GP 24-24-Offshore Passive Fire Protection

Document No.
GP 24-24
Applicability Group
Date 30 December 2005
Guidance on Practice for

Offshore Passive Fire Protection
GP 24-24
BP GROUP
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
30 December 2005 GP 24-24
Guidance on Practice for Passive Fire Protection -Offshore
Foreword
This is the first issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) BP GP 24-24. This Guidance on Practice
(GP) is based on parts of heritage documents from the merged BP companies as follows:
British Petroleum
RP 24-02 Fire Protection - Offshore
Copyright  2005, BP Group. All rights reserved. The information contained in this
document is subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which
the document was supplied to the recipient’s organization. None of the information
contained in this document shall be disclosed outside the recipient’s own organization
without the prior written permission of Director of Engineering, BP Group, unless the
terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.
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Table of Contents (Contents style)

Page
Foreword.......................................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 4
1. Scope...................................................................................................................................... 5
2. Normative references.............................................................................................................. 5
3. Terms and definitions.............................................................................................................. 6
4. Symbols and abbreviations.....................................................................................................9
5. Requirements for Passive Fire Protection:............................................................................11
5.1. PFP Fire Protection System Roles:............................................................................11
5.2. PFP System Effectiveness.........................................................................................13
5.3. Conflicts - Fires and Explosions.................................................................................15
5.4. System Installation.....................................................................................................15
5.5. PFP System Inspection, Maintenance and Repair.....................................................16
5.6. Regulatory and Code Compliance..............................................................................17
5.7. System Performance Standards.................................................................................17
6. Applications:.......................................................................................................................... 20
6.1. Structural Steelwork...................................................................................................20
6.2. Pipe Supports.............................................................................................................20
6.3. Supports for Vertical Towers and Vessels..................................................................21
6.4. Vessels...................................................................................................................... 21
6.5. Electrical, Hydraulic and Pneumatic Control Systems................................................23
6.6. Emergency Valves.....................................................................................................23
6.7. Piping and Flanged Joints..........................................................................................25
6.8. Critical Equipment (Fire pumps, emergency generators and well control equipment) 25
6.9. Risers and Riser ESD Valves.....................................................................................25
6.10. Firewalls..................................................................................................................... 27
6.11. Accommodation areas, Control rooms, Hull spaces, Utility areas and Enclosed muster
points......................................................................................................................... 28
6.12. Escape and Evacuation Systems...............................................................................29
7. Selection of Systems and Materials......................................................................................30
7.1. Primary materials and systems..................................................................................30
7.2. Specification of Penetrations......................................................................................36
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Introduction
This GP provides guidance on implemention of hazard management decisions relating to the provision
of passive fire protection. The fire and explosion hazard management process described in GP 24-20
should have already been conducted. The fire and explosion hazard management process and the
supporting analyses on fire hazards described in GP 24-21, should have provided the designer with a full
understanding of the fire hazards and a definition of the fire events (through the use of hazard
categorisation) that may occur at a facility. This process should have already defined where protection is
required, the fire hazard characteristics, the type of protection (active or passive), and the type of
systems, e.g. deluge, intumescent coatings. It shall also define the role of these systems in counteracting
the identified hazards.
This GP turns those high level objectives into detailed specifications that form the basis of design of the
passive fire protection systems. It provides guidance on how to provide reliable, effective and cost
effective systems.
Complementary Guidance on active protection (GP 24-23) decribes the role of active fire protection and
how those systems should be specified.
Where the detailed design of protection systems is not adequately described in international codes,
further Guidelines on Industry Standards have been provided.
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1. Scope
This GP provides guidance for the selection, design, and installation of Passive Fire Protection (PFP) for
offshore exploration and production installations. It does not define the need for fire protection or the
standard. The need results from the analysis of the fire hazards as described in GP 24-21 and the hazard
management decision making process as described in GP 24-20.
This guidance covers the specification of passive systems including
o structural protection
o firewall, doors and penetrations
o protection of process plant and pipelines
o protection of safety systems
o protection of accommodation and muster points
This GP covers the protection against all offshore fire hazards that may constitute a direct risk to life
through their immediate effects or through escalation including all well, well service, riser and process
hydrocarbon hazards. It covers fuel, utilities and accommodation fires through reference to default
international standards. It only covers drilling and blow out hazards and equipment on production
installations or wellhead towers where the drilling rig is an integral part of the facility. It does not cover
mobile drilling rigs or the fire protection of “knock down” drilling rigs which are owned by others and
assembled as required on the facility.
2. Normative references
The following normative documents contain requirements that, through reference in this text, constitute
requirements of this technical practice. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or revisions of,
any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this technical practice are
encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents
indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative document referred to applies.
This Guidance on Practice does not rely upon international codes and standards as primary normative
references. These are not considered to provide a fully integrated hazard management process and
therefore cannot be relied upon to ensure that systems match the events that could realistically occur or
their particular fire characteristics. They are also not considered to be sufficiently up to date with current
research on fire hazards or protection efffectiveness. They are also not considered to be sufficiently
precise to clearly define either the need for systems or the detailed performance standards that they should
meet.
BP Engineering Technical Practices (ETPs)

GP 24-20 Guidance on Practice for Fire and Explosion Hazard Management - Offshore
GP 24-21 Guidance on Practice for Fire Hazard Analysis
GP 24-23 Guidance on Practice for Offshore Active Fire Protection
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GP 24-24 Guidance on Practice for Passive Fire Protection – Offshore

GP 44-80 Guidance on Practice for Design Guidelines for Relief Disposal Systems
GP 48-50 Guidance on Practice for Major Accident Risk Process
British Petroleum (old BP) RPSEs

RP 43-3 Subsea Isolation Systems
International Standards
IMO International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974
Chapter II-2, Construction – Fire Protection, Fire Detection and Fire
Extinction
European Standards
EN ISO 13702 Petroleum and natural gas industries – Control and mitigation of fires and
explosions on offshore production installations – Requirements and
guidelines; First issue June 1999
EN ISO 834 Fire resistance tests – Elements of building construction 1975
Industry Standards
API RP 14G Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on Open Type
Offshore Production Platforms; Third edition December 1993
UKOOA Guidelines for Fire and Explosion Hazard Management Rev 2 October 2003
3. Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this GP, the following terms and definitions apply:
Active Fire Protection: A system for fire prevention and control requiring moving parts and mechanical
system that may or may not require human intervention to initiate. These include water deluge and foam
systems, monitors, systems, fire extinguishers etc.
Availability (Performance Standard): Target availability is a performance criterion for repairable

