VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, vs. PASTOR D.

AGO,
LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-28546
July 30, 1975 CASTRO, J. (65 SCRA 505)
FACTS
In 1955, the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit
against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil
case 27251). Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of
sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties. However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor
Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale. The Court of First
Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's
final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to
the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. While the battle on the matter of the
lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966. The
Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the
petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court. The Court dismissed the petition in a
minute resolution on February 8, 1967. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of
Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction. Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the
present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment.
HELD
Yes. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the
fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos,
abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial
process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly
resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times
in the Supreme Court).
 Santiago v Rafanan

FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by BJMP employee Jonar Santiago against Atty.
Edison Rafanan. Santiago, in his complaint, alleged among others that Rafanan, in
notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: Make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants (*one making the
affidavit);o Enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; Make and
execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he notarized.
Santiago also alleged that Rafanan executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered it as
evidence (Rafanan stood as counsel and as witness of his client) and Rafanan, as alleged by
Santiago, waited for him together with his “men” and disarmed Santiago and uttered insulting
words at him. Atty. Rafanan admitted having administered the oath to the affiants
whose Affidavits were attached to the Complaint of Santiago. But Rafanan believed that the non-
notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits were allowed
because notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary
public, and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other
government offices. He also pointed out that older practitioners in Nueva Ecija also do what he
did – they do not indicate affiants’ residence certificates on documents they notarized, or have
entries in the notarial register for these documents. He also contends that the case filed by
Santiago was only to harass Rafanan since he is the counsel of the parties who filed cases against
him before the ombudsman (Brgy. Capt. Ernesto Ramos and BJMP)

before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rafanan is guilty in violating the Notarial Law.
2. Whether or not a lawyer (in this case, Rafanan) can stand as witness in favor of his
clients.
RULING:
1. Yes, he violated the Notarial Law for not making the proper notation and entering the
details of the notarized documents. he Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations
and duties of notaries public. And these formalities are mandatory and cannot be
simply neglected. They are required to certify that the party to every
document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue
and the date as part of such certification. They are also required to keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; etc. As to Rafanan’s defense
that it’s a common practice in Nueva Ecija, SC says: It is appalling and inexcusable that
he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were
doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification
for breaking the law.
2. Yes, a lawyer can stand as witness of a client. A lawyer is not disqualified from being a
witness, except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from
an attorney-client relationship. The preference is for lawyers to REFRAIN from testifying
as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from
active management of the case. Atty. Rafanan cannot be administratively liable because
It’s the duty of the lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by
law for the benefit of the client.(Remember, there is a criminal case of attempted
 murder against his client which will deprive his client of his life and liberty, if they fail to
display a good defense.)

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

Facts:
A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients &
encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of
paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial
assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted
and called them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit
of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty
relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”:

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01

Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of
said calling card.

Issue:
W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services

Held:
Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon
3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus,
lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to
advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the
profession in the public’s estimation).
With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of
gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes
“ambulance chasing” (involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a measure
to protect community from barratry and champertry.
As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyer’s
best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
 Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise
of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their
original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability.
This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal
profession.

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO

(409 SCRA 299, 2003)

FACTS
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:
“Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court,
called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty.
Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-
6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It
appears that similar advertisements were also published.
An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation
and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although
the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed
against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute
prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by
the prohibition.

ISSUE
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD
Yes!
The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is
public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public
service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their
primary interest.
 Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and
undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages
people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.
Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s
name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly
publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the
contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.

MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

(223 SCRA 378, 1993)

FACTS:
This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed
by law.
The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret
marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free
books on Guam Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the
fact of the publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law
but is merely rendering legal support services through paralegals. It also contends that such
advertisements should be allowed based on certain US cases decided.

ISSUE:
W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.
W/N the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements complained of.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. When a person participates
in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks
the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of
court. And applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the
“practice of law”.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent
and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are when he appears in
a reputable law list and use of an ordinary, simple professional card.
The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack. Hence, it should be enjoined.
 Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie [A.C. No. 2131 May 10, 1985]
136 SCRA 349
FACTS: Respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie,
which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked a certain Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his
reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he
be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie “and if not, what is your
purpose in using the letterhead of another law office.” Not having received any reply, he filed the
instant complaint. As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in
30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar,
practicing under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
McKenzie
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.
HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that
being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the
Court finds unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name
Baker & McKenzie.

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP,

SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”
July 30, 1979
Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5,
1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976,
praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners
who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom or
usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name
of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who
already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners
from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages
and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will
have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old
firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association
for a particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute
the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
 GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN

Facts:
Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genato’s building. Atty. Silapan handled some
of Genato’s cases. After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to buy a car. Atty.
Silapan bought the car, and issued a postdated check to Genato. The check was dishonored.
Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22. In his defense, he alleged that
Genato was in the business of “buying an selling deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and
other shady deals” and that he was also involved in bribery cases.
Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client
relationship.

Issue:
Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?
Held:
No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him, especially with privileged communication – the protection is only limited to
communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of
a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.
Thus, here, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment
in the strictest sense.
However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapan’s rights as they
were not pertinent to the case. It was improper for him to disclose those information as they were
not the subject matter of litigation at hand. His professional competence and legal advice were
not being attacked in the said case. A lawyer must conduct himself with integrity.
He is therefore suspended for 6 months.

LUALHATI M. LIWANAG,complainant, vs.JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE

[A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168.April 21, 1999]
Facts:
Judge Paterno presided a case for the violation of BP 22 filed by Lualhati's husband for
violation of BP 22. She stated that when she went to see Judge Paterno, he prepared an order for
the accused. At that point, he touched the shoulder of Lualhati, down to her breast. She froze and
could not do anything. When asked to see him again, she did come back to see him which
resulted to the delay of the hearing and several postponements. On several occasions, Judge
Paterno required of her sexual favors. First, when he ordered her to meet her at 7:00am in his
chambers then he would caress her breast. He would expose his penis and ordered Lualhati to
orally masturbate him. There was a fluid that oozed from his penis, which was somewhat bloody;
and second, when he fetch her and went to a resort in Laguna. He undressed himself and ordered
her to do the same like the last time. This event happened twice. She stated that she made a
mistake by becoming a willing victim. But she did it for the sake of her family she thought that is
the only way she can help her husband get back his money for their future. Pictures at the resort
were presented as evidence. Judge Paterno denied the allegations. According to him, the
complaint was filed because Lualhati and her husband wanted to accommodate, hastily schedule,
decide arbitrarily and finish the case within a short period. He further claimed that he could not
have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 am as alleged since he usually arrives for work some
five to ten minutes before 8. With his age of 67, and with heart ailment and diabetes, sex is
beyond his physical capacity and cannot longer indulge in such because he might die.
Issue:
Whether Respondent has committed impropriety in the performance of his duties.
Ruling:
Judge Paterno grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to
avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his private life as well. He does not deny that he
is the one appearing with Lualhati in the photographs presented. He could not offer any plausible
explanation why he was seen with Lualhati coming out of what is apparently a private room. The
Court cannot countenance any act or omission on the part of the officials at every level in the
administration of justice which erodes rather than enhances the public's faith and trust in the
judiciary.