ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT approving or rejecting any act or law.
approving or rejecting any act or law. When you say any act, it also includes resolutions. This was the ruling in the
SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Section 1 Article VI of the Constitution confers legislative power to the Congress of the Philippines. Legislative
power has been defined as the power to make or enact laws, to repeal or amend them or modify the laws. While
the constitution grants legislative power to the Congress under Section 1 Article VI, that does not necessarily
mean that the Congress only exercises legislative power. There are other non-legislative powers conferred by the
constitution to the Congress (Section 17- quasi judicial power, sec 22- executive power, Article 7 the power to act
as board of canvassers in the Presidential and Vice Presidential election, the power to revoke the proclamation of
Martial Law, suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus – section 18 of Art 7, the power of the Senate to
concur treaties ratified by the president)
Romualdez-Marcos vs Manglapus
The power of the Congress does not only refer to those specifically conferred by the Constitution, there are
other powers not specifically conferred by the Constitution but are essentially legislative in character or which
are implied from the given power to the Congress. One of those powers is the power to confer powers to
Administrative Agencies. The Congress in the exercise of its general legislative power can create administrative
agencies and as a consequence thereof, the congress has the power to confer powers to these administrative
agencies, some of which may be in the nature of quasi legislative power.
The power of the Congress to enact laws to amend or repeal them is not absolute and unlimited. (Pimentel vs
Comelec citing Government v Springer)
Government vs Springer
The Supreme Court held that, Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and
confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such
powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority
against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.
Like the ocean, the extent of the ocean is limited by the shore, in the same manner, the scope of authority of the
Congress, is limited by the Constitution. The Congress cannot exercise its legislative power in violation of the
constitutional limitations.
Under Section 1 of Article VI, aside for the Congress, the constitution also confers legislative power to the people,
this is through the system of initiative and referendum. In relation thereto, Section 32 of Article VI mandates that
the Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum and the exceptions
therefrom whereby the people can directly enact, reject or approve any act or law upon a petition signed by at
least 10% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3
percent of the registered votes thereof. This process should be distinguished from initiative on the Constitution
under Section 2 of Article XVII.
Section 2 of Article XVII refers to a method or mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution while initiative
and referendum under Section 1 of Article 6 as well as Section 32 of Article 6 are modes of proposing or enacting,
case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC
The system of initiative and referendum under Section 1 Article 6 in relation to Section 32 of Article 6 can be
exercised also to approve or reject any act or resolution. The term “act” according to the Supreme Court under
SBMA vs Comelec, is broad enough to cover resolutions. It is not only limited to law or ordinance, but it also
includes resolutions of legislative bodies. There is a difference between initiative and referendum. The Supreme
Court said, when we talk of initiative, the proposal originates from the people, so the people themselves are the
one who propose the act while in a referendum, the proposed act emanates from the legislative body whether
national or the Congress. Referendum is only resorted to in order that the act may become a law without
submitting it to the president with the approval or to the local chief executive.
For example, there is a bill passed by the Congress, and it is already anticipated that the president will veto the
act, a petition for referendum may be filed by the citizens in order that instead of submitting the act to the
President, it would be submitted to the people in a plebiscite for their approval or rejection. This is referendum.
Initiative on the other hand, the proposed measure emanates from the people. There are two steps in initiative
and referendum: (1) filing of the petition, (2) plebiscite. Like initiative on the constitution, the proposed measure
shall be submitted to the people for their approval or rejection through plebiscite.
Lambino vs COMELEC
Under Section 1 Article 6, legislative power is vested in the congress of the Philippines and the constitution
specifies what kind of Congress is established under the Constitution, which is a bicameral congress. This system
of legislative body cannot be modified by mere legislative act. It requires a change of the Constitution which
according to the Supreme Court in the case of Lambino vs COMELEC will amount to revision because it will vary a
general governmental structure and would also modify the systems of checks and balances established by the
constitution.
SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters
of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Section 2 (composition of the senate, manner of election and who may vote)
Section 2 of Article 6 may be divided into two parts;
(1) The senate shall be composed of 24 senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines,
(2) as may be provided by law.
“as may be provided by law”
Q: To what does the phrase apply? Does it apply to the entire first part of section 2 of article 6? Well, we say
first part refers to the composition of the senate, the manner of election and who may vote for senators. Can
the Congress enact a law providing for a different number of senators? Different manner of election? Instead
of elected by the people at large, by region? Can the congress enact a law providing for the qualification of
voters?
 A: The answer to that question is that “as may be provided by law” only applies to the qualification of voters not
as to the senate or manner of election. Congress cannot enact a law providing for a different number of senators
and manner of election but they can enact a law providing for the qualification of voters of the Philippines.
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
Section 3 (qualification of senators)
There are five qualifications of senators (same in Congress except the age and residency) ;
(1) natural born citizenship,
(2) able to read and write,
(3) at least 35 years of age on the day of the election(2 nd Monday of May),
(4) resident (anywhere in the ph) at least 2 years immediately preceding the day of the election,
(5) registered voter(anywhere in the ph).
Frivaldo v COMELEC(1996 case)
Qualifications mandated by law or by Constitution which are not specified when this qualification should be
possessed, must be possessed at the time that the term of office of the public officer begins.
While Frivaldo v Comelec does not involve a member of congress but a local government officer (Governor), the
principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in that case can be extended to members of congress. In the absence
of any decision of the SC modifying the principle, specifying the qualification of the members of congress which
are not specifically provided for in the constitution as to the date of the possession, we can apply the ruling of
the SC in Frivaldo vs Comelec. Again, this qualification must be possessed at the beginning of the term of the
public officer, noon 30th day of June next following the election.
Q: Is it possible, for a person who is not a natural born citizen at one time, but subsequently becomes a natural
born ?
A: possible thru the system of repatriation.
Altajeros v Comelec and Maquiling v Comelec
Repatriation is curative in character and it is retroactive in application.
Just like in the case of Frivaldo v Comelec, the application for repatriation was made prior to the filing of the
COC, but the application was only approved on the day that the petitioner starts the term of his office. The SC
said, that’s enough, as long as at the time that the public officer commences the term of his office, the procedure
has been completed. In that regard, he is qualified to assume the position and discharge the function of this
office.
SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 4 (term and term limit of senators)
Term of office: 6 years
Constitution provides that it should begin at noon 30th day of June next following the election.
Q: Can it be set at a different date?
A: Yes, because the constitution says, “unless otherwise provided by law.”
The phrase only refers to the beginning of the term of the senators; it does not refer to term of office of the
senators. The congress cannot enact a law providing for a longer or shorter term of office of the senators.
Without changing the constitution, the term of office of the senators, the term of office of the senators cannot
be modified by congress.
Term limit: 2 successive terms
DO NOT SAY TWO TERMS, MUST BE TWO SUCCESSIVE TERMS – because senators can hold more than two terms
as long as the senators do not serve more than two consecutive terms. The senator can hold five terms as long as
does not exceed two consecutive or successive terms.
Under the last part of section 4 of Article 6, it provides that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as interruption in the continuity of service of the full term for which he was elected. This
means that even if the senators resign on the second term, he remains to be disqualified for the successive term
because resignation is a voluntary renunciation of office.
Q: Supposing instead of resignation, the senator was expelled due to his disorderly behavior on his second
term, is he qualified to run for the senate in the next succeeding election?
A: No, the disqualification remains.
The sentence under section 4 of Article 6, that says voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as interruption in the continuity of service of the full term for which he was elected should be
interpreted to mean such as but not exclusive. Meaning, voluntary renunciation is not just on of the mode of not
suspending the running of the term limit but does not exclude other modes of cessation of office including
expulsion because expulsion is an involuntary manner of cessation of office. Disqualification attached even to
expulsion. But it does not apply to expulsion because of lack of qualification to become a senator or expulsion
because of not having the one duly elected. Expulsion refers to disorderly behavior not expulsion because he was
not the duly elected senator.
Q: supposing A and B ran for the senate in 2007, A was proclaimed by the Comelec as the 12 th duly elected
senator and B 13th in rank. A took his oath before the president of senate in open session and he assumed office.
Supposing B filed an electoral protest before the electoral tribunal challenging the election of A. Electoral
tribunal found B the duly elected 12 th senator in 2012. B assumed office and completed the term until 2013. In
next election 2013, both parties ran again and won and assumed office and completed the term until 2019.
Supposing 2019 the subsequent elections, they ran again. Are they disqualified? (Pimentel and Zubiri)
A – served first 5 years of the term 2007-2013 and completed the 6 year term in 2013-2019
Can we say that 2007-2013 – first term and 2013-2019 –second term?
 No pronouncement yet on the part of the SC as to the interpretation of the term limit of members of Congress.
Pimentel and Zubiri case
In so far as Pimentel, the petition to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy was denied by the
Comelec, there was no appeal to the SC and currently no Senate electoral protest before the senate electoral
tribunal challenging the running in the election of senator Pimentel. Nonetheless, a case which involves a local
elective official, interpreting the term “three successive terms”. This is in relation to section 8 article 10.
Section 4 Acticle 6 and Section 8 article 10 are almost identical in terms of the limit.
Under Section 4 Article 6, it says, no senator shall serve more than two successive terms.
Under Section 8 of Article 10 it says, no local elective public officer shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms.
Abundo v Comelec
The SC interpreted that phrase under Article 10 to mean, “elected for three consecutive terms and completed
the term for three consecutive terms. This case involves a mayor, the petitioner was elected in 2001 as a mayor
until 2004. In 2004, he ran again but the other candidate was proclaimed elected initially, so he filed an electoral
protest. More than 1 year, in 2005, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor so he served the remaining term
(2005- 2007). In 2007, he ran again and completed the term until 2010. In 2010, he filed a COC and the
respondent contends that he is already disqualified because he has already served three consecutive terms.
According to the Supreme court, the 2004 – 2007 term should not be counted because the petitioner was not
able to complete the term because of the electoral protest. The 2010 election of the petitioner is his second
term.
While the case applies to local officers, we can also extend that principle to article 6 in the absence of categorical
pronouncement of the SC interpreting the last paragraph of Section 4 Article 6, the term limit of the senators.
Reason again, consider it side by side with Section 8 Article 10, the sentence when it comes to term limits is
identical. They are almost the same. Again, in the absence of any pronouncement of the Supreme Court, we can
apply the case of Abundo v Comelec. But the last sentence of Section 4 should be qualified by the statement,
voluntary renunciation of office shall not be considered as interruption and as we said earlier, voluntary
renunciation also includes involuntary modes of cessation such as expulsion except expulsion because of lack of
qualification. Lack of qualification to be a candidate not lack of qualification particularly those which are
continuing in character. (e.g citizenship)
Example: Supposing on the 2nd term of office of the senator, he was ousted because he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he expressly renounced it. The statement earlier that disqualification should not be counted is not
applicable in the given case because, he is qualified as a candidate but he lost his qualification during his term.
That will be counted as one term even if he was removed because of a qualification. The qualification in this case
is continuing in character.
Q: In the hypo given with regard to the case of Pimentel and Zubiri, if we apply the Abundo case, both are
qualified?
A: yes. Because in so far as Pimentel is concerned, although he was elected for two consecutive terms, he was not
able to serve two successive complete terms. Insofar as senator Zubiri is concerned, he was only elected in 2013.
He was not elected in 2007. If he was again elected in 2019, that is his 2 nd consecutive term.
Q: What if the disqualification has been present before pa, for example, he was not qualified to become a
senator?
A: in that regard, any vote casted in his favor, is considered as null and void. This is the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Ongsiako Reyes v Comelec with regard to the application of the so called 2 nd placer rule and the
application on the rule of succession
Ongsiako Reyes v Comelec
If a person runs for an office but he or she does not possess the qualification, any vote casted in his or her favor
shall be considered null and void. The 2nd highest vote is not considered as the 2nd placer but the first placer
insofar as the valid votes are concerned. He is the one who obtained the highest number valid votes. The one
who obtained the highest vote is disqualified, therefore, the votes casted in his favor is invalid, therefore the one
who obtained the highest valid votes should be proclaimed elected.
If this happens in Congress, no special election shall be called, because the qualification of the one who obtained
the highest number of votes will entitle the one obtaining the highest number of valid votes to assume the office
and serve the remaining period of the term.
Q: Will the two successive terms apply?
Supposing a candidate was 34 yrs old on the day of election. He was proclaimed elected by the Comelec and he
served office until such time he was declared disqualified by the SET because he lacked the age qualification on
the day of the election. Will that be counted as one term?
A: In order for this disqualification to attach, he must be duly elected for two consecutive terms, and has served
the full term for two consecutive terms. Since he has not be duly elected since he was disqualified, then that term
shall not be counted against him.
SECTION 5.
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Q: what is the composition of the HOR?