systems that accounts for both the downtime limits for a system while awaiting or undergoing repair. If
these are exceeded , further risk reduction measures may be required, possibly including the shutdown of
hazardous operations or processing. It is combined with the reliability to give the overall probability that
the system operates successfully and effectively when required.
Catastrophic Event: An event which would overwhelm an offshore installation such that; orderly
emergency response could not be achieved; the infrastructure of safety systems is impaired to such an
extent that they cannot counteract the effects of the event; or that controlled evacuation cannot be
achieved.
Catastrophic Escalation: Escalation which could lead to the destruction of the facility before safe
evacuation can be achieved.
Compartment Fire: A fire originating in the modular compartments of an offshore installation such that
there is limited ventilation.
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Confined Fire: A fire within an area such that the shape of the flames is severely disrupted by the
presence of walls or ceilings but the ventilation may not be restricted to the extent that it is ventilation
controlled.
Control Systems: (In the context of control measures for hazards rather than instrumented control
systems). Measures systems, procedures or processes which limit the severity of hazards.
Controllable Event: A fire or explosion event where the effects and potential escalation can be
controlled such that evacuation is not essential to preserve life.
Deluge Header: Piping arrangement which distributes firewater from the fire pumps to the inlets to
deluge systems and monitors which are needed to protect against the effects of process and well fires. It is
of the minimum practical length, located in a safe area and does not provide double feeds though a “ring”
type arrangement.
Deluge System: A system designed to distribute water spray onto specific targets either to suppress fires
or to protect equipment and structure from the effects.
Escape Route: A route whereby persons can remove themselves from any point in a dangerous location
to a place of safety.
Escape System: A secondary means for escape from an installation in which the individuals must depend
upon their own resources for survival; e.g. life rafts or decent devices.
Evacuation Event: A fire or explosion event that would require the controlled evacuation of personnel
from the offshore location.
Evacuation Route: A path of minimum size from each work station that is accessible at all times for
employees to reach the evacuation system.
Evacuation System: A system consisting of boats, helicopters or other means to evacuate the offshore
installation.
Exposure Protection: The fire protection offered from a suppression system for a specific type of fire
event, e.g.; jet fire, pool fire, etc.
External Flaming: External flames projected from modules due either to the size of the fire or
ventilation-controlled conditions fires (fires in modules that are controlled by the amount of ventilation in
the module).
Fixed Monitor: Part of the active fire protection system. This device is fixed in a permanent location,
connected to the firewater supply, and is capable of directing a straight or diffuse jet of water through a
variable horizontal trajectory and elevation towards a potential fire location. Typical monitors shall have
a capacity from 1800 – 3600 litres / minute.
Fixed System: A permanently installed system that either extinguishes or controls a fire at the location of
the system.
Functional (Performance Standard): The minimum measurable criteria which define whether a system
is achieving its high level performance standard. These may be criteria such as a response time, duration,
flow or application rate.
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Hazard: The potential to cause harm (including ill health or injury), damage to property, plant, products,
the environment, or production.
Helideck Reference Area: The helideck reference area is the landing area for the helicopter as defined
by 0.75D2 where the D value given in chapter 1.2 of CAP 437 is that for the largest aircraft for which the
helideck is certified.
High Level Performance Standard: A statement of the overall role or intent of a system with respect to
specific hazardous event; for example, to prevent the catastrophic rupture of a pressure vessel when
exposed to a jet fire.
Integrated Platform: An integrated or facility platform has all of the facilities upon one supporting
structure or floating hull. This may include processing, wells, drilling facilities, risers utilities and
accommodation.
Intumescent PFP: Intumescent PFP products are those which expand (or intumesce) to several times
their original size when activated by high temperatures. This action prevents the spread of flames and
smoke to other parts of a building. Passive fire seals and pipe clamps contain intumescent compounds.
Jet Fire: A fire caused by the release and ignition of a pressurized gas
Manual Fire Fighting: Manual fire fighting involves personnel using portable or fixed fire fighting
equipment to extinguish a fire.
Muster Area: A location on the installation that is located and protected from the effects of anticipated
incidents and to which people are instructed to go in the event of an emergency.
Natural Gas Liquids: Those portions of reservoir gas which are liquefied at the surface in lease
separators, field facilities, or gas processing plants. Natural gas liquids include but are not limited to the
following: ethane, propane, butanes, pentanes, natural gasoline, and condensate.
Passive Fire Protection: Fire protection which does not require power sources or initiation in order to
achieve its aim. This is generally applied to firewalls and systems which protect the plant and structures
by preventing the transfer of heat and temperature fires for a defined period. It may include systems which
react to the fire; e.g. intumescent paints.
Pool Fire: A turbulent diffusion fire burning above a horizontal pool of vaporising hydrocarbon fuel
where the fuel has zero or low initial momentum.
Pool/Spray Transition Pressure: This is the pressure at which 90% of a liquid release burns as a spray.
This is classified as 7 bar for oil and 4 bar for condensate. In the presence of medium velocity deluge in
roofed modules, these pressures will rise to 15 and 10 bar respectively.
Portable Fire fighting Equipment: Fire fighting equipment that is not fixed and is intended to be moved
to location in the event of a fire.
Probability of Failure on Demand: Generally used to define overall success rate for a safety system.
The probability of failure on demand is the inverse of the probability that the system will operate
successfully when demanded due to an emergency situation, such as a fire. This includes events causing
the system to be unavailable, including unexpected failures, breakdowns, un-revealed failures faults,
repair time, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.
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Radiative Heat Flux: Heat from impinging fire on plant structures or people either within or beyond the
flames. The absorbed heat flux will be less and will be determined by the reflectivity of the surface.
Reliability (Performance Standard): Reliability represents the probability of components, parts and
systems to perform their required functions for a desired period of time without failure in specified
environments with a desired confidence. A high reliability may be required for specific systems.
Ring main: A ring main is a method of distributing firewater around a platform such that any point can
be supplied from at least two different directions. In this Guidance on Practice, it is only used for hydrants
in process and well bay areas and for supplies to non hazardous areas. Deluge systems should be supplied
through a deluge header.
Risk: The product of the frequency of a specific undesired event and the consequences of that event.
Spray Fire: The fire characteristics resulting from the release of pressurized liquid such that the droplet
generation and heat feed back cause the liquid to burn as a spray rather than dropping out to form a pool
fire. A spray fire is normally defined by the pool/spray transition point.
Survivability (Performance Standard): Refers to a piece of equipment or system remaining operational

after an event such as a fire or explosion. The requirement for a piece of equipment to remain operable
during and/or after a specific hazardous event such as a fire or explosion. The standard will require the
severity and duration of the event or the survival time to be specified.
4. Symbols and abbreviations
For the purpose of this GP, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:
AFFF Aqueous film forming foam
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API American Petroleum Institute
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
ATK Aircraft turbine kerosene
BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
BOP Blow out preventer
BS British Standard
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CCR Central control room
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CUI Corrosion under insulation
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COSHH Control of substances hazardous to health
CSE Concept Safety Evaluation
DAE Design accidental event
DHSV Down hole safety valve
ESD Emergency shutdown
F&E Fire and Explosion
FEHR Fire and explosion hazard register
FHA Fire Hazard Analysis
GRP Glass reinforced plastic
HAZID Hazard identification
HSE Health and Safety Executive (UK)
HVAC Heating, ventilating and air conditioning
IMO International Maritime Organisation
IP Institute of Petroleum
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation
LNG Liquefied natural gas
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
MOL Main oil line
NDT Non destructive testing
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NGLs Natural gas liquids
PFP Passive fire protection
SGI Smoke and gas ingress assessment
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
SSIV Sub-sea intervention valve
SWG Standard wire gauge
TR Temporary refuge
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UKOOA United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association
UL Underwriter's Laboratory
5. Requirements for Passive Fire Protection:
The following requirements shall guide the selection and specification of passive fire protection systems
hereinafter referred to as PFP. Appendix 3 of GP 24-20 gives default provisions for control and mitigation
measures including active and passive fire protection for a range of fire hazards. If these default systems
are specified rather than following the FEHM process, then retrospective analysis and assessment of the
fire hazards shall be used to confirm their selection and specification.
The provision of PFP to protect against non process hydrocarbon hazards should follow established
international standards for buildings on marine facilities. The FEHM process should be used to confirm
the suitability of these standards wherever there are major inventories of fuel which, if ignited, might
overwhelm the installation.
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of this document describe each type of system in common use, the roles that they can
fulfil, the hazards in which they will be effective. They also list any limitations and drawbacks. These
shall be taken into account during their selection and specification.
5.1. PFP Fire Protection System Roles:

a. PFP fire protection systems shall have clearly defined roles as designated by the FEHM
process and the categorisation of the hazards.
The overall aim for fire protection in each category is:
Controllable hazards: To protect personnel in the muster area, limit fire spread and its
effects, and prevent escalation to an evacuation or catastrophic event
Evacuation hazards: To protect muster and evacuation areas and to prevent
catastrophic escalation until controlled evacuation has been completed
Catastrophic hazards: To prevent the occurrence of catastrophic events through fire
exposure
b. The use of PFP shall be considered after all practical ways to minimise the exposure of critical
equipment and structures by their relocation has been considered. These roles shall be defined
in relation to specific hazards and their quantified effects.
c. PFP shall be used in preference to active systems for the protection of structures, walls,
accommodation, muster areas and safety systems.
d. PFP shall be used where practical to prevent the premature catastrophic escalation of
evacuation events before all personnel can be mustered and leave the installation.
e. PFP systems shall fulfil one or more of the following roles:
5.1.2. Prevention of structural failure or collapse

PFP may be applied to structures where their failure can lead to;
o Further loss of containment of process hydrocarbons
o Loss of support for the muster area or safety systems
o Collapse of firewalls
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o Collapse of tall structures

o The progressive collapse of the topsides structures and jacket
5.1.3. Prevention of catastrophic process or riser failure

a. PFP may be used to protect risers and large process inventories where their failure may lead to
major escalation.
This would include catastrophic rupture of vessels or result in fires which would either
require evacuation or could be catastrophic.
b. PFP shall only be used where it does not increase the chance of leakage due to corrosion or
seriously hinder essential inspection of the equipment.
c. If this requires regular removal of the PFP, it shall only be used if it is practical to dismantle
and replace it such that it continues to maintain its effectiveness.
5.1.4. Limitation of fire spread

Firewalls, decks and ceilings may be used to separate different hazardous areas within the facility or
to segregate non hazardous areas from those hazards. They shall prevent the passage of gas, smoke,
heat and flame. They may also serve a dual role of blast walls.
The need for and extent of fire barriers shall be defined by the FEHM process in
GP 24-20. Their presence may limit ventilation, increasing the size of gas clouds, with
a consequent increase in ignition probability and explosion overpressure.
5.1.5. Protection of essential safety systems

PFP may be used to protect safety systems, or their components which are required to function at
the beginning of a fire or throughout the whole event. This may include;
o Critical shutdown or depressurisation valve, their actuators and power sources
o Control and power cables
o Piping supports for firewater, flare and drains systems
o Fire pumps and emergency power supplies
o Protection of the main, and any emergency, control rooms
Protection is only required if the system is both exposed to the fire and needed to control that
incident.
Well control equipment should not require protection against process incidents. This is
double jeopardy. If it may be exposed to process events, this should be highlighted and
operation control placed on hazardous process activities during those periods when the
well control equipment may be required.
ESD valves and their control systems should only be protected if they are in the same
area as the source of the fire for which they are required.
5.1.6. Protection of personnel

PFP may be used to protect personnel in the following ways:
o Protection of escape routes allowing personnel safe passage back to the primary muster
points or to other safe locations such as bridge linked installations
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o Protection of the accommodation from external fire effects

o Protection of personnel from internal accommodation fires
o Protection of personnel in enclosed areas from hydrocarbon and other fires
The protection of personnel in the hulls of floating installations requires particular
consideration where there might not be easy or rapid escape from fire effects.
o Protection of the muster points outside the accommodation
o Protection of the evacuation routes from the muster areas to the primary evacuation systems
o Protection of the primary evacuation systems
5.2. PFP System Effectiveness

