (1915–2001); John MacDonald MacKenzie  (1943–); Sir
Edward Anthony Wrigley (1931–).
84. Stone (1979), p. 5.
85. Le Roy Ladurie (1979 [1973]), p. 15. On this point, see Stone (1979), p. 5.
86. Among the most prominent historians and economists endorsing the cliometric model
are the following: Francesco Boldizzoni (1979–); Robert William Fogel  (1926–2013);
Edward L. Glaeser  (1967–); Claudia Goldin (1946–); John S. Lyons (1944–2011);
Stanley Reiter (1925–); Peter Turchin (1957–).
87. Stone (1979), p. 6.
88. Ibid., p. 6.
89. Ibid., p. 6.
90. On this point, see ibid., pp. 6–8.
91. Ibid., p. 13.
92. Ibid., p. 24.
93. Butler (2002), p. 32 (italics added) (the word ‘multiple’ is misspelled as ‘multiply’ in
the original version).
94. Ibid., p. 34 (italics added) (already referred to above).
95. Macfie (2010), p. 220 (italics added).
96. Zagorin (1999), pp. 4–5.
97. Ibid., p. 5 (italics added).
98. Ibid., p. 5 (italics added).
99. Ibid., p. 11 (italics added).
100. Braun (1997 [1994]), p. 423.
101. Lang (1997 [1995]), p. 427.
102. Mcevoy (2007b), p. 386.
103. Zagorin (1999), p. 14.
104. Ibid., p. 14 (italics added).
105. Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 116 (italics added).
106. Ibid., p. 116.
107. Ibid., p. 116 (italics added).
108. Bentley (1999), p. 140.
109. On this point, see ibid., p. 140. See also Susen (2007), pp. 90–4 and 192–8.
110. Zagorin (1999), p. 14.
111. Ibid., p. 16.
112. Ibid., p. 23.
113. Appleby, Jacob, and Hunt (1994), p. 236 (italics added). On this point, see Stewart
(1997), p. 187. In this context, see also Reddy (1992).
114. Bentley (1999), p. 140. For instance, on canon formation in late twentieth-century British
sociology, see Outhwaite (2009).
115. Bentley (1999), p. 140.
116. Macfie (2010), p. 226 (italics added).
117. Jenkins (1997b), p. 7 (italics added).
118. Susen (2007), p. 167.
119. Muir (1991), p. xiii. On this point, see Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 110.
120. Muir (1991), p. xiii. On this point, see Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 110. More generally, see
Muir and Ruggiero (1991).
121. See Blackburn (2000), p. 268 (italics added).
122. Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 105.
123. In conceptual opposition to the title of Magnússon (2003).
124. See title of ibid.
125. In conceptual opposition to the title of ibid.
316 Notes

126. See title of ibid.

127. Blackburn (2000), p. 269.
128. Ibid., p. 270.
129. Ibid., p. 270.
130. Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 102.
131. Evans (2002), p. 80.
132. Ibid., p. 80 (italics added).
133. Stone (1979), p. 23.
134. Ibid., p. 23.
135. On this point, see, for instance, Strauss (1991), esp. pp. 130, 137, 138, and 149.
136. Ibid., p. 130.
137. Ibid., p. 130 (italics added).
138. On this point, see ibid., p. 137.
139. On this point, see ibid., p. 137.
140. Ross (1989a), p. 232. See also Ross (1990 [1989]), p. 129. On this point, see also Strauss
(1991), p. 144.
141. Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 103 (italics added).
142. Ibid., p. 102 (italics added).
143. Mcevoy (2007b), p. 405. See also ibid., p. 406.
144. Ibid., p. 406.
145. Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 102.
146. Ibid., p. 102.
147. Ibid., pp. 107–8.
148. Ibid., p. 109.
149. Ibid., p. 109.
150. See ibid., pp. 14, 101–17, and 143. On the concept of ‘microstoria’, see ibid., pp. 107–12
and 139.
151. Levi (1988 [1985]), p. xiii. On this point, see Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 110.
152. See Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 102.
153. Ibid., p. 104. See also ibid., p. 114.
154. Thompson (2000), p. 3 (italics added).
155. Ibid., p. 3.
156. Ibid., p. 132.
157. Bentley (2006), p. 360.
158. Thompson (2000), p. 3.
159. Ibid., p. 3.
160. See Hegel (1975 [1837]). On this point, see also, for example: Domańska (1998a);
Köster (1972); McLennan (1981); Thompson (2000), p. 3.
161. Kellner (1987), p. 5. On this point, see also Thompson (2000), p. 119.
162. Mcevoy (2007b), p. 386 (italics added).
163. Giddens (1990), p. 6.
164. Ibid., p. 51.
165. Ibid., p. 50.
166. Evans (2002), p. 80.
167. Giddens (1990), p. 3.
168. Ibid., p. 5.
169. Ibid., p. 6 (italics added).
170. Ibid., p. 6 (italics added).
171. These five questions all appear at Thompson (2000), p. 128; here, the spelling of the
first word of each of these questions has been modified.
172. Ibid., p. 128 (italics added).
173. Ibid., p. 129.
174. Ibid., p. 129.
 Notes 317

175. Ibid., p. 130.

176. Ibid., p. 130.
177. Ibid., p. 130.
178. Schopenhauer (1972 [1819]).
179. On this point, see Susen (2012b), pp. 701–2.
180. These five questions are in opposition to the aforementioned questions posed by
Willie Thompson. Cf. Thompson (2000), p. 128.
181. Ibid., p. 132.
182. Ibid., p. 138.
183. Ibid., p. 138.
184. Ibid., p. 139.
185. Ibid., p. 139.
186. Ibid., p. 139.
187. Domańska (1998b), p. 173.
188. Ibid., p. 173.
189. Ibid., p. 173.
190. On the notion of ‘the fragility of reality’ not in postmodern thought but in French prag-
matic sociology, see Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010).
191. Giddens (1990), pp. 52–3 (italics in original).
192. Ibid., p. 53.
193. Mcevoy (2007b), p. 385 (italics added; except for ‘telos’, which is italicized in the
original).
194. Ibid., p. 385 (italics added).
195. Ibid., p. 385 (italics added).
196. Bentley (1999), p. 142.
197. Zagorin (1997 [1990]), p. 309 (italics added).
198. Susen (2011a), p. 451.
199. Marx (2000/1977 [1845]), p. 173.
200. Susen (2011c), p. 380 (italics removed).
201. Ankersmit (1997 [1989]), pp. 293–4 (italics added).
202. Ibid., p. 294.
203. Giddens (1990), p. 5.
204. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
205. Blackburn (2000), p. 266 (italics added).
206. Ibid., p. 266.
207. On Fukuyama’s conception of ‘the end of history’, see Fukuyama (1992), esp. pp. 276–7.
On this point, see also, for example: Blackburn (2000), p. 267; Boltanski (2008), p. 63;
Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]), p. 53; Eagleton (1995), esp. p. 66; Fukuyama
(2002); Good and Velody (1998b), pp. 5 and 9; Hammond (2011), pp. 305–6, 310, 312,
and 315; Horrocks (1999), pp. 7 and 13; Kellner (2007), p. 119; Osamu (2002); Paulus
(2001), p. 745; Williams (2010), p. 309.
208. Fukuyama (1992), esp. pp. 276–7.
209. On the historical context of the rise of postmodern thought, see, for example: Blackburn
(2000), p. 267; Boron (1999), p. 63; Butler (2002), p. 127; Delanty (2000b), p. 146;
Eagleton (1995); Flax (2007), p. 74; Gane and Gane (2007), pp. 134–5 and 141;
Hammond (2011), pp. 305–6 and 310–15; Smart (1993), pp. 11–39; Torfing (1999),
pp. 1–2; Wilterdink (2002), pp. 190 and 205–10.
210. Butler (2002), p. 127 (already referred to above).
211. Ibid., p. 127.
212. Flax (2007), p. 74 (italics added).
213. On this point, see ibid., p. 74.
214. Ibid., p. 74.
215. Delanty (2000b), p. 146 (italics added).
318 Notes

216. Ibid., p. 146 (italics added).

217. Ibid., p. 146 (italics added). Cf. Meštrović (1991), pp. 202–4. On this point, see also
Silverman (1999).
218. Gane and Gane (2007), p. 134 (italics added).
219. See Ianni (1999 [1995, 1996]).
220. See Lash and Lury (2007). On this point, see also, for instance: Franklin, Lury, and
Stacey (2000); Lury (2004).
221. Flax (2007), p. 74.
222. Ibid., p. 74.
223. Hammond (2011), p. 312.
224. Ibid., p. 315.
225. Ignatieff (1998), p. 98. On this point, see Hammond (2011), p. 315.
226. Smart (1993), p. 12.
227. See Wilterdink (2002), p. 190. See also Ruiter (1991), p. 27.
228. See previous note on the concept of a global network society.

5 From Modern to Postmodern Politics? The ‘Autonomous Turn’

1. On the ‘autonomous turn’ in politics, see, for example: Brants and Voltmer (2011a, 2011b);
Good and Velody (1998a, 1998b); Habermas (1986); Havel (1999); Laclau (1996);
Meschonnic and Hasumi (2002a, 2002b); Meštrović (1993); Poulain (2002); Rancière
(2002); Squires (1998).
2. On the idea of a ‘postmodern politics’, see, for example: Coleman (2011); Good and Velody
(1998a, 1998b); Haber (1994); Harding (1992); Havel (1999); Heller and Fâehâer (1988);
Ivic and Lakicevic (2011); Janos (1997); Keith and Pile (1993b, 1993c); Krishna (2007);
McGowan (2007); Nel (1999); Rojek and Turner (1998a); Slater (1992); Yeatman (1994).
See also, for instance: Agger (2002), esp. pp. 149–77, 189–97, and 199–216; Coole
(1998b), esp. pp. 117–23; Cooper (1998), esp. pp. 61–3; Buzan, Held, and McGrew (1998),
esp. pp. 388–91; Delanty (2000b), esp. pp. 146–53; McGowan (1991), esp. pp. 89–210
and 211–80; Plant (1998), esp. pp. 82–3 and 86–7; Smart (1992), esp. pp. 176–82; Thiele
(1995); Turner (1990b); Wiley (2005), esp. pp. 65 and 86.
3. On the ‘politics of identity’, see, for example: Appiah (2005); Grainge (1999); Hawthorne
(2004); Keith and Pile (1993a); Kymlicka (2007); Massey (1993); Mulhern (2006 [1997]).
See also, for instance: Augé (1992), esp. p. 145; Bauman and Tester (2007), esp. pp. 28–9;
Butler (2002), esp. pp. 44–61; Chevallier (2008 [2003]), esp. pp. 223–35; Day (2004),
esp. p. 726; Delanty (2000b), esp. pp. 143–53; Eadie (2001), esp. pp. 575, 577, and
580; Fishman (1995), esp. p. 302; Grainge (1999), esp. pp. 628, 633, and 635; Haber
(1994), esp. pp. 113–21; Hutcheon (2007), esp. p. 17; Kellner (2007), esp. pp. 109, 113,
115, and 116; Keupp et al. (1999), esp. pp. 16–25, 45–53, and 170–80; Newman and
Johnson (1999), esp. p. 81; Schneider (2004), esp. pp. 87 and 94; Seidman (1994c), esp.
pp. 126–31 and 136–7; St Louis (2002), esp. pp. 656 and 659; Susen (2010a), pp. 204–8;
Susen (2010b), pp. 260–2 and 271–4; Susen (2013b), pp. 93, 97, and 100 n. 35.
4. On the ‘politics of difference’, see, for example: Di Stefano (1990); Mulhern (2006 [1997]);
Susen (2010a, 2010b); West (1994); Yeatman (1990); Young (1994 [1989], 1990a, 1990b).
See also, for instance: Augé (1992), esp. p. 145; Bauman and Tester (2007), esp. pp. 28–9;
Butler (2002), esp. pp. 44–61; Chevallier (2008 [2003]), esp. pp. 223–35; Day (2004),
esp. p. 726; Delanty (2000b), esp. pp. 143–53; Eadie (2001), esp. pp. 575, 577, and 580;
Fishman (1995), esp. p. 302; Grainge (1999), esp. pp. 628, 633, and 635; Haber (1994),
esp. pp. 113–21; Hutcheon (2007), esp. p. 17; Jullien (2014 [2008]); Kellner (2007), esp.
pp. 109, 113, 115, and 116; Keupp et al. (1999), esp. pp. 16–25, 45–53, and 170–80;
Newman and Johnson (1999), esp. p. 81; Schneider (2004), esp. pp. 87 and 94; Seidman
(1994c), esp. pp. 126–31 and 136–7; St Louis (2002), esp. pp. 656 and 659; Susen (2010a),
pp. 204–8; Susen (2010b), pp. 260–2 and 271–4; Susen (2013b), pp. 93, 97, and 100 n. 35.
 Notes 319

5. On the ‘politics of recognition’, see, for example: Cusset (2003); Fraser (2003a, 2003b,
2007b); Fraser and Honneth (2003a, 2003b, 2003a); Gutmann (1994); Honneth (1995
[1994], 2003a, 2003b, 2007); Lovell (2007a, 2007b); Taylor and Gutmann (1992); van
den Brink and Owen (2007a, 2007b); Voirol (2003); Yar (2001). See also, for instance:
Douzinas (2007), esp. pp. 68 and 71; Gane and Gane (2007), esp. pp. 134–5; Susen
(2007), pp. 192–8.
6. On the concept of community, see, for instance, Bauman (2000a) and Delanty (2003).
See also, for example: Abeysekara (2008); Anderson (1991 [1983]); Bauman (2000b),
pp. 168–201; Benhabib (1992); Chatterjee (1993); Halsall, Jansen, and Murphy (2012);
Plant (1998); Silverman (2012); Walmsley (2000); Young (1990b).
7. On the concepts of commensurability and incommensurability, see, for instance: Bravo
(1996); Pearce (1987); Wright (1984). On these two concepts, see also, for example: Baert
and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 266; Bernstein (1983), p. 198; Butler (2002), pp. 19–40, 56,
and 122; Clark (2006), see esp. pp. 392, 393, and 397; Fielding (2009), p. 430; Goulimari
(2007b), p. 1; Laudan (1990), chapter 5; Parusnikova (1992), p. 24; Paulus (2001), p. 733;
Sokal and Bricmont (1998), pp. 51–68, 71–8, 78–85, 85–92, 92–9, and 99–105; Susen
(2011e), pp. 55–8, 62–4, 75, 76–7, and 79–80; Szahaj (1995), pp. 562–3; van Raaij (1993),
p. 542; Weyembergh (1995), p. 576.
8. See previous note.
9. See previous notes on the ‘politics of identity’, the ‘politics of difference’, and the ‘politics of
recognition’ respectively.
10. On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2010b). See also Susen (2010a).
11. See Susen (2010b), pp. 271–4.
12. Ibid., p. 272.
13. Young (1994 [1989]), p. 391.
14. See Susen (2010b), pp. 264–5. See also Marshall (1964 [1963], 1981); and Turner (2009).
15. See Susen (2010b), pp. 272–3.
16. On this point, see Holloway and Peláez (1998). See also, for example: Holloway (2010),
pp. 53 and 240; Susen (2010b), p. 279 n. 31; Susen (2012a), p. 316 n. 53.
17. On the sociohistorical significance of this paradigmatic transition, see, for instance: Day
(2004), pp. 717–18, 722–3, 726, 728, 735–6, and 740; Delanty (2000b), pp. 143–4;
Evans (1997a), pp. 231–5 and 239–41; Gane and Gane (2007), p. 133; Jameson (1984),
pp. 319–45; Patton (2004), p. 11875; Torfing (1999), pp. 55–6 and 291; West (1994);
Wilterdink (2002), pp. 190 and 205–10.
18. For a detailed analysis of this shift, see von Beyme (1991), pp. 296–321. On this point, see
also, for example: Browne and Susen (2014), pp. 224–8; Susen (2008a), pp. 60–80; Susen
(2008b), pp. 148–64; Susen (2010a), pp. 151–8; Susen (2010b), pp. 268–71. On the concept
of power in the literature concerned with, or used in relation to, modern and/or post-
modern thought, see, for instance: Agger (2002), esp. pp. 150 and 167; Butler (2002), esp.
pp. 44–5; Carretero Pasín (2006); Delanty (2000b), esp. pp. 51–3; Doyran (2011); Grabham
(2009); Hartsock (1990); Ivashkevich (2011); Lykke (2010); Newman and Johnson (1999);
Nietzsche (1967 [1930]); Pease (2002), esp. pp. 138–44; Rømer (2011); Smith (2006);
Susen (2009a); Taylor (1989); van den Brink and Owen (2007a, 2007b); Weiss (1997a,
1998). The literature on sociological approaches to the concept of power is vast. For use-
ful discussions, see, for example: Bachrach and Baratz (1971 [1962]); Baumgartner et al.
(1976); Bendix and Lipset (1967); Bentham (1971 [1843]); Boltanski (2009); Bourdieu
(1976, 1979, 1992); Burns and Buckley (1976); Champlin (1971a, 1971b); Clegg (1979,
1989); Clegg and Haugaard (2009); Cox, Furlong, and Page (1985); Dean (2013); Dowding
(1996, 2011); Emmet (1971 [1954]); Foucault (1979 [1975], 1980); Goldman (1986
[1972]); Habermas (1981a, 1981b, 1987b [1985]); Haugaard (1997, 2002); Hearse (2007);
Hindess (1996); Hobbes (1971 [1651]); Holloway (2005 [2002]); Honneth (1991 [1986]);
Isaac (1987); Lukes (1974, 1986a, 1986b); MacKenzie (1999); March (1971 [1966]); Martin
(1977); Marx (1972 [1852]); McClelland (1971 [1966]); Mendieta y Nuñez (1969); Miller
(1987); Morgenthau (1971 [1958]); Morriss (2002 [1987]); Poggi (2001); Poulantzas (1980
320 Notes

[1978]); Rojek (2013); Russell (1986 [1938]); Scott (1996, 2001, 1990b); Simmel (1986
[1950]); Stewart (2001); Susen (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2014a);
Weber (1980 [1922]); Wolin (1988); Wrong (1995 [1979]).
19. Taylor (1989), p. 20.
20. On this point, see Susen (2010b), p. 270.
21. See Susen (2011d), esp. pp. 51–6.
22. On this point, see Susen (2010b), p. 271 See also Susen (2010a), pp. 154–8.
23. Lyotard (1984 [1979]), p. 82 (italics added). For further discussion of this frequently
quoted aphorism, see, for example: Ashley (1994), p. 62; Calhoun (1995b), p. 110; Lash
(1992), p. 178.
24. Huyssen (1990), p. 271.
25. Bauman (1991), pp. 244–5 (italics added).
26. Delanty (2000b), p. 149.
27. Ibid., p. 149.
28. Ibid., p. 149. See also ibid., pp. 5 and 99.
29. Ibid., p. 150 (italics added).
30. Ibid., p. 150 (italics added). On this point, see also Connolly (1995).
31. Delanty (2000b), p. 150 (italics added).
32. Ibid., p. 150 (italics added). On this point, see also ibid., pp. 151–3.
33. Ibid., p. 153.
34. Ibid., p. 153. On this point, see also Calhoun (1995a) and Mouffe (1993).
35. Fraser (1995c), p. 68 (italics added). See also Squires (1998), p. 127. On this point, see
also, for instance: Benhabib et al. (1995); Cusset (2003); Fraser (1995a, 1995b, 2007b);
Fraser and Honneth (2003a); Honneth (1995 [1994], 2007); Lovell (2007a, 2007b); Susen
(2007), pp. 192–8; van den Brink and Owen (2007a, 2007b); Voirol (2003); Yar (2001).
36. Squires (1998), p. 128.
37. Ibid., p. 129.
38. Butler (2002), p. 57.
39. Ibid., p. 57.
40. Ibid., p. 56 (italics in original; except for ‘all’).
41. Ibid., p. 57.
42. Ibid., p. 59 (italics in original).
43. Delanty (2000b), p. 144.
44. Vattimo (1992 [1989]), pp. 8–9 (italics added; except for ‘disorientation’, which is itali-
cized in the original version). On this point, see also Delanty (2000b), p. 144.
45. Hutcheon (2007), p. 17.
46. Benhabib (1992), p. 15. On this point, see also Hutcheon (2007), p. 17.
47. Douzinas (2007), p. 68. On this point, see also ibid., p. 71.
48. See Newman and Johnson (1999), p. 81.
49. Eagleton (1995), p. 68.
50. Coole (1998a), p. 358.
51. Grainge (1999), p. 635.
52. Ibid., p. 635. On this point, see also Cole (2003), p. 493.
53. Grainge (1999), p. 635.
54. Ibid., p. 635.
55. St Louis (2002), p. 659.
56. Yar (2001), p. 72. On this point, see also, for instance: Chevallier (2008 [2003]), esp.
pp. 223–35; Susen (2010b), esp. pp. 260–2 and 268–74.
57. Cole (2003), p. 492.
58. See Schneider (2004), esp. p. 87. On the concept of intersectionality, see also, for example:
Susen (2012b), p. 716; Susen (2012a), pp. 284 and 290.
59. Kellner (2007), p. 109 (italics added). On postmodern conceptions of ‘mapping’, see also, for
instance: Huyssen (1990); Jones, Natter, and Schatzki (1993a); Kellner (2007); Pile and
Thrift (1995a, 1995b); Žižek (1994).
 Notes 321

60. Kellner (2007), p. 113 (italics added).

61. Ibid., p. 116 (italics added). On this point, see also ibid., pp. 119–23.
62. Ibid., p. 116.
63. Ibid., p. 115.
64. Ibid., p. 115 (italics added).
65. Ibid., p. 115 (italics in original).
66. Ibid., p. 113 (italics added).
67. On this point, see Bloch (1959). See also Gunn (1987). In addition, see Susen (2008a,
2008b).
68. Kellner (2007), p. 113 (italics added).
69. Fraser and Honneth (2003b), p. 1 (italics added). In relation to this point, see Fraser and
Honneth (2003a).
70. See Hegel (1977 [1807], 1990 [1825–26], 1975 [1837]). See also Susen (2015a), p. 1028.
71. See Honneth (1995 [1994]).
72. See Taylor and Gutmann (1992) and Gutmann (1994).
73. Fraser and Honneth (2003b), p. 1 (italics added).
74. Ibid., p. 2 (italics added).
75. Ibid., p. 2 (italics added).
76. On this point, see, for example: Fraser (2003a, 2003b); Fraser and Honneth (2003a,
2003b); Honneth (2003a, 2003b). On this point, see also, for instance: Bernstein
(2005); Boltanski (1990a, 1993); Cole (2003); Fraser (2007b); Habermas (1990); Harvey
(1996); Honneth (1995); Lovell (2007a); Miller and Walzer (1995); Nielsen (2003);
Rawls (1999 [1971]); Rojek and Turner (1998a); Turner and Rojek (2001); Young
(1990a).
77. Fraser (2003a), p. 7 (italics added).
78. Ibid., p. 7.
79. Ibid., p. 7.
80. See Fraser and Honneth (2003a).
81. See Parekh (2008), esp. pp. 8–30, 31–55, 80–98, and 152–80.
82. See Fraser (2003a), esp. pp. 7–11.
83. Ibid., p. 9 (italics added; except for ‘both’ and ‘and’, which are italicized in the original
version).
84. Ibid., p. 9.
85. Ibid., p. 9 (italics added).
86. Haber (1994), p. 121.
87. On this point, see Susen (2010a), esp. pp. 151–8. See also Susen (2010b), pp. 268–71,
and Susen (2015a), pp. 1034–6.
88. On this point, see, for example: Apter (1992); Basconzuelo, Morel, and Susen (2010a,
2010b); Boggs (1995); Chernaik (1996); Chesters and Welsh (2005); Day (2004); della
Porta et al. (2006); Eder (1985); Gundelach (1989); Hamel et al. (2001a, 2001b); Harding
(1992); Jogdand, and Michael (2003); Kriesi (1995); Laclau (1992); Laraña, Johnston, and
Gusfield (1994); Mayo (2005); Melucci (1980, 1994, 1996); Nederveen Pieterse (1992a,
1992b); Nielsen (2003); Offe (1985); Plotke (1995); Ray (1993); Roseneil (2001);  Scott
(1990a); Sklair (1995, 1997); Slater (1992); Smith and Johnston (2002a, 2002b); Susen
(2010a); Waterman (1998); Wertheim (1992).
89. Delanty (2000b), p. 147.
90. See, for example, Callinicos (1989).
91. See, for example, O’Neill (1995).
92. See, for example, Habermas (1987a [1985]) and Susen (2007).
93. See, for example, Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield (1994); Melucci (1980, 1994); Nederveen
Pieterse (1992a); Plotke (1995); Ray (1993); Roseneil (2001); Scott (1990a); Smith and
Johnston (2002a); Susen (2010a); Touraine (1995 [1992]); and Waterman (1998).
94. See, for example, Bourdieu (1997, 1999); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992); Susen (2007,
2011a, 2011e).
322 Notes

95. Delanty (2000b), p. 147 (italics added).

96. Ibid., p. 147 (italics added) (in the original version, the word ‘postmodernism’ is misspelled).
97. On this point, see Susen (2010a, 2010b).
98. Bauman and Tester (2007), p. 23 (italics added).
99. Ibid., p. 23.
100. Ibid., p. 24.
101. Ibid., p. 23.
102. Ibid., p. 23.
103. Ibid., p. 23.
104. Ibid., p. 23.
105. Ibid., p. 24.
106. Ibid., p. 24 (italics added).
107. Ibid., p. 24 (italics added) (drawing upon Albert Camus). On the influence of Camus
on Bauman’s intellectual development, see Tester (2002).
108. Bauman and Tester (2007), p. 25.
109. Ibid., p. 29.
110. On this point, see ibid., p. 29.
111. Kellner (2007), p. 117.
112. Cf. Susen (2010d).
113. See Jacobsen and Marshman (2008), p. 804 (italics added).
114. See ibid., p. 804.
115. See ibid., p. 804. On this point, see also Berman (1983) and Marx and Engels
(1987/1945 [1848]). On the relevance of this aphorism to postmodern thought, see, for
instance, Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 144.
116. Jacobsen and Marshman (2008), p. 805 (italics added).
117. Ibid., p. 805 (italics added).
118. Bauman (2005), p. 2 (italics added). On this point, see also Jacobsen and Marshman
(2008), p. 805.
119. On the concept of liquidity, see, for example: Bauman (2000b, 2007); Gane (2001); Gane
and Gane (2007), p. 136; Jay (2010); Taylor and Trentmann (2011).
120. Jacobsen and Marshman (2008), p. 805.
121. Ibid., p. 805 (italics added).
122. On this point, see, for instance: Bauman (1991); Bauman and Tester (2007), esp.
pp. 23–5 and 29; Hammond (2011), pp. 305, 310, 312, and 315; Iggers (2005 [1997]),
pp. 146–7; Jacobsen and Marshman (2008), pp. 804–7; Kellner (2007), p. 117; Mulinari
and Sandell (2009), p. 495; Quicke (1999), p. 281; Susen (2010d), esp. pp. 62–78; van
Raaij (1993), esp. pp. 543–6, 551–5, and 559–61 (already referred to above).
123. On the ‘end of ideology’ thesis, see, for example: Bell (2000 [1960]); Donskis (2000);
Rubinstein (2009); Waxman (1968). On this point, see Introduction. See also van Raaij
(1993), pp. 543–6.
124. For an excellent introduction to political ideologies, see Heywood (2007 [1992]). For
useful discussions of the concept of ideology, see also, for instance: Abercrombie,
Hill, and Turner (1980, 1990); Apel (1971a); Bell (2000 [1960]); Boltanski (2008);
Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]); Brown (1994a); Chiapello and Fairclough
(2002); Cloud (1994); Cole (1994); Conde-Costas (1991); Donskis (2000); Eagleton
(2006 [1976], 2007 [1991]); Honneth (2007); Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield (1994);
Larrain (1991b [1983]); Lee (1992); Marx and Engels (1953 [1845–47]); Marx and
Engels (2000/1977 [1846]); Mongardini (1992); Pelinka (1981); Rehmann (2004);
Reitz (2004); Rossi-Landi (1974 [1972]); Rubinstein (2009); Scott (1990a); Simons
and Billig (1994); Susen (2011a); Susen (2013e), pp. 211 and 228; van Dijk (1998);
von Beyme (1991); Wacquant (2002 [1993]); Watson (2011); Waxman (1968); Wolff
(2004); Žižek (1989, 1994).
125. Van Raaij (1993), p. 544 (italics added).
126. Ibid., p. 544.
 Notes 323

127. Ibid., p. 551 (italics added).

128. Ibid., p. 551 (italics added).
129. See previous note on anything goes.
130. Van Raaij (1993), p. 551.
131. Ibid., p. 554 (italics added).
132. Ibid., p. 560.
133. Ibid., p. 560.
134. Ibid., p. 560.
135. Ibid., p. 560.
136. Ibid., p. 560. On this point, cf. Susen (2011d), pp. 51–6.
137. Van Raaij (1993), p. 562 (italics added).
138. Ibid., p. 562 (italics added).
139. Durkheim (2010 [1924]), p. 59.
140. On the role of ‘identity’ in a ‘postmodern world’, see, for instance, Sarup (1996).
141. Susen (2007), p. 292.
142. Ibid., p. 292 (italics added).
143. See previous note on anything goes.
144. Van Raaij (1993), p. 560.
145. Hammond (2011), p. 310 (italics added).
146. Ibid., p. 310.
147. Ibid., p. 310.
148. Ibid., p. 312.
149. Delanty (2000b), p. 134.
150. Ibid., p. 146 (italics added).
151. Ibid., p. 146 (quotation modified: ‘expressed’ replaced with ‘expresses’).
152. See previous note on the announcement of ‘the end of “the social”’.
153. Delanty (2000b), pp. 146–7.
154. See previous note on the ‘crisis’ rhetoric in contemporary social thought.
155. Delanty (2000b), p. 148.
156. Wiley (2005), p. 86 (italics in original).
157. Torfing (1999), p. 69 (italics in original).
158. Delanty (2000b), p. 135 (italics added).
159. Ibid., p. 135.
160. On this point, see ibid., p. 135.
161. On this point, see ibid., p. 135.
162. Ibid., p. 133.
163. Ibid., p. 133.
164. Ibid., p. 133 (italics added).
165. Ibid., p. 136.
166. Ibid., p. 136.
167. Ibid., p. 136.
168. On this point, see ibid., p. 136. For an outline of a critical theory of cultural production,
see, for instance, Susen (2011b).
169. On this point, see Bourdieu (1979, 1984 [1979]), as well as Lyotard (1979, 1984 [1979]).
Perhaps it is no accident that Bourdieu’s La distinction and Lyotard’s La condition post-
moderne were published in the same year (1979). Indeed, even the English translations
of these two influential studies came out in the same year (1984).
170. See previous note on the postmodern attack on the distinction between ‘high art’ and ‘low
art’ (and ‘high culture’ and ‘low culture’).
171. On this point, particularly in relation to the ‘affective turn’, see, for example: Adkins
(2013); Burkitt (2014); Clough and Halley (2007); Colebrook (2010); Davetian (2005);
Flatley (2008); McCalman and Pickering (2010); Thompson and Hoggett (2012).
172. On this issue, see, for instance: Susen (2007), pp. 118–21, 155–6, and 161; Susen
(2011a), p. 463; Susen (2012b), p. 718; Susen (2012a), p. 302.
324 Notes

173. On this tripartite typology, see Jones, Le Boutillier, and Bradbury (2011 [2003]), p. 86.
174. Wiley (2005), p. 65 (italics added).
175. Ibid., p. 65.
176. See the title of Good and Velody (1998b).
177. Ibid., p. 1.
178. Ibid., p. 3. On this point, see also Plant (1992).
179. Good and Velody (1998b), p. 3.
180. Ibid., p. 5.
181. Ibid., p. 5.
182. Ibid., p. 6.
183. Squires (1998), p. 129.
184. On this point, see Thompson and Hoggett (2012).
185. Squires (1998), p. 131. On this point, see ibid., pp. 131–5.
186. Ibid., p. 126.
187. Ibid., p. 126.
188. Plant (1998), p. 82.
189. Cf. ibid., p. 82 (as opposed to the previous point).
190. On the meaning of the English word ‘sense’, as well as on the sociological significance of its
etymological origins, see Susen (2007), pp. 118–19.
191. See, for instance, Poulain (2002), p. 15.
192. Butler (2002), p. 44.
193. Ibid., p. 44.
194. Ibid., p. 44.
195. On the relationship between ‘validity claims’ and ‘legitimacy claims’, see, for example:
Susen (2007), p. 257; Susen (2013e), esp. pp. 200, 207–15, 217–18, 219, 222, 225–30;
Susen (2013f), esp. pp. 330, 331, 334, 335, 337, 339, 341, 342, 343, 344, 349, 363, 365,
and 369. Cf. Bourdieu (1982b, 2002).
196. Butler (2002), p. 45.
197. In opposition to the previous point, see ibid., p. 45.
198. Ibid., p. 45.
199. Stead and Bakker (2010), p. 51 (italics added; except for ‘other’, which is italicized in
the original version). On this point, see also Hook (2007).
200. Stead and Bakker (2010), p. 51 (italics added) (already quoted above).
201. On this point, see Susen (2008a, 2008b). See also Susen (2007), pp. 173–4, 183–4, and
192–8.
202. Stead and Bakker (2010), p. 51.
203. Ibid., p. 51.
204. Pease (2002), p. 138. On this point, see ibid., pp. 138–40.
205. Stead and Bakker (2010), p. 53.
206. On this point, see Susen (2007), pp. 92–4.
207. Foucault (1978 [1976]), p. 95. On this point, see also Pease (2002), p. 141. In addi-
tion, see, for example, Susen (2008a), pp. 76–80, and Susen (2008b), pp. 155–9 and
167–9.
208. See Boltanski and Chiapello (1999). On this point, see also, for instance: Boltanski,
Rennes, and Susen (2010); Chiapello and Fairclough (2002); Fairclough (2002); Gadrey
et al. (2001); Susen (2012b, 2012a); Turner (2007).
209. Pease (2002), p. 144.
210. See Susen (2007), pp. 280–3.
211. See ibid., pp. 283–7.
212. Pease (2002), p. 144.
213. Agger (2002), p. 166.
214. Schweppenhäuser (1997), p. 181 (my translation); original text in German: ‘der Geist
des Multikulturalismus’.
215. Ibid., p. 181 (my translation); original text in German: ‘die Kulturen zusammenrücken’.
 Notes 325

216. Ibid., p. 181 (my translation); original text in German: ‘kontinuierliche Erlebnis-,
Handlungs- und Denkweisen’. On this point, see also ibid., p. 182.
217. Susen (2007), pp. 287–8 (italics in original).
218. Ibid., p. 288 (italics in original).
219. Schweppenhäuser (1997), p. 182 (my translation); original text in German: ‘die
Befriedigung materieller und geistiger Bedürfnisse der Menschen’.
220. Ibid., p. 183 (italics in original) (my translation); original text in German: ‘Kultur ist
stets fehlbar […]. Möglichkeiten ihres Gelingens sind einzig die nie abschließbare,
wechselseitige Vermittlung zwischen Subjekt und Objekt. Eine offene Kultur kann
mißlingen, aber nur als offene könnte sie auch gelingen.’
221. Susen (2013b), p. 92. On this point, see also, for example: Susen (2011b), pp. 174–5;
Triandis (1996), esp. pp. 408–9; Williams (1994), esp. p. 48.
222. Raz (1995), p. 308 (italics added) (my translation); original text in German:
‘“Kontextualität” und “Wertepluralismus” als den Kern […] des Multikulturalismus”’.
On this point, see also Schweppenhäuser (1997), p. 182.
223. This typology differs from other typologies in the relevant literature. For instance, on
a tripartite model of (i) lifeworldly (lebensweltlich), (ii) philosophical, and (iii) political
multiculturalism, see Schweppenhäuser (1997), pp. 184–6.
224. Ibid., p. 184 (my translation); original text in German: ‘Konsum-Multikulturalität der
warenproduzierenden Gesellschaft’.
225. Ibid., p. 185 (my translation); original text in German: ‘kulturelle Hegemonie-
Ansprüche’.
226. Ibid., p. 185 (my translation); original text in German: ‘eurozentrische und imperialis-
tische Beiklänge’.
227. Grimm and Ronneberger (1994), p. 91 (my translation); original text in German:
‘Internationalisierung der städtischen Ökonomie’. On this point, see also
Schweppenhäuser (1997), p. 185.
228. Schweppenhäuser (1997), p. 186 (my translation); original text in German: ‘[d]ie Welt
als multikulturelles Happening’.
229. Ibid., p. 187 (italics added) (my translation); original text in German: ‘Doppelgesicht
des Begriffs Multikulturalismus’.
230. Ibid., p. 187 (italics added) (my translation); original text in German: ‘Auseinandersetzung
zwischen partikularistischen und universalistischen Konzeptionen’.
231. Ibid., p. 187 (my translation); original text in German: ‘Konflikt zwischen Gleichheit
und Differenz’.
232. Ibid., p. 187 (my translation); original text in German: ‘Anspruch auf Anerkennung
ihrer je besonderen kulturellen Identität, ihrer Andersheit’.
233. Ibid., p. 191 (my translation); original text in German: ‘Akzeptanz multikultureller
Vielfalt’.
234. Ibid., p. 191 (my translation); original text in German: ‘Anerkennung der potentiellen
Gleichwertigkeit verschiedener Kulturen’.
235. Ibid., p. 191 (my translation); original text in German: ‘Besonderheit individueller und
kollektiver Identitätsformen’.
236. On this point, see, for instance, Barry (2001).
237. On these points, see, for example, Crouch (1999), esp. pp. 287–92.
238. On these points, see, for example, ibid., pp. 288–90. See also Parekh (2008),
pp. 80–98.
239. In most cases of this type, the cultural minority is kept separate from the cultural major-
ity. In some cases of this type, however, the cultural majority is kept separate from the
cultural minority (for instance, under apartheid in South Africa).
240. In most cases of this type, the cultural minority is expected to adapt to the cultural major-
ity. In some cases of this type, however, the cultural majority is expected to adapt to the
cultural minority (for instance, under colonial rule).
241. See Susen (2010b).
326 Notes

242. Chevallier (2008 [2003]), p. 227 (my translation); original text in French: ‘[l]a diversifi-
cation croissante des groupes ethniques, des confessions, des modes de vie, des visions
du monde’.
243. Ibid., p. 227 (italics added) (my translation); original text in French: ‘citoyenneté
multiculturelle’.
244. On the concept of multiculturalism, see, for instance: Barry (2001); Chevallier (2008
[2003]); Crowder (2013); Jullien (2014 [2008]); Kelly (2002); Khory (2012); Kymlicka
(2005, 2007); Kymlicka and He (2005); Lutz, Herrera Vivar, and Supik (2011); Modood
(2013 [2007]); Nemoianu (2010); Parekh (2008); Phillips (2007); Schweppenhäuser
(1997); Taylor and Gutmann (1992); Yar (2001). See also, for instance: Susen (2010a),
pp. 204–8; Susen (2010b), pp. 260–2 and 271–4; Susen (2013b), pp. 93, 97, and 100 n. 35.
245. Kymlicka (2007), p. 3.
246. Ibid., p. 3 (both ‘political’ and ‘discourse’ are italicized in the original version).
247. Ibid., p. 4.
248. Ibid., p. 4.
249. Ibid., p. 4.
250. Ibid., p. 3.
251. Ibid., p. 7.
252. Ibid., p. 8.
253. See ibid., p. 17.
254. On this point, see, for example: Benhabib, Shapiro, and Petranovi (2007); Gilbert
(2010); Gleizer (1997); Hoogheem (2010); Isin and Wood (1999); Jenkins (2008
[1996]); Keith and Pile (1993a); Keupp et al. (1999); Lawler (2008); Maffesoli (1996
[1988]); Nemoianu (2010); Parekh (2008); Sarup (1996); Susen (2010d); Zima (2000).
255. Parekh (2008), p. 12. On this point, see also Appiah (2005).
256. On this point, see, for example, Mead (1967 [1934]), esp. pp. 173–8, 192–200, 209–13,
and 273–81. See also James (1890) as well as Susen (2010d).
257. On this point, see Susen (2007), pp. 92–4.
258. Parekh (2008), p. 13.
259. Ibid., p. 25.
260. On this point, see ibid., p. 37.
261. Ibid., p. 41.
262. See ibid., pp. 152–80.
263. See ibid., pp. 152–5.
264. On the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, see Huntington (1996).
265. Parekh (2008), p. 153. On this point, see also Gilbert (2010), pp. 181–2.
266. Parekh (2008), p. 153.
267. Ibid., p. 152 (italics added).
268. Ibid., p. 152 (italics added).
269. Ibid., pp. 152–3 (italics added).
270. See ibid., pp. 152–80.
271. See ibid., p. 154. The quoted passages are taken from Huntington (1996), pp. 43 and
20, respectively.
272. See Parekh (2008), p. 153 (italics added).
273. See ibid., p. 154 (italics added).
274. See ibid., p. 154 (italics added).
275. Ibid., p. 154 (italics added).
276. On this point, see, for instance: Susen (2009b), pp. 113–15; Susen (2010c), pp. 111–12
and 117.
277. On this debate, see, for example: Furseth (2009); Habermas (2002 [1981, 1991, 1997],
2008 [2005], 2010 [2008]); Habermas and Ratzinger (2006 [2005]).
278. Phillips (2007), p. 1.
279. Ibid., p. 11.
280. Parekh (2008), p. 155.
 Notes 327

281. On the concept of cosmopolitanism, see, for example: Appiah (2007 [2006]); Archibugi
(2008); Archibugi, Held, and Köhler (1998); Beck (1998, 2000, 2002a, 2003, 2006
[2004], 2011); Beck and Sznaider (2006); Benhabib (2008); Bohman and Lutz-
Bachmann (1997); Breckenridge, Pollock, and Bhabha (2002); Brennan (1997);
Brown and Held (2010); Buzan, Held, and McGrew (1998); Calhoun (2007); Cheah
and Robbins (1998); Chernilo (2007a); Delanty (2000a); Delanty (2003), pp. 149–53;
Delanty (2009, 2012); Fine (2003, 2007); Habermas (2003); Held (2010); Holton (2009,
2011 [1998]); Hutchings and Dannreuther (1999 [1998]); Inglis and Robertson (2008);
Jacob (2006); Kendall, Woodward, and Skrbiš (2009); Kögler (2005); Post (2008); Reid,
Gill, and Sears (2010); Rovisco and Nowicka (2011); Rumford (2008); Skrbiš and
Woodward (2013); Toulmin (1990); Turner (2000a, 2000b, 2002); Vertovec and Cohen
(2002); Waldron (2000); Walzer (1995); Went (2004); Woodward, Skrbiš, and Bean
(2008); Yeĝenoĝlu (2005); Zolo (1997).
282. On this point, see Delanty (2009), p. 253.
283. Ibid., p. 253.
284. Ibid., p. 253.
285. Ibid., p. 253. On this point, see also ibid., pp. 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 143,
150, 151, 153, 154, and 156. In addition, see Kymlicka (2005).
286. Delanty (2009), p. 253.
287. Ibid., p. 253.
288. Ibid., p. 253.
289. Ibid., p. 253.
290. Ibid., p. 253.
291. Ibid., p. 253.
292. On the distinction between ‘first-order principles’ and ‘second-order principles’, see, for
instance, Susen (2013b), pp. 95–7.
293. On this point, see, for instance, ibid., pp. 95–7.
294. On this point, see Delanty (2009), p. 253.
295. Ibid., p. 253.
296. Ibid., p. 253.
297. Ibid., p. 253.
298. See ibid., p. 255.
299. Ibid., p. 255.
300. Ibid., p. 255.
301. Ibid., p. 255.
302. Ibid., p. 255 (in the original version, ‘diasporic’ is misspelled [‘disaporic’]).
303. See ibid., p. 253.
304. Ibid., p. 255 (italics added).
305. On this concept, see Archibugi (2008).
306. On this point, see Delanty (2009), p. 254.
307. On this point, see ibid., p. 254. See also Susen (2012a), pp. 286, 287, 290, 293, 303,
306, and 323–4 n. 148.
308. Delanty (2009), p. 254.
309. Fine (2007), p. ix.
310. Ibid., p. ix (italics added). It should be noted, however, that – on most occasions – Kant
used the terms Weltbürger, weltbürgerlich, and Weltbürgerlichkeit, which are commonly
translated into English as ‘cosmopolitan citizen’, ‘cosmopolitan’, and ‘cosmopolitan-
ism’, respectively.
311. Hegel (1991 [1820]), p. 240 / §209. On this point, see Fine (2007), p. ix (italics added).
On this point, see also ibid., p. 30.
312. Fine (2007), p. ix (italics added).
313. Ibid., p. ix (italics added).
314. Ibid., p. ix (italics added).
315. Durkheim (2010 [1924]), p. 59.
328 Notes

316. Cf. Bell (2001).

317. Fine (2007), p. ix (italics added); Fine quoting from Aron (1972 [1968]), p. 200.
318. Fine (2007), pp. ix, 6, 7, 9. 10, 11, 13, and 14.
319. Ibid., pp. ix, 6, 7, and 11.
320. Susen (2007), p. 278.
321. Ibid., p. 278.
322. Ibid., p. 278.
323. Ibid., p. 278.
324. Fine (2007), p. x (italics added).
325. Ibid., p. xvii.
326. Post (2008), p. 1.
327. Ibid., p. 1. More generally, on the significance of the relationship between ‘universal-
ism’ and ‘particularism’ in recent and current debates on cosmopolitanism, see also ibid.,
pp. 1–9.
328. Ibid., p. 9.
329. Ibid., p. 1 (italics added).
330. Ibid., p. 1 (italics added).
331. Fine (2007), p. x.
332. Ibid., p. x.
333. Ibid., p. x.
334. Beck (2002b), p. 51. On this point, see also, for instance: Beck (2002a, 2003, 2006
[2004]); Beck (2011), esp. p. 18; Fine (2007), esp. pp. 6–9.
335. Fine (2007), p. 6.
336. Ibid., pp. ix, 6, 7, and 11.
337. Arguably, the critique of ‘methodological nationalism’ is much older than often
assumed, thus preceding Beck’s recent writings concerned with this issue. In fact, the
‘methodological-nationalist’ tendency to conceive of nation-states as largely inde-
pendent, self-contained, and self-sufficient – in short, autopoietic – units of social
and political organization was criticized by various thinkers in the 1970s. See, for
instance, Giddens (1981 [1973]) and Martins (1974). On this point, cf. Fine (2007),
p. 7; more generally on this point, see ibid., pp. 6–17. On the critique of the critique of
‘methodological nationalism’, see, for example: Chernilo (2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b,
2008).
338. Fine (2007), p. xvii (italics added).
339. Ibid., p. x.
340. Ibid., p. x (italics added).
341. Ibid., p. xi. On the relationship between natural law and social theory (including cosmo-
politan social theory), see also, for instance: Chernilo (2013a, 2013b); Chernilo and
Fine (2013); Fine (2013); Thornhill (2013); Turner (2013a).
342. Fine (2007), p. xi.
343. On this point, see ibid., p. xi (no. 7).
344. On this point, see ibid., p. xi.
345. On this point, see ibid., p. xi (italics added).
346. Ibid., p. xi.
347. Ibid., p. xv (italics added).
348. Ibid., p. xv.
349. Ibid., p. xvi.
350. Ibid., p. xvi.
351. Ibid., p. xvi.
352. Ibid., p. xvi (italics added).
353. On the concept of human rights, see, for example: Armaline, Glasberg, and Purkayastha
(2014); Benhabib (2011); Blau and Frezzo (2012); Douzinas (2007); Frezzo (2005);
Morgan and Turner (2009); Turner (1993); Woodiwiss (2003, 2005).
354. Fine (2007), p. xi.
 Notes 329

355. Ibid., p. xi.

356. On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2010b), esp. pp. 262–74.
357. Fine (2007), p. xi.
358. Ibid., p. xi.
359. Ibid., p. xi.
360. Ibid., p. xi.
361. Ibid., pp. xi–xii.
362. Ibid., p. xii.
363. Ibid., p. xii (italics in original).
364. Ibid., p. xii.
365. Ibid., p. xii.
366. Ibid., p. xii.
367. Ibid., p. xii. On this concept, see also ibid., pp. ix, xiii, 11, 24, 39, 40, 56, 57, 59, 69,
71, 73, 75, 136, 137, 138, and 171.
368. Ibid., p. xii (italics added).
369. Ibid., p. xii.
370. Ibid., p. xii.
371. Ibid., p. xii.
372. Ibid., pp. xii–xiii (italics added).
373. Ibid., p. xiii.
374. Ibid., p. xiii.
375. Ibid., p. xvi.
376. Ibid., p. xvi. On this point, see also ibid., pp. x, xi, xvi, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 39, 40, 56, 81, 82, 83, 94, 96, 135, and 175. In addition, see Fine
and Chernilo (2004).
377. Fine (2007), p. xvi.
378. Ibid., p. xvi.
379. Ibid., p. xvi (as Hegel puts it).
380. Ibid., p. xvi.
381. Ibid., p. xvii.
382. Delanty (2003), p. 149 (italics added). On this concept, see ibid., chapter 8.
383. Ibid., p. 150.
384. Ibid., p. 150 (italics added).
385. Ibid., p. 150.
386. Ibid., p. 149.
387. On this concept, see, for instance, Robertson (1995). See also Susen (2010a), pp. 196–7,
and Susen (2012a), p. 306 (already referred to in Chapter 3).
388. Delanty (2009), p. 1.
389. Ibid., p. 1.
390. Ibid., p. 5.
391. Ibid., p. 5.
392. Ibid., p. 5.
393. Ibid., p. 5.
394. Ibid., p. 5.
395. Ibid., p. 7 (italics added).
396. Ibid., p. 7 (italics added). See also ibid., pp. 125 and 149.
397. See Massey (1993, 2005). See also Susen (2013c).
398. See Delanty (2009), p. 7.
399. Ibid., p. 7 (italics added).
400. Ibid., p. 7.
401. Ibid., p. 7.
402. Ibid., p. 9.
403. Ibid., p. 9. See also ibid., p. 8.
404. See, for instance, ibid., p. 111. See also ibid., p. 66.
330 Notes

405. See, for instance, ibid., p. 111. See also ibid., pp. 57, 110, 112, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121,
123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, and 131. On this point, see also, for instance: Hutchings
and Dannreuther (1999 [1998]); Smith (2007); Turner (2000b, 2000a, 2002).
406. See, for instance, Haber (1994).
407. See, for instance, Bridges (1994) and Miller (1993a).
408. Delanty (2009), p. 111 (italics added).
409. Ibid., p. 112.
410. Ibid., p. 122.
411. Ibid., p. 123.
412. Ibid., p. 123.
413. Ibid., p. 123.
414. Ibid., p. 120 (italics added). On this point, see also Sassen (1996).
415. Delanty (2009), p. 120 (italics added).
416. Ibid., p. 126.
417. Ibid., p. 126. See also ibid., pp. 58, 127, and 130.
418. Ibid., p. 126. See also ibid., p. 58. In addition, see Smith (2007).
419. Benhabib (2004), p. 174 (italics in original). On this point, see also Delanty (2009),
pp. 57 and 127.
420. Benhabib (2004), pp. 174–5 (italics added). On this point, see Delanty (2009), p. 127
(italics added).
421. On this point, see, for instance, Post (2008), p. 1: ‘the inescapable interdependence of
the globe. For the past half century, we have grown ever more tightly interconnected
by the expanding international circulation of persons, capital, commerce, pollution,
information, labor, goods, viruses, and so on, ad infinitum’ (italics in original).
422. Delanty (2009), p. 127 (italics added). On this point, see also, for instance: Beck (1998,
2000, 2002a, 2003, 2006 [2004], 2011); Beck and Sznaider (2006).
423. Delanty (2009), p. 128.
424. On the concept of irony in this context, see, for instance: Coleman (2011); Domańska
(1998b); Rorty (1989); Sim (2002); Smith (2007); Turner (2000b, 2000a, 2002);
Weyembergh (1995).
425. Delanty (2009), p. 129.
426. Ibid., p. 129.
427. Ibid., p. 129.
428. Ibid., p. 129 (italics added).
429. Ibid., p. 129.
430. Turner (2002), p. 55 (italics added). On this point, see also Turner (2000a, 2000b).
431. Delanty (2009), p. 130.
432. Ibid., p. 172 (italics added).
433. Ibid., p. 172.
434. Ibid., p. 172.
435. Rumford (2008), p. 14 (italics added). On this point, see also Delanty (2009), p. 250.
436. Rumford (2008), p. 14. On this point, see also Delanty (2009), p. 250.
437. Fraser (2007a), p. 45 (italics added).
438. Ibid., p. 54. See also ibid., pp. 45, 46, 47, 54, 60, and 65.
439. See title of ibid.
440. See Habermas (1989 [1962]). For useful discussions of the concept of the public sphere,
see, for instance: Calhoun (1992); Fraser (2007a); Geuss (2001); Kögler (2005); Nash
(2014a); Rabotnikof (1998); Steinberger (1999); Susen (2011d); Volkmer (2014);
Weintraub and Kumar (1997).
441. See Fraser (2007a). Cf. Couldry (2014); Fraser (2014, 2014 [2007]); Hutchings (2014);
Kurasawa (2014); Nash (2014a, 2014c, 2014d); and Owen (2014).
442. Fraser (2007a), p. 47 (italics added).
443. On this point, see, for example: Habermas (1989 [1962]), pp. 14–26 and 79–88;
Habermas (1996a [1992]), pp. 135–8, 141–4, 366–7, and 433–6 (references provided in
Fraser (2007a), p. 47 n. 3).
 Notes 331

444. Fraser (2007a), p. 48 (italics added).

445. Ibid., p. 48 (italics in original).
446. Ibid., p. 48 (italics in original).
447. Ibid., p. 48 (italics in original).
448. The German concept of Rechtsstaat is generally translated into English as ‘state of law’,
‘legal state’, ‘state of justice’, or ‘state of rights’.
449. On this point, see, for example: Habermas (1989 [1962]), pp. 20–4, 51–7, 62–73, 83–8,
and 141ff.; Habermas (1996a [1992]), pp. 365–6, 381–7 (references provided in Fraser
(2007a), p. 48 n. 4).
450. Fraser (2007a), p. 48 (italics added).
451. Ibid., p. 48 (italics added).
452. Ibid., p. 48.
453. On this point, see, for example: Habermas (1989 [1962]), pp. 14–20, esp. p. 17;
Habermas (1996a [1992]), pp. 344–51, esp. pp. 349–50 (references provided in Fraser
(2007a), p. 48 n. 5).
454. Fraser (2007a), p. 48 (italics added).
455. Ibid., p. 48.
456. Ibid., p. 48.
457. Ibid., p. 48 (italics added).
458. Ibid., p. 48 (italics added).
459. Ibid., p. 48 (italics added).
460. On this point, see, for example: Habermas (1989 [1962]), pp. 58 and 60–70; Habermas
(1996a [1992]), pp. 373–4 and 376–7 (references provided in Fraser (2007a), p. 48 n. 6).
461. Fraser (2007a), p. 48 (italics added).
462. Ibid., p. 48 (italics added).
463. On Habermas’s conception of the ‘ideal speech situation’, see, for example, Habermas
(2001), pp. 7–8, 10–13, 23, 29, 37, 42, 45–7, 52, and 83–4. See also, for instance: Susen
(2007), pp. 74, 88–90, 99–100 n. 105, 116, 122, 123, 144, 261, and 306; Susen (2009a),
esp. pp. 81, 82–3 n. 4, 93–9, 101–3, 107, 109–10; Susen (2009b), esp. pp. 110–13; Susen
(2010c), esp. pp. 108–9 and 116; Susen (2013e), esp. pp. 200, 213, 217, 218, and 229;
Susen (2013f), esp. p. 325.
464. Fraser (2007a), p. 48 (italics added).
465. On this point, see, for example: Habermas (1989 [1962]), pp. 24–39, esp. pp. 36–7,
55–6, and 60–73; Habermas (1996a [1992]), pp. 360–2, 369–70, and 375–7 (references
provided in Fraser (2007a), p. 48 n. 7).
466. Fraser (2007a), p. 48 (italics added).
467. Ibid., p. 48 (italics added).
468. Ibid., p. 48 (italics added) (‘envisioned’ replaced with ‘envision’).
469. See Anderson (1991 [1983]) and Chatterjee (1993). See also Fraser (2007a), pp. 48
and 49.
470. On this point, see, for example: Habermas (1989 [1962]), pp. 41–3 and 48–51;
Habermas (1996a [1992]), pp. 373–4 (references provided in Fraser (2007a), p. 48).
471. On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2011d), pp. 51–6. See also, for example:
Antonio (1989); Habermas (1976b); Habermas (2000), esp. pp. 12–16, 18, and 20;
Kirkpatrick (2003); McCarthy (1981); Outhwaite (2009 [1994]), esp. pp. 56–65; Susen
(2007), pp. 22, 43 n. 25, 50, 67, 114, 117, 134, 150, 154, 206, 265, 279, 281, 285, 290,
295, and 299; Susen (2009b), pp. 103 and 105; Susen (2010c), pp. 103, 104, 105, 107,
108, 109, 114, 115, 116, 118 n. 7; Waizbort (2004); Whitton (1992).
472. Fraser (2007a), p. 55 (italics in original) (‘post-Westphalian’ appears as ‘postWestphalian’
in the original version).
473. Morris (1997), p. 193 (already quoted in Chapter 3).
474. On this point, see Chapter 3.
475. Fraser (2007a), p. 56 (italics added).
476. Ibid., p. 56.
477. Ibid., p. 56.
332 Notes

478. Ibid., p. 56 (‘non-citizens’ appears as ‘noncitizens’ in the original version).

479. Ibid., p. 56.
480. Ibid., p. 56.
481. Ibid., p. 56.
482. Ibid., p. 56.
483. Ibid., p. 56 (italics in original).
484. Ibid., p. 56.
485. Ibid., pp. 56–7.
486. Ibid., p. 57 (italics added).
487. Ibid., p. 57.
488. Ibid., p. 57.
489. Ibid., p. 57.
490. Ibid., p. 57.
491. Ibid., p. 58. Cf. Orgad (2012).
492. Fraser (2007a), p. 58 (in the original version, the words ‘media’ and ‘some’ are sepa-
rated by a comma, rather than by a hyphen).
493. Ibid., p. 58.
494. Ibid., p. 57.
495. Ibid., p. 58 (italics added).
496. Ibid., p. 58 (italics added).
497. On the socio-philosophical significance of these tensions, see, for instance: Holloway and
Susen (2013, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2011d, 2012a, 2015a).
498. See, for instance, Negroponte (1995). See also Orgad (2012).
499. Fraser (2007a), p. 58 (italics added).
500. Ibid., p. 58 (italics added) (in the original version, ‘Internet’ is spelled ‘internet’).
501. Ibid., p. 58.
502. Ibid., p. 58.
503. Ibid., p. 58.
504. Ibid., p. 58 (italics added).
505. Ibid., p. 58 (italics added).
506. Ibid., p. 58 (italics added; except for ‘lingua franca’, which is italicized in the original
version).
507. Ibid., p. 59.
508. Ibid., p. 59.
509. Ibid., p. 59 (italics added).
510. See Lash and Lury (2007). On this point, see also, for instance: Franklin, Lury, and
Stacey (2000); Lury (2004).
511. Fraser (2007a), p. 59.
512. Ibid., p. 59.
513. Ibid., p. 60 (italics added).
514. Ibid., p. 60 (italics added).
515. Ibid., p. 60.
516. Ibid., p. 60 (italics added).
517. Ibid., p. 60.
518. Ibid., p. 60.
519. On this point, see, for example: Beck (1992 [1986], 1995 [1988], 1999, 2009 [2007]);
Borodina and Shvyrkov (2010); Cerutti (2007); Elliott (2002); Robertson and Kellow
(2001).
520. Fraser (2007a), p. 60 (italics added).
521. Ibid., p. 60.
522. Ibid., p. 60 (italics added).
523. Ibid., p. 60.
524. See ibid., p. 60 (italics added).
525. Ibid., p. 60. See also ibid., p. 64.
526. Ibid., p. 60.
527. Calhoun (2007), p. 292. See also Walzer (1995).
 Notes 333

