Rem Part II Evid 2019 Last Minute

PRE-WEEK AND LAST MINUTE LECTURE IN REMEDIAL LAW (2019 BAR)
BY:
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, LL.M.
-- EVIDENCE --
GENERAL CONCEPTS
PROOF VS. EVIDENCE
Proof is the logically sufficient reason for assenting to the truth of a proposition advanced. In its
juridical sense it is a term of wide import, and comprehends everything that may be adduced at a trial, within
the legal rules, for the purpose of producing conviction in the mind of the judge xxx, aside from mere
argument; that is, everything that has a probative force intrinsically, and not merely as a deduction from, or
combination of, original probative facts.1
Under the Rules of Court, evidence is defined as the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the
truth respecting a matter of fact2 – may be object,3 documentary,4 and testimonial.5 It is required that
evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant and competent.6 But the admissibility of evidence should not be
confused with its probative value. [Tabuada, et al. vs. Tabuada (G.R. No. 196510, 12 September 2018)(First
Division)[Bersamin, J.].]
Evidence, broadly defined, is the means from which an inference may logically be drawn as to the
existence of a fact; that which makes evident or plain. Evidence is the demonstration of a fact; it signifies that
which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side
or on the other. In legal acceptation, the term 'evidence' includes all the means by which any alleged matter of
fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved. 'Evidence' has also been defined
to mean any species of proof legally presented at the trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through
the medium of witnesses, records, documents, concrete objects, and the like.7
BURDEN OF PROOF VS. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Burden of proof lies on the party making the
allegations;8 that is, the party who alleges the affirmative of the issue. 9 Burden of proof never shifts from one
party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie
case in his or her favor. The other party then bears the burden of going forward10 with the evidence considering
that which has ostensibly been established against him or her. [David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal (803 SCRA
435, 20 September 2016)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.].]
EQUIPOISE RULE
EQUIPOISE RULE. If inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a conviction.11 [Amanquiton vs. People, G.R. No. 186080, 14
August 2009)(First Division)[Corona, J.].]
1
Black, H.C. (1979). Black’s Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition (p. 1094). St. Paul Minn.: West Publishing Co.
2
Section 1, Rule 128, Rules of Court.
3
4
5
6
7
31A C.J.S. Evidence § 3, at 67-68 (1996).
8
Uytengsu III vs. Baduel, 514 Phil. 1 (2005)[Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
9
Jison vs. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138 (1998)[Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
10
Tañada vs. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997)[Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
11
People vs. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606 (1999).
2
VESTING ORDER NO. P-89
Q.1. What is the rationale of Vesting Order No. P-89?
A.1. In Luriz vs. Republic (785 SCRA 142, 24 February 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was
held that: Being an official record of a duty especially enjoined by laws in force in the Philippines at the time it
was issued,12 Vesting Order No. P-89 is, therefore, prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.13
Vesting Order No. P-89 dated April 9, 1947 stated that, after proper investigation, the Philippine Alien
Property Administration had found that the properties particularly described in Exhibit A, i.e., the Transcript of
TCT No. 1297; Book T-9; Page 47, were owned or controlled by nationals of a designated enemy country (Japan).
Q.2. What is the legal effect of a Vesting Order? Explain.
A.2. The legal effect of a vesting order was to effectuate immediately the transfer of title to the US by
operation of law, without any necessity for any court action, and as completely as if by conveyance, transfer, or
assignment, thereby completely divesting the former owner of every right with respect to the vested property. It
is worthy to note that under Section 39 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, properties of Japanese
nationals vested after December 17, 1941 shall not be returned to their owners, and the US shall not pay
'compensation therefor. Instead, the vested properties were to be conveyed to the Republic as part of its over-
all plan of rehabilitation.
Nonetheless, to safeguard the rights of citizens and friendly aliens- i.e., persons who are not enemies or
allies of enemies- claiming any interest, right, or title to the vested properties, the Trading with the Enemy Act,
both in its original and amendatory provisions, permits the filing of suits for the recovery of any property vested or
seized on or after December 18, 1941, until April 30, 1949 or after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of
vesting, whichever is later.14
ADMISSIBILITY
GENERAL PROVISIONS (RULE 128)
Q.3. What is the difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its
probative weight?
A.3. In the following cases:
1. Heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan vs. Comorposa (408 SCRA 692, 12 August 2003)(Third Division)
[Panganiban, J.]
2. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 107518, 8 October
1998)(Third Division)[Romero, J.], it was held that:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not
it proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight
depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be
presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the
contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents
suspect. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.15
Q.4. Does the statistics provided by the Philippine Statistics Authority (formerly NSO) that 99%
percent of the population in the Philippines are Filipinos mean that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life?
12
Namely, the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and the Philippine Property Act of 1946. The said laws which were
passed by the US Congress continued to be in force even after the Philippines was given independence on July 4, 1946.
[See Brownell, Jr. vs. Bautista, 95 Phil. 853 (1954), citing Brownell, Jr. vs. Sun Life Assurance Company, 95 Phil. 228 (1954)].
13
See Dimaguila vs. Monteiro, 714 SCRA 565 (27 January 2014).
14
Lino M. Patajo, Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act in the Philippines, 26 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL 305, 336-
337 (1951).
15
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
3
A.4. Yes. In the case of Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC (786 SCRA 1, 8 March 2016)(En Banc)
[Perez, J.], it was held that: There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 16 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province
would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's
parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height,
flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In [Comerciante vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 205926, 22 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-
Bernabe, J.].], the Supreme Court held that:
Section 2, Article III17 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence
of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III 18 of
the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.19
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest.20 In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.21
JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS (RULE 129)
Q.5. Can the court take judicial notice of a foreign law cited as reference by a party in the
pleadings?
A.5. No. In the case of Maquiling vs. COMELEC (700 SCRA 367, 2 July 2013)(En Banc)[Sereno,
C.J.], it was held that: The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws22 which must be presented as
public documents of a foreign country and must be evidenced by an official publication thereof. Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
16
Section 3 (y), Rule 131.
17
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution states:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
18
Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution states:
Section 3. xx xx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
19
See Ambre vs. People, 692 Phil. 681 (2012).
20
Id., citing People vs. Delos Reyes, 672 Phil. 77 (2011).
21
Malacat vs. CA, 347 Phil. 462 (1997).
22
Benedicto vs. CA, G.R. No. 125359 (4 September 2001), citing Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722 (1994), which in turn
cited Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin, 58 SCRA 266 (1974).
4
MATTERS OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE; UNQUESTIONABLE DEMONSTRATION
In Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago vs. COMELEC (673 SCRA 651, 29 June 2012)(En Banc)[Sereno, J.], the
principle of Matters of Public Knowledge and Unquestionable Demonstration was explained by the High Court in
this wise:
Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration.23 Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to
evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.
JUDICIAL NOTICE IN RAPE CASES
It can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always
nor necessarily isolated or secluded, for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can and has
been committed in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5)
meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with the accused’s
sister.24
The High Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipina’s inbred modesty and shyness and
her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.25
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of
professional and scientific knowledge. For example, in People vs. Alicante,26 the trial court took judicial notice of
the clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby boys as premature since one of
the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would
be facts which are ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were
received by a party.
PROBLEM:
Angelo Embestro is the father of AAA. He was accused by the latter of rape. During the presentation of
evidence in chief by the prosecution, a medical certificate was presented stating that AAA was fifteen (15) years
old at the time she was examined. The Medical Certificate was admitted by the defense.
Q.6. Can the court take the minority of AAA as a judicial notice based on the Medical Certificate
as admitted by the defense?
A.6. No. In the case of People vs. Metin (G.R. No. 140781, 8 May 2003)(En Banc)[Quisumbing, J.],
citing the case of People vs. Rivera,27 it was held that: The trial court could only take judicial notice of the
victim's minority when the latter is, for example, 10 years old or below. Otherwise, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the victim's age at the time of the rape. While it is true that in this case the defense admitted
the medical certificate dated August 29, 1997, which indicated that private complainant was fifteen years old at
the time of the examination, it was held in Rivera that the absence of denial on the part of appellant does not
excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. Besides, the medical certificate is not the primary evidence
of the date of birth of party examined. In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is inappropriate,
despite the defense counsel's admission of the medical certificate.
As required by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court in any other matters such as age, a hearing is
required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by
23
Sec. 2, Rule 129.
24
People vs. Villar, 322 SCRA 393 (19 January 2000); People vs. Geromo, 321 SCRA 355 (21 December 1999); People vs. Sandico,
307 SCRA 204 (1999); People vs. Sangil, 276 SCRA 532 (1997).
25
People vs. Taño, 331 SCRA 449 (5 May 5, 2000); People vs. Alquizalas, 305 SCRA 367 (1999); People vs. Lapinoso, 303 SCRA
664 (1999).
26
332 SCRA 440 (31 May 2000).
27
362 SCRA 153 (31 July 2001).
5
the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents
were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Here, neither her birth certificate or baptismal certificate nor any school record was presented by the
prosecution to prove the age of private complainant at the time of the rape. The prosecution having failed to
present evidence as to private complainant's age, appellant can be convicted only of simple rape, the
appropriate penalty for which is reclusion perpetua.
Q.7. What is the effect of a judicial admission in the pleadings such as the Answer of a party to a
case?
A.7. In the case of Mactan Rock Industries, Inc., et al. vs. Germo (G.R. No. 228799, 10 January
2018)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Statements in the Answer made by a party
constitute judicial admissions, which are legally binding on them.28 Case law instructs that even if such judicial
admissions place a party at a disadvantageous position, he may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally and that
he must assume the consequences of such disadvantage.29
Q.8. What are the instances that a party in a case may make judicial admissions?
1. Florete Sr., et al. vs. Florete Jr., et al. (G.R. No. 223321, 2 April 2018)(Second Division)
[Peralta, J.]
2. Odiamar vs. Valencia (795 SCRA 18, 28 June 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
3. Republic vs. Estate of Hans Menzi (685 SCRA 291, 13 November 2012)(En Banc)[Perez, J.], it
was held that:
A party may make judicial admissions:
(a) in the pleadings filed by the parties;

(b) in the course of the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or
(c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding as in the pre-trial of the case.
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a
waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact
from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a
position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.30
When made in the same case in which it is offered,31 no evidence is needed to prove the same and it
cannot be contradicted unless it is shown to have been made through palpable mistake or when no such
admission was made.32 The admission becomes conclusive on him, and all proofs submitted contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or not.33
OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE (RULE 130-A)
Q.9. What does corpus delicti mean in drug cases?
A.9. In People vs. Sorin (754 SCRA 594, 25 March 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], a case
for Violation of Sections 5, R.A. No. 9165, wherein the accused was acquitted due to non-compliance with Section
21 of the same law, it was held that: The presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the
28
See Constantino vs. Heirs of Constantino, Jr., 718 Phil. 575 (2013).
29
Citing Bayas vs. Sandiganbayan, 440 Phil. 54 (2002).
30
520 Phil. 982 (2006).
31
Republic Glass Corporation vs. Qua, 479 Phil. 393 (2004).
32
Arroyo, Jr. vs. Taduran, 466 Phil. 173 (2004).
33
Canada vs. All Commodities Marketing Corporation, 569 SCRA 321 (17 October 2008).
6
crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items.34 The lack of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from the accused strongly militates against a finding
of guilt.35 Corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential.36
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (RULE 130-B)
DEFINITION
Under the Rules of Court (Section 2, Rule 130), documentary evidence is defined as documents as evidence
consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their contents.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Q.10. When can the best evidence rule be applied?
1. Estrada vs. Hon. Desierto (G.R. No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001)(En Banc)[Puno, J.]
2. Republic vs. Mupas (769 SCRA 384, 8 September 2015)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that:
The best evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry.
Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the
original.37 Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.38
The best evidence rule prohibits the introduction of secondary evidence unless it is shown that original
document has been lost or destroyed or is beyond jurisdiction of court without fault of offering party; if
original document is lost, then secondary evidence is properly admissible.39
Q.11. Can the fax or photocopy of the marriage contract and the canonical certificate of marriage
be admitted as evidence of the fact of marriage between the parties?
A.11. No. In Calimag vs. Heirs of Silvestra N. Macapaz,40 the Supreme Court held that:
(1) fax or photocopy of the marriage contract; and