A: Not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law
The constitution fixes the maximum number of members. The constitution says, “shall not be more than”. Do not
say not less than because if it is not less than, it would mean it could more than 250 without any positive act on
the part of the Congress.
The 250 could be increased because of the phrase “unless otherwise fixed by law”
Q: What are the 2 types/kinds of members of the HOR?
A: District Representative (80% of membership); and Party-List Representative (20% of membership)
Q: How many are the members for the District Representatives?
A: 80%. The 20% shall come from party-list representatives.
Q: How are the district representatives apportioned, according to the Constitution? Can Municipalities be
constituted as legislative district?
S: Yes
Q: Can we say that legislative districts are constituted only over provinces and cities? Remember, if we go to
paragraph 3, Section 5 of Art VI, it says, each province or each city (the population of atleast 250,000 shall have
at least 1 representative. Can we say then that legislative districts can only be constituted over provinces or cities
with at least 250,000 population but not over municipalities?
S: Yes
Q: Alright, so municipalities cannot be constituted as legislative district. Right?
A: Yes
G: But remember, in the cases of Mariano v COMELEC and Tobias v Abalos the local gov’t units involved here are
municipalities.
Mariano v COMELEC
The case of Makati. Prior to its conversion to a highly urbanized city, it constitutes a lone district of Makati. So,
ever before it was converted to a highly urbanized city, it is already considered as one legislative district, which is
the lone district of municipality of Makati.
Tobias v Abalos
This case involves a special law which separates the municipalities of San Juan and Mandaluyong and converted
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with one legislative district, as well as San Juan with
1 legislative district.
G: In both these cases, the LGUs concerned are municipalities. It shows that municipalities may also be
constituted as legislative districts.
Q: Supposing a highly urbanized municipality in Mindanao, can it be constituted as a legislative district.
Supposing the population in that highly urbanized municipality is 250,000, can it be constituted as a legislative
district?
S: Having met the requirement of 250,000, yes.
Q: Even if it’s only a municipality?
S: Yes sir, the rule will apply even the municipality is located in provinces and not in the city.
G: But can we say that municipalities as legislative districts are only allowed in the Metropolitan Manila area, not
elsewhere? In the two cases we mentioned, the municipalities involved are both in Metro Manila. In the first
paragraph of Section 5, Article 6 it says that, “..legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila are in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio and the Metropolitan Manila area.” Municipalities outside Metropolitan Area
cannot be constituted as legislative districts. Outside Metropolitan Area, legislative districts can only be
constituted over provinces and cities, but within the Metropolitan area, municipalities may be constituted as
legislative district. That is the effect of paragraph 1, Sec 5, of Art VI.
…
Q: Under the last paragraph of Section 5 of Art VI, the Consti authorizes the Congress who vary the
apportionment of legislative district. This is within 3 years following the return of consensus. So there must be a
reapportionment of legislative district. Does that mean that the composition of the House of Representatives can
only be increased by general apportionment law, which is mentioned under the last paragraph of Section 5, Art
VI?
S: No, Sir. The reapportionment of legislative districts may also be done through a special law.
Q: Okay so the composition of the House of Representatives may also be increased through a special law. For
example, a special law converting a local government unit into a highly urbanized city, or a special law converting
a local gov’t unit into a province. What is the reason, according to the Supreme Court in the cases of Mariano v
COMELEC as well as Aquino v COMELEC (2010) why there is no need for a general reapportionment law before
the composition of the House of Representatives may be increased?
S: According to these cases, if we have to wait for a general apportionment law to be passed by Congress then
such legislative districts would have no representatives for such districts if we have to wait for three years, Sir.
G: Okay so, not only three years. The three years is counted from the return of every census, and census is
conducted NOT yearly.
So, depending on the policy of the government, it could be five years, ten years.. so, that’s the time when the
gov’t conduct census.
So, if we’re going to wait for census and then every three years before the return of such census, reapportion a
legislative district, therefore a long period of time, this newly created LGU would be deprived of
 representation. That is the practical reason mentioned by Supreme Court in the last two cases. But as a legal
basis, the Constitution particularly paragraph 1, sec 5 of Art VI, only says, “..unless otherwise fixed by law,” and
the term law is unqualified. So it could be, a general apportionment law or a special law. So since the consti
DOES NOT specify the type of law, then the courts should NOT also qualify / limit the authority to increase the
composition of the House of Representatives.
Q: Again, we said earlier that the constitution says the composition of the house of rep to not more than 250
members. We said earlier that the ruling of the SC in the cases of Mariano v COMELEC, Tobias v Abalos, this
250,000 maximum may be increased by the Congress even by a special law because of the phrase, “..unless
otherwise fixed by law,” right? Can the phrase be used in order to decrease the composition of the house of
representatives? Supposing, instead of 250, the Congress says, “From now on, we will limit the composition of
the house of representatives to not more than 200 members.” Is that allowed?
S: It is allowed sir. – not allowed - The Consti says, “who shall be elected from legislative districts comprising of
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and a progressive ratio,” those must be complied with by the
Congress..
G: It is allowed by the phrase, “..unless otherwise fixed by law.” So it also authorized the change by decreasing
the composition. But can we say that in determining the apportionment of legislative district, par 3, section 5 of
Art VI provides for the guidelines and standards, “contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” But, similarly, par 1,
section 5 of Art VI also provides for guidelines for the apportionment of legislative district . The Consti says, “who
shall be elected from legislative districts comprising of provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and a progressive
ratio,” those must be complied with by the Congress..
Q: What is the implication of the use of the term progressive? Does progressive mean forward but not
backward? Upward and not downward?
S: Yes
G: Yes, so the Congress CANNOT enact a law decreasing the composition based on these standards. By
complying to these standards, the Congress can only increase the composition. Otherwise, the Congress will
violate these standards. Another standard mandated by the Constitution, the components of the legislative
district must be, “contiguous, compact, and adjacent.”
Tobias v Abalos
Explained why the wisdom behind this standard. The importance of this standard is gerrymandering.
G: But of course it is also intended for efficacy. In order that the LGUs may be effectively administered.
Because, just imagine if the composition of the districts will be scattered. A territory is in Luzon, another is in
Visayas, another is in Mindanao. So it will be hard for the legislative districts. But nonetheless, according to the
SC, the main reason why the Consti Commission provided for the standards is to prevent gerrymandering.
Gerrymandering refers to political bills restricting a political subdivision in order to favor one political party or
political candidate. The origin of the word can be traced in the 18 th century in Boston, Massachusetts. The term
gerrymandering is a portmanteau. When we say portmanteau, this is process of joining 2 words in order to
create 1 word with a new meaning. For example, smoke and fog which will be smog. Another example is
DongYan (hahahahahaha Dingdong and Marian hahahaha). So the two words for gerrymandering are Gerry and
salamander. Because it was first used in 1850s in Boston, because Gerry here refers to the governor of Boston at
the time, Elbridge Gerry, who approved a law redistricting Boston and the resulting configuration of the new
legislative district resembles a lizard. The purpose of redistricting is to favor the political party of governor.
G: For a city to be entitled to one legislative district, the Constitution requires that the City must have at least
250,000 population. Is this also required for a province?
S: No sir, the province is entitled to one legislative district regardless of the population.
Q: In the first place, may an LGU be created as a province without that minimum population? Or can we say that
the province can only be created over a territory with at least 250,000 population? In Aquino v COMELEC, in
citing the Local Government Code.. does the local government code allow creation of provinces over a
geographical territory with a population of less than 250,000? So we can say that if a territory does NOT have at
least 250,000 population, it CANNOT be created as a province.
S: Yes sir
G: Okay so a local area may be created as a province even if it DOES NOT have a population of at least 250,000,
right? Under the Code, there are 3 qualifications to be a province. Are all these three considered as mandatory
qualifications?
Three qualifications:
1. Annual average income of NOT less than 20 Million based on 1990 price index;
2. It must have a population of not less than 250,000;
3. It must have an area of not less than 20,000 q kilometer.
S: As for the population sir, it is not required.
G: So you mean it’s only an alternative? So long as the areas has one of the three qualifications, it can be
constituted as a province?
S: All the qualifications must be present.
G: Hence, when we say province, the population of 250,000 has been complied with. Which means, a province or
a political subdivision to be considered as a province therefore, entitled to at least 1 representative. So the
statement by the Supreme Court in Aquino v COMELEC that the province is not required to have a 250,000
population to be entitled to 1 district rep is NOT accurate? It’s not true? Because by creating it as a province it
already means that it already has satisfied the population requirement of 250,000. Agree?
S: Sir, in the case of Aquino.
G: This case talks about legislative district. So let’s talk about initial representation. To be entitled to initial
representation, is a province required to meet the 250,000 population?
S: Yes
G: Therefore, a province with less than 250,000.. not entitled to one district representative?
 S: Yes.
G: Basis?
S: Initially Sir, the province is already entitled to 1 legislative district Sir.
Aquino v COMELEC (2010)
G: Yes, but to be entitled to 1 district representation, it must have a population of not less than 250,000. Same
with the city? No difference? Right? So to be entitled to one, at least 250,000?
Aquino v COMELEC
The qualification does not apply to a province because under the Local Government Code, provinces may be
created even without 250,000 population. Because among the three qualifications, the mandatory qualification
is the annual income of at least 20 Million. The other two qualifications are alternative, so either one of the
two. So the three qualifications are not required to be possessed. The only mandatory qualification is the
annual income to be supplemented or complemented alternately by the area or the population requirement.
Q: So for a province to be entitled to one representative it does not have to have 250,000 population. But, for
a city to be entitled to one representative, it must have at least 250,000 population?
S: Yes
G: For a city to be entitled to an additional district, is it required that the additional district must also have a
population of not less than 250,000.
S: No, so long as a city were able to comply with the 250,000 requirement for the initial legislative district, such
city is also entitled to an additional legislative district if the population increases.
G: ..and the increase in the population does not necessarily mean that there must also an increase of another
250,000?
Mariano v COMELEC
Montejo v COMELEC
At the time when Makati was converted into a highly urbanized city, the population was 450,000. By declaring
Makati as a highly urbanized city, it was divided into two legislative districts. If we are going to evenly divide the
population, it means that each legislative district will have 225,000 population only. If we will give 250,000 to one
legislative district, it means that the other legislative district will only have 200,000 population.
G: Did the SC declare the law unconstitutional because the grant of additional legislative district to Makati would
result in both or one legislative district falling below the minimum 250,000 population?
In Mariano v COMELEC, the minimum population for cities only applies for the first apportionment. Petitioners
cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is NOT in accord with Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
This section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000. In fact, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than
250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
Initial and subsequent apportionment of legislative districts for provinces do not require a minimum
population. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city
to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirements for cities only to
its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to
have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case,
which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
AG: You mentioned earlier that a province does not need to have a population of 250,000 in order to be entitled
to 1 legislative district. For an additional legislative district, is it required that a province comply with the
minimum population of 250,000?
AG: When it comes to additional apportionment, 250,000 is not applicable to a province.
SC said that as we compare city to a province—A city is required to comply with the 250,000 population for an
initial legislative district; province, not required. But for a city to have an additional legislative district, no need to
get a 250,000 population, so with more reason that a province need not be required 250,000 population for the
additional legislative district.
A province is entitled to a legislative district even if its population is less than 250,000.
AG: In the case of Montejo v COMELEC, the petitioner here was requested by the COMELEC to make a
reapportionment of the legislative district in Leyte. Because remember that the conversion of Biliran to a full-
fledged province, petitioner said that it resulted into an imbalance in the population of the original legislative
district in Leyte. The request of the petitioner is that the municipality of Tolosa be transferred to District 2. The
petitioner here is a representative of District 1. He wants to transfer Tolosa to District 2 but the representative of
District 2 does not want Tolosa; he wants it to be transferred to District 4.
Why does no one of the original legislative districts want Tolosa? What is with Tolosa? Why does nobody want
it?
AG: They do not want Imelda Marcos. When Imelda returned to the Philippines, she resided in Tolosa. She
acquired the domicile of her parents. She also expressed her desire to run for the Congress. None of the
incumbent representatives of the districts in Leyte want to have an electoral contest with Imelda Marcos. That is
 why they want to get rid of Tolosa. That is the real reason. But according to the petitioner, the reason for the contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
transfer is to correct the imbalance in the population of the remaining legislative district. become members of the House of Representatives.

The COMELEC acceded to the request. Is it within the authority of the COMELEC to transfer one municipality What is a political party as defined under the law?
from one legislative district to another?
Section 3(b) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
S: No. It is not within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Area apportionment of legislative districts is within the principles, and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
powers of the Legislature only. securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office.
AG: But according to the ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution granted the COMELEC to make minor
adjustments in the apportionment of the initial apportionment of legislative districts. Will this justify the transfer It is either national or regional.
of Tolosa from District 1 to District 2?
What is a national party?
S: No. It is not a minor adjustment, because the transfer of Tolosa will affect the manner of representation of the
districts. Also, such matter is within the power of the Legislature. It is not within the jurisdiction of COMELEC. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions.
AG: The act of transferring one municipality to one legislative district to another amounts to apportionment of
legislative districts and the power of apportionment of legislative districts is lodged exclusively to the Congress, What is a regional party?
not to the COMELEC.
It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
Remember that in the case of Montejo v COMELEC, the SC provided the deliberation of the Constitutional majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
Commission. There was a problem then when they were making the initial apportionment of the legislative
districts. They were recognizing the possibility of errors in the initial apportionment. There were 3 proposals What is a sectoral party?
made by Davide: (1) allow the Congress to correct the apportionment; (2) allow the President to make the
apportionment; (3) allow the COMELEC to make the apportionment. It refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Sec. 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Among the three, they chose the third option but only insofar as the minor adjustments are concerned. The
members of the ConCom made that ordinance and appended to the 1987 Constitution. But Supreme Court said A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
that minor adjustments only refer to correction of clerical or typographical error. Example, a municipality was employment, interests or concerns.
omitted in the list, that can be corrected by the COMELEC; but not transferring one municipality from one
legislative district to another. That can no longer be considered as typographical error or minor adjustments. Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC

Only the Congress can do that, not the COMELEC. What are the 4 inviolable parameters of the party-list system under RA 7941?
1. 20% allocation
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM 2. 2% threshold
3. 3-seat limit
What is the party-list system all about (RA 7941)? 4. Proportional representation

AG: Section 3 of the law provides that “the party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the COMELEC. Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the party-list system.
Section 2 provides that “The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
What is the basis of the 20% allocation? By express constitutional provision.
Par. 2, Section 5, Article VI: The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list xxx
Sec. 11, RA 7941: The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
How do we get the 20% allocation? What is the formula by the SC?
 1/3 of district representatives divided by .8 (to get the total number of members of the HoR) then multiplied by . In Banat v COMELEC, did the SC consider the 2% threshold as absolutely valid? Or partly invalid? Partially valid,
2 to get the 20% thereof. partly invalid. What part of the 2% threshold is valid and which part is unconstitutional?

