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Criminal Law 1

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted
rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the
felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender
establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked
female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a
position to penetrate the female's vagina.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his
hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended
his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his
intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs
towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of
double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not
permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily,
his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to continue, and to have
sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit
to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.

We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did
not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly
connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no
connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts
would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could include
his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for
himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy
more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory
acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Codefor as long as they remained equivocal or
of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what
the perpetrator's intent really was.

It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness
is the offender's intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable,
but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore,
when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent
to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of
acts of lasciviousness is committed. (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014)
A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm. In case injury or death
results from the policemans exercise of such force, the policeman could be justified in
inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the policeman had used
necessary force.

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In this case, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban were in the performance of duty
as policemen when they escorted Valino, an arrested robber, to retrieve some stolen items. We
uphold the finding of the Sandiganbayan that there is no evidence that the policemen conspired
to kill or summarily execute Valino. In fact, it was not Valino who was supposed to go with the
policemen in the retrieval operations but his two other cohorts, Magat and Reyes. Had the
policemen staged the escape to justify the killing of Valino, the M16 Armalite taken by Valino
would not have been loaded with bullets. Moreover, the alleged summary execution of Valino
must be based on evidence and not on hearsay.

Undoubtedly, the policemen were in the legitimate performance of their duty when Cabanlig shot
Valino. Thus, fulfillment of duty is the justifying circumstance that is applicable to this case. To
determine if this defense is complete, we have to examine if Cabanlig used necessary force to
prevent Valino from escaping and in protecting himself and his co-accused policemen from
imminent danger.

In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when Valino
grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen
would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary to
prevent his escape. But Valino was not only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the
M16 Armalite of a policeman. The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to
recover the loose firearm. By grabbing Mercados M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm,
Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger.(Cabanlig Vs. Sandiganbayan)

Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, Treachery may still be
appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim
was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the victim was surprised by the attack coming
from the appellant. The victim was merely walking along the street unsuspecting of any harm that
would befall his person. That appellant shouted “ano, gusto nyo, away?” immediately before
stabbing the victim could not be deemed as sufficient warning to the latter of the impending attack
on his person.

Records show that after challenging the unsuspecting victim to a fight, appellant immediately
lunged at him and stabbed him at the back. Under the circumstances, the victim was indisputably
caught off guard by the sudden and deliberate attack coming from the appellant, leaving him with
no opportunity to raise any defense against the attack. The mode of the attack adopted by the
appellant rendered the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself. (People of the Philippines
Vs. Richard Napalit, G.R. No. 181247 March 19, 2010, J. Del Castillo)

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The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish
that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the
relative strength of the aggressors and the victim

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish
that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative
strength of the aggressors and the victim.

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in age, size
and strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them (Elizer) armed with
a knife, assaulted the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of them armed with a knife,
does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength.

Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the presence of this circumstance. Neither did the
prosecution present proof to show that the victim suffered from an inferior physical condition from
which the circumstance can be inferred.

In fact, there is evidence that the victim was able to get hold of a piece of wood and deliver
retaliatory blows against the knife-wielder, Elizer. Furthermore, the events leading to the stabbing
further disprove any finding of deliberate intent on the part of the assailants to abuse their superior
strength over that of the victim. (People Vs. Beduya, G.R. No. 175315 August 9,2010, J. Del
Castillo)

If the accused had the opportunity to escape, exempting circumstance of fear of an equal
or greater injury cannot be appreciated. A mere threat of future injury is insufficient. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to
escape.

The appellants attempt to evade criminal liability by insisting that he acted under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury fails to impress. To avail of this exempting
circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that
the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal
to that committed. A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.

We find nothing in the records to substantiate appellants insistence that he was under duress
from his co-accused in participating in the crime. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Villatima
and Bargo dragged the victim towards the sugarcane field and left the appellant inside the tricycle
that was parked by the roadside. While all alone, he had every opportunity to escape since he
was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. Surprisingly, he opted to wait for
his co-accused to return and even rode with them to Kabankalan, Negros Occidental to hide the
victims motorcycle in the house of Villatimas aunt.

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The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for more
than 10 hours and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to escape or
at least request for assistance from the people around him. (People Vs. Baron, G.R. No. 185209,
28 June 2010, J. Del Castillo)

For treachery to be appreciated, is it not enough to show that the attack against the
intended victim was unexpected

The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the
attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the safety of the
accused from the defensive acts of the victim. A finding of the existence of treachery should be
based on “clear and convincing evidence.” Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of
killing itself. In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted
or reflected on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage (Cirera v.
People, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014).