PFP systems shall be effective in counteracting the hazards as characterised by the fire analysis.
The PFP system shall be designed to the following requirements:
5.2.1. Suitability for the fire type

Most PFP systems are suitable and approved for cellulose fires. These relate to
conditions experienced within accommodation areas with fire sources such as furniture,
fittings and timber construction of partitions.
a. Suitability for cellulose fire exposure shall be defined by the “A” rating and testing against
conditions defined in ISO 834
Pressurised liquid hydrocarbon releases below the transition pressure (see definitions),
external flaming effects from roofed or confined modules, and the hot ceiling layer
within these modules give fire exposure equivalent to a pool fire.
b. Suitability for pool fire exposure shall be defined by the “H” rating and testing against
conditions defined in ISO 834.
Direct impingement of gas jet fires and pressurised liquid releases above the transition
pressure will give jet fire exposure. The velocities and heat intensities of gas jet and
high pressure liquid spray fires are such that some passive fire protection systems may
erode, break up, or collapse under the effects.
c. Suitability for jet and spray fire exposure will be defined by the “J” rating and testing against
conditions defined in the UK Health and Safety Executive report.
The OTO 95 634 test regime attempts to simulate large high pressure gas releases using
a 0.3 kg/sec (0.7 lb/sec) propane release at 12 bar(175 psi). In highly critical
applications for high pressure gas exposure, further demonstration of effectiveness at
larger scale and pressure is advised. Typical representative testing would be exposure
to a 60 bar (875 psi) 3 kg/sec (7 lb/sec) gas jet fire.
High pressure liquid releases which are depressurised may experience short term jet
and prolonged pool fire exposure. In these cases a composite rating may be applied;
typically J30/H60 which means that there is a 30 minute jet fire exposure followed by a
30 minute pool fire exposure giving a total of 60 minutes in all.
d. PFP may be designed to match these jet and spray fires but only materials and complete
systems which have been tested and certified, or examined and approved by a BP authority,
under these conditions shall be used.
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5.2.2. Suitability for the protected equipment and areas

The suitability of passive protection for equipment will depend upon the shape, complexity and
need for routine access to that equipment.
a. PFP should be suitable for structures and walls where it is directly applied and bonded to the
surfaces allowing it to follow the shape of the steelwork.
b. PFP should not be suitable for complex process equipment. Penetrations or joints in the
passive protection for instruments, cable, impulse line, flanges, doors and access panels will
cause weak points. There features will deteriorate more rapidly than the main body of the
passive system. Passive protection should only be used if there are effective, long lasting,
proven detailed arrangements for these features.
c. The use of enclosures as PFP for equipment such as fire pumps, emergency generators,
hydraulic power packs and valve actuators may be permitted.
d. PFP shall be suitable for the underlying temperatures of any structure or process equipment to
which it may be applied.
Intumescent epoxy products begin to lose their properties between 60 oC (140ºF) and
85oC (185ºF) depending upon the manufacturer. This should be considered when
applying the product to risers or process plant.
e. PFP should not be used where its presence may increase the likelihood of hydrocarbon release
or reduce the probability of success of safety systems.
1. Restrictions in access to equipment will hinder or prevent critical inspection such as the
non destructive examination of vessel walls for thinning, pitting or erosion
2. The presence of passive protection may encourage corrosion through entrapment of
water, particularly in open deck areas or modules protected with deluge systems.
3. Passive protection may cause equipment and cables to overheat, reducing their capacity
or reliability.
5.2.3. Suitability for the working environment

a. PFP systems which generate toxic or acrid fumes shall not be used within the accommodation
or enclosed escape routes.
The generation of fumes from PFP systems within openly ventilated hydrocarbon areas
is not considered to be a problem unless the rate of fume generation increases the
overall toxicity or asphyxiation potential of the smoke from the fire by more than 10%.
b. PFP systems shall be suitable for the operating environmental conditions and realistic
exposure to chemicals which may be present on the plant, such as drilling fluids or process
additives.
5.2.4. Sufficiency
The extent of the fire protection coverage shall be sufficient to match the dimensions of the
damaging events. External flaming from confined modules and the radiation from large fires shall
be taken into account. Reasonable variations in the location of the fire effects due to wind strength
and direction should be included in the analysis for coverage area.
The duration of the fire protection shall be sufficient to;
a) match the duration of the fire,
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b) ensure the operation or survival of the protected plant,

c) or to allow controlled evacuation, which ever is appropriate according to the
categorisation and consequences.
5.2.5. Effectiveness
The effectiveness of the system depends upon all aspects of the completed system
meeting the performance standards upon initial commissioning and thereafter
throughout the life of the facility.
The type of system and the functional performance standards shall be sufficient to ensure that the
system performs its role effectively against the designated hazards for the life of the facility. Design
conditions shall include:
a) Any deterioration of the material properties over time, particularly where it is
difficult to repair or replace them
b) Systems which are regularly opened or disassembled for inspection of the protected
equipment shall be robust and have designs where the effectiveness of the protection
can be assured after repeated intervention.
c) In order to take account of any deficiencies in installation or deterioration with time,
a design safety factor of 25% shall be applied to the duration of the protection unless
the vendors can demonstrate that this is not required and guarantee lifelong the
performance with a lower figure.
d) Systems shall remain effective following any explosion effects and the deformation
of any supporting or underlying structure or equipment
5.3. Conflicts - Fires and Explosions

a. Any conflict between fires and explosions shall be identified during the FEHM process.
b. The primary conflict is between the requirement for effective fire barriers and for natural
ventilation and the presence of these barriers shall be defined by the FEHM process in
GP 24-20.
c. PFP enclosures located within confined areas with gas explosion hazards shall be designed to
minimise their effects upon the overpressures.
Enclosures shall be sized, located and oriented such that they minimise the turbulence
and vent blockage in there areas.
5.4. System Installation

a. The effectiveness of the system will depend upon the installed system being at least as good as
the systems which were certified during type testing and approval. This depends upon the
material, preparation, site installation and detailing matching that approval standard.
b. Where the quality of the system may be impaired by the weather conditions during application
such as temperature, humidity or rain, the limiting conditions shall be identified and taken into
consideration during selection of materials.
c. Systems shall be installed either by the vendors of the materials and systems or by an
applicator or installer who has been trained and formally approved and certificated by them.
d. The quality assurance system shall ensure that the completed system does meet the
performance standard.
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e. For coating systems, inspections shall provide assurance of:

o the surface preparation
o primer type and application
o time intervals and weather conditions between layers
o bond strength
o reinforcement
o edge and penetration detail
o the applied material quality
f. For other systems, inspections shall provide assurance of:
o alignment of components
o the assembly methods
o joint details
o edge and penetration detail
g. The completed PFP system shall be approved and certified by the vendor’s representative as
matching the certification test, performance standards, and the procurement documentation.
The effectiveness of passive protection is highly dependent upon the materials and the
application on site. There have been a number of failures due to deficiencies in these
areas. The judgement of their adequacy is a specialised task and the vendors are
normally the best qualified to judge that adequacy. Vendors shall be required to
perform periodic site inspection or continuous supervision and provide a formal
certificate to verify that the system, as applied and installed, meets the performance
standards. This gives them primary responsibility for the quality and effectiveness of the
overall system.
h. All passive fire protection coatings shall carry an indelible means of identification such that, as
a minimum, material and fire/blast rating is self evident without reference to drawings,
documentation or certificates. Suitable methods shall include nameplates or embossed/painted
surfaces.
5.5. PFP System Inspection, Maintenance and Repair

a. PFP systems shall maintain their properties for the life of the facility with the minimum
reasonable amount of inspection, maintenance, repair and refurbishment.
b. An inspection and maintenance schedule shall be developed in conjunction with the vendors.
c. PFP system inspection shall address the structure, assembly and the condition of the materials
of construction.
d. Arrangements shall be provided either to assess the chemical properties of the fireproofing
materials or else vendors shall demonstrate by accelerated or real time testing that the
properties do not fall below the minimum functional standards over the working life of the
installation.
e. Repairs shall be carried out using the same materials as those from the original construction. If
these are no longer available, the systems shall be cut back or removed to a suitable junction
so that a certified interface between the old and new systems can be created. Repairs shall
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follow the vendor’s procedures and shall be carried out either by them or an approved
applicator or installer.
5.6. Regulatory and Code Compliance

a. Systems shall comply with any local country statutory requirements and regulations.
b. Compliance with local regulations, class rules or default prescriptive codes and standards shall
not be used in place of a formal assessment of the fire hazards to determine the need for fire
protection.
c. Prescription of fire protection requirements without hazard assessment shall not be used to
provide assurance that the systems are either sufficient or effective.
5.7. System Performance Standards