Is the 20% allocation mandatory? In the part that only those 2 percenters are qualified to have a seat, it is constitutional. All party-lists, coalitions,
or organizations obtaining at least 2% votes is entitled to at least one seat. The 2% threshold is valid as to the
It is only a ceiling. It is not required to be distributed to parties, organizations or coalitions participating under the qualifying seats.
party-list system.
In the part that the distribution is only limited to the two percenters, is the 2% threshold valid? No, it is
Does the party-list system allow reserve seating? unconstitutional. Even those who did not obtain the 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system may be
entitled to the additional seats.
Is allocation the same with reserve-seating? No. What is the difference? If it is allocation, the 20% is set aside.
Reserve seating is there is a certain percentage for certain sectors. For example, 5% for labor, 5% for women, 5% In Banat v COMELEC, the SC divided the distribution of seats allocated to party-list system into 2 rounds. The first
for youth. round is available only to the 2 percenters. All the 2 percenters will be given 1 seat each. Once they are all given
The constitution does not allow reserve seating under the party-list system. and there are still available slots, then we go to the second round of distribution. In the 2 nd round of distribution,
those who did not obtain at least 2% votes may participate in the distribution.
Can the 20% can be obtained by one sector—only labor sector. Is this allowed? Example, there were 100 parties
about labor. These 100 parties obtained the highest ranking. Shall they not be entitled to the 20%? SC held that the Panganiban formula in the case of Veterans Federation case is considered as superseded. It is
abandoned. Why? What was the reason given by the SC?
The 20% shall not be allocated to one party; but it may be allocated to one sector. That is allowed.
S: It is because of the mathematical impossibility of distributing the seats to the qualified party-list.
What is the basis in the 2% threshold?
AG: Applying the Panganiban formula will make it mathematically impossible to distribute all the 20% allocated
Sec.11, RA 7941(b)—The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
to the party-list system. It is impossible to exhaust all the 20% seats.
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:
Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC
Provided finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats.
AG: Because in the Panganiban formula, the distribution is based on the first party.
Why does that the law provides that those who obtained 2% are invited to have a qualifying seat? What is the
wisdom behind this parameter?
Under RA 7941, the first step in the distribution of seats under the Party-list system is to rank the parties from
the highest to lowest. Those obtaining the highest votes up to the lowest.
The principle or main purpose of the party-list system is to allow marginalized and unrepresented sectors who
cannot obtain a legislative district seat to have the opportunity to become a member of the HoR.
And the second step, get the proportional vote of each party, And we said earlier, the proportional vote is
obtained by dividing the number of votes of each party to the number of votes of the entire party list system.
These sectoral parties cannot defeat major political parties in legislative district elections, but they now have the
chance to get seats in the HoR through the party-list system. A candidate in a legislative district election only
In the Panganiban formula, the distribution is based on the first party and the first party pertains to the party
needs 200,000 votes to win; a party representative cannot get that in a legislative district election; but that party
obtaining the highest vote under the party-list system. According to the SC, if the first party obtained at least 2%,
can get it nationwide. The 2% threshold is intended to show that it has a decent number of people to represent.
entitled to one seat. If the first party obtained at least 4 but not more than 5.99%, entitled to one additional seat.
Representation presupposes that it represents a substantial number of constituents.
If it has obtained at least 6% of the votes cast, entitled to additional 2.
The 2% threshold, is this absolutely constitutional and valid?
This is the rule in Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC. Now according to the SC, it is easy to distribute the
seats to the first party. The problem is on the other parties. The Panganiban formula, insofar as putting
There are two conflicting cases. In the case of Veterans Federation v COMELEC, the SC only limited the
additional seats as the other parties adopted a formula. The formula is the number of votes obtained by a
distribution of seats under the party-list system to the 2 percenters. Meaning, party-lists, organizations, or
party over votes obtained by the first party multiplied by the additional seats obtained by the first party.
coalitions that did not obtain 2% in the votes cast are disqualified to participate in the distribution of seats under
the party-list system. To the extent that it limits the distribution to the 2 percenters, is the 2% threshold valid
Q: What is the wisdom behind that formula?
and constitutional?

Banat v COMELEC
 AG: Is it based on the wisdom that other parties, other than the first party should not obtain higher seat than the
first party? They can only get a seat lower than the first party, That’s the reason why the proportion is in relation Q: What does that mean then that the 20% allocation now becomes mandatory. Not merely a ceiling, but
to the first party. mandatory?

BANAT vs. COMELEC S: It is still a ceiling not mandatory

The SC has expressly abandoned the Panganiban formula and applied a different formula in the distribution of
seats under BANAT v COMELEC is the controlled doctrine when it comes to the distribution of seats in the party-
list system.
Q: The formula under BANAT v COMELEC is divided into two rounds. The first round only applies to?
S: The 2%-ers
AG: Even by applying the formula in BANAT v COMELEC, there are remaining seats that can be distributed,
particularly the application of the 3-seat limit.
Q: What is the principle or wisdom behind the 3-seat principle?
S: In order to have a proportional representation so that the 3-seat limit implements that policy of proportional
representative

AG: To those parties, organizations or coalitions that obtained at least 2% of the votes cast. If there are AG: It is also to broaden the composition of the party-list system by not allowing a political party to dominate the
remaining seats after giving one each to the two percenters, we go to the second round party-list system. Without this, one political party can get the 20%. Each party, whether political or sectoral, can
only get at most 3 seats in order to broaden the system.
Q: Is second round only available to the 2%-ers?
AG: When it comes to guidelines for the registration and accreditation of nominees participating in the party-list
S: No, it also applies to those who obtain less than 2% system, we still have the Ang Bagong Bayani v COMELEC guideline but this was clarified and modified in Atong
Paglaum v COMELEC.
AG: The SC said that by determining the additional seats, the formula is?
In Ang Bagong Bayani v COMELEC, we have 8 guidelines. The political party must show that they represent the
S: The proportionate vote of each party multiplied by the remaining seats less those of the guaranteed seats marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To be eligible as a nominee, the nominee must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sector. The youth cannot be represented by a retiree, the women cannot be
AG: When you say remaining seats, we have already subtracted those distributed and the guaranteed seat. The represented by a man. The nominee must belong to the sector.
remaining seat.
From 8, we now only have 6 guidelines.
For example, the 20% allocation is 55. And the first round distribution resulted in the distribution of 17. So the
remaining seats of 38. In order to determine the remaining seats, we multiple 38 to the proportionate vote of Q: Under the first guideline, who may participate under the party-list system?
each party. And the result may be whole integer and the fractional number.
S: There are 3
Q: So how do we identify the number of additional seats? The additional seats shall be represented by? The
whole integer or the fraction? 1. National party or organization
2. Regional party or organization
S: The whole integer 3. Sectoral Party or organization

AG: The additional seats shall be represented by the whole integer number without rounding up. So if multiplying Q: May an individual participate in the party-list system?
38 by 7.2 results in 2.90, the additional seat would only be 2.
S: No
AG: This is subject on the rule of the 3-seat limit. But after giving the additional seat representing the whole
integer, There is still a remaining. What do we do with the remaining seat? AG: Because only limited to parties, organizations or coalitions. The vote is on the party and not on the nominee.
The first guideline: 3 groups can participate
S: It is allocated to the other party even to those who did not obtain the 2%
Q: Second guideline when it comes to national and regional parties or organizations, what is the guideline?
AG: Even those who did not obtain at least 2% of the votes cast and even to those by multiplying the remaining
seat to their proportional number, will not result in a whole integer. This shows that as much as possible S: They are in line or organized alone with a sectoral organization
distribute all the 20% allocated to the party-list system.
AG: Which means that the national or regional organization may be principle based
 S: indigenous cultural communities, fisherfolk, handicapped, veterans and OFWS
S: Yes
Q: And those lacking in well-defined political constituencies?
AG: It doesn’t mean that it must register under sectoral lines. For example, the party may be advocating
socialism, not sectoral but principle or philosophy based. But again, national and regional parties do not need to S: The youth, women, the professionals and the elderly
organize under sectoral lines, but is it required that they represent the marginalized and underrepresented?
Q: Is this list exclusive?
Q: They can be principle based but at the very least do they need to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented? S: No. As held in the case of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, the enumeration is not exclusive.

S: No it is not required as per the Atong Paglaum case Q: May the religious sector participate in the party-list system?

AG: Let’s go to Political Parties S: No

Q: Can political parties participate in the Party-list system? AG: This is one of the disqualifications under Sec 6 of RA 7941 and expressly under Sec 5 of Article VI, “except the
religious sector”
S: Yes, provided that they do not field in legislative or district candidates
Q: May religion be used as a basis as a disqualification?
AG: So there are two conditions:
1. They have to register under the party-list system S: No because of the non-establishment clause in the Constitution. This prohibits the government from religious
2. That they do not participate in the legislative district justification

Q: But political parties, major or not, that field candidates in the legislative district election can still participate AG: While religion cannot be represented under the party-list system, a party organization cannot be disqualified
under the party-list system. How? solely on the basis of religion. Example in the case of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC initially
disqualified the petitioner to register under the party-list system because of religious morality. Basis: Bible and
S: By registering through their sectoral wing Quran. SC said that we cannot rely on religious morality but only secular morality in determining the authority or
rather in determining entitlement to participate in the party-list system.
Q: And that sectoral wing can independently register under the party-list system?
Q: And to be considered as marginalized and underrepresented, is it required that the sector must belong to the
S: Yes, they are considered as separate and independent minority group? When we say marginalized and underrepresented, do we refer to the minority group?

AG: These are the first 3 rules for the registration and accreditation under the party-list system. S: No

AG: Let’s go to the fourth guideline, the sectoral parties representation Q: Why not?

Q: So what are the two sectoral parties or organizations? S: It only provides that majority of the members must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented

S: Q: No, the question is, when we say marginalized and underrepresented sector, are we referring to the majority
1. Marginalized and underrepresented or group of our community?
2. Those lacking in well-defined political constituencies
S: No
AG: It is enough that the principle advocacy of the sectoral representation refers to the special interest and
concern of their sections. Q: Why not? marginalized and underrepresented does not refer to the minority group? Why?

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC Q: In our society, who comprises the minority group? Minority refers to whom in our society?

Q: Under Section 5 of RA 7941, there are 12 sectors identified by the law. Which among these sectors are S: The marginalized and underrepresented
marginalized and underrepresented?
Q: refers to the minority? So marginalized and underrepresented refers to the minority group of our society