6 Critical Reflections on Postmodern Thought:

Limitations of the ‘Postmodern Turn’
1. On postmodern and poststructuralist critiques of ‘logocentrism’, see, for instance: Agger
(2002), pp. 195–7; Ankersmit (1997 [1989]), p. 295; Benton and Craib (2001),
pp. 166–8; Butler (2002), pp. 16–17 and 38; Doja (2006), pp. 177–9; Fox (2003), pp. 81–4;
Joyce (1998), pp. 208–11; Mcevoy (2007b), p. 392; Parusnikova (1992), p. 36; Seidman
(1994b), pp. 8–9; Sim (2002), p. 43–5; Singh (1997), esp. pp. x, 1–2, and 5–10; Torfing
(1999), p. 280; Zagorin (1997 [1990]), pp. 299–300.
2. Bauman (1992), p. 188 (italics added) (already quoted above).
3. On the concept of false consciousness, see, for example: Corallo (1982); Dannemann
(2008); Haug (1999); Larrain (1991b [1983]) (already referred to above).
4. Habermas (1989 [1985/1987]), p. 45. On this point, see also Frank (1992), p. 159.
5. On this point, see Susen (2011a), p. 463, and Susen (2012b), pp. 717–19.
6. On this point, see Susen (2012a), pp. 324–5 n. 165.
7. On the Habermasian notion of ‘performative contradiction’, see, for example: Habermas
(1987c [1981]), p. 308; Habermas (2001), pp. 10–11 and 31; Abdel-Nour (2004),
pp. 83–7 and 91–2; Apel (1990 [1985]), pp. 43 and 45; Apel (1996), pp. 5–7; Bengoa Ruiz de
Azúa (2002 [1992]), p. 142; Ferrara (1987), p. 47; Gamwell (1997), pp. 25–7; Giri (2004),
p. 93; Heath (2001), pp. 293, 296, and 309; Horowitz (1998), pp. 18–20; How (2003),
pp. 44–5; Jay (1992); Johnson (1993), p. 76; Matustik (1989), esp. pp. 143–8, 169, and
172; Mitchell (2003), pp. 11–12; Nault (2004), pp. 266–7; Panagia (2004), pp. 825 and
829–33; Papastephanou (1997), pp. 41 and 59; Ray (2004), p. 317; Rorty (1994), p. 977;
Schoolman (2005), pp. 336, 356–8, and 364; Susen (2007), pp. 77 and 98 n. 68; Swindal
(2003), p. 146; Thomassen (2005), p. 550.
8. Habermas (1986), p. 155 (italics added). On this point, see also Terdiman (2005), p. 127.
9. On this point, see, for example, Celikates (2009) and Susen (2011a).
10. On ‘modernity as an unfinished project’, see, for example: Frank (1992); Habermas (1996
[1981], 1989 [1985/1987]); Honneth et al. (1992a, 1992b); McLellan (1992); Passerin
d’Entrèves and Benhabib (1996); Patton (2004), esp. p. 11875.
11. On this point, see, for instance: Bauman (1991); Bauman and Tester (2007), esp.
pp. 23–5 and 29; Hammond (2011), pp. 305, 310, 312, and 315; Iggers (2005 [1997]),
pp. 146–7; Jacobsen and Marshman (2008), pp. 804–7; Kellner (2007), p. 117; Mulinari
and Sandell (2009), p. 495; Quicke (1999), p. 281; Susen (2010d), esp. pp. 62–78; van
Raaij (1993), esp. pp. 543–6, 551–5, and 559–61 (already referred to above).
12. On the sociological significance of social processes such as exploitation, alienation, fragmenta-
tion, individualization, bureaucratization, and rationalization, see, for instance, Susen and
Turner (2011b), esp. p. 6.
13. On this point, see, for instance, Smart (1998), p. 45: ‘Certainly there can be little doubt
[…] that a critical preoccupation with the dark side of the Enlightenment has been a
persistent feature of European thought since at least the end of the nineteenth century,
a feature that has become more prominent of late.’ See also Smart (1996), p. 456.
14. See Horkheimer and Adorno (1994 [1944/1969]) and Adorno and Horkheimer (1997a
[1944/1969]).
15. On the distinction between ‘Verstand’ and ‘Vernunft’, see, for example: Susen (2009b),
pp. 104–5; Susen (2010c), pp. 112–13; Susen (2013f), pp. 326 and 330–1; Susen (2015a),
pp. 1027–8.
16. Horkheimer and Adorno (1994 [1944/1969]), p. 12 (my translation); original text:
‘Aufklärung ist totalitär. […] Die Aufklärung verhält sich zu den Dingen, wie der
Diktator zu den Menschen.’ Cf. Benhabib (1993), p. 108.
17. Delanty (1999), p. 3 (italics added).
18. See Marx (2000/1977 [1857–58/1941]).
19. See Weber (1991 [1948]), esp. pp. 196–244.
20. See Durkheim (1966/1951 [1897]) and Durkheim (1984 [1893]).
334 Notes

21. See Simmel (1997 [1903]). See also Susen (2013c), pp. 334–6.
22. See Horkheimer (1976).
23. Marx (2000/1977 [1845]), p. 172.
24. Cf. Susen (2007), pp. 56–7.
25. On this point, see, for instance, Celikates (2009) and Susen (2011a).
26. On ‘modernity as a self-critical project’, see, for example: Adorno and Horkheimer (1997a
[1944/1969]); Beck and Lau (2005), pp. 533, 537–40, and 551–4; Bentley (1999), esp.
pp. 8–15 and 16–24; Butler (2002), p. 17; Delanty (1999), p. 3; Delanty (2000b), esp.
chapter 1, but also chapters 2–6; Eadie (2001), p. 577; Durkheim (1966/1951 [1897],
1984 [1893]); Elliott (2000), p. 336; Horkheimer and Adorno (1994 [1944/1969]);
Lyon (1999 [1994]), p. 90; Marx (2000/1977 [1857–58/1941]); Seidman (1994b),
pp. 1–2; Simmel (1997 [1903]); Smart (1996), p. 456; Susen (2009b), pp. 104–5; Susen
(2010c), pp. 112–13; Susen (2013c), pp. 334–6; Susen (2013f), pp. 326 and 330–1; Susen
and Turner (2011b), esp. p. 6; Torfing (1999), pp. 59–61; Weber (1991 [1948]), esp.
pp. 196–244; Wilterdink (2002), pp. 210–12; Zagorin (1999), pp. 6–7.
27. Crook (1990), p. 69.
28. Eadie (2001), p. 577.
29. Stones (1996), p. 15. On a similar point, see Butler (2002), p. 17: ‘This is Derrida’s own
grand metanarrative, and he seems quite falsely to assume that there was nothing in
the Western metaphysical tradition which put into question the fit of language to the
world – but nominalism and essentialism have long been at odds’ (italics added).
30. Wilterdink (2002), p. 211.
31. See Hume (2007 [1748]).
32. See Nietzsche (1967 [1930]).
33. See, for example, Schwandt (1994), esp. p. 119. On hermeneutics, see, for instance: Apel
(1971a); Baert (2003); Bengoa Ruiz de Azúa (2002 [1992]); Bernstein (1983); Bubner
(1988 [1971, 1973, 1976, 1980, 1984]); Corcuff (2002); Davey (1985); Dickie-Clark
(1990); Frank (1989); Gadamer (1965, 1976); Garz (2000); Giddens (1977); Ginev (1999);
Grondin (1994); Habermas (1988b [1967/1970], 1987e [1981]); Harrington (2000,
2001); Heidegger (2001 [1927], 1992 [1989/1924]); Heller (1989); How (1985, 1998); Joas
(1991 [1986]); Kelly (1990); Kögler (1996 [1992], 1996, 2005, 2013); Lafont (1997, 1999
[1993]); McCarthy (1982); Outhwaite (1987a); Strydom (1999); Susen (2007, 2010c,
2011a, 2013b, 2013e, 2013f); Thompson (1993, 1981); von Bormann (1971); Vattimo
(1988 [1985]); Wachterhauser (1994); Waizbort (2004).
34. See, for example, Hegel (1975 [1837]). See also Köster (1972).
35. See, for example, Heidegger (2001 [1927]) and Heidegger (1992 [1989/1924]). Cf. Thiele
(1995).
36. See, for example, Gadamer (1965, 1976).
37. See Adorno (1991 [1975], 1991 [1981]) and Horkheimer (1997b [1944/1969]). For
critical discussions of this issue, see, for instance: Bernstein (1991); Haug (1994); Held
(1980); Konersmann (1996); Paddison (1996); Schnädelbach (1985, 1996 [1992]); Susen
(2011b), pp. 184–92; Thompson (1990); Williams (1994).
38. Beck and Lau (2005), p. 550 (italics in original).
39. See ibid., esp. pp. 550–5.
40. Ibid., pp. 551–2.
41. Ibid., p. 551.
42. Seidman (1994b), p. 1 (italics added) (‘self-redemption’ appears as ‘self redemption’ in
the original version).
43. Beck and Lau (2005), p. 538.
44. Ibid., p. 533.
45. On the distinction between ‘class in itself’ (Klasse an sich) and ‘class for itself’ (Klasse für
sich), see, for instance: Balibar (1982);  Bottomore (1991 [1983]);  Dannemann (2008);
Fetscher (1991 [1983]); Steiner (2008); Vester (2008).
46. Marx (2000/1977 [1852]), p. 329. It is worth emphasizing that, in the original ver-
sion, Marx uses the word Menschen (‘human beings’), rather than Männer (‘men’), thus
 Notes 335

including all members of humanity in the sense of Menschheit (‘humanity’). See Marx
(1972 [1852]), p. 115: ‘Die Menschen machen ihre eigene Geschichte, aber sie machen
sie nicht aus freien Stücken, nicht unter selbstgewählten, sondern unter unmittelbar
vorgefundenen, gegebenen und überlieferten Umständen.’ On this point, see, for
instance: Susen (2008a), p. 77; Susen (2010a), pp. 174–5 and 180–1; Susen (2013c),
pp. 343, 349, and 355 n. 1.
47. For further reading on the relationship between ‘necessity’ and ‘contingency’ in Marxist
thought, see Daly (1999), esp. p. 71.
48. Zagorin (1999), p. 6.
49. Ibid., p. 6. On the concept of emancipation, see, for instance, Susen (2015a).
50. Translation from German into English: historians’ quarrel or historians’ dispute. Taking
place in West Germany between 1986 and 1989, the Historikerstreit was an intellectual
and political controversy concerned with the interpretation of the Holocaust. On this
point, see, for instance: Habermas (1989 [1985/1987]); Nolte (1977, 1987). See also
Kienel (2007) and Kronenberg (2008).
51. Arguably, the most famous – conservative – advocate of anti-utopian political thought
in the context of the aforementioned Historikerstreit is the German historian Ernst Nolte.
See Nolte (1977, 1987).
52. For an excellent introduction to modern political ideologies, see Heywood (2007 [1992]).
53. On modernity as a path-breaking project, see, for example: Adorno (1991 [1975], 1991
[1981]); Adorno and Horkheimer (1997b [1944/1969]); Bernstein (1991); Crook (1990),
p. 69; Daly (1999), esp. p. 71; Gadamer (1965, 1976); Habermas (1989 [1985/1987]);
Haug (1994); Heidegger (2001 [1927], 1992 [1989/1924]); Held (1980); Heywood (2007
[1992]); Hume (2007 [1748]); Kienel (2007); Konersmann (1996); Kronenberg (2008);
Marx (2000/1977 [1852]); Nietzsche (1967 [1930]); Nolte (1977, 1987); Paddison (1996);
Schnädelbach (1985, 1996 [1992]); Stones (1996), p. 15; Susen (2011b), pp. 184–92;
Thompson (1990); Torfing (1999), pp. 59–61; Williams (1994).
54. Delanty (2000b), p. 1 (italics added).
55. Ibid., p. 1 (italics added).
56. On this assertion, see Latour (1993 [1991]). See also Delanty (2000b), p. 1.
57. On this claim, see Delanty (2000b), p. 1.
58. Ibid., p. 4.
59. Ibid., p. 4.
60. Ibid., p. 4. See also ibid., pp. 5, 15, and 20.
61. Torfing (1999), p. 61 (italics in original).
62. Ibid., p. 60.
63. Ibid., pp. 59–60.
64. Such as – most famously, perhaps – Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida.
65. Such as – most famously, perhaps – Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel, but also, of
course, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Habermas.
66. Torfing (1999), p. 60.
67. Ibid., p. 60.
68. See previous note on the ‘crisis’ rhetoric in contemporary social thought.
69. See previous note on the ‘crisis’ rhetoric in contemporary social thought.
70. See previous note on the announcement of ‘the end of “the social”’.
71. Rojek and Turner (2000), p. 637.
72. Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 84.
73. See section on ‘cultural sociology’ in Chapter 3.
74. Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), p. 84 (italics added).
75. Ibid., p. 85.
76. Butler (2002), p. 32.
77. On this point, see, for example, Alexander, Giesen, and Mast (2006) and Carlson (2004
[1996]).
78. Gafijczuk (2005), p. 30 (italics in original).
79. Zagorin (1999), p. 7.
336 Notes

80. Ibid., p. 7.
81. On this point, see, for instance, White (1997 [1992]), p. 392.
82. On this point, see, for example, Inglis (2013).
83. Joyce (1991), pp. 205–6 (italics added).
84. Wood (2006 [1997]), p. 5 (italics in original).
85. On this point, see Kelly (1991), pp. 210–11.
86. On this point, see, for instance: Robbins (2010, 2012, 2013).
87. See previous note on the announcement of ‘the end of “the social”’.
88. For Bourdieusian interpretations of this position, see, for example: Adkins (2013);
Fowler (2013); Grenfell (2013); Inglis (2013); Kögler (2013); Lawler (2013); Outhwaite
(2013); Robbins (2013); Susen (2013a, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f); Turner (2013b).
89. On the problem of textualism, see, for example: Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]),
pp. 84–5; Barthes (1973); Braun (1997 [1994]), pp. 418–19 and 423; Brown (1994b);
Butler (2002), pp. 31–32 and 119–21; Engelmann (1990b); Evans (2002), pp. 80 and
86–7; Frank (1989); Gafijczuk (2005), p. 30; Joyce (1991), pp. 205–8; Kelly (1991),
pp. 209–11; Kirk (1997 [1994]), esp. pp. 333–4; Lang (1997 [1995]), p. 427; Robbins
(2010, 2012, 2013); Rojek and Turner (2000), p. 637; Stone (1992), pp. 190–3; White
(1997 [1992]), p. 392; White and Doran (2010); Zagorin (1999), pp. 7 and 23; Zagorin
(2000), pp. 201, 204–5, and 209.
90. Consider, for example, recent debates on Holocaust denial. On this point, see, for
instance: Braun (1997 [1994]); Eaglestone (2001); Lang (1997 [1995]).
91. Rojek and Turner (2000), p. 638.
92. On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2013e), pp. 201–2, 204–5, and 208–11.
93. Joyce (1991), p. 208 (italics added).
94. Kelly (1991), p. 209.
95. Lang (1997 [1995]), p. 427.
96. Joyce (1991), p. 208.
97. Ibid., p. 208.
98. Iggers (2005 [1997]), p. 140.
99. Ibid., p. 140.
100. Ibid., p. 139.
101. Wood (2006 [1997]), p. 8.
102. Ibid., p. 9.
103. On this point, see ibid., p. 13.
104. Ibid., p. 13.
105. Zagorin (2000), p. 209.
106. Wood (2006 [1997]), p. 10.
107. Zagorin (2000), p. 201.
108. See Jenkins (1997b), pp. 5–6.
109. Stone (1979), p. 23.
110. See Hobsbawm (1994). See also Alexander (2013) and Mazower (1998).
111. Evans (1997b), p. 124.
112. On the problem of ahistoricism, see, for example: Braun (1997 [1994]), pp. 418–19;
Eaglestone (2001); Iggers (2005 [1997]), pp. 113, 139, and 141–7; Jenkins (1997b),
pp. 1 and 4–7; Joyce (1991); pp. 205–9; Joyce (1997 [1995]), p. 361; Kelly (1991), p. 209;
Kirk (1997 [1994]), pp. 333–4; Stewart (1997), pp. 178–83 and 187; Stone (1979),
pp. 22–3; Stone (1992), pp. 190–3; Wood (2006 [1997]), pp. 5, 8, and 13; Zagorin (1997
[1990]), pp. 309 and 311; Zagorin (2000), pp. 201, 205, and 209.
113. Derrida (1967), p. 227.
114. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), p. 28 (italics added).
115. Cf. Fairclough (1995), pp. 185–6.
116. In this context, see, for instance, an interesting discussion of Laclau and Mouffe’s neo-
Marxist conception of ‘discourse’ in Geras (1987), esp. pp. 65–7 and 82. Geras sharply
attacks Laclau and Mouffe, arguing that they remain trapped in shamefaced idealism,
 Notes 337

as expressed in statements such as the following: ‘Our analysis rejects the distinction
between discursive and non-discursive practices. It affirms: a) that every object is con-
stituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive
condition of emergence; and b) that any distinction between what are usually called
the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect dis-
tinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social production of
meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totalities.’ See Laclau and
Mouffe (2001 [1985]), p. 107; see also Geras (1987), p. 65. Geras is right to ask to what
extent this view can be reconciled with Marx and Engels’s critique of philosophical
idealism; see Marx and Engels (2000/1977 [1846], 1953 [1845–47]). For a sympathetic
reading of Laclau and Mouffe, see Howarth (1995). Howarth defends Laclau and
Mouffe’s conception of ‘discourse’, contending that they do not consider everything as
merely ‘discursive’. Rather, in his view, they develop a ‘relational theory of discourse’
(ibid., p. 119). According to this relational account, ‘discourses incorporate elements
and practices from all parts of society’ (ibid.), without therefore representing, let alone
constituting, society in its totality.
117. Zagorin (2000), p. 204.
118. Ibid., p. 204 (italics added).
119. On the problem of idealism, see, for example: Eaglestone (2001); Evans (2002), pp. 80–1
and 86–7; Kirk (1997 [1994]), pp. 333–4; Prior (2005), pp. 132–5; Zagorin (1999), p. 23;
Zagorin (2000), pp. 205 and 209.
120. On the commodifying logic of capitalism, see, for instance: Browne and Susen (2014);
Haug (1994); Jameson (1991); Susen (2011b, 2012a).
121. An elaborate discussion of this concept, which plays a pivotal role in the writings of
Adorno and Horkheimer, would go beyond the scope of this analysis. See Horkheimer
and Adorno (1994 [1944/1969]) and Adorno (1991 [1975]).
122. An interesting critique of this concept can be found in McMahon (1999).
123. Adorno and Horkheimer (1997b [1944/1969]), p. 137. See Horkheimer and Adorno
(1994 [1944/1969]), p. 145: ‘Amusement ist die Verlängerung der Arbeit unterm
Spätkapitalismus.’
124. On the concept of punk sociology, see Beer (2014).
125. On the concept of decorative sociology, see Rojek and Turner (2000).
126. Pawley (1986) (italics added); quoted in Featherstone (1988), p. 195, as well as in
Featherstone (2007 [1991]), p. 1. On this point, see also Best and Kellner (1997), p. 12:
‘journalists, cultural entrepreneurs, and theorists invent and circulate discourses like the
postmodern in order to accrue cultural capital, to distinguish themselves, to promote spe-
cific artifacts or practices as the cutting edge, and to circulate new meanings and ideas.’
127. See, for example: Craib (1997); Giddens (1996 [1971]); Hawthorn (1987 [1976]);
Morrison (2006 [1995]); Sayer (1991). See also Susen and Turner (2011b).
128. On the problem of aestheticism, see, for example: Adorno (1997 [1970]); Beck, Giddens,
and Lash (1994); Bouchet (1994), pp. 406–9; Butler (2002), p. 123; Carp (2010); Cova
and Svanfeldt (1993), pp. 297–8; Delanty (2000b), pp. 132–7; Evans (1997a), pp. 232–
5; Halsall, Jansen, and Murphy (2012); Joyce (1997 [1995]), p. 361; Robbins (1990);
Squires (1998), pp. 129–1, 131–5, and 144–5; Zagorin (1997 [1990]), p. 309.
129. On this point, see Susen (2007), p. 98 n. 79. On this point, see also, for instance:
Delanty (2000b), p. 132; Habermas (1988 [1971]), pp. 25–7; Habermas (1987a [1981]),
pp. 334–7; Heath (2001), p. 304; Raulet (1996), p. 91; White (1988b), p. 33.
130. On this point, see Susen (2007), p. 98 n. 79.
131. On this point, see ibid., pp. 75–82.
132. Delanty (2000b), p. 132 (italics added).
133. Ibid., p. 133 (italics added).
134. Ibid., p. 134 (already referred to above).
135. On this point, see ibid., p. 135.
136. Ibid., p. 135 (already referred to above).
338 Notes

137. Ibid., p. 136 (already referred to above).

138. On this point, see Prior (2005).
139. See Evans (1997a), p. 232.
140. See Squires (1998), pp. 131–5. See also ibid., pp. 144–5.
141. Cf. Shusterman (1988).
142. Butler (2002), p. 61.
143. See Petit (2005), p. 29: ‘la philosophie postmoderne paraît être le dernier “cheval de
Troie” de philosophes néoconservateurs’.
144. Delanty (2000b), p. 140. See also, for instance: Habermas (1987a [1985]), esp. pp. xi
and 3–4; Habermas (1989 [1985/1987]); Habermas (1996 [1981]).
145. Huyssen (1993), pp. 26–30. See also Rose (1991), pp. 85–95; and Sim (2002), p. 12.
146. Zižek (2000), p. 98 (italics removed from ‘not’ and – with the exception of the word
‘depoliticization’ – from ‘the very notion and form of the “political” within which it operates
is grounded in the “depoliticization” of the economy’).
147. On the dehumanizing, destructive, and exploitative nature of capitalism, see, for instance,
Susen (2012a), pp. 306–7. See also, for example: Holloway (2005 [2002], 2010);
Holloway and Susen (2013).
148. See Zižek (2000), p. 97.
149. Rojek and Turner (2000), pp. 635–6 (italics added). On this point, see also, for example:
Callinicos (1989), p. 7; Huyssen (1990), p. 253; Zima (1997), p. 82. On this point, cf.
Rojek and Turner (1998b), p. 2 (italics added): ‘Wright Mills argued that postmodernity
is the result of the disintegration of the two major political ideologies of the modern period:
liberalism and socialism. He equated this collapse with general social disorientation
since it is no longer possible to adhere to the belief that history is driven by an engine
of progress.’ On this point, see Mills (1959), p. 184. See also Elliott (2000), p. 336.
150. As argued particularly by Marxist historians, coups d’état can be regarded as historical
examples of the brutality employed to defend capitalist regimes in situations of major
political crisis. Consider, for example, Greece (1967), Chile (1973), and Argentina
(1976). On this point, see Kühnl (1990 [1979], 1983). Cf. Habermas (1988 [1973]).
151. See Young (1990a), esp. pp. 98–9. See also Adorno (1973 [1966]), esp. pp. 146, 173, 216,
and 279.
152. Young (1990a), p. 99. Cf. Adorno (1973 [1966]). On this point, see also Susen (2010b),
p. 273.
153. On this point, see, for instance: Susen (2008a), pp. 58–60; Susen (2008b), pp. 164 and
166; Susen (2010a), pp. 204–8; Susen (2010b), esp. pp. 271–4.
154. On the problem of conservatism, see, for example: Butler (2002), pp. 58 and 61; Delanty
(2000b), p. 140; Evans (2002), pp. 80–1 and 86–7; Habermas (1989 [1985/1987]);
Huyssen (1993), pp. 26–30; Iggers (2005 [1997]), pp. 113, 139, and 141–7; Nemoianu
(2010); Petit (2005), pp. 29 and 31–2; Rose (1991), pp. 85–94 and 95; Sim (2002), p. 12.
155. See Vattimo (1988 [1985]).
156. Butler (2002), p. 28.
157. Ibid., p. 28.
158. On this point, see, for instance: Beck and Lau (2005), pp. 540–54; Boghossian (2006),
p. 23; Butler (2002), pp. 35; Clicqué (2005), esp. p. 29; Cole (2003), p. 493; Eickelpasch
(1997), pp. 18–19; Elliott (2007 [2001]), p. 141; Gane and Gane (2007), p. 131;
Matthewman and Hoey (2006), p. 536; Mcevoy (2007b), p. 399; Nola and Irzik (2003),
p. 395; Rose (1991), pp. 3 and 60; Sokal and Bricmont (1998), pp. 78–85; Torfing
(1999), pp. 275–6; van Raaij (1993), p. 560 (already referred to above).
159. On the concept of irony in this context, see, for instance: Coleman (2011); Domańska
(1998b); Rorty (1989); Sim (2002); Smith (2007); Turner (2000b, 2000a, 2002);
Weyembergh (1995) (already referred to above).
160. On the problem of nihilism, see, for example: Butler (2002), pp. 27–8, 48–9, and 119–21;
Cole (2003), p. 493; Coole (1998a), esp. p. 357; Kellner (2007), p. 102; Morrisson
(2003), pp. 184 and 209; Vattimo (1988 [1985]); Zagorin (1997 [1990]), p. 311.
161. See White (1997 [1992]), p. 392.
 Notes 339

162. Susen (2013b), p. 97 (italics in original).

163. Butler (2002), p. 121.
164. Ibid., p. 121.
165. See ibid., p. 121.
166. Kellner (2007), p. 102.
167. Torfing (1999), p. 276 (italics added).
168. Ibid., p. 276. Cf. Rorty (1989), pp. 4–5.
169. MacKinnon (2000), p. 703.
170. Ibid., p. 703.
171. Ibid., p. 703.
172. Ibid., p. 710.
173. Eagleton (1995), p. 68.
174. Ibid., p. 68.
175. On the problem of relativism, see, for example: Alexander (1995); Bernstein (1983);
Boghossian (2006); Gellner (1982); Hacking (1982); Haddock (2004); Hollis and Lukes
(1982); Laudan (1990); Lukes (1982); Margolis (2007 [1986]); McCarthy (1982); Norris
(1997); Rorty (1991b, 1997a); Rossi-Landi (1974 [1972]); Schroeder (1997). In addition,
see, for instance: Braun (1997 [1994]), pp. 418–19; Butler (2002), pp. 119–21; Cole
(2003), p. 493; Coole (1998a), p. 357; Eaglestone (2001); Eagleton (1995), p. 14; Kellner
(2007), p. 102; Lang (1997 [1995]), p. 427; MacKinnon (2000), pp. 702–5 and 710; Petit
(2005), p. 32; Torfing (1999), p. 276.
176. On the problem of identitarianism, see, for example: Eagleton (1995); Gilbert (2010);
Hoogheem (2010); Isin and Wood (1999); Jenkins (2008 [1996]); Keith and Pile
(1993a); Keupp et al. (1999); Lawler (2008); Nemoianu (2010); Parekh (2008); Pile and
Thrift (1995a); Sarup (1996); Susen (2010b); Zima (2000).
177. Eagleton (1995), p. 60.
178. Ibid., p. 60 (italics added).
179. Ibid., p. 61 (italics added).
180. Ibid., p. 61 (italics added).
181. Ibid., p. 67.
182. Butler (2002), p. 14.
183. Ibid., p. 39.
184. On the civilizational significance of ‘scientific narratives’, see, for instance: Baert (2005);
Benhabib (1993); Benton and Craib (2001); Bernstein (1983); Best and Kellner
(2001); Clicqué (2005); Delanty (1997); Delanty and Strydom (2003); Dickens and
Fontana (1994a); Dilthey (1883); Dods (2004); Doherty, Graham, and Malek (1992);
Gamble, Marsh, and Tant (1999); Habermas (1970); Harding (1990); Hempel (1966);
Hollinger (1994); Iggers (2005 [1997]); Jacob (1999); Janich (2006); Keat (1971); Keat
and Urry (1982 [1975]); Lakatos, Feyerabend, and Motterlini (1999); Laudan (1990);
Mcevoy (2007b); Murphy (1990); Newton-Smith (1981); Nola and Irzik (2003); Norris
(1997); Outhwaite (1987a, 1996, 1998); Parusnikova (1992); Peat (2007); Popper
(1966 [1934], 2002 [1959/1934]); Resnik (2000); Rosenau (1992); Rouse (1991);
Salleh (2009); Schroeder (1997); Sismondo (2010 [2004]); Sokal and Bricmont (1998);
Stockman (1983); Susen (2011e); Thompson (1993); Waizbort (2004); Wright (1984).
185. On ‘the end of scientific metanarratives’, see, for example: Best and Kellner (2001);
Clicqué (2005); Delanty (2000b); Denzin (1994); Dickens and Fontana (1994a);
Doherty, Graham, and Malek (1992); Gafijczuk (2005); Harding (1990); Hollinger
(1994); Iggers (2005 [1997]); Mcevoy (2007b); Mouzelis (2008); Murphy (1990);
Nola and Irzik (2003); Parusnikova (1992); Patton (2004); Peat (2007); Reisch (1997);
Rosenau (1992); Salleh (2009); Schroeder (1997); Seidman (1994c); Smart (1990); Sokal
and Bricmont (1998); Thompson (1993); Wersig (1993).
186. On this point, see, for instance, Sismondo (2010 [2004]).
187. On the historical significance of ‘modern metanarratives’, see, for example: Coole (1998b);
Friedrich (2012); Kellner (2007); Raese (2011); Rouse (1991); Smith (2006); Stone (1979);
Thompson (1993); White (1984, 1987); White and Doran (2010); Zagorin (1999).
340 Notes

188. On the concept of global network society, see, for example: Castells (1996, 1997, 1998). See
also, for instance: Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]), pp. 249–55; Beck and Lau (2005),
pp. 525–33; Burawoy (2000), esp. pp. 34–5 and 345–9; Buzan, Held, and McGrew (1998),
pp. 388–91; della Porta et al. (2006); Featherstone and Lash (1995), pp. 1–15; Giddens
(1990), p. 64; Giddens (1991), pp. 1 and 20–3; Kali and Reyes (2007); Latour (2005), esp.
pp. 247–62; Ruby (1990), p. 35; Toews (2003), p. 82 (already referred to above).
189. On the problem of theoreticism, see, for example: Baert and da Silva (2010 [1998]),
pp. 261–2 and 267–8; Beck and Lau (2005), pp. 533 and 537–40; Butler (2002), pp. 14
and 39–40; Jagger (2005), pp. 101–3; Prior (2005), pp. 133–4.
190. On the problem of oxymoronism based on performative contradictions, see, for example:
Butler (2002), pp. 27–8 and 118; Cole (2003), p. 493; Coole (1998a), p. 353; Feldman
(1998), pp. 66–7; Jay (1992); Kellner (2007), pp. 102 and 121; Matustik (1989); Morris
(1996); Stewart (1997), pp. 178–83 and 187.
191. On the problem of anti-rationalist rationality, see, for example: Coole (1998a), p. 353;
Kellner (2007), p. 102.
192. On the problem of the anti-metanarrativist metanarrative, see, for example: Blackburn
(2000), pp. 265 and 268; Butler (2002), pp. 17 and 27–8; Cole (2003), p. 493; Gane
and Gane (2007), pp. 129–30; Kellner (2007), pp. 102 and 121; Lyon (1999 [1994]), pp.
98–9; Stewart (1997), pp. 178–83 and 187; Wilterdink (2002), pp. 197 and 206; Zagorin
(1999), p. 7; Zammito (2010), p. 299.
193. Lyon (1999 [1994]), p. 98.
194. Gane and Gane (2007), p. 129.
195. Zagorin (1999), p. 7.
196. Appleby, Jacob, and Hunt (1994), p. 236 (italics added) (already referred to above). On
this point, see Stewart (1997), p. 187. In this context, see also Reddy (1992).
197. On the problem of anti-universalist universality, see, for example: Butler (2002),
pp. 27–8 and 118; Cole (2003), p. 493; Coole (1998a), p. 353; Feldman (1998), pp. 66–7;
Jay (1992); Kellner (2007), pp. 102 and 121; Matustik (1989); Morris (1996); Stewart
(1997), pp. 178–83 and 187.
198. Butler (2002), p. 118.
199. Feldman (1998), p. 66. On this point, see also Kellner (1988).
200. On the problem of anti-political politics, see, for example: Aronowitz (1989); Boyne and
Rattansi (1990b); Butler (2002), pp. 27–8, 58, and 119–23; Delanty (2000b), pp. 133–7;
Good and Velody (1998a); Heller and Fâehâer (1988); Hutcheon (1989); Magnus
(1993); Miller (1993b); Rengger (1995); Rojek and Turner (1998b); Rorty (1997b); Ross
(1989b); Solomon (1998); Turner (1990b); Yeatman (1994).
201. Butler (2002), pp. 27–8.
202. Ibid., p. 58.
203. Gray (2007 [1995]), p. 228. On this point, see Butler (2002), p. 121.
204. On the problem of uncritical critique, see, for example: Delanty (2000b), pp. 145–6; Slott
(2002), pp. 420–2.
205. Delanty (2000b), p. 145 (in the original version, the term ‘post-Fordism’ appears as
‘postfordism’). Cf. Harvey (1989b).
206. Delanty (2000b), p. 145. Cf. Harvey (1989), esp. pp. 115–17 and 336.
207. Delanty (2000b), p. 145. Cf. Harvey (1989), esp. pp. 115–17 and 336.
208. Delanty (2000b), p. 145 (in the original version, the term ‘post-Fordist’ appears as
‘postfordist’). Cf. Harvey (1989b), esp. pp. 115–17 and 336.
209. Delanty (2000b), p. 146. Cf. Harvey (1989), esp. pp. 115–17 and 336.
210. Delanty (2000b), p. 146. Cf. Anderson (1998), pp. 80–1.
211. Delanty (2000b), p. 146. Cf. Meštrović (1991), pp. 202–4.
212. Delanty (2000b), p. 146. Cf. Meštrović (1991), pp. 202–4. On this point, see also
Silverman (1999).

Conclusion
1. For a Grundriß concerned with the socio-ontological foundations of humanity, see Susen
(2007), esp. chapter 10.
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Index of Names
Abdel-Nour, Farid, 333n7
Abercrombie, Nicholas, 295n24, 322n124
Abeysekara, Ananda, 289n174, 313n6
Aboulafia, Mitchell, 289n170
Abramson, Paul R., 304n270, 305n278,
307n310
Adkins, Lisa, 283n43, 288n167, 289n170,
289n173, 309n355, 323n171, 336n88
Adorno, Theodor W., 236, 284n81, 285n89,
300n113, 333n14, 333n16, 334n26,
334n37, 335n53, 335n65, 337n121,
337n123, 337n128, 338n151, 338n152
Agger, Ben, 287n152, 288n165, 297n2,
297n3, 298n41, 299n58, 299n59, 300n96,
300n97, 300n98, 301n154, 301n155,
301n161, 302n168, 318n2, 319n18,
324n213, 333n1
Aghion, Philippe, 308n337
Akhter, Syed H., 308n337, 308n340
Alcorn, Marshall W. Jr., 293n2, 294n22
Alexander, Jeffrey C., 285n110, 289n169,
289n170, 290n16, 291n20, 291n21,
291n28, 292n34, 299n67, 335n77,
336n110, 339n175
Allan, Kenneth, 382n9, 382n13
Altvater, Elmar, 290n2, 292n39, 309n358
Amin-Khan, Tariq, 310n372, 310n373
Amino, Yoshihiko, 314n81
Anderson, Benedict, 319n6, 331n469
Anderson, Perry, 289n176, 298n41,
340n210
Anderson, Walter Truett, 285n102, 290n11,
312n12
Ankersmit, F. R., 311n1, 317n201, 333n1
Antonio, Robert J., 284n81, 331n471
Apel, Karl-Otto, 288n158, 288n159,
288n166, 289n170, 290n2, 291n33,
292n39, 293n4, 293n14, 295n24, 295n28,
298n50, 322n124, 333n7, 334n33
Appiah, Anthony, 318n3, 326n255,
327n281
Appignanesi, Richard, 287n150, 287n152,
287n153, 311n1
Appleby, Joyce Oldham, 315n113, 340n196
Apter, David E., 284n81, 321n88
Archibugi, Daniele, 327n281, 327n305
Arendt, Hannah, 16
399
Armaline, William T., 328n353
Arnason, Johann P., 295n24
Arndt, Helmut, 314n81
Aron, Raymond, 328n317
Aronowitz, Stanley, 340n200
Arpin, Stéphane, 287n152
Ashenden, Samantha, 286n125
Ashford, Nicholas Askounes, 310n373
Ashley, David, 285n100, 285n104,
289n176, 291n20, 293n1, 311n1,
312n16, 320n23
Athanasiou, Athena, 289n169
Athique, Adrian, 289n175
Atkinson, Elizabeth, 287n152
Augé, Marc, 318n3, 318n4
Axford, Barrie, 306n301
Ayer, A. J., 292n35
Bachrach, Peter, 319n18
Baer, Hans A., 308n344
Baert, Patrick, 282n6, 282n9, 282n13,
282n15, 282n24, 282n27, 282n29,
289n170, 290n17, 291n20, 292n35,
297n2, 298n41, 299n64, 299n67, 299n69,
303n219, 304n251, 304n257, 306n301,
307n311, 307n320, 307n321, 319n7,
334n33, 335n72, 335n74, 336n89,
339n184, 340n188, 340n189
Baker, Christopher Richard, 289n174,
308n342
Bakker, Terri M., 287n151, 293n2, 295n30,
299n64, 301n167, 303n211, 303n214,
303n216, 303n219, 303n222, 304n247,
304n249, 324n199, 324n200, 324n202,
324n205
Balibar, Étienne, 334n45
Balls, Graham, 311n390
Baraith, Roop Singh, 310n373
Baratz, Morton S., 319n18
Barrett, William, 311n5
Barry, Brian, 325n236, 326n244
Barthes, Roland, 148, 314n41, 314n52,
314n58
Bartsch, Ingrid, 287n151, 293n1
Basaure, Mauro, 283n43, 289n170
Basbaum, Leôncio, 314n81
Basconzuelo, Celia, 321n88
400 Index of Names
Bassett, Keith, 288n167
Baudrillard, Jean, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, 88, 98, 109, 117, 297n19,
300n111
Bauman, Zygmunt, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, 284n76, 285n86, 286n123,
286n137, 286n140, 286n143, 287n152,
288n162, 288n163, 288n164, 289n176,
290n12, 290n15, 291n20, 291n29, 296n1,
297n2, 297n4, 297n17, 298n41, 298n48,
298n51, 299n62, 299n65, 299n66,
300n125, 306n301, 308n332, 308n334,
308n341, 311n386, 311n389, 311n392,
311n1, 311n2, 312n6, 312n7, 312n10,
312n17, 313n21, 313n22, 318n3, 318n4,
319n6, 320n25, 322n98, 322n108,
322n118, 322n119, 322n122, 333n2,
333n11
Baumgartner, Tom, 319n18
Baym, Nancy K., 289n175
Bean, Clive, 327n281
Beaumont, Justin, 289n174, 292n42,
308n342
Beck, Ulrich, 282n9, 284n76, 286n134,
288n167, 292n35, 297n2, 305n278,
306n301, 307n320, 308n344, 312n15,
327n281, 328n334, 330n422, 332n519,
334n26, 334n38, 334n43, 337n128,
338n158, 340n188, 340n189
Beckermann, Ansgar, 290n2, 292n38,
292n39
Beckjord, Sarah H., 313n39
Beer, David, 337n124
Beer, Moses, 314n81
Beer, Raphael, 290n2, 292n39
Beetham, David, 284n78
Behrends, Christoph, 287n152
Beilharz, Peter, 284n76, 287n152, 288n162,
291n27, 311n1
Belk, Russell W., 289n175, 303n232,
303n233
Bell, Daniel, 286n136, 288n164, 296n1,
297n7, 297n8, 322n123, 322n124
Bell, David Avrom, 328n316
Belsey, Catherine, 287n150
Bendix, Reinhard, 319n18
Bengoa Ruiz de Azúa, Javier, 333n7, 334n33
Benhabib, Seyla, 284n72, 286n124,
286n125, 291n23, 291n31, 302n168,
302n190, 312n15, 319n6, 320n35,
320n46, 326n254, 327n281, 328n353,
330n419, 330n420, 333n10, 333n16,
339n184
Bennington, Geoffrey, 284n63
Bensussan, Gérard, 284n81
Bentham, Jeremy, 319n18
Bentley, Michael, 287n153, 299n64, 311n1,
315n108, 315n114, 315n115, 316n157,
317n196, 334n26
Benton, Ted, 287n150, 292n35, 299n64,
301n145, 333n1, 339n184
Berberoglu, Berch, 310n372, 310n373
Berger, Arthur Asa, 312n16
Berger, Peter L., 290n9
Berger, Suzanne, 309n368
Berman, Marshall, 284n76, 322n115
Bernard, Mitchell, 307n316, 308n337,
309n350
Bernstein, J. M., 321n76, 334n37, 335n53
Bernstein, Richard J., 284n76, 288n160,
290n1, 292n35, 293n15, 312n15, 319n7,
334n33, 339n175, 339n184
Berry, Philippa, 292n42
Bertens, Johannes Willem, 286n120,
286n139, 286n142, 286n145, 289n176,
297n10, 298n30, 311n1, 313n18
Besley, A. C., 301n167, 302n191, 303n225,
303n231
Best, Steven, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 282n1, 282n8, 285n98, 287n150,
289n176, 292n35, 299n64, 304n246,
311n1, 311n5, 312n11, 312n16, 337n126,
339n184, 339n185
Betts, Alexander, 308n342
Bhabha, Homi K., 327n281
Bhambra, Gurminder K., 284n76, 292n43
Bhaskar, G., 310n372
Bhaskar, Roy, 290n2, 292n38, 292n39
Biernacki, Richard, 288n164, 296n1, 298n41
Billig, Michael, 293n1, 295n24, 295n28,
322n124
Blackburn, R. J., 287n153, 306n305,
308n336, 311n1, 315n121, 316n127,
317n205, 317n207, 317n209, 340n192
Blau, Judith, 328n353
Bloch, Ernst, 321n67
Blokker, Paul, 283n43, 289n170
Blond, Phillip, 289n174
Bogard, William, 297n3, 297n22, 297n23
Boggs, Carl, 321n88
Boghossian, Paul Artin, 286n134, 287n150,
288n160, 290n1, 290n13, 293n15,
299n64, 338n158, 339n175
Bogusz, Tanja, 283n43, 289n170
Bohman, James, 288n158, 288n159, 293n4,
295n24, 327n281
Boisvert, Yves, 289n176, 291n23, 291n31,
312n16

Boldizzoni, Francesco, 315n86
Boltanski, Luc, 282n30, 283n43, 289n170,
292n38, 295n24, 302n184, 303n245,
305n288, 317n190, 317n207, 319n18,
321n76, 322n124, 324n208
Bonefeld, Werner, 295n33, 307n316,
307n318
Bonnell, Victoria E., 288n164, 296n1,
298n41
Bookman, Myra, 289n170
Bordo, Susan, 286n125
Borodina, Svetlana, 306n308, 308n337,
332n519
Boron, Atilio A., 292n34, 287n19, 299n64,
306n301, 306n305, 306n309, 307n314,
307n318, 308n336, 317n209
Böss, Michael, 310n372, 310n373
Bottomore, Tom, 334n45
Bouchet, Dominique, 288n164, 296n1,
297n71, 298n41, 298n46, 301n145,
305n284, 337n128
Bourdieu, Pierre, 282n30, 288n158, 288n159,
288n166, 288n167, 289n168, 289n169,
291n33, 293n49, 293n4, 293n14, 295n24,
298n50, 317n207, 319n18, 321n94,
322n124, 323n169, 324n195
Boyer, Robert, 306n303, 308n340, 310n373
Bracher, Mark, 293n2
Bradbury, Liz, 282n9, 324n173
Braddick, Michael J., 287n154
Brah, Avtar, 308n342, 308n344
Brantlinger, Patrick, 287n154, 292n43
Brants, Kees, 287n154, 288n165, 318n1
Brauer, Jurgen, 308n343, 308n344
Braun, Robert, 311n1, 315n100, 336n89,
336n90, 336n112, 339n175
Bravo, Michael T., 319n7
Breckenridge, Carol A., 327n281
Brennan, Timothy, 327n281
Bricmont, Jean, 286n134, 292n35, 319n7,
338n158, 339n184, 339n185
Bridges, Thomas, 308n341, 330n407
Briggs, Dennie, 287n152
Brnzeu, Pia, 287n150
Broekaert, Eric, 287n152
Brown, Garrett Wallace, 327n281
Brown, Gillian, 293n2
Brown, Richard Harvey, 282n1, 282n8,
291n20, 295n30, 322n124, 336n89
Browne, Craig, 283n43, 289n170, 289n178,
295n33, 295n41, 304n257, 309n355,
311n392, 319n18, 337n120
Browning, Gary K., 287n150, 291n23,
291n31, 311n1
Index of Names 401
Bruce, Steve, 290n2, 292n39, 305n285
Brummer, Alex, 309n355
Bruun, Peter, 307n315
Bubner, Rüdiger, 334n33
Buckley, Walter Frederick, 319n18
Burawoy, Michael, 282n26, 287n152,
289n176, 306n301, 306n309, 307n320,
340n188
Burchardt, Hans-Jürgen, 306n301, 308n337,
308n340, 309n345, 309n357, 309n367
Burckhardt, Jacob, 240
Burda, Hubert, 289n175, 303n232
Burkitt, Ian, 288n167, 289n173, 323n171
Burns, Christy L., 287n153, 311n1
Burns, Tom R., 319n18
Burstein, Gabriel, 287n152
Butler, Catherine, 302n187
Butler, Chris, 289n168
Butler, Christopher, 286n134, 287n149,
287n150, 287n152, 287n153, 289n176,
290n182, 291n20, 291n23, 291n31,
292n35, 295n30, 297n2, 297n3, 297n23,
298n41, 299n64, 301n145, 302n185,
302n188, 302n190, 302n192, 306n301,
307n311, 307n321, 313n25, 313n37,
313n39, 313n40, 314n45, 315n93,
317n209, 317n210, 318n3, 318n4, 319n7,
319n18, 320n38, 324n192, 324n196,
333n1, 334n26, 334n29, 335n76, 336n89,
337n128, 338n142, 338n154, 338n156,
338n158, 338n160, 339n163, 339n175,
339n182, 340n189, 340n190, 340n192,
340n197, 340n198, 340n200, 340n201,
340n203
Butler, Judith, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 286n125, 286n126, 288n162,
288n164, 289n169, 291n20, 296n44,
296n1, 311n1
Buzan, Barry, 292n43, 306n301, 307n314,
307n320, 318n2, 327n281, 340n188
Calhoun, Craig, 293n3, 297n16, 297n18,
298n30, 311n1, 320n23, 320n34,
327n281, 330n440, 332n527
Callari, Antonio, 286n126
Callinicos, Alex, 286n126, 286n133,
291n18, 312n15, 321n90, 338n149
Carlson, Jon D., 310n373
Carlson, Marvin A., 289n169, 335n77
Carlyle, Thomas, 240
Carmichael, Thomas, 287n153, 298n41,
300n112, 302n194, 302n198, 311n1
Carn, Nick, 309n355
Carnap, Rudolf, 49
402 Index of Names
Carp, Richard M., 287n152, 292n43,
337n128
Carretero Pasín, Angel Enrique, 287n154,
312n16, 319n18
Carver, Terrell, 286n126
Casey, Mark E., 302n187
Castells, Manuel, 307n320, 307n324,
308n341, 340n188
Caulkin, Simon, 307n315
Celikates, Robin, 283n30, 283n43, 289n170,
290n2, 292n39, 302n201, 333n9, 334n25
Centeno, Miguel A., 306n301, 306n309,
307n314, 308n337
Cerny, Philip G., 308n337, 310n379,
310n380
Cerutti, Furio, 308n343, 308n344,
332n519
Chakrabarti, Ranjan, 315n83
Champlin, John R., 319n18
Chatterjee, Partha, 319n6, 331n469
Cheah, Pheng, 327n281
Chelstrom, Eric S., 293n12
Chernaik, Laura, 321n88
Chernilo, Daniel, 310n373, 327n281,
328n337, 328n341, 329n376
Chesters, Graeme, 311n391, 321n88
Chevallier, Jacques, 287n154, 318n3, 318n4,
320n56, 326n242, 326n244
Chiapello, Ève, 293n2, 295n24, 303n245,
322n124, 324n208
Chirico, JoAnn, 306n301
Chouliaraki, Lilie, 293n2, 294n16, 294n18,
294n22, 336n114
Chow, Esther Ngan-ling, 302n187
Cimbala, Stephen J., 308n343
Clark, John A., 287n150, 291n23, 291n31,
300n131, 319n7
Clark, Terry Nicholls, 298n30
Clayton, Belinda, 287n152, 297n19
Clegg, Stewart, 319n18
Clicqué, Guy M., 286n134, 286n135,
292n42, 338n158, 339n184, 339n185
Cloud, Dana L., 286n126, 322n124
Clough, Patricia Ticineto, 289n173,
323n171
Cohen, Joseph N., 306n301, 306n309,
307n314, 308n337
Cohen, Robin, 308n342, 310n373,
327n281
Cole, Mike, 286n126, 286n134, 287n152,
320n52, 320n57, 321n76, 338n158,
338n160, 339n175, 340n190, 340n192,
340n197
Cole, Steven E., 288n162, 311n1, 322n124
Colebrook, Claire, 289n172, 289n173,
323n171
Coleman, Stephen, 287n154, 318n2,
330n424, 338n159
Collins, Randall, 286n121
Comack, Elizabeth, 286n125
Comte, Auguste, 48–9
Conde-Costas, Luis A., 295n24, 295n26,
322n124
Connolly, William E., 320n30
Cooke, Maeve, 290n2, 292n39, 295n43
Coole, Diana, 286n116, 286n125, 291n23,
291n31, 311n1, 318n2, 320n50, 338n160,
339n175, 339n187, 340n190, 340n191,
340n197
Cooper, David E., 297n3, 313n2
Corallo, Jean-François, 295n25, 333n3
Corbridge, Stuart, 289n168
Corcuff, Philippe, 334n33
Corfield, Penelope, 284n76, 285n103,
285n106, 287n153, 289n176, 311n1,
313n28
Cornis-Pope, Marcel, 287n154, 292n43
Corroto, Carla, 287n151
Couldry, Nick, 330n441
Cova, Bernard, 297n17, 300n131, 301n138,
301n139, 301n154, 337n128
Cox, Andrew W., 319n18
Craib, Ian, 284n67, 284n76, 287n150,
292n35, 299n64, 301n145, 333n1,
337n127, 339n184
Cressler, John D., 307n319
Cresswell, James, 287n152, 302n168
Cronin, Ciaran, 283n30
Crook, Stephen, 311n5, 334n27, 335n53
Crouch, Colin, 308n340, 310n373, 325n237
Crowder, George, 326n244
Cusset, Yves, 319n5, 320n35
Daly, Glyn, 286n126, 335n47, 335n53
Dannemann, Rüdiger, 295n25, 333n3,
334n45
Dannreuther, Roland, 327n281, 330n405
Darwin, Charles, 165
Das Nair, Roshan, 302n187
Davetian, Benet, 282n9, 289n173, 323n171
Davey, Nicholas, 334n33
Davies, William, 306n305, 306n309
Davis, Mark, 287n152, 288n162, 297n17,
305n284, 311n1
Day, Richard J. F., 318n3, 318n4, 319n17,
321n88
de Lara, Philippe, 295n27, 298n31, 300n110
de Larrinaga, Miguel, 310n373

de Onís, Federico, 285n106, 285n107
de Saussure, Ferdinand, 148, 296n69,
296n72, 314n51
Dean, Mitchell, 319n18
Descartes, René, 16
Dees, Stephane, 310n372
Delanty, Gerard, 282n4, 284n63, 284n65,
284n74, 284n76, 285n87, 285n90,
285n92, 285n93, 287n150, 287n152,
287n153, 288n158, 288n161, 288n165,
288n166, 289n176, 290n13, 291n20,
291n31, 291n33, 292n35, 292n43, 293n4,
293n14, 297n2, 297n3, 297n23, 298n30,
298n41, 298n50, 299n84, 300n93,
300n118, 300n120, 300n123, 301n131,
301n133, 301n137, 301n139, 301n145,
301n154, 301n159, 302n168, 302n201,
302n202, 303n210, 305n297, 306n300,
306n301, 306n304, 306n305, 306n309,
307n321, 308n336, 308n341, 312n15,
317n209, 317n215, 318n2, 318n3, 318n4,
319n6, 319n17, 319n18, 320n26, 320n31,
320n43, 320n44, 321n89, 322n95,
323n149, 323n153, 323n155, 323n158,
327n281, 327n282, 327n286, 327n294,
327n306, 327n308, 329n382, 329n388,
329n398, 330n408, 330n415, 330n419,
330n420, 330n422, 330n423, 330n425,
330n431, 330n435 330n436, 333n17,
334n26, 335n54, 335n56, 335n57,
337n128, 337n129, 337n132, 338n144,
338n154, 339n184, 339n185, 340n200,
340n204, 340n205, 340n206, 340n207,
340n208, 340n209, 340n210, 340n211,
340n212
Deleuze, Gillles, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31
della Porta, Donatella, 307n320, 309n349,
321n88, 340n188
Denzin, Norman K., 288n161, 290n13,
293n1, 294n17, 294n22, 298n27, 339n185
Depoortere, Frederiek, 287n154
Derrida, Jacques, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 148, 296n65, 300n111, 314n53,
314n61, 334n29, 335n64, 336n113
Deutscher, Isaac, 314n81
Di Mauro, Filippo, 310n372
Di Stefano, Christine, 283n49, 286n125,
318n4
Dicken, Peter, 306n301, 306n309,
308n337
Dickens, David R., 285n106, 288n160, 290n1,
293n1, 293n15, 297n22, 298n30, 311n1,
313n18, 339n184, 339n185
Index of Names 403
Dickie-Clark, Hamish F., 334n33
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 288n158, 288n166,
291n33, 293n4, 293n14, 298n50, 339n184
DiPalma, Carolyn, 287n151, 293n1
Disco, Cornelio, 295n24
Dods, Roberta Robin, 287n150, 339n184
Doetsch-Kidder, Sharon, 302n187
Doherty, Joe, 339n184, 339n185
Doja, Albert, 287n152, 292n43, 333n1
Dolgon, Corey, 297n2, 306n301, 306n309,
307n314, 307n316, 307n318
Domańska, Ewa, 288n156, 311n1, 314n55,
316n160, 317n187, 330n424, 338n159
Donskis, Leonidas, 286n136, 322n123,
322n124
Doran, Robert, 314n55, 336n89, 339n187
Dore, Ronald Philip, 309n368
Dostert, Troy Lewis, 289n174
Doucet, Marc G., 310n373
Douzinas, Costas, 287n153, 319n5, 320n47,
328n353
Dowding, Keith M., 319n18
Doyran, Mine Aysen, 309n355, 319n18
Drache, Daniel, 308n340, 310n373
Drake, Michael S., 306n301, 308n340
Drucker, Peter F., 308n335
Dunning, John H., 310n382
Dupuy, Jean Pierre, 290n2, 292n39
Durkheim, Émile, 11, 12, 32, 284n69,
284n79, 292n35, 294n23, 303n218,
323n139, 327n315, 333n20, 334n26,
335n65
Duvall, John N., 287n152, 288n164, 296n1,
297n17, 298n41, 300n122, 305n284,
311n1
Eadie, Jo, 292n43, 318n3, 318n4, 334n26,
334n28
Eaglestone, Robert, 287n153, 336n90,
336n112, 337n119, 339n175
Eagleton, Terry, 283n30, 286n126, 295n24,
298n41, 299n83, 300n112, 306n305,
308n336, 312n15, 317n207, 317n209,
320n49, 322n124, 339n173, 339n175,
339n176, 339n177
Eder, Klaus, 308n340, 310n373,
321n88
Eickelpasch, Rolf, 286n134, 288n164,
296n1, 298n41, 299n57, 299n76,
300n112, 304n258, 304n268, 338n158
Eley, Geoffrey, 311n1
Elliott, Anthony, 282n9, 286n134, 287n152,
291n31, 299n58, 301n131, 301n134,
301n167, 302n179, 302n183, 302n196,
404 Index of Names
302n198, 303n210, 303n220, 303n235,
303n236, 303n238, 304n246, 304n254,
304n257, 305n279, 305n280, 305n284,
305, 296, 306n300, 306n301, 307n321,
308n342, 308n344, 312n15, 322n115,
332n519, 334n26, 338n149, 338n158
Elliott, Emory, 308n342
Elman, Cheryl, 287n152, 304n260,
304n268, 304n269, 304n271, 305n277,
305n278
Emmet, Dorothy, 319n18
Emmison, Michael, 287n152, 289n168,
297n17, 305n284
Engelmann, Peter, 289n176, 336n89
Engels, Friedrich, 295n24, 295n26,
309n352, 322n115, 322n124, 337n116
Eriksen, Erik O., 295n43
Ermarth, Elizabeth Deeds, 286n115,
287n151, 299n64, 311n1
Eulriet, Irène, 283n43, 289n170
Evans, David, 289n180, 292n43, 298n41,
305n287, 311n1, 319n17, 336n111,
337n128, 338n139
Evans, Michael A., 287n152, 304n246
Evans, Richard J., 287n153, 290n11,
298n41, 311n1, 313n30, 313n36, 314n42,
314n49, 316n131, 316n166, 336n89,
336n111, 337n119, 338n154
Factor, Regis A., 292n35
Fâehâer, Ferenc, 298n30, 318n2, 340n200
Fairclough, Norman, 288n159, 293n2,
293n10, 294n16, 294n18, 294n21,
294n22, 295n24, 322n124, 324n208,
336n114, 336n115
Farrar, John H., 310n372, 310n373
Farrell, Frank B., 290n13, 297n19, 298n41,
299n63, 302n169, 302n182
Featherstone, Mike, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, 284n76, 287n152, 288n164,
289n168, 290n184, 296n1, 297n2,
297n17, 298n30, 301n138, 305n284,
306n301, 306n309, 307n320, 308n341,
337n126, 340n188
Feierman, Steven, 311n1
Feldman, Steven P., 288n161, 340n190,
340n197, 340n199
Fendler, Lynn, 287n151, 293n2
Fernando, Jude L., 287n152
Ferrara, Alessandro, 333n7
Festenstein, Matthew, 295n43
Fetscher, Iring, 334n45
Feyerabend, Paul, 292n36, 339n184
Fforde, Matthew, 287n152, 297n2
Fielding, Nigel G., 287n151, 290n13, 293n1,
295n30, 301n145, 319n7
Fillmore, Charles J., 288n159, 293n2,
294n22
Fine, Robert, 327n281, 327n309, 327n311,
327n312, 328n317, 328n318, 328n324,
328n331, 328n334, 328n335, 328n337,
328n338, 328n341, 328n342, 328n354,
329n357, 329n376, 329n377
Firat, A. Fuat, 297n17, 297n19, 300n119,
300n122, 300n124, 300n126, 301n143,
301n145, 301n147, 301n152, 312n16
Fish, Stanley, 314n72
Fishman, Daniel B., 292n35, 293n1,
295n30, 318n3, 318n4
Flamez, Brande, 287n152, 302n187,
308n341
Flatley, Jonathan, 289n173, 323n171
Flax, Jane, 285n111, 286n125, 287n153,
302n170, 302n173, 302n174, 302n175,
302n183, 317n209, 317n212, 318n221
Fogel, Robert William, 315n86
Føllesdal, Dagfinn, 290n2, 292n38,
292n39
Fontana, Andrea, 285n106, 288n160,
290n1, 293n1, 293n15, 297n22, 298n30,
311n1, 313n18, 339n184, 339n185
Forester, Tom, 307n319
Foster, Hal, 288n164, 296n1, 298n41,
308n341
Foster, John Bellamy, 286n126, 287n153,
311n1
Foucault, Michel, 23, 24 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 148, 300n111, 302n173, 302n174,
314n57, 319n18, 324n207, 335n64
Fowler, Bridget, 283n43, 289n170,
336n88
Fox, Nick J., 287n151, 290n13, 295n30,
299n64, 333n1
Frank, Arthur W., 333n4, 333n10
Frank, Manfred, 287n150, 301n167,
334n33, 336n89
Frankel, Jeffrey A., 308n344
Franklin, Sarah, 288n164, 296n1, 298n41,
300n91, 306n301, 308n341, 318n220,
332n510
Fraser, Mariam, 289n172
Fraser, Nancy, 286n125, 291n23, 291n31,
293n3, 301n145, 302n187, 306n301,
308n341, 319n5, 320n35, 321n69,
321n73, 321n76, 321n77, 321n80,
321n82, 330n437, 330n441, 330n442,
330n443, 331n444, 331n449, 331n450,
331n453, 331n454, 331n460, 331n461,