(2) the canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of
marriage without running afoul with the provision of the first paragraph of Section 3, Rule
130 of the Rules of Evidence.
Q.12. Will the court admit the summary of the voluminous original documents with the party
invoking Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the ROC?
A.12. Yes. In Republic vs. Mupas (769 SCRA 384, 8 September 2015)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held
that: If the party has shown that the underlying writings are numerous and that an in-court examination of
these documents would be inconvenient. In other words, Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does
away with the item-by-item court identification and authentication of voluminous exhibits which would only
be burdensome and tedious for the parties and the court.
34
Citing People vs. Almorfe, 631 Phil. 51 (2010); Cacao vs. People, 610 SCRA 636 (22 January 2010).
35
Mallillin vs. People, 576 Phil. 576 (2008).
36
People vs. Quebral, 606 SCRA 247 (27 November 2009).
37
Citibank, N.A. vs. Sabeniano, 504 SCRA 378 (12 October 2006).
38
Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108 (3 April 2001), citing Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1191, p. 334.
39
State of Stephens, Mo.App., 556 S.W.2d 722.
40
791 SCRA 620 (1 June 2010).
7
Q.13. What is the condition precedent to the admission of the summary of numerous documents?
Explain.
A.13. The proponent must lay a proper foundation for the admission of the original documents on
which the summary is based. The proponent must prove that the source documents being summarized are also
admissible if presented in court.41 In concrete terms, the source documents must be shown to be original, and
not secondary. Furthermore, the source documents must likewise be accessible to the opposing party so that
the correctness of the summary of the voluminous records may be tested on cross-examination and/or may
be refuted in pleadings. In ordinary trial-type proceedings, a proper foundation for the introduction of a
summary may be established through the testimony of the person who is responsible for the summary's
preparation, or the person who supervised the preparation of the summary.42
Q.14. What is the reason for the procedural foundations in the admission of the summary of
numerous documents in lieu of the originals? Explain.
A.14. The primary reason for these procedural foundations is that the summary of numerous
documents is hearsay evidence. The trial court should not haphazardly allow a party to present a summary of
numerous documents and immediately admit and give probative value to such summary without sufficiently
laying these foundations.
PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE HEARSAY
If the source documents of the summary are non-original, the trial court would commit a grave error in
admitting and/or giving probative value to the summary of non-original documents; the evidence admitted
would be double hearsay.43Furthermore, when a party invokes Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he
does not similarly invoke Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He does not likewise claim
that the original documents have been lost or destroyed. The party merely asserts that the numerous documents
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and that the fact sought to be established from these
documents is only the general result of the whole.
Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best evidence rule pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, he asks permission from the trial court to produce a summary of numerous documents,
whose originals are available to the adverse party for inspection. He does not ask permission from the trial
court to present in evidence the numerous non-original documents. Otherwise, the very purpose of Section 3(c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court would be defeated. In that case, every exhibit of non-original documents would be
identified, authenticated, and cross-examined, leading to a tedious and protracted litigation.
Q.15. What must be established by a party presenting photocopies of the original documents?
A.15. If a party desires to present photocopies of the original documents, he must first establish that
the presentation of photocopies is justified under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
He must establish the presence of all the elements under these provisions.
UNSIGNED AFFIDAVIT
Q.16. Can an unsigned Affidavit, which identified photocopied documents and was not objected to
by the adverse party, be given probative value?
A.16. No. In Republic vs. Mupas (790 SCRA 217, 19 April 2016)(En Banc)[Brion, J.],44 it was held: We
disagree with PIATCO’s argument that the Court should have considered the photocopies of PIATCO’s
documents supporting attendant costs. PIATCO cannot rely on the affidavit of Atty. Tolentino who allegedly
identified the photocopied documents supporting attendant costs. The Court observed that the alleged
affidavit of Atty. Tolentino does not have any signature above his name as the affiant.
41
29A Am Jur 2d Evidence § 1072, § 1073, & § 1079.
42
29A Am Jur 2d Evidence § 1077.
43
29A Am Jur 2d Evidence 1079.
44
Resolution on the Denial of PIATCO’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration. R.A. No. 8974, An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition
of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes.
8
The affidavit cannot be said to have at least substantially complied with the requirements laid down in
Sections 3(a), (b), and/or (d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court for the admissibility of photocopies as secondary
evidence. Thus, PIATCO’s documents allegedly supporting the attendant costs are hearsay evidence. With
respect to the effect of the alleged non-objection of the parties to the presentation of these photocopy
documents, the High Court further ruled in PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. CA, et al.45 that a
hearsay evidence has no probative value and should be disregarded whether objected to or not.
Q.17. Can the Transcript of Records showing excellence in conduct of a student be considered as
evidence for his innocence in an administrative case against him?
A.17. No. In Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the PMA (751 SCRA 469, 24 February 2015)(En Banc)
[Peralta, J.], it was held that: Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia. While his Transcript
of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding academic performance but his excellent grade in subjects
on Conduct during his four-year stay in the PMA, it does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of the offense
charged. It is enough to say that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time.46 While the TOR may
be received to prove his identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student, it does not show his specific intent,
plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a specific Honor Code violation.
Q.18. Are there exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule?
A.18. Yes. In BPI vs. Mendoza (821 SCRA 41, 20 March 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was
held that: As exceptions to the best evidence rule, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that non-
original documents may be produced in court in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. 47
Q.19. What is the rationale for the admission of secondary evidence of the contents of the original?
A.19. Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory that the original
cannot be produced by the party who offers the evidence within a reasonable time by the exercise of
reasonable diligence.48 The Best Evidence Rule comes into play when a reproduction of the original or oral
evidence is offered to prove the contents of a document. The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the
best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of the best evidence and withholds
it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence
is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and defeat.49
Q.20. When can the presentation of the original document be dispensed with?
A.20. In People vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)(665 SCRA 89, 7 February 2012)(En Banc)
[Brion, J.],50 it was held that: If the party never objected to the submission of the photostatic copies as evidence,
the production of the originals is dispensable. This was the ruling in Estrada vs. Hon. Desierto51 where the
Supreme Court ruled that the production of the original may be dispensed with if the opponent does not
45
358 Phil. 38 (1998).
46
Sec. 3d, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
47
See Heirs of Prodan vs. Heirs of Alvarez, 717 Phil. 54 (2013), citing Citibank, N.A. Mastercard vs. Teodoro, 458 Phil. 480
(2003); Marquez vs. Espejo, 629 SCRA 117 (25 August 2010).
48
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 188881 (21 April 2014).
49
Asuncion vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 414 Phil. 329 (2001).
50
The petition for certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines assailed the decision dated 22 March 2002 of the
Sandiganbayan which granted the demurrers to evidence filed by Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez, and Rafael
Zagala.
51
408 Phil. 194 (2001).
9
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose would be served by requiring its
production. In such case, the secondary evidence of the content of the writing would be received in evidence if
no objection was made to its reception.
SECONDARY EVIDENCE
Q.21. Can a photocopy of a document be admitted in evidence? Explain.
A.21. No. In the following cases:
1. Republic vs. Cuenca, et al. (G.R. No. 198393, 4 April 2018)(First Division)[Tijam, J.]
2. Robiñol vs. Bassig (845 SCRA 447, 21 November 2017)(En Banc)[Tijam, J.], it was held that:
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.52
In Cuenca, the Supreme Court sustained the Dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence, the
Republic's complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The high court through
Mr. Justice Tijam said: In this case, the Sandiganbayan observed that the Republic failed to introduce either
the original or the certified true copies of the documents during its examination-in-chief for purposes of
identification, marking, authentication and comparison with the copies furnished the Sandiganbayan and the
adverse parties. When the Sandiganbayan inquired as to whether the Republic will present the original or
certified true copies of its documentary exhibits, the Republic answered that it will do so, if necessary, as the
originals are kept in the Central Bank vault. Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of the
documents' originals, the Republic still failed to present the same and contented itself with the presentation
of mere photocopies. Neither was there any showing that the Republic exerted diligent efforts to produce the
original.
Further, despite the Republic's claim that the excluded documentary exhibits are public documents, the
Sandiganbayan is correct in observing that the Republic failed to show, in case of a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, an official publication thereof or a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certification that such officer has the custody, or in the case of a public record of a
private document, the original record, or a copy thereof attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.53
Q.22. Are certified xerox copies of documents issued by a custodian public officer admissible as
evidence?
A.22. Yes. In Bunagan-Bansig vs. Celera (713 SCRA 158, 14 January 2014)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], it
was held that: Certified xerox copies of marriage contracts issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE (SEC. 9, RULE 130)
Q.23. What is the Parol Evidence Rule? Explain.
A.23. In the case of Spouses Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation (G. R. No.
171601, 8 April 2015)(Second Division)[Leonen, J.], the Supreme Court explained that: Per this rule, reduction to
written form, regardless of the formalities observed,54 forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a
written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon
by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.55
This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in deferring to the contracting parties' articulated intent. In
choosing to reduce their agreement into writing, they are deemed to have done so meticulously and carefully,
52
Lee vs. Tambago, 568 Phil. 363 (2008); Country Bankers Insurance Corporation vs. Antonio Lagman, 669 Phil. 205 (2011).
53
Citing Sections 24 and 27 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
54
See Inciong, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 364 (1996)[Per J. Romero, Second Division].
55
Seaoil Petroleum Corporation vs. Autocorp Group, 590 Phil. 410 (2008)[Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Spouses Edrada
vs. Spouses Ramos, 505 Phil. 672 (2005)[Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
10
employing specific — frequently, even technical — language as are appropriate to their context. From an
evidentiary standpoint, this is also because oral testimony . . . coming' from a party who has an interest in the
outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language.56
This evidence rule seeks to preserve integrity of written agreements by refusing to permit contracting
parties to attempt to alter import of their contract through the use of contemporaneous oral declarations.57
Q.24. When can a party be allowed to present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the agreement?
A.24. A party may be allowed to present evidence if he puts in issue in his pleading the following:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the
four (4) items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement.58 Raising any of these items as an issue in a pleading
such that it falls under the exception is not limited to the party initiating an action.
Q.25. What need to be established for parol evidence or by testimony or other evidence to be
admitted?
A.25. Two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted:
1. first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party's
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and
2. second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the
conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Parol Evidence. Oral or verbal evidence; that which is given by word of mouth; the ordinary kind of
evidence given by witness in court in a particular sense, and with reference to contracts, deeds, wills, and other
writings, parol evidence is the same as extraneous evidence or evidence aliunde.59
APPLICABILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE
Q.26. When can the parol evidence rule be invoked?
1. Eagleridge Development Corporation vs. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (G.R.
No. 204700, 10 April 2013)(Third Division)[Leonen, J.](Main Decision)
2. Eagleridge Development Corporation vs. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (G.R.
No. 204700, 24 November 2014)(Special Third Division)[Leonen, J.](Resolution that denied the
56
Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 514 (1997)[Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
57
Rose vs. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 437 Pa. 117, 262 A.2d 851.
58
ACI Philippines, Inc. vs. Coquia, 580 Phil. 275 (2008)[Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
59
Black, H. C. (1979). Black's Law Dictionary with Pronunciation. Fifth Ed. (p. 1006). Manila, Phil.: Merriam & Webster Inc.
11
Motion for Reconsideration), citing the cases of Macalino vs. Pis-an,60 citing Marquez vs.
Espejo,61 the Supreme Court said:
The Parol Evidence Rule is exclusive only as between the parties and their successor-in-interest. The
Parol Evidence Rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy
of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a
right originating in the instrument. 62 Thus, when the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in
issue whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding
body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of
the parties in order to determine such intent.63
PROBLEM:
Jess Dima and his co-heirs executed an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate and Absolute Sale
adjudicating among themselves Lot 3154 (consisting of 469 sq.m.) and selling a 207-sq.m. portion of the same to
Spouses Antonio and Amalia Cabañes. The document did not, however, identify the portion being sold as Lot No.
3154-A. Immediately after the sale, Spouses Cabañes sold Lot 3154-A to Ariel Gabarda by virtue of a Deed of Sale.
Gabarda, intending to have Lot 3154-A registered in his name, discovered that the portion occupied by him
consists of 140 sq.m. only and not 207 sq.m. Gabarda claimed that the 207 sq.m. property sold by Spouses
Cabañes to him consists of Lot 3154-A with an area of 140 sq.m. and Lot 3154-C with an area of 67 sq.m. Thus, he
filed against Dima a Complaint for Quieting of Title over Lot 3154-C. Gabarda, in order to further his case, rely on
the failure of the Absolute Sale to state that the 207-square meter portion conveyed by Dima and his coheirs to the
Spouses Cabañes was Lot 3154-A. Dima, on the other hand, puts emphasis on the fact that the Deed of Sale
between Gabarda and the Spouses Cabañes expressly stated that the lot subject of the sale was Lot 3154-A only.
Plainly, the parties' respective arguments hinge on two relevant documents which they adopted as
common exhibits:
(1) the Absolute Sale subject of which, among others, is the conveyance made by Dima and his co-
heirs to the Spouses Cabañes; and
(2) the Deed of Sale between the Spouses Cabañes and Gabarda.
There is no dispute regarding the contents of these documents, that is, neither of the parties contests
that the Absolute Sale did not state that the 207-square meter portion sold to the Spouses Cabañes was Lot 3154-
A nor that the Deed of Sale between Gabarda and Spouses Cabañes expressly mentioned that the subject of the
sale between them was Lot 3154-A.
Q.27. Based on the facts, will the parol evidence rule apply? Explain.
A.27. No. Petitioner Gabarda was not a party in the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Absolute Sale
executed by Dima and his co-heirs. Likewise, Dima was not a party to the Deed of Sale entered into by and
between Gabarda and the Spouses Cabañes. Hence, the inapplicability of the Parole Evidence Rule. What is really
in issue is whether the admitted contents of the said documents adequately or correctly express the true
intention of the parties to the same.
It has been held that when the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue
whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding
body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions
of the parties in order to determine such intent.64 In view of this and since the Parol Evidence Rule is
inapplicable in this case, an examination of the parties' respective parol evidence is in order. Indeed, examination
of evidence is necessarily factual65 and not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari66 which only
60
791 SCRA 672 (1 June 2016).
61
629 SCRA 117 (2010).
62
Lechugas vs. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 310 (1986).
63
Marquez vs. Espejo, supra:
―when the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into
the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such intent.‖
64
Marquez vs. Espejo, 643 Phil. 341 (2010).
65
Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co. Inc. vs. People, 721 Phil. 760 (2013).
12
allows questions of law to be raised. However, this case falls under one of the recognized exceptions to such
rule, i.e., when the CA's findings are contrary to that of the trial court.67 (Macalino, Jr. vs. Pis-an, 791 SCRA
672, 1 June 2016.)
INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS (SECTIONS 10-19, RULE 130)
Q.28. What is the probative value of an expert opinion on written instrument?
A.28. In the case Mercado vs. Commission on Higher Education (686 SCRA 446, 27 November 2012)
(En Banc)[Perez, J.], it was held that: It is doctrined that opinions of handwriting experts, like signature analyses
of the PNP, are not conclusive upon courts or tribunals on the issue of authenticity of signatures.68
The seminal case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals69 reminds Us that the authenticity or forgery of
signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics
or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature, and thus the opinion
of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less than an opinion
rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. Hence, in resolving the question of whether or not forgery
exists, courts or tribunals are neither limited to, nor bound by, the opinions of handwriting experts. Far from
it, courts or tribunals may even disregard such opinions entirely in favor of either their own independent
examination of the contested handwritings or on the basis of any other relevant, if not more direct, evidence of the
character of the questioned signatures.70 Verily, the weight that may be given to opinions of handwriting
experts varies on a case-to-case basis and largely depends on the quality of the opinion itself71 as well as the
availability of other evidence directly proving the forgery or authenticity of the questioned signatures.72
ESTABLISHED THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE EXPERT
Before such opinions may be accepted and given probative value, it is indispensable that the
integrity and soundness of the procedures undertaken by the expert in arriving at his conclusion, as well as
the qualifications of the expert himself, must first be established satisfactorily. However, as such opinions are
essentially based on mere inference, they should always be accorded less significance when lined up against
direct statements of witnesses as to matters within their personal observation.
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE (RULE 130, C)
QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES (SECTIONS 20-24, RULE 130)
Q.29. Who is tasked to assess the credibility of a witness?
1. Orsos vs. People (845 SCRA 150, 20 November 2017)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.](A
case of acts of lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No. 7610)
2. People vs. Caoili (835 SCRA 107, 8 August 2017)(En Banc)[Tijam, J.](a rape case in relation to
R.A. No. 7610), citing the case of People vs. Pareja73
3. People vs. Monroyo (828 SCRA, 28 June 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.](Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No. 7610)
4. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Flores (755 SCRA 400, 14 April 2015)(En Banc) [Per
Curiam]
5. Corpuz vs. People (724 SCRA 1, 29 April 2014)(En Banc)[Peralta J.][A case for Estafa under
Art. 315(1)(b)]
6. People vs. Buado, Jr. (688 SCRA 82, 8 January 2013)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], it was uniformly
held that:
66
Miro vs. Vda. de Erederos, 721 Phil. 772 (2013).
67
Virtucio vs. Alegarbes, 693 Phil. 567 (2012).
68
Jimenez vs. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA, 432 Phil. 895 (2002).
69
321 Phil. 463 (1995).
70
Jimenez vs. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, supra, citing Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio vs.
Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753 (1998); Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, p. 762.
71
Gamido vs. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 463 (1995).
72
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, p. 762.
73
724 Phil. 759 (2014).
13
It bears to emphasize the recognized rule in this jurisdiction that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe the
deportment and demeanor of a witness on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts; and when his
findings have been affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.
TESTIMONIES OF CHILD VICTIMS IN RAPE CASES
Q.30. Who is qualified to be a witness?
A.30. As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity,
gender, educational attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long
as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of
Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of
a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.74
Q.31. How should the court treat the testimony of a child witness?
1. People vs. Caoli (835 SCRA 107, 8 August 2017)(En Banc)[Tijam, J.]
2. People vs. Magbitang (793 SCRA 266, 14 June 2016)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.]
3. People vs. Balcueva (761 SCRA 489, 1 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.](Rape of a
female over 12 years old but under 18 years of age by his father), it was held that:
The Supreme Court has been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child-victims especially
in sensitive cases of rape. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when
a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are
inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also
the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl’s revelation that she
had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo
public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily
dismissed as mere concoction. Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial
court determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity is such as to render him incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the facts truthfully.75 The testimony
of the child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known the perception can be believed in the
absence of any showing of an improper motive to testify.76
MORAL ASCENDANCY IN RAPE CASES
It is likewise settled that in cases where the rape is committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father,
stepfather, uncle, or the common-law-spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation
be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.77
FINDINGS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
The rule is that findings of an investigating justice on the credibility of witnesses are generally given by
this Court great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they
testified.78
Q.32. How are testimonies be considered?
74
Cavili vs. Judge Florendo, 154 SCRA 610 (9 October 1987).
75
Section 21(b), Rule 130, Rules of Court.
76
People vs. Gacho, 124 SCRA 677 (23 September 1983).
77
People vs. Padua, 661 Phil. 366 (2011); People vs. Corpuz, 597 Phil. 459 (2009).
78
Gacad vs. Judge Clapis, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257 (17 July 2012); Santos vs. Judge Arcaya-Chua, 598 Phil. 496 (2009).
14
A.32. In Tuldague vs. Pardo (707 SCRA 622, 17 October 2013)(En Banc)[Carpio J.], it was held that:
Such testimony must be considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. 79 To determine which
contradicting statements of a witness are to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received must be
considered.80
OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION
Q.33. What are the factors to be considered in ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification
is positive or derivative?
A.33. In People vs. Pepino (779 SCRA 170, 12 January 2016)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], citing the case of
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,81 the Supreme Court explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the
test to determine the admissibility of such identifications in this manner:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose in resolving the admissibility of and
relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz:
(1) the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness’s degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.82 (Vidar vs. People, supra.)
Q.34. Can the accused use the ill motive of the private complainant in a rape case?
A.34. No. In People vs. Caoili supra (En Banc)[Per Tijam, J.], it was held that: It is settled that ill
motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim,
which clearly establishes the liability of the accused.83
In Caoili, AAA was a little over fifteen (15) years old when she testified, and she categorically identified
Caoili as the one who defiled her. She positively and consistently declared that Caoili inserted his finger into
her vagina and that she suffered tremendous pain during the insertion. Her account of the incident, as found
by the RTC84 and the CA,85 was clear, convincing and straightforward, devoid of any material or significant
inconsistencies.
SECTION 24(e), RULE 130 OF THE ROC
Q.35. What is the concept of executive privilege communication? Explain.
A.35. In the case of Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security (G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008)(En Banc)[Leonardo-De Castro, J.], it was held that: The privilege is
said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who
assist him' with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so
in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
79
Vidallon-Magtolis vs. Salud, 506 Phil. 423 (2005).
80
Citing Office of the Court Administrator vs. Morante, 471 Phil. 837 (2004).
81
319 Phil. 128 (1995).
82
People vs. Sinco, 408 Phil. 1 (2001); Dizon vs. People, 616 Phil. 498 (2009).
83
Rondina vs. People, 687 Phil. 274 (2012).
84
The RTC's Decision states: x x x this Court finds the testimony of AAA, who was little over fifteen years old at the time she
testified, to be clear, convincing and straightforward, devoid of any material or significant inconsistencies. x x x. (People vs.
Caoili, supra).
85
The CA held: We also find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court upholding AAA's credibility. x x
x. (People vs. Caoili, supra).
15
THE NIXON WATERGATE SCANDAL
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential communications
privilege.86 In United States vs. Nixon,87 the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in preserving the
confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President's performance of his official duties. It thus
considered presidential communications as presumptively privileged. Apparently, the presumption is founded on
the President's generalized interest in confidentiality.
KINDS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
In Re: Sealed Case,88 the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of
executive privilege:
1. The communication privilege pertains to communications, documents or other materials that

reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain
confidential.
2. The deliberative process privilege includes advisory opinions, recommendations and

deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the

constitutional principle of separation of power and the President's unique constitutional role. The presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional
materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the
presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative
process privilege.
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
Deliverative process privilege is the decision-making of executive officials. This is the common law
privilege.
OFFICIALS COVERED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In Re: Sealed
Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff that has operational proximity to direct presidential
decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of
presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as quintessential and non-delegable
Presidential power, such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to grant
pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to
negotiate treaties, etc.89
The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. vs. Department of Justice90 tested the In Re: Sealed
Case principles. There, while the presidential decision involved is the exercise of the President's pardon power, a
non-delegable, core-presidential function, the Deputy Attorney General and the Pardon Attorney were deemed to
be too remote from the President and his senior White House advisors to be protected. The Court conceded that
functionally those officials were performing a task directly related to the President's pardon power, but
concluded that an organizational test was more appropriate for confining the potentially broad sweep that
would result from the In Re: Sealed Case's functional test. The majority concluded that, the lesser protections of
the deliberative process privilege would suffice. That privilege was, however, found insufficient to justify the
confidentiality of the 4,341 withheld documents.
86
CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments at p. 2.
87
418 U.S. 683.
88
In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124 (17 June 1997).
89
CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments at pp.
18-19.
90
365 F.3d 1108, 361 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 64 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 141.
16
But more specific classifications of communications covered by executive privilege are made in older
cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state
secret,91 identity of government informers in some circumstances,92and information related to pending
investigations.93 An area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign relations.
In United States vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,94 the U.S. Court, citing President George Washington,
pronounced: The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy,
and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions
which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious
influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to
other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making
treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the body was formed
confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to
have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a
dangerous precedent.
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In the 1998 case of Chavez
vs. PCGG,95 the Supreme Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect
to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters.
Whereas, in the 2002 case of Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority supra, the Supreme Court recognized
matters which has long been considered as confidential such as information on military and diplomatic
secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused. It also stated that presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during close-door cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court or other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. Such information cannot be pried-open by a co-equal branch of government.
In Senate vs. Ermita supra, the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed. As
may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,96
appointing,97 pardoning,98 and diplomatic99 powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Q.36. What are the elements of presidential communications privilege?
A.36. The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re: Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide
the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential

power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
91
See United States vs. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Chicago vs. Airlines, Inc. vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103;
Totten vs. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
92
Roviaro vs. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-61.
93
See Friedman vs. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. 738 F. 2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
94
14 F. Supp. 230, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
95
360 Phil. 133 (1998).
96
Section 18, Article VII.
97
98
99
Section 20 and 21, Article VII.
17
Q.37. What are the limitations of the executive privilege as provided for by law? Explain.
A.37. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be
provided by law. Some of these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713, Article 229 of the Revised Penal
Code, Section 3 (k) of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24(e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential and what our
Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized
public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case
belonging to such kind.
Q.38. Was the executive privilege properly invoked by Secretary Neri in not answering the
questions as above cited?
A.38. Yes. The Claim of Executive Privilege was properly invoked. Jurisprudence teaches that for
the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter.100 A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a
precise and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality.101 The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive
Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states
that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate vs.
Ermita supra, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the
President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate vs. Ermita supra, a less categorical letter was even
adjudged to be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested
information could be classified as privileged. The case of Senate vs. Ermita supra only requires that an allegation
be made whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be
comprehensive.
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE (SECTION 25, RULE 130)
Q.39. Can filial privilege be waived?
A.39. Yes. In People vs. Invencion (G.R. No. 131636, 5 March 2003)(En Banc)[Davide, Jr., C.J.], it
was held that: Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is otherwise known as the rule on filial privilege. This
rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify
against an ascendant.102 The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges. In Invencion, a rape case, the high court said: As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not
compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against
Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell
the truth.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS (SECTIONS 26-33, RULE 130)
Q.40. What is admission against interest?
A.40. In the case of Heirs of Peter Donton vs. Stier (837 SCRA 583, 23 August 2017)(Second
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: An admission against interest is the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against himself
unless such declaration is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person who makes the same,
and absent any showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can
100
United States vs. Reynolds, supra.
101
Unites States vs. Article of Drug, 43 F.R.D. at 190.
102
See 2 Florenz Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 583 (7th rev. ed. 1995).
18
offset it.103
PROBLEM:
A court sheriff was charged administratively in the OCA for violations of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. Section 2, Canon I provides that Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit
based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions,
while Section 2(e), Canon III states that Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity,
discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a major
purpose of the donor is to influence the Court personnel in performing official duties.
However, upon receipt of the notice to comment, he merely ignored the same and instead, he no longer
report for work.
Q.41. Would his failure to file comment equivalent to admission? Explain.
A.41. Yes. In Noces-De Leon vs. Florendo (784 SCRA 440, 23 February 2016)(En Banc)[Per Curiam],
it was held that: Instead of facing the charges against him, Florendo chose to ignore the accusations by no longer
reporting for work. Indeed, for his failure to file comment, he is deemed to have impliedly admitted the
charges against him.104Florendo was found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and would have
been DISMISSED from service, had he not been earlier dropped from the rolls. His retirement and other benefits,
except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Supreme Court emphasized that: all Court employees, being public servants in an office
dispensing justice, must always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and Court
regulations. To maintain the people's respect and faith in the judiciary, Court employees should be models of
uprightness, fairness and honesty. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust and
confidence in the Courts.105
PLEA FOR FORGIVENESS IS ANALOGOUS TO AN ATTEMPT TO COMPROMISE (SEC. 27, RULE 130)
In People vs. Español (G.R. No. 175603, 13 February 2009)(En Banc)[Corona, J.], a parricide case, the
Supreme Court considered appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness as analogous to an
attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission of guilt under Section 27, Rule
130.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA (SEC. 28 IN RELATION TO SEC.30, RULE 130)
Q.42. Can the act or declaration of the whistleblowers in the PDAF scam be given probative value
during the preliminary investigation without violating the res inter alios acta rule? Explain.
A.42. Yes. In Reyes vs. Ombudsman (787 SCRA 354, 15 March 2016)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.],106
it was held that:
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their
invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission
is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule.107 The foregoing rule constitutes a
103
Stanley Fine Furniture vs. Galiano, 748 Phil. 624 (2014).
104
Agustin vs. Mercado, 555 Phil. 186 (2007).
105
Executive Judge Rojas, Jr. vs. Mina, 688 Phil. 241 (2012).
106
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported by whistleblowers Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina Suñas,
the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for the years 2004 to
2010, in the total amount of P172,834,500.00.
107
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its
existence, may be given, in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
19
technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation
proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which
would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation as
long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.108 This is because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting
the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the
evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, the technical rules on evidence
are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation, as in
this case.
Q.43. What is the effect of a person’s declaration whenever a privity of estate exists between the
declarant and the party?
A.43. In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (406 SCRA 190, 15 July 2003)(En Banc)[Corona, J.],109 a
forfeiture proceedings against the Marcoses pursuant to RA 1379,110 it was held that:
An admission of one in privity with a party to the record is competent.111 And where several co-parties
to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent
against all. The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a privity of estate exists
between the declarant and the party, the term privity of estate generally denoting a succession in rights.112 In the
absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents' judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss
deposits is definitely binding on them. The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of
them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
supra, it was held that: Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a
confirmation of respondents recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. Admissions of a party
in his testimony are receivable against him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession
has the force of a judicial admission.113
It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.'s testimony that the Marcos family agreed to negotiate with the
Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family
regarding the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on their part. The rule is
that the testimony on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission when a party
testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own knowledge.114
PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE (SECTIONS 34-35, RULE 130)
Q.44. What is the effect of admission of the accused charged with acts of lasciviousness filed by
his eleven-year old daughter, while he is facing another rape charge filed by his six-year old daughter?
1. People vs. Losano (310 SCRA 707, 20 July 1999)(En Banc)[Per Curiam]
2. People vs. Magpayo (G.R. Nos. 92961-64, 1 September 1993)(Third Division)[Bidin, J.], it was
held that:
necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the
common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy." (People vs.
Ibañez, 698 SCRA 161, 10 June 2013.)
108
See Estrada vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41 (21 January 2015), citing Unilever Philippines, Inc. vs. Tan, 715 SCRA 36
(29 January 2014).
109
The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of
petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
110
An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or
Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor.
111
31A C.J.S., Par. 322, p. 817.
112
29 Am Jur 2d Par. 824, p. 211.
113
29A Am. Jur., Par. 770, p. 137.
114
31A C.J.S., Par. 311, p.795.
20
It only proves that such a case was filed and pending with the municipal court. It does not prove the
propensity of the accused-appellant to crave for his children. The pendency of another case, does not affect the
constitutional presumption of innocence afforded to the accused-appellant. The trial court's error on this point
does not, however, obliterate the fact that the prosecution was able to prove that indeed, accused-appellant
raped his daughter. The Supreme Court find no reason to disturb the finding of the trial court that the guilt of the
accused-appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to establish the particular crime, and
it is usually competent to prove the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme
or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the other, or the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.
TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE (SECTION 36, RULE 130)
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Q.45. What is hearsay evidence?
A.45. In Philippine Free Press, Inc. vs. CA (473 SCRA 639, 24 October 2005)[Garcia, J.], it was held
that: Any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness
stand.115Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered
hearsay.116 Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. (Espineli vs. People, 725
SCRA 365, 9 June 2014.)
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a testimony is hearsay if offered against a
party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely because the
party against whom it is presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine the persons to
whom the statements or writings are attributed.117
Q.46. What is the evidentiary value of newspaper articles?
A.46. In Ocampo vs. Enriquez (835 SCRA 484, 8 August 2017)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.], about the
interment of the late former President Ferdinand Marcos at LNMB, it was held that: Newspaper articles amount
to hearsay evidence, twice removed and are, therefore, not only inadmissible but without any probative value
at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted.118 As it is, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such publication exists with the tenor of
the news therein stated. The same rules apply to news article published via the broadcast media or the internet
communication. While it may be asserted that President Duterte's position on the issue is consistent, the
Supreme Court must base its decision on a formal concrete act, preferably a written order denying the MR or
appeal, so as to avoid being entangled in possibly moot and academic discourses should he make a volte-face
on the issue.
Needless to state, he should be given an opportunity to correct himself, as it is disputably presumed that
he would maintain his solemn oath to faithfully and conscientiously fulfill his duties as President of the
Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate
himself to the service of the Nation.119
Q.47. What is the probative value of an Affidavit? Explain.
115
PNOC Shipping & Transport Corp. vs. CA, 358 Phil. 38 (8 October 1998); Phil. Home Assurance Corp. vs. CA, 327 Phil. 255 (20
June 1996); Valencia vs. Atty. Cabanting, 196 SCRA 302 (26 April 1991).
116
Go vs. CA, 351 SCRA 145 (5 February 2001).
117
Philippine Home Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 468 (1996), citing Baguio vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA
366 (1993).
118
Feria vs. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412 (2000).
119
Section 5, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
21
1. Atienza vs. People (716 SCRA 84, 12 February 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
2. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Tormis (801 SCRA 530, 30 August 2016)(En Banc)[Per
Curiam), a case in MTC, Cebu City for turning the solemnization of marriages into business, it
was held that:
An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay evidence.120 Since it is often prepared not by the affiant
but by another person who makes use of his or her own language in writing the statements, it is generally
rejected unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify. Courts take judicial notice of the fact that
an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete narration of facts.121Court testimonies, therefore, are favored
because these can be subjected to cross-examination.
Q.48. Can a certification issued by the Regional Technical Director of the DENR be considered prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein?
A.48. No. In Republic vs. Galeno (815 SCRA 191, 23 January 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.],
it was held that: If the witness who identified the Certification was not the one who prepared it, it is
considered as hearsay. Even if the adverse party interposed no objection to the admission of the foregoing
evidence in the proceedings in court, it should be borne in mind that hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to
the hearsay evidence rule.122 Thus, while the documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the
opposing party's lack of objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight.
Q.49. What is the doctrine of independently relevant statements?
A.49. In the case of Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman (812 SCRA537, 6 December 2016)(En Banc)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court explained that:
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact
that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.123
In Cambe, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the
involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co-accused in the present controversy, considering their respective
participations in the entire PDAF scam. Therefore, the statements made by whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy,
who were employees of JLN Corporation and privy to the financial transactions of Napoles concerning, among
others, Sen. Revilla's PDAF, should be given consideration as they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to
the issue at hand.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE (SECTIONS 37-47, RULE 130)
Q.50. What are the requisites for a dying declaration to constitute as an exception to the hearsay
evidence rule?
1. People vs. Palanas (759 SCRA 318, 17 June 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.](a murder
case, where a police officer on his way to the hospital, made a dying declaration)
2. People vs. Rarugal alias ―Amay Bisaya‖ (G.R. No. 188603, 16 January 2013)(First Division)
[Leonardo-De Castro, J.], it was held that:
120
Flores, et al. vs. Lofranco, 576 Phil. 25 (2008)[Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division], citing People's Bank and Trust Co. vs.
Judge Leonidas, 283 Phil. 991 (1992)[Per J. Nocon, Second Division].
121
People vs. Villena, 439 Phil. 509 (2002)[Per Curiam, En Banc].
122
Philippine Home Assurance Corporation vs. CA, 327 Phil. 255 (1996), citing Baguio vs. CA, 226 SCRA 366 (14 September
1993).
123
People vs. Estibal, 743 SCRA 215 (26 November 2014), citing People vs. Velasquez, 405 Phil. 74 (2001).
22
For a dying declaration to constitute as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule,124 four (4) conditions
must concur:
(a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death;
(c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the
declarant is the victim.125
Q.51. Why is a dying declaration an exception to the hearsay evidence rule? Explain.
A.51. In the case of People vs. Palanas supra, SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration,
given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number
and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that
his own death was already imminent.126 A dying declaration is an evidence of the highest order; it is entitled to
the utmost credence on the premise that no person who knows of his impending death would make a careless and
false accusation.127 (People vs. Cabtalan, 666 SCRA 174, 15 February 2012.)
Further, the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when
every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak
the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which
is imposed by an oath administered in court.128
Q.52. What is res gestae?
A.52. In People vs. Palanas (759 SCRA 318, 17 June 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.](a
murder case, where a police officer on his way to the hospital made a dying declaration), the High Court held that:
Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to
illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the
idea of deliberation and fabrication.
Q.53. What are the requisites in order that a statement deemed to form part of res gestae would
constitute as an exception to the rule on hearsay evidence?
A.53. In order to be excepted from the hearsay evidence, it requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

(b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.129
Q.54. Can a dying declaration be also treated to form part of res gestae? Explain.
A.54. Yes. In the case of People vs. Palanas supra, the dying declaration of SPO2 Borre’s was likewise
treated to be deemed to form part of the res gestae. SPO2 Borre’s statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e.,
him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to
contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as
one of the authors of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused and that the killing of
SPO2 Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
124
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole orin part on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. (See Espineli vs. People, G.R. No. 179535, 9 June 2014; See also
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.)
125
People vs. Salafranca, 666 SCRA 501 (22 February 2012).
126
People vs. Cerilla, 564 Phil. 230 (2007).
127
People vs. Sanchez, 622 SCRA 548 (29 June 2010); People vs. Cortezano, 425 Phil. 696 (2002).
128
Citing United States vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530 (1909); People vs. Saliling, 161 Phil. 559 (1976).
129
People vs. Villarico, Sr., 662 Phil. 399 (2011).
23
Q.55. What is the test of admissibility of evidence as part of the res gestae?
A.55. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae are:
(1) Whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with
the principal fact, or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself; and
(2) Whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.130
ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS (SEC. 44, RULE 130)
Q.56. What is the presumption on the entries in official records made by a public officer? Explain.
A.56. In People vs. Laba (689 SCRA 367, 28 January 2013)(Second Divison)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], a
case for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, wherein the Supreme Court affirmed the
convicition of the accused, it was held that: Under Sec. 44 of Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official
records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts they state. Thus, the
testimony of the chemical analyst, and the report of an official forensic chemist regarding a recovered
prohibited drug enjoys the presumption of regularity in its preparation.131 The necessity of this rule consists in
the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.132
Q.57. What are the requisites in order that a testimony in a former proceeding be admitted?
A.57. In the case of Ambray vs. Tsourous (795 SCRA 627, 5 July 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-
Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: In order that a testimony in a former proceeding involving the same
parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party the following requisites must
be satisfied:
(a) the witness is dead or unable to testify;