Q: In our society, does that mean minority are poor? Majority are the rich? Or can we say that in our society, the
minority are the ultra-rich and the majority, the poor
S: Yes
Q: Minority does not usually refer to the poor, it refers to the rich because in terms of number, they are lesser.
The term “marginalized and underrepresented” should not be interpreted to mean the minority group. The term
“marginalized and underrepresented” to what group does it refer according to Atong Paglaum v COMELEC?
Q: Is it required that the they must suffer in extreme poverty?
S: No
Q: When we say marginalized and underrepresented, to what sector do we refer to? Again, not the minority
group, not to the those who wallow in poverty but to those?
S: Those sectors that by their nature are economically marginalized and underrepresented
Q: To what sector do we refer to? To those below middle class. Marginalized and underrepresented means
below middle class.
AG: Let’s go the fifth guideline regarding membership
S: Majority of the members must belong to marginalized and underrepresented or lacking well-defined
constituencies
AG: Let’s clarify. Let’s separate marginalized and underrepresented from those lacking well-defined political
constituencies.
So sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented sector, the majority
must be?
S: Majority of the marginalized and underrepresented
Q: Similarly the sectoral parties that are lacking well-defined political constituencies, majority must?
S: Majority must belong to the lacking well-defined political constituencies that they represent
AG: In short, they must belong to the sector in which they represent
Q: Let’s go to nominees. When it comes to sectoral parties, whether those lacking in well-defined political
constituencies or representing the marginalized and underrepresented sector, is it required that the nominee
must belong to the sector sought to be represented?
S: It could also be they have a track record of advocacy for their respective sector
Q: Meaning they must concur both or alternative?
S: Alternative
AG: Which means that nominees of sectoral parties must either belong to the sector represented or must have a
track record of advocacy to the special interest and concern of their sector. Which means that under the new
guideline, an elderly sector, a party representing the elderly may be represented by one who is not a senior
citizen. The women sector may be represented by a man, lgbt may be represented by a straight person.
Q: What sector is only limited to nominate one belonging to them?
S: The youth sector
AG: Because under the law, the nominee of the youth sector must be at least 25 must not be more than 30 years
old at the time of the election.
Q: How about national, original parties organization, the nominee must be?
S: Must be a bona fide member of the party, organization or coalition
Q: Does that mean that nominees of sectoral parties, organization, whether those representing the marginalized
and underrepresented or lacking well-defined political constituencies, do not need to be a member of the party
or organization?
S: No. It is also required that they are a member of the organization
AG: But under the guideline, we said earlier that the nominee must either be belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking well-defined political constituencies or have a trac record of advocacy. So the bona
fide candidate applies to the political party under the last part of the fifth guideline. Nominee of political parties
must be bona fide member of the organization sought to be represented. That is for political party. But for
sectoral parties, there are only two alternative qualifications, either belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking well-defined political constituencies or have a track record of advocacy. So
nominees may not be a member of the sectoral party organization
AG: but can we say that on the other hand, that the qualifications under RA 7941 to become a nominee is
unqualified? Can we say that particularly under Sec 9 of RA7941, the qualifications of nominees are provided for.
Does the law specify whether the law represents political party or sectoral party? It refers to nominees. Can we
say that that requirement applies to all nominees whether from political parties or sectoral parties? Under that
provision, “bona fide member. Right? For how long?
S: At least 90 days before the election.
Q: Can there be an instance where the nominee can be disqualified even if a nominee is a member of that party
or organization for more than 90 days?
S: Yes
Q: When?
S: When he changes affiliation
AG: So to qualify as a nominee he must be a member of the new party or organization for at least 6 months. He
must establish his residency in the new party organization for at least 6 months. Otherwise he is not eligible for
nomination. Then again, even for sectoral parties, the nominee must be a bona fide member of the party
organization sought to be represented. That is by clear provision of the law.
The fifth guideline in the case of Atong Paglaum v COMELEC should also be supplemented by that provision of
RA 7941
Q: And what happens in the last guideline when the nominees are disqualified?
S: The party or organization will not be disqualified provided that at least 1 nominee remains qualified
Q: So based on that, if all the nominees admitted by the parties are disqualified, that they can no longer be
entitled to a seat under the party-list system?
S: Yes
AG: Yes, based on that guideline. Because under the law, how many nominees should be submitted by each
party?
S: At least 5
Q: When should that be submitted? Not later than?
S: Not later than 90 days before the election
AG: Not later than 90 days is the registration or the submission of the manifestation of intent to participate. But
the list of nominees should come later. Not later than?
S: 45 days before the election
AG: These are the guidelines when it comes to the party -list system. RA 7941 also provides for disqualifications
or deregistration of these parties, organizations and coalitions. And there are 8 rounds for deregistration or
denial of application of registration. And the 8 grounds is that the parties must have failed to participate in the
last preceding elections or failed to obtain the 2% of the votes cast in the last two preceding elections
Q: Supposing party A participated in 2001 party-list election. That party-list A failed to obtain 2% of the vote cast
in that election. Party A did not participate in 2004 elections. Now, it wants to participate in the 2007 elections.
Can we say that it is disqualified?
S: No. It is qualified
AG: But can we say that when party A did not register in 2004, it also failed to obtain the 2% of the vote cast in
the party-list system?
S: It is provided in the law that the party must have failed to participate in the last two preceding election or
failed to obtain at least 2% of the vote cast in the last two preceding elections.
Q: Which means?
S: Only either and party A participated in 2001 but it failed however in 2004, it did not qualify under that it failed
to participate in the last preceding two elections
AG: This is now the new principle or doctrine in the case of Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs.
COMELEC. The disqualification under the law, particularly the failure to participate in the last two preceding
elections and the failure to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in the last two preceding elections should be
taken separately and not alternatively. In that regard, the SC expressly abandoned its ruling in the earlier case of
Genero v COMELEC.
Q: What is the effect of the ruling of the SC in BANAT v COMELEC as to the disqualification that the party who
failed to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in the last two preceding elections should be disqualified?
S: The disqualification should mean that failed to obtain a seat in the two preceding elections.
Q: What is the effect of the ruling of the supreme court in banat vs comelec as to the disqualification that the
party that failed to obtain atleast two percent of the votes cast in the last two preceding election shall be
disqualified?
S: Because of the ruling in Nanat sir, the disqualification for failure to garner two percent it should mean that,
its means that failure to qualify for a party list in the two preceding elections sir.
G: Okay so which means failure to obtain at least one of the six allocated under the party list system for the last
two preceding election.
G: So even if the party failed to obtain at least two percent of the votes cast. if it was allocated as sit under the
party list system under the competition in Banat vs comelec, then it will not be disqualified. right?
S: Yes sir.
G: So this is also provided for by the supreme court in Philippine Guardians Brotherhood vs COMELEC. right?
S: Yes sir.
Q: So in the case of _____________, or under section 7 of republic act 7941, it is expressly provided that the
commission on election shall release a certified lease of the parties organization or coalition registered under the
party list system and this certified lease should be posted in the calling(?) precinct, but the lease shall not include
the names of the nominees right? it is provided for under section 7 of republic act 7941 right?
S: Yes sir.
SECTION 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare
a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have
manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for
posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified
list.
Q: Okay. does that mean miss pasia that the names of the nominees can not be disclosed to any person who G: the party organizations participating under the party list system.
intends to exercise his or her right to information under section 7 of article 3? S: yes sir.

S: No sir. G: right. because any vote to any person should be considered as null and void. right?
S: yes sir.
Q: Okay. So what does section 7 of republic act 7941 only prohibit if not the disclosure?
Palparan vs. HRET
G: this is the main issue in the case of entire republic act 7941 vs comelec or bara(?) 7941 vs comelec right?
G: okay and in the case of Palparan vs. HRET, according to the petitioner, the qualifications, returns, elections of
S: yes sir. in this case sir it was called the comelec cannot, it won’t release the list of the nominees considered…. party list representatives, can only be contested before the comelec, before it is the comelec that registers and
determines the qualifications of parties of organizations or coalitions participating under the party list system.
G: because there was a prior request from former comelec chairman abalos. they were requesting for the list of Q: will the supreme court agree?
the nominees. according chairman abalos "no we cannot disclose because section 7 of republic act 7941 except
the list of nominees.” G: okay so again miss patia under the party list system, it is the comelec that determines the qualifications of
parties, organizations, or coalitions to participate under the party list system right?
S: yes sir it was stated by the supreme court that section 7 of RA 7941 a certain justified (?) card (?) for comelec S: yes sir.
to deny the requested disclosure.
Palparan vs COMELEC

Q: can we say miss pasia that section 7 of republic act 7941 only prohibits the posting of the lease with names of G: okay according to the petitioner in Palparan vs COMELEC, any electoral proof test involving party list
nominees? representatives should be filed before the comelec, because it is the comelec that determines the qualifications
of parties organization participating under the party list system.
G: so meaning what must be posted in the calling precinct, is only the certified lease of parties organization or
coalitions without the names of the nominees. Q: did the supreme court agree?
S: yes sir.
S: no sir.
G: yes but that does not mean that the disclosure of the nominees is prohibited by law.
S: yes sir. Q: why not?

G: yes it can be disclosed right? G: so meaning the house of representatives electoral tribunal has jurisdiction.
S: yes sir.
S: because sir the authority to determine the qualification of a party list nominee belongs to the party or the hret
G: so the prohibition is only the posting of the names of the nominees in the calling precinct. sir.
S: yes sir.
Q: they have submitted to the comelec right?
G: because what must be posted again should be the list of parties organization right?
S: yes sir. Q: the list of nominees together with their qualifications are submitted to the comelec right?

Q: okay and under the party list system how many votes per voter for the member of congress are allowed? S: yes sir.

Q: how many votes? per voter? G: yes. so thats the ground of the petitioner. according to him, since the qualifications not only of the nominees
S: two votes sir. but also the parties, organzitions participating under the party list system, are to be determined by the comelec,
then any electoral protest involving party list representatives should be filed with the comelec not the hret.
Q: two votes. one for district representative and the second one for?
S: party list sir. G: since according to the petitioner, under the party list system, the voters do not go for nominees. they vote for
the party, organizations, or coalitions. right?
Q: party list representative or party list representatives? S: yes sir.
S: no sir.
 G: so according to him since the voters do not vote for the nominees, then the qualifications of the nominees,
should be determined by the comelec and what has become(?) a part or member of the house of
representatives, any electoral protest should be filed with the comelec.
S: yes sir.
Q: okay so the supreme court agree right?
Q: do they agree miss pasia?
S: no sir? yes sir.
Q: okay so electoral protest involving members of the house of representatives belonging into the party list
system, should be filed with the comelec not the house of the representatives electoral tribunal right?
S: yes sir.
Q: okay but can we say miss patia that under section 17 of article 6 be a grant of jurisdiction to the electoral
tribunals of each house particulary for the house of representatives is unqualified?
S: yes sir.
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Q: so did the authority to be sole judge of all contest relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of each
members, does that specify whether it is for district representatives or party list representatives?
S: yes sir.
G: so in that regard, that jurisdiction covers all members of the house of representatives, whether district
representatives or party representatives.
S: yes sir.
G: okay so once the nominee becomes a member of the house of representatives, then any electoral protests,
can only be filed with the house of representatives electoral tribunal. right?
G: so that was the ruling of the supreme court in the case of palparan vs hret in relation to section 17 of article 6.
okay?
S: yes sir.
G: so let us go now to the qualifications of members of the house of representatives under section 6 of article 6.
S: sir section 6 provides that no person shall be a member of the house of representatives unless he is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election is atleast 25 years of age, able to read and write,
and except the party list representatives, are registered voter in the district in which you shall be elected, and a
resident thereof or a period of less than 1 year, immediately preceding the day of the elections.
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
G: okay which means that for party list representatives, the qualification of a registered voter and the residency
qualification can be maintained anywhere in the Philippines.
S: yes sir.
G: okay remember in the case of Pimentel vs COMELEC, the supreme court said that the qualifications of the
members of congress, particularly for senators under section 3 of article 6, is exclusive right?
S: yes sir.
G: therefore the congress can not expand it or constrict it by mere legislation.
S: yes sir.
G: right so in the case of pimentel vs comelec the supreme court declared unconstitutional that part of the
dangerous drugs act that requires a elective officer, including members of the congress to submit a certification
of drug free before they are allowed to assume their office. right?
S: yes sir.
G: because it serves to expand the qualifications of members of congress even if it were post election. right?
S: yes sir.
G: because they require a senator, a member of the house of representatives to submit it to assume office, it
means that an elected member of congress may be prevented from assuming office, just because he can not
submit that requirement. right?
S: yes sir.
Q: okay republic act 7941 provide for additional qualification of members of the house of representatives
belonging to the party list system?
G: remember awhile ago you only enumerated five qualifications. natural born filipino citizen, atleast 25 years
old on the day of the election, able to read and write, except for party list representatives a registered voter on
the legislative on which you shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than 1 year
immediately preceeding tha date of the election. only five right?
S: yes sir.
G: under republic act 7941 nominees who later on would become members of the house of representatives are
mandated to become bonafide members of the party, organization, or coalition that they represent atleast 90
days before the election. right?
S: yes sir.

Q: is this an additional qualification?
G: so for a nominee who will eventually become a member of the house of representatives, he must be a
member of the party organization at least 90 days before the election. otherwise he cannot become a nominee,
and which means he cannot become a member of the house of representatives participating under the party list
system. right?
G: so in relation to members of house of representatives, the constitution requires that the district
representatives must be residents of the legislative district of which he or she shall be elected for a period of not
less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election. right?
S: yes sir.
Q: okay the term residence can we say that it should be understood to mean residence of civil law?

S: yes sir. S: it should be understood to mean a domicile sir.

G: therefore unconstitutional right? Q: so domicile not residence in civil law?

S: yes sir.
G: because in civil law residence is a, residence has a specific meaning. right?
G: okay so republic act 7941 is unconstitutional particularly that part thereof which requires that nominees must
be bonafide members of the party, organization, or coalition sought to be represented because that provision G: in civil law residence means presence, physical presence at a fixed place. right?
provides for additional qualification of members of the house of representatives. right?
S: yes sir.
S: yes sir.
Q: is that residence in political law?
Q: okay but can we say that that qualification is inherent in the party list system?
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
G: because nominees cannot just deflact(?) anywhere. nominees must be members of the parties, organizations,
or coalitions participating under the party list system. S: in political law sir, as decided sir in the case of romualdez-marcos sir. the residence here sir refers to domicile
and residence means that there is an intent to stay sir and intent to return.
G: so to allow a nominee who is not part of the party would result to meeting the party list system as a backdoor
to become a member of the house of representatives. so rich filipino citizens would just say that "even if im not a G: whenever absent.
member of your party (win)? me as nominee I will give you contribution even if im not a member of your party".
S: whenever absence sir. this means that the period of stay is not mere temporary but rather permanent sir.
G: so that would violate the principle of the system, right?
G: okay so according to supreme court in romualdez-marcos vs comelec the term residence in political law
S: sir i will retract my answer. should be understood to mean domicile. political law residence is synonymous with domicile but domicile is not
residence. right?
G: which is?
S: yes sir.
Q: republic act 7941 provide for additional qualification to be eligible as a nominee and ultimately to become a
member of the house of representatives, this is valid because? G: so the supreme court said that domicile means the physical presence in a fixed place coupled with the intent
to remain or intent to stay or the so called animus manendi and the intent to return whenever absent or the
Q: this is valid because? why? animus revertendi. right?

Q: is it inherent in the party list system? S: yes sir.

