GP 24-21-Fire Hazard Analysis

Document No.
GP 24-21
Applicability Group
Date 30 December 2005
Guidance on Practice for

Fire Hazard Analysis
GP 24-21
BP GROUP
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
30 December 2005 GP 24-21
Guidance on Practice for Fire Hazard Analysis
Foreword
This is the first issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) BP GP 24-21.
Copyright  2005, BP Group. All rights reserved. The information contained in this
document is subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which
the document was supplied to the recipient’s organization. None of the information
contained in this document shall be disclosed outside the recipient’s own organization
without the prior written permission of Director of Engineering, BP Group, unless the
terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.
Page 2 of 46
Table of Contents
Page
1. Scope...................................................................................................................................... 7
2. Normative references.............................................................................................................. 7
3. Terms and definitions.............................................................................................................. 7
4. Symbols and abbreviations.....................................................................................................8
5. General................................................................................................................................... 9
5.1. Direction....................................................................................................................... 9
5.2. Objectives of FHA........................................................................................................ 9
5.3. FHA Timing in the Project Cycle...................................................................................9
6. FHA process........................................................................................................................... 9
6.1. Types of Fires addressed.............................................................................................9
6.2. Analysis process steps...............................................................................................10
6.3. Inventory of fire hazards.............................................................................................11
6.4. Damage potential.......................................................................................................14
6.5. Selection of fire cases for analysis.............................................................................14
6.6. Impact of fires.............................................................................................................16
6.7. Further analysis.......................................................................................................... 17
6.8. Documentation and presentation of results................................................................17
7. Impact criteria........................................................................................................................ 18
7.1. General...................................................................................................................... 18
7.2. Personnel exposure...................................................................................................18
7.3. Equipment and structural exposure............................................................................19
Annex A (Normative) Basic methodology for FHA..........................................................................21
A.1. General................................................................................................................................. 21
A.2. Gas jet fire calculations.........................................................................................................21
A.2.1. Fire characteristics.....................................................................................................21
A.2.2. Release rate calculations...........................................................................................22
A.2.3. Reduction in pressure following isolation....................................................................25
A.3. Flash fires.............................................................................................................................. 26
A.4. Liquid fire calculations...........................................................................................................26
A.4.1. Fire characteristics.....................................................................................................26
A.4.2. Release rate calculations...........................................................................................27
A.4.3. Spray fire dimensions.................................................................................................28
A.5. Pool fire dimensions.............................................................................................................. 29
A.5.1. Size of pool................................................................................................................29
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A.5.2. Flame height..............................................................................................................32

A.5.3. Flame tilt.....................................................................................................................32
A.5.4. Flame drag................................................................................................................. 33
A.5.5. Duration of burning pools...........................................................................................34
A.6. BLEVE.................................................................................................................................. 34
A.7. Boilover................................................................................................................................. 35
A.8. Thermal radiation..................................................................................................................36
A.8.1. Pool fires.................................................................................................................... 36
A.8.2. Jet fire and liquid spray fires.......................................................................................36
A.8.3. Reduction in radiant heat due to obstructions............................................................37
A.9. Confined fires........................................................................................................................ 37
A.9.2. Confinement of combustion products.........................................................................38
A.9.3. Restrictions to ventilation...........................................................................................38
A.9.5. External flaming......................................................................................................... 39
A.10. Smoke from fires................................................................................................................... 40
A.10.1. General..................................................................................................................40
A.10.2. Outdoor smoke concentration................................................................................40
A.10.3. Smoke impairment.................................................................................................43
A.10.4. Smoke ingress into buildings.................................................................................44
List of Tables
Table 1 - Example fire hazard inventory.........................................................................................15

Table A.1 - Typical burn rates for hydrocarbon fuels......................................................................34
Table A.2 - Gas jet and liquid spray fire hazard ranges..................................................................37
Table A.3 - Obstruction attenuation factors....................................................................................37
Table A.4 - Plume compositions - open or well ventilated fires.......................................................41
Table A.5 - Plume compositions - poorly ventilated fires................................................................41
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Overview of FHA process...............................................................................................13

Figure A.1 - Typical initial release rate for methane at 10°C (50F).................................................23
Figure A.2 - Methane gas jet fire flame dimensions........................................................................25
Figure A.3 - Transient release rate of gas as a function of initial inventory.....................................25
Figure A.4 - Crude oil release rate as a function of vessel pressure...............................................27
Figure A.5 - Example liquid releases..............................................................................................28
Figure A.6 - Crude oil liquid spray fire flame dimensions................................................................31
Figure A.7 - Pool fire flame height as a function of pool diameter...................................................32
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Figure A.8 - Flame deflection (degrees from vertical) for gasoline pool fires as a function of wind
speed.................................................................................................................................... 33
Figure A.9 - Downwind heat flux from stabilised crude oil fires of various diameters......................36
Figure A.10 - Smoke dilution factors for seven representative fires................................................42
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Introduction
Value of this Guidance on Practice
An approach for identification of fire hazards and their mitigation methods in the early project
development stage, Select and Define, has been developed. Use of this fire hazard analysis process is a
key requirement of the plant or facility fire hazard management strategy.
Application
How to use and interpret the wording of this GP is defined in the ETP Introduction document GP 00-01.
Text in italics is Commentary. Commentary provides background information that supports the
requirements of the GP, and may discuss alternative options. It also gives guidance on the implementation
of any ‘Specification’ or ‘Approval’ actions.
This document may refer to certain local, national or international regulations but the responsibility to
ensure compliance with legislation and any other statutory requirements lies with the user. The user
should adapt or supplement this document to ensure compliance for the specific application.
Feedback and Further Information
Users are invited to feedback any comments and to detail experiences in the application of BP GPs, to
assist in the process of their continuous improvement. Please use the ETP Library comment feature or the
ETP Shared Learning System to provide feedback regarding issues with this document. You may access
both systems through this link http://etp.bpweb.bp.com/.
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1. Scope
a. This Guidance on Practice (GP) gives direction and process for fire hazard analysis (FHA) to
provide required level of understanding to make informed decisions regarding the most
effective combination of fire hazard management strategies.
b. Guidance contained in this GP shall be applied to all new onshore and offshore installations.
c. FHA guidance is applicable to the following personnel:
1. Project managers: to promote understanding of fire hazards as part of hazard management
process.
2. Process, control, and layout engineering disciplines: to optimise their designs to address
effects of fire hazards.
3. Hazard analysts: to identify and quantify fire hazards in form that can be used by
discipline engineers and operators.
4. Loss control/fire protection engineers: to design operable fire protection systems to match
consequences of identified fire hazards.
d. Guidance is intended to be applied to new installations, but application to modifications and
existing installations may be considered if further assessment of fire hazards is needed.
FHA provides understanding of the impact of fires and how that impact can be
managed.
2. Normative references
The following normative documents contain requirements that, through reference in this text, constitute
requirements of this technical practice. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or revisions of,
any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this technical practice are
encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents
indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative document referred to applies.
BP
GP 24-10 Fire Protection - Onshore.
GP 24-20 Fire and Explosion Hazard Management - Offshore.
GP 24-23 Active Fire Protection - Offshore.
GP 24-24 Passive Fire Protection - Offshore.
“Smoke and Gas Ingress Assessment Methodology” SPR/G/97/006 Issue 0,
April 1997.
Fire Hazard Training Course, 1999, Graham Dalzell, Simon Webb.
SINTEF Petroleum Research

SINTEF Handbook for Fire Calculations, 1997.
3. Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this GP, the following terms and definitions apply:
Page 7 of 46
Escalation
This occurs when the fire from the original source burns long enough (greater than 1.5 hour) to cause
hazardous fire conditions at adjacent fire potential tanks, vessels, piping, or structures. The adjacent
equipment then ignites and adds fuel to the original fire, enlarging the fire envelope and putting more
adjacent equipment at risk of fire.
Fire hazard management

Process described in GP 24-10 for onshore facilities and in GP 24-20 for offshore installations.
Fire target
Object that may be damaged by fire with serious implications to life, equipment, or structures
Fuel
Flammable hydrocarbon gas or liquid
Hazard zone
Maximum area around a fire source at a given fire effect or radiant heat flux
Radiant Heat Flux