The following performance standards shall be set for all PFP systems required by the FEHM
process. These shall ensure that the requirements of above are met and can be measured or assessed
throughout the lifecycle of the facility.
The requirements for setting performance standards are fully explained in GP 48-50. These are the
clearly defined minimum requirements which the fire protection systems shall meet during the
working life of the facility. Design performance standards shall be set to take account of
performance deterioration of the system and there shall be sufficient reserve performance to allow
prolonged intervals between refurbishment and repair.
5.7.1. Fire Type
5.7.2.
Fire exposure shall be categorised A, H or J and certified. PFP systems may be exposed to different
fire types and shall be suitable for the anticipated range of heat fluxes and flame velocities.
5.7.3. Duration
5.7.4.
a. Systems shall be specified to prevent failure within a specified duration, where failure is
defined as exceeding the failure temperature. The duration will either be:
1. maximum anticipated fire exposure time.
2. operating time of the protected equipment (e.g. ESD valves).
3. evacuation time.
The figures used for the duration of the protection ought to be conservative, i.e. taking
account of possible inaccuracies in the fire estimates, manual rather than automatic
operation of safety systems and delayed evacuation while searches are carried out for
lost personnel.
b. The duration applies to two aspects of the design of firewalls;
1. time that the wall maintains its structural integrity and resisted the passage of smoke and
flame
2. insulation time; i.e. the time that the safe side remains below specified point and average
temperatures
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c. The minimum default time that walls shall maintain their structural integrity shall be as
follows:
1. Jet and pool rated fire walls designated H and J ratings: 1 hour
2. Primary non hydrocarbon rated fire walls, designated “A” ratings by international codes:
1 hour
3. Internal accommodation partitions, designated “B” ratings by international codes:
30 minutes
d. The FEHM process shall identify any walls which require a longer survival time. The integrity
of the walls shall be at least as long as the insulation time.
5.7.5. Coverage
5.7.6.
a. Coverage shall be defined as the plant, equipment and structure to be protected.
b. Coverage should be sufficient to ensure that areas of localised overheating are not sufficient to
constitute failure of the protected item.
c. Coverage shall include connecting piping or structure which shall also require protection in
order to prevent heat excess conduction into the protected item.
5.7.7. Failure Temperature
5.7.8.
Failure temperature shall be defined as the temperature above which the protected item would have
insufficient strength to carry out its role in the following:
(a) Containing hydrocarbons (piping and vessels).
The default figure should be based on an average steel temperature. It should be the
temperature at which the yield strength has reduced by 50%. Localised heating in
excess of these temperatures may be permissible providing that it does not compromise
the overall integrity. Greater reductions in yield strength may be used in cases where
the steel is not highly stressed.
(b) Supporting loads (structural steel).

The default figure should be 450oC (840ºF). This may be increased if a detailed analysis
of the structure and material shows that the overall structural integrity will be
maintained at higher temperatures or with localised heating above that figure. This may
be applied in the case of gas jet fires which only cause local effects to a single member.
Liquid fires have a larger flame volume and are likely to provide widespread uniform
heating to the structure. A structural engineer should be consulted regarding structural
strength at high temperatures.
(c) Limiting enclosure and the surface temperatures on the protected side (accommodation
internal temperatures or equipment enclosures such as fire pumps).
1. The default average internal temperature for the muster area should be 60 ºC (140ºF)
2. Internal surface temperatures for fire walls should not exceed 139 ºC (282ºF) average and
180ºC (356ºF) maximum at any point
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3. The maximum temperatures for machinery enclosures shall be such that the operation of
the equipment is not impaired
(d) Safety system operation (valve operation).
The maximum temperatures will be determined by assessment of the equipment and
consultation with the manufacturers.
5.7.9. Operational Life
5.7.10.
The operational life shall be defined as the required life in the anticipated environmental conditions
and the default should be field life, or a minimum of 10 years.
The inspection, service and refurbishment requirements should be provided by the
manufacturers. They should provide guarantee for the performance over the specified
life on the basis that their requirements are met.
5.7.11. Explosion Resistance
5.7.12.
The explosion characteristics and consequent deformation after which the systems are expected to
function to their specified performance shall be defined.
The explosion resistance will be a function of the performance of both the passive
system and any supporting steelwork. The explosion resistance should take into account
any elastic and plastic deformation of the underlying structure or supports.
5.7.13. Impact Resistance
5.7.14.
The required resistance to impact should be defined considering normal operations and missiles in
explosions.
5.7.15. Availability and Reliability

The FEHM process shall determine the minimum probability that PFP will fulfil its role as defined
by the functional performance standards. For PFP, this shall be expected to be very high, typically
in excess of 99.5% as this is a passive system requiring no moving parts or human intervention. The
only reasons for the non availability of the systems are.
o removal for inspection or maintenance of the protected item
o failure to reinstate the system after intervention
This includes the failure to close and latch fire doors. Fire doors normally are designed
out of the firewalls facing the process and well bay areas.
o system degradation below a minimum standard
o damage through external effects
This high probability of success will be assured by the robustness and quality of the design and by
applying an appropriate safety factor in the design.
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The design shall proceed upon the assumption that the system is always in place and effective.
Operations shall carry out risk assessments whenever a system is not available and shall implement
further risk reduction measures or limit operations. This assessment shall consider the need to shut
down operations if the system is ineffective for long periods.
6. Applications:
The preferred method of protection of exposed equipment, structure, and safety systems shall be to locate
them where they would not be exposed to fire hazards. Where that is not possible, they shall be located
such that the severity of any exposure is minimised. Thereafter, the possibility of their failure shall be
assessed using the FEHM process and the techniques given in GP 24-21.
When it is determined that PFP is required, the PFP system shall be applied as follows:
6.1. Structural Steelwork

a. Structural steel shall be protected by directly applied epoxy intumescent PFP. This shall apply
to both the primary and secondary steel work on the topsides of fixed and floating structures.
b. Epoxy intumescent PFP shall not be applied to areas where there is direct regular exposure to
wave action unless it has an inherently low water absorption rate and has been suitably coated.
Intumescent epoxy paints all absorb water to a greater or lesser extent. This can cause
softening and a reduction in the fire performance. Two areas are at particular risk of
water exposure; the cellar decks of fixed structures and the supports for the process
plant on FPSOs. Protection is not normally extended more than 5m below the topsides
as the FEHM process should minimise the likelihood of fire exposure in this area.
c. In cases where the structure is an integral part of a fire barrier such as a wall or a ceiling, both
should be protected by the same material. If a different arrangement is chosen, the design
interface between the panel and structural systems should be verified to confirm that it will
meet the performance standards.
d. The extent of the protection should take into account heat transfer into the steel structure from
any other steel connections, walls or ceilings.
e. Epoxy intumescent PFP should not be applied to bolted structures such as drilling derricks or
flare towers.
Bolted structures require regular inspection. There is no practical way of protecting
these structures other than using monitors. If their failure can lead to critical
escalation, the bolted design should be challenged and replaced with a welded
construction which can be protected with epoxy PFP.
f. Structural joints may require routine inspection for fatigue cracking. If these also require
passive protection, directly applied epoxy intumescent PFP will inhibit that inspection. In that
case, the design of the structure should be reviewed and consideration given to reduced
loadings or increased structural integrity to eliminate the need for inspection.
6.2. Pipe Supports

a. Pipe supports for major process lines, deluge mains, flare and relief systems shall be passively
protected if the fire size and duration requires protection.
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b. Deluge system main supports shall be protected if the response time of the systems is greater
than 120 seconds or the systems do not provide general area coverage.
c. Epoxy intumescent PFP shall be used.
d. Pipe hangers shall not be used.
6.3. Supports for Vertical Towers and Vessels
6.4.
Vessel supports shall be protected with PFP if the FEHM process identifies there is sufficient fire
exposure and that major escalation may result either from the release of the inventory or the
collapse of a tall vessel onto other parts of the facility.
The vessel supports refer to
 the supporting structure
 the mountings which raise the vessel above the floor.
 the skirts or saddles which are part of the vessel.
The structure is covered in 6.1. The skirts, supports, and mountings shall be protected as follows:
6.4.1. Floor mountings

a. The mountings which are not part of the welded construction of the vessel shall be protected
with epoxy intumescent paint.
b. The mountings shall be designed to allow movement at the free end of any horizontal vessel.
These joints are in compression and should not be highly stressed. It is not necessary to have a
certified joint at this point, providing that the amount of exposed metal is minimised.
c. Elevated exposed legs supporting towers or vessels shall be fire proofed to their full load
bearing height.
d.
6.4.2. Skirts and saddles