S: yes sir. It is inherent sir. G: okay romualdez-marcos vs comelec remember that in her certificate of candidacy for the legislative district in
leyte, in the item residence the petitioner stated that seven months. so and then later on after the period
G: so exactly. can be required without violating the constitution. right? allowed by law of correcting manifest error on COCs, she changed it to since childhood.

S: yes sir. Q: so it that allowed? according to the supreme court?

G: okay so lets continue our discussion mister pracuelles. S: yes sir. in this case sir what happened is that the only reason why imelda marcos changed residence for several
instances is because, since 1952 when she was married to ferdinand marcos sir, they changed residence
constantly. however in this case sir, there was the supreme court found that there was no express renunciation
of domicile in the part of imelda marcos. therefore applying the requisites provided by the supreme court sir,
where there was a valid change of domicile, there should be an animus manendi and animuns non revetendi,
which is not present in the case so this means that when imelda marcos got married to ferdinand marcos, there
was actually no express transfer or change of domicile on the part of imelda marcos sir. so simply stated there
was no positive act in the part of imelda marcos sir.
G: okay so which means that the petitioner here did not abide her domicile of origin.
S: yes sir.
G: so according to the supreme court even after marriage to the former president, she occasionally returns to
her domicile in leyte.
G: so that shows that she intends to maintain her domicile of origin and her change of residence does not result
in the abandonment of her domicile.
S: yes sir.
G: right so according to the supreme court a person can maintain several residences for different reasons. for
pleasure, for work, for any other reason. but the person can only maintain one domicile. right?
G: and according to the supreme court there are three conditions before a person can abandon his or her
domicile of origin.
Q: what are the three conditions in order to abandon domicile of origin?
S: first there must be...
S: an actual transfer or change of domicile sir.
G: okay.
S: there there must be no intent to return.
G: yes. so there must be an actual change or removal of former place of domicile.
S: yes sir.
G: second. there must be a bonafide intent...
S: bonafide intent to change the place of domicile sir.
G: okay bonafide intent to change the place of domicile and establish a new one.
S: yes sir.
G: and the last one? there must be? because domicile is a matter of intent. so the third condition states that?
S: there must be a positive act sir...
S: overt acts...
G: which correspond to...
S: in the intent of transferring or changing domicile sir.
G: okay so there must be overt acts that correspond to the purpose. right? these are the three conditions in
order to abandon domicile of origin. so domicile of origin can not be easily be lost. right?
Q: okay in the case of co vs hret, remember that the respondent here, what the residence of the respondent
here was a challenge because, according to the petitioner, the respondent does not own any real property in
that legislative district. in samar. according to the petitioner, only the grandfather and the father own the real
property in samar. so the respondent does not own any real property. so according to the petitioner, he is not a
domicile of samar.
Q: so did the supreme court agree?
S: in this case sir the supreme court did not agree because, although owning real property in a particular locality
sir, would show...
G: legislative district.
S: legislative district would show intent or domiciliary, but here in this case sir what followed was that the child
follows the domiciliary of parents sir.
G: since the parents and the grandparents of the respondent are domicile of samar, it follows that he obtained
the domicile of his parents and grandparents.
S: yes sir.
G: okay so the fact that he does not own any real property in samar is of no moment(?). right because according
to the supreme court, that would amount to property qualification, which is prohibited by the constitution.
right?
S: yes sir.
G: according to supreme court the case of co vs hret, a person can be a domicile of a place even if he does not
own real property in that place, and he only rents his residence there. right?
Aquino vs COMELEC
G: so in the case of Aquino vs COMELEC, remember that the petitioner here filed a certificate of candidacy for
the newly created legilative district in the city of makati. so according to the supreme court, he is not a resident
of makati because he does not own any real property in makati. he is only renting a condominium unit in makati.
according to the supreme court, he owns several real properties in tarlac. therefore he is a resident of tarlac. so
based on this, it shows that real property ownership is relevant in determining domicile or residence on political
law.
Co vs. HRET
Q: how can we reconcile this with the case of Co vs. HRET, that property ownership is not relavant?
S: again sir when property ownership is good indication of domicilary on a certain place or legislative district, in
the same case sir the supreme court also ruled that the background or history of aquino sir, was that he grew up
in tarlac and much of his adult life is spent in tarlac and he only became a resident of makati, months or in a
short span of time prior the election sir. so in this case sir...
Q: how about the real property ownership. the supreme court said the does not own the real property in
makati?.
G: He did show a lease agreement. he does not own. he is leasing. he does not own. so that is one of the reasons
of the supreme court. he is not a resident of makati because he does not even own any real property in makati.
so it shows a real property ownership is relevant. right?
G: he is only leasing he does not own. he owns real properties in tarlac. right? so that the reason why according
to supreme court he is domicile if tarlac. so real property ownership is material.
Q: what are the two kinds of domicile?
G: domicile of origin and?
G: domicile of choice. domicilium voluntarium.
S: yes sir.
Q: right. what kind of domicile is involved in Co vs. HRET?
S: domicile of choice sir.
Q: it was by choice that the respondent choose samar as his domicile?
S: i mean sir voluntary. voluntary.
G: yes voluntary, that is domicile of choice. voluntary.
G: you said earlier that the parents and the grandparents of the respondent are domicile of samar.
S: yes sir.
G: and it follows the domicile of the parents are transmitted to their children.
S: yes sir yes sir.
Q: okay so what kind domicile was involved in the case of Co vs. HRET?
Q: is it domicile of origin or domicile of choice?
S: domicile of origin sir.
G: domicile of origin. right?
Q: so can we say that when it comes to domicile of origin, ownership of real property is not relevant?
G: even if a person does not own any real property in that legislative district, as long that is his domicile of origin,
he would be considered as a resident of that legislative district. right?
S: yes sir.
Q: in the case of aquino vs comelec, what kind of domicile was involved there?
S: sir it is a domicile of choice sir.
G: domicile of choice. because his domicile of origin is tarlac.
S: yes sir.
G: right? so in so far as the domicile of choice is concerned, so since the person changing domicile must show his
intent to change his domicile, real property ownership is material and relavant. to show that he has intent to
remain in that legislative district, and to show whenever absent, he intends to return in that legislative district.
S: yes sir.
G: right? remember when senator pacquiao changed residence from gen san to sarangani, he bought a real
property in sarangani and built a house there. right?
S: yes sir.
G: same with former president estrada, when he transferred residence from san juan to manila, he bought a
property in manila. real property in manila, and built a house in manila. right? to show that he has the intent to
stay in that place and to show that whenever absent, he would return to that place. right? so that is the
difference with domicile of choice and domicile of origin. okay?
S: yes sir.
Q: let us go now... so to when it comes to term limit, its the same as the same principle applied to senators.
right? the only difference is that members of the house of representatives, what is the term limit?
S: three sir.
Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the
House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
 Q: three what? three terms?
S: three successive terms sir.
G: not more than three consecutive terms.
S: not more than three consecutive terms sir.
G: they can hold three consecutive terms but they can not hold more than that.
S: yes sir.
G: okay thats the term limit for members of the house of representatives.
Q: but supposing a representative was the district representative of manila in 2001, and then he was a gain re-
elected as a district representative of manila in 2004. in 2007 he participated under the party list system and he
became the nominee of a party organization of who is entitled to one seat in the the house of representatives in
2007. so 2001 he is the district representative of manila. 2004 district representative of manila. 2007 he is a
nominee of the party organization that is entitled to a seat in the house of representatives. right? and then in
2010 he again want to become a nominee of the same party organization. is he qualified?
S: no sir he is no longer qualified sir.
Q: why not?
S: because the three term limit does not distinguish sir between a district representative and party list
representative sir.
G: okay so which means that the membership or the term limit applies to all kinds of memberships in the house
of representatives.
S: yes sir.
G: okay so even if several terms pertain to the district representation and other terms pertain to party list
representation that would be counted in determining the term limit.
S: yes sir.
Q: okay and your basis is?
S: the language of the provision sir.
G: that says no member of the house of representatives shall hold more than three consecutive terms.
S: yes sir.
G: without qualifications whether district representative or party list representative.
S: yes sir.
G: okay lets continue our discussion miss olosan.
G: lets go to... lets first close the issue on term.
G: in the case of dimaporo vs mitra, remember under in the old omnibus selection code prior to its
ammendment, elective public officers would file a certificate of candidacy to an office other than the office they
are holding and other than the office of the president and vice president, are deemed automatically resigned in
their public office.
Dimaporo vs. Mitra
So in the case of Dimaporo vs. Mitra, the petitioner was a member of the HOR. And then there was election is
ARMM. He filed his COC as governor of the ARMM. According to the Respondent Speaker Mitra, he is deemed
automatically resigned from HOR. He lost in the election for the governor of ARMM. He wants to return in the
HOR. According to the petitioner, the “deemed automatically resigned” provision of the Omnibus Election
shortens the term of members of the HOR. Did the SC agree?
S: No. The term of office of the members of HOR cannot be shortened or can it be extended. However, the
tenure of members is what can be shortened. Therefore, in this case when the member ran for office, he is
already deemed resigned, hence, it is not considered as shortening of the term.
G: So what was shortened there was the tenure of office of the petitioner.
Because according to the SC if a special election is called to fill the vacancy because of the running of the
petitioner for another officer, the one elected will only serve the unexpired term. That shows that the term
remains, only that the petitioner shortened his tenure by running to another office. Therefore, the SC sustained
the constitutionality of the Omnibus Election Code.
But that provision has already been amended, which means that elective public officer as what we have
discussed in Quinto (?) vs. COMELEC, elective public officers are not deemed resigned in their position/office
upon the filing of the COC even to another office. So that is now the new provision of the OEC. Only the
appointive public officer are automatically resigned because they are mandated by Article IX of the Constitution
to remain apolitical. So, once they submit their COC, that means that they are already engaged in partisan
political campaign and they have forfeited their appointive position.
Q: What are the 2 kinds of election of the Congress?
Regular election – shall be held during second Monday of May
Special election
Q: Regular election – can it be set to another date?
G: Yes. Sec 8 starts with the phrase “unless otherwise provided by law.”
Whenever there is a vacancy, a special election may be called to fill the vacancy?
S: Yes
Q: And under Sec 9, the Constitution says, it should be in the manner provided for by law?
S: Yes
G: Under Sec 9 of Article VI, it says “in case of vacancy in the Senate or in the HOR, a special election may be
called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law,” is there a requirement for a law in order to call a
special election?
S: Yes
A: RA 6645 (Dec 28, 1987) AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives
at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon
receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the
existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. I
Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by
the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be
sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only
for the unexpired term.
G: Mere resolution is not enough?
A: Depends on the period when vacancy arises
G: Supposing there is a vacancy in the HOR, 1 year and 6 months prior to the next regular election. Can a special
election be called by a mere resolution of the HOR?
S: Yes, there shall be no special election if the vacancy occurs within 12 months from the next election. For the
HOR, at least 1 year. For the Senate, it is 18 months.
G: Okay, if the vacancy occurs within 1 year from the next election, no special election shall be called. So if the
vacancy in the Senate occurs within 18 months, no special election shall be called?
Q: Supposing the vacancy in the HOR occurs 18 months prior to the next election, may a special election be
called?
G: Yes
Q: Can it be called by a mere resolution of the HOR?
A: Yes
G: Is there a law that allows the calling of special election by mere resolution, particularly RA 6645?
G: Does the law allow the calling of special election by mere resolution of each House? So if it is the Senate, only
the Senate resolution. If it is in the House, only House resolution?
S: Yes.
G: Does this comply with Section 9 of Article VI?
S: Yes
G: Because under such, under Section 9 Article VI, the special election may be called in the manner provided for
by law. And there is a law passed by Congress that if the vacancy occurs not within 18 months before the next
election in the Senate, a special election may be called by mere resolution. If the vacancy occurs more than 1
year in the HOR before the election, a special election may be called by resolution of the HOR.
Q: Can there be a succession in the Congress without a special election? Or can we say that all vacancies in the
Congress should be filled by Special election? Can there be succession without election?
A: Yes
G: Remember when spokesperson Harry Roque, before he was a member of Congress representing a party list.
And then he was appointed as a member of the executive department. Was there a special election to fill the
vacancy because of that appointment?
S: No.
G: Is succession allowed in Congress?
S: Yes
G: Which House?
S: HOR
G: All members of HOR are subject to succession?
S: For party list
G: If the vacancy occurs in the party list system, the nominee next in rank will succeed the person ousted. Either
by death, resignation or permanent disability. But when it comes to district representatives, when it comes to all
the Senators, any vacancy shall be filled by special election.
SECTION 10. The salaries of the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Perquisites of Members of Congress
Q: How are the salaries of members of Congress determined?
S: Determined by law.
Q: Does salary include per diem, bonuses, and other emoluments aside from salary?
S: No.
G: Which means that other perquisites of Congress may be established by mere resolution as long as they are not
part of the salary.
Q: What is the limitation on determination of salaries of members of Congress?
S: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.”
G: Remember, we are currently in the 18 th Congress. The 18th Congress is up to 2022. So in 2022, we will have the
19th Congress until 2025. Supposing the 18th Congress passed a law increasing the members of Congress. When
will the law take effect?
S: On the 19th Congress in 2022.
G: Why?
S: The Constitution says, “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.”
G: That law passed by the 18th Congress shall take effect on the 19 th Congress? For the 19th Congress, there are
still 12 Senators who are part of the 18th Congress. The salary increase by the 18th Congress shall apply to all
members of the HOR because the 19th Congress, that would be a clean slate. For the 12 Members of Senate who
are part of the 18th Congress, they are not entitled. But for the new 12 Senators elected in 2022, they are now
entitled to the new salary. So there will come a situation that in the Senate, the more junior ones will have more
salary and it will create a situation that the House of Representatives are already entitled to the salary increase.
But. In the Senate, half of it will not be entitled? Can there be a law partially applicable, partially not?
S: It shall only be effective after the full term of all the Members approving such increase. So, those newly
elected members of the 19th Congress shall not be benefitted by the increase in the salary
G: How about the old ones?
S: Yes
G: So no need to make distinctions between the old and the new.
So which means in the example given, the law passed by the 18 th Congress, increasing the salaries of Members of
Congress shall take effect only on the 20th Congress when all the Members of the Senate who participated in the
approval of such increase when their term has already expired. Because in 2022, there are still 12 Senators who
are part of the 18th Congress
Again, when it comes to increase, the increase cannot take effect during the term of the office of the Members
approving such increase.
Q: Can the salaries of the members of Congress be decreased by law?
S: Yes
Q: Can the decrease of the salary of the Members of Congress take effect immediately?
A: Yes
G: No. There was no provision saying that “decrease of the salary of the Members of Congress will take effect
only after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of Congress approving such decrease”. Therefore,
decrease can be effected immediately even during the terms of all the Members of Congress approving the law
authorizing the decrease of the salary.
G: Again, this constitutional provision is only intended to prevent abuse form the Congress. They cannot abuse
their authority by enacting a law increasing their Compensation. But they can enact a law depriving themselves
of their privileges. And that can be implemented immediately even during the term of all the Members
participating in the approval of the law.
SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable but not more than 6
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress.
Q: What are the parliamentary immunities of members of Congress?
G: The parliamentary immunity of arrest and the parliamentary immunity of speech and debate
Q: When may the parliamentary immunity from arrest or of arrest be invoked by Members of Congress
S: “A Senator or a Member of the HOR shall, in all offenses punishable but not more than 6 years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.”
G: The term “Session” under Sec 11 of Article III, does it refer to the entire life of Congress which is 3 years, the
entire regular session which opens 4th Monday of July and closes at least 30 days prior to the opening of the next
regular session, or the only time when the Congress is transacting business because even while the Congress is
on regular session, it may also have adjournments in between, right? So does that mean that “in session” only
means to that part where the Congress is doing business?
S: Final answer. It is effective during the regular session if the Congress is in business. If the arrest was done
when the Congress is in regular session, he is immune form it. But if the arrest is done during recess, he is not
immune.
G: Okay, so this is in line with Sec 15 of Article VI. This defines regular session. According to the Constitution, the
Congress shall convene for its regular session on the 4 th Monday of July and shall continue to be in such session
for such number of days as it may determine until at least 30 days prior to the opening of the next regular
session. So which means that once the regular session is convened, regular session continues even if there are
short adjournments in between. And the provision under Sec 11 that says that “while the Congress is in session”
should eb interpreted to mean, “while the Congress is in regular session.”
So which means, that even during short adjournments in between regular session, the parliamentary immunity
from arrest still applies. Because the Congress remains to be in session during that period. So it only adjourns 30
days prior to the opening of the next regular session.
Q: Supposing, A was a subject of a criminal complaint for serious physical injuries. Supposing the penalty for the
offense charge is maximum 6 years imprisonment. A committed the act prior to his election to the Congress. But
the warrant of arrest was only issued while he is a member of Congress. Is he entitled to the immunity form
arrest while the Congress is in session?
S: No longer. He is no immune from arrest
G: because? He committed the act. Prior to his election?
S: Yes
G: So are you saying that immunity from arrest only applies to offenses committed during the term of office of
the member of congress?