Ospital ng Maynila, a public hospital, cannot be solidarily nor subsidiarily liable for civil
damages on account of the death of a patient caused by its Physician Consultant.

Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly
enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-
fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be
complied with.

Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a
corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of
art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry.
However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit
but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was
engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila
acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such
employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged
against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was
unsatisfied due to his being insolvent. (Dr. Soliidum Vs. People, G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014)

Criminal Law 2

Novation can be a defense in estafa through misappropriation where the contract of

agency is converted into sale

Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 (on total
extinguishment)16 and Article 94 (on partial extinguishrnent) of the Revised Penal Code list down
the various grounds for the extinguishment of criminal liability. Not being included in the list,
novation is limited in its effect only to the civil aspect of the liability, and, for that reason, is not an

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efficient defense in estafa. This is because only the State may validly waive the criminal action
against an accused. The role of novation may only be either to prevent the rise of criminal liability,
or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such
that the breach of the obligation would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned
is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.

The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal information in court by
the state prosecutors because up to that time the original trust relation may be converted by the
parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to
insist on the original trust. But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and
instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its power to
exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the
state, only the latter can renounce it

It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the Penal
Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only be to
either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic
transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal responsibility,
as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.
(Deganos Vs. People, G.R. No. 162826 ,October 14, 2013)

There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is important to

ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with
estafa.

If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper
crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of
falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes, the
accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco
Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11
days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer
for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for
which he was convicted of falsification of private document.

In U.S. v. Infante, the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the
pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned
the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the
article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,
the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the
payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified
documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private
document.

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In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and
3453. (Batulanon Vs. People, G.R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006)

If a bank teller took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to
leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction and without their knowledge, thereby
filling out withdrawal slips that she signed, misrepresenting to her bank employees that
the signatures had been verified in due course and enabling her to receive the amounts
stated in the withdrawal slips, the bank teller committed a complex crime of estafa through
falsification under article 48 of the RPC since latter crime is a necessary means to commit
the former

The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document
was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the bank
depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction.
Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and
misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course.
Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the
withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family
Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of Matuguina and
Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures of Matuguina and
Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had signed the
respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex
crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the
withdrawal slips. (De Castro Vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015)

But If the falsification is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses
of estafa and falsification must be filed

Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as
one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime
of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to falsify certain
documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another person. In other words, the
falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed
to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are committed.
In the instant case, when accused collected payments from the customers, said collection which
was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries which she made on
the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount of her collection which
she did not remit to the company (Patula Vs. People, G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012)

Prosecution for estafa will not prosper if the parties waive the negotiable character of the
check, and instead treat the same as proof of an obligation. For instance, when there is an
agreement between the parties at the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks
that the obligee shall not encash or present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be
prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was

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informed that the checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not
arise.

In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would
deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva's
account. Villanueva posits that the receipt the Prosecution presented in evidence did not embody
such agreement.

This defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule that estafa will not lie when the parties
waive the negotiable character of the check, and instead treat the same as proof of an obligation.
For instance, when there is an agreement between the parties at the time of the issuance and
postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash or present the same to the bank, the
obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. When the payee
was informed that the checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not
arise. ( People Vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 163662 February 25, 2015)

The fact that the victim did not show any form of resistance is immaterial in a rape case
when the victim is sufficiently intimidated by her assailant and she submits against her
will because of fear of her personal safety.

There is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or
startling or frightful experience. Not every rape victim can be expected to act conformably to the
usual expectation of everyone. Some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into
insensibility; while other openly welcome the intrusion.

It is not uncommon for a woman to be easily intimidated into silence and conceal for sometime
the violation of her honor, even by the mildest threat to her life. (People Vs. Madeo, G.R. No.
176070 | October 2, 2009, J. Del Castillo)

Even if the accused merely retained the properties for the purpose of preserving his right
of lien over them, same is immaterial because failure to return upon demand the properties
which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own
personal use.

With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was able to prove
this through circumstantial evidence. Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the
prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. The failure to account upon
demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. As
mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the properties of SPI which were
received by him in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or
conversion of said properties to petitioners own personal use. Even if petitioner merely retained
the properties for the purpose of preserving his right of lien over them, same is immaterial
because, to reiterate, failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to
return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use.