a. If the vessels are not passively protected, then the saddles and skirts do not need to be
passively protected. PFP may be required if the collapse of tall vessels onto other parts of the
facility has been identified by the FEHM process as a particular consequence.
If deluge protection is considered sufficient to protect the vessels, then this is also
considered sufficient to protect integral saddles and skirts.
b. Anchor bolts for vertical vessels shall be fire protected unless otherwise specified. These may
require removable cast intumescent panels to match the material on the skirts.
6.5. Vessels
6.6.
a. Passive protection may be required to prevent catastrophic rupture (BLEVE), loss of inventory
or to reduce the size of the fire relief system. This shall be defined by the FEHM process or by
the GP 44-80.
There is no simple solution for the protection of vessels which require protection
against sustained high pressure liquid or gas jet fires. Most gas inventories are not
Page 21 of 38
sufficient to cause rupture of large vessels such as separators but many liquid
inventories can give fires of sufficient size and duration to do so. Deluge has limited
effectiveness and both the source and target vessels may have to be depressurised. If
there is still a need for passive protection onto vessels which may be subject to
corrosion, the FEHM process should be revisited, including the examination of
automatic or enhanced depressurisation.
b. PFP of pressure vessels which may be subject to internal corrosion shall be avoided unless
there is no other practical means of achieving the requirements.
There are no commercially available PFP systems which can allow NDT without the
removal of the system. Experience has shown that no commercially system allows easy
access without major dismantling. It has also shown that this takes considerable time
and that it is rarely reinstated to the original standard. After repeated removals the
system is unlikely to be effective unless it is carried out or inspected by the
manufacturer.
c. Where a vessel is to be fire protected, the whole vessel shall be PFP. Pipe work leading from
the vessel shall be protected up to the first fire safe ESD valve.
d. The PFP system shall be specifically designed to resist the drag forces of explosion due to
foreseeable blast waves (if any), and to maintain its insulation properties for the period defined
by the performance standard.
e. All systems other than those directly bonded to the vessel shall be designed to resist the
ingress of moisture into the insulation and through to the vessel itself. It shall be self draining
to allow the release of any moisture.
f. Vessels shall be coated to prevent corrosion due to the ingress and retention of salt water at the
vessel operating temperature.
g. Special designs shall be made to prevent chloride stress cracking of protected stainless steel
vessels.
Vessels will be exposed to the local saline atmosphere and may also be periodically
drenched with sea water from the deluge system. It should be presumed that all systems
other than directly bonded epoxy intumescent will admit some water and that this will
be retained by the system. There have been a number of serious near miss incidents
involving corrosion under insulation including chloride stress cracking.
h. If vessel inspection is required the future operator if available, shall be consulted as to the
choice of the system and the practicality of its removal and effective reinstatement. Otherwise
the Group Fire team shall be consulted.
i. Mineral fibre and stainless steel clad insulation systems may be used for vessel protection
providing that it has been fully certified for the duty. It shall only be used for protection from
pool fire exposure unless the complete system including the joint details has been exposed to
representative jet fire testing.
In this case, the testing described in OTI 95634 is not considered to be a representative
jet fire test. Testing should be carried out on a complete vessel arrangement, including
details to represent all connections, man ways and instruments. Flow rates of 3 kg/sec
are considered to be of an adequate scale with pressures and fluids to represent the
source fire conditions as designated by the FEHM process.
This type of fire protection will require ceramic fibre to withstand the fire conditions
and the stainless cladding design shall be more robust than conventional insulation
arrangements.
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j. Directly applied epoxy intumescent PFP may be used but only where there is no requirement
for external NDT. It shall not be used where the normal vessel operating temperatures exceed
the normal working temperatures of the PFP system.
The only cases where there is no requirement for external NDT are those where the
internal process fluids are not inherently corrosive or the vessel materials are
inherently corrosion resistant. Internal inspection or the use of corrosion resistant
linings are not substitutes for external NDT.
Directly applied epoxy systems may be used if a point specific corrosion inspection plan
can be developed for the vessel. The use of removable inspection windows over these
points is permitted providing that they do not constitute a total of more than 5% of the
vessel area or more than 2 points in any one square metre
k. The man ways shall be removable without damaging the PFP. This will require the use of
removable cast epoxy mouldings to protect the flange and the bolts.
l. Soft wrap or flexible panels system shall not be used if regular removal for inspection is
required.
m. Rigid cast or pre-shaped panel systems may be used only if panels can be removed
individually or in pairs without disturbing the overall integrity of the system.
6.7. Electrical, Hydraulic and Pneumatic Control Systems
6.8.
a. The protection system selected should keep the temperature of the cable within acceptable
limits for the time period necessary to carry out critical control functions.
However, it should be noted that fire proofing systems for cables can result in cable
operating temperatures that are higher than normal and the cable may need to be de-
rated.
b. Hydraulic and pneumatic lines which are required to deliver pressure in order to fulfil their
function, i.e. they are not fail safe, shall be protected if they are exposed to the fire which
needs that system to operate.
Pneumatic and hydraulic systems which are fail safe, i.e. function on loss of pressure,
do not require protection. These systems may be fitted with fusible or frangible plugs to
ensure their operation before the system fails
c. The supports for these cable and hydraulic trays shall be protected with intumescent epoxy
PFP. Pipe hangers shall not be used.
d. Cable and hydraulic trays may be protected with rigid panel, moulded epoxy and soft wrap
systems.
These cable trays should not require access for inspection. If they are disturbed for
modification, the system should be recertified by the vendors
Hydraulic systems using type 304, 316 and 321 stainless steel tubing may not require
fire protection provided all parts of the system are provided with pressure relief.
e. Hydraulic power packs shall be protected by enclosures or panel systems
Page 23 of 38
6.9. Emergency Valves
6.10.
a. The FEHM process will determine which valves are critical and whether they require
protection.
b. Valves which are fail safe; i.e. operate to the desired position on loss of pneumatic or
hydraulic pressure should not require protection providing heat sensitive fusible/frangible
plugs or plastic piping is fitted and located close to the valve and actuator. They may also be
connected to a more widespread pneumatic shutdown system.
c. Where blast and/or fire protection is required, both the valve and the actuator may be protected
with the same enclosure.
d. The assessment of the fire exposure and the response time of the system will determine
whether the actuator alone or the whole valve assembly should be protected. This protection
should extend over the flanges and 1m (3 ft) either side of the valve.
In most cases, only the actuator requires protection as the mass of the valve delays the
rise in temperature of the body such that it will operate within the time defined in its
performance standard. Fire safe valves are normally designed to operate at elevated
temperature. More information on fire safe valves can be found in the ETP #62 series
documents.
e. Where continued power is required to operate valves which are critical for safe shutdown
(depressurisation or isolating the feed of a unit) the valve and its associated power supply shall
be afforded fire protection as follows.
1. Protection shall be provided to power and signal lines and the motor or actuator.
2. The valve is within a significant fire exposed envelope
3. The duration of the protection shall be sufficient to ensure that the valve has completed
its function.
4. Where protection has been specified, it shall have a minimum duration of 15 minutes.
5. Duration may be greater to allow sufficient time for the following to take place:
o Detection of the fire
o Remote manual initiation of the valve from a remote point such as the control room
This shall apply even if the valve is normally automatic to allow for instances when the
control action may be overridden. This shall acknowledge that this is an emergency
situation and shall allow time to recognise that the valve has not close. This may be up
to 5 minutes
o The valve operation. Large valves may take up to 2 minutes to close.
o Limitations on the speed of valve closure. Incoming valves on liquid lines may have
extended closure times to prevent surge pressures
f. Rigid systems such as those listed below shall be used in preference to soft wrap systems.
o Cast epoxy intumescent enclosures
o Shaped insulating GRP enclosures
o Panel systems on a supporting framework
Page 24 of 38
Soft wrap systems have a poor record of replacement. The initial quality of assembly by
the manufacturers does not appear to be achievable by operators when servicing
valves. This allows the systems to become misaligned and renders them ineffective.
g. The system must be designed to allow access for maintenance, inspection and removal.
Removal cases will require full strip down of the system. The system should be designed to
withstand frequent removal, particularly hinges and catches.
h. Systems with screws/bolts on inspection hatches are unsuitable.
i. The valve hand wheel and engaging lever shall not be fire proofed to the extent that the valve
is inoperable.
j. The valve position indicator shall not be covered.
6.11. Piping and Flanged Joints

a. Piping and flanged joints should not normally require passive fire protection.
b. The FEHM process may identify particular cases where the failure of piping or a critical joint
could lead to catastrophic escalation, therefore in these cases, the choice of protection should
follow the principles for vessels.
c. Flanged joints may be protected using removable rigid half shells made from cast intumescent
epoxy PFP or shaped GRP systems. This protection should extend 1m (3 ft.) either side of the
flanges.
6.12. Critical Equipment (Fire pumps, emergency generators and well control equipment)
a. Critical equipment should be protected by location such that their exposure to process and well
fires is minimised.
b. If protection is still considered necessary by the FEHM process, critical equipment may be
housed within rooms protected with firewalls or they may have a dedicated enclosure made
from panel systems.
c. Where the critical equipment needs an air supply either for cooling or combustion air, the
intakes should be located such that they will minimise the ingestion of flames, smoke and hot
products of combustion.
d. If the supporting structure may be exposed to fire, it should be protected as per structures.
6.13. Risers and Riser ESD Valves
6.14.
a. Risers and associated ESD valves should be protected as required by the FEHM process and
BP RPSE RP 43-3.
b. The valves and risers should be protected by location. This may require segregation by
firewalls or solid floors.
The risers normally terminate at ESD valves underneath the platform or in a dedicated
riser area which is totally segregated from all other hazards. If they have solid decks
above them, and/or effective firewalls, specific protection of each valve and riser should
not be necessary. The detailed design of the riser, valves and inboard instrumentation
should be examined to determine whether these constitute a design case within these
areas. A large number of risers could result in a moderate probability of inter riser
escalation. Instruments inboard of the ESD valve could be a source of leakage which
Page 25 of 38
could affect all of the risers and valves in the areas, again constituting a design case. If
these conditions are identified, the FEHM process should be revised to determine if
protection in necessary
c. The protection specification should match the maximum anticipated explosion overpressure
and impact loads where the riser and valves cannot be located remote from these hazards.
d. The fire protection systems must match the type and duration of the anticipated fires and
should protect the ESD valve, the actuator, control and support systems (e.g. hydraulic power
packs) and the riser down to 5 m (16 ft.) below the bottom deck of the platform.
The need for further protection below the bottom deck will be determined by the FEHM
process.
e. The protection of the valves and actuators should follow the guidance mentioned above.
f. The protection of the risers shall not facilitate hidden external corrosion. This may arise from
water absorption by the PFP system, corrosion tracking under a directly applied PFP system or
water penetration into a gap in between the system and the riser. The possibility of this
occurring as a result of damage shall be considered.
g. Risers shall have effective corrosion protection under the PFP or the systems shall have
sufficient inherent corrosion resistance to control it.
Such damage may not be revealed immediately and it may take 12 months before it is
identified and repaired. Systems should have sufficient inherent corrosion resistance
such that only superficial damage to the riser may occur in that time.
h. Risers with passive fire protection shall be located such that they cannot be directly impacted
by supply boats.
i. The PFP systems shall remain effective after prolonged exposure to sea water.
j. The PFP systems shall take into account the thermal and dynamic movement of the risers.
They shall remain effective over the full range of movement of the risers.
k. Any additional wave loadings on the riser caused by the additional diameter shall be included
in the riser, support and structural analyses.
l. The temperature differences between operating and shutdown conditions due to the process or
well fluids may cause considerable thermal expansion and contraction. The PFP system should
be able to accommodate this relative movement.
m. If the PFP systems are rigid and require a seal at either end to prevent water ingress, this seal
should be able to accommodate this thermal expansion and contraction movement. If a rigid
system is directly bonded to the riser at either end or over the entire length, the bond strength
should be sufficient to accommodate the shear stresses caused by the differential thermal
expansion.
n. The design of the PFP shall provide an effective means of providing support within the riser
guides or clamps. It shall withstand any loads, movement and chafing within these guides.
o. Risers which require both PFP and thermal insulation shall be treated as a special design case.
If possible the design should be revised to eliminate the need for one or the other. Achieving
effective corrosion resistance, insulation and fire protection will be a difficult compromise.
p. The following systems are considered suitable for protection of risers:
1. Directly applied composites
This can only be applied onshore.
Page 26 of 38
2. Moulded and clamped composites