(b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests;
(c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different
causes of action;
(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the
present case; and
(e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.133
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for
the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony can be introduced in evidence,
the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the
admission of testimony in the realm of admissible evidence.134
OPINION RULE (SECTIONS 48-50, RULE 130)
Q.58. What is the probative value of the testimony of an expert witness? Explain.
A.58. In the case of Tortuna et al. vs. Gregorio, et al. (G.R. No. 202612, 17 January 2018)(Third
Division)[Leonen, J.], it was held that: Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts.
However, courts exercise a wide latitude of discretion in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking into
consideration the factual circumstances of the case. Opinions, when admissible, must have proper factual basis.
They must be supported by facts or circumstances from which they draw logical inferences. An opinion bereft of
factual basis merits no probative value.
130
See People vs. Gatarin, G.R. No. 198022 (7 April 2014), citing People vs. Salafranca, 666 SCRA 501 (22 February 2012).
131
People vs. Quebral, 606 SCRA 247 (27 November 2009), citing People vs. Cervantes, 581 SCRA 762 (17 March 2009), People
vs. Bandang, 430 SCRA 570 (3 June 2004); Malillin vs. People, 553 SCRA 619 (30 April 2008).
132
Herrera, O.M. (2004). Remedial Law. Vol. V. (p. 740). Quezon City, Philippines: Rex Printing Company. Inc.
133
Samalio vs. CA, 494 Phil. 456 (2005).
134
See Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 678 Phil. 358 (2011).
24
Q.59. What is the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert?
A.59. In Tamani vs. Salvador,135 the Supreme Court said that the value of the opinion of a handwriting
expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the
assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an
unpracticed observer. The use of the word may in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies that the
use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts.136 Jurisprudence is
also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove
forgeries.137 However, we have also recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents.138
Q.60. Is a medical certificate indispensable in the prosecution for the crime of rape?
A.60. In People vs. Buado, Jr. (688 SCRA 82, 8 January 2013)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], it was held
that: A medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not
indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape.139 The accused may then be convicted solely on the basis of
the victim’s credible, natural and convincing testimony. This is no less true when the rape victim testifies against
her own father; unquestionably, there would be reason to give her testimony greater weight than usual.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE (SECTION 51, RULE 130)
Q.61. Define character and good moral character.
A.61. In People vs. Lee (G.R. No. 139070, 29 May 2002)(En Banc)[Puno, J.], character is defined to be
the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the
opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are acquainted
with him; his reputation.140
Good moral character includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among these are
common honesty and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good
among people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that
status which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.141
Q.62. What is the rule as regards to character and reputation of a party in a case?
A.62. The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in
determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the
case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be
apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all,
the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous
cause.142 There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both
criminal and civil cases.
135
647 SCRA 132 (4 April 2011).
136
Tabao vs. People, 654 SCRA 216 (20 July 2011).
137
Manzano, Jr. vs. Garcia, 661 SCRA 350 (28 November 2011).
138
Mendez vs. Court of Appeals, 672 SCRA 200 (13 June 2012).
139
People vs. Ela, 541 SCRA 508 (27 December 2007).
140
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. I, 3rd revision, p. 457 (1914). Strictly speaking, character is not synonymous with reputation.
Character is the nature of a person, his disposition generally, or his disposition in respect to a particular trait such as
peacefulness or truthfulness. Reputation is the community estimate of him. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence in the
United States, failure to make the distinction may result in confusion. Character evidence is governed by Rule 404 while
reputation is a method of proving character in Rules 405 and 608—M. Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell
Series, 2nd ed., p. 94 [1987].
141
14 C.J.S. Character p. 400 (1939); Also cited in V. Francisco, Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, Vol. VII, Part I, p. 743.
The concept of character has acquired strong moral overtones over the years owing perhaps to the far greater frequency
with which it is encountered in criminal cases. Inquiry into the nature of the person has largely been confined to
considerations which can be characterized as either goodness or badness. As psychiatry and psychology progress and win
increasing acceptance in the law, the concept seems destined to encompass a broadened view of human nature--
Graham, supra, at 94-95.
142
Jones on Evidence, Civil and Criminal, Vol. I, 5th ed., Sec. 165, p. 294 (1958) citing Thompson vs. Church, 1 Root (Conn) 312,
and other cases; Also cited in O. Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. V, p. 834 (1999).
25
Q.63. Can the accused in a criminal case prove his good moral character? Explain.
A.63. Yes. In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused
may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and
where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit the
crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not
likely to have committed the act charged against him.143
Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused
except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he is a person of bad character.144 The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a
privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such
evidence.145 Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer
evidence of the defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would have a license
to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.146
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of the
accused.147 And this evidence must be pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged, meaning, that
the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act charged, 148 e.g., on a charge of rape,
character for chastity; on a charge of assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for
embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity.149
Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of the offended party.150
Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged. Such evidence is most commonly
offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case.151
CHARACTER EVIDENCE APPLIES ONLY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Q.64. What is the limitation of character evidence?
A.64. In the case of Civil Service Commission vs. Belagan (G.R. No. 132164, 19 October 2004)(En
Banc)[Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.], it was held that: The provision on character evidence pertains only to criminal
cases, not to administrative offenses. Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
proved under the provision of Section 51, Rule 130 of the ROC. Only those which would establish the probability
or improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and
characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a
charge of assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement - character for
143
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, Sec. 367 (1994 ed.).
144
McCormick on Evidence, Vol. I, 4th ed., Sec. 190, p. 797 (1992); 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, Sec. 365 (1994 ed.); See also People
vs. Rabanes, 208 SCRA 768 (1992).
145
Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, 12th ed., Sec. 221, p. 456 (1955).
146
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. I, 3rd ed., Sec. 58, p. 458 (1940); See footnotes for English and American cases.
147
In the case at bar, it was the prosecution that first presented evidence of the bad moral character of the accused-appellant
by citing the two criminal cases pending against him. The presentation of this evidence, however, was not objected to by
the accused-appellant.
148
Francisco, supra; See also Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, 12th ed., Sec. 221, pp. 459-461 (1955).
149
Francisco, supra, citing Wigmore on Evidence (Stud. Txt) 62.
150
With respect to a witness in both criminal and civil cases, his bad moral character may be proved by either party as provided
under Section 11, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence – see Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. II, p. 631
(1995).
151
R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence, American Casebook Series, p. 238 (1982); McCormick on
Evidence, Vol. I, 4th ed., Sec. 193, pp. 820-822 (1992) at Sec. 193, pp. 820-822. In the American jurisdiction, courts in the past
generally admitted evidence of the victim’s character for chastity. In the 1970’s however, nearly all jurisdictions enacted
"rape shield" laws. The reforms range from barring all evidence of the victim’s character for chastity to merely requiring a
preliminary hearing to screen out inadmissible evidence on the issue. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 lies between these
extremes Reversing the traditional preference for proof of character by reputation, it bars reputation and opinion evidence of
the victim’s past sexual conduct, but permits evidence of specific incidents if certain substantive and procedural conditions
are met.--McCormick on Evidence, supra, Sec. 193, p. 822.
26
honesty. In one rape case, where it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently
uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful. 152
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS (RULE 131)
Q.65. Explain the concept of burden of proof.
A.65. In David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal (803 SCRA 435, 20 September 2016)(En Banc)[Leonen,
J.], the case of Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares, a foundling, whose biological parents are unknown;
wherein her citizenship was questioned, on whether she is a natural born Filipino citizen, the High Court ruled
that:
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Burden of proof lies on the party making the
allegations;153 that is, the party who alleges the affirmative of the issue. 154 Burden of proof never shifts from one
party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie
case in his or her favor. The other party then bears the burden of going forward155 with the evidence considering
that which has ostensibly been established against him or her.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings the action
and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before
quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof is substantial
evidence.156 This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden
of evidence shifts to the respondent.
Q.66. In an administrative case filed against a judge, who has the burden of proof?
1. In Re: Complaint dated January 28, 2015 of Catherine Damayo, Represented by her Mother,
Veniranda Damayo, Against Hon. Marilyn Lagura-Yap, Associate Justice, Court of Appeals-
Visayas, Cebu City, Cebu (762 SCRA 581, 14 July 2015)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.]
2. Bunagan vs. Celera (713 SCRA 158, 14 January 2014)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], it was held that:
The burden of proof rests on the complainant.157 We find the allegations of spurious judgment and the
failure to promulgate judgment to be bereft of factual or legal basis. It is not enough that complainant made an
allegation of fraud; there should be a clear and convincing evidence to prove it. Extrinsic evidence is required to
establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred
from the decision or order itself.
It should be emphasized that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous. For any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.civil, criminal or
administrative He cannot be subjected to liability. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file
an administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and
correction. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before the latter can be branded with the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that
a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith
or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. 158
Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the burden of proof is vested upon the party who
alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative
152
Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 168, citing 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 667(5).
153
Uytengsu III vs. Baduel, 514 Phil. 1 (2005)[Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
154
Jison vs. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138 (1998)[Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
155
Tañada vs. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997)[Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
156
Sec. 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
157
Rivera vs. Judge Mendoza, 529 Phil. 600 (2006).
158
Salvador vs. Judge Limsiaco, Jr., 519 Phil. 683 (2006), citing Balsamo vs. Suan, 458 Phil. 11 (2003).
27
Services, Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gutierrez159 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations
and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is
sustained.
PROBLEM:
A disqualification case to run as President of the Republic of Timbukto was filed against Senator Amor
Madlang Awa on the ground of her admission that she is a foundling. The complainant alleged that with such
admission, the Senator’s Filipino citizenship is doubtful.
Q.67. In this case, who has the burden of proof?
A.67. In the case of Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC (786 SCRA 1, 8 March 2016)(En Banc)[Perez, J.],
it was held that: The burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her
admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the
possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos. It must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither
unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity
and Filiation.160 That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Q.68. In a collection suit, who has the burden of proof on the status of defendant’s indebtedness?
Explain.
A.68. In Ligon vs. RTC, Branch 56, Makati (717 SCRA 373, 26 February 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-
Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The plaintiff-creditor has the burden of proof to show that defendant had not
paid him the amount of the contracted loan. However, it has also been long established that where the plaintiff-
creditor possesses and submits in evidence an instrument showing the indebtedness, a presumption that the
credit has not been satisfied arises in his favor. Thus, the defendant is, in appropriate instances, required to
overcome the said presumption and present evidence to prove the fact of payment so that no judgment will be
entered against him.161
Q.69. Who has the burden of proof in assailing the constitutionality or legality of a Municipal
Ordinance for the alleged non-compliance of the requisite publication before its effectivity under the 1991
Local Government Code?
A.69. In Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr. (706 SCRA 440, 30 September 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-
Bernabe, J.], it was held that: He who assailed has the burden of proof. Petitioners had the burden of proving
their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the similar case of Figuerres vs. CA,162 citing United
States vs. Cristobal,163 the Supreme Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the
lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public hearings were conducted.
Q.70. Who has the burden of proof if one of the parties to a contract assailed that there was
vitiation of consent?
A.70. In Serra vs. Paic Savings and Mortgage Bank, Inc. (734 SCRA 694, 10 September 2014)(First
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: One who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid
consent to a contract must establish the same by full, clear, and convincing evidence, not merely by
preponderance of evidence.164Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is not
evidence.165 The rule is that he who alleges mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since
it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and
regular. Where mistake or error is alleged by parties who claim to have not had the benefit of a good education, as
159
666 SCRA 29 (15 February 2012).
160
Article 163 to 182, Title VI of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on 4 August 1988.
161
Ting Ting Pua vs. Sps. Lo Bun Tiong, 720 Phil. 511 (2013).
162
364 Phil. 683 (1999).
163
34 Phil. 825 (1916).
164
Leonardo vs. CA, 481 Phil. 520 (2004).
165
Ramos vs. Obispo, 692 SCRA 240 (27 February 2013).
28
in this case, they must establish that their personal circumstances prevented them from giving their free,
voluntary, and spontaneous consent to a contract.
PRESUMPTION
Q.71. What is a presumption? Explain.
A.71. In the case of Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. vs. Manzano (827 SCRA 253, 19 June 2017)(First
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of
law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise
established in the action.166 It is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from proof of other facts.167 However, a presumption is not evidence,168 but merely affects the
burden of offering evidence.169 Under Section 3, Rule 131, disputable presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
Q.72. What is the natural presumption of a person who signed a document?
1. Encarnacion Construction & Industrial Corporation vs. Phoenix Ready Mix Concrete
Development & Construction, Inc. (838 SCRA 500, 4 September 2017)(Second
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
2. Diaz vs. People (776 SCRA 43, 2 December 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was
held that:
The natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its
contents and consequences.170 Under Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that
a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Further, under Section 3(p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed
that private transactions have been fair and regular.171 This behooves every contracting party to learn and know
the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. 172 The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof
is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no
contrary proof is offered, will prevail.173 In Diaz, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these
presumptions. Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her
claim that the same has not been extinguished.174 Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be
greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence.175 All things considered, the evidence in this case
clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.
Q.73. What is the time honored presumption of factual findings of administrative agencies of the
government?
A.73. In Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) vs. Tormon (686 SCRA 854, 4 December 2012)(En
Banc)[Peralta, J.], the High Court held that: Factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific
field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such
findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the
interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.176
Q.74. How can the doctrine of presumption of regularity be rebutted upon?
166
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1067, citing Uniform Rule 13; NJ Evidence Rule 13.
167
See Delgado vda. de Da la Rosa vs. Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian, 516 Phil. 130 (2006).
168
See Riano, Evidence (The Bar Lecture Series), (2009), p. 427, citing California Evidence Code in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
Ed., 1167.
169
See Riano, Evidence (The Bar Lecture Series), (2009), p. 427, citing 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 64.
170
See Cabanting vs. BPI, G.R. No. 201927 (17 February 2016); and Spouses Poltan vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 546 Phil
257 (2007), citing Lee vs. CA, 426 Phil. 290 (2002).
171
Allied Banking Corp. vs. CA, 527 Phil. 46 (2006).
172
Olbes vs. China Banking Corporation, 519 Phil. 315 (2006).
173
Lastrilla vs. Granda, 516 Phil. 667 (2006).
174
See Bank of the Phil. Islands vs. Sps. Royeca, 581 Phil. 188 (2008).
175
Duarte vs. Duran, 673 Phil. 241 (2011).
176
Lumayna vs. Commission on Audit, 601 SCRA 163 (25 September 2009).
29
1. Tze Sun Wong vs. Wong (743 WSCRA 567, 3 December 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe,
J.](The Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioners assertion that there was no proper
deliberation made by the BOI Board of Commissioners before it arrived at an adverse decision
against him because only two (2) members out of 3, signed the Decision.)
2. Delos Santos vs. COA (703 SCRA 501, 13 August 2013)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
3. Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs. Casanova (789 SCRA 209, 12 April 2016)(First
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of Bustillo vs. People,177 it was held that:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 63
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE (RULE 132)
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES (SECTIONS 1-18, RULE 132)
PROBLEM:
Accused Anthony Tavern and Jose Dima were charged with the crime of rape. Tavern was first
apprehended, tried and convicted. Later, Dima was arrested. The trial court allowed the prosecution witnesses to
merely affirm on direct examination their previous testimonies taken during the trial of accused Tavern.
Q.75. Accused Dima contends that the proceedings violated his right to confront and cross-
examine said witnesses. Is Dima correct? Explain.
A.75. Yes. In the case of People vs. Go and De Los Reyes (G. R. Nos. 130714 and 139634 and G.R.
Nos. 139331 and 140845-46, 27 December 2002)(En Banc)[Carpio-Morales, J.], after the therein accused had
testified, the defense counsel manifested that for the subsequent witnesses, he was filing only their affidavits
subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters therein and on all matters pertinent and material
thereto. The trial court acceded to the manifestation over the objection of one of the private prosecutors.
The Supreme Court citing the case of People vs. Estenzo,178 held that: Such procedure violated
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the then Revised Rules of Court, which required that the
testimonies of witnesses be given orally.
The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for
the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent, according to an eminent authority,
demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the
purpose of cross-examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and
obtaining immediate answers. There is also the advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness
before the judge, and it is this it enables the judge as the trier of facts to obtain the elusive and incommunicable
evidence of a witness deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the
witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner
and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition
of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy
will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court.
Indeed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based upon his having
had just that opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the
witnesses.
In the advent of A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC (Judicial Affidavit Rule),179 which took effect on 1 January 2013,
Judicial Affidavit now serves as direct testimony of the witness subject to cross-examination of the opposing
counsel.
177
620 SCRA 483 (12 May 2010).
178
72 SCRA 428 (1976).
30
Q.76. How should the Supreme Court treat the assessment of the credibility of a witness in the
lower courts?
1. Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan (844 SCRA 244, 7 November 2017)(En Banc) [Reyes, J.]
2. Fianza vs. People (834 SCRA 254, 2 August 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.](A case of
child abuse under R.A. No. 7610)
3. People vs. Dionaldo (731 SCRA 68, 23 July 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.](The
conviction of the accused was affirmed by the Supreme Court with modification. The accused
was found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to
pay, jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro with damages.)
4. People vs. Hallarte (720 SCRA 582, 2 April 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.],
wherein the accused was convicted for Simple Rape and Rape by Sexual Assault, it was held
that:
The Court accords a high degree of respect to the assessment of the trial court which is in the best
position to observe the declarations and demeanor of the witnesses, and evaluate their credibility, even more
so when the same is affirmed by the CA.180 It is elementary that the factual findings of the trial court,
especially on the assessment or appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect.181 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment
of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court.182
Q.77. Will variations in the testimony of the witness affect his credibility?
A.77. No. In the case of People vs. Nelmida (680 SCRA 386, 11 September 2012)(En Banc)[Perez, J.].
[wherein the accused-appellants were convicted for two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing upon them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count; Seven (7) counts of attempted murder thereby imposing upon them
the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor, as maximum, for each count; and to pay the civil indemnity and moral damages], it was held that:
These variations are in fact indicative of truth and show that the witness was not coached to
fabricate or dissemble. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground
to reverse a conviction.183 In Nelmida, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush. Being the
aggrieved parties, they all desire justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is unnatural for them to
falsely accuse someone other than the real culprits. Otherwise stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution
witnesses to implicate an innocent person to the crime. It has been correctly observed that the natural
interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, more so, the victims themselves, in securing the
conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the
culprits would gain immunity.184
Q.78. What is the function of cross-examination?
A.78. In the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (662 SCRA 152, 13 December 2011)(En Banc)
[Bersamin, J.], the High Court held that: The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the
statements of a witness made on direct examination. The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded
as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-
examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness may be called. This right
is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination of witnesses at the trial.
179
By virtue of the Supreme Court's authority under Section 5 (5), Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
180
See People vs. Subesa, 676 Phil. 403 (2011).
181
People vs. Yambot, 397 Phil. 23 (2000).
182
People vs. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37 (2000). See also People vs. Lamsen, 691 SCRA 498 (20 February 2013).
183
People vs. Ignas, 458 Phil. 965 (2003).
184
People vs. Reynes, 423 Phil. 363 (2001).
31
The principal justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as
an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the present
adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of
cross-examination is an essential safeguard against falsehoods and frauds.
Q.79. Give an instance where leading questions are allowed under the rules.
1. People vs. Santos (G.R. No. 171452, 17 October 2008)(Third Division)[Austria-Martinez, J.]
2. People vs. Del Valle alias "Smith" (G.R. No. 139229, 22 April 2002)(En Banc)[Quisumbing, J.],
the High Court held that:
Section 10 (c) of Rule 132 allows leading questions to be asked of a witness who is a child of tender
years, especially when said witness has difficulty giving an intelligible answer, as when the latter has not
reached that level of education necessary to grasp the simple meaning of a question, moreso its underlying
gravity.185 This exception is now embodied in Section 20 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which
took effect on December 15, 2000. Under Section 4 thereof, a child witness is any person who at the time of
giving testimony is below the age of 18 years.
In Del Valle alias "Smith", the High Court said: As a general rule, leading questions are not allowed.
However, we have held that when the witness is a child of tender years, it is proper for the court to allow
leading questions as it is usually difficult for a child of such age to state facts without prompting or
suggestion.186 Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.
Q.80. What does credibility mean under the Rules of Evidence?
A.80. In the case of Civil Service Commission vs. Belagan (G.R. No. 132164, 19 October 2004)(En
Banc)[Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.][Two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/
directress of the Mother and Child Learning Center, and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar
Elementary School, against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and
harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances. Respondent was
DISMISSED from the service for Grave Misconduct.], it was explained by the High Court that:
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a
person’s integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.187 When the credibility of a witness is sought to be
impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed
before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose 188 or at the time of the trial and
prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.189 This is because a person of
derogatory character or reputation can still change or reform himself.
Q.81. How can a witness be discredited?
A.81. By evidence attacking his general reputation for truth honesty or integrity.
Q.82. Can the offended party in the witness stand be discredited?
A.82. Yes. By testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character or reputation attack
pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same
position as any other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation. 190Thus, in
CSC vs. Belagan supra, it was held that: The character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge
is a proper subject of inquiry. However, the High Court disagreed with the CA as to the ultimate question – is
185
People vs. Daganio, 374 SCRA 365 (23 January 2002); People vs. Escultor, 429 SCRA 651 (27 May 2004).
186
People vs. Losano, 310 SCRA 707 (1999).
187
Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 502.
188
32 C.J.S. §434, citing In Re: Darrow, 92 N.E. 369, 175 Ind. 44.
189
81 Am Jur §897, citing Carter vs. State, 226 Ala 96, 145 So. 814; State vs. Potts, 78 Iowa 656, 43 NW 534; State vs. Crockett,
161 Wash 262, 296 P 1041.
190
98 C.J.S. § 494.
32
Magdalena’s derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility? The High Court said: A careful review of
the record yields a negative answer.
First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts committed in
the 80’s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed with the Chairmen of Barangay
Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant
administrative case, the offense was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer
reliable proofs of Magdalena’s character or reputation.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the
principle that evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the
time in question.191 In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at
the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the
suit.192 Hence, to say that Magdalena’s credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation existing
almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path
of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or
reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal cases specified
by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to
show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense,
or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.193
This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories:
(a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his
credibility;
(b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime;
(c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established;
and
(d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of
misconduct.194
Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness
may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the
confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and because the witness may not be prepared
to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts.195
Q.83. Should the trial court allow the defense to show the bad character of the witness for the
prosecution? Explain.
A.83. Yes. In the following cases:
1. Lejano vs. People (G.R. No. 176389, 18 January 2011)(En Banc)[Abad, J.](Resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration which acquitted ALL the accused)
2. People vs. Webb, et al. (G.R. No. 176864, 18 January 2011)(En Banc)[Abad, J.](Resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration which acquitted ALL the accused), the concurring opinion of
Justice is enlightening, viz:
The Motion for Reconsideration assails the majority for failing to uphold the trial court’s conclusions. The
simple fact is that the evidence tends to demonstrate that Hubert Webb is innocent. The simple fact also is
191
Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 170, citing 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 341; 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 677
(2); 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 434 (b).
192
81 Am Jur 2d § 897, xxx.
Evidence of the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity twelve years prior to the trial will be excluded as too remote.
(Hapton vs. State, 78 Tex. Crim. Rep. 639, 183 S.W. 887).
193
81 Am Jur 2d § 905, citing United States vs. Dilts, (CA7 Ill) 501 F2d 531; Stephens vs. State, 252 Ala 183, 40 So 2d
90; Woodard vs. State, (Ala App) 489 So 2d 1; State vs. Johnson, 106 Ariz 539, 479 P2d 424; Judy vs. Mcdaniel, 247 Ark 409,
445 SW2d 722.
194
81 Am Jur 2d § 905.
195
81 Am Jur 2d, § 901, citing Miller vs. Journal Co., 246 Mo 722, 152 SW 40; People vs. Brown, 72 NY 571.
33
that the evidence demonstrates that not only had Jessica Alfaro failed to substantiate her testimony, she had
contradicted herself and had been contradicted by other more believable evidence. The other main prosecution
witnesses fare no better. This is the gist of the Decision sought to be reconsidered. While the Supreme Court does
not make a dispositive ruling other than a pronouncement of guilt or non-guilt on the part of the accused, the
legal presumption of innocence must be applied in operative fact.
Madam Justice Sereno in her concurring opinion said that: It is unfortunate that statements were made
that sought to dilute the legal import of the majority Decision. A pronouncement of this Court that the accused
has not been proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt cannot be twisted to mean that this Court does not
believe in the innocence of the accused when the reasoning of the Court demonstrates such belief. A careful
reading of the majority Decision, as well as the concurring opinions, is required to determine whether the accused
were acquitted solely because there was lingering doubt as to their guilt of the crime charged or whether the
accused were acquitted not only because of doubt as to their guilt but also because the evidence tends to
establish their innocence.
PROBLEM:
Joe Dima obtained a loan from Masagana Bank. He signed pertinent loan documents which were
presented to him by the loans officer. The loan is payable for three (3) years. When Dima defaulted from payment
of his loan, he was sued by the Bank. In his answer, he merely stated that he specifically deny the pertinent
allegations of the Complaint for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiff’s purposes.
Q.84. Does the plaintiff need to prove the due execution of the loan documents? Explain.
A.84. No. In Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (760 SCRA 486,
29 June 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], a case with similar factual milieu with the problem, citing the
case of Permanent Savings & Loan Bank,196 it was held that:
The failure to specifically deny the due execution of the loan documents is equivalent to implied
admission which needs no further proof. While Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules requires that private documents
be proved of their due execution and authenticity before they can be received in evidence, i.e., presentation and
examination of witnesses to testify on this fact; in the present case, there is no need for proof of execution and
authenticity with respect to the loan documents because of respondent's implied admission thereof.
The Supreme Court clarifies that while the failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an
actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppels and want of consideration nor bar a party from raising
the defense in his answer or reply and prove at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing,
or that it does not express the true agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is
an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.197
Q.85. What is the effect of improper notarization of a document like a Deed of Sale? How must the
due execution and authenticity of a private document be proved in court?
1. Aguinaldo vs. Torres, Jr. (839 SCRA 354, 11 September 2017)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe,
J.]
2. Heirs of Corazon Afable Salud vs. Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc. (788 SCRA 494, 6 April 2016)
(Second Division)[Del Castillo, J.]
3. Heirs of Victorino Sarili vs. Lagrosa (713 SCRA 726, 15 January 2014)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that:
The improper notarization of the deed of sale stripped it of its public character and reduced it to a
private instrument.198 Hence, it is to be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of
196
482 Phil. 193 (2004).
197
Republic of the Phils vs. CA, 357 Phil. 174 (1998).
198
Heirs of Sarili vs. Lagrosa, 724 Phil. 608 (2014); Meneses vs. Venturozo, 675 Phil. 641 (2011), citing Fuentes vs. Roca, 633 Phil.
9 (2010), and Dela Rama vs. Papa, 597 Phil. 227 (2009).
34
Court which pertinently provides that before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
In relation thereto, Section 22, Rule 132 of the same Rules provides the manner by which the genuineness
of handwriting may be proved, i.e.:
(a) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged;
(b) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Q.86. What is the duty of the court if the authenticity of the signature is at issue?
A.86. In Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman (812 SCRA537, 6 December 2016)(En Banc)[Perlas-
Bernabe, J.], it was held that:
The judge is duty bound to conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. As such, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine.199 It
was further held that Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported handwriting
experts, Rogelio G. Azores and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui cannot be readily credited
at this stage of the proceedings.
Q.87. Is the certification issued by CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, to the
effect that the land is alienable and disposable, considered as public document under Section 23, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Evidence? Explain.
1. Republic vs. Galeno (G.R. No. 215009, 23 January 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
2. Republic vs. Medida (G.R. No. 195097, 13 August 2012)(Second Division)[Reyes, J.], citing the
case of Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,200 it was held that:
The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO certification, by itself,
fails to prove the alienable and disposable character of a parcel of land. It is not enough for the PENRO or
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
PROBLEM:
The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) is a government-owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) performing proprietary functions with original charter or created by special law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. 1752, amending P.D. No. 1530.201 As a GOCC, the HDMF's legal matters are to be handled by the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), save for some extraordinary or exceptional circumstances when it
is allowed to engage the services of private counsels, provided such engagement is with the written conformity of
199
Shu vs. Dee, 734 Phil. 204 (2014).
200
555 SCRA 477 (26 June 2008).
201
See Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Commission on Audit, 432 SCRA 126 (15 June 2004).
35
the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel and the written concurrence of the Commission on
Audit (COA).202
The HDMF hired the legal services of the Yorac Law Firm to represent it in some of its cases. Pending
concurrence of the COA and the OSG, it filed a Motion for Reconsideration in one of its cases in Makati City. It
attached, however, a certification coming from the Resident Auditor of the COA.
Q.88. Is the Certification issued by the Resident Auditor admissible as COA’s concurrence in
compliance with Sections 24-25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence? Explain.
A.88. No. In the case of Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) Pag-Ibig Fund vs. Sagun, et al.
(G.R. No. 205698, 31 July 2018)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], citing the case of Phividec Industrial Authority vs.
Capitol Steel Corporation,203 it was held that:
The best evidence to prove the COA's concurrence with the engagement of a private lawyer or law firm
was the written concurrence from the COA itself. In Sagun et al., the records reveal that although the OGCC
authorized the HDMF to engage the services of the Yorac Law Firm, the HDMF did not sufficiently prove that the
written concurrence of the COA had been obtained. The certification was merely the attestation by Atty. Tan that
COA had concurred in the retainer agreement entered into by and between the HDMF and the Yorac Law Firm.
Such attestation did not establish the written concurrence of the COA on the engagement of the Yorac Law
Firm because it did not state that the copy was a correct copy of the original considering that no copy of
COA's written concurrence was actually attached to the January 10, 2013 certification.
Atty. Tan's attestation of the COA's purported concurrence had no evidentiary value due to its non-
conformity with the requirements of Section 24 and Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court for presenting the
record of a public document. In view of the HDMF's failure to secure the written concurrence of the COA, the
Yorac Law Firm could not have been considered as authorized to represent the HDMF. With the filing of the
HDMF's motion for reconsideration vis-a-vis the January 30, 2012 summary judgment of the Makati RTC being
unauthorized, the CA did not err in upholding the Makati RTC's treatment of the HDMF's motion as a mere scrap
of paper.
Q.89. What is a Certificate under the Rules of Evidence?
A.89. In Alcantara-Aquino vs. Dela Cruz (714 SCRA 337, 21 January 2014)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], it
was held that: It is a written assurance, or official representation, that some act has or has not been done, or
some event occurred, or some legal formality has been complied with. To certify is to attest the truthfulness of
the document. Without the records to verify the truthfulness and authenticity of a document, no certification
should be issued. This is basic.204
In Alcantara-Aquino, the High Court went on to say that: Respondent should know that when she certified
the questioned order, she did so under the seal of the court. Thus, when the decision she certified turned out to be
spurious and non-existent, she undoubtedly compromised the Judiciary and jeopardized the integrity of the court.
Respondent’s acts betray her complicity, if not participation, in acts that were irregular and violative of ethics and
procedure, causing damage not only to the complainant but also to the public.
AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS (SECTIONS 19-33, RULE 132)
Q.90. Can the courts take judicial notice of foreign laws?
A.90. No. In Sobejano-Condon vs. COMELEC (678 SCRA 267, 10 August 2012)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.], it
was held that: Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
202
See The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 269 (13 January 2015).
203
414 SCRA 327 (23 October 2003).
204
Atty. Francisco vs. Galvez, 607 SCRA 21 (4 December 2009).
36
PROBLEM:
In a petition for the correction of the area of the subject real property embodied in OCT No. 46417 from
20,948 square meters to 21,248 square meters, petitioner submitted the following documentary exhibits:
(a) the Certification issued by a certain Althea C. Acevedo, Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical
Services Section of the Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land Management Services of the DENR in Iloilo
City, which states that the true and correct area of Lot 2285, Cad. 246 Dingle Cadastre is 21,928 square meters;
(b) the technical description of Lot No. 2285, a copy of which was certified by Ameto Caballero,
Chief of the Surveys Division, while another copy was certified correct by Acevedo; and
(c) the approved subdivision plan of Lot No. 2258, certified by Rogelio M. Santome, Geodetic
Engineer; Alfredo Muyarsas, Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, and Edgardo R. Gerobin, OIC, Regional
Technical Director of the Land Management Services, DENR. On the strength of these pieces of evidence,
respondent sought a reconciliation of the area of the subject property with the records of the DENR.
However, the government officers who issued the said certifications were not presented in court.
Q.91. Are the documentary exhibits sufficient to warrant the correction prayed for? Explain.
A.91. No. In Republic vs. Galeno (815 SCRA 191, 23 January 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe,
J.], citing the case of Republic vs. Medida,205 it was held that: The Court cannot accord probative weight upon
them in view of the fact that the public officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts
stated therein. The certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be considered prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that: Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in
Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit in this respect. Thus, the CENRO and
Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer, such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the
books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public documents.
Q.92. What are the grounds to impeach a judicial record?
A.92. In vintage case of Añuran vs. Aquino (38 Phil. 29, 2 April 1918)(En Banc)[Carson, J.], it was
held that: Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of:
(a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer;