As correctly noted by the CA:

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“We are not impressed by appellants excuse. We note that SPIs demand for the return of the
properties subject of this case was made on January 14, 1997. At that time, appellant was no
longer the managing director of SPI, he having been terminated from his position on November
19, 1996. This observation, coupled with SPIs demand for the return of its equipment and
materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the said properties and the fact that he
failed to return or at least account for them raises the presumption of misappropriation and
conversion. “(Aigle Vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 174181 June 27, 2012, J. Del Castillo)

In the crime of robbery with homicide the main intent is rob and the killing is merely
incidental
Indeed, we are satisfied that in this case the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish the
elements of robbery with homicide, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

(2) The property taken belongs to another;

(3) The taking is with animo lucrandi; and cralawlawlibrary

(4) By reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.

All the elements mentioned above are present in this case. In point of fact, the prosecution
succeeded in showing that the primary aim or objective of the malefactors Buenamer and
Lambada was to rob the passengers of the FX taxi. Prosecution witness David, a passenger of
the FX taxi in which the two robbers staged the heinous felony, was herself a victim of the robbery
that was staged by the malefactors that afternoon of October 20, 2009 along España Boulevard
in Sampaloc, Manila. David positively identified Buenamer as the very perpetrator of the crime
together with his co-accused Lambada. David testified that she saw the faces of these two
malefactors when these two boarded the FX taxi at the Pantranco terminal in Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City; that Buenamer and Lambada, then armed with firearms, declared a hold-up on
board the moving vehicle, after which these; two divested the passengers of their personal
belongings, while threatening the passengers that they would blow off their heads ("pasabugin
ang ulo namin") should the passengers resist the robbery. By taking the personal belongings and
valuables of the passengers, employing force, violence, and intimidation, end motivated moreover
by animus lucrandi or intent to gain or profit, and thereafter hitting Ferrarie causing him to fall from
the passenger jeepney resulting to his death, there can be no question that Buenamer did commit
robbery with homicide. (People Vs. Buenamer, G.R. No. 206227, August 31, 2016, J. Del Castillo)

Lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as
the maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so
imposing.

Lower courts thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set
the rules "for the application of penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first rule
that the courts should impose the penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should there
be neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that
within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to
the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and. the greater or lesser

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extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling
of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate sentence became arbitrary,
or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which
is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal. (Ladines Vs. People, G.R. No.
167333, January 11, 2016)

Where the application of the law on indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the
accused, resulting in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate
sentence should not be applied. A straight sentence may be imposed if the same will be
favorable to the accused

Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act 56 and
Republic Act No. 4 penalizes the criminal act of the appellant with imprisonment of not less than
five (5) years nor more than ten (10)years. So, if we applied the law on indeterminate sentence,
the penalty as recommended by the Solicitor General would be not less than five (5) years and
not more than a period exceeding ten (10) years. That penalty could hardly be regarded as
favorable to the accused, considering his plea of guilty. We should not lose sight of the fact that
the law on indeterminate sentence as a rule is intended to favor the defendant ina criminal case
particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment, depending upon his behavior and his physical,
mental, and moral record as a prisoner, to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence.
Upon favorable recommendation by that Board, the prisoner may be released on parole upon the
expiration of his minimum sentence. In fact the Governor General in his message published in 31
Off. Gaz., No. 92, August 3, 1933, issued in connection with the promulgation of the present law
on indeterminate sentence, said that one of the purposes of the law was to prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness.

Under the special law on illegal possession of firearms applicable to this case, already referred
to, if we had no law on indeterminate sentence in this jurisdiction, considering the plea of guilty
entered by the appellant, the trial court could well and lawfully have given him a prison sentence
of five (5) years. If we are now to apply the law on indeterminate sentence in the instant case, the
prison term would to be more than five (5) years for the reason that the minimum could not be
less than five (5) years and the maximum necessarily would have to be more than five (5) years
but not more than ten (10) years. That would certainly be not in accordance with the purpose of
the law on indeterminate sentence; in fact, it would run counter to its spirit. (

We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that in cases where the application of the law on
indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his
prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be applied. Under this opinion, it
is obvious that the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant to imprisonment for five (5)
years and one (1) day. (People Vs. Nang Kay, G.R. No. L-3565, April 20, 1951)

But the Nang Kay principle is not applicable if the penalty is imposed under the Revised
Penal Code. Applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied since it is
beneficial to the accused

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This case is about the correctness of the sentence rendered by Judge German G. Lee, Jr., who
imposed on Roman Amil, a straight penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for homicide.
He applied the rule in People vs. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515,. involving a conviction for illegal
possession of firearms which is punished by imprisonment for not less than five years and not
more than ten years.