331n464, 331n465, 331n466, 331n469,
331n470, 331n472, 331n475, 332n492,
332n499, 332n511, 332n520
Freud, Sigmund, 16
Freundlieb, Dieter, 290n2, 292n39
Frezzo, Mark, 328n353
Friedländer, Saul, 311n1
Friedman, Jonathan, 305n289, 306n301
Friedman, Sam, 301n131
Friedrich, Rainer, 284n81, 287n153,
287n154, 291n23, 291n31, 311n1,
339n187
Friese, Heidrun, 284n63
Fukuyama, Francis, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, 170, 287n154, 311n1,
317n207, 317n208
Fuller, Steve, 283n43, 289n170
Furlong, Paul, 319n18
Furseth, Inger, 292n42, 326n277
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 16, 238, 295n24,
334n33, 334n36, 335n53
Gadrey, Jean, 324n208
Gafijczuk, Dariusz, 289n180, 335n78,
336n89, 339n185
Gamble, Andrew, 339n184
Gamwell, Franklin I., 333n7
Gane, Mike, 285n108, 285n113, 286n129,
286n134, 287n147, 287n152, 288n163,
288n167, 289n176, 290n13, 295n30,
297n3, 306n301, 306n305, 307n321,
307n323, 308n336, 317n209, 318n218,
319n5, 319n17, 322n119, 338n158,
340n192, 340n194
Gane, Nicholas, 284n78, 285n108,
285n113, 286n129, 286n134, 287n147,
287n150, 287n152, 287n153, 288n162,
288n163, 288n167, 289n176, 290n2,
290n13, 291n20, 292n39, 295n30, 297n3,
306n301, 306n305, 307n321, 307n323,
308n336, 311n1, 317n209, 318n218,
319n5, 319n17, 322n119, 338n158,
340n192, 340n194
Garrett, Chris, 287n150, 287n152, 287n153,
311n1
Garrick, John, 288n158, 288n166, 293n4
Garz, Detlef, 334n33
Gebauer, Gunter, 288n159
Gellner, Ernest, 285n112, 288n160, 290n1,
291n31, 292n42, 293n15, 339n175
Geras, Norman, 286n126, 336n116
Geuss, Raymond, 293n3, 330n440
Gibbins, John R., 285n106, 290n185,
297n10, 311n1, 312n5, 313n18
Index of Names 405
Giddens, Anthony, 284n66, 284n67,
284n71, 284n76, 288n167, 290n184,
292n35, 295n26, 297n5, 301n167,
303n210, 305n278, 305n292, 306n300,
306n301, 307n320, 307n324, 308n326,
308n341, 308n342, 311n385, 311n1,
312n5, 312n15, 316n163, 316n167,
317n191, 317n203, 328n337, 334n33,
337n127, 337n128, 340n188
Gieben, Bram, 284n76
Giesen, Bernhard, 299n67, 335n77
Gilbert, Paul, 326n254, 326n265, 339n176
Gill, Judith, 310n373, 327n281
Gillison, Gillian, 287n152, 288n164, 296n1,
298n41, 298n43, 308n341
Ginev, Dimitri, 334n33
Gingras, Yves, 288n167
Giri, Ananta Kumar, 333n7
Glaeser, Edward L., 315n86
Glasberg, Davita S., 328n353
Glass, David Victor, 315n83
Gleizer, Salzman Marcela, 326n254
Goffman, Erving, 289n169, 301n167
Goldhammer, Arthur, 284n81, 288n159
Goldin, Claudia, 315n86
Goldman, Alvin I., 319n18
Good, James, 288n165, 297n3, 305n289,
305n290, 306n300, 317n207, 318n1,
318n2, 324n176, 324n179, 340n200
Goonewardena, Kanishka, 289n168
Gordon, Daniel, 284n81, 287n150
Goulimari, Pelagia, 287n150, 289n176,
312n17, 319n7
Grabham, Emily, 302n187, 319n18
Graham, Elspeth, 339n184, 339n185
Grainge, Paul, 318n3, 318n4, 320n51,
320n53
Gray, John, 340n203
Greco, Monica, 289n172
Gregory, Derek, 289n168
Grenfell, Michael, 336n88
Griffiths, Tomand, 315n83
Grimm, Sabine, 325n227
Gritsch, Maria, 308n337, 308n340,
310n372, 310n373
Grondin, Jean, 293n11, 334n33
Guattari, Félix, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31
Gundelach, Peter, 321n88
Gunn, Richard, 295n33, 321n67
Gupta, Damyanti, 310n373
Gusfield, Joseph R., 321n88, 321n93,
322n124
Gutmann, Amy, 319n5, 321n72, 326n244
406 Index of Names
Haber, Honi Fern, 291n23, 291n31, 318n2,
318n3, 318n4
Habermas, Jürgen, 284n64, 284n72,
284n76, 284n80, 284n81, 285n92,
288n158, 288n159, 288n165, 288n166,
289n174, 290n2, 291n33, 292n35,
292n39, 292n42, 293n3, 293n4, 293n14,
295n24, 295n43, 298n50, 301n145,
312n15, 318n1, 319n18, 321n76, 321n92,
326n277, 327n281, 330n440, 330n443,
331n449, 331n453, 331n460, 331n463,
331n465, 331n470, 331n471, 333n4,
333n7, 333n8, 333n10, 334n33, 335n50,
335n53, 335n65, 337n129, 338n144,
338n150, 338n154, 339n184
Hacking, Ian, 288n159, 288n160, 290n1,
290n2, 290n13, 291n31, 292n39, 293n15,
339n175
Haddock, Adrian, 287n150, 288n160,
290n1, 293n15, 339n175
Hall, Peter A., 308n337, 310n380
Hall, Ralph P., 310n373
Hall, Stuart, 284n76, 295n27, 298n31,
300n110
Halley, Jean O‘Malley, 289n173, 323n171
Halsall, Francis, 319n6, 337n128
Halttunen, Karen, 298n41, 311n1
Hamel, Pierre, 309n349, 310n371, 321n88
Hamilton, Clive, 289n174
Hammond, Philip, 285n86, 287n152,
297n2, 306n301, 306n305, 308n336,
317n207, 317n209, 322n122, 323n145,
333n11
Hancké, Bob, 308n337, 310n380
Haraway, Donna J., 23
Harding, Sandra, 23, 284n81, 286n125,
318n2, 321n88, 339n184, 339n185
Harrington, Austin, 334n33
Harrod, Tanya, 287n152
Hartmann, Klaus, 295n24, 295n26
Hartsock, Nancy, 23, 286n125,
319n18
Harvey, David, 23, 288n164, 289n168,
289n176, 296n1, 297n19, 300n11,
306n301, 306n309, 307n311, 307n314,
307n316, 307n318, 308n342, 308n344,
321n76
Hassan, Ihab Habib, 23, 282n1, 282n8,
288n164, 296n1, 311n1, 312n16
Hasumi, Shiguehiko, 288n154, 312n17,
318n1
Hatton, T. J., 308n342
Haug, Wolfgang Fritz, 295n25, 333n3,
334n37, 335n53, 337n120
Haugaard, Mark, 319n18
Havel, Václav, 318n1, 318n2
Hawkesworth, Mary, 286n125, 290n30
Hawthorn, Geoffrey, 284n67, 284n76,
284n81, 290n3, 337n127
Hawthorne, Susan, 306n301, 306n309,
307n314, 318n3
He, Baogang, 326n244
Hearse, Phil, 319n18
Heath, Joseph, 290n2, 292n39, 333n7,
333n129
Heelas, Paul, 292n42, 305n285, 311n1
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 11, 16, 91,
238, 316n160, 321n70, 327n311, 334n34
Heidegger, Martin, 23, 311n3, 334n33,
334n35, 335n53
Held, David, 284n76, 292n43, 306n301,
307n314, 307n320, 307n324, 312n15,
318n2, 327n281, 334n37, 335n53,
340n188
Heller, Ágnes, 23, 298n30, 300n111,
312n10, 318n2, 334n33, 340n200
Hempel, Carl G., 292n35, 339n184
Herrera Vivar, Maria Teresa, 302n187,
326n244
Herrschel, Tassilo, 310n373
Herzen, Alexander I., 240
Hewison, David, 287n150, 290n13
Heywood, Andrew, 284n77, 322n124,
335n52, 335n53
Hickman, Mary J., 308n342, 308n344
Hidetaka, Ishida, 287n154
Hiley, David R., 288n158, 293n4
Hill, John Edward Christopher, 314n81
Hill, Stephen, 295n24, 322n124
Hindess, Barry, 319n18
Hines, Sally, 302n187
Hirst, Paul Q., 306n301, 307n324, 308n337,
308n340, 309n346, 309n358, 309n361,
309n363, 310n373
Hobbes, Thomas, 319n18
Hobsbawm, Eric, 311n1, 312n8, 314n81
Hoey, Douglas, 286n134, 287n152,
301n145, 338n158
Hoggett, Paul, 289n173, 301n167,
323n171
Hollinger, Robert, 282n3, 339n184,
339n185
Hollis, Martin, 288n160, 290n1, 290n2,
291n31, 292n39, 293n15, 339n175
Holloway, John, 295n33, 307n316,
307n318, 319n16, 319n18, 332n497,
338n147
Holton, Robert J., 310n373, 327n281

Honneth, Axel, 283n43, 284n73, 284n80,
289n170, 295n24, 312n11, 319n5,
319n18, 320n35, 321n69, 321n76,
322n124
Hoogheem, Andrew, 287n152, 288n164,
292n42, 296n1, 326n254, 339n176
Hoogvelt, Ankie M. M., 306n301, 308n337
Hook, Derek, 324n199
Horkheimer, Max, 236, 284n81, 285n89,
333n14, 333n16, 334n26, 334n37,
335n53, 337n121, 337n123
Hornung, Alfred, 287n152
Horowitz, Asher, 333n7
Horrocks, Chris, 297n19, 306n301,
307n321, 317n207
Horwitz, Howard, 314n72
How, Alan, 333n7, 334n33
Howarth, David, 293n2, 294n22, 337n116
Hu, Howard, 308n343
Hubbard, Phil, 289n168
Hudson, Wayne, 290n2, 292n39
Hume, David, 335n53
Hunt, Lynn, 288n164, 296n1, 298n41,
315n113, 340n196
Huntington, Samuel P., 209, 326n264,
326n271
Husserl, Edmund, 16
Hutcheon, Linda, 23, 287n152, 289n176,
291n23, 291n31, 292n43, 306n301,
306n309, 307n321, 318n3, 318n4,
340n200
Hutchings, Kimberly, 327n281, 330n405,
330n441
Huyssen, Andreas, 23, 286n125, 286n133,
288n164, 296n1, 298n41, 306n301,
312n16, 320n59, 338n145, 338n149,
338n154
Hyman, Richard, 307n317
Ianni, Octavio, 306n301
Iggers, Georg G., 285n86, 287n153,
288n158, 288n166, 293n4, 299n64,
311n1, 313n30, 313n32, 314n74,
322n122, 333n11, 336n112, 338n154,
339n184, 339n185
Ignatieff, Michael, 318n225
Inayatullah, Sohail, 288n161, 290n13
Inglehart, Ronald, 304n270, 305n276,
305n278, 307n310, 308n341,
312n17
Inglis, David, 282n9, 289n180, 327n281,
336n88
Inoue, Masamichi S., 308n343
Irigaray, Luce, 23
Index of Names 407
Irzik, Gürol, 286n134, 287n150, 291n23,
291n31, 299n64, 311n1, 312n15,
338n158, 339n184, 339n185
Isaac, Jeffrey C., 314n81, 319n18
Isin, Engin F., 308n341, 326n254, 339n176
Ivashkevich, Olga, 287n152, 319n18
Ivic, Sanja, 287n154, 318n2
Jabès, Edmond, 291n30
Jacob, Margaret C., 288n164, 290n13,
296n1, 298n41, 306n301, 311n1,
315n113, 327n281, 339n184, 340n196
Jacobsen, Michael Hviid, 285n86, 287n152,
322n113, 322n116, 322n118, 322n120,
322n122, 333n11
Jäger, Ludwig, 288n159
Jagger, Elizabeth, 286n125, 287n152,
297n17, 305n284, 340n189
Jakubowski, Franz, 295n24
James, Cyril Lionel Robert, 314n81
James, William, 326n256
Jameson, Fredric, 23, 286n128, 287n152,
288n164, 289n168, 289n176, 296n1,
297n3, 297n17, 298n41, 298n47, 299n82,
299n85, 299n87, 300n89, 300n103,
301n141, 301n150, 301n154, 305n284,
306n301, 306n309, 307n311, 307n314,
307n316, 307n318, 308n341, 319n17,
337n120
Janich, Peter, 287n151, 293n2, 339n184
Janos, Andrew C., 306n301, 318n2
Jansen, Julia, 319n6, 337n128
Jay, Martin, 287n152, 288n163, 322n119,
333n7, 340n197
Jedan, Christoph, 289n174, 292n42
Jencks, Charles, 311n1, 313n18
Jenkins, J. Craig, 314n56
Jenkins, Keith, 23, 311n1, 314n56, 315n117
Jenkins, Milly, 311n390, 326n254
Jenkins, Richard, 311n390, 326n254
Jenks, Chris, 283n61, 290n4, 296n71,
298n32
Jessop, Bob, 307n316, 310n373
Joas, Hans, 334n33
Jogdand, Prahlad Gangaram, 306n301,
309n349, 321n88
Johnson, Fred, 297n19, 318n3, 318n4,
319n18, 320n48
Johnson, James, 333n7
Johnson, John M., 287n152, 289n171
Johnston, Hank, 309n349, 321n88, 321n93,
322n124
Jones, Andrew, 306n301
Jones, Daniel T., 307n315
408 Index of Names
Jones, John Paul, 285n101, 311n1, 312n17,
313n18, 320n59
Jones, Pip, 282n9
Jørgensen, Kenneth Mølbjerg, 287n150
Jorgenson, Andrew, 308n344
Joyce, Patrick, 287n153, 298n41, 299n78,
311n1, 313n29, 314n68, 333n1, 336n83,
336n89, 336n93, 336n96, 336n112,
337n128
Jullien, Francois, 291n31, 318n4,
326n244
Junge, Barbara, 289n175, 309n232
Junge, Matthias, 291n20
Kali, Raja, 307n320, 308n337, 340n188
Kamper, Dietmar, 288n162, 311n1
Kant, Immanuel, 16, 284n81
Kaplan, E. Ann, 289n176
Karsenti, Bruno, 283n43, 283n170
Kasher, Asa, 293n2, 293n5
Katovich, Michael A., 293n1
Keat, Russell, 292n35, 339n184
Keith, Michael, 318n2, 318n3, 326n254,
339n176
Kelemen, Mihaela, 287n152, 291n20,
301n145, 302n169, 302n181, 302n192,
302n195, 302n198, 303n223, 303n231,
304n249
Kellner, Douglas, 23, 282n1, 282n8,
288n164, 289n176, 298n41, 300n92,
304n246, 311n1, 311n5, 312n11, 312n16,
287n150, 299n64, 284n76, 286n126,
297n3, 297n19, 297n20, 297n23, 298n30,
340n199, 285n86, 286n131, 287n153,
289n176, 291n23, 291n31, 292n35,
297n2, 302n183, 302n193, 302n198,
303n234, 303n237, 304n246, 305n293,
305n294, 306n300, 306n301, 306n309,
307n311, 307n314, 307n318, 307n321,
311n1, 312n16, 317n207, 318n3, 318n4,
320n59, 321n60, 321n68, 322n111,
322n122, 333n11, 338n160, 339n166,
339n175, 339n187, 340n190, 340n191,
340n192, 340n197
Kellner, Hans, 316n161
Kellow, Aynsley, 308n344, 332n519
Kelly, Catriona, 311n1, 336n89, 336n94,
336n112
Kelly, Michael, 334n33
Kelly, P. J., 308n341, 326n244
Kember, Sarah, 289n172
Kemp, Catherine, 289n170
Kendall, Gavin, 327n281
Kerr, Keith, 287n152
Kersenboom, Saskia, 287n150
Keupp, Heiner, 318n3, 318n4, 326n254,
339n176
Khory, Kavita R., 308n242, 326n244
Kick, Edward L., 308n344
Kienel, Simone, 311n1, 335n50, 335n53
King, Russell, 308n342
King, Ursula, 284n62, 292n42
Kirk, Neville, 288n159, 311n1, 336n89,
336n112, 337n119
Kirkpatrick, Graeme, 331n471
Kitchin, Rob, 289n168
Kögler, Hans-Herbert, 288n167, 293n3,
327n281, 330n440, 334n33, 336n88
Köhler, Martin, 327n281
Köhler, Michael, 285n106, 311n1
Konersmann, Ralf, 334n37, 335n53
König, Ekkehard, 288n159
Koshul, Basit Bilal, 284n78, 287n152,
290n2, 292n39
Köster, Udo, 316n160, 334n34
Kotarba, Joseph A., 287n152, 289n171
Kozul-Wright, Richard, 309n353, 309n356,
309n366, 310n371
Krämer, Sybille, 288n159
Kriesi, Hanspeter, 321n88
Krishna, Sankaran, 290n13, 292n43,
318n2
Krizsán, Andrea, 302n187
Kroll, Gary, 308n344
Kronenberg, Volker, 311n1, 335n50, 335n53
Kühnl, Reinhard, 338n150
Kumar, Krishan, 283n58, 285n109, 285n110,
286n118, 289n176, 290n6, 291n23,
291n31, 293n3, 297n2, 297n3, 297n7,
297n12, 298n30, 298n34, 298n41, 299n64,
300n88, 300n90, 300n94, 301n145,
302n198, 303n208, 303n210, 303n240,
304n246, 307n311, 312n17, 330n440
Kunow, Rüdiger, 287n152
Kurasawa, Fuyuki, 330n441
Kvale, Steinar, 312n11
Kymlicka, Will, 308n341, 318n3, 326n244,
326n245, 327n285
Labica, Georges, 295n27, 298n31, 300n110
Lachenmann, Gudrun, 288n157, 291n32,
298n50
Lachmann, Richard, 310n373
Laclau, Ernesto, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 75, 284n81, 287n153, 288n162,
288n165, 289n176, 291n31, 292n43,
296n44, 296n53, 296n75, 296n79,
300n111, 311n1, 318n1, 321n88, 336n116

Lafont, Cristina, 288n159, 334n33
LaFreniere, Gilbert, 315n83
Lahire, Bernard, 301n167, 302n184,
304n268, 305n288, 308n341
Lahiri, Sajal, 308n337
Lakatos, Imre, 292n35, 339n184
Lakicevic, Dragan D., 287n154, 318n2
Landry, Lorraine Y., 286n124, 286n126,
287n152
Lane, Christel, 307n313, 309n362
Lang, Berel, 311n1, 315n101, 336n89,
336n90, 336n95, 339n175
Laraña, Enrique, 321n88, 321n93,
322n124
Larrain, Jorge, 295n24, 295n25, 295n27,
298n31, 300n110, 322n124, 333n3
Lascelles, David, 355n309
Lash, Scott, 23, 284n76, 287n152, 288n164,
288n167, 289n168, 289n179, 295n131,
296n1, 297n2, 297n17, 298n41, 300n91,
301n151, 303n228, 305n278, 305n289,
306n301, 306n309, 307n311, 307n314,
307n320, 307n323, 308n341, 312n15,
318n220, 320n23, 332n510, 337n128,
340n188
Laslett, Thomas Peter Ruffell, 315n83
Lassander, Mika, 289n174, 292n42
Latour, Bruno, 23, 292n35, 297n3, 306n301,
307n320, 311n1, 312n14, 335n56,
340n188
Lau, Christoph, 284n76, 286n134, 292n35,
297n2, 306n301, 307n320, 308n344,
312n15, 334n26, 334n38, 334n43,
338n158, 340n188, 340n189
Laudan, Larry, 288n160, 290n1, 291n31,
292n35, 292n36, 319n7, 339n175,
339n184
Lawler, Steph, 301n167, 326n254, 336n88,
339n176
Laxer, Gordon, 309n352
Le Boutillier, Shaun, 282n9,
324n173
Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel, 315n83,
315n85
Lee, David A., 288n159, 290n13, 293n2,
295n24, 322n124
Lee, David J., 297n7
Lefebvre, Henri, 289n168
Lehman, Glen, 287n150, 288n158,
288n166, 292n34, 293n4, 308n344
Leledakis, Kanakis, 288n161
Lemert, Charles C., 301n145
Lemieux, Cyril, 283n43, 289n170
Le roy, Ladurie E., 315n83, 315n85
Index of Names 409
Levi, Giovanni, 316n151
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 298n42
Li, Quan, 308n337, 308n340
Lichtblau, Klaus, 284n76, 298n41, 300n111,
300n116
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 298n30, 319n18
Livet, Pierre, 290n2, 292n39
Llamas, Rosa, 289n175, 303n232, 303n233
Lloyd, G. E. R., 292n36
Locke, Simon, 290n2, 292n39
Löhr, Isabella, 310n373
Lommel, Michael, 287n152, 303n243,
304n246, 305n298, 306n300
Lorenz, Chris, 311n1
Lovell, Terry, 289n169, 319n5, 320n35,
321n76
Luckmann, Thomas, 290n9
Lukes, Steven, 284n81, 288n160, 290n1,
291n31, 292n39, 293n15, 319n18,
339n175
Lury, Celia, 287n152, 288n164, 289n172,
296n1, 297n17, 298n41, 300n91,
301n151, 303n228, 306n301, 306n309,
307n311, 307n314, 307n323, 308n337,
308n341, 318n220, 332n510
Lutz, Helma, 302n187, 326n244
Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias, 327n281
Lykke, Nina, 302n187, 319n18
Lyman, Stanford M., 287n152, 302n168
Lyon, David, 23, 284n64, 284n76, 286n124,
289n176, 292n43, 334n26, 340n192,
340n193
Lyons, John S., 315n86
Lyotard, Jean-François, 23, 285n97,
285n104, 291n22, 291n23, 291n31,
297n13, 311n1, 312n13, 312n16, 323n23,
323n169
Mac an Ghaill, Máirtín, 308n342, 308n344
MacDonald, Gayle Michelle, 302n187,
315n83
Macdonell, Diane, 293n2, 294n22
Macfie, Alexander Lyon, 287n153, 311n1,
313n34, 314n60, 314n62, 315n95,
315n116
Mach, Ernst, 49
MacKenzie, Iain, 319n18
MacKenzie, John MacDonald, 315n83
MacKinnon, Catharine A., 287n154,
312n15, 339n169, 339n175
MacLure, Maggie, 287n151, 293n1, 295n30
Maffesoli, Michel, 23, 288n158, 288n166,
289n180, 293n4, 305n287, 326n254
Magnus, Bernd, 340n200
410 Index of Names
Magnússon, Sigurdur Gylfi, 287n153,
311n1, 315n123
Makhijani, Arjun, 308n343
Malek, Mohammed H., 339n184, 339n185
Malešević, Siniša, 310n383
Malik, Kenan, 287n154
Malpas, Simon, 286n124, 286n125,
286n126
Mann, Michael, 310n374
March, James G., 319n18
Marcos, Sous-Commandant, 308n333
Margolis, Joseph, 288n160, 289n170,
290n1, 290n14, 290n17, 291n20, 291n31,
293n15, 339n175
Marks, John, 289n172
Marsh, David, 339n184
Marshall, Thomas Humphrey, 308n338,
319n14
Marshman, Sophia, 285n86, 287n152,
322n113, 322n116, 322n118, 322n120,
322n122, 333n11
Martell, Luke, 306n301
Martens, Ekkehard
Martin, Bill, 289n174
Martin, David, 292n42, 311n1
Martin, Roderick, 319n18
Martin, Ron, 289n168
Martins, Herminio, 328n337
Marx, Karl, 284n68, 295n24, 295n26,
300n109, 309n352, 317n199, 319n18,
322n115, 322n124, 333n18, 334n23,
334n26, 334n46, 335n53, 337n116
Massey, Doreen, 23, 289n168, 300n111,
318n3, 329n397
Mast, Jason L., 299n67, 335n77
Matthewman, Steve, 286n134, 287n152,
301n145, 338n158
Matthews, Julian, 288n164, 297n1
Matustik, Martin J., 333n7, 340n190,
340n197
Mavelli, Luca, 289n174
Mavrotas, George, 310n372
May, Tim, 288n159
Mayes, David G., 310n372, 310n373
Mayo, Marjorie, 306n301, 309n349,
321n88
Mazower, Mark, 312n8, 336n110
McAdams, Dan P., 303n213
McCalman, Iain, 289n173, 323n171
McCarthy, George E., 288n156, 291n32,
298n50
McCarthy, Thomas, 288n161, 331n471,
334n33, 339n175
McClelland, Charles A., 319n18
Mcevoy, John G., 286n134, 287n150,
287n153, 292n34, 299n64, 300n122,
301n145, 311n1, 314n77, 315n102,
316n143, 316n162, 317n193, 333n1,
338n158, 339n184, 339n185
McGowan, John, 287n150, 318n2
McGraw, Lori A., 286n125, 287n152
McGrew, Anthony G., 284n76, 292n43,
306n301, 307n314, 307n320, 312n15,
318n2, 327n281, 340n188
McGuigan, Jim, 288n164, 296n1
McKenzie, Wark, 287n150, 306n301,
307n321
McKibbin, Warwick J., 310n372
McKinley, William, 287n152
McLaren, John, 310n372
McLaughlin, Amy, 287n150, 289n170,
290n17
McLellan, David, 284n73, 284n81, 333n10
McLennan, Gregor, 311n1, 316n160
McMahon, Charlie, 286n126, 288n164,
296n1, 337n122
McNichols, Christine, 287n152, 302n187,
308n341
Mead, George Herbert, 326n256
Mefford, Robert N., 307n315
Melucci, Alberto, 311n391, 321n88, 321n93
Mendieta y Nuñez, Lucio, 319n18
Mendieta, Eduardo, 319n18
Menger, Carl, 49
Menz, Georg, 308n337, 310n380
Menzel, Ulrich, 309n358
Meschonnic, Henri, 287n154, 312n17,
318n1
Mesny, Anne, 283n30
Meštrović, Stjepan G., 286n124, 289n180,
318n217, 318n1, 340n211, 340n212
Michael, S. M., 306n301, 309n349, 321n88
Michelfelder, Diane P., 288n161
Milbank, John, 289n174, 292n42
Miller, David, 321n76
Miller, Max H., 308n337, 310n380
Miller, Peter, 319n18
Miller, Toby, 302n168, 330n407, 340n200
Mills, C. Wright, 338n149
Milner, Stephen J., 311n1
Mimiko, Nahzeem Oluwafemi, 310n372
Mitchell, Gordon R., 333n7
Mittelman, James H., 306n301, 308n337,
309n347
Modood, Tariq, 326n244
Mohamed, Feisal G., 292n42, 289n174
Mohren, Nastasia, 287n152, 297n19
Molendijk, Arie L., 289n174, 292n42

Molina, Alfonso Hernan, 307n319
Mongardini, Carlo, 286n122, 295n24,
297n11, 311n1, 313n18, 322n124
Montag, Warren, 289n176
Morawski, Stefan, 288n164, 296n1
Morel, Teresita, 321n88
Morgan, Rhiannon, 314n56, 328n353
Morgan, Sue, 314n56, 328n353
Morgenthau, Hans J., 319n18
Morris, Lydia, 308n328, 308n340, 308n342,
310n373, 331n473
Morris, Martin, 340n190, 340n197
Morrison, Ken, 284n67, 284n76, 337n127
Morriss, Peter, 319n18
Morrisson, Iain, 338n160
Moses, Jonathon Wayne, 308n342, 314n81
Motterlini, Matteo, 292n36, 339n184
Mouffe, Chantal, 23, 285n107, 293n49,
294n22, 295n30, 295n34, 296n44,
296n75, 296n79, 320n34, 337n116
Mouzelis, Nicos P., 287n152, 292n35, 299n64,
306n301, 312n17, 314n47, 339n185
Muir, Edward, 315n119, 315n120
Mulhern, Francis, 286n126, 288n154,
298n41, 318n3, 318n4
Mulinari, Diana, 285n86, 286n125,
287n152, 297n2, 304n267, 304n268,
312n15, 322n122, 333n11
Müller-Doohm, Stefan, 290n2, 292n39
Munslow, Alun, 314n56
Murphy, Nancey, 339n184, 339n185
Murphy, Sinéad, 319n6, 337n128
Murrey, Lucas, 287n150, 301n145
Nachi, Mohamed, 283n43, 289n170
Nagel, Ernest, 49
Nagl, Ludwig, 293n49
Nash, Kate, 283n43, 289n170, 293n3,
330n440, 330n441
Natter, Wolfgang, 285n101, 311n1, 312n17,
313n18, 320n59
Nault, François, 333n7
Nayar, Baldev Raj, 308n340, 310n373
Nederveen Pieterse, Jan, 284n81, 285n110,
306n301, 312n17, 321n88, 321n93
Neemann, Ursula, 288n157, 291n32,
298n50
Negoita, Constantin Virgil, 287n152
Negroponte, Nicholas, 289n175, 300n97,
303n232, 304n246, 307n321, 332n498
Nel, Philip, 297n19, 318n2
Nemoianu, Virgil, 287n152, 288n164,
292n42, 296n1, 308n341, 326n244,
326n254, 338n154, 339n176
Index of Names 411
Newell, Peter, 308n344
Newman, Rhona, 297n19, 318n3, 318n4,
319n18, 320n48
Newton-Smith, W. H., 290n2, 292n35,
292n39, 339n184
Nicholson, Linda J., 23, 286n125, 291n23,
291n31, 301n145, 302n187
Nield, Keith, 311n1
Nielsen, J. N., 309n345
Nielsen, Kai, 321n76, 321n88
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 23, 319n18,
334n32, 335n53
Nissanke, Machiko, 310n372
Nola, Robert, 286n134, 287n150, 291n23,
291n31, 299n64, 311n1, 312n15,
338n158, 339n184, 339n185
Nolte, Ernst, 335n50, 335n51, 335n53
Norris, Christopher, 286n124, 288n160,
288n161, 290n1, 291n31, 293n15,
297n19, 311n5, 312n15, 339n175,
339n184
Novick, Peter, 314
Nowicka, Magdalena, 327n281
Nowotny, Helga, 283n53, 311n1, 312n17
Noya, Javier, 288n167
Núñez, Isabel Vericat, 319n18
Nuyen, A. T., 284n81, 301n167
Nynäs, Peter, 289n174, 292n42
O’Connor, Justin, 287n152, 300n130
Ödün, N. Reşat, 308n343
Offe, Claus, 321n88
Oliver, Marvarene, 287n152, 302n187,
308n341
Orgad, Shani, 300n96, 307n321, 308n340,
308n341, 332n491, 332n498
Osamu, Nishitani, 287n153, 312n17,
317n207
Osborne, Rachael, 302n187
Osborne, Thomas, 284n81, 290n2, 290n13
Outhwaite, William, 283n43, 284n66,
284n76, 288n158, 288n166, 289n170,
290n2, 291n33, 292n35, 292n39, 292n43,
293n4, 293n14, 297n6, 298n50, 312n15,
315n114, 331n471, 334n33, 336n88,
339n184
Overend, Tronn, 295n24
Owen, David, 319n5, 319n18, 320n35,
330n441
Owens, Craig, 286n125
Paddison, Max, 334n37, 335n53
Page, Edward, 319n18
Pakulski, Jan, 311n5
412 Index of Names
Palmer, Richard E., 288n161
Panagia, Davide, 333n7
Papastephanou, Marianna, 333n7
Parekh, Bhikhu C., 288n154, 308n341,
321n81, 325n238, 326n244, 326n254,
326n255, 326n258, 326n265, 326n266,
326n272, 326n280, 339n176
Parsons, Talcott, 32
Parusnikova, Zuzana, 300n122, 301n145,
319n7, 333n1, 339n184, 339n185
Passerin d’Entrèves, Maurizio, 284n72,
284n81, 297n14, 312n15, 333n10
Patel, Pari, 310n371
Patton, Paul, 285n114, 287n150, 291n23,
291n31, 293n1, 295n30, 297n2, 297n19,
299n64, 319n17, 333n10, 339n185
Paul, T. V., 310n373
Paulus, Andreas L., 288n154, 291n20,
292n43, 306n301, 306n305, 308n336,
317n207, 319n7
Pavitt, Keith, 310n371
Pawley, Martin, 337n126
Payne, Jasmine, 308n342
Pearce, David A., 319n7
Pease, Bob, 284n81, 319n18, 324n204,
324n207, 324n209, 324n212
Peat, F. David, 287n150, 291n20, 292n35,
311n392, 312n16, 339n184, 339n185
Pefanis, Julian, 291n23, 291n31, 297n19
Peláez, Eloína, 319n16
Pelinka, Anton, 322n124
Pellizzoni, Luigi, 290n2, 292n39, 295n43
Pels, Dick, 288n167
Peltonen, Tuomo, 287n152, 291n20,
301n145, 302n169, 302n181, 302n192,
302n195, 302n198, 303n223, 303n231,
304n249
Pendleton, Brian F., 287n152, 304n260,
304n268, 304n269, 304n271, 305n277,
305n278
Peper, Jürgen, 311n1
Peters, Michael, 295n31
Petit, Jean-François, 285n106, 287n152,
291n23, 291n31, 292n35, 312n17,
338n143, 338n154, 339n175
Petranovi, Danilo, 326n254
Petrella, Riccardo, 306n301, 306n307,
308n337, 309n364, 310n369, 310n383
Phillips, Anne, 308n341, 326n244, 326n278
Pickering, Paul A., 289n173, 323n171
Pieters, Jürgen, 287n153, 291n23, 291n31
Piketty, Thomas, 306n301, 306n309,
307n314, 307n318, 308n337, 309n355,
310n372, 310n373
Pile, Steve, 299n64, 305n293, 306n300,
320n59, 339n176
Pinheiro, Maria de Lourdes Elias, 287n152,
312n16
Plant, Raymond, 318n2, 319n6, 324n178
Pleasants, Nigel, 293n49
Ploesch, Patricia, 308n342
Plotke, David, 321n88, 321n93
Plüss, Caroline, 292n42, 305n285, 305n286,
305n288
Poggi, Gianfranco, 319n18
Polan, Dana, 288n164, 296n1
Pollock, Sheldon I., 327n281
Popper, Karl R., 49, 292n41, 339n184
Porter, Jack Nusan, 282n7, 282n9, 287n152
Post, Robert, 327n281, 328n326, 330n421
Poster, Mark, 286n124
Poulain, Jacques, 288n154, 312n15, 318n1,
324n190
Poulantzas, Nicos, 319n18
Prior, Nick, 287n152, 300n130, 301n131,
337n119, 338n138, 340n189
Psychopedis, Kosmas, 295n33
Purkayastha, Bandana, 328n353
Quéré, Louis, 283n43, 289n170
Quicke, John, 282n1, n8, 285n86, 301n145,
322n122, 333n11
Quiniou, Yvon, 295n24
Rabotnikof, Nora, 293n3, 300n440
Racevskis, Karlis, 284n81, 291n19
Rademacher, Claudia, 288n164, 296n1,
298n41, 312n17
Raese, Matthew W., 287n151, 287n153,
291n23, 291n31, 311n1, 339n187
Rajagopalan, Kanavillil, 293
Rajaiah, G., 310n372
Ramazanoglu, Caroline, 288n164, 297n1
Rancière, Jacques, 288n165, 318n1
Raschke, Carl, 292n42
Rassekh, Farhad, 308n337, 310n372
Rattansi, Ali, 282n9, 285n107, 289n176,
290n8, 291n18, 297n10, 298n30,
340n200
Ratzinger, Joseph, 290n2, 290n39, 292n42,
326n277
Raulet, Gérard, 312n17, 337n129
Rawls, John, 321n76
Ray, Larry, 284n81, 321n88, 321n93, 333n7
Raz, Joseph, 325n222
Reddy, William M., 315n113, 340n196
Redner, Harry, 306n301
Reese II, William A., 293n1

Rehmann, Jan, 295n24, 322n124
Reid, Alan, 310n373, 327n281
Reimer, Bo, 285n106, 290n185, 297n10,
311n1, 312n5, 313n18
Reisch, George A., 339n185
Reiter, Stanley, 315n86
Reitz, Tilman, 295n24, 295n28, 322n124
Rengger, Nicholas J., 284n81, 340n200
Rennes, Juliette, 283n43, 289n170,
317n190, 324n208
Resnik, David B., 292n36, 339n184
Reuveny, Rafael, 308n337, 308n340
Reyes, Javier, 307n320, 308n337, 340n188
Reynaud, Bénédicte, 290n2, 292n39
Rhodes, Martin Feb, 308n337, 310n380
Ricœur, Paul, 16
Rigotti, Eddo, 288n159
Ripsman, Norrin M., 310n373
Ritzer, George, 306n301, 306n309, 308n337,
308n341
Robbins, Bruce, 337n128
Robbins, Derek, 283n43, 289n170, 336n88
Robbins, Richard H., 308n344
Roberts, Brian, 293n13
Robertson, David, 308n344, 332n519
Robertson, Roland, 284n76, 289n168,
289n180, 306n301, 308n341, 311n384,
327n281, 329n387
Rojek, Chris, 286n132, 286n133, 287n152,
288n164, 291n23, 291n31, 297n19,
298n41, 301n154, 308n341, 312n17,
318n2, 321n76, 335n71, 336n89,
338n149, 340n200
Rolfe, Gary, 302n168, 312n16
Rømer, Thomas Aastrup, 287n152, 319n18
Ronneberger, Klaus, 325n227
Roos, Daniel, 307n315
Rorty, Richard, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 283n43, 283n58, 288n159, 288n160,
290n1, 290n5, 290n17, 291n23, 291n31,
292n39, 294n15, 311n1, 330n424, 333n7,
338n159, 339n175, 340n200
Rose, Margaret A., 284n76, 285n106,
286n134, 289n176, 297n3, 300n122,
301n145, 312n17, 313n18, 338n145
Rosecrance, Richard, 308n330, 310n373
Rosenau, Pauline Vaillancourt, 339n184,
n185
Rosenberg, Arthur, 314n81
Roseneil, Sasha, 311n387, 312n16, 321n88
Ross, Andrew, 316n140, 340n200
Rossi-Landi, Ferrucio, 288n159, 290n1,
291n31, 293n2, 294n15, 322n124,
339n175
Index of Names 413
Rouse, Joseph, 291n23, 311n1, 339n184
Rovisco, Maria, 327n281
Rozvan, Eugen, 314n81
Rubel, Maximilien, 314n81
Rubinstein, W. D., 286n136, 289n174,
292n42, 322n123
Ruby, Christian, 297n2, 297n19, 307n320,
340n188
Ruccio, David F., 286n126
Ruggiero, Guido, 315n120
Ruigrok, Winfried, 307n324, 310n371
Ruiter, Frans, 288n155, 318n227
Rumford, Chris, 327n281, 330n435
Rundell, John, 286n126, 312n17, 313n19
Runnel, Pille, 289n175, 303n232
Russell, Bertrand, 320n18
Sahoo, Basudeb, 310n372
Saiedi, Nader, 284n81, 290n2
Salleh, Ariel, 286n125, 287n150, 304n246,
339n185
Sandell, Kerstin, 285n86, 286n125,
287n152, 297n2, 304n267, 312n15,
322n122, 333n11
Sandywell, Barry, 288n167
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, 284n81
Sarup, Madan, 288n164, 297n1, 308n341,
323n140, 326n254, 339n176
Sassen, Saskia, 306n301, 308n327, 308n340,
310n378, 311n387, 330n414
Sayer, Derek, 284n67, 337n127
Schatzki, Theodore R., 285n101, 293n49,
311n1, 312n17, 313n18, 320n59
Scherpe, Klaus R., 288n164, 296n1, 298n41,
306n301, 312n16
Scheurich, James Joseph, 293n1
Schiffrin, Deborah, 293n2
Schmitt, Carl, 240
Schmückle, Karl, 314n81
Schnädelbach, Herbert, 334n37, 335n53
Schneider, Christopher J., 287n152, 318n3,
320n58
Schoolman, Morton, 333n7
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 163, 317n178
Schöttler, Peter, 288n159
Schrag, Calvin O., 290n2, 291n18, 292n39,
302n168, 312n11, 312n16
Schroeder, Ralph, 288n160, 290n1, 291n31,
294n15, 304n246, 339n175
Schwandt, Thomas A., 290n13, 293n1,
334n33
Schweppenhäuser, Gerhard, 288n164,
296n1, 298n41, 312n17, 324n214,
325n219, 325n228, 326n244
414 Index of Names
Scott, Alan, 321n88, 321n93, 322n124
Scott, James C., 320n18
Scott, John, 320n18
Scott, Peter, 289n176
Sears, Alan M., 310n373, 327n281
Seddon, John, 307n315
Segal, Marcia Texler, 302n187
Seibold, Carmel, 286n125, 287n151, 293n1
Seidman, Steven, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 282n1, 282n10, 282n17, 282n22,
282n28, 283n31, 283n44, 283n50,
292n35, 298n25, 299n64, 312n16, 318n3,
333n1, 334n26, 339n185
Seigel, Jerrold, 301n167
Sells, Laura, 287n151, 293n1
Sennett, Richard, 304n250, n257, 304n268,
305n285
Sewell, William H., Jr., 288n164, 297n1,
298n41, 308n341
Sewlall, Harry, 287n152
Seymour, Celeste Grayson, 287n152
Shapiro, Ian, 326n254
Sheehy, Maura, 286n125
Shusterman, Richard, 288n158, 293n4,
338n141
Shvyrkov, Oleg, 306n308, 308n337,
332n519
Silber, Ilana F., 283n43, 289n170
Silva, Filipe Carreira da, 282n6, 282n13,
282n24, 289n170, 290n17, 291n20,
292n35, 297n2, 298n41, 299n64, 303n219,
304n257, 306n301, 307n311, 307n321,
319n7, 335n72, 336n89, 340n188
Silverman, Hugh J., 23, 287n152, 319n6
Silverman, Max, 318n217
Sim, Stuart, 285n, 287n152, 288n164,
291n23, 297n1, 297n3, 308n241, 330n424,
333n1, 338n145, 338n154, 338n159
Simmel, Georg, 32, 289n168, 320n18,
334n21, 335n65
Simons, Herbert W., 293n1, 295n24,
295n28, 322n124
Singh, Kumari Ranjana, 310n372
Singh, Raghwendra Pratap, 299n64,
301n145, 312n17, 333n1
Sismondo, Sergio, 339n184, 339n186
Skjeie, Hege, 302n187
Sklair, Leslie, 306n301, 309n349, 311n393,
321n88
Skrbiš, Zlatko, 327n281
Slater, David, 284n81, 318n2, 321n88
Sloterdijk, Peter, 288n162, 306n301,
306n305, 307n309, 308n337, 308n341,
311n1, 312n11
Slott, Michael, 287n152, 295n30, 306n301,
307n309, 307n314, 307n323, 309n363,
340n204
Smart, Barry, 284n64, 286n119, 286n126,
288n165, 289n176, 291n23, 297n2,
298n30, 298n41, 300n122, 301n132,
306n301, 307n321, 311n1, 312n11,
312n17, 317n209, 318n2, 333n13, 334n26
Smith Maguire, Jennifer, 288n164, 297n1
Smith, Anthony Paul, 289n174
Smith, Dennis, 288n162, 311n1
Smith, Jackie, 309n349, 321n88, 321n93
Smith, James K. A., 287n150, 288n161,
291n23, 291n31, 292n42, 299n64,
339n187
Smith, Philip, 287n152, 289n168, 297n17,
305n284
Smith, William, 330n405, 330n418,
330n424, 338n159
Soboul, Albert, 314n81
Soederberg, Susanne, 308n337, 310n380
Soja, Edward W., 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
31, 286n124, 289n168, 308n342
Sokal, Alan, 286n134, 292n35, 319n7,
338n158, 339n184, 339n185
Sokol, Martin, 310n372
Solomon, Jack, 288n164, 297n1, 301n145,
308n341, 312n16, 340n200
Somerville, Margaret, 287n151, 293n1,
295n30, 297n2, 299n58, 299n64
Soskice, David W., 308n337, 310n379
Speir, John, 308n337, 310n372
Spence, David, 283n43, 289n170
Spengler, Oswald, 285n94
Speth, James Gustave, 308n344
Spiegel, Gabrielle M., 287n153, 292n43,
306n301, 311n1
Spinks, Lee, 287n152, 308n341
Squires, Judith, 288n165, 298n41, 301n157,
301n159, 302n187, 318n1, 320n35,
324n183, 337n128
St Louis, Brett, 288n154, 318n3, 320n55
Stacey, Jackie, 288n164, 296n1, 298n41,
300n91, 306n301, 308n341, 318n220
Stead, Graham B., 287n151, 293n2, 295n30,
299n64, 301n167, 303n211, 304n247,
324n199
Steinberger, Peter J., 293n3, 330n440
Steiner, Helmut, 334n45
Stewart, Angus, 320n18
Stewart, Gordon T., 315n113, 336n112,
340n190, 340n192, 340n197
Stockman, Norman, 290n2, 292n35,
292n39, 339n184

Stone, Lawrence, 311n1, 313n29, 314n70,
314n74, 315n82, 315n87, 316n133,
336n109, 339n187
Stones, Rob, 283n43, 289n170, 297n3,
311n1, 312n5, 334n29, 335n53
Strange, Susan, 307n312, 309n354
Strauss, Gerald, 3311n1, 316n135, 316n140
Stronach, Ian, 293n1
Struik, Dirk Jan, 314n81
Strydom, Piet, 288n158, 288n166, 291n33,
293n4, 298n50, 334n33, 339n184
Sujatha, B., 306n308, 308n337
Sullivan, Lawrence Eugene, 289n174, 292n42
Supik, Linda, 302n187, 326n244
Suranovic, Steven M., 310n372
Susen, Simon, 282n6, 282n13, 283n43,
283n49, 284n67, 284n80, 285n84,
288n158, 295n41, 297n6, 299n64,
301n167, 302n169, 302n183, 302n198,
303n210, 303n222, 304n248, 304n257,
306n302, 308n336, 308n341, 311n392,
312n15, 314n44, 318n3, 319n7, 319n10,
319n16, 320n58, 321n70, 321n88,
322n122, 323n172, 324n195, 325n217,
325n221, 326n244, 326n257, 328n320,
330n440, 331n463, 333n5, 333n15,
334n21, 334n26, 335n49, 336n88,
337n120, 337n129, 338n147, 338n153,
339n176
Svanfeldt, Christian, 297n17, 301n131,
301n139
Swanson, Guy E., 312n17
Swindal, James, 333n7
Szahaj, Andrzej, 292n35, 299n64, 319n7
Sznaider, Natan, 327n281, 330n422
Sznyi, Gyrgy E., 287n150
Tabb, William K., 308n337, 308n340
Taine, Hippolyte A., 240
Tambini, Damian, 308n340, 310n373
Tan, Lin, 302n187
Tant, Tony, 339n184
Taylor, Charles, 288n159
Taylor, David, 319n18, 320n19
Taylor, Mark C., 292n42, 319n5, 321n72,
326n244
Taylor, Vanessa, 288n154, 288n163
Taylor, Yvette, 302n187
Terdiman, Richard, 333n8
Terzi, Cédric, 283n43, 289n170
Tester, Keith, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 285n86, 286n123, 287n152, 288n162,
289n176, 298n41, 311n1, 312n17, 318n4,
322n107, 322n122, 333n11
Index of Names 415
Thatcher, Mark, 308n337, 310n380
Therborn, Göran, 285n92, 312n15
Thévenot, Laurent, 283n43, 289n170,
302n184, 305n288
Thiele, Leslie Paul, 318n2, 334n35
Thomas, Helen, 284n76, 312n17
Thomassen, Lasse, 333n7
Thompson, Craig J., 288n161, 290n13,
291n23, 292n35
Thompson, Grahame, 306n301, 308n329,
308n337, 308n340, 309n346, 309n358,
309n363, 310n373, 310n377
Thompson, John B., 292n39, 334n37,
335n53
Thompson, Kenneth, 289n176, 302n184,
305n288
Thompson, Simon, 301n167
Thompson, Willie, 287n153, 299n64,
314n64, 316n154, 316n160, 317n180
Thornhill, Chris, 328n341
Thorpe, Christopher, 282n9
Thrift, Nigel J., 289n168, 299n64, 305n293,
306n300, 308n341, 339n176
Tierney, William G., 293n1, 298n41, 298n44
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 240
Toews, David, 287n152, 288n164, 297n1,
297n23, 307n320, 340n188
Tomlinson, John, 306n301, 308n341
Tönnies, Ferdinand, 11
Torfing, Jacob, 284n76, 286n134, 291n20,
293n2, 295n30, 295n35, 296n44, 296n70,
297n2, 301n145, 306n305, 307n321,
308n336, 312n17, 319n17, 333n1,
334n26, 335n53
Toulmin, Stephen, 327n281
Touraine, Alain, 321n93
Trentmann, Frank, 288n154, 288n163,
298n41, 322n119
Triandis, Harry C., 325n221
Tuckey, Steven F., 287n151, 293n2
Tulder, Rob van, 307n324, 310n371
Turchin, Peter, 315n86
Turner, Bryan S., 282n2, 282n5, 282n9,
283n41, 283n43, 284n67, 285n110,
288n158, 288n166, 289n170, 289n170,
290n17, 292n42, 293n4, 297n1, 297n6,
297n19, 298n30, 300n108, 301n154,
303n231, 306n301, 308n337, 308n338,
312n15, 318n2, 319n14, 327n281,
328n341, 330n405, 330n424, 333n12,
334n26, 335n71, 336n89, 337n125,
337n127, 338n149
Turner, Graham, 308n337, 309n355
Turner, Jonathan H., 282n9
416 Index of Names
Urpelainen, Johannes, 308n337, 308n340,
310n372
Urrutia Elejalde, Juan, 287n151, 293n1
Urry, John, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31,
298n168, 289n179, 297n17, 300n95,
305n284, 339n184
Utriainen, Terhi, 289n174, 292n42
Vakaloulis, Michel, 286n126, 287n152,
291n23, 291n31, 297n2, 299n58,
300n122, 301n145, 304n246, 304n268,
305n278, 306n301, 307n309, 307n318
Valentine, Gill, 289n168
van den Brink, Bert, 319n5, 319n18,
320n35
van Dijk, Teun Adrianus, 293n2, 293n6,
294n22, 295n24, 322n124
van Raaij, W. Fred, 285n86, 286n134,
297n17, 301n145, 305n284, 319n7,
322n122, 322n123, 325n125, 323n130,
333n11, 338n158
van Reijen, Willem, 287n152, 292n35,
312n17
Vandevelde, Stijn, 287n152
Varga, Ivan, 303n226, 303n229, 303n231
Vattimo, Gianni, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, 286n141, 287n146, 288n164,
289n176, 297n3, 312n16, 320n44,
334n33
Veeser, H. Aram, 288n162, 311n1
Velody, Irving, 288n165, 297n3, 305n289,
306n300, 317n207, 318n1, 324n176
Venkatesh, Alladi, 297n17, 297n19,
300n119, 300n124, 301n143, 301n147,
312n16
Venturi, Robert, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 287n150
Vertovec, Steven, 327n281
Vester, Heinz-Günther, 304n258
Vester, Michael, 334n45
Visser, Hans, 310n372
Voirol, Olivier, 319n5, 320n35
Volkmer, Ingrid, 293n3, 330n440
Voltmer, Katrin, 287n154, 288n164,
318n1
von Beyme, Klaus, 298n30, 311n1, 313n18,
319n18, 322n124
von Bormann, Claus, 334n33
Vos, Rob, 310n372
Vries, Hent de, 289n174, 292n42
Wachterhauser, Brice R., 334n33
Wacquant, Loïc, 288n167, 295n24, 321n94,
322n124
Wade, Robert, 307n324, 308n337, 309n358,
309n363
Wagner, David G., 283n52
Wagner, Peter, 283n52, 284n75, 284n76,
285n99, 289n170, 289n176, 298n30,
311n1, 312n5, 312n15, 312n16
Waizbort, Ricardo, 331n471, 334n33, 339n184
Waldron, Jeremy, 327n281
Walker, Alexis J., 286n125, 287n152
Walker, William, 308n343
Walmsley, D. J., 287n152, 300n95, 300n99,
319n6
Walsh, David F., 284n76, 312n17
Walter, Tony, 284n76, 302n177, 302n183,
305n281, 305n284
Walzer, Michael, 321n76
Ward, Keith, 292n42, 312n16
Waterman, Peter, 309n349, 321n88, 321n93
Waters, Malcolm, 311n5
Watkins Chapman, John, 20
Watson, P. J., 287n152, 322n124
Waxman, Chaim Isaac, 286n136, 322n123,
322n124
Weber, Max, 292n38, 290n2, 292n39,
320n18, 284n70, 284n78, 333n19,
334n26, 292n42
Weber, Thomas, 295n24, 295n27, 298n31,
300n110
Webster, Frank, 307n321
Weigård, Jarle, 295n43
Weintraub, Jeff Alan, 293n3, 330n440
Weiß, Johannes, 290n2, 292n38, 292n39
Weiss, Linda, 308n340, 309n360, 310n373,
310n376, 310n381, 319n18, 309n358,
309n363, 310n371
Weiss, Ulrich, 284n81
Wellmer, Albrecht, 284n76, 286n124,
288n159, 290n2, 292n35, 292n39,
312n17
Welsch, Wolfgang, 23, 287n150, 287n152,
287n153, 288n154, 312n17
Welsh, Ian, 311n391, 321n88
Welzel, Christian, 304n270, 305n278,
307n210
Went, Robert, 308n337, 308n340, 310n372,
327n281
Wenzlhuemer, Roland, 310n373
Wernet, Christine A., 287n152, 304n260,
304n268, 304n269, 304n271, 305n277,
305n278
Wernick, Andrew, 287n152, 288n164,
292n42, 297n1, 297n3, 297n19,
297n21, 297n23, 298n41, 301n165,
312n17