(b) collusion between the parties, or
(c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.
Any person adversely affected by a judgment to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and to
have it declared a nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in the very matter of obtaining the
judgment when such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised at the trial
which resulted in such judgment; and fraudulent collusion between an administrator and a third person
resulting in an order or judgment whereby an interested person is unjustly deprived of his rights in or to the
estate under administration, has always been recognized as a sufficient ground for the grant of relief from the
order or judgment thus fraudulently procured.206
Q.93. What is the probative value of a notarized document under the Rules of Evidence? Explain.
205
692 Phil. 454 (2012).
206
23 Cyc., 1022, 1025, 1027, and numerous case there cited.
37
1. Mariano vs. Echanez (791 SCRA 509, 31 May 2016)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.]
2. Philippine Trust Company (Also known as Philtrust Bank) vs. Hon. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
150318, 22 November 2010)(First Division)[Leonardo-De Castro, J.], it was held that:
The act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by
law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.207As held in Gutierrez vs. Mendoza-Plaza,208 a
notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence. (Espineli vs. People, 725 SCRA 365, 9 June 2014.)
In Philippine Trust Company (Also known as Philtrust Bank) vs. Hon. Court of Appeals supra, it was
held that: Under Section 30, Rule 132 of the ROC, the acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is
prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).209
PROBLEM:
Jess Dima applied for work in Saudi Arabia as truck driver. He went to ANA MARIE EMPLOYMENT
AGENCY in Ermita, Manila. Dima was referred to BATANG BATO MEDICAL CENTER, an accredited medical and
dental service provider in Saudi Arabia, for his medical examination. After his medical examination, Dima was
issued a Medical Certificate which states that he is fit for work. Dima was deployed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as
truck driver. After three (3) months, the company subjected Dima to medical examinations. He was purportedly
found to be positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. Another examination was conducted and the result was the
same. Thus, he was repatriated back to Manila.
ANA MARIE EMPLOYMENT AGENCY filed a case for damages in the MTC of Manila against BATANG
BATO MEDICAL CENTER for allegedly issuing a false medical certificate. The agency attached to the Complaint
the result of Dima’s medical examination issued by the Saudi government, which was partly written in English
and partly in Arabic.
Q.94. Is the Medical Certificate issued by the Saudi Government admissible as evidence? Explain.
A.94. No. In St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. vs. LWV Construction Corporation (G.R. No. 217426, 4
December 2017)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The courts a quo, in the first place, erred
in admitting and giving probative weight to the Certification of the General Care Dispensary, which was written
in an unofficial language which is proscribed by Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. A cursory
examination of the subject document would reveal that while it contains English words, the majority of it is in an
unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or Filipino provided by respondent, the same should not
have been admitted in evidence; thus, their contents could not be given probative value, and deemed to
constitute proof of the facts stated therein.
Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the said certification were not proven in accordance
with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Notably, the said provision applies since the Certification does not
fall within the classes of public documents under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court - and hence, must be
considered as private. It has been settled that an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be
accorded probative value.210
OFFER AND OBJECTION (SECTIONS 34-40, RULE 132)
SECTIONS 34 AND 35, RULE 132 OF THE RULES OF COURT ARE MANDATORY
Q.95. What does formal offer mean?
207
St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz, 531 Phil. 213 (2006); Zaballero vs.
Montalvan, 473 Phil. 18 (2004).
208
607 SCRA 807 (4 December 2009).
209
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents.
210
Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., 700 Phil. 327 (2012).
38
1. Gumabon vs. PNB (G.R. No. 202514, 25 July 2016)(Second Division)[Brion, J.]
2. Westmont Investment Corporation vs. Francia, Jr. (G.R. No. 194128, 7 December 2011)(Third
Division)[Mendoza, J.], it was held that: Formal offer means that the offeror shall inform the court
of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into evidence. Without a formal offer of evidence,
courts cannot take notice of this evidence even if this has been previously marked and
identified.211
Q.96. What is the importance of a formal offer of evidence?
A.96. In Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha,212 the Supreme Court reiterated the importance of a formal
offer of evidence. Courts are mandated to rest their factual findings and their judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. The formal offer enables the judge to know the purpose or
purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. It also affords the opposing parties the chance to
examine the evidence and to object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will
not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Q.97. What are the exceptions from the requirement of a formal offer of evidence?
A.97. In People vs. Napat-a,213 People vs. Mate,214and Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. vs. Escolastico
215
Saves, et al., the high court recognized the exceptions from the requirement of a formal offer of evidence,
namely:
(a) the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and
(b) the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
Q.98. What is the procedure for the formal offer of evidence?
A.98. In Republic vs. Gimenez (778 SCRA 261, 11 January 2016)(Second Division)[Leonen, J.], citing
the cases of Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha216 and Constantino vs. Court of Appeals,217 the Supreme Court
held that our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence:
1. Testimonial evidence is offered at the time a witness is called to testify.218