Nang Kay was sentenced to five years and one day since an indeterminate sentence would be
unfavorable to him. It would lengthen his prison sentence.

But the instant case is not a prosecution under a special law. It is a homicide case. The application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory if the imprisonment would exceed one year. It
would be favorable to the accused (People vs. Alvarez, 101 Phil. 516). Fiscal Servilliano Elvinia,
Jr. objected to the straight penalty.

Judge Lee found that the homicide was attended by the two generic mitigating circumstances
provocation and voluntary surrender to the authorities. There was no aggravating circumstance.
Hence, the penalty of reclusion temporal must be lowered by one degree or to prision mayor.
The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor minimum.

By applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty has to be reduced by one degree or
to prision correccionalfrom which the minimum sentence has to be taken.

The certiorari resorted to by Fiscal Elvinia is proper because his purpose is to correct a manifest
error of the trial court amounting to excess of jurisdiction and to favor the accused The proceeding
did not place the accused in double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The judgment of the trial court is modified. The accused is
hereby sentenced to imprisonment of three (3) years of prision correccional medium as minimum
to seven (7) years of prision mayoras maximum. No costs. (People Vs. German Lee, G.R. No. L-
66859 September 12, 1984)

The Nang Kay principle is not also applicable when the accused did not make a voluntary
plea of guilty. In this case, he does not deserve any form of leniency similar to that granted
in the Nang Kay case

Indeed, the imposition of an indeterminate sentence is mandatory. For instance, in Argoncillo v.

Court of Appeals,[29] three persons were prosecuted for and found guilty of illegal fishing (with
the use of explosives) as defined in Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1058, for which the prescribed penalty was imprisonment from 20 years
to life imprisonment. The trial court imposed on each of the accused a straight penalty of 20 years
imprisonment, and the CA affirmed the trial court. On appeal, however, this Court declared the
straight penalty to be erroneous, and modified it by imposing imprisonment ranging from 20 years,
as minimum, to 25 years, as maximum.

We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay,[30] a prosecution for
illegal possession of firearms punished by a special law (that is, Section 2692, Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 56 and Republic Act No. 4) with
imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than ten years.

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There, the Court sustained the straight penalty of five years and one day imposed by the trial
court (Court of First Instance of Rizal) because the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison sentence. Yet, we cannot
apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a prosecution under a special law like
that in Nang Kay. Firstly, the trial court in Nang Kay could well and lawfully have given the accused
the lowest prison sentence of five years because of the mitigating circumstance of his voluntary
plea of guilty, but, herein, both the trial court and the CA did not have a similar circumstance to
justify the lenity towards the accused. Secondly, the large number of Fundador articles
confiscated from his house (namely, 241 empty bottles of Fundador, 163 Fundador boxes, a half
sack full of Fundador plastic caps, and two filled bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly demonstrated
that Batistis had been committing a grave economic offense over a period of time, thereby
deserving for him the indeterminate, rather than the straight and lower, penalty.

Special Penal Laws

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code. If the laying of hands is
done in a spur of anger, the accused is not guilty of child abuse

Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any
of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

xxxx

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree
with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted
provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on
Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being,
or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying
of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his
being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his
self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and

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dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. (Bongalon
Vs. People, G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013)

But when a School Teacher pinched hard her student on the left thigh and when she held
him in the armpits and threw him on the floor and as the boy fell down, his body hit the
desk causing him to lose consciousness but instead of feeling a sense of remorse, the
accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor,
she is criminally liable for Anti- Child Abuse Act.

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by
deeds or by word that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner "went
overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched
hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the
floor and as the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but
instead of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears
and pushed him down on the floor." On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop
going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to
another school where he had to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond
reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.

It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her
first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross
examination that she had also experienced the petitioner’s cruelty. The petitioner was also
convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of
another child named Dariel Legayada. Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had
"a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26, 2003 (Rosaldes
Vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014)

If the mastermind in a plunder case is unidentified, the total amount allegedly amassed by
several accused shall be divided for purposes of determining if the P50 million threshold
had been reached. On the other hand, if the main plunderer is identified, the total amount
amassed by him and his co-conspirators shall be the determining factor whether the P50
million threshold had been reached.

The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who
amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in
Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several
individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members
of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the

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information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either
manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must
be properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.

Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating and/or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating P65,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the crime
charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be the main plunderer. As such, each of the
10 accused would account for the aliquot amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the
alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth
required for plunder. (GMA vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016)

The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check
after having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have
forestalled the filing of the Information incourt. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22,
is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served
by penalizing people who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made
restitution for damages even before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the
payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already attained the
purpose of the law. On the other hand, prosecution for violation of B.P 22 shalll continue
if the payment is done after the filing of the information

It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the
information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused
from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the
criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had
every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check,
then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the
letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.

Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated
from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the
essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud.
In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal
liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.

In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6)
months before the filing of Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping
with justice and equity. (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014).)

The coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police
authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation

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Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may
carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Republic Act No. 9165 requires the NBI, PNP
and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related
matters," the provision does not make PDEA’s participation a condition sine qua non for every
buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in
apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is
not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA (People v. Balaquiot, G.R. No. 206366,
August 13, 2014).

The absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust
operation as there is no textbook method of conducting the same.

A buy-bust operation has been proven to be an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In
this regard, police authorities are given a wide latitude in employing their own ways of trapping
or apprehending drug dealers in flagrante delicto. There is no prescribed method on how
the operation is to be conducted. Citing People v. Garcia, the absence of a prior surveillance or
test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation as there is no textbook method of
conducting the same. As long as the constitutional rights of the suspected drug dealer are
not violated, the regularity of the operation will always be upheld. Thus, in People v. Salazar, we
ruled that “if carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, buy-bust operation
deserves judicial sanction.” (People Vs. Robelo, GR No. 184181 November 26, 2012, J. Del
Castillo)

Marking of the seized item in the police station and the failure to conduct inventory are not
fatal to the prosecution of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act

Appellant also posits that the marking of the seized item at the police station instead of at the
place of seizure immediately after his arrest engendered serious doubt as to its identity. The Court
is not convinced. Marking the subject item at the police station did not dent the prosecution's case.
While R.A. No. 9165 provides for the immediate marking of the seized item, it does not specify a
time frame when and where said marking should be done. In fact, in People v. Resurreccion, the
Court had the occasion to rule that marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.

Finally, while it is admitted that the apprehending officers failed to conduct an inventory of the
seized item and to photograph the same as required by paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the non-compliance did
not affect the seized item's evidentiary weight and admissibility in evidence. As previously
discussed, the chain of custody of the seized item was unbroken, hence, its integrity and
evidentiary value were not compromised. It must be stressed that what is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item. (People of the Philippines
Vs. Larry Basilio, G.R. No.195774, February 23, 2015, J. Del Castillo)

The defense of non-compliance to chain of custody rule cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal

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When an accused raises the issue of non-compliance by the police officers with Sec. 21 of the
IRR of R.A. 9165 particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized specimen and the non-
taking of photograph thereof on appeal after the CA rendered a decision, the Court must uphold
his conviction. Cabrera should have raised the said issue before the trial court. Truly, objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party desires the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal (People v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 190175,
November 12, 2014).

Anti VAW-C cases are not subject of a compromise agreement

The instant petition is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement. The law explicitly prohibits
compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v.
Drilon, the Court declared that: Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. xxx A process
which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault.

While AAA filed her application for a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO) as an independent action and not as an incidental relief prayed for in a
criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases falling under the
provisions of R.A. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to
compromise applies (BBB vs. AAA*, G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015).

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut that: In this jurisdiction, it is settled that the
offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for
offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315
of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code.
It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa (People v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 173792,
August 31, 2011)

The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence
against women and children

Del Socorro and Van Wilsem got married in 1990 in Holland. They were blessed with a son.
However, in 1995, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. Van Wilsem made a promise to provide monthly support for their
son. Del Socorro and their son went back to the Philippines. Since the arrival of Del Socorro and
their son to the Philippines, Van Wilsem never gave support to their son. Consequently, Van
Wilsem came to the Philippines and remarried. All of the parties are presently living in Cebu City.
Thereafter, Del Socorro sent a letter demanding support to Van Wilsem. In this case, Van Wilsem
liable under R.A. 9262. Van Wilsem may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No.

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9262. The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence
against women and children (Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014).

Any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law.

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking
or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It
is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore,
there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should
be no departure.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section
24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted
of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section
70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Act. The law
considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and
pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically
disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors
alike, are given the chance to mend their ways. The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that
had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug
traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared
so.

The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective
of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only
a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense
under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling
dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act
No. 9165. ( Padua Vs. People, G.R No. 168546, July 23, 2008)

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