Wersig, Gernot, 339n185
Wertheim, Wim F., 284n81, 321n88
West, Cornel, 308n341, 318n4, 318n17
West, David, 302n183, 309n349
Westera, Wim, 289n175, 303n232
Weyembergh, Maurice, 290n2, 292n35,
292n39, 299n64, 319n7, 330n424,
338n159
Whistler, Daniel, 289n174, 292n42
White, Daniel, 287n150, 289n170, 290n17
White, Hayden, 314n55, 290n11, 313n30,
313n32, 313n33, 313n39, 339n187,
290n13, 311n1, 336n81
White, Stephen K., 289n176, 337n129,
312n17
Whitton, Brian J., 331n471
Wickham, Christopher John, 314n81
Wilding, Adrian, 312n14
Wiley, Stephen B. Crofts, 289n168, 318n2,
323n156, 324n174
Williams, Raymond, 325n221, 334n37,
335n53
Williams, Robert C., 287n153, 311n1,
317n207
Williams, Steve, 306n301, 307n309,
307n311, 307n314, 307n318, 308n337
Williamson, Jeffrey G., 308n337, 308n342
Wilson, Bryan R., 290n2, 292n39
Wilterdink, Nico A., 286n117, 286n128,
286n130, 287n148, 287n152, 288n155,
291n23, 291n31, 296n45, 297n2,
301n131, 317n209, 318n227, 319n17,
334n26, 334n30, 340n192
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 23, 293n49
Wodak, Ruth, 293n2, 294n21
Wolff, Rick, 295n24, 322n124
Wolin, Sheldon S., 320n18
Womack, James P., 307n315
Wood, Ellen Meiksins, 286n126, 287n153,
299n64, 311n1, 314n74, 336n84,
336n101, 336n106, 336n112
Wood, Patricia K., 308n341, 326n254,
339n176
Index of Names 417
Woodiwiss, Anthony, 328n353
Woodward, Ian, 287n152, 289n168,
297n17, 305n284, 327n281
Wright, Charles, 319n7, 339n184
Wrigley, Edward Anthony (Sir), 315n83
Wrong, Dennis Hume, 320n18
Wulf, Christoph, 289n169
Wynne, Derek, 300n130
Yar, Majid, 288n154, 319n5, 320n35,
320n56, 326n244
Yeatman, Anna, 283n49, 286n125, 318n2,
318n4, 340n200
Yeĝenoĝlu, Meyda, 310n383, 327n287
Yih, Katherine, 308n343
Young, Iris Marion, 23, 283n49, 286n125,
291n26, 295n43, 302n187, 308n341,
318n4, 319n6, 319n13, 321n76, 338n151,
338n152
Yule, George, 293n2
Zagorin, Perez, 287n153, 291n23, 291n31,
292n43, 311n1, 314n73, 315n96,
315n103, 315n110, 317n197, 333n1,
334n26, 335n48, 336n79, 336n89,
336n105, 336n107, 336n112, 337n117,
337n119, 337n128, 338n160, 339n187,
340n192, 340n195
Zammito, John, 287n153, 311n1,
340n192
Zarzecki, Thomas W., 308n343
Zhao, Shanyang, 289n175, 303n232,
303n233
Zieleniec, Andrzej, 289n168
Zima, P. V., 284n76, 286n133, 287n150,
297n9, 312n17, 326n254, 338n149,
339n176
Zižek, Slavoj, 23, 287n150, 287n152,
287n153, 287n154, 288n162, 295n24,
296n44, 305n293, 311n1, 320n59,
322n124, 338n146, 338n148
Zolo, Danilo, 327n281
Zvonkovic, Anisa M., 286n125, 287n152
Index of Subjects
abandonment, 73, 89, 241
abilities/ability, 10, 13, 15, 36, 37, 54, 57,
58, 59, 96, 109, 111, 113, 114, 116,
122, 151, 161, 172, 173, 183, 184, 185,
192, 193, 196, 208, 214, 216, 220, 222,
223, 272
ableist
anti-ableist, 183
absolutism, 140, 204, 252
academia, 228
academic, 7, 8, 9, 18, 21, 29, 31, 33, 34, 38,
39, 55, 64, 65, 66, 156, 218, 242, 248,
258, 262, 273
acceptability, 35, 57
accident(s), 50, 134, 154, 159, 164, 224,
252, 280, 323n169
accidental, 4, 121, 136, 154, 164, 267, 271
accidentalist, 159, 164
accidentality, 166
accomplishments, 8, 51, 64, 95, 115, 262
action(s), 75, 94, 147, 178, 204, 206
action coordination, 35, 36, 180, 272
actions and reflections, 54
bureaucratic forms of action
coordination, 35
capacity for action, 201
collective action(s), 135, 256
communicative action, 216
conscious action(s), 165
contexts of action, 82, 263
creative action, 122
crisis of action, 96
culturally codified types of action, 52
emotionally motivated actions, 115
fields of action, 201
forms of action, 35, 36, 62, 156, 189
global network of actions and
interactions, 277
happenings and actions, 163
human action(s), 41, 98, 153, 162, 171,
252
individual and collective actions, 256
interhuman structures of action, 153
meaningful action, 180, 188
people’s actions, 198, 255, 256
people’s capacity for action, 201
performative aspects of social action, 165
418
physical actions, 294n22
political action, 199, 201, 257
processes of action, 44
purposive action, 12
purposive and cooperative forms of
action, 62
purposive, regulative, and expressive
action, 217
realms of action, 216
reason-guided action, 216
reason-guided modes of action, 198
regimes of action, 8, 156, 190
resources of action, 36
social action, 67, 165
social forms of action, 156
speech and action, 224
symbolic action, 188
teleologically, morally, and dramaturgically
constituted forms of action, 189
unfolding of actions and reactions, 263
utility-driven and strategic modes of
action, 62
actionalist, 162
activities/activity, 34, 48, 55, 59, 60, 62,
64, 66, 68, 79, 106, 119, 121, 122, 126,
129, 131, 165, 169, 184, 187, 204, 218,
246, 261, 262, 310n371
actor(s), 62, 113, 261
actors of globalization, 133, 134
actor-specific particularities, 174
asymmetrically positioned actors, 254
bodily actors, 61
cognitive actors, 61
collective actors, 8, 35, 37, 70, 71, 110,
135, 171, 174, 177, 178, 199, 200, 208,
221, 223, 252, 254, 255, 257, 263
contemporary social actors, 233
creative actors, 118
decentred actors, 221
decentred and fragmented microactors,
178
different actors, 261
digitized actors, 116
discursive actors, 229, 277
disempowered actors, 182, 254
domestic actors, 134
embodied actors, 219

globally interconnected actors, 219, 224
grassroots actors, 249
group-specific actors, 187
historically situated actors, 151
human actors, 8, 13, 15, 43, 50, 52, 55,
59, 76, 80, 81, 82, 94, 112, 118, 135,
163, 172, 175, 179, 189, 203, 208, 249,
252, 262, 263, 273
individual and collective actors, 8, 35, 37,
71, 110, 135, 171, 174, 177, 178, 199,
200, 221, 223, 255, 257, 263
individual or collective actors, 174, 200,
208, 252, 254
institutional actors, 225, 276
interconnected actors, 219, 224
interpreting actor, 151, 157
intersectionally constituted actors, 9
large-scale actors, 126
life-interpreting actors, 157
locally embedded and globally intercon-
nected actors, 219
marginalized actors, 182
microactors, 143, 178
microhistorical actors, 158
morally conscious actors, 211
nonhuman actors, 37, 166, 181
open-minded, reflective, and
self-empowered actors, 196
ordinary actors, 8, 9, 37, 52, 58, 62, 64,
84, 154, 158, 178, 237, 262
particular actor, 9
performative actors, 181
peripheral actors, 155
perspective-taking actors, 221
pluralized actors, 111
political actors, 50
postmodern actor, 36, 112, 193, 235, 273
powerful actors, 50, 174
reflexive actors, 223
sidelined and disempowered actors, 182
social actors, 54, 56, 76, 77, 115, 117,
122, 135, 168, 204, 205, 233, 267, 269
socially diverse actors, 187
socially situated actors, 9
spatiotemporally embedded actors, 167–8
spatiotemporally situated and embodied
actors, 219
state actors, 310n379
structurally interrelated actors, 42
voiceless actors, 155
actor–network
actor–network relations, 28
actor–network theory, 312n14
Index of Subjects 419
actualities/actuality, 17, 48, 52, 81, 99, 148,
184, 207, 245
adaptability, 36
adjustment
adjustment strategies, 206
age, 10, 15, 19, 35, 36, 37, 88, 109, 111,
116, 126, 143, 144, 172, 185, 186, 188,
189, 193, 194, 196, 201, 208, 214, 220,
223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 236, 237, 239,
247, 251, 268, 272, 273, 276, 277, 280
ageist
anti-ageist, 183
aesthetic, 29, 38, 39, 43, 75, 101, 102, 103,
104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 157, 161, 173,
183, 184, 186, 194, 196, 199, 203, 204,
223, 247, 248, 249, 250, 266, 274
aestheticism, 247, 280, 337n128
aestheticization
aestheticization and depoliticization of
politics, 109
aestheticization of everyday life, 106,
197, 249, 250
aestheticization of human life forms, 196
aestheticization of ordinary existence,
249
aestheticization of politics, 108
aestheticization of ‘the personal’, 106
aestheticization of ‘the social’, 196
aesthetics, 51, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,
250, 252, 280
affect(s) [noun], 197, 198, 199, 274
affective/affectively, 8, 34, 52, 54, 56, 105,
198, 199, 260
affective turn (‘affective turn’), 197,
289n173, 323n171
affectivity, 115
affirmative, 18, 134, 172, 195
Afghanistan, 227
African, 23, 209
afterness, 18, 19, 313n18
agencies/agency, 9, 59, 62, 74, 77, 78, 82,
115, 117, 118, 123, 129, 133, 136, 141,
160, 162, 168, 179, 181, 198, 221, 226,
229, 252, 263, 268, 276, 312n14
agenda(s), 6, 10, 11, 41, 42, 53, 74, 86, 109,
124, 127, 128, 134, 142, 152, 168, 172,
173, 175, 176, 177, 197, 199, 213, 214,
220, 226, 231, 240, 250, 251, 257, 260,
263, 265, 267, 269, 272, 273, 279, 280
agent(s), 117, 118, 134, 149, 221, 237
agents provocateurs, 237
agreement(s), 121, 217, 224
agricultural, 34
420 Index of Subjects

ahistoricism, 244, 245, 280, 336n112 anthropology

Algeria, 227 social anthropology, 151
alienating, 230 anti-
alienation, 16, 17, 99, 236, 333n12 anti-ableist, 183
allegiances, 181, 222 anti-ageist, 183
alliance(s), 22, 133, 195 anti-anthropocentric, 107
alterity, 172, 176, 180, 181, 204, 205, 223, anti-classist, 183
251 anti-conventionalism, 183
alternativist, 188 anti-democratic, 74
ambiguities/ambiguity, 5, 18, 20, 44, 75, anti-determinist, 104
106, 112, 113, 121, 142, 144, 238 anti-dogmatism, 183
clarity versus ambiguity, 4, 171, 178–9, anti-elitism, 193
180, 189–92, 240, 272, 273 anti-elitist, 106, 183
ambivalence, 1, 16–22, 44, 75, 113, 119, anti-essentialist, 67, 74, 90, 200
143, 174, 178, 179, 180, 190, 191, 204, anti-exclusionism, 184
205, 219, 223, 235, 236, 269, 273, 276, anti-fascist, 177
279, 285n86 anti-foundationalism, 43, 253, 259, 291n20
America anti-foundationalist, 8, 9, 29, 44, 45, 47,
North America, 124 74, 103, 213
American, 212 anti-functionalist, 104
Anglo-American, 108, 134 anti-hegemonism, 183
Latin-American, 209, 285n106 anti-ideological, 30, 108, 250
North American, 24 anti-ideologism, 30
South American, 24 anti-Marxism, 30
US-American, 24 anti-metanarrativist, 255, 340n192
Americanization, 228 anti-modernist, 285n106
anachronism, 33 anti-monism, 184
anachronistic, 84, 226 anti-monist, 105
anarchism, 14, 30, 35, 140, 179, 192 anti-monoculturalism, 183
anarchist, 29, 192 anti-nationalism, 183
anecdotal, 56, 157 anti-parochialism, 183
Anglo-American, 108, 134 anti-political, 109, 256, 340n200
Anglo-European, 23 anti-postmodern, 230
Anglophone, 24, 25, 32, 195, 228 anti-productivist, 107, 108
Angola, 228 anti-projective, 176
animal rights, 29, 177, 187 anti-racist, 177, 183
animal(s), 29, 107, 177, 187 anti-rationalist, 105, 255, 340n191
annihilation, 60, 126 anti-representationalism, 103
anomaly, 105 anti-representationalist, 103, 104
anomic, 116 anti-Semitic, 214
anomie, 236, 257 anti-sexist, 183
antagonism, 133 anti-social, 109
class antagonism, 295n26 anti-substantialist, 200
social antagonism, 159 anti-teleologism, 104
antagonistic, 69 anti-totalitarian, 176
anthropocentric, 37, 77, 181, 197, 260 anti-traditionalism, 184
anti-anthropocentric, 107 anti-universalism, 47, 183, 256
non-anthropocentric, 312n14 anti-universalist, 8, 166, 256, 340n197
postanthropocentric, 194 anti-utopian, 106, 240, 335n51
anthropocentrism, 27, 179 antinomies/antinomy, 2, 3, 4, 41, 47, 48,
anthropological, 40, 54, 63, 94, 108, 140, 66, 68, 72, 93, 140, 152, 159, 180, 186,
172, 182, 184, 197, 202, 203, 213, 261 189, 204, 260, 269
anthropology, 31, 51, 52, 93–4, 154, 203, antinomy between freedom and
265 necessity, 96
 Index of Subjects 421

antinomy between the concept of necessity material or symbolic arrangements, 78,

and the concept of contingency, 137 167
conceptual antinomies, 42, 53, 82, 90, physical arrangements, 104
145, 146, 181, 273 political arrangements, 190, 221
counterproductive antinomies, 66, 68 social and political arrangements, 221
definitional antinomies, 140 social arrangements, 17, 69, 88, 90, 117,
epistemic antinomies, 41, 260 196, 221
normative antinomies, 273 art(s)
paradigmatic antinomies, 47, 204 art and everyday life, 106
antiquity, 11, 284n64 art and literature, 20
anxieties/anxiety, 59, 139, 208 art criticism, 248
anything goes/anything-goes, 32, 117, 193, arts and architecture, 20
194, 211, 252, 280, 286n134, 323n129, autonomous art, 106
323n143 emancipatory art, 104
apparatus(es), 133 empowering art, 104
conceptual apparatuses, 7 functions of art, 104
institutional apparatus, 177 ‘high art’, 106, 196, 300n131, 323n170
mental apparatus, 77 high-brow art, 107
modern state apparatus ‘low art’, 196, 300n131, 323n170
perceptive apparatus, 103 purposeless purpose of art, 104
state apparatus, 224 visual art, 20
applicability, 10, 32, 152, 161, 202, 271, artistic, 35, 56, 99, 100, 101, 164, 203
274 Asia
appreciate/appreciating, 23, 56, 78, 205, East and South East Asia, 310n371
264 Asian
appreciation, 172, 183, 253 East Asian, 134, 310n376
aesthetic appreciation, 102 assemblage(s), 164
appreciation of aesthetic forms, 107 assemblage of events, 166
patterns of appreciation and perception, assemblage of local happenings, 165
101 assemblage of meaning-bearing acts, 114
sensory appreciation, 107 assemblage of scraps, 121
appreciative, 77 assemblages of meaning, 71, 78, 263
arbitrariness, 90, 119, 141, 201 centreless ensemble of assemblages, 107
arbitrary, 4, 16, 31, 35, 41, 51, 57, 58, 62, postmodern assemblages, 91
63, 66, 78, 79, 82, 90, 95, 102, 106, relationally contingent assemblages, 71,
107, 136, 138, 142, 145, 159, 166, 167, 243, 263
168, 182, 203, 208, 214, 229, 243, 267, assemblies, 157
271, 277 assimilate(d), 56, 112, 206, 243
architectonic, 217 assimilation, 121, 206, 207, 264, 274
architects, 179 assimilationist, 206, 207, 209
architectural, 285n107 astronomy, 51, 52
architecture, 20, 31, 88, 100, 104, 196, 248, atomic, 50, 128, 311n5
249, 265 atomization, 116
Argentina, 227 228, 338n150 atomized, 116, 257
Argentinean, 24 atoms, 50
Aronian, 213 attachment/attachments, 19, 119, 150, 172
arrangement(s), 94, 183 attentiveness, 19, 143, 180
citizenship arrangements, 226 Aufhebung, 159, 185
coexistential arrangements, 196, 200, Auschwitz, 246
201, 204 Australia, 228
cultural arrangement(s), 94, 203 Austrian-British, 24
institutional arrangements, 26, 100, 207, authentic, 41
280 inauthentic, 41
macro-social arrangements, 221 authenticity, 42, 99, 230, 259
422 Index of Subjects
authenticity – continued
authenticity and substance, 264
existential authenticity, 245
inauthenticity, 99
authoritarian, 15, 75, 166, 218, 236
authority, 17, 200
arbitrary authority, 57
cognitive authority, 51
discursive authority, 238
epistemic authority, 5, 44, 47
explanatory authority, 56
normative authority, 177
religious authority, 50
secular-rational authority, 120
self-referential authority, 41
social authority, 10
symbolic authority, 10, 11
traditional authority, 120
traditional sources of authority, 14
autobiographical, 114
autonomism, 120, 177, 305n278
autonomist, 188
autonomist Marxism, 301n140
autonomist Marxists, 301n140
autonomous, 45, 75, 87, 106, 111, 119,
125, 130, 142, 177, 183, 196, 249, 268
autonomous turn (‘autonomous turn’), 1,
4, 34, 39, 171, 180, 231, 258, 271, 278,
288n165
autonomy, 15, 17, 88, 101, 122, 123, 126,
133, 171, 176, 310n379
autonomy and solidarity, 17
autonomy from power, 177
autonomy of the signifier, 88
autonomy versus heteronomy, 227
cognitive and moral autonomy, 77
crisis of autonomy, 126, 225
cultural autonomy, 97, 242
degree of autonomy, 243
different forms of autonomy, 171
empowering sources of autonomy, 180
external crisis of autonomy, 225
human autonomy, 4, 13, 120, 135, 171,
178, 180, 267, 271, 272
individual and collective autonomy, 187,
188, 248
individual and collective forms of
autonomy, 175
institutional autonomy, 276
legislative and executive autonomy, 276
monetary autonomy, 130
personal autonomy, 120
political autonomy, 172, 272
postmodern conceptions of autonomy, 175
relative autonomy, 80, 81, 88, 99, 101,
105, 129, 266
search for autonomy, 175, 176
social forms of autonomy, 175, 272
avant-garde
post-avant-garde, 106
awareness, 12, 38, 39, 53, 75, 112, 116,
139, 144, 209, 211, 218, 220, 241, 246,
268
background(s), 205
background assumptions, 35, 56
background horizon(s), 9, 52, 53, 57, 65,
66, 77, 94, 95, 185
background horizon of the lifeworld, 114
background suppositions, 50
cultural background, 253
disciplinary background, 22, 30
individuative background, 114
integrative background, 114
interpretive background, 114
motivational background, 185
sociocultural background, 27, 211, 223
sociohistorical background, 178, 250
barbarisms, 139
base, 44, 70, 92, 157, 186, 187, 263
base and superstructure, 90, 91, 97,
99, 100, 101, 265, 295n27, 298n31,
300n110
battlefield
political battlefield, 201, 251, 254, 280
social battlefield, 108, 266
Baudrillardian, 88, 98, 297n19
Beckian, 213
behaviour, 52, 119, 121
behavioural, 10, 46, 51, 90, 112, 118, 147,
164, 173, 186, 200, 252, 255, 270, 275,
280, 337n116
Belgian, 24
Belgium, 227
belief/beliefs, 140, 141, 142, 146, 165, 166,
173, 176, 179, 182, 190, 192, 194,
196, 198, 199, 210, 215, 233, 235, 238,
241, 245, 260, 267, 268, 275, 276, 278,
338n149
Belize, 227, 228
belonging, 80, 199, 225
belonging to the present, 11
bonds of belonging, 113
feeling of belonging, 209
generational belonging, 25
identity and belonging, 128
patterns of belonging, 215
sense of belonging, 122, 207, 228, 277

transformative conception of belonging,
221
beyondness, 13, 222
bias/biases, 54, 61, 147
biased, 41
unbiased, 156
binaries, 27, 220
binary, 3, 11, 41, 42, 76, 79, 82, 90, 98,
100, 101, 105, 254, 259, 263, 265
biographical/biographically
autobiographical narratives, 114
biographic plans, 122
biographical narratives, 114
biographically shaped body, 56
biographies, 120
electoral and experimental biographies,
122
human biographies, 122
partial biographies, 122
personal biographies, 222
biological, 160, 165
biology, 51, 52
Black Friday, 130
Blochian, 184
body/bodies, 115, 118
biographically shaped body, 56
body of knowledge, 245
institutional body, 215
interacting bodies, 118
mind–body dichotomy, 115
mind–body dualism, 62
Bolivia, 227, 228
Botswana, 228
boundaries/boundary, 6, 51, 59, 66, 75,
98, 106, 112, 116, 126, 200, 207, 214,
219, 220, 226, 229, 232, 259, 277, 279,
294n22
Bourdieusian, 99, 336n88
bourgeoisie, 129, 309n352
Brazil, 124, 227, 228, 306n306
Bretton Woods, 226, 309n358
BRIC countries, 124
Britain (Great Britain), 134, 310n382
British, 24, 315n114
brutality, 216, 338n150
Buddhism, 140
bureaucracy/bureaucracies, 35
advanced types of bureaucracy, 15
critique of bureaucracy, 236
large-scale bureaucracies, 35
spread of bureaucracies, 15
bureaucratic, 187, 189
bureaucratic forms of action
coordination, 35
Index of Subjects 423
bureaucratic rationalization, 12
bureaucratization, 15, 236, 333n12
business, 41, 130, 226, 228, 309n368
calculability, 59
Cameroon, 227, 228
Canada, 227, 228
Canadian, 24
canon(s)
canon formation, 315n114
canonical, 27, 28, 70
canonical presuppositions of
Enlightenment project, 28
canonical significance of the postmodern
project, 27
canonical view of ideology, 70
canons of ideological convictions, 196
canons of orthodoxy in reading and
writing, 151
canons of validation, 153
research canons, 189
capacities
assertive, normative, and expressive
capacities of the ‘rational subject’, 40
cognitive capacities, 55, 107
epistemic capacities, 63, 112, 113, 261
productive capacities, 152
rational capacities, 208
reflective, critical, and moral capacities, 8
representational, interventional, and
critical capacities of scientific
epistemologies, 37
theoretical and practical capacities to
emancipate themselves, 237
capacity, 10, 78, 79, 88, 96, 108, 117, 200,
225
capacity for a mutual evaluation of
cultures or identities, 221
capacity for action, 201
capacity for self-reflexivity, 223
capacity for the positive recognition of
the Other, 221
capacity for the relativization of one’s
own culture or identity, 221
capacity of national literary cultures to
provide solid frameworks of imagined
solidarity and cultural identification, 229
capacity of social actors for creative
action, 122
capacity to accept the deep ambivalence
of our positioning in the world, 223
capacity to account for the meaning-laden
dimensions permeating socially
constructed realities, 48
424 Index of Subjects
capacity – continued
capacity to affect current social trends,
255
capacity to attribute aesthetic value to
reality, 101
capacity to attribute meaning to reality,
222
capacity to bring about meaningful and
formative encounters with the com-
plexities of socially hybrid realities, 204
capacity to capture the complexity of
highly differentiated societies, 74
capacity to capture the entire complexity
of human reality, 6
capacity to construct a conceptually
organized hyperreality, 80
capacity to construct and reconstruct a
unique sense of subjectivity, 111
capacity to contribute to the possibility
of individual and social liberation from
both material and ideological forms of
domination, 235
capacity to convert an individual or a
collective subject into a real or
imagined driving force of history, 268
capacity to convert into protagonists of
emancipation, 16
capacity to cope with constant existential
ambiguity, 121
capacity to create a shared normative
culture, 221
capacity to determine the conditions of
existence by virtue of purposive reason
(Verstand), 13
capacity to develop a sense of
belonging to, identification with,
and responsibility towards a particular
social group, 199
capacity to develop a tripartite relation to
reality, 80–1
capacity to develop both individual and
collective identities, 94
capacity to enable human actors to
obtain an increasingly sophisticated
power over their environment, 52
capacity to evaluate critically both the
culture of the Other as well as one’s
own, 223
capacity to find one’s place in society,
123
capacity to gain rational control, 45
capacity to generate constantly evolving
production, distribution, and con-
sumption patterns, 13–14
capacity to hold symbolic power, 200
capacity to illustrate the thematic
complexity of the ‘postmodern turn’, 232
capacity to make deregulation possible,
133
capacity to minimize the distortive impact
of bias, prejudice, and partiality, 61
capacity to mobilize, 194
capacity to mobilize large amounts of
people, 194
capacity to provide illuminating accounts
of both ephemeral and structural
elements shaping the unfolding of
worldly temporality, 244
capacity to provide meaningful criteria
for the pursuit of morally defensible
forms of agency, 252
capacity to put in place social, political,
economic, educational, and military
regulation mechanisms aimed at
overseeing the practices performed by
its citizens, 224
capacity to raise, differentiate between,
and – if required – problematize three
validity claims, 248
capacity to recognize people’s
spatiotemporal situatedness, 222
capacity to shape real and
representational structures, 15
capacity to take on a large variety of
social roles, 36
capacity to transform an individual or
a collective subject into an actual
or imaginary driving force of a given
society, 141
capacity to transform social and political
arrangements for the better, 221
capacity to trigger the emergence of
counterhegemonic discourses, 22
capacity to uncover underlying causal
mechanisms, 58
cognitive capacity to establish a rational
relation to the world, 54
collective capacity, 224
critical capacity, 37
emancipatory capacity, 235
epistemic capacity, 78, 242
epistemic capacity to provide exhaustive
representations, 78
explanatory capacity, 40, 41, 112, 128
human capacity to step out of self-
imposed immaturity by mobilizing the
critical resources inherent in reason
(Vernunft), 234

humanity’s capacity to determine its own
destiny, 60
incapacity, 126, 226
interpretive and desiderative capacity, 252
interventional capacity, 37
normalizing capacity, 94
normative capacity, 105
people’s capacity to convert themselves
into protagonists of their own destiny,
15
performative capacity, 115
reflexive capacity, 45
representational capacity, 2, 37
species-constitutive capacity, 197
species-generative capacity, 197
steering capacity of highly bureaucratized
states, 73
steering capacity of human rationality, 45
steering capacity of the nation-state, 134
structuring capacity, 82, 263
capital, 97
capital accumulation, 130
capital controls, 226
capital flows, 132, 310n369
capital stock, 310n369
cultural and symbolic capital, 155
cultural capital, 337n126
economic capital, 124
experiential capital, 204
financial capital, 124, 127, 130
global capital, 226
human capital, 125
international capital, 307n314, 310n369
internationalization of capital, 125, 131
monetary capital, 130
nomadic and hypermobile types of
capital, 131
productive and financial capital, 124
productive capital, 130
capitalism, 12, 35, 111, 130, 135, 140, 194,
238, 250, 280, 295n23, 306n304
acceptance of capitalism, 250
casino capitalism, 124, 127, 130
commodifying logic of capitalism,
337n120
consumer capitalism, 27
consumerist capitalism, 121
cyber-capitalism, 130
dehumanizing, destructive, and exploitative
nature of capitalism, 250, 338n147
development of capitalism, 310n383
expansion of capitalism, 129
extension of capitalism into the cultural
sphere, 97
Index of Subjects 425
global capitalism, 127
globalizing capitalism, 185
industrial capitalism, 13, 14, 34, 127
late capitalism, 97, 98, 108, 118, 247,
251, 257
new spirit of capitalism, 201
nomadic capitalism, 124
organized capitalism, 35
postindustrial capitalism, 34
print capitalism, 225, 276
ruthless face of capitalism, 257
ubiquity of capitalism, 124
varieties of capitalism, 134, 310n380
capitalist, 12, 13, 14, 34, 35, 111
capitalist consumerism, 115, 307n323
capitalist countries, 313n18
capitalist formations, 239, 279
capitalist forms of social organization,
250
capitalist legitimacy, 32, 128, 251
capitalist market economy, 224
capitalist markets, 97, 248
capitalist practices, 135
capitalist regimes, 338n150
capitalist relations, 250
capitalist societies, 117, 121, 247, 248,
251
capitalist society, 86, 97, 248, 280
capitalist system, 32, 128
capitalist tendency, 238
capitalist types of consumerism, 264
capitalist world market, 124
classically capitalist, 86
democratic-capitalist, 117
late capitalist formations, 279
late-capitalist, 86
liberal-capitalist, 32
Cartesian, 62, 115, 197
catastrophes, 50
categorical imperative(s), 95, 115, 119, 215,
260
categories/category, 10, 11, 41, 57, 67, 79,
82, 90, 98, 113, 137, 150, 152, 154,
155, 159, 179, 180, 215, 216, 228, 249,
280
categorization, 27, 186, 194
Catholic, 213
causal, 6, 12, 41, 58, 67, 69, 84, 99, 147,
148, 149, 150, 154, 157, 159, 160, 167,
262, 270
causalist, 42, 150, 162, 163, 164
causalities/causality, 51, 52, 59, 154, 166
Central Europe, 4, 35
centralization, 144
426 Index of Subjects
centre(s), 77, 78, 81, 90, 103, 107, 156, 160,
177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 193
centreless, 10, 107, 156, 160, 179, 181
centrelessness, 178
centuries/century, 26, 67
certainties/certainty, 2, 55, 56, 57, 59, 76,
90, 113, 139, 166, 169, 179, 235, 254
certainty versus uncertainty, 2, 40, 43–5,
47, 48, 189, 259, 291n20
changeability, 36
chaos, 161, 166
chaotic, 32, 34, 138, 142, 145, 159, 161,
267, 271, 312n5
charisma(s), 198
charismatic, 156, 198
chemical, 128, 160
chemistry, 51, 52
Chile, 227, 228, 338n150
China, 124, 227, 306n306
Christian, 11, 141, 163, 209, 284n64
Christianity, 140
Church, 11
circular, 71, 118
cities/city, 128, 204, 221
citizen(s), 75, 126, 174, 214, 215, 216, 218,
221, 224, 225, 226, 229, 276, 277,
327n310
citizenry, 226, 276
citizenship(s), 207
citizenship à la Marshall, 216
citizenship as an active process, 222
complex forms of citizenship, 190, 207
cosmopolitan citizenship, 221
decoupling of nationality and
citizenship, 221
differentialist citizenship, 175
differentialist models of citizenship, 173,
174, 175, 216
differentiated citizenship, 208
dual and triple citizenship arrangements,
226
equation of citizenship, nationality and
territorial residence, 226
ethnic citizenship, 274
global citizenship, 222, 274
legal, political, and social citizenship, 127
multicultural citizenship, 207
multidimensional conception of
citizenship, 174
‘new’ forms of citizenship, 177
numerous forms of citizenship: civil,
political, social, economic, cultural,
reproductive, sexual, national,
transnational, and global, 174
plurality of citizenships, 174
postmodern citizenship, 221
post-sovereign citizenship, 226, 276
post-traditional models of citizenship,
184
reappropriation of citizenship, 177
state-bound citizenship, 212
universal citizenship, 174
universalist models of citizenship, 173,
174, 216
civil rights, 177, 187, 216
civil society, 176, 177, 183, 187, 189, 216,
217, 229, 277
civilization(s), 172, 199, 209, 210
civilizational, 11, 12, 16, 38, 40, 52, 60,
77, 100, 104, 105, 140, 161, 162, 170,
191, 196, 197, 205, 210, 217, 225, 229,
237, 241, 250, 259, 261, 274, 277, 280,
339n184
civilizing mission, 60
clarity, 4, 5, 6, 20, 21, 38, 55, 127, 137, 142,
144, 194, 216, 231
clarity versus ambiguity, 171, 178–9, 180,
189–92, 240, 272, 273
clash(es)
clash of civilizations, 209, 326n264
clash of classes, 149
clashes between nation-states, 126
class, 9, 10, 15, 36, 74, 109, 111, 172, 185,
187, 193, 196, 208, 214, 220, 272
clash of classes, 149
class antagonism, 295n26
class conflict, 74, 141, 152, 239
class societies, 295n26
class-based, 87, 108
class-based identities, 87
‘class for itself’ (Klasse für sich), 239,
334n45
‘class in itself’ (Klasse an sich), 239,
334n45
classes, 117
dominant social class, 100
literate classes, 163
lower or under class, 200
middle or upper class, 200
ruling class, 70, 71, 295n26
second-class citizen, 215
social class(es), 50, 100
socioeconomic classes, 117, 200
working class, 73, 85
classical sociological theory, 85
classification(s), 27, 57, 66, 140
cliometric, 150, 315n86
closure, 7, 78, 79

code(s), 94, 168
codes of legitimacy, 78, 201
codes of normativity, 78, 99
codes of social legitimacy, 35
codes of taken-for-grantedness, 201
ideological, behavioural, and
institutional codes, 90
mixing of codes, 106
codification(s)
cultural codification, 88, 96
discursive codifications, 280
socio-legal codification of
multiculturalism, 207
coding
decoding, 67
double coding, 313n18
cognition, 9, 15, 36, 44, 53, 57, 59, 66
cognitive, 8, 29, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 51, 54,
55, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 70, 71, 75, 77,
78, 103, 107, 122, 141, 158, 173, 194,
216, 219, 223, 234, 249, 250, 253, 259,
261, 262, 294n22
cohesion, 194, 207
coincidentalist, 164
Cold War, 26, 32, 35, 126, 169, 170, 194,
306n305
collapse, 4, 26, 32, 35, 74, 106, 124, 127,
169, 194, 250, 251, 306n304, 310n383,
338n149
collective
collective action, 135, 256
collective actors, 8, 35, 37, 70, 71, 110,
135, 171, 174, 177, 178, 199, 200, 208,
221, 223, 252, 254, 255, 257, 263
collective and cumulative effort, 53
collective capacity, 224
collective carrier, 141
collective decisions, 253
collective desire, 121
collective effort, 224
collective emancipation, 249
collective empowerment, 75, 235
collective endeavour, 214
collective energy of social movements,
135
collective entities, 61
collective entity, 16
collective existence, 217
collective experience(s), 139, 163
collective false consciousness, 235
collective force, 141
collective forms of autonomy, 175
collective forms of empowerment, 183
collective forms of identity, 74, 205
Index of Subjects 427
collective forms of performative
expressivity, 182
collective forms of public visibility, 182
collective forms of sociocultural
idiosyncrasy, 182
collective historical subject(s), 70, 71, 85,
262, 268
collective identities, 15, 74, 94
collective identity, 36
collective imaginary(ies), 50, 237
collective interests, 219
collective life form, 93, 203, 265
collective memories, 155
collective mobilization, 177, 189
collective practices, 205
collective processes of empowerment,
211
collective pursuit of universal truths and
principles, 46
collective representation, 177, 225
collective search for certainty, 45
collective self-determination, 59
collective self-realization, 185
collective subject(s), 141, 162, 163, 268
collective subjectivities, 194
Colombia, 228
colonial, 325n240
colonialism, 166, 239
colonize, 97, 174, 234
colonized, 97, 121, 132, 205, 250
colonizing, 31, 70
comfort zones, 6, 65, 66, 139, 173
commensurability, 161, 173, 194, 319n7
commitment(s), 8, 22, 46, 56, 57, 61, 66,
104, 119, 137, 171, 172, 174, 176, 181,
182, 190, 196, 214, 215, 219, 221, 222,
223, 234, 252, 253, 257, 280
commodification, 97, 204, 227, 279
commodities/commodity, 33, 97, 108, 121,
193, 194, 204, 228, 266, 277
commodity fetishism, 121
common good, 219
common sense, 7, 9, 13, 49, 51, 52, 58, 59,
84, 99, 112, 148, 154, 157, 167, 210,
259, 270
commonality, 82, 183, 189, 239, 263
commonwealth, 212
communication(s), 50, 65, 98, 116, 125,
183, 198, 206, 221, 225, 227, 228, 229,
276, 277, 293n5, 307n321
communism, 14, 35, 124, 140, 169, 179,
192, 194, 240, 306n304
communist, 240, 306n304
communist parties, 306n304
428 Index of Subjects
community/communities
reasoning and community, 199
classical conceptions of community, 98
community membership 226
community rights, 208
community-based, 155
concept of community, 319n6
cosmopolitan community, 219
cultural and political communities, 172
cultural community, 42
culturally constituted communities, 95
culturally diversified and politically
empowering communities, 172
culturally specific communities, 101
epistemic communities, 9, 169
European Community, 310n371
feeling and community, 199
grassroots communities, 186
human communities, 274
imagined community, 225
large-scale political communities, 209
paradigm communities, 60, 261
particular – cultural, linguistic,
discursive, disciplinary, or
paradigmatic – communities, 51
particular communities, 94, 102, 122
political community, 215, 217, 220, 224,
226, 277
socially specific communities, 94
spatiotemporally situated communities,
182
transnational community of risk, 229
worldwide community of global citizens,
218
comparability, 165
competence(s), 197, 216, 217, 221
competition, 14, 34, 97, 127, 133, 165, 194,
205, 209, 280
competitiveness, 128, 310n379
complementarity, 86
completeness, 142
complexification, 177, 201, 222, 276
complexities/complexity, 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,
13, 15, 17, 20, 22, 36, 38, 39, 46, 47,
54, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 83, 85, 88, 90,
91, 92, 100, 103, 112, 113, 122, 124,
125, 135, 145, 153, 154, 160, 163, 172,
174, 176, 177, 184, 187, 189, 190, 204,
220, 222, 231, 232, 258, 265, 266, 271,
278
comprehensibility, 79, 81, 114
computerized
computerized societies, 98
Comtean, 163, 197
conceptuality, 265
conclusiveness, 230
configuration(s), 44, 79, 183, 196, 217
conflict/conflictual, 7, 74, 110, 112, 126,
127, 159, 182, 185, 204, 205, 209, 217
class conflict, 141, 152, 239
conflicting, 9, 21, 36, 62, 112, 261
conflictuality, 61, 261
conformative, 96, 155, 196, 243
non-conformative, 105
conformity, 172
nonconformity, 105, 193
conjuncture(s), 169, 294n22
connectedness, 119
consciousness
Christian consciousness, 163
cosmopolitan consciousness, 135
discursively assembled consciousness,
77–8
false consciousness, 42, 70, 144, 233,
235, 259, 295n25, 295n26, 333n3
human consciousness, 141
planetary consciousness, 135
practical consciousness, 141, 268
self-consciousness, 11
time consciousness, 11, 17
true consciousness, 70
conservatism, 14, 17, 30, 35, 119, 140, 179,
192, 240, 250–1, 280, 338n154
conservative(s), 29, 118, 192, 201, 240, 243,
250, 279, 335n51
consistency, 90, 105, 193, 232
constitutional, 170, 216
constitutionalism, 208
constraint(s), 88, 98, 123, 125, 130, 191,
207, 305n299, 312n5
constructedness, 90
construction(s), 58, 79
causal constructions, 147
construction and development of
postmodern thought, 23
construction of ‘a global
commonwealth’, 212
construction of discursive determinacy,
82
construction of ‘discursively constituted’
realms of normativity, 181
construction of ‘general assumptions’,
152, 270
construction of ‘rigid oppositions of
“inside” and “outside”’, 254
construction of ‘the political’, 180
construction of ‘totalizing knowledge’,
245

construction of a ‘radical plural democ-
racy’, 75
construction of a critical ‘epistemology of
a shared reality’, 220–1
construction of a deeply paradoxical real-
ity, 121–2
construction of a distant past, 106
construction of a plurality of citizenships,
174
construction of a postmodern society, 27
construction of a radically ‘pluralistic
world’, 106
construction of a society, 13, 188, 259
construction of a society based on expe-
riences of radical contingency and
ineluctable ambiguity, 192
construction of a specific Kulturform, 202
construction of a teleological storyline,
141
construction of a world that would make
freedom redundant, 190
construction of an emancipatory society,
273
construction of an imagined community,
225
construction of an unprecedented histori-
cal formation, 188
construction of any human Lebensform,
202
construction of binary categories, 79
construction of both individual and soci-
etal narratives, 208
construction of both small-scale and
large-scale normative realities, 198
construction of boundaries, 200
construction of consumerist identities,
108
construction of contestable codes of nor-
mativity, 99
construction of day-to-day existence, 272
construction of eclectic realities, 108
construction of emancipatory realities,
273
construction of emancipatory social rela-
tions, 237
construction of empowering social reali-
ties, 180
construction of epistemic universals, 47
construction of event-based narratives,
269
construction of everyday life, 175
construction of ‘general assumptions’,
270
construction of global citizenship, 274
Index of Subjects 429
construction of historical events, 151
construction of human life, 217
construction of human life forms, 272
construction of human realities, 48, 60,
81
construction of human reality, 5, 7, 90,
97
construction of humanity, 173, 189, 242
construction of ‘“hybrid” and playful
subjectivities’, 121
construction of internally and externally
pluralized selves, 112
construction of intersubjective
environments, 110
construction of large-scale societies, 225
construction of life forms based on
mutual recognition, mutual learning,
and mutual respect, 211
construction of meaning, 82, 97, 238,
263
construction of memory, 168
construction of metadiscourses and
metanarratives, 46
construction of metanarratives, 141
construction of normativity, 252
construction of one’s identity, 193
construction of particular perspectives,
41
construction of personhood, 15, 266
construction of postindustrial identities,
108
construction of radical democracy, 75
construction of radically contingent,
open, and multiple social realities, 171
construction of reality, 74, 92, 118
construction of selfhood, 193
construction of social formations, 69
construction of social life, 70, 106, 275
construction of social realities, 90
construction of sociality, 173
construction of societies sustained by
dialogical processes of mutual respect
and recognition, 223
construction of society, 82, 215
construction of solidarity, 114
construction of the self, 111
construction of universally empowering
life forms, 214
construction of various – arguably ‘mod-
ern’ – epistemological dichotomies, 41
construction process(es), 36, 172, 173,
190, 198, 260, 265
construction processes of cultural and
political communities, 172
430 Index of Subjects
construction(s) – continued
construction processes of multiple
knowledges, 260
construction processes of postmodern
identities, 36
constructions of linguistic identity, 79
constructions of reality, 58, 260
constructions of self, 201
cultural constructions, 105
daily construction of human reality, 7, 97
daily construction of meaning, 97
daily construction of social life, 70, 106
day-to-day construction and appreciation
of aesthetic forms, 107
ideological construction of the subject,
179
meaningful construction of human
relations, 215
meaning-laden construction, 76
monolithic construction of modernity,
179
permanent construction and
reconstruction of humanity, 173
reconstructable constructions, 67
social construction(s), 95, 96, 203, 204,
253, 266, 274
socially constructed, 42, 43, 44, 48, 67,
82, 106, 173, 181, 202, 214, 238, 274
sociohistorical constructions, 165
symbolic and material construction of
reality, 118
constructivism
aesthetic constructivism, 102
constructivism versus realism, 140
epistemological constructivism, 95
opposition between objectivism and
constructivism, 259, 290n13
subjectivist constructivism, 103
transcendental constructivism, 103
transcendental-subjectivist
constructivism, 103
constructivist, 43, 44, 47, 57, 103, 146, 164,
165, 168, 247
consumerism, 87–9, 90, 92, 108, 115, 121,
125, 127, 169, 195, 238, 247, 248, 264,
266, 273, 305n284, 307n323
consumerist, 36, 87, 105, 108, 121, 193,
194, 204, 248, 249
consumption, 14, 34, 51, 87, 106, 108, 125,
128, 129, 194, 196, 204, 211, 226, 238,
249, 264
contentedness, 123
contestability, 201
contestation, 205, 206, 209, 223, 224
contestationist, 209
contextual, 44, 47, 58, 59, 61, 90, 111, 136,
208, 215, 260
contextualism, 140, 204, 291n31
contextualist, 122, 154
contextuality, 10, 203
continent, 204, 208
continental European, 23, 24, 134
contingency/contingencies, 4, 9, 35, 40, 42,
43, 58, 60, 62, 67, 73, 74, 75, 76, 90,
91, 97, 102, 105, 110, 113, 114, 117,
129, 141, 142, 145, 148, 151, 158, 159,
166, 168, 169, 179, 182, 184, 190, 192,
198, 201, 202, 208, 210, 238, 239, 240,
244, 252, 253, 254, 262, 267, 269, 270,
271, 274, 302n169, 311n5, 335n47
necessity versus contingency, 136–9
contingent turn (‘contingent turn’), 34,
136–70, 267, 288n162, 311–18
continuist, 161
continuities/continuity, 89, 161, 166, 233,
239, 268, 279, 312n5, 313n18
continuity versus discontinuity, 4, 143–5,
267
contradiction(s), 132, 178, 185, 207, 232,
233, 241, 273, 279
contradiction in terms, 20, 83, 89, 101,
142, 230, 242
paradigmatic contradiction, 58
performative contradiction, 234, 255,
256, 257, 281, 333n7, 340n190
structural contradictions, 236
contradictoriness, 112, 178, 201, 302n198
control(s), 52, 132, 172, 173, 190, 198, 222,
225, 226, 227
Bretton Woods capital controls, 226
control of the state, 176
control over both the natural world and
the social world, 41
control over our natural and social
environments, 58
control over reality, 15
control over the constitution of a
particular mode of production, 15
control over the flow of information,
goods and cultural processes, 222
control over the objective, normative,
and subjective facets of our existence,
45
control over the population, 224
control-based, 140
control-oriented, 37
liberation from control, 15
predictive control, 59

quest for control, 142, 160
rational control, 45
regulative control, 225, 276
relatively arbitrary control, 16
state controls, 227
territorial control, 127
total control, 166, 198
totalitarian control, 15
uncontrollable force, 127
uncontrollable mobility, 130
uncontrollable realities, 36
uncontrollable social environment, 126
variations of control, 17
controversies/controversy, 3, 14, 16, 22, 29,
32, 33, 34, 48, 64, 65, 72, 98, 123, 124,
136, 171, 189, 204, 225, 229, 233, 237,
238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 258, 263, 266,
267, 278, 335n50
convention(s), 94, 95, 96, 102, 205, 206,
209, 212, 215, 252
conventional, 49, 168, 187, 188, 212, 240
conventionalist, 187
coordination, 15, 35, 36, 133, 171, 180,
224, 256, 272, 276
coordinative, 257
corporeal, 62, 115, 118, 261
corporeality, 115, 266, 303n231
corrosion
corrosion of character, 118
corrosion of the self, 119
cosmopolitan, 29, 129, 134, 135, 210–12,
213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220,
221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 229, 276, 277,
327n310, 328n341
cosmopolitanism
15 features of cosmopolitanism, 212
15 theses on cosmopolitanism, 274
concept of cosmopolitanism, 327n281
cosmopolitanism and postmodernism, 4,
219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 276
cosmopolitanism with and through post-
modernism, 219
cosmopolitanism without and beyond
postmodernism, 212
debates on cosmopolitanism, 4, 212, 276,
328n327
elements of cosmopolitanism, 212
holistic universe of cosmopolitanism, 217
idea of cosmopolitanism, 212, 213
methodological cosmopolitanism, 213, 214
new cosmopolitanism, 219
postmodern cosmopolitanism, 30
postmodernism and cosmopolitanism,
220, 223
Index of Subjects 431
roots of cosmopolitanism, 215
‘semi-soft’ cosmopolitanism, 211
‘semi-strong’ cosmopolitanism, 211
‘soft’ cosmopolitanism, 211
‘strong’ cosmopolitanism, 211
tribalism to cosmopolitanism, 274
variants of cosmopolitanism, 211, 212,
219
versions of cosmopolitanism, 211, 212,
274
Costa Rica, 228
counterevidence, 49
counterfactual, 226
counterfeit, 41
counterhegemonic, 22, 168, 200, 201, 202
counterintuitive, 210
counterproductive, 31, 66, 68, 254
countries/country, 75, 120, 124, 129, 132,
204, 207, 227, 228, 277, 306n306,
310n369, 310n371, 310n376, 313n18
creative, 25, 96, 104, 111, 114, 118, 121,
122, 129, 134, 147, 179, 180, 186, 196,
201, 204, 233, 237, 245, 274, 277
creativity, 18, 97, 104, 105, 106, 119, 128,
249
credibility, 7, 32, 37, 41, 55, 61, 73, 89,
166, 169, 170, 178, 194, 200, 226, 261
crime(s), 45, 139
crisis/crises
credit crisis, 130, 309n355
crisis and demise of utopian paradigms,
250–1
crisis of ‘the social’, 83, 89, 90, 91, 92,
195, 242
crisis of action or representation, 96
crisis of autonomy, 126, 225
crisis of legitimacy, 126, 225
crisis of Marxism, 28, 250
crisis of modernity, 236, 237, 265
crisis of orthodox notions of progress,
161
crisis of representation, 95, 98, 299n58
crisis of social theory, 89, 265
‘crisis’ rhetoric, 297n2, 323n154, 335n68,
335n69
cultural crisis in late capitalism, 257
economic crisis, 130, 309n355
economic world crisis of 1929, 130
global economic crisis, 130
intellectual crisis of Western Marxism,
32, 250
legitimacy crises, 251
legitimacy crisis, 5
political crisis, 338n150
432 Index of Subjects
critical capacity/critical capacities, 37
critical competences, 221
critical sociology, 96, 98, 99, 189, 248
critical theorists, 238, 247
critical theory, 22, 68, 189, 286n124,
323n168
criticism(s), 22, 55, 60, 130, 211, 230, 233,
234, 240, 242, 244, 248, 285n107
critique(s)
comprehensive critique of postmodern
thought, 279
constructivist critique of epistemological
realism, 44
cosmopolitan critique of intellectual and
institutional tribalism, 214
critique as self-critique, 235
critique of (and a certain fascination
with) consumer capitalism, 27
critique of alarmist accounts of
globalization, 310n371
critique of anthropocentrism, 27
critique of binaries, 27
critique of disciplinary power and
surveillance, 27
critique of essentialism, 27
critique of foundationalism, 27
critique of heteronormativity, 27
critique of instrumental reason, 236
critique of logocentrism and
representationalism, 27
critique of metanarratives, 27
critique of metaphysics, 28, 137
critique of methodological and political
nationalism, 214
critique of ‘methodological nationalism’,
328n337
critique of methodological or political
nationalism, 218
critique of modern reason, 28
critique of modernity, 28, 233, 236, 237
critique of orthodox Marxism, 28
critique of positivism, 48
critique of social domination, 250
critique of sociological theory, 6
critique of teleologism, 28
critique of the critique of ‘methodological
nationalism’, 328n337
critique of the instrumental organization
of space, 28
critique of the political economy of the
sign, 28
critique of the postmodern project,
242–57
critique of the subject, 28
critique of tradition, 13, 28
critique of traditional notions of
sociality, 28
critique, argument, and rationality, 62
critiques of ethnocentrism in general and
Eurocentrism in particular, 292n43
critiques of major sources of social
inequality, 257
critiques of modernity, 237
Durkheim’s critique of anomie and the
organic division of labour, 236
Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics, 137
Horkheimer’s critique of science, 236
ideology critique, 71, 72, 73, 74, 99, 262,
295n28, 295n29
Marx and Engels’s critique of
philosophical idealism, 337n116
Marx’s critique of political economy, 236
Marxist critique of the culture industry,
238
modern critique of modernity, 237
political – notably conservative – critique
of, and attack on, utopian thought,
279
postmodern and poststructuralist
critiques of ‘logocentrism’, 333n1
postmodern critique of classical social
theory, 12
postmodern critique of modernity, 237
postmodern critique of the modern era
in general and of modern intellectual
thought in particular, 279
postmodern critiques, 241
pragmatic sociology of critique, 283n43,
289n170
radical critique of modernity, 233
radical critique of the invention of political,
philosophical, religious, economic, and
cultural metanarratives, 142
self-critique, 235, 279
Simmel’s critique of the abstraction of
space, 236
social critique, 242, 244, 257
uncritical critique, 257, 340n204
Weber’s critique of bureaucracy and
large-scale organization, 236
cross-
cross-border, 129, 228
cross-continental, 226
cross-cultural, 210
cross-national, 226
cross-regional, 226
cross-situational, 161
Cuba, 228

cult, 15, 36, 114, 121, 194, 213, 254
cultural
cross-cultural legitimacy, 210
the cultural, 3, 8, 15, 36, 83, 88, 91, 93,
95, 97, 102, 103, 110, 114, 147, 148,
157, 195, 196, 197, 206, 243, 246, 247,
257, 264, 265, 270, 273, 277, 296n1,
298n41, 308n341, 325n239, 325n240
cultural act, 104
cultural alterity, 204
cultural analysis, 93
cultural and political communities, 172
cultural and subcultural identities, 204
cultural and symbolic capital, 155
cultural appropriation, 211
cultural arrangement(s), 94, 203
cultural autonomy, 97, 242
cultural awareness, 211
cultural background, 57, 211, 223, 253
cultural basis, 209
cultural beings, 56, 118
cultural capital, 337n126
cultural certainty, 113
cultural chauvinism, 205
cultural claims to hegemony, 204
cultural codification(s), 88, 96
cultural community, 42
cultural configurations, 196
cultural conflicts, 209
cultural constitution, 94
cultural constructions, 105
cultural constructs, 95
cultural contestation, 205, 206
cultural context, 148
cultural contingency, 60, 91, 97, 102, 114
cultural creativity, 106
cultural crisis, 257
cultural critic, 105
cultural developments, 34, 86
cultural differences, 125, 251
cultural dimensions, 247
cultural disappointment, 189
cultural diversity, 6, 211, 274, 277
cultural dynamics, 206
cultural elites, 243
cultural encounters, 221
cultural entities, 204
cultural entity, 209
cultural entrepreneurs, 337n126
cultural environments, 37
cultural expression(s), 94, 249
cultural field, 97
cultural forms, 106
cultural globalization, 228
Index of Subjects 433
cultural goods, 34
cultural grouping(s), 94, 209
cultural heterogeneity, 46
cultural hybridity, 128, 228, 277
cultural hybridity and hybridization, 228,
277
cultural identification, 229
cultural identities, 87, 183, 205, 228, 254,
280
cultural identity, 205, 209, 225
cultural imperialism, 210
cultural impulse, 17
cultural interaction, 205, 206
cultural issues, 220
cultural level, 15, 36, 127, 276, 277,
308n341
cultural life, 97
cultural limitations, 214
cultural logic, 97, 196
cultural majority, 206, 325n239, 325n240
cultural Marxism, 101
cultural Marxist, 300n111
cultural metanarratives, 140, 142, 255
cultural minorities, 206, 207
cultural minority, 206, 325n239, 325n240
cultural modernization, 86
cultural multiplicity, 220
cultural narrative structures, 114
cultural narratives, 114
cultural objects, 108
cultural organization, 207
cultural origins, 225
cultural otherness, 221
cultural particularities, 178, 280
cultural performance, 243
cultural phenomena, 94
cultural pluralism, 121, 220
cultural politics, 206, 207
cultural postmodernization, 86
cultural practice(s), 97, 243, 245
cultural preferences, 15, 36
cultural processes, 222
cultural production, 97, 100, 243,
323n168
cultural products, 108, 228, 277
cultural projects, 177
cultural protection, 205, 206
cultural realm, 103
cultural relations, 87, 90, 100
cultural representations, 88
cultural rights, 208
cultural sciences, 93, 95, 298n50
cultural setting, 95
cultural sociology, 96, 97, 242, 335n73
434 Index of Subjects
cultural – continued
cultural specificity, 8, 9, 43, 90, 102, 148
cultural sphere, 97
cultural standards, 60, 102
cultural standards, principles, and values,
60
cultural struggles, 110
cultural studies, 3, 31, 93, 147, 195, 242,
244, 247, 263, 270
cultural subjects, 202
cultural texts, 294n22
cultural turn (‘cultural turn’), 3, 34,
83–135, 148, 195, 247, 264, 265, 266,
288n164, 296–311
cultural underpinning, 208
cultural value spheres, 248
cultural variety, 117, 172
cultural world, 93, 160
inter-cultural dialogue, 212
‘social’ versus ‘cultural’, 147–8
sociocultural, 107, 161, 166, 182, 211,
223, 274, 294n22
sociocultural background horizons, 57
sociocultural contingency, 60, 102
sociocultural determinacy, 43
sociocultural diversity, 6
sociocultural particularity, 9
sociocultural role, 274
symbolic and cultural, 87, 90
cultural imperialism, 210
cultural studies (‘cultural studies’), 3, 31,
93, 147, 195, 242, 244, 247, 263, 270
cultural turn (‘cultural turn’), 3, 34, 83–135,
148, 195, 247, 264, 265, 266, 288n164,
296–311
culturalization, 97
culturalism
economism versus culturalism, 90–2, 93,
238, 265
culturalist, 90, 109, 110, 167, 242, 243,
247, 254
culturalization, 93, 95, 97, 299n77
culturally
culturally advanced, 225
culturally codified, 52
culturally constituted, 95
culturally constructed, 102, 109
culturally contingent, 93, 195, 253
culturally diverse, 125, 209, 223
culturally diversified, 172
culturally embedded, 66
culturally equipped, 276
culturally heterogeneous, 185
culturally homogenous, 226
culturally hybrid, 125
culturally or ethnically defined, 225
culturally sensitive, 109
culturally sophisticated, 31
culturally specific, 9, 94, 95, 101, 103,
148, 269, 270
culturally variable, 94
culturally vastly heterogeneous, 226
socioculturally contingent, 151
socioculturally contingent, 253
socioculturally specific, 77, 184
transculturally applicable, 212
culture(s)
carriers of culture, 98
commodification of culture, 97, 204, 279
concept of culture, 93, 96, 101, 108, 203,
265
consumerist culture, 105
contemporary culture, 113
contemporary understandings of culture,
99
cosmopolitan culture, 212
critical dialogue between cultures, 209
culturalist political culture, 110
culture and tradition, 223
culture as a collective life form, 203, 265
culture as ‘self-determined determination’,
105
culture as a social battlefield, 266
culture as a social construction, 203
culture as a source of aesthetic
experience, 266
culture as a text, 242
culture as a world ‘for itself’ (für sich), 95
culture as an aesthetic experience, 203
culture as an existential source of
species-constitutive transcendence, 203
culture as education or Bildung, 203
culture as the performative nucleus of
social constructions, as a commodity,
as a form of hyperreality, as an
epiphenomenal reality, and as a sphere
of relative autonomy, 266
culture industry, 97, 108, 115, 169, 211,
228, 238, 247
culture of modernity, 240
culture of self-redemption and
emancipatory hope, 239
culture of the Other, 223
culture-constitutive conventions, norms,
and values, 209
cultures as social constellations, 94
cultures moving closer together, 202
deep structure of culture, 94

depoliticized popular culture, 196, 249
dialogue with other cultures, 223
different – discipline-specific – conceptions
of culture, 203
distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low’,
‘sophisticated’ and ‘primitive’, ‘refined’
and ‘coarse’, and ‘superior’ and
‘inferior’ expressions of culture, 197
global consumer culture, 125
global culture industries, 108
global culture industry, 97, 115, 169, 211,
228
global culture industry’s economy, 108
global normative culture, 212
high and low culture, 106
high culture, 300n131, 323n170
interactive multimedia culture, 116
intertwinement of culture, consumption,
and capitalism, 238
key functions of culture, 202
low culture, 106, 300n131, 323n170
mass/popular culture, 106
meanings of culture, 203
national literary cultures, 229
naturalization of culture, 95
nature and culture, 95
political economy of culture, 97
politics of culture, 204
popular culture, 106, 196, 249
postmodern culture, 105, 106, 108, 120,
249
potential of culture, 94
present-day understandings of culture,
3, 265
production and consumption of culture,
106
recognition of the potentially equal value
of different cultures, 205
social contingency of culture, 97
socio-existential significance of culture,
202
sociology of culture, 96, 97
socio-ontological centrality of cultures,
202
socio-ontological preponderance of
culture, 94
socio-performative preponderance of
culture, 97
socio-relational determinacy of culture,
97
species-constitutive role of culture, 95
study of culture, 94
techno-culture, 87
the turn to culture, 195
Index of Subjects 435
visual culture, 228, 229
visual cultures, 229
world culture (Weltkultur), 212
curiosity, 105
cyber-
cyber-capitalism, 130
cyber-realities, 98
cyber-relations, 116
cybersociety, 201
cyberspace, 98, 116, 229
cyber-technologies, 98
cybernetic(s), 85, 264
cybernetic societies, 85
cynical, 30, 86, 121, 130, 194, 246, 247,
255, 280
cynicism, 30, 219, 275
Cyprus, 227
Darwinian, 149, 163, 165
Darwinist, 165
death(s)
birth and death, 50
death of governance, 133
the death of ‘the social’, 83, 88, 89, 92,
242, 243
paradigmatic deaths, 107
the ‘death’ rhetoric in postmodern
thought, 297n3
the death of God, 107
the death of metanarratives, 107, 170,
271
the death of the author, 107
the death of the foundational approach
to political analysis, 198
the death of the subject, 107
the death of truth, 107
the death of values, 107
debate/debates, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 18, 20,
22, 29, 32, 33, 40, 45, 55, 64, 65, 66,
83, 89, 99, 130, 136, 137, 145, 155,
171, 177, 179, 181, 189, 204, 209, 212,
217, 224, 225, 229, 231, 233, 237, 238,
239, 240, 241, 242, 255, 259, 263,
267, 268, 273, 276, 309n358, 310n372,
310n373, 311n5, 312n11, 326n277,
328n327, 336n90
debunking, 190
debureaucratization, 35, 124
decentralization, 124, 144
decentre, 167
decentred (decentered), 10, 112, 116, 120,
151, 157, 178, 179, 180, 193, 194, 195,
196, 221, 227
decentredness, 179
436 Index of Subjects
decentring, 74, 107, 301n145
decolonization, 169, 310n383
deconstruction, 37, 66, 79, 90, 107, 252,
254, 265, 294n22
reconstruction and deconstruction,
167–9, 271
deconstructionism, 168
deconstructive
deconstructive attitude, 37
deconstructive intensity, 107
deconstructive nature, 67
deconstructive spirit, 106
deconstructive turn, 34, 288n161
deconstructivism, 67
deconstructivist, 4, 37, 68, 90, 230, 269
deductive, 152–3, 270
deductivist, 152
defensibility, 247
deideologization, 35, 250
deindustrialization, 34, 124
delay, 98
delegitimization, 26, 35, 73, 75, 83, 182
deliberation, 109, 224
deliberative
deliberative and direct democracy, 187
deliberative and direct models of
democracy, 212
deliberative democracy, 75
deliberative spirit, 106
direct and deliberative models of
democracy, 295n43
interplay between system and
deliberative realms of action, 216
demarcation
demarcation between an inside and an
outside, 79
demarcation criteria, 56
demarcation lines, 65, 106
demarcation problem, 49, 292n36
dematerialization, 98, 124
democracies/democracy, 74
cosmopolitan democracy
deliberative and direct democracy, 187
deliberative democracy, 75
direct and deliberative models of
democracy, 295n43
direct democracy, 75, 109, 187
liberal democracy, 75, 124, 208
models of democracy, 212, 295n43
nation-state democracy, 239
postmodern social democracy, 30
radical democracy, 75
radical plural democracy, 75
representational democracies, 74
democratic
anti-democratic, 74
democratic coordination, 256
democratic decision-making processes, 75
democratic politics, 186
democratic regimes, 206, 207
democratic societies, 120
democratic spaces of debate, deliberation,
and contestation, 224
democratic-capitalist societies, 117
liberal democratic, 74
social-democratic, 79, 186
democratization, 11, 196
demographic, 11, 128, 129, 150, 155, 160,
248, 266, 277, 308n342, 315n83
demography, 154
denationalization, 124, 221, 222, 227, 276,
277
deontologism, 140, 204
dependence, 15, 19, 57, 81, 94, 130, 243
depoliticization, 109, 196, 250
depoliticized, 196, 249
derationalization, 34
deregulation, 124, 130, 133
deregulation of economic systems, 125
deregulation of market systems, 134
deregulation of productive systems and
labour markets, 125
economic deregulation, 134
Derridean, 148, 181, 246
descriptibility, 43, 152
description, 20, 146, 269
desire(s), 45, 111, 120, 160, 161, 162, 163,
168, 185, 208, 222, 235
collective desire, 121
creative desire, 121
desire for domination, 235
modern desire, 41, 137, 168
postmodern theories of desire, 29
random desires, 121
destabilized, 127, 151
destiny, 13, 15, 60, 88, 108, 117, 139, 142,
268, 269
destruction, 128, 191
destructive, 60, 219, 250, 338n147
destructive forces, 191
destructive potential, 246, 280
self-destructive, 139
determinacy
conditions of determinacy, 142
context-dependent determinacy, 173
determinacy versus indeterminacy, 189
different forms of determinacy, 142
discursive determinacy, 82

economic determinacy, 101
existential determinacy, 142
ideological invention of determinacy, 268
illusory quest for determinacy, 268
material determinacy, 71, 87
natural and social determinacy, 264
ontological determinacy, 138, 142
perspectival determinacy, 42
postmodern determinacy, 268
pretentious determinacy, 180
quest for determinacy, 265, 268
relational determinacy, 77, 97
relative determinacy, 1, 39, 48, 65, 72,
74, 92, 233, 258, 265, 278
self-invented determinacy, 178
sociocultural determinacy, 43
socio-ontological determinacy, 138
socio-relational determinacy, 97
source of determinacy, 90
spatiotemporal determinacy, 40
underlying determinacy, 99
determinant(s), 42, 48, 70, 88, 90, 91, 92,
97, 98, 99
determinism, 75, 100, 140
determinist, 75, 104, 160, 162, 163, 164
non-determinist, 160
determinist, 129, 138, 139, 295n26, 311n4
deterritorialization, 98, 134, 220, 267, 276
development(s)
arbitrary, unpredictable, chaotic,
directionless, and irreducible develop-
ment, 138, 142, 145, 159, 267, 271
Bauman’s intellectual development,
322n107
civilizational development(s), 16, 38,
140, 217
conceptual and methodological
developments in historiography, 148
contemporary developments in social
and political theory, 212
cutting-edge developments in the social
sciences, 279
development of atomic and chemical
weapons, 128
development of behavioural, ideological,
and institutional patterns of
interaction, 275
development of capitalism, 310n383
development of complex networks of
rights, 217, 275
development of constantly shifting
research agendas, 53
development of contemporary societies,
220, 239
Index of Subjects 437
development of critical approaches to
politics, 4, 271
development of critical social thought,
234
development of cutting-edge research, 85
development of different types of
rationality, 54
development of discourse analysis, 70
development of diverse dimensions of
social reality, 255
development of enlightening knowledge,
55
development of globalization, 129
development of highly differentiated
social settings, 190
development of highly differentiated
societies, 87
development of history, 3, 104, 137, 169,
267
development of human cognition, 53
development of human communities,
274
development of human existence, 140
development of human history, 40
development of human life forms, 41
development of human societies, 6
development of human society, 168, 172
development of institutional processes,
218
development of intersectionalist
approaches, 185
development of macrotheoretical
approaches in the social sciences, 90
development of modern history, 14, 17
development of modern public spheres,
224
development of modern societies, 16, 86,
241
development of modern society, 5, 12,
197, 238
development of modernity, 13, 14
development of new theoretical
approaches, 248
development of postindustrial
capitalism, 34
development of postindustrial realities,
85
development of postmodern
epistemological sensibilities, 47
development of postmodern societies, 86
development of postmodern thought, 23
development of reality, 7, 245
development of social constellations, 69
development of social life, 178
438 Index of Subjects
development(s) – continued
development of social reality, 5
development of society, 50, 60, 92, 118,
168, 176, 188, 241
development of society ‘from the bottom
up’, 187
development of society ‘from the top
down’, 187
development of technology, 52
development of the human species, 53
development of the human subject, 13
development of the modern period, 84,
192
development of the social sciences, 2, 39,
48, 67, 180, 233, 240, 258
developments in sociology, 3, 263
developments in the cultural world, 160
developments in the sphere of inter-
societal relations, 217
developments of the contemporary
world, 231
diagnostic development, 72
directionless development of history, 137
discontinuous development of history,
104
economic and cultural developments of
postindustrial societies, 34–5
empowering development, 75
epochal development, 195
etymological development, 19
evolutionary development, 59
forthcoming developments, 58
future developments, 52, 59, 160, 261
geo-social developments, 220
global developments, 127, 153, 161
global political developments, 209
historical development(s), 13, 16, 38, 91,
136, 137, 138, 141, 145, 147, 149, 153,
154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162,
163, 165, 166, 270, 271, 275
human development, 163
intellectual developments in cultural
studies, 147, 270
large-scale historical developments, 13,
153, 165, 271
large-scale social developments, 150
large-scale societal developments, 100,
101, 104
major historical developments, 3
material and ideological development of
society, 188
modern social development, 161
natural and social developments, 162,
164
paradigmatic developments in modern
intellectual thought, 286n121
paradigmatic developments in
present-day forms of social and
political analysis, 4
paradigmatic developments in the social
sciences, 33, 258, 266
postmodern development, 107
power-laden developments within social
processes, 152
radical indeterminacy of social
development, 166
real and representational developments,
53
scientific developments, 100
social developments, 3, 10, 150, 162,
164, 165, 178, 218, 279
societal and cultural developments, 86
societal development from productivism
to consumerism, 90
societal development(s), 90, 100, 101,
104, 134, 154, 159, 264, 268
spatiotemporal developments, 155, 158,
162, 163, 164, 267, 271
technological developments, 116
temporal development, 4, 155, 158, 162,
163, 164, 267, 271
textual developments, 242
theoretical development, 195
unavoidable, predictable, progressive,
directional, and universal develop-
ments, 138, 141, 142, 145, 159, 267,
271
worldly developments, 164
worldly forms of small-scale or large-scale
development, 162
developmental, 100, 134, 159, 160, 161,
223
dialectic(s), 3, 16, 38, 46, 65, 68–9, 72,
73, 148, 159, 236, 238, 262, 294n22,
313n18
dialectical, 68, 69, 99, 100, 101, 149, 159,
160, 248, 262, 294n22
dialogical/dialogically, 53, 223, 224
dialogue, 65, 66, 68, 172, 205, 207, 209,
210, 212, 221, 223
diaspora(s), 109, 226
diasporic, 212, 224
dichotomies/dichotomy, 41, 90, 100, 115,
136, 259, 298n32
dichotomism, 11
difference, 79, 82, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110,
112, 144, 171, 180, 199, 204, 240, 251,
263, 272, 273, 280, 318n4, 319n9