3. Directly applied intumescent epoxy
Only materials with a very low water uptake should be considered. They should be
coated with a water resistant coating such as a glass flake epoxy.
4. Moulded epoxy shells
These are only suitable for use in the 5m (16 ft.) area under the topsides
5. Fire resistant vulcanised rubber systems
This can only be applied onshore.
6. Enclosure of the riser within a water filled J tube
6.15. Firewalls
a. Firewalls shall conform to the requirements of ISO 834, Fire resistance tests - Elements of
building construction. They shall meet the performance standards and shall retain their
structural strength and resistance to the passage of smoke and flame after the fire exposure of
the designated duration.
b. The firewall design shall either shield the supporting structure from heat exposure or it shall be
directly protected with PFP.
c. Firewalls shall fulfil their required fire performance following exposure to the blast loads
designated by the FEHM process.
The blast loading may cause deflection of the firewall. Controllable events should not
cause plastic deformation. Evacuation events may cause plastic and permanent
deformation but should not damage the wall integrity such that it permits the passage of
smoke and flame. Following the loading and deformation, the fire resisting properties
of the wall should be sufficient to meet the performance standard.
d. Penetrations and doors through firewalls directly facing hydrocarbon areas should be
minimised. Those that remain should meet the same standard as the wall for fire and blast
protection.
The integrity of any penetrations may be affected by the deflections due to the blast
loadings. Their design should be capable of absorbing those deflections if the piping or
services passing through do not move with the wall.
e. Where firewalls may be exposed to hydrocarbon fires from either side, they shall meet the
rating defined by the performance standard for each face.
Some wall designs rely on heat loss from the non exposed side to maintain the
supporting structure below the failure temperature. Applying fire resisting insulation to
both sides may compromise the wall causing the core to overheat.
f. The following types of firewall may be considered:
1. Free standing profiled steel coated with intumescent epoxy PFP
This is particularly suitable for jet and pool fire exposure following blast loading
2. Sheet steel with structural supports coated with intumescent epoxy PFP
This is suitable for pool and jet fire loading but is less resistant to preceding explosions
Page 27 of 38
3. Free standing profiled stainless steel with mineral wool insulation systems on the “safe”
side
This is particularly suitable for jet and pool fire exposure following blast loading
4. Panel systems supported by a structural steel framework.
Designs which completely shield the supporting structure are preferred. Their
suitability for jet and pool fire exposure and their explosion resistance shall depend
upon the characteristics of each type of panel
6.16. Accommodation areas, Control rooms, Hull spaces, Utility areas and Enclosed
muster points
6.16.1. Internal requirements:

The specification for the internal partitions and the protection of escape routes within the
accommodation, hull and utility areas shall meet the requirements of the International Maritime
Organisation requirements for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
Refer to the active fire protection practice GP 24-23 regarding the use of sprinklers. As
they are no longer considered essential, the “B” rated partitions between cabins shall
extend through any suspended ceilings up to the floor above. Materials of construction,
fixtures and fittings shall comply with the low surface spread of flame and ignitability
requirements of ISO 834.
6.16.2. Protection from external effects:

a. The exposure to smoke, radiated heat and flame shall be defined by the FEHM process. The
accommodation, emergency control room, and any enclosed muster areas shall be designed to
maintain habitable conditions when exposed to evacuation event fire loadings for the
maximum time required to evacuate.
Part of the accommodation may be designated as a temporary refuge in which
personnel may muster and remain until the incident subsides or evacuation proceeds. In
that case, the remainder of the accommodation is not required to meet the survivability
and habitability requirements. However, there must be effective barriers to heat and
smoke between the muster area and the remainder of the accommodation.
Habitable conditions are those in which orderly muster can be carried out without
inducing panic and decisions can be taken without loss of judgement due to smoke or
toxic effects. These conditions shall not rise above the following within the stipulated
survival time:
o Internal air temperature 60ºC (140ºF)
o Carbon monoxide level 300 ppm
o Smoke density 1 db/m
(These conditions to be confirmed by BP)
b. The whole design of these enclosures shall achieve this result. On permanently manned
facilities, this shall include:
1. Their location such that their exposure to fire effects, particularly external flaming and
smoke is minimised
Page 28 of 38
2. The positioning of any weak points; doors, windows, penetrations and HVAC inlets such
that their exposure to smoke, flame (toxic and flammable gas) is minimised.
The regular access points to the accommodation and muster points should be positioned
closer to the hazards so that exposure of personnel to the hazards is minimised
3. The provision of large air locks on the primary escape routes into the accommodation
from the hazards areas and on the primary evacuation routes out to the lifeboats. These
air locks shall be of sufficient size to accommodate a stretcher and the bearers.
4. The provision of positive pressurisation
5. The provision of detection and shutdown systems for ventilation such that they will close
before a significant quantity of smoke or gas is ingested.
Non resident and small facilities with limited numbers of personnel may not require all
of these systems if the primary response to fire hazards is evacuation. These are only
required where the muster and evacuation process may be delayed by the weather
conditions or take a prolonged time to account for everyone on board.
c. The external walls and ceiling of the accommodation shall be a minimum of A60 rated. This
will be sufficient to withstand radiation exposure from fires up to 100 kw/m 2 (31,750 btu/ft²).
d. The accommodation floor should be a minimum of A0. If the accommodation floor is located
on top of a solid deck with sufficient spacing between them, or there is an effective fire barrier
closing the gap, calculations shall be made to verify that no further insulation is required.
e. The supporting floor shall be fitted with bunds to prevent the spread of any liquid
hydrocarbons underneath it.
The requirement for bunding shall apply where there is any potential for rain out from
a blow out, fuel spills or process hydrocarbons.
f. Walls which may be subjected to direct fire exposure from pool or low pressure liquid fires or
to external flaming shall be rated H60.
g. Walls which may be subjected to direct gas jet fire or high pressure liquid fire exposure shall
be jet fire rated for the duration of the fires or the maximum evacuation time whichever is
shorter.
h. An all welded steel or stainless construction shall be used for accommodation modules, control
rooms and any enclosed muster areas.
i. All penetrations and doors shall match the rating of the adjacent walls. Walls and penetrations
should be designed to maintain their fire rating after this exposure and any subsequent
deflection.
j. The accommodation should be located so that it is not directly exposed to explosions. The
possibility of external overpressures caused by explosion venting will be identified by the
FEHM process.
6.17. Escape and Evacuation Systems

