A Military Analysis of the Sino–Indian Border Clashes

rusi.org/commentary/military-analysis-sino–indian-border-clashes

June 2,
2020

Recent events on the Sino–Indian border, which have seen China’s People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) deploy a reported 5,000 troops in border positions near Galwan and
Demchok represent a significant escalation in the ongoing regional competition between
the two Asian powers. Admittedly, standoffs and limited clashes in disputed territory are
not unprecedented. However, this would represent the first major PLA incursion into
territory that both sides’ maps recognise as being on the Indian side of the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) – the de facto border between the two countries. And while it is too early to
deduce precisely what caused this latest escalation, it is possible to identify the various
geostrategic factors which may have contributed to China’s decision to mount this
incursion.

The decision to escalate tensions on the Indian border even as China adopts a more
emollient stance with some of its other neighbours fits with what some scholars view as
China’s approach to counter-containment – the strategy of selectively and sequentially
targeting individual members of what it views as a nascent encircling alliance in order to
prevent such a tie-up. Such an incursion could also represent a form of coercive issue
linkage, whereby China utilises pressure on disputed territories to secure concessions
with regards to another issue area. For example, China could hold out the offer to
withdraw from Indian territory as well as the threat of further limited escalations as
leverage with which to shape Indian policy with regards to issues such as any renewed
future push for Taiwanese observer status at international organisations such as the
World Health Organization. This would be consistent with the coercive linkage seen with
regards to disputes such as the Senkakus, where China’s decisions to escalate or
minimise tensions over the Senkakus have often had less to do with the value China
places on the territories themselves than they have with attempts to shape Japan’s wider
foreign and security policies.

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That being said, the causes for this escalation are likely to be more local. The immediate
catalyst for the crisis – Chinese attempts to disrupt the construction of Indian military
infrastructure in the region – should not be understated. Recent incidents reflect a wider
pattern of behaviour by which the PLA utilises localised escalations to disrupt or freeze
the construction of Indian infrastructure. The fact that this latest escalation has left the
PLA holding the heights straddling a critical Indian road artery would suggest that it
intends to hold the territory rather than use it as bargaining leverage.

The Sino–Indian Military Balance

On paper, PLA forces in the Western Military Theatre operate at a significant advantage
to their Indian counterparts. The PLA’s Western Theatre Command fields 230,000 troops
compared to the 225,000 troops which can be mobilised from India’s Northern, Central
and Eastern commands. However, the concerted construction of road and rail links on
the Chinese side of the border – vastly outstripping Indian efforts – means that the PLA
can redeploy forces to the region at increasingly rapid rates. By contrast, many of the
roads on which the Indian army would rely end 40–80 km from the front lines of a likely
conflict.

This being said, the local military balance of power – at least in the early days of a conflict
– may tilt against the PLA. Most PLA units in the Western Theatre Command are
deployed in depth, partially as a result of deployments on the Russian border and
deployments to support internal security missions. In Tibet and Xinjiang – the regions
closest to the Indian border – the PLA deploys 40,000 and 70,000 troops respectively.
Moreover, many of the 70,000 troops in Xinjiang are deployed near urban centres such
as Urumqi – hundreds of kilometres from the Indian border – in order to manage
internal threats. In wartime, the People’s Armed Police may relieve PLA forces of some of
their internal security missions in regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang, but these missions
will likely draw on PLA manpower all the same. At the point of immediate contact, then,
the PLA is numerically inferior by a significant margin to the generally forward deployed
forces of India’s China-facing military commands, and will take time to redeploy forces
from the Chinese interior.

The PLA also faces a mountainous terrain that heavily favours the defender. The
fragmented geography of the valleys of the region and the altitudes at which combat
takes place will attenuate the effects of firepower and impede targeting using airborne
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). The Indian Army has begun a
programme of renewed modernisation specifically for this theatre, with recent
investments in rapidly re-deployable artillery under the aegis of the airmobile 17
Mountain Strike Corps. This might give the Indian Army a competitive fire support
capability in the early days of a conflict, though the process of acquiring and fielding
these artillery assets is not yet complete.