equality versus difference, 172–5, 180,
181–6
differentialism, 272
differentialist, 29, 109, 173, 174, 175, 216,
250, 251, 272
differentiality, 46, 216
differentiation, 38, 41, 42, 53, 71, 79, 86,
91, 103, 172, 175, 177, 239, 282n13,
337n116
digital
digital age, 98, 116, 117, 227, 303n232
digital era, 98, 117
digital interconnectedness, 229
digital self, 116
digital sociology, 96, 98
digital technologies, 98
digital turn (‘digital turn’), 34, 289n175
digitalization, 98, 125
digitization, 116
dignity, 17, 135
direction(s), 104, 137, 162, 163, 164, 194,
209
directional, 82, 137, 138, 141, 142, 145,
158, 159, 162, 267, 271
directionality, 114, 311n5
directionless, 7, 32, 104, 114, 137, 138,
142, 145, 159, 163, 164, 267, 271
directionlessness, 8, 138, 159, 162, 163,
164, 267
disabled, 79, 200
disciplinary
disciplinary angles, 265
disciplinary background, 22, 30
disciplinary boundaries, 6, 59, 66
disciplinary divides, 3, 264
disciplinary power, 27
disciplinary practices, 118
disciplinary relevance, 31
disciplinary speciality(ies), 30
disciplinary traditions, 93
disciplinary unit, 66
interdisciplinary applicability, 32
interdisciplinary endeavour, 6
multidisciplinary approach, 65
multidisciplinary research method, 65
discipline, 17, 29, 31, 50, 63, 65, 262,
293n5, 294n22
discontinuities/discontinuity, 4, 105, 166, 196
continuity versus discontinuity, 143–5,
268, 313n18
discontinuist, 161
discourse(s)
academic and non-academic discourses,
7, 33
Index of Subjects 439
aestheticized discourses, 248
authoritative discourse, 79
competing discourses, 35, 81
concept of discourse, 65, 69, 70, 71, 76,
246, 263
constitution of discourses, 71, 72, 76, 263
contemporary academic discourses, 18
contemporary discourses, 139
contemporary theories of discourse,
295n29
contextualization of discourse, 294n22
counterhegemonic discourses, 22
creation of discourses, 200
critical discourse analysis, 67, 68, 69, 71,
262, 294n22
critical discourse analysts, 67, 69, 238,
246, 247, 262
critical discourses, 129
cultural, political, legal, philosophical,
artistic, scientific, and/or religious
discourses, 99, 100
culturalist discourse, 254
dialectical view of discourse, 294n22
dialogically constituted discourses, 53
discourse
discourse analysis, 2, 64–74, 246, 262,
293n2, 293n5, 294n22
discourse analysts, 2, 64, 73
discourse as a ‘structural order’, 77
discourse as social practice, 69
discourse idealism, 246
discourse in and for itself, 67
discourse in relation to other discourses,
67
discourse in relation to the
nondiscursive, 67
discourse of discourse, 70
discourse of ideology, 70
discourse of the post, 18
discourse on discourse, 65
discourse structures, 293n5
discourse-laden, 81
discourses as assemblages of meaning, 78
discourses of discourse, 76–82
discourses of modernity, 240, 248
eclectic discourses, 176, 272
everyday discourses, 50
extra-discoursal, 294n22
‘false’ discourses, 42
finite discourse, 78
Foucauldian conception of ‘discourse’,
295n29
foundational discourses, 9
hegemonic discourses, 22, 201
440 Index of Subjects
discourse(s) – continued
historicity and variability of discourse, 77
historicization of discourse, 243
ideological discourses, 26, 100, 101
ideology of discourse, 70
ideology versus discourse, 69–72
influential discourses, 46
intersubjective discourse, 205
Lacanian view of discourse, 294n22
legitimating metadiscourse, 183
linguistic discourse, 67, 247
metadiscourse(s), 46
Mouffe and Laclau’s neo-Marxist
conception of ‘discourse’, 294n22
multiple discourses, 101
orders of discourse, 249
ordinary discourses, 210
overlapping and contradictory discourses,
201
plurality of contending discourses, 113
political discourse of multiculturalism,
207
popular discourses, 207
positional, plural, and polymorphous
constitution of discourses, 71, 263
postmodern discourse(s), 86, 257
‘postmodernist’ discourse, 190
poststructuralist accounts of discourse,
73–6, 295n30
poststructuralist approaches to discourse,
74
poststructuralist discourse analysis, 79, 80
poststructuralist discourse theorists, 75,
77
pre-established discourses, 77
production of discourses, 69, 82, 263
relational theory of discourse, 337n116
relationship between discourse and
power, 199–200
relationship between discourse and
society, 294n22
scientific discourses, 210
‘true’ discourses, 42
universalist discourses, 46
discoveries/discovery
discovery of ‘truths’, 40
discovery of context-transcending
generalizability, 37
discovery of truths, 53
discovery of universal laws, 51, 52, 58
enlightening discovery, 43
path-breaking discoveries, 60
scientific discoveries, 45, 60
scientific discovery, 58, 60
discursive, 5, 8, 13, 14, 20, 22, 26, 32, 36,
38, 39, 42, 47, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 63,
65, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81,
82, 86, 88, 109, 112, 118, 130, 141,
142, 144, 146, 147, 148, 152, 154, 170,
176, 177, 181, 186, 189, 193, 197, 199,
200, 213, 223, 224, 229, 236, 238, 242,
243, 244, 245, 246, 263, 270, 277, 279,
280, 294n22, 311n5, 337n116
discourse and the discursive, 81
non-discursive, 80, 81, 82, 241, 263,
337n116
the non-discursive and the discursive, 80
discursivist (relationalist-discursivist), 201
discursivity, 81, 82, 241, 242, 263
disembedded, 191
disembeddedness, 119, 122, 128, 135
disembedding, 125, 191, 307n313
disembodied, 115
disembodying, 229
quasi-disembodied, 62
disempower, 173
disempowered, 134, 155, 156, 174, 182,
185, 190, 199, 254
disempowering, 17, 75, 113, 116, 119,
135, 191, 208, 236, 251, 267, 279
disempowerment, 122, 135, 201, 227,
235, 257
disenchanted, 12, 114, 120, 294n23
disenchantment, 195
disillusionment, 219
disintegration
communal disintegration, 135
disintegration of the two major
political ideologies of the modern
period, 338n149
social disintegration, 121
disinterested, see interest
Disneyland, 108
disorder, 122, 127, 184, 312n5
disordered, 159, 162
disorientation, 119, 135, 183, 320n44,
338n149
disparity, 112
dispersion, 112
disposability, 98
disposition(s), 56, 183, 234, 235, 253
dispositional, 110, 111
dispositionally, 204, 243
predispositional, 77
dispute(s), 3, 13, 20, 31, 48, 66, 132, 136,
149, 204, 225, 232, 237, 242, 259, 264,
267, 335n50
distance [noun], 144

communication across distance, 225
critical distance, 247
distance from homeland, culture, and
tradition, 223
distance from one’s own culture, 223
ironic distance, 223
distinctiveness, 95
distortion, 42, 259
distortive, 54, 58, 61, 71, 123, 233, 262,
263
distribution, 13, 34, 51, 125, 131, 185, 196,
199, 211, 226, 228, 277
diversification, 105, 127, 134, 144, 207,
267, 326n242
diversity, 6, 32, 36, 73, 120, 142, 144, 162,
172, 177, 183, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210,
211, 212, 220, 227, 228, 272, 274, 277
division(s), 216, 217, 227, 236
division between positivist and interpre-
tivist schools of thought, 66
division between science and doxa, 99
division of labour, 7, 236
historical divisions, 214
international division of power, 126, 133
normative division between ‘the
majority’ and ‘the minorities’ or, in
some cases, between ‘the majorities’
and ‘the minorities’, 215
north–south divisions, 132
organic division of labour, 236
social divisions, 116
traditional division of labour, 7
doctrinally, 193
doctrine(s), 52, 105, 170, 251
dominant, 70, 100, 155, 156, 182, 183, 193,
199, 200, 201, 274
dominated, 18, 32, 92, 125, 155
domination, 15, 45, 163, 166, 184, 201,
227
charismatic domination, 198
consequences of domination, 185
critique of social domination, 250
desire for domination, 235
forms of domination, 135, 198, 235
legal-rational domination, 198
material and symbolic domination, 45
mechanisms of domination, 37, 117, 135,
174, 200, 249
mechanisms of social domination, 236,
237, 257
processes of domination, 17
quest for domination, 17
social domination, 113, 236, 237, 250,
257
Index of Subjects 441
society free of domination, 7
symbolic and material domination, 173
systemic domination, 135
totalitarian domination, 235
traditional domination, 198
typology of domination, 198
Weber’s tripartite interpretation of
domination, 198
Dominican Republic, 228
doubt, 12, 14, 16, 18, 48, 58, 66, 92, 103,
119, 189, 195, 201, 219, 251, 333n13
feeling of doubt and ambiguity, 5
doubtful
doubtful attitude, 142
doxa, 60, 99, 156
doxic, 42
dramaturgical/dramaturgically, 51, 189
Durkheimian, 15, 36, 42, 163, 197, 213,
248
post-Durkheimian, 36
dynamic, 12, 13, 14, 36, 67, 69, 111, 118,
123, 135, 159, 161, 166, 218, 242, 266,
267, 275
dynamics, 14, 38, 113, 125, 128, 130, 134,
137, 154, 183, 205, 206, 209, 220, 226,
254, 267, 274
dynamism, 119, 122, 191, 306n300
dysfunctionalities, 236, 279
earth science, 51, 52
Eastern and Central Europe, 4, 35
East-Timor, 228
eclectic/eclectically, 20, 21, 28, 38, 71, 108,
173, 176, 178, 231, 233, 250, 272, 278,
279
eclecticism, 22, 104, 177, 193, 195
ecological, 128, 150, 315n83
economic, 11, 15, 16, 31, 35, 38, 51, 52, 56,
60, 61, 70, 73, 77, 97, 139, 160, 164,
174, 181, 182, 186, 188, 221, 224, 248,
251, 266
culturalization of the economic, 97
the economic, 13, 34, 86, 91, 92, 93,
99, 124, 130, 195, 247, 265, 276, 277,
308n337
economic activities, 126
economic activity, 34, 129
economic and civilizational evolution,
100
economic and cultural developments, 34
economic and political players, 133
economic and political revolutions, 100
economic aspects of social reality, 247
economic base, 70
442 Index of Subjects
economic – continued
economic capital, 124
economic coordination and regulation,
133
economic crisis, 130, 309n355
economic decisions, 127
economic deregulation, 134
economic determinacy, 101
economic determinants, 90
economic determinism, 100
economic expansion, competition, and
development, 34
economic factors, 86, 150, 153
economic flows, 92, 264
economic forces, 86, 97, 90, 100, 125,
127, 133
economic foundation of society, 99
economic gain, 120
economic globalization, 119, 131,
310n372
economic growth, 73, 239
economic infrastructure, 70
economic innovation, 85
economic level, 13, 34, 127, 276, 277,
308n337
economic liberalism, 121, 124, 127, 195,
266, 306n309
economic liberalization, 124
economic metanarratives, 140, 142, 255
economic model(s), 140, 149, 150,
314n81
economic organization, 280
economic phenomenon, 127
economic players, 127
economic power(s), 15, 156, 219
economic process, 130
economic production, 34, 87, 100
economic production, distribution, and
consumption, 34
economic relations, 71, 91, 100, 101, 224
economic reproduction, 92, 264
economic restructuring processes, 125
economic rights, 216
economic shifts, 184
economic sociology, 96, 97
economic strategies, 133 226
economic structures, 97, 162
economic system(s), 13, 14, 91, 125, 130,
251
economic turn, 195
economic world crisis of 1929, 130
economically, 126, 132, 172, 229, 277
economically advanced societies, 224
economically constituted infrastructure, 71
economics, 31, 51, 52, 154, 195, 197, 200
economies/economy
advanced economies, 124, 130, 132
capitalist market economy, 224
developed economies, 132
economy and society, 124
economy of cultural production, 97
economy of difference, 108
economy of practices, 120
free market economies, 133
free market economy, 119
global economy, 108, 124, 127, 226
industrial economy, 264
industrial-based economy, 239
industrialized economies, 131
international economy, 124, 132
knowledge-based economies, 85
national economies, 129
national economy, 224, 226
new economy, 119
northern economies, 309n368
political economy, 28, 97, 236
political economy of culture, 97
political economy of the sign, 28
post-Fordist economies, 119, 257
post-sovereign economies, 226, 277
society without economy, 86
space economy, 126
symbolic economies, 100
the economy, 14, 29, 85, 86, 87, 124,
125, 242, 244, 250
the economy and the polity, 15, 88
urban economy, 204
world economy, 131, 132
economism
economism versus culturalism, 90–2, 93,
265
economists, 49, 121, 315n86
Ecuador, 228
education, 200, 203
educational, 155, 204, 224, 274
educator, 237
egalitarianism, 272
Egypt, 227
eighteenth and nineteenth century, 276
eighteenth century, 13, 195, 213
El Salvador, 228
elasticity, 22, 30, 32, 73, 93, 128, 151, 278
elitism
anti-elitism, 193
elitist, 7, 196, 197
anti-elitist, 106, 183
emancipated, 88, 144, 233
emancipation(s), 37, 87, 170, 183, 240

concept of emancipation, 15, 284n81,
335n49
emancipation from preconceptions, 13
emancipation of human beings, 13
emancipation of the rational or working
subject, 46
forms of emancipation, 16
grand narrative of emancipation, 240
human emancipation, 7, 16, 45, 213,
234, 235, 236, 274
individual and collective emancipation,
249
individual and social emancipation, 234
processes of emancipation, 15, 117, 174
protagonists of emancipation, 16
emancipatory
emancipatory and non-emancipatory
practices, 249
emancipatory art, 104
emancipatory aspect of globalization, 135
emancipatory aspects of the modern
condition, 17
emancipatory behavioural, ideological,
and – if necessary – institutional
arrangements, 280
emancipatory capacity, 235
emancipatory considerations, 259
emancipatory cornerstone of modernity,
237
emancipatory era, 235
emancipatory expressions, 105
emancipatory hope, 239
emancipatory identities, 74
emancipatory knowledge interest, 68
emancipatory mission, 248
emancipatory models of ‘postnationalism’,
212
emancipatory politics, 181, 251
emancipatory potential, 13, 175, 234,
279
emancipatory potential of modernity,
235
emancipatory power of human reason,
45
emancipatory power of technology, 196
emancipatory practice, 249
emancipatory project, 241
emancipatory promises of the
Enlightenment, 234
emancipatory realities, 273
emancipatory reflection, 37
emancipatory resources, 218
emancipatory resources of the
Enlightenment, 246
Index of Subjects 443
emancipatory social force, 254
emancipatory social relations, 237
emancipatory society, 188, 273
emancipatory sociological imagination,
214
emancipatory subjects, 178
embeddedness, 43, 131, 243
embodied, 62, 74, 107, 115, 116, 135, 157,
166, 181, 211, 219, 229, 253
emotion(s), 58, 62, 115, 198, 208
emotional/emotionally, 51, 56, 105, 107,
115, 119, 157, 199
empathy, 62, 216, 261
empirical, 14, 21, 22, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53,
55, 56, 57, 58, 68, 77, 80, 86, 87, 93,
95, 125, 128, 130 131, 132, 139, 140,
144, 149, 207, 211, 215, 217, 234, 238,
242, 255, 260, 262, 263, 264, 268, 280
empirical turn (‘empirical turn’), 34
empiricism, 49, 68, 149, 262
empiricist, 55
empower, 188, 199
empowered, 182, 200
empowering, 17, 37, 41, 45, 74, 75, 104,
106, 109, 116, 119, 121, 135, 141, 153,
170, 171, 172, 174, 180, 181, 183, 186,
189, 190, 191, 197, 201, 202, 204, 205,
211, 214, 217, 218, 219, 222, 227, 234,
236, 249, 254, 256, 259, 267, 269, 272,
274, 275, 279
empowerment, 10, 75, 113, 122, 135,
144, 172, 177, 183, 186, 201, 211, 221,
227, 235, 272, 276
enclosure, 17, 82, 205, 209, 263, 312n9
end (the end), 4, 109, 132, 134, 144, 190
end of God, 169
end of history, 169, 170, 271, 317n207
end of ideology, 32, 192, 193, 286n136,
289n177, 322n123
end of man, 168–9
end of metanarratives, 255
end of metaphysics, 169
end of organized capitalism, 35
end of scientific metanarratives, 255,
339n185
end of society, 89, 169
end of the Cold War, 26, 32, 35, 126,
169, 194, 306n305
end of the Keynesian era, 128
the end of ‘the social’, 88, 91, 109, 195,
297n23, 323n152, 335n70, 336n87
end of the subject, 169
end-of-ideology thesis, 193
engagement(s)
444 Index of Subjects
engagement(s) – continued
anti-foundationalist engagement with
multiple social struggles, 74
common-sense engagement with the
multiple ways in which the world
presents itself to us as a phenomenally
constituted domain of appearances, 99
critical engagement with ‘the social’, 247
critical engagement with both the past
and the future, 175
critical engagement with different
expressions and experiences of
particularity, 46
critical engagement with friction and
contradiction, 185
critical engagement with postmodern
thought, 230
critical engagement with small narratives,
145
critical engagement with symbolically
mediated forms of coexistential
complexity, 69
critical engagement with the condition of
contingency, 139
critical engagement with the develop-
ment of institutional processes and
power-laden interactions, 218
critical engagement with the emergence
of ‘a multi-cultural and fragmented
civil society’, 183
critical engagement with the historical
constitution of social reality, 245
critical engagement with the
nature – and, indeed, with the
very possibility – of modernity, 237
critical engagement with the ongoing
struggle between ‘the hegemonic’ and
‘the marginal’, 199
critical engagement with the real and
representational boundaries of the
modern project, 75
deficient engagement with the
preconditions for the establishment of
solidified forms of sociality, 122
diagnostic engagement, 234
dialectical engagement with human
reality, 68
embodied engagement in the reciprocal
play of interpretations and influences,
115
engagement with contingency, 179
engagement with empirical reality, 55
engagement with everyday life and
human autonomy, 272
engagement with incommensurability,
173
engagement with other life forms, 205
engagement with postmodern thought,
32, 230
engagement with reality, 57, 76, 78, 98,
104
engagement with the constitution of
empirical realities, 255
engagement with the material and
economic aspects of social reality, 247
engagement with the structural
underpinnings of highly differentiated
large-scale social settings, 255
engagement with the world as if it were
one’s lifeworld, 222
hermeneutically mediated engagement
with reality, 76
human engagement with reality, 78
investigative engagement with reality, 57
ironic engagement with reality, 104
long-term ethical engagement, 170
meticulous engagement with the
seemingly irrelevant and mundane
facets of everyday life, 155
microprojective engagements, 143
open-minded engagement with disordered,
disjointed, and unclassified elements of
history, 162
particularist engagement with difference,
273
postmodern engagement with ‘the other’,
181
postmodern engagement with aesthetics,
104
postmodern engagement with the
various theoretical and practical
challenges arising from the development
of postindustrial realities, 85
postmodern engagement with, and
enthusiastic celebration of, multiple
expressions of social alterity, 222–3
postrationalist engagement with the
sociocultural role of affect, 274
practical engagement, 49
practical engagement with the Other, 182
reflective engagement with normative
issues, 220
shared engagement with ‘the local’ and
‘the global’, 220
simultaneous engagement with three
spheres of existential interactionality, 80
systematic engagement with empirically
constituted actualities, 245

systematic engagement with the
constitutive features of scientific
knowledge production, 49
systematic engagement with the
socio-ontological significance of
spatiotemporal contingency, 238
thorough engagement with the
far-reaching power of globalization, 266
worldly, rather than otherworldly,
engagement with particular aspects of
reality, 260
English, 11, 20, 228, 323n169, 324n190,
327n310, 331n448, 335n50
enlightened, 53
to-be-enlightened, 7, 84, 104
enlightener(s), 7, 84, 178, 237
enlightenment, 41, 42, 78, 227, 239, 259
Enlightenment, 1, 2, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21,
22, 28, 37, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 50, 54,
73, 75, 77, 84, 90, 111, 137, 139, 141,
152, 170, 172, 185, 188, 197, 198, 209,
213, 218, 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 240,
246, 250, 258, 259, 260, 269, 278, 279,
284n73, 284n81, 333n13
entertainment
global mass entertainment, 228
mass entertainment, 228
entities/entity, 9, 13, 18, 145, 50, 51, 54,
57, 58, 61, 62, 77, 80, 81, 82, 95, 96,
107, 113, 115, 120, 125, 134, 175, 204,
209, 213, 218, 219, 221, 224, 263, 275,
277
environment, 13, 52, 56, 77, 88, 120, 122,
126, 133, 151, 154, 184, 187, 191, 244
environmental, 128, 129, 149, 191, 222,
266, 308n344
environmentalism, 192
anarchist environmentalism, 192
conservative environmentalism, 192
feminist environmentalism, 192
liberal environmentalism, 192
nationalist environmentalism, 192
religious environmentalism, 192
socialist environmentalism, 192
environmentalist, 177, 192
ephemeral, 35, 71, 81, 122, 138, 157, 159,
164, 244, 312n5
epicentre, 10, 166
epiphenomena, 90, 100
epiphenomenal, 71, 91, 98, 101, 199, 262,
266
epiphenomenalist, 70
epiphenomenality, 101
epiphenomenon, 164
Index of Subjects 445
epistemic, 1, 2, 5–11, 14, 15, 16, 20, 29, 34,
35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46–53,
55–63, 65–7, 70, 73, 74, 76, 78, 84, 92,
95, 106, 112, 113, 140, 147, 150, 151,
152, 157, 158, 167, 169, 214, 219, 238,
242, 245, 247, 252, 253, 254, 259, 260,
261, 268, 270, 279, 280
epistemological, 9, 33, 58
epistemological ‘crisis of representation’,
98
epistemological agendas, 2, 42, 260
epistemological anti-foundationalism, 43
epistemological assumptions, 49, 55
epistemological certainty, 166
epistemological chaos, 166
epistemological constructivism, 95
epistemological convictions of postmod-
ern thought, 55
epistemological dichotomies, 41, 259
epistemological discrepancies, 48
epistemological disputes, 237
epistemological distinction, 84
epistemological division between science
and doxa, 99
epistemological foundationalism, 43
epistemological opposition between
foundationalism and anti-
foundationalism, 259
epistemological opposition between
objectivism and constructivism, 259
epistemological opposition between
universalism and particularism, 259
epistemological perspective, 95
epistemological position of ‘anti-repre-
sentationalism’, 103
epistemological preoccupation, 49
epistemological principle, 53
epistemological project, 48
epistemological questions, 9
epistemological realism, 44, 57, 79
epistemological relativism, 2, 40
epistemological scepticism, 57
epistemological sensibilities, 47
epistemological significance, 53
epistemological stance, 48
epistemological tenets, 55
epistemological tension between
certainty and uncertainty, 291n20
epistemological tension between truth
and perspective, 290n13
epistemological tension between
universality and particularity, 291n31
epistemological tensions, 2, 47
epistemological vacuum, 247
446 Index of Subjects
epistemological – continued
epistemologically inspired relativization
of cognitive, normative, and aesthetic
standards, 29
epistemologically naïve, 55
epistemologically one-sided, 61
epistemologically ostentatious, 58
epistemologically pretentious. 58
epistemologically reflexive, 56, 260
epistemologically rigid, 59
epistemologically superior, 63
epistemologically unsustainable, 56
epistemologically untenable, 61, 254
epistemologies/epistemology, 28, 33, 37,
40–63, 73, 220, 232, 237, 252, 259–61,
287n150, 290–3
new epistemology, 48–63
relativist turn in epistemology
(‘relativist turn’ in epistemology), 2,
48, 259, 290n1
equality, 17, 74, 204, 240, 272, 273
equality versus difference, 172–5, 180,
181–6
Equatorial Guinea, 228
Erkenntnis
Erkenntnisfunktion, 61
Erkenntniskampf, 61
Erkenntnisnormativität, 61
Erkenntnisnutzung, 61
Erkenntnisstandpunkt, 61
Erklären (explain/explanation), 48, 66,
291n33, 293n14
essentialism
critique of essentialism, 27
linguistic essentialism, 67
essentialist, 74
anti-essentialist, 67, 74, 90, 200
essentialize/essentialized/essentializing,
208, 216, 251, 254
étatisme, 177
eternity, 7
ethics
ethics in a world of strangers
ethics of (postmodern) relationships
ethics of identity
ethics of proximity, of responsibility for
the Other, 182
ethics of representation
ethics of the concern for the self as a
practice of freedom
ethics of the ideal communication
Community
ethics of truth
global ethics, 220
intersubjectivist ethics, 182
morality and ethics, 214
political ethics
postmodern ‘ethics of aesthetics’, 250
postmodern ethics, 182
post-secular ethics
Ethiopia, 227
ethnic, 9, 74, 111, 139, 156, 177, 181, 182,
183, 188, 199, 207, 209, 212, 221, 274
ethnicity, 10, 15, 36, 87, 109, 116, 172,
185, 187, 193, 196, 208, 214, 220, 222,
272
ethnocentric, 9, 37, 60, 62, 202–10
ethnocentrism, 9, 10, 274, 292n43
ethno-conscious, 8, 9
ethos of pluralization, 181
Eurocentric, 60, 204
Eurocentrism, 292n43
Europe
Eastern and Central Europe, 4, 35
Eastern Europe, 74, 124, 127
Western Europe, 124, 132
European, 76, 163, 212, 309n362, 310n371,
333n13
Anglo-European, 23
continental European, 23, 24, 134
European Community, 310n371
Europeanization, 212
everyday
everyday concerns and experiences, 7
everyday discourses, 50
everyday life, 2, 106, 115, 154, 155, 156,
157, 175, 196, 197, 213, 249, 250, 261,
272, 294n22
everyday lives, 163, 178, 199, 273
everyday meaning, 45
everyday perception of worldly
actualities, 52
everyday perceptions of reality, 51
everyday performances, 42
everyday practice(s), 68, 153, 275
everyday processes, 7
everyday reality, 196
everyday situations, 96, 223
everyday social practices, 215
everyday trust, 59
everyday understanding of reality, 99
everyday understandings, 9
everyday unfolding of social life, 272
evolution, 6, 13, 37, 41, 51, 53, 60, 84, 90,
91, 100, 137, 147, 149, 158, 161, 165,
261
evolutionary, 11, 52, 53, 59, 137, 158, 159,
160, 161, 165, 168, 176, 198, 261
 Index of Subjects 447

evolutionism, 11, 60, 149, 166, 225 factual, 49, 53, 58, 94, 146–7, 157, 160,
evolutionist, 60, 163, 224, 261 173, 260, 261, 269
exactitude, 231, 261 faith, 17, 57, 140, 161, 173, 196, 207, 210
exchange value, 228 fallacies/fallacy, 241, 294n23
exchange(s), 54, 92, 100, 106, 121, 129, fallacious, 254
205, 209, 221, 224, 228, 229, 264, 276, false, 7, 41, 42, 56, 70, 71, 144, 186, 233,
309n358 235, 259, 280, 295n25, 295n26, 333n3
existential, 8, 15, 18, 36, 45, 50, 59, 66, 78, falsifiability, 49, 50, 56, 57, 260
80, 81, 88, 94, 96, 114, 116, 117, 119, falsifiable, 49, 56, 260
120, 121, 122, 135, 139, 142, 156, 170, familiar, 114, 240
178, 179, 184, 190, 191, 202, 203, 222, family(ies), 216, 239
235, 245, 260, 265, 268, 273 fascism, 14, 30, 35, 140, 166, 169, 176, 179,
existentialist turn (‘existentialist turn’), 192, 240, 254
34 fascist, 29, 192, 206, 240
existentialism, 53, 311n5 fatalism, 219, 275
existentialist, 34, 99, 162, 289n171 fatalistic, 129, 244
expansion, 13, 34, 125, 128, 129, 131, 132 fate, 257
expansionist, 128, 130 FDI(s) (foreign direct investment(s)), 125,
experience(s), 7, 36, 46, 49, 55, 56, 59, 62, 130, 131, 132, 309n366, 309n368,
80, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 310n371
111, 112, 113, 115, 119, 120, 121, 122, fear(s), 122, 191, 208
123, 135, 138, 139, 154, 155, 156, 157, feeling(s)
163, 166, 169, 174, 175, 178, 184, 191, emotions, feelings, and sentiments, 198
192, 193, 202, 203, 204, 214, 218, 221, feeling and community, 199
222, 224, 225, 235, 248, 251, 260, 261, feeling of anxiety, out-of-placeness, loss
266, 268, 273, 274, 285n86, 294n22 of direction, 139
experiential, 49, 55, 82, 105, 199, 202, 204, feeling of belonging, 209
205, 263 feeling of disorientation and
experiment(s), 49, 55, 116, 184, 128, 244, disembeddedness, 135
255, 280 feeling of doubt and ambiguity, 5
experimental, 20, 49, 55, 105, 122 feeling of existential insecurity, 135
expert/experts, 8, 14, 61, 62, 63, 148, 156, feminism, 32
157, 252 anarchist feminism, 192
expert knowledge, 7, 34 conservative feminism, 192
explanation(s), 6, 9, 32, 37, 42, 49, 53, 56, ecofeminism, 192
59, 60, 65–8, 69, 78, 101, 104, 147, environmentalist feminism, 192
148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 158, 163, 164, liberal feminism, 192
238, 245, 314n74 nationalist feminism, 192
paradigm of explanation, 48, 66, 67, 150, postmodern feminism, 30
291n33, 293n14 postmodernism and feminism, 22,
explanatory, 2, 7, 10, 12, 40, 41, 43, 49, 52, 286n125
54, 56, 58, 61, 63, 68, 84, 85, 90, 91, religious feminism, 192
99, 101, 112, 124, 128, 130, 140, 146, second-wave feminism, 182
148–51, 152, 158, 165, 168, 171, 239, socialist feminism, 192
242, 245, 267, 270, 278 female, 79, 200
exploitation, 17, 125, 129, 236, 309n352, feminist, 29, 62, 177, 192, 302n187
333n12 fetishism, 121
explosion, 119, 211 fetishization, 197, 208
export(s), 131 fetishize(d), 230, 254, 280
expressivity, 182 fetishizing, 254
fiction(s), 47, 146, 147, 245, 246
fabricated, 44, 66, 147, 245 fictional, 146, 147, 245, 269
facticity, 94, 96, 114, 152 fictitious, 53
factories, 86 fidelity, 106
448 Index of Subjects

field(s) fragility of reality, 317n190

academic fields and subfields, 31
cultural field, 97
economic, cultural, and scientific fields,
97
field and habitus, 99
field of diametrically opposed normativi-
ties, 117
field of discursivity, 81
field of expertise, 26
field of identity, 78
field of materially sustained economic
production, 100
field of signifiers, 159
field of social and political research, 65
field of symbolically mediated cultural
production, 100
fields of action, 201
fields of public life, 218
fields of sociological enquiry, 96
fields of the social sciences and
humanities, 195
level playing field, 206
political battlefield, 201, 251, 254, 280
social battlefield, 108, 266
social field, 97
social fields, 97
fiscalism, 140
fixity
fixity, 74, 81
unfixity, 81
flexibility, 119, 120
flexibilization, 119, 124, 125
flexible, 35, 125, 188, 189, 277
fluid, 36, 74, 90, 111, 120, 122, 160, 166,
198, 208
fluidity, 7, 81, 111, 178, 201, 266
flux, 36, 64, 78, 111, 113, 118, 169, 203,
312n5
Fordist, 119, 273
for-itselfness, 123, 218
form(s) of existence, 1, 10, 39, 50, 80, 97,
233, 252, 258, 278
Foucauldian, 117, 152, 295n29
foundational, 9, 18, 29, 44, 48, 62, 90, 91,
92, 97, 118, 151, 197, 198, 261
foundationalism, 27, 43, 44, 45, 140, 259,
291n20
foundationalist, 8, 9, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 74,
151, 198, 213, 253
foundationless, 6, 151, 253
foundationlessness, 8
fragility
fragility, 178
fragility of social reality, 166
fragmentation, 17, 36, 85, 105, 144, 161,
193, 196, 236, 333n12
France, 134, 310n382
Francophone, 24, 28
freedom
antinomy between freedom and neces-
sity, 96
attainment of freedom in the name of
freedom, 190
commodified freedom, 194
freedom, 15, 17, 43, 74, 115, 120, 121,
122, 123, 179, 190
freedom and constraint, 191
freedom of choice, 123
freedom of personal choice, 121
freedom of speech, 193
freedom of uncontrollable mobility, 130
freedom to be free, 120
freedom-based, 140
human freedom, 184, 190
individual freedom, 15, 122
kingdom of universal freedom, 217
pseudo-freedom, 123
quest for freedom, 193
simultaneous celebration and repression
of freedom, 190
French
French, 24
French ecological/demographic model,
150
French impressionism, 20
French intellectual history
French pragmatic sociology, 317n190
French representatives of postmodern
forms of analysis, 26
French Revolution, 46
French social philosophers, 31
Freudian, 29, 99
Freudianism, 30
friction(s), 126, 185
Friedmanian, 197
friend(s), 169, 216, 257
friendship(s), 120, 216, 217
fulfillment (fulfilment), 120
functionalist
functionalist, 41
functionalist imperatives, 249, 97
functionalist implications, 238
functionalist modes of rationality, 236
functionalist perspective, 52
functionalist reason, 227
functionality, 61, 104, 261

fundamentalism, 74
future
future, 18, 19, 35, 52, 54, 58, 149, 161,
162, 175, 178, 183, 185
future developments, 52, 59, 160, 261
future history, 11
future occurrences, 59
future of humanity, 128, 139
future social possibilities, 7
future-oriented, 52, 59, 85, 160
futures, 191
oriented towards a remote future, 176
oriented towards the future, 17
postmodern future, 144
project of the future, 176
utopian future, 106, 175
futurist, 186
Gadamerian, 211
game(s)
game changers, 31
game in town, 32, 35, 110
games in town, 119
language game, 7, 35, 56, 60, 62, 78, 171,
200, 215, 245, 250, 280
language games, 8, 44, 56, 60, 62, 63,
101, 147, 181, 184, 193, 200, 231, 245,
248
strategic games, 188
GDP (gross domestic product), 131,
309n358
Gemeinschaft, 11
Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft, 11
gender, 9, 10, 15, 36, 87, 107, 111, 116,
120, 172, 185, 193, 196, 208, 214, 220,
272
gendered, 29, 183
gender-specific, 181, 182, 199
genealogical, 74
genealogies/genealogy, 111, 238
generalizability, 37, 61, 139
generalization(s), 144, 153, 157
generational, 25, 111, 182, 188, 199, 221
genuineness, 99
geographic(al), 23, 125, 131, 132, 139, 172,
202, 204, 277
geography, 31, 310n371
German, 24, 213, 299n76, 299n77,
303n243, 303n244, 304n258, 305n298,
305n299, 309n352, 309n357, 310n382,
324n214, 324n215, 325n216, 325n219,
325n220, 325n222, 325n224, 325n225,
325n226, 325n227, 325n228, 325n229,
325n230, 325n231, 325n232, 325n233,
Index of Subjects 449
325n234, 325n235, 331n448, 335n50,
335n51
Germanophone, 24
Germany, 134, 310n382
Gesellschaft, 11
Ghana, 227, 228
ghettoization, 257
globalism, 211, 274
globalist, 131, 132, 152, 219, 224, 226, 270
globality, 111, 135
globalization
alarmist accounts of globalization, 128,
131, 132, 310n371
alarmist view of globalization, 133
alternative models of globalization, 129
analysis of globalization, 128, 306n302
cabaret of globalization, 127
competing accounts of globalization, 124
complexity of globalization, 125
concept of globalization, 135, 306n301
contingency of globalization, 129
critical account of globalization, 129
cultural globalization, 228
determinist accounts of globalization,
129
development of globalization, 129
diverging approaches to globalization,
124
economic globalization, 119, 131,
310n372
elements of globalization, 126
emancipatory aspect of globalization, 135
epoch of globalization, 126
era of globalization, 135
facilitators and promoters of
globalization, 134
features of globalization, 123, 124, 125,
266
forces of globalization, 132
globalization and localization, 134
globalization and neoliberalization, 134
globalization and territorialization, 134
globalization of multiculturalism, 207
globalization processes, 127, 133
globalization strategies, 131
globalization theory (‘hyperglobalizers’,
‘transformationists’, and ‘sceptics’),
307n324
globalization thesis, 128, 138
globalization with a human face, 135
immateriality of globalization, 130
impact of globalization on society, 126
intensity of globalization, 129, 130
limits of globalization, 123, 128, 266
450 Index of Subjects
globalization – continued
materiality of globalization, 129, 130
mediators, guarantors, and actors of
globalization, 133, 134
multi-dimensional globalization, 239
nature of globalization, 129
ontology of globalization, 129, 130
phenomena of globalization, 239
postmodernity and globalization, 123,
266
power of globalization, 123, 126, 266
process of globalization, 134
reductive accounts of globalization, 135
relationship between the state and
globalization, 310n373
scope of globalization, 129
socio-legal globalization, 207
sociological approaches to globalization,
129
study of globalization, 128
territoriality of globalization, 129, 132
theoretical and empirical studies of
globalization, 130
world of globalization, 125, 222
globe, 12, 38, 125, 129, 133, 149, 219, 228,
229, 271
glocalist, 134
glocalization, 134, 135, 220, 267, 276
God
cult of God, 15, 36
death of God, 107
end of God, 169
God, 81
God, Nature or Reason, 81
God’s Eye-View, 199
God’s intentions, 50
God’s will, 141
God-given, 216
Godsend, 128
goods, 34, 51, 85, 222, 330n421
governance, 126, 133, 215, 219, 221, 222,
226
government(s), 125, 126, 133, 198, 206,
207, 221, 222, 226
governmental, 50, 124, 127, 130, 226
grammar(s)
grammar, 154
grammars, 8, 82, 116, 263
grammar of social conflicts
grammar of worldwide historical
tendencies, 154
grammars of generic operating systems,
116
grammars of justification, 8
grammars of signification and
interpretation, 82, 263
grammatical
grammatical, 67
ungrammatical, 166
grand narrative(s)
grand narrative, 28, 46, 156, 163, 194,
240, 256
grand narratives, 11, 26, 46, 140, 145,
152, 154, 170, 184, 194, 255, 256
grand narratives versus small narratives,
4, 136, 140, 145, 239, 267
grassroots, 75, 106, 107, 154, 155, 186, 187,
211, 220, 249, 268, 274
gravity, 50, 129, 160, 170
Great Britain, 134, 310n382
Greco-Roman, 209
Greece, 338n150
Groundlessness, 164, 254
guarantee(s) [noun]
guarantee, 163, 179
guarantee for embracing a cosmopolitan
attitude, 218
guarantees, 7, 57, 216
guarantees of history, 139
new guarantees of human rights, 218
no guarantee of anything, 179
politics without guarantees, 91, 190
social theory without guarantees, 7
sociology without guarantees, 91
Guatemala, 228
guerrilla (postmodern guerrilla), 175
Guinea-Bissau, 228
Gulag, 169
Habermasian, 197, 216, 225, 248, 276, 333n7
habitual, 118
habitualization, 14
habitualized, 52, 56, 113, 118, 209, 214
habitualizing, 52, 118
habitus, 99
happiness, 120
harmonic, 237
harmonious, 204
harmonization, 144
harmony, 193
Hegelian, 159, 163, 165, 197, 213, 219
hegemonic
counterhegemonic, 22, 168, 200, 201,
202
hegemonic, 22, 26, 97, 98, 108, 118, 121,
124, 129, 132, 135, 183, 186, 199, 200,
201, 202, 205, 218, 219, 228, 247, 274,
279

hegemonization, 173, 174, 201
hegemonize, 174, 199, 205
hegemonized, 208
hegemony, 32, 71, 204, 227, 280
Heideggerian, 99
hermeneutic/hermeneutically, 22, 45, 66,
96, 153, 221, 271
hermeneutics, 9, 151, 189, 238, 334n33
critical hermeneutics, 189
double-hermeneutics, 53
double-hermeneutics of evolutionary
existentialism, 53
‘hermeneutics’ of everyday life, 154
hermeneutics of meaning, 46
hermeneutics-inspired programme of
‘cultural sociology’, 242
heterodox, 118, 155
heterogeneity, 7, 105, 106, 112, 121, 161,
166, 172, 176, 181, 193, 220, 272, 277,
278
heterogeneous, 10, 20, 21, 76, 172, 173,
174, 181, 185, 186, 187, 189, 198, 207,
209, 223, 226, 232, 272
heteronomy, 15, 17, 19, 227, 248
heteronormativity, 27
hierarchies/hierarchy, 43, 71, 105, 115
Hindu, 209
Hinduism, 140
Hispanic, 20
Hispanophone, 24
historian(s), 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152,
153, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163, 164,
166, 167, 168, 244, 245, 269, 314n81,
315n83, 315n86, 335n50, 335n51,
338n150
historical, 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 30, 33, 34, 35,
36, 38, 39, 45, 54, 58, 70, 71, 73, 74,
76, 77, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 103,
108, 114, 117, 124, 127, 130, 131, 136,
137, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146,
147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154,
155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162,
163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170,
172, 174, 176, 178, 182, 188, 191, 193,
194, 195, 196, 202, 213, 214, 215, 234,
236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245, 246,
249, 251, 256, 257, 262, 263, 264, 265,
266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 275, 279,
280, 282n9, 295n31, 297n10, 308n336,
313n18, 317n209, 338n150, 339n187
historicism
actionalist or structuralist historicism, 162
causalist or determinist historicism, 162
Index of Subjects 451
coincidentalist or accidentalist
historicism, 164
constructivist or phenomenological
historicism, 164
evolutionist or progressivist historicism,
163
existentialist or interpretivist historicism,
162
historicism, 162
non-teleological or non-purposivist
historicism, 164
performativist or processualist
historicism, 165
polycentrist or interconnectivist
historicism, 164
teleological or purposivist historicism, 162
historicist, 10, 159
historicity, 9, 67, 77, 131, 132, 136, 137,
145, 151, 238
histories
common histories, 276
histories, 152, 153, 157
incoherent, fragmented, and directionless
life histories, 114
life histories, 102, 114
power-laden ensemble of infinitely differ-
entiated, interconnected, and irreduc-
ible histories, 157
unique life histories, 102
Historikerstreit, 240, 335n50, 335n51
historiographies/historiography
contingent turn in historiography
(‘contingent turn’ in historiography),
1, 39, 145, 231, 258, 278, 311n1
historiographies, 28, 154, 156
historiography, 3, 4, 30, 33, 51, 136, 145,
146, 147, 148, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,
157, 167, 168, 232, 239, 245, 246, 247,
269, 270, 271, 287n153
new historiography, 145
history
[a]rguments about history, 149
actors in history, 155
ancient history, 52
barbarisms of modern history, 139
condition of human history, 137
conscious praxis in history/practical
consciousness of history, 141, 268
contemporary accounts of history, 4
contemporary understandings of history,
145
course of history, 4, 12, 47, 128, 136,
137, 141, 145, 148, 154, 160, 163, 179,
197, 259, 267, 270
452 Index of Subjects
history – continued
course of human history, 42
course of modern history, 12, 149, 256
Darwinian understanding of history, 165
debates on the nature, development, and
study of history, 137
denial of history, 245
determinist reading of history, 138
determinist view of history, 311n4
development of history, 3, 169, 267
development of human history, 40
devoid of history, 169
direction of history, 162
directionless development of history, 137
directionlessness of history, 164
discontinuist conception of history, 161
discontinuous development of history,
104
disordered, disjointed, and unclassified
elements of history, 162
driving force of history, 268
embeddedness in history, 43
end of history, 169, 170, 245, 271,
317n207
engine of history, 162
exploration of history, 150
faith-based interpretations of history, 140
forward march of history, 196
generalization of history, 153
grassroots history, 155
groundlessness of history, 164
history, 3, 4, 11
‘history’ (in the lower case), 245
‘History’ (in the upper case), 245
history (historical explanation), 152
history (historical understanding), 152
history as an assemblage of local
happenings, 165
history from above, 155
history from below, 155
history of everyday life, 154
history of human thought, 242
history of humankind, 14
history of intellectual thought, 22
history of philosophy, 46
history of postmodernity, 120
history of social changes, 242
history of spatiotemporal processes, 242
history of the past two centuries, 240
history of the post-historical moment,
169–70
history of the twentieth century, 45, 100,
246, 251
history’s divinely predetermined telos, 50
human history, 10, 47, 219, 239
idea of history as a sacred drama, 163
illusory belief in guarantees of history,
139
indeterminate constitution of history, 139
intellectual history, 240
interpretation of history, 136, 251
interpreting history, 148
journey of human history, 45
lawful, predictable, linear, teleological,
and universal development of history,
169
laws of history, 51, 59, 261
lifeworld history, 166
macro-oriented conceptions of history, 155
mainstream history, 155
making history, 59
managed history, 191
meaning of history, 162
meaninglessness of history, 164
mechanistic conceptions of history, 139
microhistory, 153, 157
micro-oriented conceptions of history, 155
modern accounts of history, 149, 167
modern and postmodern approaches to
history, 145, 146, 167, 269, 271
modern and postmodern conceptions of
history, 136, 138, 158, 159
modern and postmodern interpretations
of history, 143
modern approaches to history, 146, 147,
148, 152, 153, 158, 269, 270, 271
modern conceptions of history, 165
modern history, 12, 14, 17, 85, 110, 139,
149, 168, 199, 235, 256
modern interpretations of history, 239
motor of history, 179
motor of human history, 219
nature of history, 3, 138, 267
non-teleological view of history, 164
official history, 155
on the fringes of history, 274
openness of history, 76, 82, 263
past, present, and future history, 11
philosophies of history, 152
philosophy of history, 151, 159, 160
polycentric or centreless conception of
history, 156
popular history, 155
postmodern accounts of history, 136,
137, 138, 145, 150, 167
postmodern approaches to history, 140,
145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 158,
167, 267, 269, 270, 271
 Index of Subjects 453

postmodern conceptions of history, 136, homogeneity, 7, 105, 161, 166, 172, 181,
138, 158, 159, 165 232, 272
postutopian interpretation of history, 251 homological, 147, 167, 226, 270
praxis in history/practical consciousness homology, 165
of history, 141, 268 homosexual, 200
‘premodern’ history, 11 Honduras, 228
progress of history, 60, 163 Honnethian, 185
progresslessness of history, 165 hope, 47, 122, 184, 191, 198, 239
rationality of history, 183 horizontal, 188, 189
reason of history, 162 hospitality, 182
reasonlessness of history, 164 hostility, 140, 268
recent history, 14 humanities, 3, 5, 29, 30, 32, 65, 72, 136,
rhetorical element in history, 148 151, 160, 166, 189, 195, 264, 266
rigid conception of history, 141 humanity, 8, 14, 42, 60, 61, 80, 128, 138,
scholarly history, 155 139, 141, 162, 163, 164, 173, 176, 179,
scientific history, 150 181, 184, 187, 189, 210, 211, 214, 215,
singularization of history, 153 218, 219, 222, 242, 273, 274, 275, 281,
social history, 94, 153, 155, 166, 244 335n46, 340n1
social history and microhistory, 153 humankind, 14, 214
social science history, 149 Humean, 237
societal history and macrohistory, 153 Hungarian, 24
study of history, 3, 137, 267 hybrid, 121, 125, 187, 189, 196, 204,
subject matter of history, 149 313n18
teleological conception of history, 162 hybridity, 128, 212, 228, 265, 277
teleological conceptions of history, 32 hybridization, 228, 277
teleological course of history, 137 hybridized, 192
teleological models of history, 163 hyper-
teleological understandings of history, hypercomplexity, 122
163 hyper-consumerist, 194
telling stories about history, 151 hyperglobalizers, 131
twentieth-century history, 166 hyper-individualism, 120
uncovering mission of modern history, hyper-individualization, 36
168 hypermobile, 125, 131
unfolding essence, or subject, of history, hypermobility, 122
166 hypermodernity, 115
unfolding logic, or telos, of history, 166 hyper-nationalist, 206
unfolding of history, 51, 162 hyperreal, 98, 117
universalist accounts of history, 11 hyperrealities, 57, 80
universalist conceptions of history, 166 hyperreality, 29, 80, 87, 88, 98, 117, 264,
unofficial history, 155 266, 297n19
use of history to make history, 161 hyper-subjectivity, 116
views of history, 155 hypervelocity, 122
Western history, 10 hypocritical, 219
world history, 154, 161, 165, 241 hypostatization, 254
write and rewrite history, 168, 271 hypostatized, 47, 170, 239
writing of history of ordinary people, 156
writing of history of powerful people, ideal, 45, 59, 146, 168, 174, 208, 225, 226,
156 260, 277, 331n463
Hobbesian, 197 ideal type(s), 57, 207
holistic/holistically, 18, 100, 217, 245, 247, idealism, 76, 140, 246, 247, 280, 337n116,
275 337n119
Holocaust, 169, 335n50, 336n90 idealist, 68, 77, 246, 247, 262
homelessness, 109, 257 idealist(s), 77, 97
Homo sapiens, 165 idealization, 17
454 Index of Subjects
ideals, 17, 90, 144, 170, 193, 239, 240
ideal-typical, 100, 204, 205, 217
identitarian, 34, 254
identitarian turn (‘identitarian turn’), 34
identitarianism, 254, 280, 339n176
identities/identity, 9, 10, 15, 36, 71, 74, 79,
81, 87, 94, 108, 111, 112, 113, 120,
122, 172, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187,
194, 204, 205, 208, 212, 221, 223, 228,
250, 254, 264, 272, 280
ideological/ideologically
anti-ideological, 30, 108, 250
ideological, 5, 10, 12, 14, 15, 21, 26, 29,
30, 32, 35, 42, 45, 46, 47, 51, 56, 70,
73, 85, 90, 99, 100, 101, 104, 118, 139,
140, 144, 150, 164, 170, 174, 176, 177,
178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 186, 187,
188, 192, 193, 196, 199, 200, 209, 211,
214, 215, 221, 233, 235, 239, 241, 245,
246, 250, 251, 252, 255, 257, 268, 272,
273, 275, 277, 279, 280
meta-ideological, 4, 35
postideological, 30, 32, 35, 186, 192, 193,
194, 250, 255, 273
pseudo-postideological, 30
ideologism
ideologism, 73, 108, 139
pseudo-postideological anti-ideologism,
30
ideologist(s), 178
ideologization
deideologization, 35, 250
ideologization, 14, 196
ideology/ideologies
age of ideologies, 35, 194
anti-ideological – and, arguably,
post-Marxist – ideology, 250
anti-ideological ideologies, 30
beyond ideologies, 35
big-picture explanatory ideologies, 7
big-picture ideologies, 10, 32, 35, 142,
251, 273
canonical view of ideology, 70
classical big-picture ideologies, 29, 30,
192
concept of ideology, 69, 70, 71, 295n24,
295n28, 295n124
discourse of ideology, 70
distortive, interest-laden, and
superstructural nature of ideology, 71
dominant ideology, 70, 182, 193
end of ideology, 32, 192
end-of-ideology thesis, 193, 286n136,
289n177, 322n123
global ideology, 127
hybridized political ideologies, 192
ideologies, 7, 30, 71, 74, 192, 194
ideology, 14, 58, 69, 70, 108, 149, 185,
186, 262, 263
ideology and discourse, 72, 238, 262
ideology critics, 73
ideology critique, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 99,
262, 295n28, 295n29
ideology of discourse, 70
ideology of ideology, 70
ideology of modernity, 313n18
ideology of scientific enlightenment and
progress, 239
ideology versus discourse, 3, 65, 69, 72,
262
issue- or paradigm-specific ideologies, 29
major political ideologies, 14, 176, 179,
192, 194, 240, 272, 338n149
Marx’s account of ideology, 295n26
modern political ideologies, 14, 179,
335n52
political ideologies, 14, 35, 73, 74, 176,
179, 187, 192, 194, 240, 272, 322n124,
335n52, 338n149
political ideology, 14, 15, 36, 179, 193
post-ideological ideologies, 273
prominent ideologies, 14
science versus ideology, 42, 259
simplistic conceptions of ideology,
295n26
‘sub-major’ political ideologies, 192
totalitarian ideologies, 234
idiosyncrasies/idiosyncrasy, 8, 41, 67, 80,
82, 94, 105, 154, 176, 182, 263
illness, 50
illusion(s), 44, 47, 58, 74, 88, 91, 95, 139,
141, 145, 161, 177, 219, 233, 241, 260,
264
illusory, 41, 47, 59, 78, 84, 89, 104, 107,
139, 166, 172, 185, 237, 268
imaginaries/imaginary, 50, 57, 59, 95, 98,
104, 141, 152, 170, 175, 228, 237, 242,
245, 271, 272, 276
imagination
figments of imagination, 115
human resources of imagination, 104
imagination, 120, 249
imagination and projection in
postmodern culture, 106
postmodern imagination, 220, 221, 222,
223, 250, 276
post-sovereign imagination, 228, 277
sociological imagination, 214

the cosmopolitan and the postmodern
imagination, 220, 221, 222, 223, 276
IMAX theatre, 108
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 127,
226
immanence, 50, 133, 222, 233, 269, 276
immateriality, 130
immaturity, 234
immediacy, 151, 175, 178, 182
imperialism
cultural imperialism, 210
imperialist, 204
impossibility, 74, 144, 179, 234
impulse, 6, 17, 129, 191, 242
inauthenticity, 99
inclusiveness, 211
incommensurability, 144, 173, 176, 221,
319n7
incommensurable, 8, 35, 56, 60
incompleteness, 142, 234, 235
incongruity, 193
inconsistency, 105
incredulity, 46, 89, 142, 240, 255, 260,
291n23
independence, 120
indeterminacy
alleged indeterminacy, 90
belief in indeterminacy, 141
conceptual indeterminacy, 22
degrees of indeterminacy, 101
determinacy versus indeterminacy, 189
empirical indeterminacy, 22
historical indeterminacy, 141
horizons of indeterminacy, 113
indeterminacy, 70, 71, 75, 101, 111, 113,
122, 141, 142, 190, 265, 268
levels of indeterminacy, 70
ontological condition of indeterminacy,
268
ontological indeterminacy, 141–2, 268
preponderance of indeterminacy, 268
radical indeterminacy, 1, 9, 19, 39, 48,
59, 65, 66, 69, 72, 74, 82, 90, 92, 93,
104, 137, 138, 139, 166, 180, 233, 258,
264, 265, 268, 278
real and representational indeterminacy,
142
recognition of indeterminacy, 265
societal indeterminacy, 268
India, 124, 227, 228, 306n306
individual, 8, 15, 16, 35, 36, 37, 59, 60, 61,
71, 74, 75, 79, 94, 98, 103, 110, 119,
120, 122, 135, 139, 141, 154, 155, 158,
162, 163, 164, 171, 174, 175, 177, 178,
Index of Subjects 455
181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 194, 199,
200, 205, 208, 211, 217, 219, 221, 223,
225, 232, 234, 235, 237, 248, 249, 252,
253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 263, 268, 271,
272
individual, the, 15, 52, 155, 194, 195, 213
individualism, 116, 119, 304n268
individualist/individualistic, 15, 119, 140
individuality
individuality, 114, 120, 122, 195
poly-individuality, 119
individualization, 15, 106, 116, 117, 120,
135, 236, 239, 333n12
individualized, 116, 119, 193, 257
individualizing, 105
inductive, 152, 270
inductivist, 152
industrialism
industrialism, 12, 85, 86, 87, 90, 92, 188,
238, 264, 294
industrialism versus postindustrialism, 3,
84, 92, 93, 264
industrialization, 11, 13
industries/industry, 105, 108
inequalities/inequality, 175
inevitability, 148, 150
inferior, 7, 105, 115, 182, 194, 197
inferiority, 43
inferiorized, 208
inferiorizing, 203, 208
infinity, 142
influence [noun], 2, 3, 12, 14, 15, 22, 26,
31, 33, 34, 35, 38, 61, 64, 69, 72, 73,
85, 97, 115, 124, 127, 129, 131, 134,
136, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 163, 165,
168, 169, 185, 192, 195, 213, 217, 220,
225, 228, 275, 276, 306n305, 306n309,
307n311, 307n314, 307n318, 307n321,
307n323, 322n107
information, 53, 77, 86, 92, 123, 169, 193,
222, 227, 229, 264, 277, 330n421
information technologies, 169, 227, 277
informational, 34, 61
infotainment, 227
ingenuity, 105
in-itselfness, 123, 218
injustice, 186
innovation, 14, 119, 122, 255
innovation-driven, 85, 264
inquiry, 245
insecurity, 119, 122, 135, 166
insider(s), 215, 216, 223
instantaneity, 98
instant-gratification-searching activity, 204
456 Index of Subjects
Institut für Sozialforschung
institution(s), 69, 118, 196, 249
institutional/institutionally, 15, 26, 35, 46,
66, 75, 90, 100, 118, 126, 134, 153, 155,
156, 164, 174, 175, 177, 182, 183, 188,
199, 206, 207, 214, 215, 218, 225, 239,
251, 252, 255, 275, 276, 277, 279, 280
institutionalism, 109, 176
institutionalist, 187
institutionalization, 14, 127, 257
institutionalized, 255
instrumental
instrumental, 28, 197, 216, 236
instrumental dimension, 62
instrumental element, 71
instrumental forms, 172
instrumental logic, 119, 121, 249
instrumental modes of rationality, 191
instrumental organization of space, 28
instrumental rationality, 15, 54, 62, 104,
120, 121, 196, 227
instrumental reason, 17, 234, 236, 279
instrumental reproduction, 118
instrumental variants, 105
instrumentality, 61, 261
instrumentalized, 61, 70, 128, 234, 251
instrumentally driven, 188
intangibility, 130
integration
integration of the global economy, 124
paradigm of integration, 206
people’s integration into society, 108
policies of integration, 207
social integration, 135
supranational integration, 127
integrationism, 238
integrationist
integrationist depoliticization of the
economy, 250
integrationist models of cultural politics,
206
integrationist modus operandi, 207
integrationist strategies, 128
integrity, 257, 265
intellectual, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 16, 18,
20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 41, 43, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54,
55, 66, 67, 73, 74, 76, 84, 85, 88, 89,
90, 93, 99, 107, 109, 136, 137, 138,
140, 141, 147, 150, 155, 158, 163, 165,
171, 195, 197, 213, 214, 215, 218, 230,
232, 233, 236, 239, 240, 241, 242, 250,
270, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 282n9,
286n121, 300n111, 322n107, 335n50
intellectualism, 68, 262
intellectuals, 156, 181, 185, 213, 241, 245
intelligibility, 113, 114, 189, 210, 222, 225,
228, 241
intelligible, 112
intensity, 107, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132, 266
interact/interacting, 35, 62, 96, 111, 118,
203, 205, 206, 261
interaction(s), 10, 43, 57, 59, 66, 78, 98,
101, 111, 116, 123, 156, 158, 188, 200,
206, 209, 220, 275, 293n5, 294n22
interactional, 10, 36, 46, 69, 85, 96, 100,
101, 111, 112, 114, 176, 177, 186
interactionality, 80
interactionism, 158
interactionist, 209
interconnectedness, 125, 126, 222, 224,
225, 229, 276
interconnectivist, 164
interconnectivity, 220, 223
interdependence, 126, 129, 222, 330n421
interdisciplinarity, 8, 66
interdisciplinary, 6, 32
interest(s)
common interest, 226, 277
common interest in the possibility of
cross-fertilizing ‘grassroots politics’ and
‘transnational politics’, 220
contextually defined interests, 61
emancipatory knowledge interest, 68
general interest of a demos, 224
global and domestic interests, 133
group-specific interests, 60, 187
hegemonic interests, 219
historical interest in the contingent
and unpredictable nature of social
developments, 279
ideological interests, 187
interest, 3, 7, 32, 57, 65, 67, 68, 74, 90,
95, 126, 151, 192, 196, 210, 212, 220,
224, 226, 238, 247, 277, 279, 281,
294n22, 298n41, 309n358
interest groups, 206, 214, 239
interest in in the interpretive aspects of
human interactions, 67
interest in the ‘big picture’, 154
interest in the normative legitimacy of
political ideologies, 74
interest in the rise of a ‘global culture
industry’, 97
interest in the role of ‘the cultural’, 93
interest in the role of ‘the cultural’ in
the contemporary social sciences,
298n41

interest of the evil forces of the universe,
279
interest politics, 187
interest-laden, 10, 71, 152, 174, 200, 243,
245, 263, 269
interests, 8, 9, 60, 61, 70, 71, 98, 100,
112, 113, 121, 133, 141, 174, 187, 188,
199, 201, 208, 219, 275
interests and convictions, 200
interests in society, 70
interests of a hegemonic power, 218
interests of the privileged will, 174
interests of the ruling class, 295n26
particular individual or collective inter-
ests in the name of universal – that is,
human – interests, 219
particular interests of individual or
collective entities, 61
people’s interests as members of human-
ity, 275
personal interests, 121
philosophical interest in historicity,
238
postmodern interest in the representational
and cultural dimensions of social life,
247
self-interest, 119
shared interests and values, 98
socio-specific interests, 141
strategic interest, 196
universal interests of humanity, 61, 187
‘inter-pret-ation’, 167
International, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128,
130, 132, 133, 207, 215, 218, 226, 239,
307n314, 309n358, 310n369, 310n379,
330n421
internationalization, 124, 125, 131, 133,
134, 204, 267
Internet, 98, 115, 117
Internet browsers, 116
internet networks, 227
interpersonal, 115, 120
interpretation, 12, 14, 32, 35, 45, 67, 79,
80, 82, 95, 114, 131, 136, 139, 143,
145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 161, 167,
193, 198, 200, 221, 232, 233, 238, 243,
244, 245, 251, 253, 256, 263, 266, 267,
280, 294n22, 335n50
interpretations, 9, 56, 81, 94, 95, 98, 100,
109, 114, 115, 119, 128, 140, 143, 146,
150, 151, 153, 158, 163, 212, 239, 246,
268, 269, 279, 336n88
interpretive, 19, 48, 56, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68,
73, 76, 78, 82, 114, 124, 146, 148, 151,
Index of Subjects 457
152, 157, 158, 168, 171, 203, 232, 237,
252, 262, 263, 270, 278
interpretive turn (‘interpretive turn’), 1,
2, 34, 39, 64, 66, 67, 72, 79, 231, 258,
262, 277, 288n158, 288n166, 293n4
interpretivism, 68, 140, 262
interpretivist, 48, 66, 68, 72, 151, 152, 162,
262
interrelatedness, 90
intersectional/intersectionally, 9, 71, 91,
109, 173, 200, 208, 220, 263, 280
intersectionalist, 110, 185, 201
intersectionality, 9, 36, 111, 176, 184, 186,
220, 302n187, 320n58
intersectionalization, 220, 276
intersubjective, 62, 110, 114, 173, 202, 205,
228, 261
intersubjectivist, 182
intersubjectivity, 225, 236
intertextuality, 242, 243, 244
intervention(s), 37, 45, 129, 130, 170, 259,
285n107
interventionism
interventionism, 128, 140, 226
Keynesian interventionism, 140
state interventionism, 128, 226
intricacies/intricacy, 2, 91, 164, 190, 207,
232
intuitions, 176, 190
intuitive
counterintuitive, 210
intuitive, 13, 36, 42, 48, 55, 95, 105, 112
invention(s), 14, 33, 37, 41, 78, 114, 141,
142, 163, 179, 212, 220, 237, 245, 248,
259, 264, 268, 273
investment(s), 124, 131, 132, 309n368,
310n371
invisible, 7, 42, 166, 200
Iran, 228
Iraq, 228
Ireland, 228
Iron Curtain, 143
ironies/irony, 128, 190, 193, 223, 230, 236,
251, 252, 253, 254, 280, 330n424,
338n159
ironist, 30
ironization, 223, 276
irreducibility, 8, 105, 166, 176, 187, 221
irreducible, 35, 37, 42, 80, 81, 101, 102,
107, 111, 136, 138, 142, 145, 153, 157,
159, 165, 166, 199, 245, 267, 271, 280
irreplaceability, 98
irreverence, 105, 193
Islam, 140
458 Index of Subjects