2. Documentary and object evidence, on the other hand, are offered after the presentation of a
party's testimonial evidence.219 Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally
unless permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence. 220 The Rules
specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be considered by the court.
Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the case. 221 Failure to make a formal
offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it.222
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the necessary
actions to secure their case.223 Hence, any document or object that was marked for identification is not evidence
unless it was formally offered and the opposing counsel was given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine
the witness called upon to prove or identify it.224
211
Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. vs. Ko, 646 SCRA 371 (23 March 2011).
212
522 SCRA 410 (27 April 2007).
213
179 SCRA 403 (14 November 1989).
214
103 SCRA 484 (27 March 1981).
215
632 SCRA 236 (6 October 2010).
216
550 Phil. 571 (2007)[Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
217
332 Phil. 68 (1996)[Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
218
219
220
221
See Sec. 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. B. Admissibility of evidence.— Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the
law or these rules.
222
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Spouses Parocha supra. See Constantino vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
223
See Heirs of Emilio Santioque vs. Heirs of Emilio Calma, 536 Phil. 524 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division], citing Pigao vs.
Rabanillo, 522 Phil. 506 (2006)[Per J. Corona, Second Division].
224
Villaluz vs. Ligon, 505 Phil. 572 (2005)[Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
39
Q.99. What is the consequence if the evidence is not formally offered?
A.99. The failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver
to submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.225
Q.100. What will happen to the documentary exhibits marked during the pre-trial but was not
formally offered in evidence? Explain.
A.100. It cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be
assigned any evidentiary weight and value.226
Q.101. Distinguish identification of documentary evidence from its formal offer.
A.101. Identification is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of
the evidence as an exhibit. While formal offer is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a
particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part
of the evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of
the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.227
Q.102. Is the rule on formal offer also applicable in tax cases filed with the Court of Tax Appeals?
A.102. Yes. In Dizon vs. Court of Tax Appeals,228 the Supreme Court held that: Under Section 8 of RA
1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-
litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the
pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents
must be formally offered before the CTA. The presentation of the BIR’s evidence is not a mere procedural
technicality which may be disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and
verify the truth of BIR’s claims against the Estate. The BIR’s failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence,
despite CTA’s directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason
was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. 229
Q.103. What are the requisites for the court to consider evidence not formally offered?
A.103. In Mato vs. Court of Appeals,230 it was held that evidence, although not formally offered, may be
admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present,:first, the same
must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated
in the records of the case.
In Ramos vs. Dizon,231 the Court deemed the exhibits to have been incorporated into the records
because they had been presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case. Likewise, the first requisite was
deemed satisfied because one of the parties therein explained the contents of the exhibits when interrogated by
the respondents’ counsel. (People vs. Villanueva, supra.)
SECTIONS 34 TO 36, RULE 132 OF THE RULES OF COURT GOVERN THE MANNER OF OFFERING AND
OBJECTING TO EVIDENCE
Q.104. When do you make an offer of the witness’ testimony?
A.104. In the case of Amoguis vs. Ballado (G.R. No. 189626, 20 August 2018)(Third Division)
[Leonen, J.], the High Court ruled that: Following the provisions of Sections 34 to 36 of Rule 132 of the ROC, a
witness' testimony must be offered at the start, when he or she takes the stand for the first time and before
questions are propounded to him or her.
225
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha supra; People vs. Villanueva, supra.
226
People vs. Villanueva, supra.
227
228
553 SCRA 111 (30 April 2008).
229
230
250 SCRA 283 (1995).
231
498 SCRA 17 (7 August 2006).
40
Q.105. Can a testimonial evidence be considered by the court even if there was no formal offer
made?
A.105. Yes. Testimonial evidence not formally offered but not timely objected to by an opposing
party may be still be considered by the court. The purpose of offering a witness' testimony is for the court to
expertly assess whether questions propounded are relevant and material, and if the witness is competent to
answer. It is to aid the court in ruling over objections made by opposing counsel. Catuira vs. Court of
Appeals232 was instructive: The petition is devoid of merit. The reason for requiring that evidence be formally
introduced is to enable the court to rule intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked.
As a general rule, the proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the proponent
offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right
to object. But such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the
earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections.
Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private
respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the
appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the moment private respondent
was called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the proponent.
Q.106. Can objection to the admissibility of evidence be raised for the first time on appeal?
A.106. No. As held by the Court in People vs. Domado,233 citing People vs. Hernandez,234 objection to the
admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for
the first time on appeal. (People vs. Diaz, 752 SCRA 17, 25 February 2015; See also People vs. Gabuya, 750 SCRA
560, 16 February 2015.)
WHEN REPETITION OF OBJECTION UNNECESSARY (SECTION 37)
Q.107. What is meant by Continuing or Running Objection? Explain.
A.107. Section 37, Rule 132 is otherwise known as Continuing or Running Objection. It means, a
single objection to all the questions in a given line of questioning. A Judge may allow a lawyer to make a
continuing objection when the judge has overruled an objection applicable to many questions and the lawyer
wants to preserve the objection for the appellate record.235
RULING (SECTION 38)
Q.108. When should the court make a ruling to the objection raised by the party?
A.108. In the case of Deutsche Bank Manila vs. Spouses Chua Yok See (G.R. No. 165606, 6 February
2006)(First Division)[Callejo, Sr., J.], it was held that: Courts are required to immediately issue a ruling to resolve
the objection to the admissibility of evidence offered or within a reasonable time. It must be made during the
trial and at such time as will give the other party an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the
ruling. Courts are further mandated to state the reason or reasons for their ruling if there are two or more
objections by the other party.236 Due process requires no less.
In the vintage case of Lopez vs. Valdez (32 Phil. 644, 24 December 1915)(En Banc)[Moreland, J.], the
High Court pronounced: Parties who offer objections to questions on whatever ground are entitled to a ruling at
the time the objection is made unless they present a question with regard to which the court desires to inform
itself before making its ruling. In that event, it is perfectly proper for the court to take a reasonable time to study
the question presented by the objection; but a ruling should always be made during the trial and at such time as
will give the party against whom the ruling is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
232
306 Phil. 424 (1994)[Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
233
635 Phil. 73 (2010).
234
607 Phil. 617 (2009).
235
Black’s Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, p. 1241, 2014, Thompson Reuters, St. Paul, MN.
236
41
PURPOSE:
If the court had given a prompt ruling on the objections, appellant would have had an opportunity to
meet the situation presented. If his objection had been overruled, he could have taken his exception and offered
evidence to rebut that adduced by the objectionable questions. If the ruling had been the other way, appellee
would have been under the necessity of offering the documents themselves, at which time appellant would have
been able to present any defense to them which the facts and circumstances might have required or permitted.
There having been no decision during the course of the trial, appellant's counsel had no means of
knowing what the ruling of the court would be on the objection and, consequently, he could not know whether or
not he would be compelled to meet any evidence at all; for, if the objection were sustained, then appellee had
offered no competent evidence to support his case; whereas, if the objection were overruled, then appellant
would not have the benefit of a ruling on his objection or of the exception taken thereto. It is error for a court to
reserve decision on such a question until after the trial is closed and the case submitted; and if such error is
prejudicial, the judgment will be vacated and the cause returned for a new trial.
STRIKING OUT ANSWER (SECTION 39)
Q.109. What is the effect if the testimony of the witness was ordered stricken off from the record?
A.109. In Metropolitan Bank And Trust Company vs. Custodio (G.R. No. 173780, 21 March
2011)(Third Division)[Sereno, J.][A civil case which essentially a demand by a bank for the recovery of a sum of
money from one of its tellers who allegedly failed to account for funds entrusted to her, amounting to six hundred
thousand pesos (PhP600,000).], it was held that: A fact elicited from a witness cannot be considered in the
disposition of the case if it has been ordered stricken out, unless it is established by any other evidence on
record.237
TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE (SECTION 40)
Q.110. What is Tender of Evidence? What is Tender of a Witness?
A.110. A tender of evidence is an offer of evidence, whether in argument or in motion for admission
in court. Whereas, tender of a witness, is for an attorney to yield to another attorney the right to examine the
witness then under oath.238
Q.111. What is the purpose of the rule on tender offer of excluded evidence? Explain.
A.111. In the case of Fortune Tobacco Orporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No.
192024, 1 July 2015)(Second Division)[Mendoza, J.], it was held: If a party's offered documentary or object
evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached to form part of the records of the case.
If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are known as
offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is
eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded
evidence.
It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was rejected by the lower court and the
offeror did not move that the same be attached to the record, the same cannot be considered by the appellate
court,239 as documents forming no part of proofs before the appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the
case.240 For the appellate court to consider as evidence, which was not offered by one party at all during the
proceedings below, would infringe the constitutional right of the adverse party – in this case, the CIR, to due
process of law.
237
Sec. 39, Rule 132, ROC.
238
The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary Compact Edition, 2011, p. 1090
239
Banez vs. Court of Appeals, 158 Phil. 16 (1974).
240
De Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 75 Phil. 824 (1945).
42
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE (A.M. NO. 12-8-8-SC)
Q.112. What is the purpose of the Judicial Affidavit Rule?
A.112. In Ng Meng Tam vs. China Banking Corporation (G.R. No. 214054, 5 August 2015)(Third
Division)[Villarama, Jr., J.](Direct recourse from the RTC to the SC on the question of whether Section 5 2 of the
Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR) applies to hostile or adverse witnesses.), it was held that: The JAR241 was
promulgated to address case congestion and delays in courts. To this end, it seeks to reduce the time needed to
take witnesses’ testimonies.242
Q.113. When was the effectivity of the JAR and what is the extent of its applicability?
A.113. The JAR took effect on January 1, 2013 and would also apply to pending cases pursuant to
Section 12 thereof. The Court En Banc gave public prosecutors in first and second level courts one year of
modified compliance.243 The JAR thus took full effect on January 1, 2014. In Ng Meng Tam vs. China Banking
Corporation supra, the parties were presenting their evidence for the RTC’s consideration when the JAR took
effect. Therefore, pursuant to Section 12 the JAR applies to the present collection suit.
Q.114. Does Section 5 of the JAR apply to hostile or adverse witness? Explain.
A.114. No. In Ng Meng Tam vs. China Banking Corporation supra, it was held that: The JAR primarily
affects the manner by which evidence is presented in court. Section 2(a) of the JAR provides that judicial
affidavits are mandatorily filed by parties to a case except in small claims cases. These judicial affidavits take the
place of direct testimony in court. Under Section 10, parties are to be penalized if they do not conform to the
provisions of the JAR. Parties are however allowed to resort to the application of a subpoena pursuant to Rule 21
of the Rules of Court in Section 5 of the JAR in certain situations.
Q.115. What does Section 5 of the JAR contemplate?
A.115. Section 5 of the JAR contemplates a situation where there is a:
(a) government employee or official or

(b) requested witness who is not the:
(1) adverse party’s witness nor
(2) a hostile witness.
If this person either:
(a) unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit; or