Amount of radiant heat from a heat source, such as a fire, which flows through a unit area of a piece of
equipment or structure per unit time
4. Symbols and abbreviations
For the purpose of this GP, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CVP Capital Value Process
D Diameter
ESD Emergency Shut Down
FHA Fire Hazard Analysis
HAZID Hazard Identification
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
P&ID Piping and Instrument Diagram
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5. General
5.1. Direction
BP group policy requires fire and explosion hazards to be managed to ensure safety of personnel
from fires that could reasonably be anticipated.
The understanding of hazards, their causes and effects is the greatest risk reducer for
an operating plant.
5.2. Objectives of FHA

The user of this document shall know that the objectives of conducting a FHA are to:
a. Provide engineering and management with the understanding of the possible scale and
magnitude of uncontrolled fires.
b. Identify the impact of uncontrolled fires on operating personnel, plant equipment, and
facilities.
c. Analyse the degree of protection of various fire hazard management strategies
d. Choose the best mitigation strategy to provide a significant reduction of the impact of
uncontrolled fires.
5.3. FHA Timing in the Project Cycle

a. Some basic form of FHA should be part of the Appraise stage of the CVP project cycle.
b. A preliminary FHA should be conducted in the Select stage to possibly impact the process
design of the plants or facilities.
c. A systematic FHA shall start during the Define stage after the completion of hazard
identification (HAZID) studies.
d. The analysis of fire hazards shall become progressively more detailed through the Execute
stage of the project.
e. A final FHA shall be conducted during the first year of operation of a plant or facility and
should be reviewed or conducted on any operating plant or facility on a 3 to 5 year basis.
In many cases, calculation methods will not change, but analysis should become more
detailed as additional design information becomes available.
6. FHA process
6.1. Types of Fires addressed

The user of this document shall be aware of the following:
a. This document describes an analysis method for determining the severity of outdoor
hydrocarbon fires.
Fires are started when an appropriate combination of fuel and oxygen reaches its
flammability limits and the fuel and oxygen mixture reaches an ignition source. The
type of fire depends on:
 Type of fuel contributing to fire.
 Shape and size of hole in loss of containment scenario.
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 Pressure and temperature of material being released.

 Degree of congestion and confinement around release point.
b. Fires within the scope of this GP are typically classified as follows:
1. Jet fire - combustion of high pressure gas
2. Spray fire - combustion of pressurised liquid release
3. Pool fire - combustion of flammable vapours from liquid hydrocarbon pool
4. Blowout - well head spray or jet fire
5. Flash fire - combustion of flammable gas cloud without developing explosion
overpressures
6. BLEVE - rapid ignited release of pressurised contents of heated vessel resulting in blast
overpressure and large fireball
7. Boilover - sudden steam generation in atmospheric storage tanks throwing tank contents
high in the air
c. Fires and explosions not within the scope of this GP are:
1. Fires resulting from cellulose, electrical, metal fires, etc.
2. Fires inside buildings
3. Explosions
d. Annex A of this GP presents some simple calculations that may be used to analyse fire
hazards. Computer codes may be used in place of calculations (e.g., BP model CIRRUS or
equivalent). Choice of either approach should be based on preference of user.
The method presented in this GP should produce results that are equivalent to the use
of these simple computer models.
6.2. Analysis process steps

The FHA process used to determine the fire hazard management strategy shall include the
following steps below. The overall FHA process is described in Figure 1.
1. Identify areas where hazardous flammable inventories are present (e.g., from HAZID).
2. Determine inventory of fire hazards:
a) Identify size of each flammable inventory.
b) Identify fire type.
3. Screen out flammable inventories with no significant potential for damage (e.g., based on
mass).
4. Identify personnel, equipment, and structures that may be affected by fire.
5. Determine size of uncontrolled hazard zones.
6. Apply selected fire hazard management strategies (e.g., automatic isolation and blow
down) and identify size and duration of hazard zones:
a) Identify size and duration of hazard zones for flame envelope and radiant heat fluxes
that correspond to impairment criteria.
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b) Review location of personnel and muster locations and embarkation areas against
hazard zones for relevant impairment criteria.
c) Identify which structures and equipment can be exposed to flames for periods longer
than typical failure times.
7. List paths to escalation
8. Review impact of fire against acceptance criteria
6.3. Inventory of fire hazards

a. Distinct hydrocarbon inventories shall be identified by FHA.
In many cases, the HAZID will not provide an inventory of fire hazards but will simply
list areas where significant fire hazards are present. The HAZID will typically list “Fire
resulting from hydrocarbon release in processing area A1”.
b. Facility shall be split into areas and, if necessary, sub areas.
c. FHA shall establish:
1. Hydrocarbon inventories based on location of major equipment
2. Arrangement of isolation and blow down valves or other breaks in process
d. Individual inventories within these areas should be identified using the following steps:
1. Divide plant into isolatable inventories, that is, those sections segregated by ESD valves
or by unit boundaries where few or no ESD valves are present.
2. Divide inventories into elements, such as vessels, lengths of piping, heat exchangers, and
pumps. Isolatable inventory should consider individual elements or group of elements as
flammable inventories.
Typically, liquid inventories will be the liquid in major vessels, and the gas inventories
will be the gas volume between these major vessels. In many cases, the liquid will act as
a seal or break point between gas inventories. The location of pumps in liquid systems
may also be used as a break point. If there is significant pressure change, gas volumes
may be split or settle out conditions defined.
3. Identify contents, fuel components, operating pressure, and temperature.
4. For elements with multiple contents (hydrocarbon liquid, gas, and water), determine
volume of each component.
5. Calculate mass of stable hydrocarbon liquid, liquefied gas, or gas in each element.
6. Calculate total mass of gas in system by adding mass of gas in each element and any
dissolved gas in liquid.
7. Calculate mass of stable hydrocarbon liquid in each element by subtracting water that
may be mixed with it and dissolved or liquefied gas.
Liquid stored at a temperature below which the LPG content liquefies should be
considered a liquid and not a liquefied gas.
8. Calculate mass of liquefied gas, i.e., which would flash off if plant was depressurised to
atmospheric pressure.
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Gas releases are based on the combined inventory of free gas, dissolved gas, and
liquefied gas. Liquid releases are based on the mass of stable hydrocarbon liquid plus
the gas that is still liquid at the release pressure.
e. For each inventory, mass of hydrocarbon, phase, composition, pressure, and fire hazard types
present shall be identified by FHA. This information may be presented in tabular form as
shown in Table 1.
f. Assumptions used in determining inventories shall be documented in FHA.
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Figure 1 - Overview of FHA process
Identify all hydrocarbon

Inventories present
Identify Fire Targets

Personnel
Process Equipment
Structures
Escape Routes
Muster areas
Embarkation area
Select next inventory

No
Is inventory significant?
Yes
For Each Leak Size
Calculate leak rate
Calculate initial hazard zones
Identify fire targets inside hazard zones
No Fire targets inside initial hazard zone?
Yes
Apply selected Fire Hazard
Management Strategy
Apply more detailed Calculate the size and duration of

analysis hazard zones
For each target

Were impairment criteria exceeded?
When was criteria was exceeded?
What was the impact?
No
Is Fire Hazard Adequately
understood?
Yes
No Have all inventories been
reviewed?
Yes
Prepare FHA Document
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6.4. Damage potential

a. Assessment of significance (damage potential) of inventories shall be based on normal
operating conditions with liquid levels at normal liquid level.
The damage potential of a hydrocarbon inventory depends on the mass available for
release.
b. All gas inventories shall be considered.
c. The following describes circumstances regarding liquid hydrocarbons in FHA:
1. Liquid inventories of less than 500 kg (1000 lb) should be excluded from FHA.
2. Liquid inventories in 500 kg (1000 lb) to 2500 kg (5000 lb) range shall be considered in
FHA but may be excluded from detailed consideration if they present no special hazards.
3. Liquid inventories above 2500 kg (5000 lb) shall be considered in FHA.
4. Liquid inventories of more than 2500 kg (5000 lb) may be excluded from FHA if:
a) Flash point of the liquid is greater than 37C (100F).
b) Material is normally at ambient temperature or stored temperature is significantly
below flash point.
6.5. Selection of fire cases for analysis
6.5.1. Uncontrolled fires