Islamic, 209 anti-foundationalist account of

Israel, 228 knowledge, 44
IT (information technology), 98 body of knowledge, 245
Italian, 24, 213 both implicit and explicit, unproblema-
Italianophone, 24 tized and problematized, practical
and theoretical, taken-for-granted,
Japan, 132, 310n371, 310n376 and discursive, intuitive and reflexive
Japanese, 209 knowledge, 112
Jew, 213 certainty of knowledge, 44
Judaism, 140 common-sense knowledge, 49, 52
Judeo-Christian, 209 common-sense treasures of knowledge,
judgement(s) 52
aesthetic judgement, 199 constructivist conceptions of knowledge,
diagnostic judgements, 281 247
epistemic forms of judgement, 43 contemporary conceptions of knowledge, 2
ethical judgements, 53 cumulative knowledge, 54
final judgement, 163 (i) descriptive, (ii) analytical, (iii) explan-
judgement, 43, 216 atory, (iv) critical, and (v) normative
judgement (Urteilskraft), 215 knowledge, 157
judgements, 107, 162 descriptive knowledge, 54, 61
judgements about aesthetic qualities, 107 discursive knowledge, 42, 54
moral judgements, 217 diverse forms of knowledge, 63
subjective judgements, 54 emancipatory knowledge interest, 68
judgemental empiricist conceptions of knowledge
judgemental, 53, 223 acquisition, 55
non-judgemental, 104, 105 enlightening knowledge, 55
juncture, 9 ethnocentric – that is, largely Eurocentric
justice, 2, 6, 7, 8, 61, 64, 90, 100, 111, 125, – conceptions of knowledge, 60
130, 151, 154, 172, 174, 181, 183, 184, evolutionary knowledge, 52, 261
185, 186, 187, 193, 202, 203, 207, 214, expert knowledge, 7, 34
216, 225, 231, 265, 266, 274, 279, 280, explanatory knowledge, 54
331n448 factual knowledge, 53, 261
justifiability, 58 fictitious knowledge, 53
justification(s) foundationalist conception of knowledge,
credible justifications, 126 43
grammars of justification, 8 foundations of knowledge, 43, 44
justification, 14, 44, 131, 149 generalizable knowledge, 51, 260
justifications, 126 historical knowledge, 151, 167, 168
ordinary practices of justification, 8 historical knowledge claims, 151
pragmatic justifications, 8 human knowledge, 43
processes of justification, 201, 283n43 idealist understanding of knowledge, 247
static models of explanation and implicit and explicit knowledge, 112
justification, 149 implicit or explicit, practical or theoreti-
cal, intuitive or discursive knowledge,
Kantian, 76, 77, 115, 163, 197, 213, 215, 42
216, 217 knowledge acquisition, 2, 55, 61, 62, 255,
Kapitalismus versus Sozialismus/ 259, 260
Kommunismus, 11 knowledge and culture, 91
Kenya, 228 knowledge and services, 124
Keynesian, 128, 197, 226 knowledge claim(s), 9, 40, 43, 49, 53,
Keynesian interventionism, 140 151, 279
Keynesianism, 124 knowledge generation, 9, 66
knowledge(s) knowledge production, 9, 14, 34, 43, 48,
academic knowledge, 66 49, 52, 55, 62, 64, 66, 259, 261

knowledge that mirrors reality, 147
knowledge, information, and services,
92, 264
knowledge, information, science, and
services, 86
knowledge-based economies, 85
knowledges, 239
laws of knowledge, 51
methodical knowledge production, 64
modern and postmodern approaches to
knowledge, 48
modern and postmodern conceptions of
knowledge, 2, 40, 46, 47, 259
multiple knowledges, 260
nature of knowledge, 2
normative knowledge, 54, 157
object of knowledge, 115
objective, rather than perspectival,
knowledge, 54
objectivist conception of knowledge, 61
observation-based knowledge, 49, 260
ordinary knowledge, 282n30
philosophers of knowledge, 49
positivist and postpositivist conceptions
of knowledge, 2, 260
possibility of knowledge, 2
postmodern approaches to knowledge,
47, 48
postmodern conceptions of knowledge,
2, 40, 46, 47, 48, 259
postmodern state of knowledge, 153
postmodern theories of knowledge, 48,
55
pragmatist conception of knowledge, 44
pragmatist conceptions of knowledge,
290n17
predictive knowledge, 54
present-day conceptions of knowledge, 40
prognostic knowledge, 52, 260
pursuit of knowledge, 43
rational foundations of knowledge, 43
rational knowledge, 54, 261
rationalist accounts of knowledge, 261
realist knowledge, 50, 260
reductive binarization of knowledge
acquisition processes, 259
relativity of knowledge, 44
representational, foundational, and
universalizable types of knowledge
production, 48
‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ types of
knowledge, 49
scientific knowledge, 2, 14, 44, 49, 50,
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60,
Index of Subjects 459
61, 167, 239, 259, 282n30, 292n34,
292n35
scientific knowledge production, 49, 55
sociology of knowledge, 53
species-constitutive potential of knowl-
edge, 58–9
status of knowledge, 86
substructure of knowledge, 44
systematic knowledge, 54, 160
testable knowledge, 49, 260
totalizing knowledge, 245
type of knowledge, 2
universalist conceptions of knowledge,
238
unreflective knowledge, 179
validity of knowledge, 2
knowledgeability
conditions of knowledgeability, 61, 261
human knowledgeability, 43
ideal of universal knowledgeability, 59
knowledgeability, 112, 266
knowledgeability of the self, 303n210
relativity of all forms of knowledgeabil-
ity, 42
resources of knowledgeability, 45
sources of knowledgeability, 112
worldly knowledgeability, 61
knowledgeable
knowledgeable, 112
knowledgeable self, 112
knowledgeable selves, 36
labour [labor], 7, 87, 125, 201, 236,
307n318, 330n421
Lacanian
Lacanian view of discourse, 294n22
laissez-faire liberalism, 140
language game(s), 7, 8, 35, 44, 56, 60, 62,
63, 78, 101, 147, 171, 181, 184, 193,
200, 215, 231, 245, 248, 250, 280
language(s), 7, 10, 24, 48, 50, 51, 52, 58,
65, 67, 79, 80, 97, 100, 110, 113, 148,
151, 201, 214, 222, 225, 227, 228, 238,
243, 247, 277, 294n22, 334n29
Las Vegas, 108
Latin American, 209
law(s)
binding laws, 224, 226
divine law, 235
inherent laws, 159
international laws, 215
irrefutable laws of natural and social
determinacy, 264
law, 200, 208, 214
460 Index of Subjects
law(s) – continued
law and morality, 248
lawful/lawfully, 169, 198
lawless, 163
law-like, 166
laws, 159, 160, 215, 226, 275
laws of argument, 51
laws of being, 51
laws of facticity, 94
laws of forms, 51
laws of history, 51, 59, 261
laws of knowledge, 51
laws of morality, 51
laws of nature, 51, 59, 261
laws of rationality, 274
laws of society, 51, 59, 261
macrohistorical laws, 104
natural law, 215, 328n341
natural law theory, 215
natural law project, 215, 275
new forms of law, 218
relationship between natural law and
social theory, 328n341
rule of law, 177
state of law, 224, 276, 331n448
transcendental laws of pure reason, practi-
cal reason, and aesthetic judgement, 199
transcendental laws of rationality, 274
underlying laws, 137, 158, 159, 160
universal laws, 51, 52, 58, 267
lawfulness, 7, 51, 104, 137, 138, 139, 159,
267
lawlessness, 138, 159, 267
laypersons, 8, 61, 62, 63, 181, 252
lean production, 125, 307n315
left/‘left’, 14, 22, 73, 74, 97, 128, 179, 187,
233, 235, 241, 247, 252
legitimacy, 4, 5, 30, 32, 69, 78, 79, 89, 113,
114, 129, 132, 133, 143, 157, 158,
170, 171, 173, 182, 186, 200, 201, 209,
210, 225, 228, 241, 251, 270, 272, 280,
324n195
legitimacy claim(s), 55, 200
legitimation, 14, 257
legitimization, 106, 182
Leibnizian, 197
leisure time, 120
leisure tourists, 204
liability, 229
liberal
classical liberal, 195
liberal, 29, 115, 240
liberal conception of multiculturalism,
208
liberal defence of privatism, 195
liberal democracy, 75, 124, 208
liberal democratic values, 74
liberal environmentalism, 192
liberal feminism, 192
liberal individualism, 115–16
liberal modernity, 195
liberal multiculturalism, 208, 211
liberal nationalism, 192
liberal pluralism, 208
liberal politics, 194
liberal universe of pluralist,
perspectivist, and inclusivist
models of multiculturalism, 211
liberal variants, 15
liberal-capitalist, 32
liberalism
economic liberalism, 121, 124, 127, 266,
306n309
era of liberalism, 273
laissez-faire liberalism, 140
liberalism, 14, 35, 127, 140, 176, 179,
192, 195, 240, 273
modern liberalism, 195
philosophical, political, and economic
liberalism, 121
political liberalism, 35, 124, 127, 195,
266, 306n305
postmodern liberalism, 30
triumph of liberalism in politics and
economics, 195
liberalization, 128, 226
liberation, 7, 15, 17, 183
libertarian, 118
liberty, 17, 117, 122
life/lives, 45, 53, 157, 165, 191, 194, 196
life form(s), 8, 15, 40, 41, 44, 67, 69, 91, 93,
94, 101, 120, 125, 140, 147, 148, 149,
155, 182, 184, 193, 196, 200, 203, 204,
205, 207, 210, 211, 214, 229, 236, 243,
246, 253, 264, 265, 272, 274
lifestyle/lifestyle(s), 15, 36, 50, 87, 105,
187, 193
lifeworld(s), 34, 45, 114, 123, 157, 166,
167, 175, 196, 205, 219, 222, 227, 248,
325n223
life-worldly, 8
linearity, 139, 161, 267
lingua franca, 228, 332n506
linguistic, 24, 41, 42, 51, 53, 55, 67, 68, 77,
79, 80, 164, 199, 225, 227, 244, 247
linguistic turn (‘linguistic turn’), 34
linguisticality, 42, 48
linguistics, 66, 79
 Index of Subjects 461

Linux, 116 macro-focused, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157

liquid macrohistorians, 158
liquid, 191 macrohistorical, 71, 76, 104, 143, 154,
liquid condition, 191 157, 158
‘liquid’ environment, 191 macrohistory, 153
liquid life, 191 macronarratives, 142
liquid modern society, 191 macro-organizational, 34
‘liquid’ solidarity, 36 macro-oriented, 153, 154, 155, 156
transition from ‘organic’ to ‘liquid’ soli- macro-physics, 117
darity, 36 macro-reality, 100
liquid turn (‘liquid turn’), 34, 288n163 macrosocial, 123, 129, 266
liquidity, 191, 322n119 macro-social, 129, 153, 221, 271
liquidization, 191 macrosocietal, 125, 134
literary macro-sociological, 206
literary, 229 macrosubject, 143, 178
literary criticism, 242, 244 macrotheoretical, 41, 83, 90, 91, 92
literary cultures, 229 mainstream, 5, 7, 41, 88, 109, 116, 136,
literary theory, 31 155, 157, 166, 187, 194, 197, 200, 212,
literature, 5, 20, 23, 29, 33, 73, 89, 93, 227, 230, 251
106, 111, 146, 147, 148, 151, 188, 200, majorities/majority, 24, 27, 182, 207, 215,
211, 228, 245, 269, 285n105, 293n2, 227, 254
294n22, 306n301, 311n5, 313n18, Malaysia, 228, 306n306
319n18, 325n223 male, 79, 200
local, 7, 8, 9, 10, 47, 91, 125, 126, 128, 133, Malta, 228
135, 140, 153, 165, 183, 187, 207, 209, manageability, 59
212, 220, 223, 226, 268, 271 managerial, 201
localism, 211, 253, 274 managerialist, 249
localist, 152, 219, 226, 271 manipulation, 227
locality, 176 mapping, 122, 184, 185, 305n293, 320n59
localization, 134 margin(s), 33, 155, 156, 199, 214
Lockean, 197 marginality, 254
logic, 7, 20, 42, 79, 90, 100, 101, 105, 115, marginalization, 173, 174, 182, 197, 201
118, 119, 125, 129, 141, 145, 153, 159, marginalize, 174, 182
163, 164, 172, 201, 210, 211, 247, 251, marginalized, 182, 183, 185, 199, 201, 204,
270, 280 208, 221
logical, 14, 35, 49, 137, 154, 210, 230, 271 marginalizing, 174, 182, 251
logocentric, 37, 62, 76, 104, 154, 159, 197, market(s)
198, 230 24/7 global electronic financial markets, 226
logocentrically, 257 capitalist market economy, 224
logocentricity, 82 capitalist market, 224, 248
logocentrism, 27, 333n1 capitalist markets, 97, 248
long-term, 128, 137, 149, 158, 159, 170, capitalist world market, 124
224, 250 constantly expanding market, 129
long-termism, 36, 98 domestic market, 131
love, 115, 216, 217 domestic markets, 131
loyalty, 119 financial markets, 133, 226, 309n358
lucidity, 231 free market economy, 119
Lyotardian, 86 free market policies, 185
global market, 124
Mac, 116, 308n342, 308n344 global market system, 227
Macau, 228 imperatives of the market, 248
Machiavellian, 197 labour markets, 125, 307n318
machinery, 86 market, 97, 105, 129, 216, 226, 239, 248,
macro/macro-, 153, 155, 271 249
462 Index of Subjects

market(s) – continued Marxist political story of class conflict

market crash of Black Friday, 130 and revolution, 141
market economies, 133 Marxist predictions about large-scale
market forces, 124 societal developments, 100
market logic, 227 Marxist scholars, 91
market principles, 97 Marxist social theory, 239
market system, 131, 227 Marxist theory, 74, 90
market systems, 133, 134 Marxist thought, 30, 99, 335n47
market-driven products, 194 neo-Marxist, 294n22, 336n116
market-driven societies, 105 orthodox Marxist, 70, 87, 92, 100, 262
marketplace, 126, 218 post-Marxist, 28, 29, 30, 74, 87, 92, 250
markets, 50, 97 Marxists
national markets, 127 contemporary Marxists, 101
new markets of production, distribution, Marxists, 301n140
and consumption, 125 orthodox Marxists, 70, 87
self-sufficient market, 277 post-Marxists, 28
supermarket, 121, 204 materialism, 121, 140
world markets, 131 materialist, 3, 68, 188, 262, 265
marketing, 194 materiality, 129, 130, 266
marketized, 193, 248 matrix, 117, 200
Marxian, 42, 163, 197, 213, 248 maturing, 133, 234, 241, 279
Marxism Meadian, 208
autonomist Marxism, 301n140 meaningless, 7, 88, 104, 154
collapse of Marxism, 32, 250 meaninglessness, 164
crisis of Marxism, 28, 250 measurability, 144
cultural Marxism, 101 measurable, 173
intellectual crisis of Western Marxism, measure(d), 2, 11, 119
32, 250 mechanics, 3, 65, 68, 72, 73, 238, 262
Marxism, 26 media
open Marxism, 295n33 global media, 227
orthodox Marxism, 28, 74 mass media, 65, 227
post-Marxism, 18 media, 29, 227
post-Marxist anti-Marxism, 30 media landscape, 227
postmodern Marxism, 30 media technologies, 98
postmodernism and Marxism, 22, modern media, 225, 276
286n126 multimedia, 116
poststructuralist Marxism, 74 national media, 225
shift from structuralist to poststructuralist new social media, 123
Marxism, 74 niche media, 227
soft Marxism, 101 postmodern theories of the media, 29
tradition of Marxism, 189 social media, 116, 123
‘unodgmatic’ and ‘open’ Marxism, 74 transformation of the media landscape in
Marxist the ‘digital age’, 227
Marxist, 28, 29, 30, 41, 87, 90, 91, 99, mediation, 95, 113, 202, 203, 266
100, 101, 127, 141, 226, 238 mediatization, 227, 277
Marxist approaches, 74 medicine, 200, 254
Marxist critique of the culture industry, memories/memory, 114, 155, 168, 183, 208
238 meritocracy, 114
Marxist distinction between ‘base’ and messiness, 190
‘superstructure’, 90, 265 metanarrative(s)
Marxist economic model, 149, 314n81 age of metanarratives, 188
Marxist mode of social and political alleged disapperance of metanarratives, 255
analysis, 165 alternative – postmodern – metanarrative,
Marxist perspective, 100 281

alternative metanarrative, 256
anti-metanarrativist metanarrative, 255,
340n192
celebration of metanarratives, 166
concept of metanarrative, 312n12
construction of metanarratives, 141
critique of metanarratives, 27
cultural metanarratives, 140, 142, 255
death of metanarratives, 107, 170, 271
deceptive pursuit of metanarratives, 142
Derrida’s own grand metanarrative,
334n29
diverging metanarratives, 141
economic metanarratives, 140
end of metanarratives, 255
end of scientific metanarratives, 255,
389n185
epitome of a metanarrative, 141, 268
from metanarratives to micronarratives,
189
hostility towards metanarratives, 140,
268
ideological metanarratives, 187, 245
incredulity toward metanarratives, 46,
142
incredulity towards metanarratives, 46,
255, 260, 291n23
influential metanarratives, 141
invention of metanarratives, 141, 259
metadiscourses and metanarratives, 46
metanarrative ‘for itself’, 140, 268
metanarrative ‘in itself’, 140, 268
metanarratives, 46, 140, 141, 142, 170,
186, 256, 260, 268
modern metanarratives, 218, 255,
339n187
mutilation of metanarratives, 142
oposition to metanarratives, 240
philosophical metanarratives, 140
political metanarratives, 140
postmodern metanarrative, 140
power of metanarratives, 256, 281
pretentious universality of metanarra-
tives, 143
proper metanarrative, 141, 268
religious metanarratives, 140
scientific metanarratives, 255, 339n185
splendour of metanarratives, 142
teleological metanarratives, 11
types of metanarrative, 140
typology of metanarratives, 140, 141
metadiscourses, 46
metaphysical, 50, 57, 110, 238, 334n29
metaphysics, 28, 137, 169
Index of Subjects 463
method(s)
critical method, 68
culturalist method, 167
deductive methods, 152, 270
historian’s methods, 245
inductive methods, 152, 270
mathematical methods, 150
method, 66, 68, 262
methods, 64, 66
quantitative methods, 150
research methods, 64, 65
rigorous methods, 55, 210
scientific method, 167
social research methods, 2, 64, 67, 72,
293n1
Methodenstreit (methodological dispute), 48,
66, 288n157, 291n32
methodical, 14, 21, 37, 49, 50, 52, 56, 58,
59, 62, 64, 148, 230, 242, 246, 270
methodologies/methodology
ethnomethodology, 151, 158
evidence-based methodologies, 57
interpretive turn in research
methodology, 72
interpretive turn in social research
methodology, 1, 2, 39, 231, 258, 262,
277, 293n4
methodologies, 73
methodologies in the social sciences, 73
methodology, 33, 65, 68, 171, 232, 262
new methodology, 72
positivist and interpretivist research
methodologies, 72, 262
postmodern methodologies, 28, 238
postmodern textual methodologies, 238
postmodernization of methodology, 68
social methodology, 64, 238
social research methodology, 1, 2, 3, 39,
64, 72, 231, 258, 262, 277, 287n151,
293n4
Mexico, 175, 228, 306n306
micro/micro-, 153, 271
microactors, 143, 178
microelectronic, 115
microelectronics, 125, 307n319
micro-experiential, 34
micro-focused, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157,
271
microhistorians, 155
microhistorical, 154, 155, 157, 158
microhistoriographies, 156
microhistory, 153, 157
micronarratives, 142, 187, 189
micro-oriented, 153, 154, 155
464 Index of Subjects
micro/micro- – continued
micro-physics, 117
microprojective, 143
micro-social, 153, 221, 271
microsociological, 66
micro-sociological, 206
micro-sociology, 151
microstoria, 316n150
micro-technologies, 124
migration(s), 128
military, 126, 128, 129, 155, 156, 222, 224,
266, 308n343
mind (the mind)
frames of mind, 56, 260
habits of the mind, 237–8
human mind, 253
linguistically, culturally, subjectively,
affectively, and interpretively consti-
tuted frames of mind, 56, 260
mind (spirit or pneuma)–body separation,
115
mind–body dichotomy, 115
mind–body dualism, 62
postmodern mind, 9, 47, 57
progress of mind, 165
the mind, 62, 115, 166, 238, 261
minorities/minority, 215, 216, 254
mirror(s) [noun], 44, 147
mirror(s) [verb], 7
mirror-like, 104
misrecognition, 199, 280
misrecognized, 156, 200
misrepresentation(s), 41, 42, 70, 71, 259
MNCs/MNEs (multinational corporations
and enterprises), 127, 309n362
mobile
hypermobile, 125, 131
mobile, 118, 120, 122, 304n264
mobility
hypermobility, 122
mobility, 123, 124, 125, 130, 204, 218
mobilization, 177, 188, 189
modality, 190
moderate, 107, 156, 188, 206, 237
modern
coexistence of modern and postmodern ele-
ments in the contemporary context, 143
continuities between modern and post-
modern ways of theorizing, 279
critique of modern reason, 28
difference between ‘modern’ and
‘postmodern’ politics, 189
differences between modern and
postmodern accounts of history, 136
differences between modern and
postmodern approaches in the social
sciences, 136, 137
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of history,
136, 138, 158
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of knowledge,
2, 40, 47, 259
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of politics,
171, 179
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of social
research, 65, 72, 262
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of sociology,
3, 84, 92, 93, 264
differences between modern and
postmodern forms of architecture, 104
differences between modern and
postmodern forms of social analysis, 6
discrepancies between modern and
postmodern conceptions of politics, 171
discrepancy between modern and
postmodern conceptions of the
present, 143
discrepancy between modern and
postmodern politics, 4, 46, 180, 272
distinction between ‘modern’ and
‘postmodern’ notions of politics, 180
divergence between modern and
postmodern conceptions of historical
development, 145
divergence between modern and
postmodern conceptions of meaningful
action coordination, 180
early modern, 25, 84, 126, 177, 188
‘early modern’ and ‘modern’ conceptions
of participation, 177
early modern and modern scholars, 25, 84
early modern period (approx. 1600–920),
25
early modern social thought, 70
from ‘modern’ to ‘postmodern’ politics,
189
from modern to postmodern epistemology,
40–63
from modern to postmodern
historiography, 136–69
from modern to postmodern
methodology, 64–82
from modern to postmodern politics,
171–229

from modern to postmodern sociology,
83–135
gap between modern and postmodern
approaches to knowledge, 48
gap between modern and postmodern
conceptions of knowledge, 46
interpenetration of modern and post-
modern historical dimensions, 313n18
late modern, 25
late modern or postmodern, 84, 177
late modern or postmodern (approx.
1970–present), 25
‘late modern’ and ‘postmodern’
conceptions of participation, 177
late modern or postmodern studies, 70
liquid modern society, 191
‘modern’, 1, 5, 11, 19, 20, 40, 41, 146,
177, 180, 189
‘the modern’, 1, 11, 18, 21, 235
modern accounts of history, 149, 167
modern adventure, 190
modern age, 13, 15, 45, 143, 236, 255
modern alignment towards universality,
46
modern ambition, 41, 48, 91, 149, 168
modern ambition to develop an ‘all-
embracing scientific explanation of
historical change’, 149
modern ambition to gain increasing
control over both the natural world
and the social world, 41
modern ambition to prove the relative
determinacy of representational,
foundational, and universalizable
types of knowledge production, 48
modern ambition towards reconstruction,
168
modern ambitions, 190
modern and postmodern conceptions of
‘time’, 283n53
‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’, 38, 46, 177,
180, 189, 232, 259
modern and postmodern thought, 38
modern approaches to history, 146, 147,
148, 152, 153, 158, 269, 270, 271
modern architecture of ‘the social’, 88
modern aspiration to generate scientific
knowledge, 259
modern aspiration towards reassuring
modes of epistemic certainty, 43
modern attempt to strive for ideological
and organizational totality, 176
modern belief in the power of cognitive
certainty, 45
Index of Subjects 465
modern belief in the reliability of Reason
and Progress, 235
modern certainties, 169
modern certainty, 45
modern commitment to reason, 234
modern conceptions of history, 136, 138,
158, 159, 165
modern conceptions of progress, 163
modern conceptions of society, 5
modern conceptual integrity, 265
modern concern with the participation
in power, 177
modern condition, 13, 16, 17, 89, 119,
144, 191, 236, 237, 295n23
modern cover story, 179
modern critics, 61, 234, 236
modern critique of modernity, 237
modern crusade against ambivalence and
the ‘messiness’ of human reality, 190
modern ‘cult of individuality’, 114
modern ‘cult of the unitary subject’, 36
modern definition of the postmodern, 20
modern desire, 41, 137, 168
modern desire to contribute to the
enlightenment of humanity, 41–2
modern desire to uncover the underlying
driving forces that determine the
teleological course of history, 137
modern disciplines, 88
modern dream to be able to dominate,
161
modern emphasis on material and
economic forces, 90
modern emphasis on the progressive role
of reason, 234
modern endeavour, 5, 230, 234
modern epistemologies, 48
modern epoch, 241
modern era, 143, 193, 279
modern exile, 191
modern formations of society, 5
modern forms of ideological self-deception,
144
modern foundationalism, 44
modern foundationalists, 44
modern historical research, 150
modern historiography, 159, 167, 241, 271
modern history, 12, 14, 17, 85, 110, 139,
149, 168, 199, 235, 256
modern humus, 144
modern ideologism, 108
modern illusion of order, 260
modern imperative ‘I work, therefore I
am’, 108
466 Index of Subjects
modern – continued
modern imposition of ideological and
systemic forms of totality, 178
modern intellectual analysts, 242
modern intellectual currents and
traditions, 46
modern intellectual debates, 240
modern intellectual thought, 20, 40, 43,
47, 89, 90, 137, 138, 140, 158, 197,
232, 236, 241, 279, 286n121
modern intellectual traditions, 230
modern interpretations of history, 239
modern invention of a universe shaped
by the irrefutable laws of natural and
social determinacy, 264
modern invention of individual and
collective historical subjects, 268
modern Lebensgesellschaft, 248
modern liberalism, 195
modern logic, 144
modern mask, 179
modern material and ideological
transformations, 209
modern media, 225, 276
modern metanarratives, 218, 255,
339n187
modern multiculturalism, 208
modern narratives about ‘emancipatory
subjects’, 178
modern nation-states, 127
modern notion that history has an
underlying story line, 104
modern obsession, 42
modern obsession of searching for
large-scale utopias, 175
modern obsession with ‘necessity’, 139
modern obsession with rationality and
regulations, 190
modern obsession with reason, 105
modern obsession with the attempt to
discover and uncover the ‘truth’, 42
modern obsession with the pursuit of
universality, 46
modern obsession with the search for
clarity, 178
modern order, 142
modern outside, 230
modern paradigm ‘society-as-a-project’,
176, 272
modern parameters, 44, 138, 145, 159,
160, 161, 162, 165, 267
modern past, 144
modern period, 35, 84, 143, 192,
338n149
modern period (approx. 1920–70), 25
modern phantasy, 198
modern philosophers, 238
modern point of view, 50, 83
modern political ideologies, 14, 179,
335n52
modern politics, 176, 177, 180, 194, 197,
198, 199, 202
modern ‘politics of solutions’, 190
modern politics of society-as-a-project,
176
modern postmodernity, 143
modern predecessors, 197, 251
modern predominance of instrumental
rationality, 104
modern project, 46, 75, 191, 194, 233,
234, 235, 236, 237, 313n18
modern project of developing big-picture
ideologies, 10
modern public sphere, 224, 225, 276
modern public spheres, 64, 224, 225, 276
modern pursuit of measurability, 144
modern pursuit of universality, 251
modern quest for context-transcending
teleologies, 274
modern quest for control, 160
modern quest for different forms of
determinacy, 142
modern quest for scientificity, 51
modern quest for the control over reality
by virtue of instrumental rationality, 15
modern quest for ultimate insights, 153
modern rationalities, 105, 145, 172
modern rationalization processes, 14
modern reality, 75
modern roots, 83
modern scholars, 25, 89, 166, 245
modern science, 6, 37, 51
modern scientific discipline, 153
modern scientific historiography, 149, 167
modern search for certainty, 44
modern self, 122, 198
modern social and political theory, 197,
224
modern social and political thought, 16,
197
modern social development, 161
modern social progress, 224
modern social science, 89, 259, 280
modern social scientists, 43
modern social theories, 84
modern social theorists, 84, 89, 137
modern social theory, 2, 5, 6, 13, 40, 44,
84, 86, 88, 89, 237, 240, 248

modern social thought, 41, 42, 47, 70,
75, 99, 238, 240
modern societal developments, 264
modern societal formations, 16
modern societies, 15, 16, 84, 85, 86, 89,
119, 126, 198, 209, 227, 241
modern society, 5, 11, 12, 13, 15, 36, 75,
85, 132, 188, 197, 238, 239, 248, 249
modern sociological approaches, 42
modern sociological traditions, 90
modern sociological view, 238
modern sociologists, 54
modern sociology, 83, 84, 85, 91, 92
‘modern’ standards, 20
modern standards of commensurability,
173
modern standpoint, 137
modern state apparatus, 224
modern state power, 276
modern subject, 37, 116, 120, 178, 179,
259
modern system-building ambition, 153
modern theoretical perspective, 76
modern thinkers, 31, 97, 240, 268
modern thought, 44, 267
modern traditions of thought, 22
modern types of analysis, 231
modern universalism, 47, 259
modern utopia of the grand story, 143
modern values, 20
modern values of clarity, consensus and
convergence, 20
modern world, 5, 12, 89, 117, 199
modern writings, 20
modern-versus-postmodern debate, 89
non-modern, 20, 21
opposition between modern realism and
postmodern scepticism, 273
‘pioneering’ early modern or modern
thinkers, 31
‘pioneering’ late modern or postmodern
thinkers, 31
‘premodern’ and ‘early modern’ preoc-
cupation with the seizure of power, 177
premodern versus modern, 140
shift from modern to postmodern
conceptions of politics, 186
shift from modern to postmodern forms
of analysis, 83, 92
shift from modern to postmodern
society, 36
tension between modern and postmodern
interpretations of history, 143
the modern, 1, 5, 11–13, 18, 19, 21
Index of Subjects 467
the modern and the postmodern, 32, 143
transition from ‘the premodern’ to ‘the
modern’, 235
modern society/modern societies, 5, 11, 12,
13, 15, 36, 75, 85, 132, 188, 197, 238,
239, 248, 249
modernism (Modernism)
continuation of Modernism and its
transcendence, 313
modernism, 2, 38, 86, 196, 237
transcendence of modernism, 20
modernist [adjective]
anti-modernist, 285n106
modernist, 20
modernist defenders of the
Enlightenment project, 269
modernist era, 313n18
modernist logic, 11
modernist project, 107
modernist tales, 10
modernist value presuppositions, 20
modernist worlds, 313n18
modernity
aesthetic experience of modernity and
postmodernity, 103
against and beyond modernity, 237
age of late modernity, 143, 268
age of modernity, 143
ambivalence of modernity, 1, 16, 190,
236
backward-looking modernity, 17
balanced view of modernity, 236
bright modernity, 17
castrated modernity, 190
children of modernity, 269
chronic ideologism of modernity, 139
commonalities between modernity and
postmodernity, 239
concept of modernity, 2, 12, 17, 284n76,
312n15
condition of modernity, 16, 19, 21, 37,
144, 176, 191, 236, 237, 279
context of modernity, 15, 18, 87, 220
contingency of modernity, 75
continuing presence of modernity, 233
crisis of modernity, 236, 237, 265
critical study of modernity, 236
critique of modernity, 28, 233, 236, 237
critiques of modernity, 237
culture of modernity, 240
dark modernity, 17
deceptive assurances of modernity, 139
decline of modernity, 89
development of modernity, 13, 14
468 Index of Subjects
modernity – continued
dialectics of modernity, 16
discourses of modernity, 240, 248
discursive landscape of modernity, 279
disempowered modernity, 190
divide between modernity and
postmodernity, 240
dynamics of modernity, 113
emancipatory cornerstone of modernity,
237
emancipatory potential of modernity,
235
emergence of modernity, 5
Enlightenment-inspired defence of
modernity, 234
epitome of modernity, 36
forward-looking modernity, 17
Giddens’s conception of ‘modernity’,
284n66
historical framework of modernity, 15
historical phase of modernity, 38
historical specificity of modernity, 38
horizon of modernity, 143, 234, 237, 241
house of modernity, 119, 137
hypermodernity, 115
idea of modernity, 17, 236, 313n18
ideology of modernity, 313n18
insufficient modernity, 133
interpenetration of modernity and
postmodernity, 145, 269
interpretation of modernity, 12
ironies of modernity, 236
key dimensions of ‘modernity’, 1, 13
late modernity, 73, 143, 268, 306n301
late, second, or radicalized modernity,
143
legitimacy of modernity, 241
liberal modernity, 195
limits of modernity, 75, 241
literature on ‘late modernity’, ‘second
modernity’, and ‘postmodernity’,
306n301
logic of modernity, 235
macrosubject of modernity, 178
modern critique of modernity, 237
modernity, 1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 21, 38, 39, 73, 75, 89, 119,
121, 134, 139, 143, 144, 145, 172, 173,
176, 177, 178, 179, 181, 191, 192, 195,
233, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 256,
268, 269, 279
modernity and liberalism, 195
modernity and postmodernity, 103, 143,
144, 145, 239, 240, 269
modernity as a path-breaking project,
233, 237, 279
modernity as a self-critical project, 233,
235, 279
modernity as an epoch turned to the
future, 17
modernity as an unfinished project, 233,
279
modernity coming of age, 144
modernity coming to terms with its own
impossibility, 144
modernity devoid of its political project,
194, 249
modernity emancipated from false
consciousness, 144
modernity for itself, 16, 139, 144, 269
modernity in itself, 16, 139, 144, 269
modernity looking at itself, 144
modernity/postmodernity controversy,
241
modest modernity, 170
monolithic construction of modernity,
179
motivational infrastructure of modernity,
104
multidimensional constitution of
modernity, 284
naked modernity, 139, 268
narrative of modernity, 107
nature of modernity, 12, 34
negation of modernity, 313n18
optimistic accounts of modernity, 236
parameters of modernity, 181
political traditions of modernity, 192
postmodern critics of modernity, 234
postmodern critique of modernity, 237
postmodern modernity, 143
project of modernity, 12, 16, 21, 75, 144,
172, 173, 179, 181, 230, 233, 250, 251
radical critique of modernity, 233
radicalization, rather than the end, of
modernity, 134
reflexive potential of modernity, 313
rejection of modernity, 144, 241
repressive facets of modernity, 17
rise of modernity, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 34,
37, 195, 240
secular concept of modernity, 17
self-imposed necessities of modernity, 139
self-monitoring modernity, 144
self-referential immanence of modernity,
233
simultaneous immanence in and
transcendence of modernity, 269

study of modernity, 233, 236, 279
teleological agenda of modernity, 176
time consciousness of modernity, 11
totalizing features of modernity, 246
transformation of modernity, 145
world of modernity, 178, 273
modernization
cultural modernization, 86
modernization, 2, 11, 38
reflexive modernization, 238
societal modernization, 86
monetarism, 140, 195
monetarist, 128, 226
monetary
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 127,
226
monetary autonomy, 130
monetary capital, 130
monetary power, 121
monetary sphere, 130
money-driven, 249
monism, 149
monocausal, 69, 150, 163, 164
monocentric, 156, 271
monocultural, 228
monoculturalism, 205
monoculturalist, 206, 225, 228
monolithic/monolithically, 72, 76, 86, 87,
91, 157, 164, 173, 178, 179, 187, 189,
208, 216, 217, 262
monological, 74
mononational, 228
monopolize/monopolized, 57, 188, 216,
277
monopolizers, 107
monopoly, 6, 10, 107, 118, 142, 178, 268
monotony, 181
moral, 8, 43, 58, 74, 77, 94, 96, 115, 142,
157, 161, 173, 216, 217, 250, 252, 253,
257, 260, 275, 280
morality, 51, 200, 214, 248, 252
Morocco, 228
movement(s)
collective energy of social movements,
135
contemporary movement, 21
divergence between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social
movements, 176, 272
diversity of social movements: proletar-
ian, ethnic, religious, feminist, envi-
ronmentalist, anti-racist, anti-fascist,
peace, squatter, student, youth, lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender, civil
rights, and animal rights, 177
Index of Subjects 469
fundamentalist movements, 74
global movements, 111
influence of new social movements, 129
intellectual movement, 195, 232, 250, 278
interstitial movements, 166
movement, 20, 70
movement beyond diversity, 211
movements, 248
neo-nationalist movements, 134
new social movements, 127, 129, 134,
135, 176, 177, 186, 187, 188, 189, 272
normative agendas of numerous new
social movements, 134
‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements, 176,
272
old social movements, 176, 177, 186,
187, 188, 272, 273
radical social movements, 109
relationship between ‘old social move-
ments’ and ‘new social movements’, 188
rise of new social movements, 73, 169
rise of new social movements in the
second half of the twentieth century, 73
shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ social move-
ments, 189
social movement, 135
social movement theory, 189
social movements, 135
social-democratic movements, 74
transition from old social movements to
new social movements, 273
variety of new social movements, 109
Mozambique, 228
multi-
multicausal, 112, 150, 162, 164
multicausality, 190
multi-cellular, 165
multi-coloured, 154
multicultural, 186, 202, 204, 205, 207,
209, 212, 226, 274
multi-cultural, 183
multiculturalism, 185, 202, 203, 204,
205, 207, 208, 211
multiculturalist, 206, 208, 210
multiculturality, 204
multidimensional, 174, 205, 233, 284n76,
289n176
multidisciplinarity, 6
multidisciplinary, 65
multiethnic, 207
multi-ethnicity, 239
multifaceted, 22, 37, 61, 71, 88, 90, 111,
129, 145, 154, 156, 160, 176, 228, 232,
247, 279
470 Index of Subjects
multi- – continued
multifactorial, 16, 37
multifariousness, 189, 190
multilayered, 10, 62, 113, 153, 160, 207,
208, 220, 271
multilevel, 16
multilingual, 226, 227, 228
multimedia, 116
multinational, 127, 226
multinationalization, 309n358
multi-option, 122
multi-optionality, 123
multiperspectival, 65, 66
multiperspectivist, 184
multi-projective, 176
multicultural, 186, 202, 204, 205, 207, 209,
212, 226, 274
multiculturalism
anthropological multiculturalism,
203
artistic multiculturalism, 203
codification of multiculturalism, 207
globalization of multiculturalism, 207
liberal conception of multiculturalism,
208
liberal multiculturalism, 208, 211
modern multiculturalism, 208
multiculturalism, 185, 203, 204, 205,
207, 208, 211, 274
multiculturalism ‘in action’, 204
pedagogical multiculturalism, 203
philosophical multiculturalism, 203
political discourse of multiculturalism,
207
sociological multiculturalism, 203
spirit of multiculturalism, 202
types of multiculturalism, 203
multiculturalist, 206, 208, 210
multidisciplinarity, 66
multidisciplinary, 65
multifactorial, 16, 37
multiplicity, 7, 10, 18, 32, 36, 37, 43, 56,
71, 81, 89, 106, 111, 112, 122, 124,
142, 173, 174, 175, 176, 183, 184, 193,
201, 203, 204, 216, 220, 224, 266, 268,
272, 274, 302
mundane, 106, 154, 155, 156
music, 244
mysteries, 53, 167
myth(s), 129, 131, 146, 180
mythical, 107
Namibia, 228
narrative(s), 28, 46, 104, 107, 114, 120,
140, 147, 154, 156, 161, 163, 168, 170,
176, 194, 240, 245, 256, 268, 270
narrativity, 113, 114, 266
nation state(s)/nation-state(s), 126, 127,
132, 133, 134, 214, 215, 216, 217, 225,
226, 227, 239, 277, 310n383, 328n337
nationalism
anti-nationalism, 183
conservative nationalism, 192
critique of methodological and political
nationalism, 214
critique of ‘methodological nationalism’,
328n337
environmentalist nationalism, 192
fascist nationalism, 192
feminist nationalism, 192
liberal nationalism, 192
methodological nationalism, 213
nationalism, 192, 213
postnationalism, 212
religious nationalism, 192
socialist nationalism, 192
transnationalism, 212
nationalist, 214
nationality, 221, 222, 226
Nationalstaat, 226
Natural, 40, 45, 50, 51, 52, 55, 58, 77, 162,
163, 213, 252, 264
natural law
natural law, 215
natural law theory, 215
natural law project, 215, 275
premises of natural law, 215
relationship between natural law and
social theory, 328n341
natural science(s), 52, 95, 160
natural world, 1, 37, 39, 41, 52, 62, 213,
233, 235, 258, 278
naturalization, 95
naturalness, 257
nature
nature, 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 28,
34, 38, 41, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 55,
57, 58, 59, 61, 70, 73, 77, 78, 79, 84,
91, 92, 94, 95, 102, 103, 110, 111, 119,
126, 128, 129, 130, 136, 137, 138, 148,
153, 157, 166, 171, 178, 179, 181, 187,
197, 201, 213, 218, 232, 234, 235, 236,
237, 247, 248, 250, 251, 255, 256, 257,
262, 266, 267, 268, 273, 275, 276, 279,
294n22, 312n5
second nature, 94, 107
 Index of Subjects 471

nature of the social, 5 Nicaragua, 228

necessity NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries), 124
necessity, 75, 81, 96, 114, 137, 139, 141, Nietzschean, 238
144, 145, 158, 212, 218, 239, 240, 267, Nigeria, 228
270, 271 nightmare, 176
necessity versus contingency, 4, 136 nihilism, 251, 252, 280
negation, 252, 313n18 nihilist/nihilistic, 30, 252
negative, 139, 191 nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 179,
neo- and post-Marxist, 74, 92 192, 194
neo-conservatism, 250 nineteenth century, 25, 26, 132, 213, 276,
neo-corporatist, 134 333n13
neoliberal/neoliberalism, 124, 134, 185, nomadic, 124, 131, 204
194, 195, 201, 257, 273 nomadism, 127, 266
neoliberalization, 134 non-
neo-Marxist, 294n22, 336n116 non-academic, 7, 9, 31, 33, 55, 242, 262,
neo-nationalist, 134 273
neo-statist, 134 non-ambiguity, 44
neotribalism, 251 non-anthropocentric, 312n14
neotribalization, 250, 251 nonbinding, 62
net-existence, 117 non-categorical, 180
netsex, 116 non-citizen, 215
network(s) non-citizens, 226
global network of actions and interac- noncommitment, 105, 193
tions, 277 noncommittal, 190
internet networks, 227 non-conformative, 105
network, 243 nonconformity, 105, 193
network of already existing social forms non-defensible, 280
of right, 216 non-desirable, 280
network of symbolically mediated – but, non-determinist, 160
ultimately, indeterminate – interactions, non-discriminatory, 205
243 non-discursive, 80, 81, 82, 241, 263,
networks, 10, 117 337n116
networks established between agents, 117 non-emancipatory, 249
networks of power, 117 non-Foucauldian, 295n29
networks of rights, 275 non-hierarchical, 104
networks of sociality, 186, 195 nonhuman, 37, 74, 78, 118, 160, 162,
technological networks, 117 166, 181
trans-social networks of mutual non-ideological, 252
recognition and arrangement, 183 non-interpretable, 151
ungrammatical networks of interstitial non-judgemental, 104
movements, 166 nonlinear, 163
network society(ies) nonlinearity, 138, 159, 267
global network society, 118, 125, 170, non-linguistic, 114
210, 227, 255, 277 non-logocentric, 21
postindustrial network societies, 108 non-methodical, 197
networked cybersociety, 201 non-modern, 20, 21
networkism, 127, 266 non-negotiable, 74
New Left, 74, 128 non-observable, 57
New Right, 128 non-postmodern, 190
new social movements (see movements), non-principled, 193
73, 109, 127, 129, 134, 135, 169, 176, non-proselytizing, 26, 27
177, 186, 187, 188, 272, 273 non-purposive, 166
New Zealand, 228 non-purposivist, 164
472 Index of Subjects
non- – continued
non-rational, 57, 62, 197, 198, 261, 274
non-realized, 117
non-reflexive, 241
non-sceptical, 241
non-science, 49, 56
non-scientific, 9, 49, 52, 63
non-secular, 210
non-subject, 112
nonsubjective, 173
non-systematic, 197
non-teleological, 163, 164
non-territorial, 221
non-universal, 47
non-universalist, 174
non-Western, 60
non-white, 200
norm(s), 15, 44, 94, 95, 96, 102, 120, 186,
205, 206, 207, 209, 215, 254, 272, 275
normalization, 125
normalize(d), 118
normalizing, 94, 116, 118, 234
normative, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17,
19, 29, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 53, 54, 57,
58, 61, 62, 63, 66, 68, 71, 74, 75, 77,
90, 95, 96, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110,
111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 121, 124, 139,
140, 142, 144, 147, 149, 157, 160, 161,
170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 180,
181, 183, 184, 185, 189, 190, 192, 193,
194, 196, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 207,
208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 217, 218,
219, 220, 221, 223, 227, 230, 231, 235,
236, 242, 245, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252,
254, 256, 258, 259, 261, 266, 267, 269,
272, 273, 275, 278, 280, 281
normativity/normativities, 10, 43, 60, 61,
67, 78, 80, 90, 94, 95, 96, 99, 101, 111,
117, 118, 146, 152, 181, 189, 201, 202,
252, 261
nostalgia, 17
nothingness, 142
novelty, 17, 67, 105, 131, 240
object(s)
constitution of the being of every object,
81
cultural objects, 108
descriptibility of the object, 43, 152
flowing objects, 111
object, 43, 81, 152, 180, 204, 220, 239,
337n116
object in the world, 107
object of discourse, 337n116
object of discussion, 239
object of enquiry, 32
object of knowledge, 115
object of problematization, 96
object of reflection, 220
object of study, 88, 89, 91, 98
objects, 82, 104, 111, 113, 164
objects and subjects, 101
objects of contemplative exploration, 113
objects of study, 64
reciprocal mediation between subject and
object, 203
subject and object, 159
subjects and objects, 82, 117, 263
objectivism
aesthetic objectivism, 102
objectivism, 149
opposition between objectivism and
constructivism, 259, 290n13
subjectivism versus objectivism, 140
objectivist, 47, 48, 61
objectivities/objectivity, 10, 20, 42, 44, 59,
61, 80, 95, 96, 99, 101, 111, 113, 146,
259, 261
obscurity, 189, 190
OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development), 131,
132, 309n358
old social movements/‘old’ social
movements (see movements)
oldness, 119
omnipotence, 130
omnipresence, 146, 179
ontology, 18, 51, 94, 98, 129, 130, 241,
252, 265, 266
opacity, 189, 190
opaque, 169
open-ended, 129, 190, 217
open-endedness, 183
open-mindedness, 211
openness, 78, 82, 105, 108, 109, 129, 166,
190, 263, 312n5
opportunistic/opportunistically, 122, 218,
248, 253
opportunities/opportunity, 16, 36, 59, 75,
117, 123, 139, 225
optimism, 37, 40
optimistic, 45, 58, 170, 176, 196, 236
order(s)
alphabetical order, 22
disorder, 122, 184, 312n5
disordered, 159, 162
divine or natural order of things, 95
first-order principles, 211, 253

functioning of social order, 262
hierarchical orders of power, 172–3
illusion of order, 47, 260
marching orders, 191
modern order, 142
‘need order’, 166
new world disorder, 127
new world order, 127
order, causality, and rationality, 154
order, continuity, and constraint, 312n5
‘order’, ‘rationality’, ‘consistency’, and
‘logic’, 90
orders of discourse, 249
orders of interpretation, 221
post-sovereign order, 126
power, authority, order, discipline, obedi-
ence, enclosure, and heteronomy, 17
precarious order, 81
relative order of the structure, 79
second-order principles, 253
social order, 69, 108, 144, 186, 262
social order of late capitalism, 108
structural order, 77, 79
structure and order, 122, 184
symbolic orders, 197
the established order, 100, 128
transformation of social order, 69, 186
unprecedented social order, 144
ordinary, 59, 63, 157
ordinary activities, 68, 262
ordinary actor, 59
ordinary actors, 8, 9, 37, 52, 58, 62, 64,
84, 154, 158, 178, 237, 262
ordinary and scholarly modes of telling
stories about history, 151
ordinary and scientific conceptions of
spatiotemporal developments, 163
ordinary and scientific modes of lan-
guage use, 67
ordinary discourses, 210
ordinary existence, 249
ordinary experiences, 106, 178, 273
ordinary human entity, 18
ordinary interactions, 196
ordinary knowledge, 282n30
ordinary language philosopher, 52
ordinary misrepresentations, 42
ordinary people, 51, 63, 107, 148, 154,
156, 157, 158, 186
ordinary perceptions, 56
ordinary practices, 8
ordinary social relations, 175
ordinary subject, 245
ordinary to-be-enlightened, 7
Index of Subjects 473
ordinary ways of engaging with, and
making sense of, reality, 52
organization(s), 35, 40, 51, 79, 186, 187,
188, 189, 190, 204, 224
origin(s)
cultural origins, 255
geographical origin, 23
hidden origins, 164
national origin, 10, 24
origin, 78
origins, 164, 220
social origins, 44
originality, 18, 116, 233, 279
orthodox, 73, 118, 161
orthodoxies/orthodoxy, 151, 186
Other (the Other)/‘the other’, 113, 169,
181, 182, 221, 223, 251, 257
Otherness, 181, 183, 221, 254
outlook, 67, 116
out-of-placeness, 139
outsider(s), 215, 216, 223
ownership, 43
oxymoronism, 255, 281
pace, 12
pace of life, 123
Pakistan, 228
Panama, 228
paradigm(s)
flow paradigms, 191
foundational paradigm, 92
intellectual paradigm, 30, 233
methodological paradigm(s), 66, 167, 271
modern paradigm ‘society-as-a-project’,
176, 272
paradigm, 32, 66, 109, 139, 147, 230
paradigm change, 97
paradigm communities, 60, 261
paradigm community, 60
paradigm inventors, 31
paradigm of assimilation, 206
paradigm of consumption, 238
paradigm of explanation, 48, 66, 67, 148,
149, 150, 291n33, 293n14
paradigm of integration, 206
paradigm of ‘interpretation’, 148, 150
paradigm of necessity, 139
paradigm of production, 238
paradigm of recognition, 185, 186, 273
paradigm of redistribution, 186, 273
paradigm of segregation, 206
paradigm of understanding, 48, 66, 67,
291n33, 293n14
paradigm shift, 109, 193
474 Index of Subjects
paradigm(s) – continued
paradigm structures, 147
paradigm-laden, 60, 261
paradigms, 148
paradigm-specific, 29
paradigm-surfing, 33
postmodern paradigm, 27, 272
postmodern paradigm ‘projects-in-society’,
272
utopian paradigms, 250–1
paradigmatic, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15, 20, 22, 29,
33, 34, 39, 41, 47, 48, 51, 54, 58, 64,
65, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 83, 85,
90, 92, 93, 96, 101, 107, 108, 119, 136,
148, 153, 155, 156, 168, 171, 177, 179,
181, 182, 185, 188, 191, 194, 195, 196,
197, 204, 230, 231, 232, 233, 240, 248,
258, 260, 263, 264, 265, 266, 271, 276,
277, 278, 279, 281
paradox/paradoxes, 30, 95, 105, 108, 116,
123, 134, 152, 193, 201, 241, 267, 269
paradoxical/paradoxically, 15, 16, 17, 19,
21, 35, 38, 66, 81, 83, 86, 92, 112, 115,
121, 124, 127, 128, 133, 134, 143, 195,
215, 225, 232, 255, 256, 257, 313n18
Paraguay, 228
Parochial, 169, 253
parody, 29, 104
partiality, 61, 78, 79, 81, 82, 156, 263
particularism, 140, 151, 204, 259
particularist, 47, 74, 165, 166, 181, 186,
204, 205, 273, 274
particularities/particularity
actor-specific particularities, 174
colourful landscape of countless
particularities, 178
critical exploration of particularity, 144
epistemological tension between
universality and particularity, 291n31
existence of infinite particularities, 177
existential preponderance of manifold
particularities, 260
expressions and experiences of
particularity, 46
group-specific differences and
particularities, 173, 174
historical particularity, 138, 165
infinite number of particularities, 221
language of particularity, 7
local particularities, 91
misrecognition of cultural particularities,
280
multiple particularities of events and
occurrences, 161
multiplicity of particularities, 175
particularities, 47
particularity, 45, 46, 47, 67, 74, 144, 176,
187, 260, 267, 291n31
particularity of small pictures within
society, 187
preponderance of context-specific
particularities, 55
preponderance of particularity, 46, 138
radical defence and playful celebration of
particularity, 47
recognition of cultural particularities,
178, 280
recognition of multiple particularities, 47
recognition of particularity, 45, 260
relational force of social particularities,
260
representational preponderance of
particularity over universality in highly
differentiated societies, 46
repression of particularity, 46
sociocultural particularity, 9
spatiotemporally constituted
particularities, 183
transcendence of particularity, 260
universality and particularity, 46, 237,
259, 291n31
universality versus particularity, 2, 40, 45,
47, 48, 138, 159, 165, 181, 259
particularization, 144
particularized, 182
passionate, 195
passions, 195, 208
pathological, 60, 86, 118, 139, 183, 234,
236, 248
pathologies
social pathologies, 236, 257, 281
patriotism, 213
peace, 177, 187, 215
perceive/perceiving, 50, 56, 264
perception(s)
aesthetic perceptions, 101, 102
appreciation and perception, 101
common-sense perceptions, 58, 259
everyday perception of worldly
actualities, 52
everyday perceptions of reality, 51
horizon of perception and interaction, 43
ideologically driven perception, 263
ordinary people’s perceptions of themselves
and of their environment, 154
ordinary perceptions, 56
perception, 43, 78, 95
perception of reality, 70, 123