(b) refuses without just cause to make the relevant documents available to the other party and its
presentation to court, Section 5 allows the requesting party to avail of issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses being excluded they are not covered by Section
5. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius: the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies
the exclusion of all others.244
Q.116. If the requested witness is the adverse party’s witness or a hostile witness, what procedure
should be followed?
241
On 4 September 2012.
242
Judicial Affidavit Rule, 4th Whereas Clause provides:
xxxx
Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of witnesses in cases under litigation, on
February 21, 2012 the Supreme Court approved for piloting by trial courts in Quezon City the compulsory use of judicial
affidavits in place of the direct testimonies of witnesses;
xxxx
243
Resolution dated 8 January 2013, rollo (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC), pp. 37-39.
244
Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. Power Sector Assets
and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), 682 SCRA 602 (9 October 2012).
43
A.116. In Ng Meng Tam vs. China Banking Corporation supra, the Supreme Court held that, the JAR
being silent on this point, it turned to the provisions governing the rules on evidence covering hostile witnesses
specially Section 12, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. – Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to
the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by
the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad
character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must
only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
Before a party may be qualified under Section 12, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the party presenting the
adverse party witness must comply with Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. – Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good
cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be
compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
In Afulugencia vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,245 the Supreme Court stated that in civil cases, the
procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are
first served upon the latter. There petitioners Spouses Afulugencia sought the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum and ad testificandum to compel the officers of the bank to testify and bring documents pertaining to the
extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of a certain parcel of land. Metrobank moved to quash the issuance of the
subpoenas on the ground of non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. In quashing the
issuance of the subpoena, the Court reminded litigants that the depositions are a mechanism by which fishing
expeditions and delays may be avoided. Further written interrogatories aid the court in limiting harassment and
to focus on what is essential to a case. The Court stated:
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to
maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written
interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later
opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing
expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written
interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony, compelling the adverse
party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party
cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of
discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a
result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead
detrimental to the calling party’s cause.
Q.117. Under the JAR, is it required to state the purpose or the offer of the testimony in the JA and
that failure to do so, a fine shall be imposed upon the counsel?
A.117. No. In Miranda vs. OCA [A.M. No. MTJ-17-1899 (Formerly OCA EPI No. 14-2646-MTJ), 7
March 2018](Second Division)[Caguioa, J.], it was held: The JAR does not require the inclusion of the offer or
statement of the purpose of the witness' testimony in the judicial affidavit and thus there is no basis for the
termination of the proceedings and the imposition of the fine. However, in Miranda vs. Oca supra, Judge Oca
denied outright the said oral motion, excused the witness, and adjourned the proceedings. Atty. Miranda
asserted that Judge Oca is grossly ignorant of the law since the JAR neither requires the inclusion of the offer or
statement of the purpose of the witness' testimony in the judicial affidavit nor does it impose a fine on the party
for failure to do the same.
245
715 SCRA 399 (5 February 2014).
44
Hence, the Supreme Court FINED the respondent in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same infraction shall be dealt with more severely. The Supreme Court
adopted the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator.
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE (RULE 133)
GREATER WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE OR GREATER WEIGHT OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
Q.118. What is preponderance of evidence?
1. BPI vs. Mendoza (821 SCRA 41, 20 March 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
2. Tabang vs. Gacott (700 SCRA 788, 9 July 2013)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], citing Aba vs. De
Guzman,246 teaches us that:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has greater weight than that of the other.
It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.247 It is settled that in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce
a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the defendant's.248 Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term 'greater weight of
evidence' or 'greater weight of credible evidence.249 Succinctly put, it only requires that evidence be greater or
more convincing than the opposing evidence.250
Q.119. What must be considered in the determination of preponderance of evidence?
A.119. In Tabang vs. Gacott (700 SCRA 788, 9 July 2013)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], it was held that: Per
Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining preponderance of evidence:
(1) All the facts and circumstances of the case;

(2) The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony;
(3) The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as the
same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
(4) The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with
the greater number.
Q.120. Can bare allegations enough to constitute preponderance of evidence?
A.120. No. In Nieves vs. Duldulao (720 SCRA 437, 2 April 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.],
it was held that: Bare allegations which are not supported by any evidence, documentary or otherwise, sufficient
to support a claim, fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed.251 (LNS International Manpower Services vs.
Padua, Jr., 614 SCRA 322, 5 March 2010.)
Q.121. Explain the Equiponderance of Evidence Rule.
246
662 SCRA 361 (14 December 2011), citing Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622 (22 August 1978); and Noriega vs. Sison, 125
SCRA 293 (27 October 1983).
247
Citing Habagat Grill vs. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603 (2005); Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Reyes,
544 SCRA 206 (11 February 2008); Republic vs. Bautista, 532 SCRA 598 (11 September 2007).
248
See Republic vs. Galeno, G.R. No. 215009 (23 January 2017).
249
Ogawa vs. Menigishi, 690 Phil. 359 (2012), citing Amoroso vs. Alegre, Jr., 552 Phil. 22 (2007).
250
See Diaz vs. People, 776 SCRA 43 (2 December 2015); [Lim vs. Mindanao Wines & Liquor Galleria, 675 SCRA 628 (4 July
2012)[Del Castillo, J.]; Peñalber vs. Ramos, 577 SCRA 509 (30 January 2009), citing Ong vs. Yap, 492 Phil. 188 (2005)].
251
Cuizon vs. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 456 (1996).
45
1. Lico vs. COMELEC (771 SCRA 596, 26 September 2015)(En Banc)[Sereno, CJ.]
2. Republic vs. Mupas (769 SCRA 385, 8 September 2015)(En Banc)[Brion, J.](the controversial
PIATCO case), it was held that:
Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when the scale of justice shall stand on equipoise and
nothing in the evidence inclines a conclusion to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.252
If the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
allegations of the plaintiff and the other consistent with the defense of the defendant, the evidence does not
fulfill the requirement of preponderance of evidence.
When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the
preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof fails.253 The reason for this rule is that the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. Thus, even if
the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of
evidence on his side when this evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.
Q.122. Is the non-presentation of paraffin test result in a case for illegal possession of fire arms
indicative of the guilt or innocence of the accused? Explain.
A.122. No. In Peralta vs. People (838 SCRA 350, 30 August 2017)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe,
J.], a case for Illegal Possession of fire arms. The Supreme Court sustained the conviction of the petitioner-
accused, it was held that: It is not indicative of his guilt or innocence of the crime charged. Paraffin tests, in
general, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin
test was extremely unreliable for use. It can only establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on
the hand; however, the test alone cannot determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the
discharge of a firearm. The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a
probability but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also admittedly found in
substances other than gunpowder.254
Q.123. Is proof of motive sufficient to support a conviction?
A.123. No. In People vs. Atienza (716 SCRA 84, 12 February 2017)(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe,
J.], the High Court held that: It is well-established that mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not
sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may
reasonably be deduced that the accused was the malefactor.255
Q.124. Is the probative value of circumstantial evidence weaker than that of direct evidence?
Explain.
1. People vs. Magbitang (793 SCRA 266, 14 June 2016)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.]
2. People vs. Oandasan (793 SCRA 278, 14 June 2016)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.][Two (2) counts of
murder and frustrated murder cases.]
3. Candelaria vs. People (744 SCRA 178, 8 December 2014)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.](A
case of Qualified Theft, Art. 310 of the RPC)
4. Atienza vs. People (716 SCRA 84, 12 February 2014)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
5. People vs. Lamsen (691 SCRA 498, 20 February 2013)(Second Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it
was held that:
Circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker in persuasive quality than direct evidence. Conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others as the guilty person.256
252
Municipality of Candijay vs. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 922 (1995).
253
Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 735 (1998).
254
Citing People vs. Cajumocan, 474 Phil. 349 (2004).
255
People vs. Comesario, 366 Phil. 62 (1999).
256
People vs. Abdulah, 596 Phil. 870 (2009); Espineli vs. People, 725 SCRA 365 (9 June 2014); People vs. Solano, Jr., 724 SCRA
397 (2 June 2014); People vs. Tanchanco, 670 SCRA 130 (18 April 2012); Diega vs. Court of Appeals, 615 SCRA 399 (15 March
2010).
46
In People vs. Delim,257 the Supreme Court held, thus: The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential
events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the
proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of the
accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.
Q.125. Can the circumstantial evidence rule be applied in quasi-judicial proceedings? Explain.
A.125. Yes. In the following cases:
1. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal (803 SCRA 435, 20 September 2016)(En Banc)[Leonen, J.]
2. CSC vs. Almojuela (694 SCRA 441, 2 April 2013)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held:
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to
criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other
proceedings.258 There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal
proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or
administrative proceedings.
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in
deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would
require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too
may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such
as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.259
ESCAPE OF A PRISONER; CIRCUSMTANCIAL EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
In CSC vs. Almojuela supra, the high court held that: While this provision appears to refer only to criminal
cases, the Supreme Court applied its principles to administrative cases.260 To fulfill the third requisite, this Court in
RE: AC No. 04-AM-2002 (Josejina Fria vs. Gemiliana De Los Angeles),261 an En Banc decision, required that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain that leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the person accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.262
In CSC, in ruling that the circumstantial evidence was duly proven against the respondent, the Supreme
Court concluded that: The circumstantial evidence the CSC presented leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
that, at the very least, SJO2 Almojuela consented to Lao’s getaway. The keys found in SJO2 Almojuela’s room fit
the padlock in the main gate, Lao’s most possible point of egress. The fact that these keys should be in the
safekeeping of JO1 Pascual and JO1 Robles does not clear SJO2 Almojuela from liability; on the contrary, it should
convince us of his involvement in Lao’s escape. It leads us to ask why the keys were found in SJO2 Almojuela’s
room, when the last person seen to possess the keys, and the personnel who were supposed to safe keep them,
was not SJO2 Almojuela. SJO2 Almojuela’s bare allegations that he was set up cannot stand up against the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the investigating officers’ duty. This presumption, when
considered with the following pieces of evidence, leads us to no other conclusion than SJO2 Almojuela’s implied
consent to Lao’s escape.
257
396 SCRA 386 (28 January 2003).
258
See Lua vs. O'Brien, et al., 55 Phil. 53 (1930)[Per J. Street, En Banc]; Vda. De Laig, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 172 Phil. 283
(1978)[Per J. Makasiar, First Division]; Baloloy vs. Hular, 481 Phil. 398 (2004)[Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; and Heirs of
Celestial vs. Heirs of Celestial, 455 Phil. 704 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
259
Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940)[Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. Also, Rule 133, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Section 5. Substantial evidence.— In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodie's, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
260
See RE: AC No. 04-AM-2002 (Josejina Fria vs. Gemiliana De Los Angeles), 430 SCRA 412 (3 June 2004); ans RE: (1) Lost
Checks Issued to the Late Roderick Roy P. Melliza, Former Clerk II, MCTC, Zaragga, Iloilo; and (2) Dropping from the Rolls of
Ms. Esther T. Andres, A.M. No. 2005-26-SC (22 November 2006).
261
430 SCRA 412 (3 June 2004).
262
RE: AC No. 04-AM-2002 (Josejina Fria vs. Gemiliana De Los Angeles), supra.
47
Q.126. Is an administrative tribunal duty bound to provide the person under investigation with
counsel? Explain.
A.126. No. In Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (751 SCRA 469, 24
February 2015)(En Banc)[Peralta, J.], citing the cases of Lumiqued vs. Exevea263 and Nera vs. The Auditor
General,264 it was held that: There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not
indispensable. Further, in Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission,265 the Court held that a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel
because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.
Q.127. What is the weight of evidence required in labor cases?
1. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc vs. Avestruz (751 SCRA 161, 18 February 2015)(First Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
2. Ayungo vs. Beamko Shipmanangement Corporation (717 SCRA 538, 26 February 2014)
(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
3. INC Shipmanagement, Inc. vs. Moradas (713 SCRA 475, 15 January 2014)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that:
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings
and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence.266 This requirement is clearly
expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
Q.128. What is the required quantum of proof in administrative proceedings?
1. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ruiz (782 SCRA 630, 2 February 2016)(En Banc)[Per
Curiam]
2. In Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on
September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan (736 SCRA 12,
23 September 2014)(En Banc)[Per Curiam]
3. Sison-Brias vs. Rubia (726 SCRA 94, 10 June 2014)(En Banc)[Per Curiam]
4. Barcelona vs. Lim (724 SCRA 433, 3 June 2014)(En Banc)[Sereno, C.J.]
5. INC Shipmanagement, Inc. vs. Moradas (713 SCRA 475, 15 January 2014)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the landmark case Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations,267 it
was held that:
All that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact is substantial evidence, which is
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This
where the findings of fact of a quasi–judicial body are supported by substantial evidence, these findings are
conclusive and binding on the appellate court.268 In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming
or even preponderant.269
263
346 Phil. 807 (1997).
264
247 Phil. 1 (1988).
265
414 Phil. 590 (2001); See also Philcomsat Holdings Corporation v. Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, 673 SCRA 611 (19
June 2012).
266
Ramos vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 203186 (4 December 2013).
267
69 Phil. 635 (1940).
268
Bagsican vs. CA, 225 Phil. 185 (1986); Heirs of E.B. Roxas, Inc. vs. Tolentino, 249 Phil. 334 (1988).
269
Jallorina vs. Taneo-Regner, 670 SCRA 301 (23 April 2012), citing Banaag vs. Espeleta, 661 SCRA 513 (29 November 2011).
48
Q.129. In an administrative case, who has the burden of proof?
1. In Re: Verified Complaint dated July 13, 2015 of Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. vs. Hernandez (784
SCRA 483, 23 February 2016)(En Banc)[Brion, J.]
2. Tuldague vs. Pardo (707 SCRA 622, 17 October 2013)(En Banc)[Carpio, J.], the High Court
ruled:
The complainants have the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence.
While the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act, or omission that would violate the norm of public
accountability or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary,270 the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in
administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.271
Q.130. How should the findings of quasi-judicial agencies, like the COA, be treated by the highest
court?
1. Delos Santos vs. COA (703 SCRA 501, 13 August 2013)(En Banc)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
2. Versoza, Jr. vs. Carague (665 SCRA 124, 7 February 2012)(En Banc)[Villarama, Jr.], it was
held that:
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially
one which is constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also
for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.272 Findings of quasi-judicial agencies,
such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence,273 and the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion.274
Q.131. Can text messages be considered as substantial evidence against an erring court officer for
extortion?
A.131. Yes. In Astorga and Repol Law Offices vs. Villanueva (751 SCRA 410, 24 February 2015)(En
Banc)[Per Curiam](Extortion demanding legal fees by the Sheriff to the lawyer who wants the Writ of Execution
be implemented), citing the case of Menor vs. Guillermo,275 it was held that:
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is that of substantial evidence, viz:
Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Otherwise stated, a finding of
guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence
that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial
evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.
In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text messages were admitted as
evidence and given probative value by this court.276 In those cases, the court considered the content of the text
messages and the identification of the person sending them as substantial evidence to prove the commission
of administrative offenses.
270
Dr. Cruz vs. Judge Iturralde, 450 Phil. 77 (2003), citing Sarmiento vs. Salamat, 364 SCRA 301 (4 September 2001).
271
See Ocampo vs. Arcaya-Chua, 619 SCRA 59 (23 April 2010), citing Espanol vs. Mupas, 442 SCRA 13 (11 November 2004).
272
Sanchez vs. Commission on Audit, 552 SCRA 471 (23 April 2008), citing Cuerdo vs. Commission on Audit, 166 SCRA 657 (27
October 1988), further citing Tagum Doctors Enterprises vs. Apsay, 165 SCRA 154 (30 August 1988).
273
Laysa vs. Commission on Audit, 343 SCRA 520 (18 October 2000).
274
Sanchez vs. Commission on Audit, supra.
275
595 Phil. 10 (2008)[Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
276
Sison-Barias vs. Rubia, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388 (10 June 2014)[Per Curiam, En Banc]; Villahermosa, Sr. vs. Sarcia, 715 SCRA 639
(11 February 2014)[Per Curiam, En Banc].
49
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE (A.M. NO. 01-7-01-SC)
Q.132. What is Ephemeral Electronic Communication? How can it be proven?
A.132. In Bartolome vs. Maranan (740 SCRA 491, 18 November 2014)(En Banc)[Per Curiam], it was
explained as: Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom
sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which
is not recorded or retained.277 It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
communications or has personal knowledge thereof.278
In Bartolome the complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal
knowledge of these text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982.
The respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging
and that the cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages
originated was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the Imus
Cavite Police conducted.
Q.133. Is Ephemeral electronic communication admissible as evidence? Explain.
A.133. Yes. Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain
conditions. Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of events,
acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall
be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person
competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
WRIT OF AMPARO (A.M. NO. 07-9-12-SC)
Q.134. What is the coverage of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo?
A.134. In the case of The Secretary of National Defense, et al. vs. Manalo, et al. (G.R. No. 180906, 7
October 2008)(En Banc)[Puno, C.J.], it was held that:
Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC specifically delimits the coverage of the writ of amparo to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Thus Section 1 described it as - The petition for a writ
of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. vs. Manalo, et al. supra, the Supreme
Court categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it presently stands, is confined to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, and jurisprudentially defined these two instances, as follows: The
Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances,
its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are
killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other
hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of
a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection
of law.
Q.135. What is the purpose of the Writ of Amparo? Explain.
A.135. In the case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. vs. Manalo, et al. supra, the Court
emphasized that the writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in
the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as
it will inevitably lead to subsequent investigation and action.
277
Sec. 1(k), Rule 2, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC (Re: Rules on Electronic Evidence) dated 17 July 2001.
278
Id., Section 2, Rule 11.
50
Q.136. Can a Petition for a Writ of Amparo be filed with the Supreme Court while there is a pending
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Court of Appeals?
A.136. No. In Agcaoili, Jr., et al. vs. Fariñas, et al. (G.R. No. 232395, 3 July 2018)(En Banc)[Tijam, J.],
the High Court ruled: The filing of the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before the Supreme Court
while the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA was still pending is improper. Even in civil cases pending
before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene through the Writ of Amparo,
as elucidated in Tapuz, et al. vs. Hon. Judge Del Rosario, et al.:279
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and
the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a
Writ of Amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security —
the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect — is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a
proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-
existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. Thus, while there is no procedural and legal obstacle to
the joining of a Petition for Habeas Corpus and a Petition for Amparo,280 the peculiarity of the then pendency of
the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the direct resort to this Court for the issuance of a Writ
of Amparo inappropriate.
Q.137. What are the elements constituting enforced disappearance?
A.137. In Navia, et al. vs. Pardico,281 the elements constituting enforced disappearance, are
enumerated as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
In Lozada, Jr., et al. vs. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.,282 the Supreme Court reiterates that the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. In Agcaoili, et al., petitioners and co-petitioner
Marcos readily admit that the instant Omnibus Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a Writ
of Amparo is dismissible.
Q.138. What are the rights protected and guaranteed by the Writ of Amparo? Explain.
A.138. The Writ of Amparo is designed to protect and guarantee the:
(1) right to life;