A: No.
Q: Are offenses committed prior to the term not included? Of course, after the term would not be included
because he is no longer a Member of Congress, right? So, offenses committed prior to the term punishable by 6
years imprisonment and below is not covered by the immunity, meaning the Member of Congress can be
arrested anytime, even if the Congress is in session?
S: Yes
G: Basis in saying the parliamentary immunity form arrest only applies to offenses committed during the term?
Note: privilege of speech is different form privilege form arrest (Cabangbang vs. Jimenez). So the act was
committed while the Congress is in recess
S: If it is only for act committed while the Congress is in session.
G: But for the parliamentary immunity from arrest, again, does it cover offenses committed prior to the election
of the members of Congress
S: Included (correct)
G: The immunity applies to arrest. Regardless when the offense was committed. Even if the crime was committed
prior to the election, as long as the penalty is six years and below and the congress is in regular session, then he
may not be arrested. And it does not make any distinction whether the offense was committed in the discharge
of his official functions or in his private capacity, as long as the penalty is six years and below, then he is entitled
to immunity from arrest.
Q: How about the parliamentary immunity from speech?
S: [No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.]
Q: Should the speech be done during the term of the member of the Congress?
S: YES
AG: It should be done during the term of the member of Congress; and it should be done in the performance of
his official functions.
Jimenez v Cabangbang
Q: In the case of Jimenez v Cabangbang, even an open letter published while the Congress is in recess – the
open letter was made in order to inform the President that certain public officials are committing acts that are
inimical to the national interest. A member of the Congress made that open letter and he published it in the
newspaper. Can he invoke parliamentary immunity from speech?
S: The Supreme Court decided that it is not within the purview of the immunity from speech and debate.
AG: The Congress is in recess and the publication of the letters to the President in order to inform him that
certain acts of the members of his Armed Forces, as well as other public officials, are inimical to the national
interest is not an official function of the member of Congress. In that regard, the immunity does not apply.
Q: Does the immunity from speech only covers statements made while the Congress is in session?
S: YES
Q: When we say speech, does it include oral and written?
S: YES
Q: How about bills passed by a member of Congress, is this covered by parliamentary immunity from speech?
S: YES
Q: Supposing a member of Congress passed a bill while the Congress is in recess and some of the statements in
that Bill are derogatory. May the persons who are the subject of the bill file a criminal action against that
member of Congress while the Congress is in recess?
S: NO
Q: Supposedly in the Bill passed by a member of Congress, the Whereas Clauses of the Bill says that “Whereas
members of the Marcos family amassed illegally wealth belonging to the Government of the Philippines.
Whereas the members of the Marcos family continue to defraud the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.” And this Bill, which was passed by a member of the Congress, was filed by such member while the
Congress is in recess. Are you saying that it is covered by the parliamentary immunity from speech?
S: YES
Q: Since that Bill can only be acted upon the Congress opens in session, are the statements made by a member
of Congress in a Bill filed while the Congress is in recess covered or not covered by the immunity from speech?
S: It is covered by immunity from speech.
Q: Should the member of Congress wait for the opening of the congress before he or she files that bill?
S: NO
Q: When it comes to Bills, these are definitely within the official functions of members of Congress and
members of Congress can file Bills even if the Congress is in recess. Can we say that in order to give substance to
the constitutional privilege of speech, members of Congress should be allowed to be protected when it comes to
filing of bills even if the Congress is in recess because definitely these are the main functions of the members of
congress?
S: YES
AG: It was mentioned in the case of Cabangbang, the Supreme Court said that it covers bills even if the Congress
is in recess or in adjournment. Therefore, Bills filed are covered while the Congress is in session or in recess.

Q: What is the meaning of the phrase “in any other place” under Section 11 of Article VI? In the case of Osmena
v Pendatun, the petitioner delivered a privilege speech – In his privilege speech, he said that the President is
committing graft and corruption practices by selling executive clemency. The members of the Congress told him
to substantiate his claim or allegation. The petitioner said No, he will not dignify the request nor present any
proof to show that the President is selling executive clemency. He then invokes parliamentary immunity of
speech, but he was punished by the House itself for disorderly behavior. However, according to him, he enjoys
parliamentary immunity from speech. Did the Supreme Court sustain the constitutionality of the imposition of
sanction by the House for the speech made by a member thereof? In short, what is the meaning of that phrase
“in any other place” because the constitution says neither shall member be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate made while the Congress is in session.
S: It means even outside the halls of the Legislative.
Q: Can he or she be held liable by the House which he or she belongs?
S: YES
Osmena v Pendatun
AG: The privilege of parliamentary immunity from speech does not extend to the House where the member
belongs, which means that a member may be sanctioned for disorderly behavior by the House for any speech or
debate made while the Congress in session. That was the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Osmena v
Pendatun.
Pobre v Santiago
Q: Does the parliamentary immunity from speech extend to all liabilities such as criminal, civil and
administrative? In the case of Pobre v Santiago, Senator Defensor-Santiago during the session of Congress,
delivered a privilege speech her delivery of privilege speech, she called the Supreme Court as “the Supreme
Court of idiots”. Can she be disbarred or at least suspended by the Supreme Court for the statement that she
made, being a member of the Bar?
S: The Supreme Court dismissed the disbarment case against Senator Defensor-Santiago.
AG: Therefore, it applies to criminal, civil, and administrative cases – meaning no criminal case, no civil case or no
administrative case can be filed against a member of Congress for any speech or debate made in Congress. Only
the House to which he or she belongs can take action for any speech or debate made by said member.
SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of
interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
Section 12 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Network
AG: Section 12 refers to the filing of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Network wherein the Constitution
provides that it must be done upon assumption of office. The Constitution does not preclude the enactment of a
law making the declaration more frequent; therefore, it could be yearly. Republic Acts 3019 or 6713 can require
that members of Congress file their Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Network yearly and not only upon
assumption of office. The Constitution also mandates that members of Congress, who suffer conflict of interest,
inform the House where they belong of such conflict of interest.
Q: Supposing the potential conflict of interest arises from filing of a Bill to which a member who suffers conflict
of interest is not an author or co-author, is he still mandated to make such manifestation?
S: NO
AG: They are not mandated when they are not the authors or co-authors. Nonetheless, the Constitution allows
each house of Congress to provide for other rules expanding this obligation. Under the Constitution, the
obligation only arises when the conflict of interest results from bills of which a member who suffers conflict of
interest is an author or co-author.
SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Section 13 Disqualifications and Inhibitions
Q: What is the difference between incompatible office and forbidden office?
S: With regard to incompatible office, no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during the term without forfeiting his seat.
With regard to forbidden office, neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Q: Does it apply during their term or during their tenure?
S: It applies during their tenure.
AG: During the 17th Congress, Senator Cayetano was elected as a Senator – He was also authored a Cabinet
Position as DFA Secretary because according to President Duterte, it is a good training ground as the Vice-
President. This is an incompatible office and the disqualification attaches during his term, which was until 2019.
The appointment was made in 2016 upon assumption of office of President Duterte. Senator Cayetano was
appointed as Secretary of DFA but he still has three years remaining in his term (because his term was from 2013
to 2019). Therefore, it is unconstitutional. He was appointed, and he accepted the appointment to an
incompatible office during his term which is not allowed.
But the member of Congress can hold that incompatible office as long as he is willing to forfeit his Congressional
seat as decided in the case of Senator Cayetano, he still has three years remaining in his term. He can accept the
appointment as Secretary of DFA as long as he is willing to forfeit his remaining period of his office. Therefore,
the disqualification attaches only during the tenure of office of the member of Congress. Tenure means the
actual holding of the position. If he is no longer actually holding the position because he resigned, he can accept
the appointment to an incompatible office. Incompatible office refers to any office or any employment in the
 Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Q: Does incompatible office extend to employment in the private sector?
S: NO
AG: A member of Congress can hold any other office or employment as long as it is not in the Government. A
member of Congress can continue becoming a boxer as an employment. A member of Congress can continue
becoming a real estate broker. Incompatible office only attaches in the office or employment in the Government.
Q: Supposing a member of Congress accepts an appointment to an office of the Government and he started to
assume the functions of the Office. Subsequently, the Office to which he was appointed was abolished because
the Supreme Court declared the law creating that Office as unconstitutional. Can that member of Congress
return to his Congressional seat?
S: NO
Zandueta v De la Costa
AG: In the case of Zandueta v De la Costa, while the public office that is involved here is a judge – an incumbent
judge accepts an appointment to a newly created court. He started discharging the functions of the Office of that
newly created court. However, the creation of the newly created court was declared unconstitutional and was
abolished. The Supreme Court said that when the petitioner accepted the appointment to another court, he
forfeited his former office. Once a member of Congress accepts the appointment of an incompatible office and
the member of Congress started to discharge the functions of that incompatible office, he had forfeited his
Congressional seat. If that public office was abolished, he cannot return to his or her Congressional seat.
Q: Supposing a member of the Congress was appointed to an office in the Government. That appointment to
such office requires confirmation from the Commission on Appointments and was made when the Congress is in
session, can we say that by mere accepting that appointment, the appointee can immediately discharge his
function of that office? And therefore, automatically forfeits his Congressional seat?
S: NO
AG: The appointee needs to wait for the confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.
Q: But suppose that the appointment was made during recess, can the appointee immediately assume the
functions of that given office? This is what we call Ad Interim Appointment.
S: YES
AG: There is no need to wait for the confirmation from Commission on Appointments in Ad interim
Appointments. But in regular appointments, the appointee must wait for the confirmation from the Commission
on Appointments.
Q: What is the effect of the acceptance of regular appointment? And what is the effect the acceptance of ad
interim appointment by a member of Congress?
ACCEPTANCE OF REGULAR APPOINTMENT VS. ACCAPTANCE OF AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT
S: Acceptance of a regular appointment by a member of congress
G: Will result or will not result to the forfeiture of the congressional seat
S: Regular appointment?
G: Yes, Okay Ms. E, a regular appointment refers to an appointment requiring the confirmation by the
commission on appointments read while the congress is in session. The appointee can only discharge the
function of that office once confirmed by the commission on appointment. So on the other hand, ad interim
appointments referred to appointments which require the confirmation by the commission on appointments
while the congress is in recess. Once an ad interim appointment is accepted the appointee can immediately
discharge the dunctions of that office and no need to wait for the confirmation of the commission on
appointments right because that appointment shall remain valid until disapproved or bypassed by the
commission on appointments.
Q: Now what is the effect of the Acceptance of ad interim appointment by the member of the congress as
distinguished form the acceptance of a regular appointment by a member of congress
Q: So once an ad interim appointment is accepted will that automatically result to the forfeiture of the
congressional seat or not
S: No sir
G: No so in ad interim appointment the member of congress shall remain as member of congress
S: Yes sir
G: And at the same time he can immediately assume the office in which he is appointed
S: Yes
G: So he will be holding two offices at the same time
S: Yes
G: That on regular appointment once a regular appointment is accepted the member of congress will lose his
congressional seat
S: sir for the regular appointment sir
G: So again for the regular appointment he needs to wait for the confirmation before he can enter the discharge
of this function so in the meantime he cannot assume the office. So what happens to the acceptance of that
appointment? Will that result to the forfeiture of the congressional seat or not?
S: No sir
G: He will not automatically lose it when he accepts it