perceptions, 95, 234
standards of perception and appreciation,
107
time-pressured perception of reality, 123
perceptive, 58, 103, 162
perfection, 78, 105, 275
performance(s), 64, 113, 118, 243, 253
performative contradiction(s), 234, 255,
256, 257, 281, 333n7
performative turn (‘performative turn’), 34
performativist, 165
performativity, 96
permanency, 105
personal, 36, 45, 54, 80, 101, 103, 105, 106,
114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123,
156, 157, 182, 184, 199, 222, 245, 253
personalities/personality, 15, 112, 114, 122,
198
personalize(d), 193
perspectival, 40, 42, 54, 55, 58, 136, 147,
151, 259, 270
perspective
perspective, 13, 19, 20, 33, 40, 41, 43, 50,
51, 52, 64, 69, 70, 74, 77, 79, 84, 90,
111, 157, 159, 166, 173, 180, 181, 188,
210, 230, 237, 252
perspective-changing, 66
perspective-laden, 43, 78, 82, 102, 147,
263, 270
perspective-ladenness, 78
perspectives, 41, 47, 57, 93, 102, 129,
174, 185, 257, 268
perspective-taking, 221, 223
truth versus perspective, 2, 40, 47, 48,
259
perspectivism, 151
perspectivist
multiperspectivist, 184
perspectivist, 211, 238
persuasiveness, 231
Peru, 228
phenomenological/phenomenologically,
17, 48, 66, 114, 164, 252
phenomenology, 158, 189
Philippines, 228
philosophical, 15, 16, 21, 29, 30, 31, 35,
37, 38, 46, 47, 60, 84, 99, 100, 101,
102, 103, 121, 136, 138, 140, 142, 184,
186, 199, 203, 238, 246, 251, 252, 255,
268, 274, 285
philosophies/philosophy
epistemology and philosophy, 287n150
history of philosophy, 46
philosophies of history, 152
Index of Subjects 475
philosophy, 30, 31, 48, 49, 94, 105, 151,
160, 197, 200, 203, 245, 265, 287, 311
philosophy of history, 151, 159, 160
philosophy of science, 49
philosophy of the atomic age, 311
philosophy of the social sciences, 48
postmodern philosophy, 37, 241
postmodernist philosophy, 245, 247
western philosophy, 76, 237
physics, 50, 51
playful, 47, 80, 104, 105, 106, 108, 121,
143, 193, 196, 196, 211, 223, 247, 249,
252, 268, 274
playfulness, 36, 104, 190, 194, 195, 265
pleasure(s)
aesthetic pleasure, 106
local pleasures, 7
pleasure-seeking, 121
pluralism
cultural pluralism, 121, 220
decentralized pluralism, 193
discursive pluralism, 56
irreducible pluralism, 111
liberal pluralism, 208
logic of pluralism, 121
multidisciplinarity and pluralism, 66
non-hierarchical pluralism, 104
pluralism, 106, 122, 150, 195
pluralism and heterogeneity, 121
pluralism in meaning and style, 106
the self and pluralism, 305n288
value-pluralism, 203
Wertepluralismus, 325n222
pluralist/pluralistic, 10, 14, 106, 124, 177,
208, 211, 223
plurality, 46, 47, 104, 106, 111, 112, 113,
122, 138, 142, 165, 168, 173, 174, 176,
177, 181, 183, 186
pluralization, 144, 181, 220, 228, 276
poetry, 20, 285n106
policies/policy
administrative policies, 226
discriminatory policies, 214
diversity policies, 208
free market policies, 185
governmental policies, 130
inclusivist policies, 185
Keynesian policies, 226
managerial and corporate policies, 201
monetarist policies, 128, 226
neoliberal policies, 124, 201
policies, 206, 207, 226
policies of assimilation, 207
policies of integration, 207
476 Index of Subjects
policies/policy – continued
policies of liberalization and privatization,
128, 226
policies of segregation, 207
policies of separation, exclusion, and
discrimination, 206
policy, 32
policy sociology, 7
postmodern housing policy, 32
social policy, 85
Polish, 24
political
anti-political, 256, 340n200
apolitical, 196
large-scale political transformation, 108
moral and political nihilism, 142
‘the personal is political’, 182, 199
political, 11, 14, 16, 18, 35, 38, 39, 47,
56, 60, 77, 97, 100, 101, 127, 129, 133,
139, 142, 153, 155, 159, 160, 162, 174,
197, 199, 203, 207, 216, 221, 222, 233,
246, 257, 266, 267, 272
the political, 14, 35, 47, 73, 75, 109, 110,
124, 128, 133, 134, 169, 177, 180, 190,
196, 199, 207, 219, 224, 249, 250, 276,
279
political action, 199, 201, 257
political activity and resistance, 169
political actors, 50
political agendas, 4, 175, 213, 220, 273
political analysis, 3, 4, 23, 76, 86, 159,
165, 185, 198, 276
political and cultural disappointment,
189
political and cultural projects, 177
political and social theory, 109
political and symbolic power, 47
political arrangements, 190, 221
political associations, 216
political autonomy, 172, 272
political battlefield, 201, 251, 254, 280
political blueprints, 240
political challenges, 285n86
political commitments, 252, 257, 280
political communities, 172, 209
political community, 215, 217, 220, 224,
226, 277
political conditions, 215
political conflict, 182
political controversy, 335n50
political convictions, 211
political crisis, 338
political culture, 110
political delegitimization, 75
political developments, 209
political differentialism, 272
political discourse, 207
political diversity, 32
political economy, 28, 97
political economy of culture, 97
political economy of the sign, 28
political egalitarianism, 272
political elites, 178
political empowerment, 75, 177
political entities, 218
political events, 169
political fixation, 199
political ideologies, 14, 35, 73, 74, 176,
179, 187, 192, 194, 240, 272, 322n124
political ideology, 14, 15, 36, 179, 193
political implications, 196, 249
political involvement, 75
‘the political is emotional’, 199
political issues, 268
political landscape, 177
political left, 73
political legitimacy, 74
political level, 14, 35, 127, 276
political liberalism, 35, 124, 127, 195,
266
political marketplace, 218
political membership, 226
political metanarratives, 140
political multiculturalism, 325
political nationalism, 214, 218
political neutralization, 196, 249
political normativities, 189
political organization, 187, 188, 328n337
political participation, 212, 216
political parties, 239
political players, 133, 188
political plurality, 46
political power, 15, 198
political practice, 195
political preoccupation, 47
political pressure, 134
political problems, 76
political programmes, 14
political project, 124, 194, 195, 249
political questionability of all
meta-ideological formations, 4, 35
political reformism, 74
political regimes, 15, 45
political regulation, 224, 276
political re-problematization, 196
political research, 65
political revolutions, 100
political rights, 217

political science, 31, 51, 52
political scientists, 49
political significance, 79
political sociologists, 101
political sociology, 96, 99
political sovereignty, 133
political spectrum, 128
political standards, 250
political states, 226
political story, 141
political strategies, 128
political struggles, 183
political subject, 16
political system, 75
political theory, 30, 197, 198, 212, 213,
224, 267, 275
political thought, 16, 18, 197, 219, 233,
267, 335n51
political totalitarianism, 139, 268
political traditions, 192
political tribalism, 215, 275
political turn, 285n107
political universalism, 275
political utopianism, 240
political versions of large-scale
ideological projects, 104
postpolitical, 109
pre-political, 221
pro-political, 109
reconceptualization of the political, 109,
199
social and political analysis, 3, 4, 23, 86,
159, 165, 185, 276
social and political debates, 65
sociopolitical cynicism, 219, 275
sociopolitical transformations, 83, 84
politicization
depoliticization, 109, 196, 250
politicization, 108, 196, 273
repoliticization, 109, 196, 220, 221, 276
politics
a move away from politics, 110
a turn away from politics, 109
anti-political politics, 256
autonomism of postmodern politics, 177
autonomous turn in politics, 1, 29, 180,
231, 258, 278
contemporary approaches to politics,
171, 229, 277
contemporary conceptions of politics, 4,
271
cosmopolitan politics, 212, 221
critical approaches to politics, 4, 271
cultural politics, 206, 207
Index of Subjects 477
culturalist conception of politics, 109
depoliticization of politics, 109
diaspora of politics, 109
differentialist models of politics, 173, 272
differentialist politics, 251
discrepancy between modern and
postmodern politics, 4, 46, 180, 272
emancipatory politics, 181, 251
empowering politics, 181, 189, 272
empowering potential of politics, 171
ethnocentric understandings of politics,
204
from modern to postmodern politics,
171–229
grassroots politics, 220
hegemonic memory of politics, 183
institutionalism of traditional politics,
176
interest politics, 187
legal-constitutional politics, 170
liberal politics, 194
mainstream politics, 187, 251
modern politics of society-as-a-project,
176
multicultural politics, 186, 205, 274
multiculturalist politics, 210
multiperspectivist politics, 184
nature and purpose of politics, 171, 179
nature of politics, 181, 273
neoliberal politics, 194
neotribalization of politics, 250, 251
new politics, 180
non-territorial politics, 221
politics, 1, 4, 39, 97, 108, 171, 173, 175,
176, 178, 179, 180, 195, 198, 199, 200,
214, 232, 239, 240, 251, 266, 272
politics and political theory, 30
politics of culture, 204
politics of difference, 4, 109, 110, 171,
172, 180, 182, 183, 184, 272, 318n4
politics of disillusionment, 219
politics of identity, 4, 171, 172, 180, 182,
193, 272
politics of identity, difference, and
recognition, 173, 183, 199, 272
politics of mapping, 184
politics of ‘particularized universalism’,
182
politics of postmodernism, 189
politics of questions, 190, 273
politics of recognition, 4, 171, 172, 180,
182, 272
politics of solutions, 190, 273
politics of the powerful
478 Index of Subjects

politics – continued popular

politics of the powerless, 199, 201, 274
politics organized around unions, political
parties, and interest groups, 239
politics oriented towards human
empowerment, 172
politics oriented towards the realization
of emancipatory potential, 175
politics oriented towards the realization
of human autonomy, 178
politics without guarantees, 190
postmodern conceptions of politics, 171,
175, 178, 179, 185, 186, 192, 198, 240
postmodern politics, 4, 28, 46, 172, 175,
176, 177, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 189,
190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 201,
202, 221, 251, 272, 273
postmodern politics of projects-in-society,
176
postutopian politics, 190
pretentious determinacy of modern
politics, 180
projects-in-society politics, 272
radical politics, 196, 249
radicalization and repoliticization of
politics, 109
role of politics, 108
social-democratic politics, 186
society-as-a-project politics, 272
symbolic politics of transgression, 104
traditional and post-traditional
conceptions of politics, 4, 273
traditional modern politics, 177
traditional politics, 171, 176, 272
transition from the politics of solutions
to the politics of questions, 273
transnational politics, 207, 220
universalist politics, 251
visionary politics, 281
polities/polity, 14, 15, 88, 244, 277
polycentric/polycentrically, 35, 46, 72, 91,
101, 107, 118, 156, 160, 248, 262, 265,
271
polycentricity, 81, 190
polycentrist, 164
poly-individuality, 119
polymorphous, 36, 71, 263
polytemporal, 157
poor, 79, 185, 310n369
Popperian, 56
popular
‘elitist’ and ‘popular’ cultural
configurations, 196
mass/popular culture, 106
popular culture, 106
popular discourses, 207
popular history, 155
popular rhetoric, 133
unpopular, 21, 92
popularity, 3, 191, 267
population, 128, 135, 150, 207, 224,
310n371
porousness, 7
Portugal, 228
Portuguese, 228
positional/positionally, 71, 204, 243, 263
positionality, 61, 261
positive, 79, 104, 128, 191, 213, 221, 254,
275
positivism
early positivism, 48
logical positivism, 49
positivism, 48, 49, 160
standard positivism, 49
positivist/positivistic, 2, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62,
63, 66, 68, 72, 79, 95, 166, 244, 259,
260, 262, 292n34
possibilities/possibility, 7, 10, 45, 110, 111,
122, 123, 174, 178, 184, 201, 203, 206,
207, 210, 212, 222
postanthropocentric, 194
postclassical, 4, 85, 86, 269
postcolonial, 60, 194, 204, 220
postcolonialism, 18
postcommunism, 18
postcommunist, 194
post-Durkheimian, 36
post-Fordism, 18, 119, 125, 127, 257, 266
post-foundationalism, 18
posthistorical, 169
post-historical, 169
posthumanism, 18
postindustrial
postindustrial
postindustrial age, 86, 297
postindustrial capitalism, 34
postindustrial consumerism, 90, 264
postindustrial countries, 120
postindustrial era, 87
postindustrial identities, 108
postindustrial modes of economic
activity, 34
postindustrial network societies, 108
postindustrial realities, 85
postindustrial relations, 189
postindustrial revolution, 124

postindustrial sector, 86, 87
postindustrial societies, 120, 177, 188
postindustrial society, 85, 124
postindustrial world, 264
postindustrialism
industrialism versus postindustrialism, 3,
84, 92, 93, 264
postindustrialism, 18, 34, 85, 86, 87, 90,
108, 119, 124, 127, 264, 266
postization, 18, 89, 91
post-Keynesianism, 18
post-Marxism, 18
postmaterialism, 18, 121
postmaterialist
postmaterialist, 120
postmaterialist conceptions of society, 3,
265
postmaterialist priorities, 188
postmaterialist sociological agendas, 3,
265
postmaterialist sociology, 93
postmaterialist values, 120
postmaterialistic, 192
postmaterialists, 120
postmodern, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12,
13, 18–22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42,
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59,
60, 62, 64, 66, 70, 83–135, 137, 142,
143, 145, 148, 158, 166, 167, 171, 175,
177, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186, 189, 190,
192, 193, 196, 198, 202, 210, 221, 230,
232, 236, 240, 241, 246, 247, 249, 251,
253, 256, 258, 262, 264, 265, 267, 271,
276, 278, 283n53, 285n105, 287n151,
287n154, 292n34, 297n10, 312n14,
313n18, 323n170
anti-postmodern, 230
both the cosmopolitan and the
postmodern imagination, 220, 221,
222, 223, 276
concept of ‘the postmodern’, 1, 18, 19,
21
concept of mapping in postmodern and
poststructuralist thought, 305 n293
conceptual indeterminacy of postmodern
thought, 22
continuities between modern and
postmodern ways of theorizing, 279
‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘postmodern, 229, 277
critical reflections on postmodern
thought, 4, 277–81
criticism levelled against postmodern
thought, 22
Index of Subjects 479
debates on the nature of the postmodern
in the social sciences, 20
definition of postmodern thought, 22,
231, 278
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of history,
136, 138, 158
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of knowledge,
2, 40, 46, 47, 259
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of politics,
171, 179
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of social
research, 65, 72, 262
differences between modern and
postmodern conceptions of sociology,
3, 84, 92, 93, 264
differences between modern and
postmodern forms of social analysis, 6
discrepancy between modern and
postmodern conceptions of the
present, 143
discrepancy between modern and
postmodern politics, 4, 46, 180, 272
distinction between ‘modern’ and
‘postmodern’ notions of politics, 180
divergence between modern and
postmodern conceptions of historical
development, 145
divergence between modern and
postmodern conceptions of meaningful
action coordination, 180
etymological development of the term
‘postmodern’, 19–20
‘founding figures’ or ‘reference figures’ of
the postmodern project, 24
French representatives of postmodern
forms of analysis, 26
gap between modern and postmodern
approaches to knowledge, 48
gap between modern and postmodern
conceptions of knowledge, 2, 40, 46,
47, 259
idea of ‘the postmodern’, 21
impact of postmodern ideas on the
contemporary social sciences, 232
impact of postmodern thought on
historiography, 311n1
impact of postmodern thought on social
research methods, 64, 72, 293n1
interpenetration of modern and post-
modern historical dimensions, 313n18
480 Index of Subjects
postmodern – continued
key characteristics of postmodern
approaches, 22
late modern or postmodern, 25, 31, 70,
84
modern and postmodern conceptions of
‘time’, 283n53
modern-versus-postmodern debate, 89
opposition between modern realism and
postmodern scepticism, 273
‘postmodern’ conceptions of participation,
177
postmodern ‘cult of orchestrated
meritocracy’, 114
postmodern ‘cult of the fragmented
individual’, 36
postmodern ‘ethics of aesthetics’, 250
postmodern ‘incredulity towards
metanarratives’, 46, 255, 260, 291n23
‘postmodern’ politics, 189
postmodern ‘politics of questions’, 190,
273
‘postmodern’ project, 1
postmodern ‘subversion of narrative’, 104
postmodern account of the development
of human society, 172
postmodern accounts, 87, 114, 136, 137,
138, 145, 150, 167, 236
postmodern accounts of history, 136,
137, 138, 145, 150, 167
postmodern accounts of the self, 114
postmodern actor(s), 36, 112, 193, 235,
273
postmodern advocates and
sympathizers, 31
postmodern aestheticization of everyday
life, 106, 197, 249, 250
postmodern aesthetics, 104, 105, 106,
108
postmodern age, 34, 86, 88, 89
postmodern agenda, 41, 142, 168, 240,
250
postmodern agents provocateurs, 237
postmodern aim of ‘destabilizing
boundaries between high and low
culture’, 106
postmodern algebra, 32
postmodern analysis, 166, 169, 240, 245
postmodern analytical framework, 244
postmodern anarchism, 30
postmodern and poststructuralist
critiques of ‘logocentrism’, 333n1
postmodern angle, 43, 58, 91, 143, 268
postmodern announcement, 83, 88, 92
postmodern announcements regarding
the possible implosion of ‘the social’,
83, 92
postmodern answer, 59
postmodern anti-universalism, 47
postmodern approaches, 2, 3, 4, 22, 29,
30, 47, 48, 83, 88, 103, 105, 106, 115,
117, 136, 137, 138, 140, 145, 146, 147,
148, 151, 152, 153, 158, 166, 167, 172,
173, 175, 176, 178, 180, 181, 184, 210,
230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 240, 244,
247, 251, 258, 259, 269, 270, 271, 272,
273, 278, 279, 292n34, 312n14
postmodern approaches associated with
the ‘cultural turn’, 93, 103, 265
postmodern approaches in the social
sciences, 2, 4, 29, 30, 136, 137, 230,
231, 232, 233, 259, 278, 279
postmodern approaches to ‘the social’,
244
postmodern approaches to aesthetics, 105
postmodern approaches to both the
small-scale and the large-scale
organization of social life, 172
postmodern approaches to history, 140,
145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 158,
167, 267, 269, 270, 271
postmodern approaches to knowledge,
47, 48
postmodern approaches to politics, 175,
176, 178, 180, 181, 184, 210, 240, 251,
272, 273
postmodern approaches to self-realization,
106
postmodern approaches to social research
methods, 2
postmodern approaches to the self, 115
postmodern approaches to the study of
social developments, 3
postmodern architecture, 196
postmodern arguments and themes, 231
postmodern as incredulity towards
metanarratives, 46
postmodern assemblages, 91
postmodern attack on linguistic
essentialism, 67
postmodern attack on the distinction
between ‘high art’ and ‘low art’ (and
‘high culture’ and ‘low culture’),
300n131, 323n170
postmodern attack on traditional ways of
‘theorizing’ in sociology, 84
postmodern attentiveness to, and playful
celebration of, small stories, 143

postmodern belief in boundless
opportunities, 123
postmodern Bible, 32
postmodern brain, 32
postmodern celebration of aestheticized
plurality, 106
postmodern celebration of difference,
251
postmodern celebration of playfulness,
eclecticism, and relativism, 195
postmodern certainty, 43, 45, 47, 259
postmodern citizenship, 221
postmodern commentators, 89, 246
postmodern commitment, 8, 46, 137,
196
postmodern commitment to political
plurality, cultural heterogeneity, and
interactional complexity, 46
postmodern commitment to the radical
democratization of the production,
distribution, and consumption of
aesthetic forms, 196
postmodern conceptions of aesthetics,
103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108
postmodern conceptions of art, in par-
ticular, and of culture, in general, 197
postmodern conceptions of autonomy,
175
postmodern conceptions of history, 136,
138, 158, 159, 165
postmodern conceptions of knowledge,
2, 40, 46, 47, 48, 259
postmodern conceptions of ‘mapping’,
320n59
postmodern conceptions of politics, 171,
175, 178, 179, 185, 186, 192, 198, 240
postmodern conceptions of
self-government, 272
postmodern conceptions of sociology, 3,
84, 92, 93, 264
postmodern conceptions of subjectivity,
110
postmodern conceptual hybridity, 265
postmodern concern with ‘contingency’,
139
postmodern concern with deconstruction,
168
postmodern concern with the challenge
of existential contingency, 190
postmodern condition, 34, 35, 37, 38,
86, 88, 119, 139, 142, 144, 179, 185,
191, 193, 194, 268, 269, 273, 285n86,
297n10, 312n5, 313n18
postmodern conservatism, 30
Index of Subjects 481
postmodern consumer, 108, 111, 121
postmodern consumerism, 121
postmodern contention that we have
entered a ‘postideological age’, 255
postmodern context, 87, 111, 189, 191
postmodern cosmopolitanism, 30
postmodern critical perspective, 201
postmodern critics, 61, 234
postmodern critics of modernity, 234
postmodern critique of classical social
theory, 12
postmodern critique of modernity, 237
postmodern critique of the modern era,
279
postmodern critiques, 241
postmodern cultural critic, 105
postmodern culture, 105, 106, 108, 120,
249
postmodern cynicism, 30
postmodern debates, 177
postmodern defence of playfulness and
ambivalence, 190
postmodern determinacy, 268
postmodern development, 107
postmodern discipline, 83
postmodern discourse(s), 86, 257
postmodern emphasis on contextual
contingency, 136
postmodern emphasis on spatiotemporal
contingency, 4, 145
postmodern endeavour, 28, 46, 83, 106,
178, 242, 258
postmodern engagement, 85, 104, 181,
222
postmodern engagement with ‘the other’,
181
postmodern engagement with aesthetics,
104
postmodern engagement with, and
enthusiastic celebration of, multiple
expressions of social alterity, 222
postmodern epistemological agendas, 42
postmodern epistemological sensibilities,
47
postmodern epistemology(ies), 28, 40–63,
48
postmodern era, 35, 37, 88, 91, 123, 178,
193, 194, 264, 266
postmodern ethics, 182
postmodern exploration of aesthetic
realities, 105
postmodern explorations, 41
postmodern eye, 8, 105, 113
postmodern fascism, 30
482 Index of Subjects
postmodern – continued
postmodern feminism, 30
postmodern finance, 32
postmodern focus on symbolic and
cultural relations, 90
postmodern formations, 119
postmodern forms of analysis, 26, 83, 92,
233, 267
postmodern forms of architecture, 104
postmodern forms of being, 33
postmodern forms of engaging with the
world, 230
postmodern forms of relating to and
making sense of the world, 258
postmodern forms of social analysis, 6,
143
postmodern Freudianism, 30
postmodern future, 144
postmodern globalism, 30
postmodern guerrilla, 175
postmodern historians, 147, 148, 153,
164, 166
postmodern historical formations, 35
postmodern historiographies, 28
postmodern historiography, 136–70, 271,
311n–318n
postmodern housing policy, 32
postmodern hyper-individualism, 120
postmodern identities, 36
postmodern imaginary, 170, 271
postmodern imagination, 220, 221, 222,
223, 250, 276
postmodern impulse, 240
postmodern individualism, 119
postmodern individuals, 36, 119
the postmodern inside, 230
postmodern intellectual thought, 158–9
postmodern interest in the representational
and cultural dimensions of social life,
247
postmodern interpretations of history,
143, 268
postmodern irony, 280
postmodern jungle, 10, 32, 122
postmodern jungle of flows, networks,
and diversified local events, 10
postmodern jungle of plurality, 122
postmodern landscape, 104, 178
postmodern language games, 231
postmodern liberalism, 30
postmodern library, 32
postmodern life, 88
postmodern logic of market principles,
97
postmodern maps, 184
postmodern Marx, or Durkheim, or
Simmel, or Parsons, or feminism, 32
postmodern Marxism, 30
postmodern meditations, 247
postmodern menu, 176
postmodern metacartography, 184
postmodern metanarrative, 142
postmodern methodologies
postmodern methodology(ies), 28, 64–82,
238, 293
postmodern micronarratives, 142
postmodern mind, 9, 47, 57
postmodern modernity, 143
postmodern moralism, 30
postmodern motto, 87, 92, 108, 264
postmodern motto ‘I shop, therefore I
am’, 108
postmodern neoliberalism, 195
postmodern nihilism, 30
postmodern openness towards differenti-
ating processes, 144
postmodern opposition to metanarra-
tives, 256
postmodern oxygen, 144
postmodern paradigm, 27, 272
postmodern parameters, 34, 43, 46, 56,
138, 144, 145, 146, 159, 160, 161, 163,
165, 172, 196, 259, 260, 267, 273
postmodern perspective, 44, 47, 56, 62,
63, 71, 83, 91, 110, 137, 138, 139, 142,
176, 178, 185, 190, 233, 264, 265, 266,
267, 268, 272, 294n23
postmodern philosophers, 60
postmodern philosophy, 37, 241
postmodern picture of a human world
characterized by radical indeterminacy,
264
postmodern point of view, 40, 41, 43, 47,
90, 253, 259
postmodern political agendas, 175, 213
postmodern politics, 4, 28, 46, 172, 175,
176, 177, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 189,
190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 201,
202, 213, 251, 257, 272, 273
postmodern politics of projects-in-society,
176
postmodern postmodernists, 25
postmodern programme of anti-
universalism, 256
postmodern readiness, 48
postmodern realities, 36, 85, 264
postmodern rejection of the modern
alignment towards universality, 46

postmodern relativists, 254
postmodern scepticism, 90, 108, 273
postmodern scepticism towards the
development of macrotheoretical
approaches in the social sciences, 90
postmodern scepticism towards the
Marxist distinction between ‘base’ and
‘superstructure’, 90
postmodern scholars, 164, 199, 235, 238,
247, 259, 268
‘postmodern’ search for the autonomy
from power, 177
postmodern self, 113, 114, 116, 122, 198
postmodern selves, 116, 120, 122, 123
postmodern sensibility towards
incommensurability, 144
postmodern set of norms, 272
postmodern settings, 106
postmodern simulation, 88
postmodern social and philosophical
thought, 21
postmodern social democracy, 30
postmodern social theory, 6–11, 88, 89,
237, 242, 248, 282n9
postmodern societies, 34, 35, 38, 86, 87,
88, 106, 193, 194
postmodern society, 27, 36, 87, 91, 107,
123, 188, 313n18
postmodern sociologies, 28, 91
postmodern sociologists, 90, 91, 92, 93,
247, 265
postmodern sociology, 3, 83, 85, 89, 90,
91, 92, 167, 238, 296n–311n
postmodern spirit, 8, 28, 30, 31, 142,
196, 201
postmodern stance, 139, 147
postmodern standpoint, 13, 105, 139, 146
postmodern state of knowledge, 153
postmodern studies, 70
postmodern study of human existence,
66
postmodern subjectivity, 116
postmodern suspicion towards societal
projects, 177
postmodern tendency not only to
recognize but also to celebrate – if not, to
fetishize – the normative significance of
cultural identities, 254
postmodern tendency to ‘regard
everything as a text’, 151
postmodern textual historiography, 167
postmodern textual methodologies, 238
postmodern theories of actor–network
relations, 28
Index of Subjects 483
postmodern theories of deconstruction,
29
postmodern theories of desire, 29
postmodern theories of gendered
performance, 29
postmodern theories of hyperreality, 29
postmodern theories of knowledge, 48,
55
postmodern theories of literature, 29
postmodern theories of parody, 29
postmodern theories of power, 29
postmodern theories of space, 29
postmodern theories of the economy, 29
postmodern theories of the media, 29
postmodern theories of the self, 29
postmodern theorists, 60, 62, 92, 145,
201, 259
postmodern theory, 146, 184
postmodern theory of historiography,
146
postmodern thinkers, 30, 31, 42, 43, 69,
71, 91, 136, 140, 223, 234, 238, 243,
251, 256, 265, 267, 272
postmodern thinking, 231
postmodern thought, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 55, 64, 65,
68, 70, 71, 72, 75, 83, 89, 90, 106, 107,
111, 128, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 145,
151, 169, 170, 171, 172, 178, 179, 180,
184, 189, 195, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234,
235, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 248, 249,
250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258,
259, 260, 262, 263, 265, 267, 268, 271,
277, 278, 279, 287n150, 293n1, 297n3,
311n1, 319n18
postmodern tradition, 23
postmodern tradition of thought, 23
postmodern truth, 47
postmodern turn (‘postmodern turn’),
1, 5, 6, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
31, 33, 34, 39, 195, 196, 230, 231, 232,
233, 240, 244, 246, 250, 253, 258, 266,
277, 278
‘postmodern’ understandings of politics,
180
postmodern universality, 47
postmodern universe, 10, 37, 56, 71, 91,
112, 120, 199, 254
postmodern vacuum, 142
postmodern valorization of difference,
heterogeneity, ambiguity and plurality,
106, 112
postmodern values, 46, 193
484 Index of Subjects
postmodern – continued
postmodern venture, 5, 231
postmodern view, 84, 147
postmodern view of historiography, 147
postmodern vocabularies, 191
postmodern Weberianism, 30
postmodern world, 57, 86, 88, 90, 113,
119, 120, 169, 177, 178, 256, 257, 264,
268
postmodern world of hyperreality, 88
postmodern world of multiple
‘short-terms’, 119
postmodern writings, 242, 243
postmodern Zeitgeist, 176
post-postmodern, 33
publications with postmodern/postmod-
ernism/postmodernity in their title, 32
shift from modern to postmodern forms
of analysis, 83, 92
shortcoming and flaws of postmodern
approaches, 4, 231, 278
tension between modern and postmodern
interpretations of history, 143
validity of postmodern thought, 5, 278
post-modern, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12,
13, 18–22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42,
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59,
60, 62, 64
post-modern condition, 257
post-modern theory, 21
postmodernism, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 18, 20, 21,
22, 28, 30, 32, 33, 39, 86, 107, 115,
151, 170, 183, 189, 195, 196, 211,
212–19, 221, 222, 223, 225, 237, 243,
245, 250, 254, 256, 257, 263, 274, 276,
278, 286n124
advocates of postmodernism, 21
banner of postmodernism, 115
commonalities between postmodernism
and other approaches, 189
confluence of postmodernism and
cosmopolitanism, 220
cosmopolitanism and postmodernism, 4,
219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 276
cosmopolitanism as a product of
postmodernism, 220
cosmopolitanism with and through
postmodernism, 219–23
cosmopolitanism without and beyond
postmodernism, 212–19
critics of postmodernism, 263
definition of postmodernism, 20
emergence of postmodernism, 86
influence of postmodernism on
contemporary debates and
controversies in sociological analysis, 3
irony and postmodernism, 223
liberalism and postmodernism, 195
marrying postmodernism with other
‘-isms’, 30
neoliberalism and postmodernism, 195
new postmodernism, 108
obsession with postmodernism, 33
politics of postmodernism, 189
post mortem to postmodernism, 33
postmodernism, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 18, 20, 21,
22, 28, 30, 32, 33, 39, 86, 107, 108,
115, 151, 170, 183, 189, 195, 196, 211,
212, 219–23, 224, 225, 237, 243, 245,
249, 250, 254, 256, 257, 263, 274, 276,
278, 286n124, 313n18
postmodernism and cosmopolitanism,
220, 223
postmodernism and critical theory, 22,
286n124
postmodernism and feminism, 22,
286n125
postmodernism and Marxism, 22,
286n126
postmodernism and other intellectual
traditions, 22
publications with postmodern/postmod-
ernism/postmodernity in their title, 32
relevance of postmodernism to
contemporary debates and controversies
in sociological analysis, 263
rise of postmodernism, 28
roots of postmodernism, 250
sociogenesis of postmodernism, 32
spectre of postmodernism, 32, 33, 170
post-modernism, 86, 88, 313n18
postmodernist [noun]
a ‘postmodernist’, 9, 20, 21, 22–31, 42,
56, 58, 84, 120, 147, 151, 156, 166,
182, 184, 190, 194, 245, 247, 252, 253,
254, 255, 256, 257, 267, 268, 279,
301n140
postmodernist [adjective]
postmodernist critics of science, 255
‘postmodernist’ discourse, 190
postmodernist intellectuals, 245
postmodernist philosophy, 245, 247
postmodernist relativism, 253
postmodernist sensibility, 42
postmodernist skepticism, 151
postmodernist terms, 194
postmodernist thought, 182

postmodernity, 2, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 32,
33, 34–8, 39, 86, 91, 103, 104, 108,
112, 113, 115, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123,
139, 142, 143, 144, 145, 170, 172, 173,
176, 177, 178, 179, 181, 190, 191, 192,
195, 198, 212, 233, 235, 239, 240, 241,
249, 265, 266, 268, 269, 272, 273, 274,
286n122, 289n176
advent of postmodernity, 26, 241
aesthetic experience of modernity and
postmodernity, 103
age of postmodernity, 37, 143, 268
centre of postmodernity, 178
centreless context of postmodernity, 179
concept of postmodernity, 108, 311n5
condition of postmodernity, 36, 91, 142,
144, 173, 176, 179, 181, 192, 212, 274
context of postmodernity, 35, 37, 91,
113, 179, 235, 272
derationalized world of postmodernity, 35
dialectics of postmodernity, 38
epochal transition to postmodernity, 19
era of postmodernity, 32, 142, 191, 220
historical formation of postmodernity, 143
historical phase of postmodernity, 39
historical stage of postmodernity, 269
history of postmodernity, 120
horizon of postmodernity, 178, 273
jungle world of postmodernity, 119
key dimensions of ‘postmodernity’, 2
literature on ‘late modernity’, ‘second
modernity’, and ‘postmodernity’,
306n301
microactors of postmodernity, 178
modern postmodernity, 143
modernity and postmodernity, 103, 143,
144, 145, 239, 240, 269
modernity/postmodernity controversy, 241
multidimensional constitution of post-
modernity, 289n176
neoliberal postmodernity, 195
non-modern description of postmoder-
nity, 20
paradoxes of postmodernity, 269
postmodernity and globalization, 123, 266
postmodernity and the political, 198
postmodernity for itself, 139
postmodernity in itself, 139, 144, 269
principal characteristics of postmodernity,
34
rise of postmodernity, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
spirit of postmodernity, 104, 181
structural circumstances of postmodernity,
86
Index of Subjects 485
transcendence of postmodernity, 233
transcendent power of postmodernity, 19
transformative potential of postmodernity,
265
postmodernization
cultural postmodernization, 86
postmodernization of methodology, 68
potential ‘postmodernization’ of the
social sciences, 232
shock of postmodernization, 311n5
post-national, 222
postnationalism, 212
post-nationality, 226
post-nationalization, 228
postpositivism, 55–63
postpositivist, 2, 166, 260
post-postmodern, 33
postproletarian, 85, 264
postrationalism, 18
post-Saussurean, 77, 99
postsecular, 18, 34, 194, 289n174
postsecular turn (‘postsecular turn’), 34,
289n174
postsecularism, 18
postsocialism, 18
poststructuralism, 18, 263
poststructuralist(s), 3, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78,
79, 80, 82, 99, 111, 200, 263, 295n30,
305n293, 333n1
post-teleological, 194
post-traditional, 4, 92, 120, 121, 184, 236,
237, 273
post-transcendentalism, 18
postutopian, 177, 185, 190, 194, 250, 251,
280
postutopian climate, 190
postutopian deideologization, 250
postutopian era, 251, 280
postutopian interpretation of history, 251
postutopian orientation, 177
postutopian politics, 190
postutopian situation of contemporary
society, 251
postutopian spirit, 185
postutopian world, 250
postutopianism, 18
post-War era, 26
post-Westphalian, 224
potential, 12, 13, 16, 50, 52, 58, 75, 79,
89, 94, 104, 119, 134, 141, 146, 159,
165, 171, 172, 175, 180, 188, 191, 201,
210, 218, 219, 222, 229, 232, 234, 235,
236, 246, 251, 260, 265, 269, 279, 280,
313n18
486 Index of Subjects
potentiality, 141, 184
poverty, 257
power
all-empowering, 74
arbitrary power, 62
autonomy from power, 177
centre of power, 156
concentration of power, 310n371
concept of power, 319n18
conceptualizing power of linguistic
reflection, 80
constraining power of social structures,
institutions, norms, and expectations,
15
context-laden power of perspective, 43
creative power, 179
disciplinary power, 27
disempowered, 134, 155, 156, 174, 182,
185, 190, 199, 254
disempowering, 17, 75, 113, 116, 119,
135, 191, 208, 236, 251, 267, 279
disempowerment, 122, 135, 201, 227,
235, 257
distribution of power, 199
economic power, 15
elucidatory power of sociological
investigation, 6
emancipatory power of technology, 196
empowered, 155, 182, 196, 200
empowering, 17, 37, 41, 45, 75, 104, 106,
109, 116, 119, 121, 135, 153, 170, 171,
172, 174, 180, 181, 183, 186, 189, 190,
191, 197, 201, 202, 204, 205, 211, 214,
217, 218, 219, 222, 227, 234, 236, 249,
254, 256, 259, 267, 269, 272, 274, 275
empowerment, 10, 75, 113, 122, 135,
183, 186, 201, 211, 221, 227
epistemic power, 15
evolutionary power, 159
explanatory power of scientific
knowledge, 2
global power, 257
hegemonic power, 121, 124, 218
hegemonic power of consumerist
pleasure-seeking activities, 121
hegemonic power of market forces, 124
hegemonic systems of power, 135
incarcerating power of discourse-laden
logocentricity, 81–2
intangible powers, 117
integrative power of local customs, 125
intensified power of global forces, 126
international division of power, 126, 133
labour power as ‘human capital’, 125
legislative, executive, and judicial power,
216
macro-physics of power, 117
meta-physics of power, 117
micro-physics of power, 117
mix of public and private transnational
powers, 229
monetary power of exchange values, 121
nature of power, 71, 201
networks of power, 117
normalizing power, 116
normative power of binary categories, 79
nuclear power, 187
obsession with power, 188
omnipresent power of historicity, 137
organizational power, 15
participation in power, 177
persistent power, 89
political and economic powers, 219
political and symbolic power, 47
political power, 15, 198
polycentric or centreless conception of
power, 156
postmodern theories of power, 29
power as a possession, a capacity or the
property of people, socioeconomic
classes or institutions, 117
power asymmetries, 243
power dynamics, 183
power of cognition and explanation, 59
power of cognitive certainty, 45
power of consumption, 87
power of contingency, 267
power of cultural representations, 88
power of faith, 57
power of global economic players, 127
power of global forces, 126, 225
power of globalization, 123, 126–8, 266
power of metanarratives, 256, 281
power of nation-states, 134, 226
power of political blueprints, 240
power of rationality, 255, 281
power of reality to be present in our
lives, 88
power of reason, 13, 45, 57, 198, 259
power of science, 14
power of scientific explanations, 42
power of social imaginaries, 95
power of social legitimacy, 238
power of structures, 77
power of the ‘there and tomorrow’, 175,
272
power of the nation-state, 132
power of the state, 187, 225

power relations, 117, 118
power strategies, 76
power struggles, 60, 61, 71, 263
power struggles over meanings and
identities, 71
power struggles over symbolic and
material resources, 60
power vacuum, 32, 250
power-affirmative, 188, 189
power-enforcing, 200
powerful, 14, 15, 19, 50, 71, 87, 89, 98,
105, 115, 123, 128, 141, 150, 154, 156,
159, 170, 174, 199, 201, 214, 238, 244,
252, 255, 266, 274, 275, 277
powerful people, 156
powerhouse, 165
power-laden, 10, 37, 43, 47, 70, 78, 108,
126, 152, 157, 174, 184, 218, 243, 245,
274
power-ladenness, 117, 266, 304n249
powerless, 115, 118, 199, 201, 214, 274,
275
power-motivated, 117
power-oriented versus power-sceptical,
186
power-over, 117
power-permeated, 117
power-sceptical, 186, 188, 189
power-to, 117
power-undermining, 200
purposive power of Verstand, 105
re-empowerment, 177
relationally constituted power, 238, 254
scientific power struggles, 61
seizure of power, 177
self-empowered, 196
social power, 71, 115, 177, 233, 263
sophisticated power, 52
source of power, 156
sovereign power, 224
species-constitutive power of reason, 13
steering power, 222
stratifying power, 254
structural and institutional power, 188
structuring power, 9
symbolic and material power, 141
symbolic power, 47, 71, 95, 196, 200, 262
symbolic power of aesthetic forms, 196
the will to power, 238
transcendent power of postmodernity, 19
transformative and emancipatory power
of human reason, 45
twofold power of discourse, 69
power relation(s), 117, 118
Index of Subjects 487
practical, 5, 9, 14, 22, 36, 39, 42, 45, 46, 47,
49, 52, 54, 59, 65, 66, 68, 71, 85, 105,
112, 136, 141, 154, 168, 182, 189, 197,
199, 207, 215, 218, 235, 237, 240, 250,
268, 272, 275
practical reason, 199, 215
practice(s), 44, 45, 60, 68, 69, 121, 124,
156, 167, 173, 175, 179, 193, 195, 201,
204, 206, 209, 245, 294n22
pragmatic, 8, 34, 201, 254, 275, 283n43,
289n170, 317n190
pragmatic sociology of critique, 283n43,
289n170
pragmatic turn (‘pragmatic turn’), 8, 34,
289n170
pragmatism, 193, 195, 204
pragmatist, 8, 44, 146, 290n17
pragmatist-constructivist, 146
pragmatists, 8, 44, 146, 290n17
praxis, 141, 268
precarious, 81, 191
precariousness, 119
preconceptions, 9, 13, 84, 95, 214
predetermine(d), 50, 104, 129, 140, 163,
166, 179
predictability, 59, 137, 138, 139, 159, 160,
264, 267
prediction(s), 52, 58, 59, 100, 128, 138,
153, 160, 161, 198
predictive, 52, 54, 59, 63, 149, 260
prejudice(s), 9, 13, 61, 148
preparedness, 139, 183, 221
present, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19,
20, 23, 25, 33, 40, 64, 65, 72, 86, 88,
101, 107, 109, 110, 111, 127, 129, 132,
139, 143, 144, 147, 153, 154, 160, 161,
175, 176, 179, 183, 185, 190, 191, 192,
213, 218, 220, 222, 244, 255, 257,
282n10
presentist, 186
primary sector, 34
principle(s), 49, 50, 53, 56, 78, 107, 161,
166, 174, 175, 182, 188, 194, 204, 211,
215, 217, 224, 225, 250, 253, 260
private, 14, 182, 216, 217, 229
privatism, 195
privatization, 124, 128, 226
privilege
place of privilege, 106
privilege of navigating, 204
privilege of the subject, 78
privileged, 20, 37, 43, 44, 50, 71, 73, 87,
92, 102, 103, 107, 116, 155, 156, 166,
174, 199, 241, 243, 259
488 Index of Subjects
privileged – continued
privileged access, 102, 155
privileged basis for cognitive certainty,
43, 44, 259
privileged circles of society, 156
privileged insight, 241
privileged monopolizers of high-brow
art, 107
privileged point of observation, 199
privileged position of the West, 166
privileged position(s), 37, 50, 71, 103,
166, 243
privileged sociohistorical role, 73
privileged status, 92, 174
privileged versus underprivileged, 155
problematization
object of problematization, 96
political re-problematization of social
content, 196
problematization, 5, 96, 191, 196, 235,
249
problematization of existential
ambivalence, 191
radical problematization, 249
re-problematization, 196
self-problematization, 223, 276
subversive problematization of
coexistential relations, 196
theoretical problematization of reality, 5
theoretical problematization of the
tension-laden constitution of
systemically differentiated societies, 235
process(es), 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 44, 50, 53, 68,
75, 77, 79, 80, 83, 86, 92, 100, 101,
104, 105, 107, 111, 112, 113, 115, 117,
118, 119, 121, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129,
130, 133, 134, 135, 137, 141, 144, 147,
148, 149, 152, 153, 159, 160, 161, 162,
165, 168, 169, 172, 173, 174, 180,
182, 190, 196, 198, 199, 201, 203, 206,
207, 209, 211, 219, 221, 223, 228, 239,
242, 259, 260, 261, 265, 275, 283n43,
294n22
processualist, 165
production
commodity production, 97
conditions of production, 44, 226, 244, 253
cultural production, 97, 100, 243,
323n168
economic production, 34, 87, 100
forces and relations of production, 159
forces of production (productive forces),
14, 99
knowledge production, 9, 14, 34, 43, 48,
49, 52, 55, 62, 64, 66, 259, 261
lean production, 125, 307n315
mass production, 105
means of production, 14, 99, 149
mode(s) of production, 15, 100, 108, 211,
264
paradigm of production, 238
production, 9, 13, 14, 15, 22, 34, 43, 44,
48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 61, 64, 66,
69, 73, 82, 85, 87, 97, 99, 100, 106,
108, 114, 125, 131, 132, 159, 193, 211,
226, 244, 253, 259, 263, 264, 307n315
production and exchange, 129
production facilities, 129
production of discourses, 69, 82, 263
production of historical knowledge, 151
production of identity, 114
production of internally and externally
pluralized social spheres, 112
production of knowledge, 61
production of language games, 193
production of material goods, 85
production of meaning, 22, 279, 337n116
production of scientific knowledge, 50
production systems, 307n318
production, distribution, and consumption,
34, 51, 125, 196, 211, 226
relations of production, 14, 99, 159
reversal of production and consumption,
107–8
scientific knowledge production, 49, 55
social conditions of production, 44
social production, 337n116
sociohistorical conditions of production,
244
units of production, 125
world production, 132
productivism, 3, 84, 87–9, 90, 92, 93, 238,
264, 273
productivism versus consumerism, 3, 84,
87–9, 92, 93, 264
productivist, 87, 249
professional(s), 7, 9, 63, 94, 119, 167, 178,
239, 261
profit(s), 33
prognoses, 59, 160, 161
prognostic, 52, 58, 160, 260
prognostications, 52
progress, 11, 14, 17, 53, 60, 100, 104, 139,
141, 152, 161, 162, 163, 165, 170, 176,
194, 199, 224, 235, 239, 261, 338n149
progress ‘for itself’, 53
progress ‘in itself’, 53
 Index of Subjects 489

progressive, 12, 18, 52, 59, 137, 138, 141, concept of the public sphere, 293,
142, 145, 158, 159, 161, 163, 165, 191, 330n440
220, 234, 241, 243, 249, 250, 261, 267, contemporary public spheres, 226, 227,
271 228, 229
progressivist, 163 critical function of public spheres, 227
progresslessness, 165 diasporic public spheres, 224
project(s), 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 21, 24, 26, global public sphere, 224
27, 28, 30, 31, 36, 40, 41, 42, 46, 48, Habermas and the public sphere, 224,
56, 59, 68, 71, 73, 75, 84, 85, 86, 88, 225, 276
98, 99, 104, 106, 107, 114, 124, 143, modern public sphere(s), 64, 224, 225, 276
144, 154, 160, 161, 164, 172, 173, 176, public sphere communication, 227
179, 181, 186, 196, 202, 204, 205, 215, subversive and potentially empowering
216, 217, 218, 221, 224, 233, 234, 236, public spheres, 227
237, 241, 250, 251, 252, 253, 256, 264, technologically advanced public spheres,
274, 275, 279, 284n72, 313n18 227
projection(s), 17, 59, 82, 102, 103, 106, transnational public spheres, 4, 224–9,
210, 263 276
projective, 52, 54, 59, 63, 140, 141, 142, publication(s), 32
268 publicity, 225
projects-in-society (projects in society), 4, publicness, 8
171, 175–8, 180, 186, 189, 194, 240, purpose, 1, 6, 45, 50, 55, 59, 61, 86, 88,
272, 273 103, 113, 138, 139, 165, 168, 171, 179,
society-as-a-project versus projects-in- 181, 191, 199, 209, 233, 234, 248, 271
society, 171, 175–8, 180 purposeless, 104
promiscuity, 106 purposelessness, 103
propensity, 62, 96, 221, 261 purposive, 12, 13, 18, 45, 50, 54, 61, 62,
properties/property, 102, 107, 117, 200, 77, 95, 105, 114, 123, 141, 186, 197,
216, 252 201, 204, 215, 217, 224, 237, 257, 274,
propinquity, 220 276, 277
prosperity, 224 purposivist
prosperous, 120 non-purposivist, 164
protection, 133, 195, 205, 206, 224, 276 purposivist, 162
protectionist, 209
Protestant, 213 qualitative, 264
provisional, 116, 257 quantitative, 131, 150
provisionality, 81 quasi-
proximity, 98, 182 quasi-anarchic, 211
pseudo- quasi-detached, 111
pseudo-freedom, 123 quasi-disembodied, 62
pseudo-post-ideological, 30 quasi-fascist, 29
pseudo-science, 49 quasi-religious, 106
pseudo-scientific, 269 quasi-transcendental, 59, 118
psychoanalytical, 99 questionability, 4, 35
psychological, 91, 97, 117, 160, 199, 248,
252 race/‘race’, 9, 15, 36, 94, 111, 185, 187
psychology, 51, 52, 66, 116, 154 ‘racial’/‘racially’, 139, 172, 199, 221
public, 4, 7, 8, 14, 50, 64, 65, 75, 114, 177, racist, 206, 214
182, 187, 193, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, anti-racist, 177, 183
229, 239, 276, 277, 293n3 radical, 1, 9, 19, 26, 37, 39, 46, 47, 48, 56,
public opinion, 224, 227 59, 64, 65, 66, 69, 72, 74, 78, 79, 82,
public sphere(s), 75, 193, 224, 225, 227, 83, 86, 89, 90, 92, 95, 100, 104, 107,
276, 293n3, 330n440 109, 121, 125, 137, 139, 142, 150, 151,
classical conceptions of the public 162, 166, 168, 188, 196, 212, 230, 238,
sphere, 224 241, 249, 254, 265, 269
490 Index of Subjects
radicalization, 109, 134, 190, 313n18
radicalize(d), 25, 75, 234
randomness, 108
rational, 16, 37, 40, 43, 44, 45, 51, 54, 58,
59, 105, 111, 122, 198, 213, 234, 235,
247, 259, 260, 261
rationalism, 62
rationalist, 54, 57, 61, 62, 105, 198, 230, 255
Rationalität
Wertrationalität, 11, 62, 120
Zweckrationalität, 11, 62, 120
rationalization, 12, 14, 236, 294, 333n12
rationalities, 105, 145, 172, 178, 183
rationality, 13, 15, 20, 35, 44, 45, 48, 54,
62, 90, 104, 105, 115, 116, 120, 121,
137, 165, 175, 183, 190, 191, 198, 199,
225, 227, 235, 236, 255, 261, 274, 281,
292n39
affective rationality, 54
analytical rationality, 54
anti-rationalist rationality, 255, 340n191
argument of rationality, 235
carriers of rationality, 62
communicative rationality, 54, 57, 225
concept of rationality, 292n39
critical rationality, 54, 210
deregulated and deregulating rationality,
105
descriptive rationality, 54
discursive rationality, 54
evidence-based rationality, 35
forms of rationality, 48, 54
functional rationality, 175
functionalist rationality, 236
human rationality, 45, 62, 261
implicit rationality, 137, 165
instrumental rationality, 15, 54, 62, 104,
120, 121, 196, 227
laws of rationality, 274
models of rationality, 54
modes of rationality, 105, 115, 191, 236
overarching rationality, 199
power of rationality, 255, 281
practical rationality, 54
purposive rationality, 54
rationalities, 105, 145, 172, 178, 183
rationality of history, 183
regulated and regulating rationality, 105
spheres of rationality, 115
strategic rationality, 54
substantive rationality, 54, 62, 121, 227
systemic rationality, 116
theoretical rationality, 54
traditional rationality, 54
types of rationality, 54, 62
value rationality, 120, 121
world of rationality, 122, 198
raw materials, 125
readiness, 48, 184
realism, 44, 57, 79, 140, 201, 247, 273
constructivism versus realism, 140
epistemological realism, 44, 57, 79
modern realism, 273
pragmatic realism, 201
realist/realistic, 50, 57, 113, 128, 151, 168,
201, 260
real, 5, 10, 15, 19, 41, 46, 47, 53, 55, 66,
68, 72, 75, 87, 98, 117, 121, 130, 135,
141, 142, 146, 148, 176, 178, 229, 243,
246, 256, 265, 268, 270, 312n5
realities/reality, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 17, 36, 37,
48, 50, 58, 59, 60, 71, 76, 80, 81, 82,
85, 88, 90, 91, 92, 98, 99, 100, 104,
105, 107, 108, 112, 115, 116, 118, 136,
138, 148, 150, 154, 160, 165, 167, 171,
173, 175, 178, 180, 182, 184, 187, 193,
196, 199, 202, 205, 217, 220, 242, 252,
255, 257, 265, 270, 273, 274, 280
reason(s), 2, 4, 8, 12, 13, 16, 17, 28, 31, 32,
38, 40, 41, 45, 47, 54, 57, 58, 60, 61,
62, 76, 81, 105, 115, 130, 133, 152,
155, 158, 161, 162, 164, 170, 181, 185,
191, 195, 197, 198, 199, 210, 215, 219,
227, 234, 236, 260, 261, 274, 279
analytical reason, 197
authoritative reason, 199
authority of reason, 41
belief in reason, 57, 210, 260
civilizational mission of reason, 40
communicative reason, 227
concept of reason, 76
critical reason, 13, 17, 197
descriptive reason, 197
discursive reason, 197
Empire of Reason, 41
empowering force of reason, 45
ethnocentric, androcentric, and
logocentric obsession with reason, 62
fetishization of reason, 197
functionalist reason, 227
in the name of reason, 234
instrumental reason, 17, 234, 236, 279
kingdom of Reason, 191
limits of reason, 115
modern obsession with reason, 105
modern reason, 28
modernity’s logocentric focus on reason,
198

normative reason, 13
optimistic conception of reason, 45
power of reason, 13, 45, 57, 198, 259
practical reason, 199, 215
progress of reason, 152
promise of reason, 17
pure reason, 199, 215
purposive reason, 13
rationalist privileging of reason, 62
reason (Vernunft), 13, 105, 215, 234, 236,
259, 275, 333n15
reason (Verstand), 13, 105, 236, 259, 275,
333n15
reason and faith, 57, 210
Reason and Progress, 235
reason of history, 162
reason to believe, 57, 210, 260
reason, rather than violence, 219
‘reason’ versus ‘affect’, 197
reason-guided, 58, 198, 216
reasons behind historical progress, 163
reflexive force of reason, 61
self-critical disposition of reason, 235
self-critical reason, 235
species-constitutive power of reason, 13
species-specific significance of reason, 274
strategic reason, 197
substantive reason, 197, 234
theoretical reason, 197
traditional reason, 197
transformative and emancipatory power
of human reason, 45
types of reason, 62, 197, 261
typologies of reason, 197
ultimate reasons, 8, 164
reasoning
critical reasoning, 13
human faculty of reasoning, 41
reasonlessness, 164
rebuilding, 167
Rechtsstaat, 224, 226, 331n448
reciprocity, 100, 144
recognition
demand for recognition, 205
misrecognition, 199, 280
mutual recognition, 183, 211
paradigm of recognition, 185, 186, 273
politics of identity, difference, and
recognition, 173, 183, 199, 272
politics of recognition, 4, 171, 172, 180,
182, 272, 319n5
positive recognition of the Other, 221
recognition for the recognition of the
sameness of the Self and Other, 181
Index of Subjects 491
recognition of ambivalence, 191
recognition of cultural autonomy, 97
recognition of cultural particularities,
178, 280
recognition of difference, 181, 183, 214
recognition of differences within a
universalistic framework, 214
recognition of ‘different voices’, 182
recognition of diversity, 172, 211
recognition of existential ambiguity, 273
recognition of group-specific identities
and differences, 186
recognition of heterogeneous language
games, 181
recognition of identities and differences,
185
recognition of indeterminacy, 265
recognition of multiple particularities, 47
recognition of one’s identity, 182
recognition of particularity, 45, 260
recognition of social legitimacy, 10
recognition of the ontological centrality
of identity, 208
recognition of the social conditions of
production, 44
recognition of uncertainty and
ambiguity, 190
redistribution and recognition, 186
respect and recognition, 223
struggle for recognition, 114, 182, 185,
200
struggle for the recognition of
differences, 183
struggles for recognition, 185
trans-social networks of mutual
recognition, 183
recognitive, 16, 185
recognitive subject, 16
recognitive claims, 185
recognitive models of justice, 185
reconstruction, 146, 167–9, 173, 218, 246,
271, 275, 313n25
reconstruction and deconstruction,
167–9, 271
reconstructionism, 168
reconstructivist, 4, 269
redemption, 191, 239
redistribution, 127, 185, 186, 273
paradigm of redistribution, 186, 273
redistribution and recognition, 186
redistributive, 185
redistributive claims, 185
redistributive models of justice, 185
reductive, 32, 38, 42, 66, 135, 175, 259
492 Index of Subjects
reductionist, 69, 100
reductionism, 245, 248
explanatory reductionism, 245
reflexive, 9, 17, 34, 36, 37, 45, 54, 55, 56,
61, 62, 95, 112, 118, 119, 120, 121,
122, 218, 223, 238, 248, 253, 260, 261,
275, 288n167, 313n18
epistemologically reflexive, 56, 260
non-reflexive, 241
reflexive actors, 223
reflexive beings, 54
reflexive capacity to shape their lives
according to their needs, 45
reflexive condition, 17
reflexive force of reason, 61
reflexive function of modern science, 37
reflexive functions of methodical enquir-
ies, 37
reflexive knowledge, 112
reflexive mode of being, 17
reflexive modernization, 238
reflexive observers, 55
reflexive performances, 253
reflexive potential of modernity, 313n18
reflexive resources of action and cogni-
tion, 36
reflexive scientific activity, 62, 261
reflexive self, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122
reflexive self-fashioning, 121
reflexive spirit, 248
self-reflexive, 122, 218, 275
unreflexive and unconscious entities, 58
reflexive turn (‘reflexive turn’), 34, 288n167
reflexivity, 62, 112, 113, 118, 134, 166, 241,
266, 304n257, 305n278
reform, 218
reformable, 111
reformism, 74
reformist, 128
regimes, 8, 15, 32, 45, 133, 156, 190, 198,
199, 206, 207, 235, 240, 251, 268,
306n304, 338n150
capitalist regimes, 338n150
democratic regimes, 206, 207
dictatorial regimes, 199
monoculturalist regimes, 206
multiculturalist regimes, 206
normative regimes, 198
political regimes, 15, 45
racist regimes, 206
regimes of action, 8, 156, 190
regimes of the ‘Eastern Bloc’, 306n304
regimes of trade standards, 133
state-socialist regimes, 32
totalitarian regimes, 235, 240, 251, 268
region(s), 132, 152, 204, 212, 239, 277
regional
cross-regional, 226
extraregional, 310n371
inter-regional, 132
intraregional, 132, 310n371
regionalization, 134, 267
regression, 60, 261
civilizational regression, 60, 261
regressive, 18, 138, 159, 161, 191
regularity, 105, 161
regulation(s), 17, 79, 96, 133, 193, 207,
215, 224, 226, 239, 253, 266, 276, 277,
309n358
beyond regulation, 309n358
deregulation, 124, 125, 130, 133, 134
full-scale regulation, 277
international regulation, 133
normative regulation, 96, 215, 266
political regulation, 224, 276
proper regulation, 226
regulation of social interactions, 79
social regulation, 193, 207
social, political, economic, educational,
and military regulation mechanisms,
224
state regulation, 239
regulatory, 126, 133
rehumanization, 190
reification, 87
reifying, 116
reinterpretation, 242
relation
relation between the signifiers (that is,
symbolic forms) and the signified (that
is, empirical substances), 80
relation between signifiers, 80
relational, 9, 38, 39, 58, 61, 69, 74, 77,
79, 81, 110, 117, 147, 260, 261, 270,
294n22
relationalist, 74, 99, 200
relationalist-discursivist, 201
relationality, 10
relationally, 6, 8, 9, 10, 35, 37, 43, 51, 58,
59, 60, 61, 67, 71, 76, 79, 83, 88, 92,
107, 108, 112, 160, 173, 182, 186, 200,
201, 238, 242, 243, 252, 254, 260, 263,
265
relationship
relationship between ‘base’ and
‘superstructure’, 90, 91, 101, 265
relationship between ‘being-there’
and ‘being-aware’, between