a. Consequences of unprotected, uncontrolled fire are determined by:
1. Type of material released.
2. Pressure and temperature of the material being released
3. Throughput and available inventory
4. Degree of congestion and confinement
5. Ambient conditions including temperature, wind speed, wind direction, atmospheric
stability, atmospheric pressure and humidity
6. Ventilation of area (e.g., enclosed or open)
7. Proximity of personnel and critical equipment and structures
b. For each flammable inventory, initial hazard zones for the following leak sizes shall be
determined by FHA:
1. Small - 12 mm (1/2 in) leak.
2. Medium - 25 mm (1 in) leak.
3. Large - 50 mm (2 in) leak.
c. For some large systems with large throughputs, use of larger leak sizes for small, medium, and
large may be appropriate.
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Table 1 - Example fire hazard inventory
Heat
Fire Combustible Pressure Inventory Escalation transfer Other
Source type material (barg) (kg) potential (kW/m2) data
LP separator Jet Gas 10 1 000 Yes 250 Includes all gas in
isolatable section.
Liquid Unstabilised 10 10 000 Yes 250 Will transition to
spray crude oil pool fire at 4 barg
Pool fire Unstabilised <4 10 000 Yes 150 Liquid isolation
crude oil valve SDV on LP
Separator oil outlet.
Diking provided.
Booster Jet fire Gas 30 500 Yes 250 Includes all gas in
compressor isolatable section.
Compressor Liquid Condensate 30 400 No 250 Most leaks will
KO drum spray cease as inventory
is rapidly exhausted.
Jet Gas 30 500 Yes 250 Includes all gas in
isolatable section.
Dry oil tank Pool fire Stabilised 0.5 15 000 Yes 150 Liquid isolation
crude valve SDV on dry oil
tank outlet. Diking
provided.
Export pump Liquid Stabilised 170 15 000 Yes 250 Spray fire will stop if
spray crude pump is shutdown,
then same inventory
as dry oil tank.
NOTE: Inventories and pressure were based on normal operating conditions.
d. Hazard zone dimensions shall be calculated based on normal operating conditions with liquid
levels at normal liquid level.
e. FHA should assume all releases are ignited.
6.5.2. Impact of fire hazard management strategies

a. FHA should consider fires with some of fire hazard management strategies in place.
b. Fire hazard management strategies typically assessed in FHA include:
1. Location of isolation valves to reduce size of isolatable gas volumes.
2. Location of isolation valves on significant liquid inventories to stop liquid releases.
3. Provision of blowdown and emergency depressurisation systems
4. Provision of manually or automatically initiated actuation for isolation and blowdown
and for energy sources, such as pumps
5. For liquid spills, size and location of dikes (bunds) and gullies
c. Mitigation measures are not typically analysed in FHA but may be recommended if inclusion
of selected hazard management strategies does not adequately control risk. Typical mitigation
measures include:
1. Type and application rate of firewater and deluge systems.
2. Provision of passive fireproofing
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d. Some assumptions regarding existing fire protection systems include:

1. Fully automatic systems should be assumed to actuate within 1 min of fire.
2. Remotely operated manual systems shall be assumed to actuate no earlier than 10 min
from time of leak.
3. Time frame to close manual valves shall be no earlier than 30 min from time of leak.
Closure time will depend on accessibility of those valves and damage that may have
occurred to those valves.
The worst case scenario is not always the release with the highest release rates. If the
isolatable inventory is limited, the worst case can be smaller leaks, as the duration of
larger leaks can be too short to fail additional equipment and structures causing
escalation.
6.6. Impact of fires
6.6.1. Structures and equipment

a. Impact of fires on structures and equipment is primarily defined by duration of direct flame
impingement.
b. FHA shall define extent and duration of flame envelope for leaks from all significant
hydrocarbon inventories.
Minor damage, such as failure of cabling, can occur outside of the flame envelope, but
failure of steel is unlikely, except for exposure of long duration.
c. List of equipment and structures that on failure could lead to escalation of fire hazard shall be
developed by FHA. Typical items to be considered should include:
1. Flare lines and equipment.
2. Active fire protection systems, including piping
3. Fuel inventories
This may include some combustible inventories that may have been excluded from the
list of fuel inventories.
Some fuel inventories may be excluded, for example, gas inventories that are blown
down simultaneously.
4. Vessel supports
5. Critical structural supports
6. Vessels with BLEVE potential
7. Muster areas and refuges
8. Escape route supports
d. Items in c. that can be inside flame envelope for more than 5 minutes shall be identified by
FHA.
6.6.2. Personnel
a. Extent of radiant heat fluxes above 37,5 kW/m2 (12,000 BTU/hr/ft2) for initial fire conditions
shall be defined by FHA.
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b. For offshore installations, FHA shall identify where radiant heat flux can exceed 12,5 kW/m2
(4,000 BTU/hr/ft2) on escape routes, as well as duration of that exposure.
c. For offshore installations, FHA shall identify where radiant heat flux can exceed 4,73 kW/m2
(1500 BTU/hr/ft2) on embarkation areas and duration of that exposure.
d. For offshore installations, FHA shall identify where smoke levels can lead to impairment
criteria being exceeded.
6.7. Further analysis

a. Early scoping studies should be performed using methods described in this GP.
b. In most cases, these scoping studies will provide sufficient information for fire hazards to be
managed.
c. In some cases, more detailed analysis may be required to understand and manage fire hazards.
For example, a more detailed approach may remove some of the conservatism inherent
in the scoping methods and demonstrate that the hazard is already adequately
managed.
d. Detailed studies
1. Need for more detailed studies should be carefully managed.
2. Detailed methods should only be used if early scooping studies indicate cause for concern
(i.e., hazards contribute significantly to overall risk, and deeper understanding is critical
to managing them effectively and specifying systems).
3. Detailed studies may include more detailed analysis of fire hazard zones (e.g.,
computational fluid dynamic models of the fire) or more detailed review of impact of
fires on structures and equipment (e.g., linear and non linear finite element review of heat
loadings produced by fires).
6.8. Documentation and presentation of results

FHA shall contain the following information:
a. Cross reference to hazard identification exercise.
b. Reference to all input data used. For example:
1. P&IDs
2. Process flow diagram and heat and material balance
3. Plot plan and layout drawings showing location of equipment, escape routes, and
embarkation areas
4. Framing plans or other drawings showing critical structural members
c. Inventory of fire hazards, including calculation of hydrocarbon inventories, including
boundaries used (e.g., isolation valves).
d. List of equipment and structures that could on failure cause escalation of fire hazard
e. For each fire hazard:
1. Unique identifier
2. Type of fire hazard
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3. Details of safety systems that are assumed to operate

4. Calculations showing magnitude and duration of hazard zones for each leak size
5. Review of impact of fire hazards on personnel and equipment
6. List of paths to escalation and timing of that escalation
7. List of assumptions used in analysis
7. Impact criteria
7.1. General
Impact criteria shall be applied to both personnel exposure and exposure of equipment and
structures.
7.2. Personnel exposure
7.2.1. Personnel exposure to fire

The following criteria shall be used for personnel exposure to fires:
a. May be caught in initial flash fire or radiant heat flux before they can escape
b. Survivors of initial event may become trapped and unable to reach place of safety
c. Effect of heat and smoke may overwhelm temporary places of safety, such as a control room
or offshore temporary refuge or muster area.
d. Fire may escalate and lead to collapse of structures supporting personnel (e.g., escape routes
and temporary refuge).
e. Fire may escalate (e.g., BLEVE, cause process column collapse, fail process column supports,
cause boilover) engulfing emergency response and fire teams.
f. Fire may escalate affecting spectators and members of public in off site areas.
7.2.2. Personnel exposed to radiant heat

The following criteria shall be used for personnel exposure to radiant heat:
a. Personnel exposed to radiant heat levels in excess of 37,5 kW/m 2 (12,000 btu/hr/ft2) or who are
inside flame boundary for any period of time should be assumed to become fatalities.
b. Personnel inside flash fire flame envelope (typically boundary of LFL) or inside any flame
envelope should be assumed to become fatalities.
c. Escape routes should be considered blocked at between 6,3 kW/m 2 (2000 btu/hr/ft2) and
12,5 kW/m2 (4000 btu/hr/ft2).
d. Embarkation areas (or other area where personnel can be exposed for over 1 min while
performing essential duties) shall become impaired at 4,73 kW/m 2 (1500 btu/hr/ft2).
7.2.3. Personnel exposed to smoke