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Despite this, the relatively limited artillery capability of PLA forces in Tibet – currently a
single forward-deployed artillery regiment backed by an artillery brigade deployed 200
km from the front line near Lhasa – would mean that the PLA lacks a significant fires
advantage in the first days of a war. While Indian ISR and fires capabilities may be
difficult to employ effectively, the locally superior Indian manpower and their
deployment to physically control mountainous terrain limits the PLA’s options for
offensive manoeuvre and opportunities to penetrate Indian territory in depth without
first engaging in the difficult task of dislodging dug-in Indian forces at any given point
along the front. Moreover, given their initial numerical preponderance, Indian forces
could envision localised counteroffensives to seize critical territory either as bargaining
chips or to permanently improve their position.

The balance of power in the air is likely to be similarly skewed in India’s favour in the
early days of a conflict. By virtue of India’s smaller size, the Indian Air Force operates
significantly more air bases and advanced landing grounds within reach of the border
region than does the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), which will rely on eight
airbases in the Western Theatre. Moreover, the high altitudes of PLAAF bases on the
Tibetan plateau limit the tempo of operations possible using aircraft operating from
these bases. This handicap is not shared by Indian aircraft operating from bases at lower
altitudes. Finally, despite the PLAAF being a qualitatively and quantitatively superior force
in aggregate, its forces in the Western Military Theatre are numerically inferior to their
Indian counterparts. They are also at a qualitative disadvantage by virtue of being largely
comprised of older J-10 and J-11 aircraft compared to aircraft such as the SU-30MKI
fielded in the Indian Eastern Command.

All of this, however, will likely change if a conflict is not very short. China’s investments in
road and rail infrastructure will allow it to redeploy 32 divisions from deep within the
Western Military Theatre to the border region in a span of around six weeks. Moreover,
the construction of airstrips and refuelling points would enable the redeployment of
more PLAAF aircraft from other military regions and bring the PLAAF’s aggregate
superiority in numbers to bear. In a longer conflict, we would likely see newer aircraft
such as the J-20 redeployed to the Western Military Theatre, shifting the balance of
power in qualitative terms. Finally, the Strategic Rocket Force’s arsenal of land-attack
ballistic and cruise missiles such as the DF-21C and CJ-10 could disrupt operations at
Indian airfields if Chinese decisionmakers deemed this worth the cost of using scarce
precision strike assets that would be needed in an East Asian conflict. Perhaps most
importantly, the Indian Army’s chronic shortages of munitions, while no longer acute due
to the initiative in recent years to purchase and hold more in reserve, would likely limit its
ability to prosecute a conflict that was not resolved within less than a month.

That being said, the PLA’s advantages can only come into play if it can hold the line in the
opening stages of a conflict. This precarious position would, however, be eroded by any
construction of additional infrastructure by India, as well as permanent military
infrastructure to enable sustained forward deployment.

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The Importance of the Galwan Valley to the PLA
The construction of what appears to be a permanent position across the LAC is a
significant escalation. The tactical value of the areas seized, the Indian army’s decision to
hold off annual presence missions as a result of Covid-19 and the belief that the
situation could be deescalated if India was presented with a bloodless fait accompli likely
all played a role in this decision.

By virtue of its position, the PLA’s new outposts in the Galwan valley effectively allow it to
offset improvements in India’s regional infrastructure. The outposts overlook the
Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) highway which passes through the valley and
places this fragile road link at risk from PLA artillery. This means that the road links to
the Indian army’s northern sector can be severed in wartime. The tactical significance of
this territory, coupled with reports that the PLA has commenced the construction of
permanent structures in the region, would suggest that it has not been seized as
bargaining leverage. Rather, this represents an effort to permanently alter the status quo
in order to offset India’s local military advantages.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the authors, and do not represent those of RUSI
or any other institution.

BANNER IMAGE: High Mountains near the India-China Border landscape. Courtesy of
Jeevan/goodfreephotos.com.

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