‘being-dominated’ and ‘being-
emancipated’, and between
‘being-as-always-already-been’ and
‘being-as-yet-to-come’, 18
relationship between ‘necessity’ and ‘con-
tingency’ in Marxist thought, 335n47
relationship between ‘objective’ and
‘subjective’ factors, 239
relationship between ‘old social move-
ments’ and ‘new social movements’, 188
relationship between ‘place’ and ‘space’,
220
relationship between postmodernity and
the political, 198
relationship between ‘space’ and ‘time’,
between ‘reality’ and ‘virtuality’, and
between ‘society’ and ‘individual’, 98
relationship between ‘the textual’ and
‘the social’, 294n22
relationship between ‘universalism’ and
‘particularism’, 328n327
relationship between ‘validity claims’ and
‘legitimacy claims’, 200, 324n195
relationship between a particular
discursive event and the situation(s),
institution(s), and social structure(s)
which frame it, 69
relationship between discourse and
discursivity, 81
relationship between discourse and
power, 201
relationship between discourse and
society, 294
relationship between modernity and
postmodernity, 144, 239, 240
relationship between natural law and
social theory, 328n341
relationship between necessity, imposed
by the constraining force of historical
‘circumstances’, and contingency,
owing to people’s own ‘making’, 240
relationship between postmodernism and
critical theory, 22, 286n124
relationship between postmodernism and
feminism, 22, 286n125
relationship between postmodernism and
Marxism, 286n126
relationship between reason and faith, 210
relationship between science and
religion, 57
relationship between social structures
and social actions, 67
relationship between sociality and
linguisticality, 48
Index of Subjects 493
relationship between society and
discourse, 69
relationship between subject and object,
159, 203
relationship between subjectivity – the
Self – and Objectivity – the Other, the
world, 113
relationship between substance and form,
79
relationship between the ‘postmodern
condition’ and the ‘postindustrial age’,
297n10
relationship between the search for
universality and the recognition of
particularity, 45
relationship between the state and
globalization, 310n373
relationship between transnational
economic forces and national
governments, 133
relativism, 2, 29, 40, 140, 195, 204, 253–4,
280, 339n175
relativist, 30, 40, 66, 253, 254
relativist turn (‘relativist turn’), 1, 2, 34, 39,
40–63, 258, 259, 277, 288n160, 290n1
relativist, 253
relativity, 11, 42, 44, 194, 202, 243, 253,
259, 274
relativization, 29, 221, 276
relativize, 221
relativizing, 223, 224
reliability, 235
religion, 14, 15, 36, 50, 57, 97, 185, 187,
193, 194, 200, 222, 292n42
religious, 9, 11, 35, 50, 53, 56, 57, 60, 74,
99, 100, 101, 142, 163, 177, 183, 184,
186, 192, 208, 209, 210, 255, 268
repoliticization, 109, 196, 220–1, 276
repoliticize, 250
representation(s), 37, 41, 42, 49, 68, 78, 79,
80, 88, 95, 96, 98, 99, 103, 109, 148,
156, 167, 177, 180, 187, 225, 253, 259,
264, 265, 299n58
crisis of representation
‘re-present-ation’, 88, 167
representational, 2, 5, 6, 10, 15, 20, 37, 40,
43, 46, 48, 53, 54, 56, 68, 71, 72, 74,
75, 79, 88, 92, 142, 147, 176, 212, 247,
270, 294n22
representationalism, 27
anti-representationalism, 103
representationalist
anti-representationalist, 103, 104
representationality, 243
494 Index of Subjects
reproduction, 3, 69, 81, 92, 95, 96, 108,
113, 118, 121, 124, 169, 173, 175, 243,
249, 264, 265, 307n313
economic reproduction, 92, 264
instrumental reproduction, 118
processes of reproduction, 3
routine-driven reproduction, 96
social reproduction, 124, 243, 249
unconscious reproduction, 95
vertical reproduction, 174
reproductive, 69, 94, 174, 243
Republic
Dominican Republic, 228
research, 2, 3, 6, 32, 53, 54, 58, 60, 64, 65,
72, 73, 85, 152, 153, 154, 157, 164,
189, 255, 263, 267, 302n187
academic research, 33
conceptually insightful research, 54
critical historical research, 271
critical research, 152
critical social research, 247
cutting-edge research in the early
twenty-first century, 85
deductivist and inductivist research
agendas, 152
empirical research, 14, 68, 93, 262
feminist research, 302n187
historical research, 146, 150, 154, 157, 271
historiographical research, 149
institutionalized forms of research, 255
large-scale research programmes, 153
Lyotardian research agenda, 86
macro-oriented historical research, 154
methodical research, 58
microhistorical research programmes, 158
micro-oriented historical research, 154
multidisciplinary research, 65
research agendas, 6, 53, 152, 267
research area, 32
research canons, 189
research epistemologies and
methodologies in the social sciences, 73
research method, 65
research methodologies, 72, 262
research methodology, 72, 263
research programmes, 3, 153, 158
research strategies, 2, 64
research strategy, 64
research traditions, 60
scientific research, 54, 60
small-scale research programmes, 153
social research, 65, 72, 247, 262
social research methodology, 1, 2, 3, 39,
64, 72, 231, 258, 262, 277, 287n151
social research methods, 2, 64, 67, 72,
293n1
social scientific research, 66
theoretical and empirical research, 93
traditions of research, 154
researcher(s), 7, 23, 50, 53, 54, 60, 63, 72,
75, 114, 148, 150, 151, 166, 232, 241,
244
critical researchers, 7, 72, 75
empirically oriented researchers, 50
phenomenologically and hermeneutically
inspired researchers, 114
research’s point of view, 157
researchers of social life, 148
scientific researchers, 53, 54, 63
the researcher and the researched, 244
residence/residency, 226
residents, 137
resignification, 185, 190, 196, 222, 276
resistance, 135, 169, 190, 201, 249
resource(s), 8, 15, 34, 36, 45, 50, 51, 54, 56,
57, 60, 61, 62, 77, 110, 111, 113, 116,
118, 125, 135, 141, 185, 186, 188, 197,
234, 248, 275, 279
respect [noun]
equal respect, 208
mutual respect, 211, 223
respect [verb]
ability to respect others, 223
respect diversity, 120
responsibility, 120, 135, 182, 199, 229
reterritorialization, 134, 267
revolution(s)
class conflict and revolution, 141
economic and political revolutions, 100
French Revolution, 46
microelectronics revolution, 125,
307n319
postindustrial revolution, 124
proletarian revolution, 152
revolutionary
revolutionary subject, 179
rhetoric, 89, 114, 130, 131, 133, 201, 243,
246, 255, 297n2, 335n68
rhetorical/rhetorically, 18, 128, 148, 171,
244, 245
Ricardian, 197
Richness, 65, 78
right(s), 10, 31, 57, 96, 123, 128, 167, 182,
195, 210, 215, 216, 217, 238, 251, 280
abstract set of rights, 177
animal rights, 29, 177, 187
civil rights, 177, 187, 216
civil, political, and social rights, 174

commercial rights, 133
community rights, 208
complex networks of rights, 217, 275
cosmopolitan approaches to rights, 217
cosmopolitan right, 216, 217
cultural rights, 208
demise of the right to have rights, 215
functional differentiality of rights, 216
group rights, 208
human rights, 187, 208, 215, 216, 218,
219, 328n353
indigenous rights, 187
lack of rights, 216
legal, political, and economic rights, 216
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
rights, 187
minority rights, 207
multiplicity of rights, 216
network of rights, 216
‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of rights, 218
old rights, 218
property rights, 216
right of all human beings to have rights,
215, 275
right of every human being to have
rights, 216
right to assert its own civilizational
superiority, 210
right to cultural identity, 205
right to define, 57
right to have the same rights, 216
right to individual and collective forms
of performative expressivity, 182
right to individual and collective forms
of public visibility, 182
right to individual and collective forms
of sociocultural idiosyncrasy, 182
right to judge for themselves, 216
‘rights for themselves’, 275
rights of civil society, 216
rights of ethnocultural minorities, 210
rights of landless or nationless people,
187
rights of love and friendship, 216
rights of political participation, 216
rights of the nation-state, 216
rights-based, 215, 217, 275
rights-based betterment of the human
condition, 217
rights-differentiated, 208
‘rights in themselves’, 275
rights-sensitive, 216, 275
rights-specific, 217
sets of rights, 218
Index of Subjects 495
social forms of right(s), 215, 216, 217,
275
socio-specific rights, 174
state of rights, 331n448
statement right, 10
sub-category of rights, 216
tolerance and rights, 211
type of right, 217, 275
universal right, 211, 216, 274
universality of rights, 215
whole system of right, 217
women’s rights, 120
rightness, 104, 247, 248
rigidity, 119
risk(s), 7, 19, 36, 38, 119, 128, 229, 232,
234, 238, 239, 241, 248, 251, 254, 280
risk society, 229
risk-taking, 36, 114, 119
transnational community of risk, 229
world risk society, 229
ritual(s), 210
ritualization, 14
robotization, 125
Roman, 11, 209, 284n64
Greco-Roman, 209
Romantic, 180, 204, 225
Rousseauian, 197
rule(s), 57, 63, 75, 80, 94, 95, 96, 116, 160,
177, 190, 205, 208, 226, 230, 252
arbitrary and self-imposed rules, 63
authoritarian and even totalitarian rule,
75
autopoietic rules of validity, 230
colonial rule, 325n240
defensible rules and conventions, 252
formal rules, 80
ground rules, 226
immanent rules, 160
logic and rule, 190
norms, rules, and conventions, 94, 95, 96
rigid rules, 230
rule of law, 177, 208
rules and parameters, 116
rules, conventions, and principles, 205
rupture, 18, 89, 104, 161
Russia, 124, 228
Rwanda, 228
sadness, 17
Saint-Simonian, 163, 197
Sameness, 173, 174, 175, 181, 183
São Tomé and Principe, 228
Saussurean, 79
post-Saussurean, 77, 99
496 Index of Subjects
scaffolding, 198
sceptic(s), 252, 257, 307n324
sceptical, 74, 109, 183, 186, 188, 189, 256,
279
non-sceptical, 241
power-sceptical, 186, 188, 189
scepticism, 20, 21, 37, 57, 60, 90, 104, 108,
151, 169, 170, 184, 188, 195, 237, 240,
241, 247, 254
Schmittean, 197
Scholastic, 9, 46, 55, 154, 237
school(s) of thought, 21, 66
science and technology, 124, 248, 255
science and technology studies (STS), 255
science(s), 6, 14, 31, 34, 35, 37, 42, 46, 49,
51, 52, 56, 57, 59, 60, 85, 86, 97, 99,
124, 151, 170, 179, 200, 214, 248, 255,
259
critical social science, 64, 84, 248, 263,
279
earth science, 51, 52
human sciences, 92, 163
natural science, 52, 95, 160, 298n50
pseudo-science, 49
social science, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 20, 22,
29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 39, 41, 48, 49, 50,
52, 54, 55, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,
72, 73, 83, 84, 89, 90, 93, 123, 136,
137, 147, 149, 151, 160, 166, 180, 189,
192, 195, 197, 207, 230, 232, 233, 237,
240, 242, 248, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263,
265, 266, 267, 268, 273, 276, 277, 278,
279, 280, 281
scientific, 2, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 28, 35, 37,
42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,
56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 89, 92,
99, 100, 101, 145, 148, 149, 150, 157,
161, 163, 167, 178, 210, 228, 239, 260,
261, 271
scientific field, 228
scientific knowledge, 2, 14, 44, 49, 50,
51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 167,
239, 259, 282n30
scientificity, 51, 58, 152, 260, 270
scientist(s)
critical scientists, 58, 62
critical social scientists, 41, 64
modern social scientists, 43
natural scientists, 50
political scientists, 49
social scientists, 41, 43, 52, 54, 55, 64
scientistic, 85, 90, 99, 264
Second World War, 169
secondary sector, 34, 264
secular, 17, 120, 163, 209
secularization, 11, 209
security, 59, 96, 133, 135, 142, 166, 193, 203
segregation, 206, 207, 254, 274
segregationist, 206, 207, 209, 216
self (the self), 3, 11, 29, 44, 85, 88, 110–23,
151, 181, 183, 265, 266, 290n181,
302n183, 303n231
centrality of the Self, 181
constitution of the self, 266
construction of the self, 111
contingency of the self, 110, 302n169
contradictoriness of the self, 112,
302n198
corporeality of the self, 115, 303n231
corrosion of the self, 119
digital self, 116
digitization of the self, 116
dominant self, 200
durability of the self, 119
exploration of the self, 111
five-dimensional account of the self,
290n181
fluidity of the self, 111, 302n183
Foucauldian understanding of the self,
117
fragmented or schizophrenic self, 112
human self, 208
individualization of the self, 116
isolation of the self, 116
knowledgeability of the self, 112,
303n210
knowledgeable self, 112
liberating constructions of self, 201
modern self, 122, 198
multiplicity of the self, 111–12, 302n192
narrativity of the self, 113–14, 303n222
postmodern accounts of the self, 114
postmodern self, 113, 114, 116, 122, 198
postmodern theories of the self, 29
power-ladenness of the self, 117, 304n249
presentation of the self, 88
reflective self, 112
reflexive self, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122
reflexivity of the self, 118–23
representation of the self, 88
Self and Other, 169, 181, 257
the self as a ‘decentred and destabilized
interpreting actor’, 151
the self as a ‘knowing subject’, 9, 151
a self with multiple identities and group
affiliations, 10
selves, 9, 36, 50, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115,
116, 117, 118, 120
 Index of Subjects 497

stable self, 111 self-empowering, 106, 187, 221

standardization of the self, 116 self-enclosed, 74
technology of the self, 116, 304n246 self-experience, 119
the Other in the Self, 181 self-expression, 193
the self and autonomism, 305n278 self-fashioning, 121
the self and consumerism, 305n284 self-fulfilling, 252
the self and dynamism, 306n300 self-fulfilment, 120, 123
the self and individualism, 304n268 self-government, 272
the self and pluralism, 305n288 self-imposed, 44, 63, 139, 193, 234
the self and short-termism, 304n257 self-interest, 119
the self as a project, 303n220 self-invented, 178
selves, 9, 36, 50, 51, 110, 111, 112, 113, self-management, 119, 304n258
115, 116, 118, 120, 122, 123 self-monitoring, 144
coexisting – and, often, conflicting – self-narratives, 114
selves, 9 self-perpetuating, 249
contingent selves, 36 self-problematization, 223, 276
contingent, fluid, pluralized, self-promotion, 119, 304n258
tension-laden, and normative selves, 208 self-realization, 16, 97, 106, 119, 121,
contradictory selves, 36 185, 203, 204, 222, 274
fluid selves, 36 self-referential/self-referentially, 7, 41, 47,
human selves, 51 67, 68, 171, 233, 234, 246, 262
internally and externally pluralized self-reflexive, 122, 218, 275
selves, 112 self-reflexivity, 223
knowledgeable selves, 36 self-reinvention, 114
multiple selves, 112 self-reliance, 119
multiplicity of selves, 36 self-reproducing, 313n24
mutually challenging and conflicting self-sufficient, 66, 134, 277, 328n337
selves, 36 self-sustainable, 313n24
plural selves, 36 selfhood, 18, 113, 117, 121, 193, 208
plurality of selves within each self, 111 semiotic, 294n22
postmodern selves, 116, 120, 122, 123 Senegal, 228
radically contingent, fluid, plural, contra- sensibilities/sensibility, 8, 42, 47, 105, 140,
dictory, and knowledgeable selves, 36 144, 178, 193, 268, 272
social selves, 208 sensitivity, 115, 184
self- services, 51, 86, 92, 124, 224, 264, 276
self-awareness, 113 seventeenth century, 12, 16, 38
self-centred, 122, 178 sex, 115
self-centredness, 119 netsex, 116
self-conceptions, 151 sexual, 9, 111, 139, 172, 174, 181, 182, 183,
self-confidently, 243 199, 216, 221
self-consciousness, 11 bisexual, 177, 187
self-contained, 78, 79, 313n24, 328n337 heterosexual, 200
self-critical, 85, 139, 142, 231, 233, 235, homosexual, 200
237, 241, 279 sexual appetite, 52
self-critique, 235, 279 sexual orientation, 9, 15, 36, 87
self-deception, 144 sexually, 172
self-declared, 27, 236, 249, 253 sexist, 214
self-defeating, 241 anti-sexist, 183
self-destructive, 139 shop/shopping, 87, 92, 105, 108, 264
self-determination, 17, 59, 75, 123 short-term, 119, 128, 224
self-determined, 105 short-termism, 36, 98, 118, 119, 253,
self-discipline, 119 304n257
self-employed, 85 short-terms, 119
self-empowered, 196 signifiability, 79, 152
498 Index of Subjects
signified/signifier, 79, 80, 82, 87, 88, 98, 99,
104, 168, 193, 263
similarity, 161, 165, 219
simplicity, 106, 189
simulacra, 87, 98, 117
sincerity, 247
Singapore, 228
singularities/singularity, 161, 181, 183
singularization, 153
Sinic, 209
Situatedness, 8, 25, 136, 222, 243
situation(s)
everyday situations, 96, 223
historical situation, 124
ideal speech situation, 225, 331n463
novel historical situation, 124
postutopian situation, 251
powerless situations, 201
present situation, 191
situation of extraterritoriality, 126
situation of increasing existential
uncertainty, 135
situations of major political crisis,
338n150
social situations, 66
sociocultural situations, 294
spatiotemporally contingent situations,
56
situational, 8, 202, 274
cross-situational, 161
situationist, 7, 178, 253
situation-laden, 10, 61
slavery, 15, 239
Slovenian, 24
small narrative(s), 4, 136, 140–3, 145, 154,
239, 267, 268
grand narratives versus small narratives,
4, 136, 140–3, 145, 267
Smithian, 163, 197
social (‘the social’), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10,
18, 20, 22, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 37, 39,
40, 41, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55,
58, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72,
73, 76, 83, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97,
100, 109, 110, 118, 135, 136, 137, 147,
160, 165, 173, 177, 195, 196, 197, 201,
203, 231, 232, 233, 237, 242, 244, 246,
247, 258, 262, 264, 266, 268, 273, 278,
280, 294n22
social action(s), 67, 165
social class(es) (see class)
social conflict(s), 110
social democracy, 30
social movements (see movements)
social democracy, 30
social fact(s), 95
social recognition (see recognition)
social science(s), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 20, 22,
29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 39, 41, 48, 49, 50,
52, 54, 55, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,
72, 73, 89, 90, 93, 123, 136, 137, 147,
149, 151, 157, 160, 166, 189, 192, 195,
207, 230, 231, 232, 233, 237, 240, 242,
247, 248, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263, 264,
265, 267, 269, 270, 273, 276, 278, 279,
280, 298n41
social struggle(s), 74, 185, 254, 280
social theory/social theories
modern social theories, 84
modern social theory, 2, 5–6, 13, 40, 44,
84, 86, 88, 89, 237, 240, 248
postmodern social theory, 6–11, 88, 89,
237, 242, 248, 282n9
social-democratic, 29, 186
socialism, 4, 14, 26, 28, 35, 74, 140, 166,
169, 176, 179, 192, 251, 306n304,
338n149
postsocialism, 18
really existing socialism, 306n304
scientific socialism, 28, 74
state socialism, 4, 26, 35, 74, 166, 169,
251
socialist, 32, 124, 127, 192
socialist bloc, 124, 127
socialist environmentalism, 192
socialist nationalism, 192
state-socialist, 32
sociality, 10, 28, 48, 67, 74, 96, 113, 118,
120, 122, 136, 145, 148, 173, 181, 186,
195, 210, 222, 243
socialization, 15, 117, 121, 220, 221, 227,
247
socio-conscious, 9
socio-contextualist, 154
sociocultural, 6, 9, 43, 57, 60, 102, 107,
161, 166, 182, 211, 223, 253, 274,
294n22
socioeconomic, 97, 117, 199, 200
socio-existential, 202
socio-generative, 218, 275
sociogenesis, 32
socio-hermeneutic, 221
sociohistorical, 2, 11, 13, 40, 48, 51, 53, 73,
75, 80, 100, 129, 135, 142, 157, 165,
173, 178, 186, 192, 200, 209, 210, 225,
234, 235, 244, 246, 253, 276, 312n9,
319n17
socio-legal, 207

sociolinguist, 52
sociologies/sociology, 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 20,
28, 30, 31, 39, 50, 51, 52, 53, 83–135,
154, 171, 189, 203, 231, 232, 238, 247,
258, 263–7, 282n4, 287n152, 315n114
ambitions in sociology, 12
British sociology, 315n114
classical sociology, 85, 87
commodified sociology, 248
contemporary sociology, 3, 92, 93, 98, 264
critical sociology, 96, 98, 99, 189, 248
cultural sociology, 96, 97, 242, 335n73
cultural turn in sociology (‘cultural turn’
in sociology), 1, 39, 92, 231, 258, 278,
296n1
culturalist method in sociology, 167
current debates in sociology, 83
decorative sociology, 248, 337n125
difference between sociology and
anthropology, 93
digital sociology, 96, 98
early sociology, 167
economic sociology, 96, 97
foundations for sociology, 8
founding figures of sociology, 12, 238
French pragmatic sociology, 317n190
implosion of sociology upon itself, 91
micro-sociology, 151
modern and postmodern conceptions of
sociology, 3, 84, 92, 93, 264
modern sociology, 83, 84, 85, 91, 92
new sociology, 93–110
organic public sociology, 7
policy sociology, 7
political sociology, 96, 99
postclassical sociology, 85, 86
postmaterialist sociology, 93
postmodern conceptions of sociology, 3,
84, 92, 93, 264
postmodern sociologies, 28, 91
postmodern sociology, 3, 83–135, 167,
238
post-societal sociology, 97
pragmatic sociology of critique, 283n43,
289n170
professional sociology, 7
public sociology, 7
punk sociology, 247, 337n124
sociology as a scientific endeavour, 6
‘sociology’ as ‘culturology’, 93
sociology of culture, 96, 97
sociology of knowledge, 53
sociology without guarantees, 91
‘theorizing’ in sociology, 84
Index of Subjects 499
traditional public sociology, 7
traditional sociology, 214
trends in sociology, 3
society-as-a-project (society as a project),
171, 175–8, 180, 186, 189, 194, 240,
272, 273
society-as-a-project versus projects-in-
society, 171, 175–8
socio-logy, 91
socio-ontological, 46, 94, 112, 138, 145,
147, 148, 155, 157, 202, 212, 213, 215,
216, 219, 238, 261, 275, 279
socio-performative, 97
socio-philosophical, 332n497
sociopolitical, 83, 84, 86, 219, 222, 275
socio-relational, 97
socio-specific, 141, 174
socio-structural, 154, 155
solidarité mécanique versus solidarité
organique, 11
solidarities/solidarity, 12, 15, 17, 36, 114, 121,
122, 135, 214, 216, 228, 229, 294n23
imagined solidarity, 229
institutionally sustained solidarities, 36
intersubjective construction of solidarity,
114
mechanic solidarity, 15
organic solidarity, 12, 15, 36, 294n23
resources of solidarity, 135
social solidarity, 114
sources of solidarity, 121
transition from ‘mechanic’ to ‘organic’
solidarity, 36
transition from ‘organic’ to ‘liquid’
solidarity, 36
universalistic solidarity, 214
weakening of social cohesion,
integration, and solidarity, 122
solidity, 78, 191
solution(s), 128, 140, 178, 179, 180, 190,
219, 268, 273
South Africa, 228, 306n306, 325n239
sovereign, 16, 17, 105, 119, 126, 127, 133,
134, 135, 175, 216, 224, 229
post-sovereign, 126, 132, 221, 224–9,
276, 277
sovereignty, 16, 17, 105, 126, 127, 133,
134, 135, 175, 216, 225, 229
post-sovereignty, 126, 224–9
Soviet Union, 124, 127, 310n383
Sozialismus/Kommunismus, 11
space(s), 22, 28, 29, 61, 78, 96, 98, 104,
106, 110, 116, 126, 128, 178, 194, 201,
219, 220, 224, 236, 241, 244
500 Index of Subjects
space(s) – continued
abstraction of space, 236
annihilation of space through time, 126
cyberspace, 98, 116, 229
discursive space, 22
functionality of space, 104
inclusive space of exchange, 106
instrumental organization of space, 28
‘place’ and ‘space’, 220
placeless space of intertextuality, 244
postmodern theories of space, 29
self-contained space, 78
social space, 61, 110, 126
space and time, 98, 194
space economy, 126
space of national territories, 128
space of possibilities, 178
spaces for resistance, 201
spaces of debate, 224
time and space, 116
time-space, 122
value-laden space of normativity, 96
Spain, 228
Spanish, 228, 285n106
spatial turn (‘spatial turn’), 34, 289n168
spatiality, 118, 131, 132
species, 94, 202, 209
human species, 53
learning species, 58
species of literature, 151
species-constitutive, 13, 16, 54, 58, 78,
80, 94, 95, 101, 105, 153, 197, 202,
203, 215, 266, 275
species-distinctive, 13, 213, 215, 275
species-generative, 197
species-residual, 105
species-specific, 63, 261, 274
species-universal, 107
spirit, 76, 78, 84, 176, 191, 194, 201, 202,
234, 235
anti-elitist spirit, 106
anti-foundationalist spirit, 29, 45, 213
anti-universalist spirit, 166
contextualizing spirit, 67
cosmopolitan spirit, 214
critical spirit, 121, 234
deceptive spirit, 128
deconstructive spirit, 106
deconstructivist spirit, 68
deliberative spirit, 106
Derridean spirit, 181
dialectical spirit, 69
dialectics of Spirit, 46
hyper-consumerist spirit, 194
intellectual spirit, 27
lifeworld spirit, 166
modernity’s self-critical spirit, 237
new spirit of capitalism, 201
open-minded spirit of pluralized
togetherness, 222
particularist spirit, 165
perspectivist spirit, 238
postmodern spirit, 8, 28, 30, 31, 142,
196, 201
poststructuralist spirit, 76
postutopian spirit, 185
radically contingent spirit, 78
reflexive spirit, 248
scientific spirit, 89
self-critical spirit of Enlightenment
thought, 235
spirit of capitalism, 201
spirit of classical sociological thought, 84
spirit of Marxian and Durkheimian
analysis, 42
spirit of multiculturalism, 202
spirit of postmodern scepticism, 108
spirit of postmodernity, 104, 181
spirit of the contemporary age, 194
spirit of the Enlightenment, 188, 235
spirit of the modern condition, 191
teleological spirit, 7, 188
teleological spirit of the Enlightenment,
188
teleological-rationalist spirit, 198
universalist spirit, 165
World Spirit, 159, 165
spiritual, 50, 56, 60
spiritualists, 57
stability, 81, 98, 111, 123, 133
stake(s), 3, 4, 34, 70, 200, 226, 240, 258,
264, 276
standard(s), 6, 8, 9, 20, 29, 49, 55, 58, 60,
62, 94, 96, 101, 102, 107, 116, 117,
131, 133, 153, 157, 158, 173, 193, 194,
202, 203, 204, 205, 243, 250, 253, 260,
272, 274
standardization, 105, 116, 117, 125, 134,
228, 267, 277
state(s), 4, 18, 26, 32, 35, 36, 50, 64, 73, 74,
75, 78, 100, 110, 111, 115, 116, 118,
126, 127, 128, 130, 133, 134, 153, 166,
174, 176, 177, 187, 188, 189, 203, 206,
212, 225, 226, 227, 229, 239, 249, 251,
276, 310n373, 311n448
bureaucratized states, 73
competitive states, 133
contemporary states, 133

control of the state, 176
developmental state, 134
emotional state, 107
facilitative state, 134
groups of states, 127
legal state, 331n448
nation state/nation-state, 126, 127, 132,
133, 134, 214, 215, 216, 217, 225, 226,
227, 239, 277, 310n383, 328n337
normative authority of the state, 177
political states, 226
postmodern state of knowledge, 153
radar of the state, 134
Rechtsstaat, 224, 226, 331n448
regulatory umbrella of the state, 126
role of the state, 126
slim states, 36
social states, 110
sovereignty of states, 133
spectator state, 134
state apparatus, 224
state controls, 227
state interventionism, 128, 226
state interventions, 130
state of affairs, 18, 116, 174
state of flux, 36, 64, 78, 111, 118, 203
state of justice, 331n448
state of law, 224, 276, 331n448
state of rights, 331n448
state power, 188, 276
state regulation, 239
state socialism, 4, 26, 35, 74, 166, 169,
251
state sovereignty, 127, 134, 229
state strategies, 134
state-bound citizenship, 212
statehood, 134
state-regulated societies, 249
states and state actors, 310n379
state-socialist regimes, 32
strong states, 36, 133
territorial state, 226
the state and globalization, 310n373
welfare state, 239
Westphalian state, 224, 225
world state, 218
status, 5, 9, 18, 19, 50, 86, 88, 92, 97, 108,
157, 161, 174, 193, 228, 240, 241, 252
stimulation, 123
storytelling, 114, 146, 242
straightforwardness, 189
straitjacket(s)
analytical straitjacket of ‘modern
sociology’, 85
Index of Subjects 501
epistemic straitjacket of binary categories,
41
rationalist straitjacket created by the
Enlightenment project, 230
straitjacket of dogmatic beliefs, 108
‘totalizing’ analytical straitjackets, 22
strategic, 14, 54, 62, 187, 188, 196, 197,
236
strategies/strategy, 2, 8, 53, 64, 76, 83, 92,
122, 128, 131, 133, 134, 226, 243,
294n22, 309n362
structural, 5, 10, 12, 41, 43, 44, 50, 67, 76,
79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 98, 128,
134, 153, 158, 188, 236, 244, 248, 255,
271, 294n22
structuralism
constructivist structuralism, 168
genetic structuralism, 216
structuralist, 3, 42, 71, 73, 74, 94, 97, 129,
162, 263
structurality, 78, 157
structuration(s), 68, 77, 208, 278
structured, 1, 48, 56, 57, 59, 64, 71, 74, 81,
99, 118, 138, 140, 141, 145, 159, 182,
183, 193, 199, 216, 232, 243, 257, 267,
271, 278, 280
structures, 15, 41, 42, 69, 75, 77, 78, 97,
111, 114, 120, 125, 147, 153, 162, 184,
193, 242, 249, 262, 293n5, 294n22
structuring, 9, 82, 118, 138, 141, 142, 145,
159, 263, 267, 271
struggle(s)
cultural struggles, 110
daily struggle over material and symbolic
resources, 75
eternal struggle for recognition, 200
heterogeneous struggles, 10
intersectional power struggles, 263
intersectionally structured power
struggles, 71
multiple social struggles, 74
multiple struggles over individual and
collective forms of autonomy, 175
ongoing struggle between ‘the
hegemonic’ and ‘the marginal’, 199
path of struggle, 185
political struggles, 183
power struggles, 60, 61, 71, 263
power struggles over meanings and
identities, 71
relationally constituted struggles, 10
scientific power struggles, 61
social struggle, 74, 185, 254, 280
struggle and competition, 165
502 Index of Subjects
struggle(s) – continued
struggle and conflict, 159
struggle for recognition, 114, 182, 185,
200
struggle for recognition and legitimacy,
114
struggle for recognition of one’s identity,
182
struggle for survival, 119
struggle for the recognition of difference,
181, 183
struggle for the recognition of the
sameness of the Self and Other, 181
struggle(s) for recognition, 114, 182, 185,
200
struggles for and over universally defensi-
ble moral and political standards, 250
struggles for justice, 7
struggles for the construction of
emancipatory social relations, 237
struggles over material and symbolic
resources, 75, 97
struggles over social legitimacy, 10, 47
struggles over symbolic and material
resources, 60
trivialization of struggles, 250
style(s), 104, 106, 193
subject(s), 9, 12, 13, 16, 28, 32, 36, 37, 41,
44, 46, 50, 56, 58, 61, 69, 71, 74, 76,
77, 78, 82, 85, 89, 98, 101, 107, 108,
111, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122, 124, 138,
141, 148, 149, 151, 156, 159, 163, 164,
166, 167, 169, 178, 179, 200, 202, 203,
216, 217, 223, 224, 255, 263, 268, 270,
273, 294n22
collective historical subject, 70, 71, 85,
262, 268
collective subject, 141, 162, 163, 194, 268
‘the communicative subject’ (Jürgen
Habermas), 16, 224
concept of the subject, 76
conscious subjects capable of purposive
action and critical thinking, 12
critique of the subject, 28
cult of the unitary subject, 36
cultural subjects, 202
death of the subject, 107
decentring of the subject, 74
emancipatory subjects, 178
the end of the subject, 169
‘the experiencing subject’ (Edmund
Husserl), 16
flowing subjects, 111
free-floating subjects, 115
historical subject, 70, 71, 74, 85, 141,
167, 262, 268
human subject, 13, 69, 77, 107, 111, 179,
181, 255, 312n14
idealist conception of the subject as the
creator of the world, 77
individual or collective subjects, 162, 163
interpreting subjects, 164
invention of the modern subject, 37
knowing subject, 9, 151
‘the linguistic subject’ (Martin Heidegger,
Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul
Ricœur), 16
locally situated and globally aware sub-
jects, 223
macrohistorical subject, 71
macrosubject, 143, 178
mediation between subject and object,
203
modern subject, 37, 116, 120, 178, 179,
259
non-subject, 112
objects and subjects, 101
‘the political subject’ (Hannah Arendt),
16
rational or working subject, 46
rational subject, 16, 40
‘the rational subject’ (Immanuel Kant),
16
reason-guided, conscious, and perceptive
subjects, 58
‘the recognitive subject’ (Georg W. F.
Hegel), 16
responsible subjects, 272
revolutionary subject, 179
self-conscious subject, 111
socially situated subjects, 44
society-generating subjects, 202
species-constitutive privilege of the
subject, 78
subject positions, 74, 111, 119
subject-centred, 108, 179
subject-positions, 119
subjects and objects, 82, 117, 263
subjects capable of acting upon,
attributing meaning to, and constantly
reinventing their unique place in the
universe, 13
subjects capable of critical reflection and
linguistic representation, 41
subjects capable of purposive realization
and discursive communication, 50
subjects capable of purposive, regulative,
and expressive action, 217

subjects capable of reflection, judgement,
and reason-guided action, 216
subjects capable of speech and action,
224
tension between subject and structure, 77
‘the thinking subject’ (René Descartes),
16
transcendental subject, 103, 180
‘the unconscious subject’ (Sigmund
Freud), 16
‘the working subject’ (Karl Marx), 16, 46
subjective, 6, 8, 18, 45, 52, 54, 56, 59, 62,
95, 102, 103, 110, 111, 120, 121, 123,
141, 142, 160, 161, 173, 198, 199, 210,
218, 239, 245, 247, 253, 259, 261
subjectivism, 102, 103, 140, 150
aesthetic subjectivism, 102
constructivist subjectivism, 103
subjectivism versus objectivism, 140
transcendental subjectivism, 103
transcendental-constructivist subjectiv-
ism, 103
subjectivist, 103
subjectivities/subjectivity, 36, 42, 51, 58,
61, 80, 81, 101, 102, 107, 110, 113,
115, 116, 117, 121, 135, 176, 179, 181,
182, 194, 201, 259
substance/form (substance and form), 79,
80, 111
substantiality, 122, 198
subversion, 104, 168
subversive/subversively, 22, 28, 79, 96, 106,
108, 118, 156, 168, 183, 185, 186, 195,
196, 227, 243
success, 114, 120
superfluity, 123
superior, 57, 62, 63, 105, 181, 193, 194,
197, 198
superiority, 205, 210
superiority-inferiority units, 43
superiorized, 208
superiorizing, 203, 208
superiors, 7
superstructural, 71, 86, 90, 100, 164, 263
superstructure, 70, 90, 91, 92, 97, 99, 100,
101, 265, 295n27, 298n31
base and superstructure, 91, 100, 265
surface(s), 41, 42, 129
suspicion, 10, 75, 128, 139, 142, 150, 156,
177, 240, 250
Switzerland, 228
symbolic capital (see capital)
symbolic forms, 1, 39, 80, 233, 244, 258,
278
Index of Subjects 503
symbolic interaction, 116
symbolic interactionism, 157–8
system(s), 7, 13, 14, 47, 60, 75, 79, 90, 91,
111, 124, 128, 130, 131, 154, 217, 227,
251, 256, 309n358
systematic, 5, 13, 14, 19, 34, 38, 40, 49, 51,
52, 54, 57, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 83,
88, 151, 153, 160, 161, 198, 213, 230,
231, 238, 242, 245, 255, 258, 259, 265
systematicity, 89, 269
systemic, 15, 85, 97, 105, 116, 135, 153,
154, 174, 175, 178, 194, 236, 248, 249,
271
taken-for-grantedness, 201
target(s), 103, 162, 163, 190
target-driven, 162
taste(s), 101, 193
Taylorian, 185
techno-culture, 87
technological, 11, 14, 34, 37, 57, 60, 100,
116, 117, 123, 125, 129, 191, 222, 225,
227, 229, 276, 277, 310n371
technologies/technology, 34, 52, 85, 86,
98, 115, 116, 117, 123, 124, 125, 169,
184, 196, 227, 229, 248, 255, 266, 277,
304n246
technologization, 116, 117
telecommunications, 98
teleological, 7, 11, 32, 53, 59, 100, 104,
114, 137, 141, 154, 158, 162, 163, 164,
176, 188, 189, 198, 212, 272
non-teleological, 163, 164
teleologically, 53, 137, 158, 162, 189
teleologies/teleology, 60, 129, 137, 138,
139, 159, 162, 179, 267, 274
teleologism, 28
anti-teleologism, 104
telos, 8, 50, 59, 108, 162, 163, 166, 176,
224, 317n193
temporality, 137, 157, 244
territorial, 126, 127, 220, 223, 226, 277
deterritorialization, 98, 134, 220, 267,
276
deterritorialized, 118, 219, 220, 229
deterritorializing, 125
non-territorial, 221
reterritorialization, 134, 267
territorialization, 134
territorialized, 219, 225
territorially, 226, 228, 277
territoriality, 129, 132, 266
extraterritoriality, 126
tertiary sector, 34, 264
504 Index of Subjects
testability, 50, 56, 61
testable, 49, 56, 260
text, 67, 148, 151, 168, 242, 243, 246,
294n22, 299n77, 304n258, 309n352,
326n242
textual, 68, 148, 167, 238, 242, 244, 246,
247, 262, 270, 280, 294n22
textualism, 150, 242–4, 280, 336n89
textualist, 243
textuality, 148, 242, 243, 244, 280
extra-textuality, 67
intertextuality, 242, 243, 244
inter-textuality, 67
intra-textuality, 67
Thailand, 306n306
theoreticism, 68, 254–5, 262, 280, 340n189
theories/theory, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 28,
29, 30, 40, 41, 42, 48, 59, 61, 66, 68, 79,
84, 86, 88, 89, 91, 104, 112, 122, 130,
147, 151, 152, 153, 165, 184, 193, 213,
215, 224, 225, 237, 245, 248, 262, 275,
278, 282n10, 294n22, 295n29, 299n64
theorize(d)/theorizing, 5, 55, 60, 84, 91,
171, 197, 279
These versus Antithese, 11
thesis and antithesis, 149
thinking
comprehensive rethinking of Marxist
approaches, 74
critical thinking, 12
heterogeneous ways of thinking, 20
identitarian thinking, 254
ideological thinking, 30
modes of thinking, 241
new ways of thinking and acting in the
world, 218
postmodern thinking, 231
task of thinking about constructive alter-
natives, 280
the historian’s methods and ways of
thinking, 245
the thinking subject, 16
trap of thinking, 239
thought
anti-utopian political thought, 335n51
Aronian thought, 213
Beckian thought, 213
Bourdieusian thought, 99
classic sociological thought, 238
classical and contemporary social and
political thought, 219
classical Enlightenment thought, 77
classical sociological thought, 10, 11, 84,
89
constructivist thought, 165
contemporary intellectual thought, 5
contemporary social and political
thought, 219, 233, 267, 292n42
contemporary social thought, 297n2,
323n154, 335n68
cosmopolitan and postmodern thought,
222
cosmopolitan thought, 218
critical social thought, 234
dogmatic thought, 235
Durkheimian thought, 213
Enlightenment thought, 15, 16, 21, 22,
28, 40, 73, 77, 84, 139, 197, 234, 235,
260, 279
European intellectual thought, 76, 163
European thought, 333n13
evolutionist thought, 163
experience, action, and thought, 202
Freudian thought, 99
Hegelian thought, 213
Hegelian tradition of intellectual
thought, 165
Heideggerian thought, 99
history of human thought, 242
history of intellectual thought, 22
influential traditions of thought, 197
intellectual thought, 5, 13, 20, 22, 26,
27, 40, 41, 43, 47, 50, 54, 55, 76, 89,
90, 136, 137, 138, 140, 158, 163, 165,
197, 213, 232, 236, 240, 241, 275, 279,
282n9, 286n121
Kantian thought, 213, 215, 217
mainstream intellectual thought, 41
Marxian thought, 213
Marxian, Durkheimian, and Weberian
thought, 248
Marxist thought, 30, 99, 335n47
mode of thought, 233
modern and postmodern thought, 38
modern intellectual thought, 20, 40, 43,
47, 89, 90, 137, 138, 140, 158, 197,
232, 236, 241, 279, 286n121
modern social and political thought, 16,
197
modern social thought, 41, 42, 47, 70,
75, 99, 238, 240
modern thought, 44, 267
modern traditions of thought, 22
normative thought, 192
positivist thought, 50, 55, 56
postmodern and poststructuralist
thought, 305n293
postmodern intellectual thought, 90, 232

postmodern social and philosophical
thought, 21
postmodern thought, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, 22,
23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31–4, 38, 40, 42,
44, 45, 64, 65, 67, 70, 72, 75, 89, 90,
107, 111, 128, 137, 138, 139, 140, 151,
169, 170, 171, 172, 178, 180, 189, 195,
230, 231, 232, 233, 240, 241, 242, 244,
249, 250, 251, 253, 257, 258, 259, 262,
265, 267, 268, 278, 279, 287n150
postmodern tradition of thought, 23
postmodernist thought, 182
post-Saussurean thought, 99
poststructuralist thought, 73, 200,
305n293
school of thought, 21
scientific thought, 99
social and political thought, 16, 18, 197,
219, 233, 267, 292n42
social thought, 25, 41, 42, 47, 70, 75, 99,
234, 238, 240, 297n2, 323n154
tradition of thought, 23, 237
utopian thought, 279
Western intellectual thought, 26, 27, 136
Western thought, 240
thought experiments, 49, 55, 128, 244, 255,
280
thoughts
rational thoughts, 198
time, 11, 15, 17, 22, 32, 38, 46, 49, 50, 66,
77, 82, 91, 98, 100, 107, 114, 116, 120,
122, 123, 128, 130, 144, 163, 168, 170,
177, 182, 183, 185, 187, 193, 194, 195,
209, 218, 219, 225, 232, 239, 240, 247,
251, 263, 283n53
annihilation of space through time, 126
diversified, contingent historical time, 161
historical time, 17, 161
modern and postmodern conceptions of
‘time’, 283n53
objective immersion in time, 123
part-time, 125
single, absolute historical time, 161
space and time, 98, 194
spans of time-space, 122
subjective immersion in time, 123
time and space, 116
time consciousness, 11, 17
time in our social lifeworlds, 123
time unit, 123
timeless, 244
time-pressure, 122
time-pressured, 123
time-savings, 123
Index of Subjects 505
TNCs (transnational companies), 125, 131,
133, 309n362
togetherness, 209, 222
tolerance, 17, 120, 193, 211
totalitarian, 15, 45, 75, 139, 176, 218, 234,
235, 236, 240, 251, 268
totalitarianism, 139, 169, 218, 234, 268
totalities/totality, 38, 39, 78, 79, 82, 100,
157, 161, 166, 168, 176, 178, 180, 217,
244, 254, 263, 272, 337n116
totalization, 78, 144, 173, 174
totalize, 78, 174
totalizing, 6, 10, 22, 79, 145, 149, 172, 173,
175, 180, 186, 234, 235, 245, 246, 251,
256, 279, 280
tradition(s), 4, 8, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23,
25, 28, 30, 40, 41, 46, 48, 54, 55, 60,
62, 66, 89, 90, 93, 120, 134, 150, 154,
159, 165, 185, 192, 197, 198, 209, 211,
213, 223, 234, 235, 237, 243, 248, 275,
334n29
traditional, 4, 7, 13, 15, 28, 35, 38, 54, 84,
98, 120, 128, 171, 172, 175, 176, 177,
187, 198, 214, 220, 227, 229, 272, 273
post-traditional, 4, 92, 120, 121, 184,
236, 237, 273
traditionalism
anti-traditionalism, 184
tragedies/tragedy, 241, 246
transcendence, 12, 20, 50, 66, 94, 133, 160,
191, 203, 222, 233, 260, 266, 269, 276,
313n18
transcendent, 19, 222
transcendental, 45, 76, 77, 82, 101, 102,
107, 138, 163, 180, 199, 238, 257, 260,
263, 274
transcendentalism, 204
classical transcendentalism, 76
constructivist transcendentalism, 103
constructivist-subjectivist transcendental-
ism, 103
contextualism and transcendentalism,
204
linguistic transcendentalism, {found in
bibliography}
post-transcendentalism, 18
subjectivist transcendentalism, 103
transcendentalist, 77, 214, 275
transdisciplinarity, 66
transformation(s), 1, 3, 5, 12, 13, 14, 19,
69, 83, 84, 85, 88, 95, 96, 108, 109,
110, 118, 125, 127, 129, 133, 134, 145,
149, 161, 169, 173, 186, 209, 212, 217,
220, 227, 238, 249, 265, 282n4
506 Index of Subjects
transformative, 12, 17, 45, 69, 94, 127, 159,
186, 217, 221, 222, 243, 265, 275
transgress(ed), 94, 96, 104, 196
transgression, 104, 196
transient, 119, 122
transition(s), 1, 12, 15, 19, 33, 36, 74, 85,
86, 87, 90, 92, 100, 124, 156, 168, 171,
186, 189, 235, 264, 273, 274, 319n17
transnational, 4, 125, 129, 131, 133, 174,
207, 212, 224, 226, 229, 276, 309n362
transnational age, 225
transnational communication, 227
transnational community of risk, 229
transnational companies (TNCs), 125,
131, 133, 309n362
transnational corporations, 129, 226
transnational economic forces, 125, 133
transnational governance, 226
transnational politics, 207, 220
transnational powers, 229
transnational public spheres, 4, 224, 276
transnationalism, 212
transparency, 189
transparent, 147, 225
travelling, 122, 204
tribal, 209, 210
tribalism, 214, 215, 251, 274
tribalistic, 275
trivial, 50, 53, 214
triviality, 106
trivialization, 196, 250
trivialize, 245, 246
trust, 2, 5, 40, 59, 73, 119, 120, 170, 216
truth(s), 2, 8, 10, 14, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46,
47, 49, 53, 58, 64, 79, 107, 108, 146,
147, 167, 181, 237, 243, 247, 259, 261,
290n11
truth versus perspective, 2, 40–3, 47, 48,
259
truth claims, 14, 49, 50, 51, 53, 64, 261
truthfulness, 104, 248
Turkey, 306n306
twentieth century, 4, 15, 18, 20, 26, 34,
35, 38, 45, 73, 74, 75, 85, 86, 87, 93,
100, 110, 139, 216, 234, 246, 251, 264,
315n114
typologies/typology, 140, 141, 150, 197,
198, 324n173, 325n223
Max Weber’s tripartite typology of
domination, 198
tripartite typology, 150, 198, 324n173
typologies of reason, 197
typology of metanarratives, 140, 141
ubiquity, 43, 94, 124, 142, 172, 265, 267
Uganda, 228
UK, 228
UN, 207, 215
unboundedness, 310n371
uncertainties/uncertainty, 2, 5, 20, 40, 43,
45, 47, 48, 88, 113, 119, 122, 123, 135,
138, 139, 142, 169, 178, 189, 190, 191,
237, 242, 251, 259, 291n20
certainty versus uncertainty, 2, 40, 43–5,
47, 48, 189, 259
unconscious, 10, 16, 32, 44, 48, 51, 57, 58,
76, 94, 96, 99, 110, 113, 144, 163, 164,
260, 261
understanding(s), 3, 6, 9, 13, 16, 19, 20,
45, 48, 53, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72, 76,
84, 87, 96, 99, 109, 117, 138, 139, 142,
144, 146, 158, 160, 161, 163, 165, 180,
181, 184, 204, 214, 224, 245, 247, 262,
276, 283n43, 293n14
paradigm of understanding, 48, 66, 67,
291n33, 293n14
underprivileged, 155
UNESCO (United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization),
207
unfixity, 81
unfolding, 16, 38, 41, 51, 53, 82, 96, 110,
118, 153, 159, 166, 196, 241, 244, 246,
249, 263, 272
unification, 17, 105, 144
uniformity, 7, 144, 172, 180, 181, 272
uniqueness, 116, 221
unity, 17, 66, 78, 114, 161, 168
universal, 7, 8, 9, 16, 33, 37, 40, 41, 44, 46,
47, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 73, 74,
94, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 145, 153,
159, 161, 163, 165, 174, 187, 193
universalism(s), 47, 140, 149, 182, 204,
213, 214, 215, 219, 251, 256, 259, 275,
281, 291n31, 328n327
abstract and disempowering
universalisms, 251
anti-universalism, 47, 183, 256
humanist universalism, 213, 215
modern universalism, 47, 259
moral and political universalism, 275
normative universalism, 219
particularized universalism, 182
universalist, 6, 11, 44, 46, 47, 48, 60, 165,
166, 173, 174, 177, 181, 186, 204, 205,
210, 212, 213, 216, 218, 238, 251, 256,
272, 273, 274
 Index of Subjects 507

anti-universalist, 8, 166, 256, 340n197 unpredictability, 119, 138, 159, 160, 172,
non-universalist, 174 264, 267
post-universalist, 212 unpredictable, 32, 120, 126, 138, 142, 145,
universalistic, 214 159, 160, 163, 267, 271, 279
universality, 2, 7, 40, 45, 46, 47, 57, 60, unpreparedness, 249
74, 75, 137, 139, 143, 144, 165, 168, unprivileged, 44, 174, 204
173, 181, 182, 212, 215, 234, 237, 251, unrepresentability, 151, 244
256, 259, 260, 267, 274, 280, 291n31, untotalizable, 120
340n197 urban economy, 204
anti-universalist universality, 256, Urteilskraft, 215, 275
340n197 Uruguay, 228
belief in universality, 46 USA, 24, 132, 228, 310n371
civilizational universality, 274 use value, 84, 104
claims to universality, 60 usefulness, 8
context-transcending universality, 75 utilitarianism, 140
epistemic universality, 10 utility, 119
epistemological tension between utility-driven, 62, 198
universality and particularity, 291n31 utopia(s), 143, 175, 178, 272
factual or moral universality, 58, 260 large-scale utopias, 175, 272
historical universality, 137, 165 utopia and totality, 272
ideal of universality, 260 utopia of the grand story, 143
inventions of universality, 212 utopian, 53, 106, 107, 175, 180, 184, 196,
mechanisms of universality, 168 217, 240, 250, 273, 279
modern alignment towards universality, anti-utopian, 106, 240, 335n51
46 anti-utopian political thought, 335n51
opposition between universality and demise of utopian paradigms, 251
particularity, 46, 259, 291n31 postutopian climate, 190
philosophical obsession with postutopian deideologization, 250
universality, 47 postutopian era, 251, 280
postmodern universality, 47 postutopian interpretation of history, 251
preponderance of particularity over postutopian orientation, 177
universality in highly differentiated postutopian politics, 190
societies, 46 postutopian situation of contemporary
principle(s) of universality, 182 society, 251
pursuit of universality, 46, 251, 274 postutopian spirit, 185
quest for universality, 47, 55, 173, 260, 280 postutopian world, 250
rejection of universality, 260 utopian blueprints, 196
search for universality, 45, 47 utopian element, 107
totalizing forms of universality, 234 utopian future, 106, 175
ultimate claim to universality, 57 utopian ideals, 240
universality of metanarratives, 143 utopian longings, 184
universality of rights, 215 utopian maps, 184
universality of the big picture of society, utopian programmes, 53
186 utopian projects, 240
universality versus particularity, 2, 40, utopian solutions, 190
45–7, 48, 138, 159, 165, 181, 259 utopian thought, 279
universalizable, 48, 51, 58, 157, 252, 260 utopian venture, 217
universalization, 174 utopianism, 17, 240, 272
universe, 6, 7, 10, 13, 32, 35, 37, 42, 51, 53, political utopianism, 240
56, 58, 71, 91, 94, 101, 107, 114, 118, postutopianism, 18
123, 166, 167, 169, 177, 181, 191, 199,
204, 211, 217, 221, 264, 273, 279 vacuum, 32, 110, 142, 170, 235, 247, 250
unmasking, 41, 42, 149 validation, 153
508 Index of Subjects
validity, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 18, 20, 30, 35, 37,
47, 51, 54, 55, 57, 60, 61, 65, 67, 70,
75, 79, 81, 83, 89, 92, 94, 107, 129,
136, 147, 219, 230, 243, 253, 265
assertions of validity, 47
cognitive, normative, and aesthetic
standards of validity, 75, 107, 194
cognitive, regulative, and evaluative
standards of validity, 158
context-transcending validity, 56, 211,
259, 274
criteria of validity, 35, 60, 193
empirical validity, 86
epistemic validity, 1, 6, 9, 10, 35, 40, 44,
46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61,
73, 74, 238, 242, 245, 252, 254
explanatory validity, 90
frameworks of validity, 81, 114
invalidity, 70
logical and evidence-based validity, 230
normative validity, 202, 274
objective, normative, or subjective
validity, 253
rational validity, 43
realms of validity, 79
representational validity, 20
rules of validity, 230
standards of validity, 8, 9
systems of validity, 152, 270
universal validity, 168, 195, 210, 256
validity and legitimacy claims, 200
validity of knowledge, 2
validity-oriented, 198
validity claim(s), 55, 56, 194, 200, 234, 248,
261, 324n195
‘validity claims’ and ‘legitimacy claims’,
200, 324n195
valorization, 106, 112
value(s), 53, 60, 74, 76, 79, 84, 87, 98, 104,
120, 121, 126, 151, 162, 169, 174,
187, 193, 203, 205, 209, 223, 249, 252,
292n38
aesthetic value, 101
alteration of social values, 186
alternative values, 187
civilizational value, 280
context-transcending values, 212
cosmopolitan values, 219
cultural value spheres, 248
death of values, 107
epistemic value, 62, 70, 150, 158
epistemic value of non-rational ways of
encountering, interacting with, and
attaching meaning to reality, 62
exchange value(s), 121, 224, 228, 276
face value, 236, 309n368
‘facts’ and ‘values’, 53, 292n38
‘Western’ values and standards, 202, 274
form of value, 87
integrative social values, 121
interests and values, 98
liberal democratic values, 74
modern values, 20
modernist value, 20
moral value(s), 74, 115, 252
pluralizing value horizons, 185
postmaterialistic values, 120, 192–3
postmodern values, 46, 193
relational and differential values, 79
shifting values, 193
source of value, 87
symbolic value, 104, 223, 228
use and exchange values, 224, 276
use value, 84, 104
value of subjective and intersubjective
experiences, understanding, and
empathy, 62, 261
value of universal legitimacy, 96
value rationality (Wertrationalität), 11, 62,
120, 121
value realization, 194
value-added, 131
value-adding, 131
value-free, 60, 61, 156, 261
value-laden, 10, 60, 152, 203, 243, 245,
261
value-neutral, 8
value-pluralism, 203
value-rational, 121
values implicit in the symbolic, 53
variability, 77
varieties/variety, 16, 18, 31, 33, 36, 62, 68,
71, 109, 112, 116, 117, 134, 140, 173,
174, 187, 193, 200, 310n380
Venezuela, 228
verifiability, 57, 260
verifiable, 146, 269
Vernunft, 13, 105, 215, 234, 236, 259, 275,
333n15
Verstand, 13, 105, 236, 259, 275, 333n15
Verstehen (understand/understanding), 48,
66, 154, 291n33, 293n14
vertical, 174, 187, 189
viability, 45, 108, 164, 173, 191, 272
Vienna Circle, 49
Vietnam War, 169
virtual, 98, 115, 126, 130
virtuality, 98
 Index of Subjects 509

virtue(s) will (the will), 238

cosmopolitan virtue, 223 the will to power, 238
individualistic virtues, 119 willingness, 151, 183, 220, 249
visibility, 182 Windows, 116
visible, 7, 50, 56, 166, 200 withinness, 13
visual word, 11, 20, 33, 80, 116, 316n171
the visual within culture, 229 work/works, 20, 94, 102, 118, 119, 156,
visual art, 20 161, 163, 195, 247
visual culture, 228, 229 artificial work, 78
vitalist turn (‘vitalist turn’), 34, 289n172 ‘blue-collar’ work, 85, 125
vitality, 209 ‘I work, therefore I am’, 87, 92, 108, 264
vocabularies/vocabulary, 7, 119, 191 part-time work, 125
voiced, 155 prolongation of work, 247
voiceless, 155, 183, 214, 254 scientific work, 60, 261
volatility, 98, 309n358 transformation of work under late
voluntarism, 140 capitalism, 118
‘white-collar’ work, 85
war(s)/War(s), 50, 187 work world, 119
Cold War, 26, 32, 35, 126, 169, 170, 194, worker(s), 85, 125, 185
306n305 self-employed workers, 85
large-scale wars, 45 ‘white-collar’/‘blue-collar’ workers, 85, 125
nuclear war, 128 working class (see class)
peace and war, 187 world(s), 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22,
post-Cold War era, 170 35, 37, 41, 44, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54,
post-war, 26 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 74, 77, 80, 83, 88,
Second World War, 169, 313n18 95, 101, 107, 112, 118, 122, 126, 132,
two World Wars, 166 134, 148, 158, 169, 172, 202, 204, 207,
Vietnam War, 169 218, 220, 222, 235, 241
war against human waywardness, 190 a world in which many worlds fit, 175
war on totality, 177 almost totally commodified and
waywardness, 190 administered world, 249
WB (World Bank), 127, 226 anything-goes-world, 32
weakness(es), 22, 89, 231, 232 better world, 105, 185
wealth, 46, 120, 185, 186 causally determined world, 42
wealthiest/wealthy, 120, 132 clear and crystalline world of rationality
Weberian, 29, 53, 62, 163, 197, 198, 248 and rational choosing, 122, 198
Weberianism, 30 common normative world, 211
welfare state, 239 contemporary world, 18, 22, 34, 35, 85,
Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 163 86, 89, 124, 128, 129, 231, 251
Weltanschauung, 146, 235 cultural world, 93, 160, 209
Weltbeschreibung, 146 culture as a world ‘for itself’ (für sich), 95,
Weltbürger, 327n310 239, 334n45
Weltbürgerlich327n310 derationalized world, 35
Weltbürgerlichkeit, 327n310 description of the world
Weltgeist, 165 (Weltbeschreibung), 146
Weltgeschichte, 165 disenchanted world, 12, 294n23
Weltgeschichtsschreibung, 165 ‘the’ external natural world, 52
Weltkultur, 212 ‘the’ external objective world, 59
Weltsituiertheit, 146 external world, 45, 112
Wertrationalität, 11, 62, 120 globalized and globalizing world, 123, 266
Wertrationalität versus Zweckrationalität, 11 globalized world, 32, 126
West (the West), 17, 26, 166, 170, 194, 239, ‘his’ or ‘her’ internal subjective world, 59
302n183, 309n349, 335n50 ‘his’ or ‘her’ personal world of
Westphalian, 224, 225, 226 subjectivity, 80
510 Index of Subjects
world(s) – continued
human world, 93, 101, 107, 157, 200,
242, 264
inner world, 45, 77
internal world, 112
jungle world, 119, 184
jungle world of multiple social roles, 184
jungle world of postmodernity, 119
lifeworld, 34, 45, 114, 123, 157, 166, 167,
175, 205, 219, 227, 248
modern world, 5, 12, 89, 117, 199
modernist worlds, 313n18
multicultural world, 209
‘my’ internal subjective world, 52
‘my’ subjective world, 160
natural world, 1, 37, 39, 41, 52, 62, 213,
233, 235, 258, 278
nature as a world ‘in itself’ (an sich), 95
new world, 19, 127
‘the’ objective world, 160
‘our’ external normative world, 59
‘our’ external social world, 52
‘our’ normative world, 160
‘our’ social world of normativity, 80
outside world, 80, 112
partly or totally administered world, 15
people’s lived and experienced worlds
(mondes vécus or erlebte Welten), 157
physical world, 80, 160
‘the’ physical world of objectivity, 80
pluralistic world, 106
position in the world (Weltsituiertheit), 146
posthistorical world, 169
postindustrial world, 264
postmodern world, 57, 86, 88, 90, 113,
119, 120, 169, 177, 178, 256, 257
postmodern world of hyperreality, 88
postmodern world of multiple
‘short-terms’, 119
post-sovereign world, 126, 132, 225, 226
postutopian world, 250
post-Westphalian world, 224
present world, 220
real world, 98, 237
realized and realizable world, 163
signified world, 80
social world, 1, 10, 33, 37, 52, 58, 66, 68,
73, 90, 173, 233, 258, 265, 280, 294n22
socially and culturally hybrid world, 125
stubbornly ambiguous world, 191
symbolic world, 42
the world, 18, 32, 35, 41, 48, 49, 52, 55,
61, 62, 77, 80, 95, 99, 103, 107, 115,
118, 122, 131, 141, 146, 170, 184, 202,
203, 210, 245
three constitutive worlds of humanity, 80
unrealized and unrealizable world, 164
view of the world (Weltanschauung), 100,
141, 146, 235
volatile world, 59
weightless worlds, 156
Western world, 38
workworld of rigid, hierarchical organiza-
tions, 119
workworld of texts and word-processing,
116
world ‘out there’, 95
world as a multicultural happening, 204
world of ‘global citizenship’, 222
world of generalized communication, 183
world of global movements, 111
world of globalization, 125, 222
world of hypercomplexity, hypermobility,
and hypervelocity, 122
world of linguistic signifiers and symbolic
forms, 80
world of lived experience, 294n22
world of modernity, 178, 273
world of simulacra, of images, 98, 117
world-inhabiting and world-viewing, 184
worldly, 40, 41, 50, 52, 61, 81, 118, 147,
162, 164, 244, 253, 260
life-worldly, 157, 325n223
life-worldly realities, 8
otherworldly, 50, 260
otherworldly transcendence, 50
worldly actualities, 52
worldly agency, 118
worldly developments, 164
worldly existence, 40, 41, 164
worldly forms of small-scale or large-scale
development, 162
worldly immanence, 50
worldly immersion, 253
worldly interactions, 81
worldly knowledgeability, 61
worldly nature of scientific knowledge, 50
worldly realities, 8, 50
worldly spheres of existence, 101
worldly temporality, 244
worldview(s), 13, 30, 35, 100, 107, 193,
210, 224, 241, 255
WTO (World Trade Organization), 127, 226
Zapatistas, 175
zapping, 119, 304n263
Zeitgeist, 176, 193
Zeitgeistsurfing, 218
Zimbabwe, 228
Zweckrationalität, 11, 62, 120