The following criteria shall be used for personnel exposure to smoke:
a. FHA shall consider the effects of smoke exposure for offshore personnel who may be trapped
or have to remain in the vicinity of fire. Effect shall include narcosis, heat, and obscuration.
b. FHA shall use narcosis impairment criterion of 15% carboxyhaemoglobin in blood.
Page 18 of 46
c. FHA shall use heat impairment criterion of body core temperature rising to 40°C (104F).
d. FHA shall use obscuration impairment criterion for blockage of escape routes of visibility less
than 10 m (33 feet) or path obscuration of more than 1 dB/m.
7.3. Equipment and structural exposure
7.3.1. General
a. Equipment and structures will fail if exposed to fire for long enough to reach their failure
temperature. The following can occur during fire leading to escalation:
1. Weakening of flanges and instruments
2. Weakening of steel work supporting escape routes, process plant, and piping
3. Weakening of steelwork leading to collapse of tall structures, such as vertical process
vessels, drilling derricks, and flare towers.
4. Weakening of pressure vessels and pipework
5. Damage to safety systems needed to contain fire: fire pumps, ring mains, ESD and
isolation systems, flare systems, and deluge system.
b. Failure temperature for heated plant depends on:
1. Inherent strength of plant, vessel, or structure
Most plants have a significant reserve of strength and, at the maximum design loading,
can tolerate up a 50% reduction in the ultimate tensile strength (UTS) of the material.
For carbon steel, this occurs at between 400 to 450°C (750 to 850 F).
2. Loading or stress in equipment or piping.
The stress in a depressurising process vessel will be reducing as the steel heats up. This
would delay and may prevent failure. However, localised heating or heating of an
anchored piece of equipment may increase stress levels.
c. Heat input and subsequent rate of temperature rise of a piece of plant will depend on the
following:
1. Degree of engulfment (total, partial, or distance from flame).
2. Heat load from flame.
3. Duration of exposure
4. Thickness, geometry, and specific heat of components
5. Rating of passive protection
This may be 30, 60, or 120 min, provided it has been specified to match fire type
identified.
7.3.2. Process equipment response

a. In many cases, detailed heat transfer assessment is not needed to estimate damage to process
equipment resulting from fire. Approximate assessment of potential for failure shall be
sufficient.
b. For first pass screening of failure times, the following guidance is appropriate:
Page 19 of 46
1. Lightweight equipment could fail in 5 min if exposed to fires with high heat fluxes. High
heat fluxes are in range 200 to 300 kw/m2 (63,000 to 95,000 Btu/hr/ft2). For example: gas
jet fires, liquid spray fires, large condensate, LPG, or compartment fires.
2. Heavyweight large equipment and thick walled piping could fail in 10 min if exposed to
fires with lower heat fluxes. Lower heat fluxes are less than 200 kW/m 2 (less than 63,000
Btu/hr/ft2). For example: smaller fires, flame extension from compartment, or edges of oil
fire.
7.3.3. Structural response

a. In many cases, detailed heat transfer assessment is not needed to determine time to failure.
Approximate assessment of potential for failure shall be sufficient.
b. For first pass screening of failure times, the following guidance is appropriate:
1. Lightweight structures could fail in 5 min in fires if exposed to fires with high heat
fluxes. High heat fluxes are in range 200 to 300 kW/m2 (63,000 to 95,000 Btu/hr/ft2). For
example: gas jet fires, liquid spray fires, large condensate, LPG, or compartment fires.
2. Heavyweight large structures could fail in 10 min if exposed to fires with lower heat
fluxes. Lower heat fluxes are less than 200 kW/m 2 (less than 63,000 Btu/hr/ft2). For
example, smaller fires, flame extension from compartment, or edges of oil fire.
Page 20 of 46
Annex A
(Normative)
Basic methodology for FHA
A.1. General
This annex provides more detailed information for performing calculations.
A.2. Gas jet fire calculations
A.2.1. Fire characteristics

c. Gas jet fires result from pressurised releases.
d. In open, non-congested areas, fire is characterised by well defined narrow jet as gas and air are
mixed and burned.
e. If release is from irregular shaped hole or flange leak or it impinges on adjacent plant, fire
plume will be wider and more diffuse than straight jet, although flames will still have
considerable momentum.
f. Burning characteristics are similar to those of jets, except that there is no single dominant jet
direction.
g. If jet is totally obstructed (e.g., impingement onto wall), release will lose all of its momentum
and burn as diffuse fireball rather than well defined jet.
h. Because air-fuel mixing in jet/diffuse fireball is more efficient than in pool fire, jet fires burn
with cleaner, less sooty flames.
i. However, as with pool fires, amount of soot will increase for heavier hydrocarbons.
j. Methane jets burn with very clear bluish flame, and most of the heat is transported away as
convective heat.
k. For propane and butane, flame is more luminous (yellowish) due to combustion of soot (i.e.,
soot is produced and consumed within flame).
l. Gas releases above 2 bara (30 psia) will be at sonic velocity. Consequently, they will have
high convective heat transfer if flames impinge onto equipment.
m. Industry guidance suggests that for natural gas releases of less than 10 kg/s (1300 lb/min), total
incident heat flux to engulfed objects can be between 50 and 300 kW/m 2 (16,000 and 95,000
Btu/hr/ft2). For larger flames or gases involving higher molecular weight components, total
heat flux to engulfed objects may be higher.
n. Lift off
1. Close to source, shear stresses created as fuel expands from orifice are high, great, and
flame cannot stabilise.
2. Therefore, there is a region close to release point where no flame exists. This is called lift
off. The jet may become unstable and lift off completely.
3. In such cases, jet will self extinguish and may result in severe explosion hazard.
4. Jet is likely to be stabilised if release is from rough, irregular shaped hole or if jet
impinges onto other process plant or structures.
Page 21 of 46
5. It is unlikely that jet will become unstable except in very open areas (e.g., a well bay).
o. Accumulated flammable atmosphere
1. If gas release does not ignite immediately, there will be accumulation of flammable
atmosphere.
2. If ignited, this will flash back from point of ignition to point of release, giving a cloud
fire.
3. Depending on release orientation and density of gas released, resulting cloud fire may be
either flash fire above grounded gas cloud or vertically rising fireball.
4. If area is congested or enclosed, explosion may also be caused.
5. Both situations (3. and 4.) represent significant risk to lives of people in immediate
vicinity.
6. Heavier gases, propane, butane, etc., can be more hazardous, as they may spread across
ground, covering wider area and engulfing more people and more potential ignition
sources. They are also more reactive gases that will give higher flame velocities and are
more likely to cause explosions. If release continues after ignition, cloud fire will be
followed by sustained jet fire.
p. Cloud fires
1. Given rapid transient nature of cloud fires, there is no realistic means of protecting people
engulfed, so it is critical that both their exposure and chance of ignited release should be
minimised.
2. Control of activities and restriction of unnecessary visits to areas of concern should be
minimised.
3. In open, non-congested areas significant overpressures will not be generated, and
structural consequences of cloud fires should be minimal.
4. In confined and congested areas, significant explosion overpressures will be generated
(i.e., explosions).
5. This GP does not cover assessment of gas cloud size or explosions. Areas that are
partially enclosed by walls or ceilings or areas with significant congestion caused by
process plant may cause both accumulations of gas and overpressures. These should be
subjected to separate assessment.
A.2.2. Release rate calculations

q. Gas only
The initial gas release rate, Q(0), in kg/s is given by:
  1 
 
 2    1  M
Q(0)  AREA  C d    P
   1 RT
Where:
Cd = discharge coefficient (= 0,85)
g = ratio of specific heats
R = gas constant = 8314
Page 22 of 46
P = pressure (N/m2)
M = relative molecular mass (g/mol)
T = temperature (K)
Typical values for  are:
Methane 1,308
Propane 1,133
Butane 1,097
Values for M (Molecular weight) are:
Methane 16
Propane 44
Butane 58
An Example is shown in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1 - Typical initial release rate for methane at 10°C (50F)
TYPICAL INITIAL RELEASE RATE (lb/s) FOR GASEOUS PROPANE (AT 50 F) AS FUNCTION OF
PRESSURE AND HOLE SIZE
120
100
INITIAL RELEASE RATE (lb/s)
1/2 inch HOLE
80 1 inch HOLE
2 inch HOLE
60
40
20
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
PRESSURE (Psia)
r. Gas supported by vapourising or flashing liquid