a. Escape and evacuation systems shall be located so that they are not directly exposed to fire
hazards. They may be duplicated so sufficient capacity remains available for all evacuation
hazards and weather conditions.
b. Escape and evacuation systems may still be exposed to some radiation or smoke effects.
Active protection shall be used to moderate and deflect these effects.
Page 29 of 38
c. The accommodation escape route should be located so that the open distance to the lifeboats is
minimised. Enclosed escape routes and sealed access to the lifeboats should not normally be
required. If this is perceived as necessary, the platform layout and categorisation of the most
severe evacuation events should be challenged by revisiting the FEHM process.
d. Radiation shields should be used to further reduce radiation on escape routes, bridges and
around the lifeboats if required by the FEHM process.
e. Radiation shields may either be stainless steel or wire mesh.
7. Selection of Systems and Materials
The following section provides guidance on the choice and specification of systems and materials.
7.1. Primary materials and systems
7.2.
7.2.1. Spray and Trowel Applied Intumescent Epoxy Coatings.
7.2.2.
a. Epoxy intumescent PFP systems shall be specified to last the lifetime of the facility. Epoxy
systems will give long term durable protection if correctly specified, installed and, where
necessary, protected from water. These systems should be chosen and installed correctly and
the vendors shall be asked as a minimum for a 10 year guarantee based upon their own
supervision, survey and certification of the installed system.
b. Epoxy intumescent PFP systems should have maximum limiting operating temperatures of
between 60oC and 80oC (140ºF and 176ºF) depending on the product. Above these
temperatures, the product will progressively deteriorate if it is directly applied to a hot surface
such as process pipe work.
c. Intumescent systems should not be used below the manufacturers low temperature limits.
Typical systems are limited to minus 40oC (minus40ºF).
d. Suitability of the installation of epoxy intumescent PFP shall be as follows:
1. For direct application sand blasted or equal prepared steel substrate such as structures and
firewalls.
2. They may be applied to vessels, pipe work and risers.
3. They are less suitable within permanently manned enclosed spaces or in escape routes
with restricted ventilation because of the emission of smoke and toxic fumes
4. Possible to make localised small repairs and modifications
5. It is not practical to remove and replace large areas on an installed facility.
e. Composite epoxy systems using a non intumescing epoxy based insulation layer covered with
an intumescent may be used but only if both products are provided by the same manufacturer.
f. The design should ensure that thermal expansion and contraction will not cause a failure in the
bonding between the layers, particularly if the insulating layer is provided for cold service
below the intumescent epoxy glass transition point.
g. The effectiveness and durability will depend upon the following factors.
Page 30 of 38
1. The selection of the make of material, particularly the water absorption and jet fire
resistance
There are major differences between different products with later generations
extracting the maximum performance from less material. There may be less tolerance
for error with these materials and they should be used with care and appropriate safety
factors, verification of the performance and quality control during manufacture and
application
The NORSOK 501 test procedure and OTO 95634 give appropriate methods for
evaluating material. Guidance should be obtained from the Group on how these
standards should be used and appropriate acceptance criteria to judge the test results.
2. An appropriate design safety factor to allow for variations in application quality,
inaccuracies in the estimation of fire loads and for the deterioration of the material
performance over the life of the facility.
3. The track record of that material and the vendors in technical support and supervision
during application
The lessons learned process and the vendors track records shall be studied to identify
where major failures have occurred on BP operated or partner installations. Notable
failures have occurred in offshore Angola and West of Shetland due to misapplication,
inappropriate materials and water ingress.
4. The thickness of the material including safety factors to allow for deviations from the
certified test samples during application
5. The application process, including the preparation, weather conditions, applicator
competence and quality control
7.2.3. Spray or Trowel Applied Cementitious Coating
7.2.4.
Cementitious coatings shall not be used offshore.
The track record of cementitious coating offshore is not acceptable. They suffer from
water ingress, corrosion of the steel substrate, and cracking due to the movement of the
structures. They cannot achieve adequate bond strength and flexibility to accommodate
the deflections experienced with explosions
7.2.5. Fire Resistant Vulcanised Elastomer for Risers

a. Strip wound reinforced fire resistant vulcanized elastomer PFP systems should be used for
risers.
These PFP systems have a proven effective record for risers. They are recommended for
this duty as they provide effective resistance to water ingress, damage resistance,
flexibility and fire resistance. Different grades are available for jet and pool fires.
The vulcanized elastomer PFP system has not been widely used for the protection of
process plant but it may be considered as a means of protecting piping and vessels. The
practicality of repairing localised sections after their removal for inspection should be
investigated. It may not be practical to shape it around flames or other awkward shapes
and either pre-vulcanised shapes or other products such as cast epoxy mouldings may
be required.
Page 31 of 38
Vulcanising requires that the system is cured at an elevated temperature, typically

140oC (284ºF) for several hours. This is best done onshore but it can be carried out
offshore with the use of a habitat for riser or with electrical heating pads for other
applications.
b. These systems shall be installed and repaired by the manufacturers.
7.2.6. Insulation Systems
7.2.7.
Such systems include mineral wool and calcium silicate block type insulation, similar to
that used for process or environmental insulation. In many cases insulation
performance is required in normal service as well as the ability to provide fire
protection capability and the engineer should ensure that the specification covers both
duties effectively. There are two groups:
those providing insulation on the inside of an impervious structural barrier
(usually steel); and
those providing insulation of the process plant.
a. Insulation type PFP systems may be used for cellulose fires – “A” ratings as they are well
established in this service.
b. Some insulation type PFP system arrangements have been certified for pool fire exposure
“H” ratings and may be used if the system contains ceramic fibre insulation.
c. The dynamic effects of jet fires will peel insulation systems off if they are not adequately
secured. Insulation type PFP systems should only be used for this role if tested against
representative large high pressure gas jet fires.
The OTO 95 634 test does not have the scale to represent the dynamic effects of gas jets
on these arrangements. Typical representative testing is a 3 kg/sec (6.6 lb/sec) methane
source at 60 bar (875 psi).
d. Where the insulation is exposed to pool and jet fires, the whole arrangement shall follow the
design, attachments and detailing as in the certification tests. The cladding shall be stainless
steel sheet with stainless steel banding and joint detail as specified by the manufacturers. The
installation and any reinstatement after removal shall be certified as matching the
arrangements in the approval.
Process insulation systems may be removed during their working life and procedures
shall be provided to ensure that they are reinstated to the approved specification.
Points requiring regular access should have removable panels.
e. The cladding shall be designed to shed water and to allow drainage of any ingress. The
protected surfaces shall be fully protected against corrosion arising from water ingress and
retention.
f. Mineral fibre systems may be suitable for use in continuously manned areas providing that
they do not emit excessive quantities of toxic fumes in a fire from the fibre, any bonding
agents, or any surface treatments applied to the fibres.
g. Composite systems using mineral wool sealed with another layer, such as fire resisting rubber
or intumescent coatings, are unsatisfactory and shall not be used.
h.
Page 32 of 38
7.2.8. Steel Construction and Partitions

a. The method of construction of primary fire and blast walls, modules, large enclosures and
accommodation should be profiled steel.
b. If dismantling of the enclosure is required or the walls require special properties such as
acoustic insulation, panel systems should be used.
c. Enclosures should maintain their shape and integrity at the end of the fire exposure such that
the passage of smoke and flames is prevented. This may be achieved in the following ways:
1. A supporting structure which is shielded from the fire by the steel wall and its insulation
or protection
2. A fireproofed structure from which the wall is supported
3. The inherent strength of the profiled steelwork.
This is only acceptable for cellulose fire or radiant heat exposure or for the
construction of small modules up to 500m3 ( 17,650 ft³) It may be considered for
hydrocarbon fire exposure if the high temperature stress analysis shows that it has
sufficient residual strength to maintain its integrity. This analysis should be
independently verified.
4. Insulation or fireproofing on the exposed side of the wall such that the profiled steel
retains sufficient strength to be free standing
d. The insulation properties of the wall may be achieved by:
1. Coating the exposed side with an epoxy intumescent PFP
2. Mineral wool insulation
a) Ceramic fibre or superwool should be used for hydrocarbon and jet fires. The
superwool should be preferred as it is safer to handle and apply.
b) Mineral wool should be located on the non exposed side of the wall for jet and
hydrocarbon fires.
c) If the firewall is double sided; i.e. it has exposure from both sides to these fires, the
insulation should be protected by protective steel sheeting. If this is in the open or
may be exposed to deluge, this sheeting should be of welded construction and the
fibre should be proven not to sag, slump or lose its properties over the life of the
facility.
7.2.9. Panel Systems
7.2.10.
a. Panel systems may be used as PFP for firewalls, ESD valve enclosures, other enclosures, or
process equipment, vessels and pipe work.
Panel systems are available as a proprietary panel, in limited sizes (which need a
supporting structure and jointing system) arranged for assembly into an integrated
system, or custom made to particular shapes and sizes. Some systems can withstand up
to 1 bar(15 psi) explosion overpressure and have some resistance to impact from
missiles, but these generally require a supporting structure to match the load.
Page 33 of 38
b. Jointing systems shall be specified for panel systems so that they can accommodate any
relative thermal expansion between the panel and the supporting or underlying structure.
c. The joints and panel systems shall either be arranged to protect the supporting structure, or
else the structure shall be protected from fire. Design and installation procedures should
ensure that full protection is achieved at the interface detail between a protected structure and
the panels.
d. These joints shall retain their fire resistance after deformation caused by explosions.
e. The panel systems shall be specified as either demountable or permanently installed.
f. Permanently installed systems shall be designed to withstand moisture ingress, or the
underlying structure/equipment shall be internally corrosion resistant, or protected to a
specification which has an adequate design life.
g. Design of the panel fixing points should be corrosion resistant and not lead to corrosion in
other parts of the panel.
Panel fixing points if not well designed will be weak points in the corrosion protection
system.
h. Where demountable systems are chosen, the fixings shall be designed to match the frequency
of removal. Hinges, latches, toggles, etc. shall be made in stainless steel and should be
specified to take the compression fixing/retention loads and the weight of the panels.
i. The seals at the joints of demountable systems or access panels shall accommodate foreseeable
misalignment and remain effective.
7.2.10.2. Glass Reinforced Plastic Sandwich
7.2.10.3.
a. GRP sandwich systems should be used for ESD valve enclosures, other enclosures, firewalls
and small modules. The material shall be suitable to protect against cellulose, pool, spray and
jet fires.
These systems have an outer layer of glass reinforced plastic and an inner rigid
insulating core. They are generally available in standard panel sizes which can be cut
to shape for a particular application. A supporting steel frame is usually required.
It should be recognised that the GRP sandwich system is sacrificial. During a fire the
transition from an inside surface temperature of 50-100°C (106-212ºF) to full flame
penetration may occur in less than 5 minutes.
b. The time to penetration should be specified as at least 30 minutes more than the insulation
time for firewalls directly protecting manned areas.
It is not normally necessary to specify a penetration time of greater than 2 hours.
c. Where the panels are cut for transits, joints and interface areas shall installed with great
precision to protect the enclosure integrity.
d. Adequate supporting structures which match the fire duty, shall be provided for
1. curved vessel sections
2. joints
3. instrument covers
Page 34 of 38
4. banding system.
7.2.10.4. Stainless Steel Sandwich
7.2.10.5.
a. Stainless steel sandwich systems are suitable for all fire types and may only be specified for
valve and emergency systems enclosures.
These are normally custom made, with either ceramic fibre or layered foil mesh
insulation. They can be self supporting or mounted on a framework. They are generally
reusable following a fire (subject to inspection by the manufacturer).
b. Demountable systems, doors and inspection hatches shall be suitable for long term use and
reliability.
c. The thickness of outer skins subject to wear and tear should not be less than 18 SWG.
d.
7.2.10.6. Building Panel Systems
7.2.10.7.
These include standard architectural systems for internal use. They are flexible to use
and easily installed on site. Specifications normally require full certifications and
provision of full details of all the likely joints and interfaces. As they are site installed,
careful quality control ensures that all the installation details comply with the
manufacturer's requirements.
7.2.11. Preformed shapes
7.2.11.1. Cast intumescent mouldings