S: Yes sir
G: The forfeiture shall only come once the appointment is confirmed is confirmed and he starts to discharge the
function of that office. For the ad interim appointment what happens when the member of congress accepts the
ad interim appointment? Does it automatically lose his congressional seat because ad interim appointment is
immediately effective?
S: Yes sir
G: Okay no need to wait for the confirmation of the commission on appointments. Upon the acceptance of the
appointment, he forfeits his congressional seat. Okay so that is the difference between acceptance of regular
appointment and acceptance of ad interim appointment. So that applies to incompatible office.
Q: How about forbidden office? What offices are contemplated by this?
S: With regard to forbidden office,
G: Can a member of congress accept a forbidden office is he is willing to forfeit his congressional seat
S: No sir
G: The disqualification does it ony apply during the tenure or the term
S: Sir it applies only to the duration of the term
G: Term. Okay so even if he is willing to forfeit his seat, he cannot accept forbidden office right. He can only
accept that after his term.
S: Yes sir
G: And okay and what offices are covered
S: The offices that are covered any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof are increased
during the term for which he was elected
G: Okay so these are the forbidden offices. And you said earlier the duration of the incompatible office is only
during the term of the office of the member of congress. It only applies during the term of office of the member
of congress right? And the basis is the last part of section 13 article 6 which says during the term for which he
was elected
Q: Can we say that that phrase applies to the creation of the office and the increase of the emoluments?
S: Yes
G: Yes and it does not refer to the duration of the disqualification
S: No sir it refers to creation sir
G: Can we say then that disqualification is perpetual? Because the term the phrase during the term for which he
was elected pertains to the creation of the office or the increase in the emoluments of that given office it does
not refer to the duration of the disqualification
S: Yes sir
G: Can we say then that the disqualification can extend even after the term of the member of the congress
meaning perpetual
S: Yes
G: Okay so disqualification lasts for the lifetime of the member of congress
S: Yes sir since
G: Supposing, that member of congress is the best fit for that position shall we deprive the country of the
services of the good officer? He is the best fit for that newly created. Only that it was created during his term. So
perpetually we can’t accept appointment to that forbidden office?
S: I would like to retract my answer
G: So the disqualification only applies?
S: The disqualification only applies for the term for which he was elected.
G: Okay so same as the condition for the creation or the enactment of the law increasing the emoluments
S: Yes sir
G: That would do.
INHIBITIONS
So personally, appearing as counsel does not necessarily mean physical appearance in court so signing of
pleadings also included in the disqualification but this does not apply when a member of congress appears for
himself okay
The ruling of the supreme court in the case of Puyat v de guzman was the disqualification of assemblyman
estanislao (equivalent to a member of congress now) the disqualification assemblyman estanislao who appear in
the SEC at the time having the jurisdiction over intra corporate dispute was only premised on the fact that his
acquisition of nominal share was only an afterthought
So he only purchased nominal shares of stocks in the corporation having controversy after his appearance after
initial entry of appearance was objected to on the ground that he is an incumbent member of congress
So the supreme court considered that as an afterthought and the acquisition of nominal shares was only made in
order to circumvent the constitutional disqualification which means that had he been a stockholder of record
prior to the controversy the entry of appearance of that member of congress would have been valid and
 constitutional because when the constitution says personally appear as counsel, it means appearing for a client
and not appearing for himself
So the disqualification is intended to prevent a member of congress from building his influence.
Of course if a member of congress is a party in a controversy it is unavoidable that his influence will affect the
resolution of the case whether as an accused or as a counsel.
Section 14 of Article VI also prohibits conflict of interest a member of congress cannot interfere in any matter for
his pecuniary benefit or he may be called upon to act in relation of his office.
SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty
days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President
may call a special session at any time.
Section 15 we have discussed in relation to the other provisions of article VI that there are two kinds of session:
regular and special. Special session can be only called by the president or the constitution.
Special session of congress which may be held even without call by the president in order to review the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18 of Article VII.
In cases of vacancies in the offices of the president the congress is mandated to hold a special session even
without need of a call but for cases which are not mandated by the Constitution, the president can call a
special session
Does that mean the president can only call a special session when the congress is in recess?
Answer is No. The constitution says at any time. So even if the congress is in regular session, the congress may
still call a special session. The only difference is that the subject matter of the call of the special session shall take
precedence over other businesses of the congress. So, the subject matter of the special session shall be priority.
It shall take precedence over other businesses of congress.
SECTION 16.
(1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as
may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than
three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section 16 Refers to proceedings of the congress. Paragraph 1 refers to the election of the president of the
senate and the speaker of the house. Again, to elect a senate president and speaker of the house the
constitution requires majority of all the members of the senate to elect a senate president. Majority of all the
members of the house of representatives to elect a speaker of the house. Majority of all the members means a
fix number it always means one half plus one of the compositions of the entire composition of the house
whether filled or vacant.
For example, in so far as the senate president is concerned always one half plus one of 24 even if there is
vacancy. For the HOR, assuming that the composition is 305, one half plus one of 305 even if there are members
of the HOR who are in the US. So this is the difference between majority of all the members of the house and
majority of the house. So majority of the house only refers to the quorum. SO, in determining a quorum only one
half plus one of the incumbent members of the congress and those who are within the jurisdiction of the house.
For example, in the session in the senate there are twenty senators present who are absent one in the US one in
the hospital in the Philippines, according to the SC, to determine a quorum we only need one half plus one of 23.
Avelino v. Cuenco
According to SC, this is in the case of Avelino v. Cuenco, include the one absent in the Philippines, exclude the
one absent who is in the US. The members who are absent but, in the Philippines, may be compelled to attend
the session. But members who are outside the country, they cannot be subjected to the compulsory processes of
the house. So that is the difference between majority of the house and majority of all the members of the house.
In PARAGRAPH 1 OF SECTION 16, the last part of that provides that each house shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary. So the procedure in the election of other officers, of each house, are considered as
beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court so for example election of majority floor leader, election of
minority floor leader, that is within their exclusive discretion of each house. And the court cannot interfere in the
election of these officers. This is the ruling of the SC in the case of Santiago v. Guingona as well as Baguilat v.
Alvarez.
Santiago v Guingona
So in Baguilat v. Alvarez, the same issue was raised in that case as Santiago v Guingona. In Santiago, the
petitioner Senator Santiago contends that minority should refer to the senators who did not elect to the senate
president, and the senators who did not elect the winning senate president and those who were not given
committee chairmanship. According to him, only senators coming from this group shall be elected as minority
floor leader.
Baguilat v. Alvarez
 Same as in Baguilat v. Alvarez, the same principle was raised, the election of the minority floor leader is an
internal procedure of the congress. So since it is an internal rule, it can be revoked at the will or pleasure of the
house. On the casis of doctrine of separation of powers, court cannot intervene.
Paragraph 3 with regard to the authority of the in charge of congress, they can promulgate internal rules of
proceedings to which the court has no jurisdiction to interfere and each house can also punish its members for
disorderly behavior or suspend or expel a member for any other cause. And the penalty of suspension should not
exceed 60 days unlike the other constitution unlimited. In the case of Osmena v. Pendatun, the petitioner there
is suspended for 6 months. So that was under the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1987 Constitution, the penalty of
suspension can only be for the maximum period of 60 days. The suspension, expulsion, always requires 2/3 of all
the members of each house.
Osmena v. Pendatun
According to the SC in the case of Osmena v. Pendatun, penalty for disorderly behavior may be suspension,
expulsion, and even commitment to prison. A member of congress who is punished for disorderly behavior may
be imprisoned
Question is What is the required vote for a member of congress to be committed to prison for disorderly
behaviors?
Because under the constitution, the 2/3 only applies to suspension and expulsion. Supposing the penalty is
commitment to prison, can we say that mere majority will do?
There is no pronouncement yet on the part of the Supreme Court. We can interpret that provision of the
constitution to mean penalties of expulsion, suspension, and those which are heavier penalty. So if the penalty is
the suspension, it requires 2/3 concurrence, the more reason that imprisonment should also require the same or
greater vote. Again, as I have said, in the absence of categorical pronouncement of the Supreme Court, we can
say that in order that constitutional provision to be reasonable, that 2/3 concurrence under par 3 section 16 of
article vi should refer to penalty of suspension, expulsion, and other penalties or sanctions which are heavier in
character.
The authority of the congress to punish its members for disorderly behavior, does not preclude the
Sandiganbayan to suspend a member of congress. This is the ruling of the SC in the case of Paredes v.
Sandiganbayan as well as Santiago v. Sandi
Because according to the SC, the suspension mention under par 3 section 16 art vi refers to suspension as a
penalty and suspension under the RA 3019 for public officers who are charged with grave offenses is not a
penalty but suspension pendente lite during the period of the proceedings. And it is mandatory. IT also covers
members of congress because suspension by the Sandiganbayan is not a penalty but only to preserve the
integrity of the proceedings in order to prevent a member of congress from interfering or influencing the
proceedings.
Arroyo v. De Venecia
In the case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, this is the case involving the syntax law. During the deliberation in the HOR,
petitioner Joker Arroyo, first raised a question of quorum. The quorum was established. And then there was a
motion to put the action for votation. The chair of the session said, “any objection?” Petitioner Arroyo stood up
and said, “what is that?” So the chair of the session said, “there being no objection, the motion is approved, so
we put now the bill to a vote.” According to Petitioner Arroyo, when he stood up and asked, “what is that?” he is
raising a question, he is questioning the quorum, and as such, it must be resolved first prior to the votation. The
SC said there are no violations of the internal rules of the HOR, and even if there is a violation of the internal
rules of the HOR, the Court cannot interfere and correct the violation because again according to the SC, the
internal rules are subject to revocation or waiver at the will or pleasure of the house adapting it. So according to
the SC, the remedy is to the house itself not to the courts.
And the SC however established two exemptions to the rule.
As a general rule, internal rules of the proceedings of each house are subject to revocation, modification, or even
waiver at the pleasure of the house adapting the rule except when the internal rules affect third parties. When
we say third parties, persons who are not members of congress. And lastly, when the internal rules violate the
constitution.
These are the only instances when the Courts can interfere and resolve issues involving the observance or non-
observance of internal rules of proceedings of the congress.
So under section 16, each house of congress is required to maintain journal and record. What’s the difference
between journal and record? Legislative journal contains the minutes of the proceedings. Only the minutes of
the proceedings. While legislative record pertains to the word per word transcription of the things that
happened in the house. Supposing there is a conflict between the legislative journal and legislative record, which
will prevail?
According to the SC, in so far as items which are needed to be entered in the journal, the journal shall prevail.
But when it comes to the matters which are referred to be entered in the journal, the legislative record shall
prevail particularly so when the accuracy of the record is certified.
Arroyo v. De Venecia,
This also happened in the case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, the only problem is that the issue there is not the
conflict between the journal and the record, but the conflict between several records. Because the several
records according to the SC, the word “no” appeared only once and it appeared three times in another record.
The Supreme Court resolved this issue by saying that since the discrepancy is not material, and it is not an issue
between the journal and the record, but among several records, and the parties admitted the statements made
by the petitioner during the session. Then the SC failed to make a categorical ruling as to which the different
records shall prevail. But again, when it comes to conflict between journal and record, and the issue pertains to
matters to be entered into the journal, the journal shall prevail. This also applies to the conflict between the
enrolled bill and the legislative journal, if the issue pertains to the matter to be entered to the journal, the
journal shall prevail. In all matters, the enrolled bill shall prevail. The enrolled bill refers to the certified copy of
the bill signed by the senate president, speaker of the house, and certified by the secretaries of both houses and
submitted to the president.
US v. Pons
The entries in the enrolled bill are conclusive upon the court, in US v. Pons, there was a law enacted the Anti
Opium law, the Anti-Opium law was challenged on the basis that on passing the bill, the congress exceeded the
authority allowed under the special session or by the president. Because according to the accused, the special
session was only until the midnight of Feb 28, 1914, but the congress continued to do business even until March
1 of 1914.
 SC said the journal says it adjourned on midnight of Feb 28 1914 congress cannot go beyond that. And the
enrolled bill also is conclusive because there is a certification that it was passed in accordance with the
procedure by the mandated by the constitution. The certification by the officers of congress is conclusive upon
the courts. So in that regard even if the congress continued its session beyond Feb 28 1914 we cannot rule on
the accuracy of the entry in the journal as well as the certification of the enrolled bill. The SC said that when the
journal says it adjourned midnight of Feb 28, 1914, the clock of the congress stopped at that time. So meaning
even if it is already march 1, in so far as the journal of the congress is concerned, it is still midnight of feb 28
1914. So that’s how powerful the congress is. The congress can even stop time. In the case of US v. Pons, the Sc
said no we cannot go beyond the entries of the journal.
PJA v. Prado
In the case of PJA v. Prado, the issue there is that whether amendments to the bill were made even after third
reading. SC said the enrolled bill is certified by the officers of the congress so since the officers certifies that it
complied with the constitution, then it is conclusive upon the courts. Again, this is on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The conclusive defect of enrolled bill is not only as to its provisions but also as to the procedure. And supposing
there is a conflict between the provision of the enrolled bill and the legislative journal, so which will prevail? So,
as we said earlier, matters entered to the journal, the journal will prevail. As to other matters, the enrolled bill
shall prevail.
Casco v. Jimenez
In the case of Casco Chemical v. Jimenez, according to the petitioner, the item exempted by the enrolled bill is
the finished product. So, urea and formaldehyde, in the legislative journal according to the petitioner, the
copulative “and” appears between urea and formaldehyde. So according to the petitioner what is sought to be
exempted in the legislative proceedings as reflected in the journal are the two components: urea and
formaldehyde not the finished product. The SC said the provision of the enrolled bill shall prevail. According to
the SC, even if there is a misprinting, even if there is an error in the printing of the bill, the remedy is not judicial
declaration of invalidity but legislative supplemental legislation according to the SC. This is in Casco v. Jimenez.
Under Section 16, no house can adjourn for more than 3 days without the concurrence of the other house. This
is intended to maintain the continuity of the operations of the congress because our system of congress is
bicameral. One house cannot act without the other. So, if one house intends to adjourn more than 3 days, the
other house must also agree with the adjournment.
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
Electoral tribunal: there are two electoral tribunal: HOR and senate, composition: 9 members. Two is to one. So,
9 members, 6 coming from the house, the 3 coming from the SC designated by the Chief Justice. The Members of
the electoral tribunal representing the house they must be elected by the house itself not by the party. The
parties only nominate. It is the house that chooses the members of the electoral tribunal representing the
House. This also applies to the Commission on Appointments.
Pimentel vs HOR,
So this is in relation to the case of Pimentel vs HOR, so in this case the petitioner contends that the House
violated the Constitution by not allowing partylist representatives from participating in the Electoral Tribunal and
the Commission on Appointments. The SC dismissed the case because the remedy is to the House and not to the
SC. Because it must first be shown that the partylist reps are deprived of their privilege to have representation on
the tribunal and Commission on appointments. But this goes to show that even members of the House under the
partylist system are entitled to a seat on the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Elections. But there must
be a formal coalition, not necessarily registered with the COMELEC so that these partylist members can have a
common (unintelligible). If this will not be allowed, then that means that they are not entitled because 3
members (the maximum seats in the House belonging to one party) will not be enough to earn a seat on the
Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Appointments. But when it comes to political parties, there must be a
formal coalition, it must not be a temporary.
AG: In the case of Angara vs Electoral Commission, the SC said that the power of the Electoral Tribunal as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of its respective
members is as plenary, as complete as if it had remained with the Congress itself. This power also includes the
power to make the rules of the proceedings. According to the SC, if the Congress can promulgate the rules of
proceedings of the Electoral Tribunal, then the Congress can control the discharge of the constitutional functions
of the ET. So the investiture of this power with the Electoral Tribunal is an implied withdrawal of this power from
the Congress and from any other agency.
Ongsakio Reyes vs COMELEC
AG: In order for the ET to assume jurisdiction over electoral protests, the SC laid down the conditions in Ongsakio
Reyes vs COMELEC, when the petitioner filed her CoC as District Rep of Marinduque, a petition for cancellation
of CoC was filed against her on the basis that she is not qualified under R.A. 9225, particularly the renunciation of
foreign citizenship and the oath of allegiance. So a division of the COMELEC promulgated its decision, ordering
the denial of the CoC of the petitioner. A MR was filed with the Commission En Banc and the Commission En
Banc sustained the decision. So despite the cancellation of the CoC of the petitioner, the Board of Canvassers
proclaimed the petitioner as the duly elected Rep. Of Marinduque. The decision of the COMELEC En Banc
became final. Without having been elevated to the SC. And then the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to
the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for continuing to cancel her CoC despite her
proclamation. So the SC denied the petition, the COMELEC retains its jurisdiction to hear petitions to cancel the
CoC. SO the SC said that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion by cancelling the CoC of the
petitioner. Again Grave abuse of discretion means a clear disregard of an express constitutional provision, this is
an abuse of discretion which is clear and patent. SO the SC said that the jurisdiction shall only be given to the ET
if 2 conditions are present:
1. A petition is filed before the ET;
2. The electoral protest involves a Congress member
Conditions to become a member of Congress:
1. That person must have been validly proclaimed
- in the case of the petitioner, she was proclaimed despite the cancellation of the CoC, therefor invalid
proclamation
 2. Oath before the Speaker of the House or the Senate President in open session (meaning Congress has
already convened its regular session)
- Taking the oath before Speaker Belmonte before the convening of the regular session is not the Oath
of Office that will set in motion the ET’s jurisdiction
3. Assumption of Office (June 30 at noon)
- Decision was promulgated before this day
AG: This all means that the petitioner is not yet a member of Congress. In such case, the ruling of the COMELEC
stays and the ET has no jurisdiction.
De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan
AG: In the case of Ongsakio Reyes vs COMELEC, like in the case of De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan, there was an
order coming from the court. In the case of De Venecia, it was coming from the Sandiganbayan and for De
Venecia, it was an order from the SC to remove the petitioner to remove petitioner and put private respondent
Velasco. Initially, Speaker Belmonte in the case of Ongsiako Reyes, refused and in the case of De Venecia, the
Paredes case where the Sandiganbayan ordered the suspension of Rep. Paredes which Speaker De Venecia
refused. In both cases, the issued is whether the SC or the Sandiganbayan can cite the Speaker of the House in
contempt for refusing to implement its rule. In the case of De Venecia, that issue became moot and academic
because the term of office of Paredes expired and in the case of OR, Speaker Belmonte acceded to the request.
But if we read the ruling of the SC in De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan, it will show that the Sandiganbayan can cite
in contempt the Speaker of the House for refusal to implement an order. If the Sandiganbayan can do it, the SC
can do it as well.
AG: Since the ET is sole judge of all electoral protests, the rulings of the ET are final and not appealable but
subject to the expanded review of the SC through certiorari. So the members of the ET also enjoy security of
tenure. They cannot be removed for breach of party loyalty or discipline. SO in the case of Bondoc vs Pineda, the
SC ruled that a member of the ET is independent of the party being represented in the ET and as such enjoys
security of tenure and can only be removed for just causes.
Just Causes for Removal
1. Death;
2. Permanent Disability;
3. Resignation from the political party represented in the ET;
4. Normal affiliation with another political party
5. Other causes for removal not including breach of party loyalty or discipline
AG: The members of the ET are also not mandatorily required to recuse whenever they are parties to an electoral
protest.
AG: The SC also said in Abbas vs SET, the SC said that this not necessarily mean that a member of the House can
voluntarily inhibit if she or she so desires but a member of the ET cannot be mandatorily required to inhibit if he
is a party top an electoral protest.
SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act
on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Coseteng vs Mitra, Guingona vs Gonzalez
AG: The cases of Coseteng vs Mitra, Guingona vs Gonzalez, there was a conflicting ruling in the SC. Remember
that the SC allowed the rounding up of the apportionment of the Commission on Apointments. SO the SC said
that the MBP having 7.9% of the members of the Senate can be rounded up to 8. An 8% would translate to 9.6
members which can be rounded up to 10. But in the case Guingona vs Gonzales, the SC declared that rounding
up is not allowed in the calculation of the members of the Commission on Appointments. Does that mean
Guingona prevails over Coseteng as it was a later ruling? No, both shall prevail. In order to implement both, they
must be implemented separately to the 2 houses. For the HoR, rounding up is allowed while it is not allowed in
the Senate. This is because insofar as the Senate is concerned, fractional numbers always result in 0.5 so if the
political party only has 1 member then they only have 0.5. But in the case of HoR, there may be a situation where
the proportional representation may be 0.99 which can be rounded up.
AG: Does the Constitution allow a rotational scheme for the members of the Commission of Appointments? Like
what happened with Cayetano and Velaso, term-sharing, 12 months to 18 months. The SC said no in Guingona vs
Gonzales. The Constitution specifies the procedure for the membership in the Commission on Appointments,
proportional representation. Term sharing means that 1 party will have the seat for a few months then will be
switched out with another party. The Court said that in the case of Guingona, that term-sharing will not be
allowed.
SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the
Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman
or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
AG: This is just the procedure for the composition of the ET and CoA, 30 days from the election of the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House.
SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in
accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an
itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.
AG: Books of records are open to audit and Congress cannot enact a law declaring the books as confidential.
They are always open to the public and must publish the amounts spent for each member.
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
AG: Inquiry in aid of legislation, the subject manner in inquiry in aid of legislation is as co-extensive as the subject
matter of legislation. What can be the subject matter of legislation can be the subject matter for an inquiry in aid
of legislation. Even if there is no pending bill, any Committee can conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation.
Although comprehensive, it does not mean unlimited. So according to the SC in Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, if the purpose is not to legislate but to investigate i order to determine criminal liability, inquiry in
aid of legislation is not allowed. Just remember, in that case Senator Enrile delivered a privileged speech
involving anomalous transactions involving the relatives of then President Aquino. He then urged the Senate to
 conduct inquiry to determine if these relatives violated the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The SC said that it is
not a valid subject matter for an inquiry in aid of legislation particularly when cases had already been filed
against these persons.
AG: But that does not necessarily mean that filing of criminal action will preempt the ability of Congress to make
inquiries in aid of legislation. This was the ruling in the SC in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks, as long as the inquiry shall not dwell on matters which are pending before the courts and not dwell on the
guilt or innocence of the resource persons, they may be compelled to attend the inquiry in aid of legislation.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
According to the SC in Neri vs Senate, the Senate is not a continuing body, it is a continuing institution. The
Senate of each Congress is separate, the 16 th Congress is separate from the 17 th Congress. SO in that regard, the
acts of the senate in the 18th Congress cannot be continued by the 19th Congress unless also adopted by the 19th
Congress.
Balag vs Senate
So now the ruling is in Balag vs Senate insofar as the extent of the order of the Congress detaining a person for
contempt. The power of the Congress or a committee thereof to cite a person in contempt and to order his
commitment is only coextensive with the inquiry in aid of legislation. Upon the dissolution of the inquiry after the
acceptance or rejection of the Committee report, the person shall already be released. According to the SC, the
only reason a resource person is imprisoned for contempt is his refusal to answer questions. So if the inquiry is
already terminated, there is no more need of the information from the resource person. However if the
committee in charge of the inquiry did not submit a Committee report, then it shall terminate at the final
adjournment of that Congress. This refers to the adjournment after 3 years.