1. For cases in which there is gas cap over liquid containing flash gas (e.g., pressurised
LPG), initial inventory of gas, W, is taken as sum of mass of gas cap and liquid that will
flash off.
2. For cases in which there is gas cap over liquid containing dissolved gas (e.g., live crude
oil), initial inventory of gas, W, is taken as sum of mass of gas cap and amount of gas
dissolved in liquid.
s. Flame dimensions
Page 23 of 46
1. For quantification purposes, jet fires are often approximated by a cone. Base of cone will
be “lifted off” from release point, and cone can be deflected by ambient wind.
2. For unconfined jet fires, the following equations can be used to give approximate size of
flame. Fireball size is pertinent to cases in which jet is deflected by local obstructions to
extent that fire burns as fireball rather than well defined jet.
3. Flame length (m) is calculated by:
Flame Length ( m )  10(Q )0,46
Where:
Q = release rate (kg/s)
4. Flame volume (m3) is calculated by:
Flame vol (m3 )  const.  (Q )1,35
Constant values are as follows:

Methane 100
Propane 90
5. Fireball diameter (m) is calculated by:
3
12vol
Fireball diameter (m) =

6. Flame volume and fireball diameter are appropriate for case in which jet flame impacts
onto object and is deflected into diffuse fireball.
7. As a rule of thumb, unobstructed flame length should be used for flames in same module
and flame diameter should be used for flames outside of module.
8. Calculation of flame volume can also be used to assess shape and dimensions of fire that
is partially confined by roof or walls.
9. An example of fireball diameter for a methane gas jet fire is shown in Figure A.2.
Page 24 of 46
Figure A.2 - Methane gas jet fire flame dimensions
90
80
70
Flame Length for Unobstructed Fire

60
50
Length (m)
Fireball Diameter for Obstructed Fire

40
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Release Rate (kg/s)
A.2.3. Reduction in pressure following isolation

t. Pressure in gas volume with a leak will start to decline once isolation valves close and
blowdown valves (if present) have opened.
u. Reduction in pressure due to mass loss from fixed mass of gas is critical in modelling benefit
provided by these safety systems.
v. If plant can depressurise or blowdown to flare, outflow from isolated inventory would be
combined mass flow rate both of accidental release and discharge to flare.
w. For simplicity, it is best to assume that emergency isolation blowdown will occur at the same
time. Initial release rate will be as calculated above, i.e., Q (0). The initial blowdown rate
would be Q (bd). This should be available from the plant process engineers.
x. For case in which blowdown is initiated after a time delay of t (bd) seconds, subsequent
transient release rate through the leak hole is given by:
   Qm(0)  Q(bd )  (t  t (bd )) 

Q(t )  Q(0) Exp 
 W 
y. Depressurisation reduces severity of fire, both by accelerating reduction in fire size and
duration.
z. An example is shown in Figure A.3.
Page 25 of 46
Figure A.3 - Transient release rate of gas as a function of initial inventory
TRANSIENT RELEASE RATE OF GAS AS FUNCTION OF INITIAL INVENTORY

INITIAL RELEASE RATE = 20 lb/s
22
20 INITIAL INVENTORY OF 1000 lb
18
INITIAL INVENTORY OF 5,000 lb
16
RELEASE RATE (lb/s)
IINITIAL INVENTORY OF 20,000 lb

14
12
10
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
TIME (Seconds)
A.3. Flash fires
aa. Flash fire occurs if cloud of flammable material burns.

bb. Duration of flash fire is typically short and equipment damage is not a concern.
cc. Typically, burn zone is estimated by dispersion modelling and is taken as boundary of
flammable limit of cloud.
dd. Flammable cloud dimensions should be calculated using CIRRUS or equivalent method.
A.4. Liquid fire calculations
A.4.1. Fire characteristics

ee. Pressurised liquid releases will initially burn as liquid spray fire, which is similar to gas jet
fire.
ff. The higher the pressure, the higher the portion of liquid that will burn in the spray.
gg. As liquid pressure reduces, fraction of liquid that burns in spray will decrease and eventually
all liquid will fall to ground and form liquid pool.
hh. Transition pressure for liquid spray fire to pool fire depends on type of liquid. The lighter
(more volatile) the liquid, the lower the transition pressure.
ii. Transition pressures, below which all liquid will burn as a pool, is approximately 4 barg (60
psig) for heavy crude oil, 2 barg (30 psig) for light oil, and 1 barg (15 psig) or lower for
condensate.
Page 26 of 46
jj. At pressures higher than transition pressure, increasing portion will burn as liquid spray.
kk. Analysis should conservatively assume that, above transition pressure, all liquid burns in spray
fire.
ll. Below transition pressure, all liquid will burn as a pool fire.
A.4.2. Release rate calculations

mm. Initial release rate
1. Release rate of liquid, m (kg/s), is given by:
2 P
m  Cd  Area  

Where:
Cd = Discharge coefficient (=0,62)
Area = hole area (m2)
r = Density of liquid released (kg/m3)
DP = Differential pressure inside vessel (N/m2)
2. Typically, density of crude is ~800 kg/m3, and condensate can be taken as ~600 kg/m3.
3. P is gage pressure of vessel.
4. An example is shown in Figure A.4.
Figure A.4 - Crude oil release rate as a function of vessel pressure
nn. Reduction in release rate

400
1/2 inch Hole

350
1 inch Hole
300
2 inch Hole
RELEASE RATE (lb/s)
250
200
150
100
50
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
VESSEL PRESSURE (Psia)
1. Once process isolation occurs, liquid inventory in vessel or piping will start to reduce.
Release will continue until inventory is exhausted.
Page 27 of 46
2. Releases downstream of pump will see rapid reduction in release rate if pump is
shutdown. At this time, pressure of release will fall to pump suction pressure, and, in
many cases, pump will act as additional restriction to flow.
3. If there is gas pad over liquid, release rate will continue at initial release rate until
inventory is exhausted.
4. If gas pad is blown down, release rate will fall as gas pad pressure reduces.
5. Example shown in Figure A.5 shows release rates for crude oil inventory of
approximately 20 tons at pressure of approximately 30 barg (440 psig) with isolation and
blowdown on gas pad (10 min for blowdown to 6.8 barg (100 psig)).
Figure A.5 - Example liquid releases
100.0
ESD and Blowdown
start here Inventory exhausted for 2 inch
90.0 leak
80.0
70.0
Release Rate (kg/s)
60.0
50.0
2 inch leak
1 inch leak
40.0 Liquid spray fire transition
to Pool fire
30.0
20.0
Inventory exhausted for 1 inch
leak
10.0
0.0
0 600 1200 1800 2400 3000
Time (seconds)
A.4.3. Spray fire dimensions

oo. For quantification purposes, spray fires are often approximated by a cone.
pp. Base of cone will be “lifted off” from release point, and cone can be deflected by ambient
wind.
qq. In cases for which there is limited spraying or no immediate vaporisation, cone will be narrow
but will terminate in large rising plume. Plume can have shape and characteristics of pool fire
of same liquid.
Page 28 of 46
rr. Unobstructed Fires

1. The following equation should be used to give approximate flame length (m):
Flame Length (m)  17(Q )0,46
Where:
Q = release rate (kg/s)
2. An example of flame length for crude oil liquid spray fires is shown in Figure A.6.
ss. Obstructed Fires
1. If jet flame impacts onto object and is deflected into diffuse fireball, diameter of this
fireball are given by:
3
12vol
Fireball diameter (ft) =

Where:
Flame vol (m3) = const × m1,35
Constant values are as follows:
Crude oil 170
Condensate 110
2. Flame volume and fireball diameter are appropriate for case in which jet flame impacts
onto object and is deflected into diffuse fireball.
3. As a rule of thumb, unobstructed flame length should be used for flames in same module,
and flame diameter should be used for flames outside of module.
4. Calculation of flame volume can also be used to assess shape and dimensions of fire that
is partially confined by roof or walls.
5. An example of fireball diameter for obstructed crude oil liquid spray fires is shown in
Figure A.6.
A.5. Pool fire dimensions
A.5.1. Size of pool

tt. Diameter (D) to which pool spreads depends on whether spill is continuous or instantaneous.
uu. For liquid spills, area of fire will be no larger than area of bund (dike).
vv. Exceptions to a. and b. are if:
1. Volume of spill is larger than volume of bund.
2. Spill has high momentum and washes over dike. This is a concern for sudden large spill
in dikes with angled sides.
3. Leak jets spray over bund wall.
Page 29 of 46
ww. For continuous spill in unbunded region, equilibrium burning pool diameter is given by:
1
 V 2
Dequilibrium  2 
 mb 
Where:
V = Volumetric spill rate (m3/s)
 = Liquid fuel density (kg/m3)
mb = specific burning rate (kg/m2/s)
[EDS Note: English equivalent units required.]
xx. For instantaneous burning spill, in unbunded or non-diked area, average pool diameter, D avg, is
given by:
Davg  0,683Dmax
Where:
1
 8
 