(2) right to liberty; and
(3) right to security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
In the case Rev. Fr. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,283 the Supreme Court had occasion to expound on
the rights falling within the protective mantle of the writ of Amparo. In Secretary of National Defense, et al. vs.
Manalo, et al. supra, the Supreme Court explained the concept of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the
279
577 Phil. 636 (2008).
280
See So vs. Hon. Judge Tacla, Jr., et al., 648 Phil. 149 (2010).
281
688 Phil. 266 (2012).
282
686 Phil. 536 (2012).
283
621 Phil. 519 (2009).
51
secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person
and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance
that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The
ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's
existence. In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the
right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things
which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the
individual.
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. vs. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,284 in
this manner: Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for
the common welfare."
Q.139. What are the justifications that would warrant the issuance of a Writ of Amparo?
A.139. Every petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo should be supported by justifying allegations
of facts, which the Supreme Court in Tapuz laid down as follows:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
Q.140. If the petition for the issuance of writ of amparo was granted by the CA, what is the remedy
of the aggrieved party?
A.140. In the case of Mamba vs. Bueno (817 SCRA 89, 7 February 2017)(En Banc)[Reyes, J.][This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, seeking to annul and set
aside the Decision dated January 18, 2010 and Resolution dated March 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 00038, which granted the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo filed by Leomar Bueno against
Mayor William N. Mamba, Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr., Ariel Malana, Narding Aggangan, Jomari Sagalon, Jun
Cinabre, Frederick Baligod, Rommel Encollado, Joseph Tumaliuan, and Randy Dayag (The Decision of the CA
which granted the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo was affirmed by the SC)], it was held that:
Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC which
provides that: Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The
appeal may raise question of fact or law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the
date of notice of the adverse judgment. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.
Q.141. Is a Motion for Reconsideration a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo?
A.141. No. There is nothing in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC which proscribes the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the final judgment or order that grants or denies a writ of amparo. Section 11 of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC only prohibits the following pleadings and motions:
284
G.R. No. 118127 (12 April 2005)(En Banc)[Tinga, J.].
52
Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:
a. Motion to dismiss;
b. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings;
c. Dilatory motion for postponement;
d. Motion for a bill of particulars;
e. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
f. Third-party complaint;
g. Reply;
h. Motion to declare respondent in default;
i. Intervention;
j. Memorandum;
k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
l. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
Q.142. What kind of Motion for Reconsideration is prohibited under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo?
A.142. What is prohibited under Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC are motions for reconsideration
directed against interlocutory orders or interim relief orders, not those assailing the final judgment or order.
The pleadings and motions enumerated in Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC would unnecessarily cause delays in
the proceedings; they are, thus, proscribed since they would run counter to the summary nature of the rule on the
writ of amparo. A motion seeking a reconsideration of a final judgment or order in such case, obviously, no
longer affects the proceedings.
Q.143. Describe the application of the Rules of Court to the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
A.143. The Rules of Court applies suppletorily to A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC insofar as it is not inconsistent
with the latter.285 Accordingly, there being no express prohibition to the contrary, the rules on motions for
reconsideration under the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Nevertheless,
considering that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a party is only given five working days from the date of
notice of the adverse judgment within which to appeal to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari, a
motion for reconsideration of a final judgment or order must likewise be filed within the same period. Thereafter,
from the order denying or granting the motion for reconsideration, the party concerned may file an appeal to
the Court via a Rule 45 petition within five working days from notice of the order pursuant to the fresh
period rule.286
Q.144. If the person subject of the Writ of Amparo was already released from detention, does it
mean that the writ will no longer be issued for being moot and academic? Explain.
A.144. No. A writ of amparo may still issue in the petitioner’s favor notwithstanding that he has
already been released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the punishment
of those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action.
Q.145. Can questions of both facts and law be raised to the Supreme Court under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo?
A.145. Yes. In Republic vs. Cayanan (844 SCRA 183, 7 November 2017)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.],287 it
was held that:
285
Section 25, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC.
286
See Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, 506 Phil. 613.
287
The Government, represented by the Director/Head of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), appeals the resolution issued on December 13, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91,
in Quezon City maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the CIDG to continue its investigation into the disappearance of
Pablo A. Cayanan; directing respondent SPO1 Rolando V. Pascua to appear before the proper forum; making the temporary
protection order permanent; and upholding the enrollment of Regina N. Cayanan in the Witness Protection Program of the
Department of Justice. Also under appeal is the resolution of January 31, 2008, whereby the RTC denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
53
Although this mode of appeal is usually limited to the determination of questions of law, Section 19
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly allows the review by the Supreme Court of questions of fact or of
law or of both. The Supreme Court can also determine the sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Q.146. What is the required quantum of evidence to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo?
Explain.
A.146. Only substantial evidence is required. This can be supported by the following provisions:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the nature of the writ of amparo as a remedy
against enforced disappearances or threats to life, liberty and personal security;
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence;
Section 18. Judgment. – x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. This standard was applied in Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo,288 the first ruling
by the Court relating to the remedy of the writ of amparo.
Q.147. What is the required diligence to be observed by a public officer or employee named as
respondent in a Petition for Writ of Amparo? Explain.
A.147. The public officer or employee named as respondent need to observe the required
extraordinary diligence. Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the diligence required of a public
official or employee who is named as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability.
Q.148. What is required of the return for the court to ensure compliance with the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo?
A.148. Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the
investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to judiciously
determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the subject had been sincere and
adequate. The return should have exerted greater effort at complying with both the letter and spirit of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo.
RULE OF AMPARO ADOPTED IN MEXICO OR IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY COULD ONLY BE PERSUASIVE AT BEST
Q.149. What is the effect in our jurisdiction of the application and implementation of the rule
of amparo adopted in Mexico or in any other country?
288
568 SCRA 1 (7 October 2008).
54
A.149. The Supreme Court clarifies that the application and implementation of the rule of amparo
adopted in Mexico or in any other country could only be persuasive at best. Despite its being patterned after
the rules on the writ of amparo of other countries, particularly those in Latin-America, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo promulgated by the Court should not be wholly dependent on how those other rules of amparo have
operated, or have been implemented. Such operation and implementation, if worthy of emulation, are only best
practices to be considered and optionally relied upon, if at all. Circumstances and needs peculiar to our country,
which the Court has well considered in crafting the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, dictate different operation and
implementation.
Q.150. Are the proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo similar to that of criminal
proceedings? Explain.
A.150. No. The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to
those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt nor innocence of the respondents is not determined, and
no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies
against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an issue.
In the latter, the prosecution of the accused with due process of law is the object of the proceedings. The
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the need for the State to
adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Q.151. Define extralegal killings and enforced disappearance.
A.151. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.289 On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court
as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons
or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.290
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA (A.M. NO. 08-1-16-SC)
(1) In the case of Lee vs. Ilagan (738 SCRA 59, 8 October 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.],
wherein the parties are former common law partners, the Supreme Court reversed the Decision of the RTC of
Quezon City which granted the petition for Writ of Habeas Data filed by Ilagan. It involves a camera with alleged
sex tape between Ilagan and another woman. It was also reproduced by Lee and used it as evidence for violation
of R.A. No. 9262 and an administrative case with NAPOLCOM against Ilagan.
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege
of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
Held: The High find the petition meritorious. A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances.291It was conceptualized as
a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals,292which is defined as "the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data
about oneself."293
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as "a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party." Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas
Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, "[t]he manner the right to
privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party."
289
Secretary of National Defense, et al. vs. Manalo, et al., 589 Phil. 1 (2008).
290
Navia, et al. vs. Pardico, 688 Phil. 266 (2012), citing Gen. Razon, Jr., et al. vs. Tagitis, supra.
291
Manila Electric Company vs. Lim, 632 SCRA 195 (5 October 2010).
292
Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211 (7 September 2010).
293
See footnote 62 of Ople vs. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998), citing Hancock, G., "California’s Privacy Act: Controlling
Government’s Use of Information?" 32 Stanford Law Review No. 5, p. 1001 (May 1980).
55
In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.294 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition
must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not
issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.295
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of
the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears
would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to
explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.1Indeed,
courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence
on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights
to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly
renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
(2) In the case of Saez vs. Macapagal Arroyo (681 SCRA 678, 25 September 2012)(Reyes, B. J.)[En
Banc], the case involves Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data. The High Court denied the petition.
QUESTIONS OF FACTS AND LAW CAN BE RAISED TO THE SUPREME COURT
Q.152. Can both questions of facts and law be raised to the Supreme Court in a petition for Writ of
Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data?
A.152. Yes. Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that
questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a
rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court which rendered the
judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant
case, the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed upon him
by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their coverage even threatened violations against a person’s right
to life, liberty or security. Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will – although not involving
invasion of bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom
from threat".296
MEANING OF THREAT
It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on the surrounding
circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life,
liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the military’s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring
activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as
stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and habeas data, in the
petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by
independent and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds.
Q.153. Can the President of the Philippines be automatically dropped as respondent being immune
from suit in a Petition for Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data?
A.153. No. Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as
substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with
knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the
necessary investigations required under the rules.1âwphi1
294
Gamboa vs. Chan, 677 SCRA 385 (24 July 2012).
295
Manila Electric Company vs. Lim, 632 SCRA 195 (5 October 2010), citing Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628 (25 November 2009).
296
568 SCRA 1 (7 October 2008).
56
The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with
the president’s incumbency.297Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-
sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.298Courts look with disfavor upon the
presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right.
RULES OF PROCEDURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL CASES (A.M. NO. 09-6-8-SC)
TEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ORDER (TEPO)
Q.154. Can the Court of Appeals issue a TRO for the actions of government agencies in the
enforcement of environmental laws?
A.154. No. The issuance of TRO is proscribed by Section 10-11, Part II, Civil Procedure, Rule 2, of A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC except the Supreme Court. It provides that:
SEC. 10. Prohibition against temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. — Except
the Supreme Court, no court can issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against lawful actions of
government agencies that enforce environmental laws or prevent violations thereof.
SEC. 11. Report on TEPO, EPO, TRO or preliminary injunction. — The judge shall report any action
taken on a TEPO, EPO, TRO or a preliminary injunction, including its modification and dissolution, to the Supreme
Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, within ten (10) days from the action taken.
Q.155. What is Continuing Writ of Mandamus?
A.155. A Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any
agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
Q.156. When can the continuing Writ of Mandamus be issued by the Court?
A.156. Section 1, Part III, Rule 8 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.—When any agency or instrumentality of the

government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental
law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto
supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully
satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties
of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Q.157. What is a Writ of Kalikasan?
A.157. In LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. vs. Agham Party List (789 SCRA 271, 12 April 2016)(En
Banc)[Carpio, J.],299 the High Court ruled that: Under Section 1, of the Rule on Writ of Kalikasan, the writ is a
297
Id., citing Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452.
298
Lozada v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012.
299
Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI’s
mining area is covered by Mineral Production Sharing AgreementNo. 268-2008-III dated 26 August 2008 by virtue of an
Operating Agreement dated 5 June 2007 with Filipinas Mining Corporation;
Whereas, Agham alleged that LAMI violated: (1) Section 6823 of PD No. 705,24 as amended by Executive Order No.
277,25 or the Revised Forestry Code; and (2) Sections 5726 and 6927 of Republic Act No. 7942,28 or the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995 (Philippine Mining Act). Agham added that LAMI cut mountain trees and flattened a mountain which serves as a
57
remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Q.158. Under what category is a Writ of Kalikasan in our procedural laws?
A.158. The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an
extraordinary remedy,300 covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ is available against an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity.
Q.159. What are to be proven by the petitioner for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan?
A.159. In an application for Writ of Kalikasan, petitioner has the burden to prove the:
(1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated;

(2) act or omission complained of; and
(3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that the magnitude of
environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and
must be contained in the verified petition.
A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or
regulation was violated or would be violated. Mere allegation that two laws – the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended, and the Philippine Mining Act – were violated without substantiation will not stand. At most, it is only
considered as mere general allegations.
- NOTHING FOLLOWS -
GOOD LUCK AND GOD BLESS.
MAY ALL OF YOU REACH THE UNREACHABLE STAR!!!
natural protective barrier from typhoons and floods not only of the residents of Zambales but also the residents of some
nearby towns located in Pangasinan.
300
Paje vs. Casiño, G.R. No. 207257 (3 February 2015).

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PRE-WEEK AND LAST MINUTE LECTURE IN REMEDIAL LAW (2019 BAR)

PROOF VS. EVIDENCE

BURDEN OF PROOF VS. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

VESTING ORDER NO. P-89

Q.1. What is the rationale of Vesting Order No. P-89?

Q.2. What is the legal effect of a Vesting Order? Explain.

GENERAL PROVISIONS (RULE 128)

A.3. In the following cases:

JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS (RULE 129)

MATTERS OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE; UNQUESTIONABLE DEMONSTRATION

JUDICIAL NOTICE IN RAPE CASES

A.8. In the following cases:

A party may make judicial admissions:

(a) in the pleadings filed by the parties;

OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE (RULE 130-A)

Q.9. What does corpus delicti mean in drug cases?

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (RULE 130-B)

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Q.10. When can the best evidence rule be applied?

A.10. In the following cases:

(1) fax or photocopy of the marriage contract; and

PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE HEARSAY

Q.18. Are there exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule?

Q.21. Can a photocopy of a document be admitted in evidence? Explain.

A.21. No. In the following cases:

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE (SEC. 9, RULE 130)

Q.23. What is the Parol Evidence Rule? Explain.

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

The term "agreement" includes wills.

APPLICABILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE

Q.26. When can the parol evidence rule be invoked?

A.26. In the following cases:

INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS (SECTIONS 10-19, RULE 130)

Q.28. What is the probative value of an expert opinion on written instrument?

ESTABLISHED THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE EXPERT

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE (RULE 130, C)

QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES (SECTIONS 20-24, RULE 130)

Q.29. Who is tasked to assess the credibility of a witness?

A.29. In the following cases:

TESTIMONIES OF CHILD VICTIMS IN RAPE CASES

Q.30. Who is qualified to be a witness?

A.31. In the following cases:

MORAL ASCENDANCY IN RAPE CASES

FINDINGS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

Q.32. How are testimonies be considered?

SECTION 24(e), RULE 130 OF THE ROC

Q.35. What is the concept of executive privilege communication? Explain.

THE NIXON WATERGATE SCANDAL

KINDS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

1. The communication privilege pertains to communications, documents or other materials that

2. The deliberative process privilege includes advisory opinions, recommendations and

PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE

Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the

DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE

OFFICIALS COVERED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE

Q.36. What are the elements of presidential communications privilege?

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential

TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE (SECTION 25, RULE 130)

Q.39. Can filial privilege be waived?

ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS (SECTIONS 26-33, RULE 130)

Q.40. What is admission against interest?

Q.41. Would his failure to file comment equivalent to admission? Explain.

RES INTER ALIOS ACTA (SEC. 28 IN RELATION TO SEC.30, RULE 130)

PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE (SECTIONS 34-35, RULE 130)