AG: So difference between inquiry in aid of legislation and question hour? Appearance in inquiry in aid of
legislation is compulsory while question hour is voluntary on the parts of the heads of the executive department.
So the difference is that under the proceeding under Sec. 22 is not part of the legislative function of the Congress
but more of the oversight function of the Congress which is more of an executive function.

AG: May a blanket invocation of executive privilege prevent heads from the executive department from
attending inqurity in aid of legislation? Senate vs Ermita. The SC said no as executive privilege refers to
information, not to person. There is only one person according to the SC who is subject to executive privilege and
that is the president and by extension, the Executive Secretary. But the Cabinet Secretaries are not subject to
executive privilege. But if the subject of the inquiry refers to matters of information which can be withheld by the
President in his exercise of Executive privilege, they may be prevented from answering questions. This was the
conclusion by the SC in Neri vs Senate where the petitioner attended the inquiry and answered questions, but
refused to answer 3 questions. During the inquiry, he disclosed the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered 200M for
a favorable action on the NBN contract. So the question was did President Arroyo follow up the NBN-ZTE action,
what was her action when you told her, and whether Pres. Arroyo told him to prioritize the NBN-ZTE contract. So
on these 3 questions, Exec. Sec. Ermita invoked executive privilege. And the SC sustained the invocation as the
information was related to quintessential, non-delegable powers of the President, particularly the power to
contract foreign loans. And the information was between close advisors of the President. The SC applied the
organizational-proximity rule, according to the SC this applies to close advisors, those public officers who enjoy
the confidence of the Presidenet.

Armault vs Nazareno

AG: Extent of the authority of the Congress to order the confinement of recalcitrant resource persons for
contempt? Initially, the SC said in Armault vs Nazareno, insofar as the Senate is concerned, the Senate can order
the imprisonment of a resource person indefinitely. The basis is because the Senate is a continuing body so
therefore, the order can be for more than 3 years. But insofar as the HoR is concerned, only up to 3 years. Is this
still applicable?

Neri vs Senate