VL g  
3
Dmax 
 2 
  mb 
 
 
   
 
Figure A.6 - Crude oil liquid spray fire flame dimensions
160
140
120
100
Flame Length for Unobstructed Fire
Length (m)
80
60
Fireball Diameter for Obstructed Fire
40
20
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Release Rate (kg/s)
Page 30 of 46
VL = Total volume of fuel spilled (m3)

g´ = Effective gravitational acceleration (m/s2). Value depends on whether spill is on land or sea
surface and is given by:
g = 9,81 m/s2 for spills on land
= 9,81(1- /w) for spills on water
w = density of water (~1025 kg/m3 for seawater)
Where spill is not ignited, pool diameter is given by:
V 
D2  L 
 D 
Where:
D is minimum depth of spill for surface type, typical values are:
Wet soil 0,03 m
Dry soil 0,05 m
Concrete 0,01 m
Water 0,001 m
[Note: Symbol ‘D’ used for two different items. Probably should change.]
A.5.2. Flame height

yy. Height of flame (H, in m) is given by:
0,61
 mb 
H  42  D   
  gD 
 
Where:
D = pool diameter (m)
mb = specific burning rate (kg/m2/s)
r = atmospheric density = 1,29 kg/m3
g = gravitational acceleration = 9,81 m/s2
zz. An example is shown in Figure A.7.
Page 31 of 46
Figure A.7 - Pool fire flame height as a function of pool diameter
POOL FIRE FLAME HEIGHT (ft) AS FUNCTION OF POOL DIAMETER (ft)
160
CONDENSATE
140
CRUDE OIL
120
FLAME HEIGHT (ft)
100
80
60
40
20
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
POOL DIAMETER (ft)
A.5.3. Flame tilt

aaa. Wind will cause flame to tilt.
bbb. Angle of deflection, θ (degrees), from vertical is given by:
 1 
  cos1  
 U* 
Where:
U wind
U*  1
 gmb D  3
 vap 
 
rvap = fuel vapour density at boiling point with:
MW
 vap  12,18
Tb
MW = Molecular weight of fuel (g/mol)
TB = Boiling temperature (Kelvin)
Page 32 of 46
ccc. An example is shown in Figure A.8.
Figure A.8 - Flame deflection (degrees from vertical) for gasoline pool fires as a function of wind speed
FLAME DEFELCTION (DEGREES FROM VERTICAL) FOR GASOLINE POOL FIRES AS FUNCTION OF
WIND SPEED (ft/s)
90
FLAME DEFELCTION FROM VERTICAL (degrees)
80
70
60
50
40 POOL DIAMETER = 15 ft
POOL DIAMETER = 30 ft
30
POOL DIAMETER = 45 ft
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
WIND SPEED (ft/s)
A.5.4. Flame drag

ddd. Flame drag is phenomenon in which flame extends beyond down wind edge of pool. This
phenomenon is caused by wind.
eee. Extension of flame (or effective flame diameter in down wind direction) is given by:
D  1,5 D( Fr )0,064
Where:
2
U wind
Fr 
gD
A.5.5. Duration of burning pools

fff. For a pool fire, burn rate is function of material being burned and surface area of pool fire.
ggg. Typical values of burn rate per unit area for common fuels are given in Table A.1.
hhh. For liquid releases resulting in pool fires, burn rate may be:
1. Lower than release rate due to drainage, spillage to lower elevations, or containment in
bunds.
2. Higher due to burning of spilled fuel that has accumulated in bunded areas.
Page 33 of 46
Table A.1 - Typical burn rates for hydrocarbon fuels
Depth burned per hr Surface burn rate

Fuel (mm) (kg/m2s)
Crude oil 180 0,05
Gasoline 180 0,05
Condensate 180 0,05
Kerosene 220 0,06
Diesel 250 0,07
Fuel oil 140 0,04
Hexane 290 0,08
Butane 290 0,08
LNG 330 0,09
LPG 400 0,11
A.6. BLEVE
iii. Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions (BLEVEs) are a result of catastrophic release of
fuel vapour.
jjj. BLEVEs normally occur with superheated liquids in which high proportion of liquid
immediately vapourises if vessel ruptures (e.g., LPGs stored under pressure).
kkk. Pressurised vessel containing liquefied gas will, if subjected to heat source (e.g., fire), absorb
heat that will cause some of liquid to vapourise. This will increase pressure in vessel. If
pressure relieving cannot dissipate increased pressure, pressure will continue to rise until
vessel catastrophically ruptures.
lll. This rupture can be accelerated by weakening of vessel wall in fire. BLEVE can occur, even
with correctly sized relief system, due to heating of tank metal surface at vapour space.
mmm. Failure
1. If failure occurs, all vessel contents will be instantaneously released and flash off,
resulting in massive release of vapour that will ignite.
2. As the cloud burns, more air will be entrained into vapour cloud to propagate burning.
3. Burning vapour cloud will rise on thermal currents produced by burning.
4. Rupture of vessel results in massive release of energy, which can cause total
fragmentation of vessel.
5. Fragments of vessel, particularly dished ends, or vessel itself, if it is not anchored, may
become missiles and travel 600 yd or more.
[EDS Note: SI equivalent unit required.]
nnn. BLEVEs can occur in as little 10 min in large intense fire with thin walled vessels, such as
LPG cylinders.
ooo. BLEVEs can present major risk to life to firefighters, personnel beyond site boundary, and
escalation potential to rest of plant.
Page 34 of 46
ppp. BLEVEs are spectacular events and could receive widespread coverage with consequent
effects on BP’s reputation.
qqq. Diameter of fireball can be calculated using:
D  5,8 M 0,333
Where:
D = fireball diameter (m)
M = mass released (kg)
[EDS Note: English equivalent units required.]
rrr. Duration of fireball is short, typically in range 10 to 30 sec.

sss. Duration of fireball is given by:
t  0,45 M 0,333 for M  37 000 kg

t  2,6 M 0,167 for M  37 000 kg
Where:
t = fireball duration (sec)
M = mass released (kg)
[BP Note: Do we need calculations for radiant heat away from fireball and missile
generation?]
A.7. Boilover
ttt. There is particular risk of boilover with large storage tanks of crude and heavy oils.
uuu. Boilover can occur if there is water (possibly due to firefighting) in oil and hot layer descends
to meet it, causing immediate and catastrophic steam generation, throwing contents of tank
high into air.
vvv. Boilovers can and have killed all firefighting personnel attempting to fight fire. Specialist
advice should be sought if this possibility exists, and manual firefighting is to be considered as
a response.
[BP Note: Should a list of material with boilover potential be provided?]
A.8. Thermal radiation
A.8.1. Pool fires

www. Calculation of radiant heat levels outside of pool fire flame envelope should be performed
using CIRRUS or other equivalent computer code.
xxx. Figure A.9 shows radiant heat against downwind distance for stabilised crude oil pool fires on
land of various dimensions. CIRRUS was used to develop this figure.
yyy. If applicable, Figure A.9 may be used in place of CIRRUS or equivalent model.
Page 35 of 46
A.8.2. Jet fire and liquid spray fires

zzz. Maximum extent of radiant heat fluxes outside of flame envelope for gas jet or liquid spray
fires can be calculated using simple multipliers on flame length.
aaaa.Multipliers are shown in Table A.2.
bbbb. Factors do not account for impact of objects blocking radiant heat.
cccc.Multiplying factor for each heat contour is applied to flame length.
Figure A.9 - Downwind heat flux from stabilised crude oil fires of various diameters
Pool Fire
Heat Flux (kW/m2)
80
70
60
50
50m
40m
40 30m
20m
10m
30
20
Downwind
10
5 (m/s)
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Downwind from Edge (m)
[BP Note: Produce similar curves for LNG, gasoline, etc.?]
Table A.2 - Gas jet and liquid spray fire hazard ranges
Heat Flux Multiplying factor (on flame length)

2 2
kW/m btu/hr/ft
37,5 12,000 1,2
12,5 4000 1,45
4,7 1500 1,75
A.8.3. Reduction in radiant heat due to obstructions

dddd. Solid objects, such as walls, should be considered impervious to thermal radiation.
Page 36 of 46
eeee.If there is partial barrier, such as process equipment or decks on open sided structures, the
following reduction factors may be used for heat flux 10 m (30 ft) or more beyond edge of
obstructed zone.
ffff. Obstruction factors should be applied to unobstructed flame length even if obstructed flame
diameter is used.
A.9. Confined fires