a. Epoxy intumescent PFP may be cast into complex shapes for use around ESD valves,
actuators, flanged joints or the top sections of risers. They may also be used to allow access to
specific surfaces of structures or pressure vessels where the rest of the substrate has been
protected by direct application.
b. Epoxy intumescent PFP mouldings should be suitable for all fire types.
c. If epoxy intumescent PFP mouldings may be exposed to explosions, the mountings and fixings
should be designed to have sufficient strength to withstand the blast and drag loadings.
d. The mouldings may be created by manufacturing an accurately dimensioned mould and
pouring the material into it. They may also be created by direct moulding onto the protected
surface using a release agent. In both cases, stainless steel mesh shall be used for
reinforcement.
e. The thickness of these moulding shall be sufficient to retain their structural strength after the
outer surface has been consumed by the fire. A minimum of 8 mm (5/16 inch) of un-reacted
material shall remain after the designated performance standard duration.
f. The mouldings shall be bolted together and shall have sufficient support such that if any
adjacent panels are removed, the whole system does not lose alignment, thereby allowing their
reinstatement.
g. The mouldings shall be sealed with fire resistant mastic both at the joints and at any
penetrations.
Page 35 of 38
7.2.11.2. Shaped insulated GRP sections

a. The glass or Kevlar reinforced panel systems may be cut and laminated into three dimensional
shapes for ESD valve enclosures or vessel protection and are suitable for all fire types.
b. Design shall include these attributes:
1. self supporting structure
2. or require an internal structure mounted on the protected equipment
3. robust and can withstand repeated removal
4. providing that the mountings and fixings ensure correct realignment
5. if exposed to explosions the mountings and fixings should have sufficient strength to
withstand the blast and drag loadings.
7.2.12. Soft Wrap PFP Systems

a. Soft wrap PFP systems should only be used where there is minimum or no planned
maintenance or inspection of the protected item.
b. If their removal is anticipated, they shall have an overlap of the fire resisting material of at
least 100 mm (4 inch) at each of the joints which may be opened.
c. The system shall be designed to still function effectively if half of the fixings retaining the
removable sections are missing or misaligned.
d. The systems shall be installed by the supplier and they shall certify that it meets the
performance standard and their own fire certification.
e. If the system is disturbed, its reinstatement shall be inspected and certified by the supplier.
Proprietary soft wrap systems are available for vessels, valves, actuators, the upper
sections of risers and cable trays. They have been successfully tested against all types of
fire.
They are made from an insulating material encased in several outer coverings giving
water proofing, strength and fire resistance. They are retained with combinations of
straps metal bands, lashing arrangements and Velcro.
They are not the primary choice for protection in cases where they may have to be
removed and replaced. They can be misaligned and require particular skill to be
reinstated to their original condition.
7.3. Specification of Penetrations

a. Any penetrations; doors, windows, ducting, piping and cable transits etc. shall match the
performance standards of the main system.
b. Penetrations shall be supported by the firewall or enclosure and shall not impair its
performance.
c. The services passing through the penetrations shall be protected so that they do not burn
through the penetration or conduct excess heat within the performance duration of the main
barrier. This may be achieved by insulation or fireproofing extending along the services. If
they are of non fire resistant materials and may burn through, such as soil pipes or ducts, a
barrier such as an intumescent seal or a damper shall be installed.
Page 36 of 38
d. In cases where the main barrier is subjected to blast loading, the relative movement of the
penetration and associated service shall not impair the performance of the barrier.
7.3.2. Doors/Airlocks
7.3.3.
a. Doors should be designed to match the overall fire resistance of the enclosure and, generally,
the outer door of the airlock and its external walling should be to that standard. Any
remaining doors should be self closing.
b. If it is likely that services, such as airlines or water hoses, will be regularly run through the
door, then a separate specific transit should be provided to avoid wedging the door open.
c. Where door seals are expected to wear out within the life of the platform, an inspection plan
should be provided and the seals should be of a replaceable type.
d. Sliding doors should be designed to avoid trapping the forearm between the handle and the
door frame during operation (this has caused a number of fractures).
e. Doors which bound areas where an explosion risk has been identified should be designed to
withstand the blast and, where required, to be operable post explosion.
7.3.4. Windows
7.3.5.
a. If windows may experience direct flame exposure or radiant heat, they shall have the same
rating as the firewall.
b. If it is not possible to specify a window to the same rating as the wall, internal and external
shutters may be provided, with internal release and fusible links.
c. Windows should not be fitted in locations where they may be subjected to blast loads.
On very large installations such as FPSOs it may be desirable to have windows
overlooking the top deck processing plant to allow routine monitoring of activity and
the assessment of an incident.
7.3.6. HVAC Penetrations
7.3.7.
a. Dampers should be fitted which match the rating of the firewall.
b. This rating may require duct insulation extending 1 m (3 ft.), or 2 x duct width, whichever is
greater, from the firewall.
c. In cases where a duct passes through an area and there are no outlets or inlets, the ductwork
may be to the firewall standard throughout the area.
d. Where dampers are critical to prevent smoke and gas ingress to, or to prevent smoke
movement within the accommodation module or TR, they should close automatically and limit
the maximum leakage at a specified differential pressure. This limit should be derived from its
contribution to the overall tolerable leakage for the accommodation or the TR.
e.
Page 37 of 38
7.3.8. Cable and Piping Penetrations
7.3.9.
a. Cable and piping penetrations shall be to the same rating as the wall.
b. Where post explosion deformation of the wall may occur, the penetration integrity shall be
maintained.
c. Sealing materials should not emit excessive quantities of toxic fumes if used in
accommodation or manned areas.
d.
Page 38 of 38

GP 24-24-Offshore Passive Fire Protection

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GP 24-24-Offshore Passive Fire Protection

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Document No.

Guidance on Practice for

Table of Contents (Contents style)

This guidance covers the specification of passive systems including

o firewall, doors and penetrations

o protection of process plant and pipelines

o protection of safety systems

o protection of accommodation and muster points

BP Engineering Technical Practices (ETPs)

GP 24-24 Guidance on Practice for Passive Fire Protection – Offshore

British Petroleum (old BP) RPSEs

3. Terms and definitions

Availability (Performance Standard): Target availability is a performance criterion for repairable

Survivability (Performance Standard): Refers to a piece of equipment or system remaining operational

4. Symbols and abbreviations

AFFF Aqueous film forming foam

ANSI American National Standards Institute

API American Petroleum Institute

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

ATK Aircraft turbine kerosene

BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion

BOP Blow out preventer

CAA Civil Aviation Authority

CCR Central control room

CO2 Carbon dioxide

CUI Corrosion under insulation

COSHH Control of substances hazardous to health

CSE Concept Safety Evaluation

DAE Design accidental event

DHSV Down hole safety valve

ESD Emergency shutdown

F&E Fire and Explosion

FEHR Fire and explosion hazard register

FHA Fire Hazard Analysis

GRP Glass reinforced plastic

HAZID Hazard identification

HSE Health and Safety Executive (UK)

HVAC Heating, ventilating and air conditioning

IMO International Maritime Organisation

ISO International Organisation for Standardisation

LNG Liquefied natural gas

LPG Liquefied petroleum gas

MOL Main oil line

NDT Non destructive testing

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NGLs Natural gas liquids

PFP Passive fire protection

SGI Smoke and gas ingress assessment

SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea

SSIV Sub-sea intervention valve

SWG Standard wire gauge

UKOOA United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association

5. Requirements for Passive Fire Protection:

5.1. PFP Fire Protection System Roles:

5.1.2. Prevention of structural failure or collapse

o Collapse of tall structures

5.1.3. Prevention of catastrophic process or riser failure

5.1.4. Limitation of fire spread

5.1.5. Protection of essential safety systems

5.1.6. Protection of personnel

o Protection of the accommodation from external fire effects

5.2. PFP System Effectiveness

5.2.1. Suitability for the fire type

5.2.2. Suitability for the protected equipment and areas