A.9.1. General
gggg. In general, confining fire will have two effects:
1. Confining flame and combustion products.
2. Restricting ventilation supply of fresh air to fire.
Table A.3 - Obstruction attenuation factors
Unobstructed heat flux Obstructed heat flux

2 2
(kW/m ) btu/hr/ft (kW/m2) btu/hr/ft2
37,5 12,000 12,5 4000
12,5 4000 4,7 1500
4,7 1500 2 600
hhhh. How these influence characteristics of fire is dependent on a number of factors:

1. Fuel.
2. Compartment size.
3. Fire size.
4. Ventilation.
5. Type of burning.
6. Fire location and, in case of jet fires, direction.
7. Insulation in compartment.
8. Mass of steel, process plant, etc., in compartment.
9. Obstructions and resulting turbulence.
10. Depth of hot gas layer.
iiii. Knowledge of confined fires is incomplete. In general, expert advice should be sought on how
to assess confined fires.
A.9.2. Confinement of combustion products

jjjj. In a confined fire, combustion products will be contained to greater or lesser extent within
compartment.
kkkk. For pool fire or vertical jet, rising plume will impinge on ceiling and spread radially in form
of ceiling jet, which may or may not extend to edge of compartment.
llll. In all confined fires, hot, less dense, combustion products will begin to accumulate at top of
compartment.
Page 37 of 46
mmmm. Downward spread of accumulating gases will be counteracted by buoyancy forces of

hot gases and well defined layer of hot gases (including flame) will develop and grow. This is
known as “hot gas layer”.
nnnn. Hot gas layer
1. Below hot gas layer is comparatively cool layer of almost clear air.
2. If ceiling is flat with no obstructions and clean openings extending up to full height and
there is good ventilation, hot gas layer may be relatively thin, and it will spread easily
across ceiling and out through openings.
3. If ceiling is congested with intersecting beams, cable trays, and piping causing dead areas
and turbulence, layer will be much thicker.
4. If openings do not extend to full height, hot gas layer will descend below top of openings
until excess heat and smoke can escape.
5. With poor ventilation, hot gas layer descends even further.
6. If there are openings in compartment, as hot gas layer builds up, gases will begin to
escape through upper part of opening(s).
7. Fresh air will be entrained through lower part(s).
8. In steady state, mass flow of hot gases leaving compartment will equal sum of mass flows
of fuel entering compartment and fresh air being drawn in.
9. Once inside compartment, fresh air will be entrained into fire plume and, under certain
conditions, into burning interface of hot gas layer.
oooo. Ceiling beams
1. Because compartment ceiling will spread flames across ceiling, significant part, if not all,
of ceiling beams and high level piping may be engulfed in flame.
2. It is possible that this could lead to simultaneous failure of all ceiling beams and upper
compartment structure.
3. This could lead to release of inventories supported on level above or of total collapse.
4. It would also heat tops of LPG vessels, which may increase chance of BLEVE.
A.9.3. Restrictions to ventilation

pppp. Amount of air that can be drawn into compartment to support combustion will depend on
both size and configuration of ventilation openings in compartment.
qqqq. Poorly ventilated fire will create more smoke and carbon monoxide.
rrrr. Unburned fuel may also burn outside compartment, endangering adjacent areas.
ssss. Fire in compartment may also cause other fuels to burn (cables, paint, plastic equipment, etc.)
These will add to the smoke.
tttt. Global equivalence ratio
1. Global equivalence ratio (  ) is used to describe entrainment of air into compartment
fire.
2. This is defined as air to fuel ratio of fire in compartment divided by equivalent air to fuel
ratio required for ideal, stoichiometric burning;
Page 38 of 46
ma

mf r
Where:
ma = mass flow (lb/s) of air drawn into module.
mf = mass flow (lb/s) of fuel entering fire.
r = air to fuel mass ratio required for ideal, stoichiometric burning.
3. In all but the simplest cases, it is not straightforward to determine m a and expert advice
should be sought.
4. For  greater than 1, fire is said to be fuel controlled (fuel lean); more than enough air to
support complete combustion can be drawn into module, and burning is limited by
amount of fuel. Although, in theory, there is enough air within module to fully burn fuel,
external flaming outside module may occur if module is not large enough to contain
flame.
5. For  less than 1, fire is ventilation controlled (or fuel rich). Insufficient air can be
drawn into module such that not all of fuel released can burn within module. In
ventilation controlled fires, unburned fuel will leave compartment and may ignite once in
encounters fresh air outside compartment. In these cases, external flaming will occur.
6. For  = 1, just sufficient air can be drawn in to module that would, if contents of module
were perfectly mixed, allow complete, stoichiometric combustion
7. It is emphasized that, while equivalence ratio is a useful parameter to describe burning
conditions, it is a hypothetical parameter based on the assumption that contents of module
(air and fuel vapour) are always perfectly mixed. In reality, some parts of module may be
fuel rich, others will be fuel lean, and others close to stoichiometric.
A.9.5. External flaming

uuuu. External burning can occur in both ventilation and fuel controlled fires.
vvvv. Fuel controlled fires
1. In fuel controlled fires, external flaming will only occur as a result of roof and/or walls of
module deflecting flame.
2. That is, while there is sufficient oxygen within module to support complete burning,
external flaming occurs because flame cannot “fit” into module.
wwww. Ventilation controlled fires
1. For ventilation controlled fires, there is insufficient oxygen within module to allow
complete combustion within module.
2. Unburned or partially burnt gases therefore leave module.
3. Provided temperature and composition requirements are met, out flowing gases may
ignite and result in external flame.
4. Assuming external flow is into open environment, characteristics of external flame will
generally be similar to those of open, unconfined pool fire.
xxxx. There may be more soot and carbon monoxide, particularly if fire is ventilation controlled.
Page 39 of 46
yyyy. Characteristics of external flame will depend on fuel involved and, in particular, amount of
thermal radiation is highly sensitive to amount of soot produced and whether soot
subsequently burns or provides effective radiation shield.
zzzz.Higher hydrocarbons will produce more soot, and flame may be shielded.
A.10. Smoke from fires
A.10.1. General
aaaaa.Modelling of smoke in this GP is for initial scoping calculations.
bbbbb. Calculations presented do not take account of rise of smoke or detailed interaction of
smoke around large obstacles (i.e., formation of a lee due to eddies around buildings, walls,
and other solid obstructions).
ccccc.Hence, the benefits of many good layout practices will not be fully realised if applying this
methodology.
ddddd. More detailed analysis will require application of computational fluid dynamics (CFD)
codes, such as Chameleon from SINTEF.
A.10.2. Outdoor smoke concentration

eeeee.In this methodology, fuel is given initial concentration of contaminants based on type of fuel
and degree of ventilation.
fffff. Initial contaminant density is diluted as it travels downwind.
ggggg. Downwind dilution is modelled using generic dilution curves.
hhhhh. Initial concentration of contaminates
1. Three categories of fuel should be considered:
a) Light (L): Predominantly methane but with no liquids.
b) Medium (M): Predominantly propane or butane but with no liquids.
c) Heavy (H): Predominantly pentane or heavier or any gas with liquids.
2. Two categories of ventilation should be considered:
a) Open (O): If four or more sides (of six) have no obstruction (e.g., deck and
deckhead but no walls or large obstructions). Open fires are well ventilated, and
burn rate is limited by available fuel.
b) Enclosed (E): If three or more sides are obstructed. Enclosed fires are poorly
ventilated, and burn rate is limited by available air.
iiiii. Initial contaminant concentrations for well ventilated fires are given in Table A.4 and in Table
A.5 for poorly ventilated fires.
Page 40 of 46
Table A.4 - Plume compositions - open or well ventilated fires
Component concentration
Component Unit Light fuel Medium fuel Heavy fuel
Carbon monoxide ppm 15 400 800
Carbon dioxide % 10 10,9 11,8
Oxygen % 0 0 0
Gas temperature deg C 1000 1000 1000
Optical density dB/m 1,5 15 47
Table A.5 - Plume compositions - poorly ventilated fires
Component concentration
Component Unit Light fuel Medium fuel Heavy fuel
Carbon monoxide ppm 28 500 30 000 31 000
Carbon dioxide % 7,7 8,2 9,2
Oxygen % 0 0 0
Gas temperature deg C 800 600 600
Optical Density dB/m 5 29 70
jjjjj. Downwind dilution

1. As smoke travels downwind, it is diluted by air entrainment and expansion of smoke
plume.
2. Dilution is modelled using dilution factors for dispersion of smoke for representative
fires.
3. Dilution curves as function of downwind distance are shown in Figure A.10.
Page 41 of 46
Figure A.10 - Smoke dilution factors for seven representative fires
F
i
g
ur
e2
S
m
ok
e
Di
l
ut
i
on
Fa
c
t
or
s
0
.
1
0
.
1k
g/
s
0
.
4k
g/
s
1
k
g/
s
0
.
01 4
k
g/
s
1
0
kg
/
s
4
0
kg
/
s
1
0
0k
g
/
s
0
.
00
1
0
.
00
01
0 2
0 4
0 6
0 8
0 1
0
0
P
l
u
meL
e
n
gt
h
(m)
kkkkk. Applicable curve from Figure A.2 is selected by using representative fire with nearest
burn rate to fire under consideration.
lllll. Size of fire is determined by burn rate of fuel in kg/s.
mmmmm. Concentration of smoke components external to target point (C ext) are calculated from
dilution factor (Df) and near fire concentration (Cs) as follows:
Page 42 of 46
Carbon Monoxide (ppm) Cext  D f  Cs

Carbon Dioxide ( % ) Cext  D f  Cs
Oxygen (%) Cext  D f  Cs  20,9(1  D f )
Temperature (C) Cext  D f  Cs  (1  D f )  Temp(ambient)
Obsuration (dB/m) Cext  D f  Cs
nnnnn. For gas jet fires and liquid spray fires, burn rate is simply release rate. Rate is
conservative. As release pressure decreases, percentage of fuel burnt will decrease. Unburned
fuel will drop out and burn as pool fire.
ooooo. For pool fire, burn rate is function of material being burnt and surface area of pool fire.
ppppp. Typical values of burn rate per unit area for fuel types on platform are given in Table
A.1.
qqqqq. Burn rates should be used to match fire being considered to one of representative fires.
A.10.3. Smoke impairment

The smoke from hydrocarbon fires has many harmful properties that will affect
personnel. There are three main categories of effect: narcosis, heat, and obscuration.
rrrrr. Impact of smoke is primarily a concern for FHA on offshore installations.
sssss. FHA should consider potential for smoke to block escape routes and should also consider
impact of smoke in areas where personnel must reside for period of time (e.g., muster and
embarkation areas).
ttttt. Narcosis
1. Impairment occurs if dose received from various fire gases cause blood carbon monoxide
(carboxyhaemoglobin) level to exceed given value.
2. Principal gases concerned are: carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and oxygen
(deficiency).
3. Dose at each 1 min time increment should be calculated using the following:
Fin  ( Fico  Vco2 )  Fio
Where:
Fico = (0,000829 × Cco1,036) / 15
Cco = Concentration of carbon monoxide at end of time increment
Vco2 = (EXP (0,2476 × Cco2 + 1,9086)) / 6,8
Cco2 = Concentration of carbon dioxide at end of time increment
Fio = 1/(EXP (8,13 - (0,54 × (20,9 - Co2))))
CO2 = Concentration of oxygen at end of time increment
4. Impairment occurs if level of carboxyhaemoglobin in blood exceeds 15%. Using the
equation in 3., this occurs if accumulated dose exceeds 1.
uuuuu. Heat
1. Heat impairment occurs if body's core temperature exceeds a set temperature.
Page 43 of 46
2. There is heat balance relationship between air temperature and ability of a person to lose
heat.
3. Levels of activity and clothing will have an effect on this calculation.
4. Realistic values are used in the equation under 5.:
Effect of “air temperature” on people is a dose related problem. If body core
temperature exceeds 40C, consciousness becomes blurred and serious illness results.
5. FHA should calculate accumulated heat dose Fih for 1 min time increments using the
following:
Fih  1/ EXP ( 5,1849  0,0273  T )
Where:
T = temperature (C) at the end of the time increment
6. Impairment occurs if accumulated dose, Fih exceeds 1.
vvvvv. Obscuration
1. Particulates in hydrocarbon fire plumes will not cause serious irritation problems, but
they may lead to reduction in visibility sufficient to impair escape or induce “irrational
behaviour”.
2. FHA shall use impairment criterion of visibility of 10 m (33ft) or path obscuration of 1
dB/m.
3. Time at which level of obscuration exceeds impairment limit (t io) is determined directly
from time/visibility calculations.
A.10.4. Smoke ingress into buildings

wwwww. The following calculations predict how conditions within a building change with time.
xxxxx. This is done for major components of plume that affect visibility, heat, narcosis, and
irritancy, namely: level of obscuration, air temperature, and concentrations of various gases,
e.g., carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and oxygen.
yyyyy. Levels of each “contaminant” in building (Cint) is calculated for time (t) using the
following:
If t  tn then Cint  Cext  A1  EXP(  Rn  t )

If t  te then Cint  Cext  A2  EXP(  Re  t )
If t  ts then Cint  Cext  A3  EXP(  Rs  t )
Where:
A1 = Cext - C0
A2 = A1 × EXP (tn × (Re - Rn))
A3 = A2 × EXP (te × (Rs - Re))
t = elapsed time since smoke arrived at building

tn = elapsed time at which HVAC air movement is effectively stopped
Page 44 of 46
te = elapsed time until external doors are sealed

ts = elapsed time until maximum required endurance
Cint = concentration, temperature or level of obscuration at time t
Cext = concentration (or temperature or obscuration) outside building
C0 = Initial concentration (or temperature or obscuration) inside the building
Page 45 of 46
Bibliography
Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)

Guidelines for Consequence Analysis of Chemical Releases, 1999.
Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Assessment, 2nd Edition,
2000.
Guidelines for Fire Protection in Chemical, Petrochemical and Hydrocarbon
Processing Facilities, 2003.
Centre for Marine Technology (CMPT)

Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 3rd Edition, 2002.
Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SPFE)

Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations, 1999.
Page 46 of 46

GP 24-21-Fire Hazard Analysis

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GP 24-21-Fire Hazard Analysis

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Document No.

Guidance on Practice for

This is the first issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) BP GP 24-21.

A.5.2. Flame height..............................................................................................................32

Table 1 - Example fire hazard inventory.........................................................................................15

Figure 1 - Overview of FHA process...............................................................................................13

Value of this Guidance on Practice

Feedback and Further Information

SINTEF Petroleum Research

3. Terms and definitions

Fire hazard management

Radiant Heat Flux

4. Symbols and abbreviations

BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics

CVP Capital Value Process

ESD Emergency Shut Down

FHA Fire Hazard Analysis

HAZID Hazard Identification

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

P&ID Piping and Instrument Diagram

5.2. Objectives of FHA

5.3. FHA Timing in the Project Cycle

6.1. Types of Fires addressed

 Pressure and temperature of material being released.

6.2. Analysis process steps

6.3. Inventory of fire hazards

Figure 1 - Overview of FHA process

Identify all hydrocarbon

Identify Fire Targets

Select next inventory

Calculate leak rate

Calculate initial hazard zones

Identify fire targets inside hazard zones

No Fire targets inside initial hazard zone?

Apply more detailed Calculate the size and duration of

For each target

6.4. Damage potential

6.5. Selection of fire cases for analysis

6.5.1. Uncontrolled fires

Table 1 - Example fire hazard inventory

6.5.2. Impact of fire hazard management strategies

d. Some assumptions regarding existing fire protection systems include:

6.6. Impact of fires

6.6.1. Structures and equipment

6.7. Further analysis

6.8. Documentation and presentation of results

3. Details of safety systems that are assumed to operate

7.2. Personnel exposure

7.2.1. Personnel exposure to fire

7.2.2. Personnel exposed to radiant heat

7.2.3. Personnel exposed to smoke

7.3. Equipment and structural exposure

7.3.2. Process equipment response

7.3.3. Structural response

This annex provides more detailed information for performing calculations.

A.2. Gas jet fire calculations

A.2.1. Fire characteristics

A.2.2. Release rate calculations

1/2 inch HOLE

r. Gas supported by vapourising or flashing liquid

Constant values are as follows:

Figure A.2 - Methane gas jet fire flame dimensions