Pakistan: Defense Canals in South Punjab and Sindh-II (Rahim

Yar Khan)
Introduction

In this section of analysis about Canal based defenses in Pakistan, we look at the general area of
Rahim Yar Khan (RYK) city. RYK is also the southernmost district in Pakistan Punjab and lies
opposite Jaisalmer District in the Indian state of Rajasthan. RYK City is the largest city in the district
of RYK and an important commercial center. We will be looking at the general area RYK and
Sadiqabad.

Strategic Importance

As introduced earlier, the city of RYK is an important commercial center in South Punjab. Apart
from that, the major north-south communication axis of Pakistan, National Highway-05, which
connects the port city of Karachi with important cities like Lahore and Rawalpindi in Punjab runs at
less than 10kms towards west of the city. Capture of this town would represent a major psychological
defeat for Pakistan and would literally mean splitting Pakistan into two by severing the north-south
link.

RYK: Regional Setting

What makes RYK a still more attractive option is the distance of the city from India—Pakistan border
– the city lies at a distance of <50kms from border and <200kms from Jaisalmer, as the crow flies. A
dash from Indian side can be made to RYK – any Indian success here can threaten the flanks and
rear of Pakistan defenses in the Fort Abbas-Bahawalpur area while creating headache for defenders
of southern Sindh. India will have prime strategic land available to barter at the negotiation table. 

Highway network map-Pakistan

Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Pakistan_Nationalhighways.PNG

At a strategic level, from Pakistan Army’s perspective, loss of N5 would represent major loss of
north-south communication axis and cut-off its forces in Punjab from those in Sindh. This would
diminish the chances of sending reinforcement from 2 Corps/31 Corps combine to V Corps. V Corps
for all practical purposes would be left alone. For example, in 1971 war, after the reversal of PA’s 18
Division at Longewala and when Indian 11 Division made advance towards Naya Chor in Sindh,
Pakistan Army sent 33 Division (then under II Corps) to reinforce the sector. Such north-south
movements would become difficult. 
It was exactly to pre-empt any such development that Pakistan built National Hgihway-55 or, the
Indus Highway. N55 runs to west of the mighty River Indus – thus, giving it more depth and
protection from any Indian advance in the area. It was meant to ensure that in case of any Indian
interdiction of N5, N55 will serve as the back-up and ensure that the north-south link is not severed.

However, while the above may well be true, N5 remains the lifeline of Pakistan. One simply cannot
overlook the fact that it passes through some of the most important towns and cities of Pakistan. As
per a 2005 Asian Development Bank Report on National Highways in Pakistan (concerning loans to
Pakistan), had this to say about the volume of traffic on N5:

“Traffic using the national highway network, comprising about 8,320 km of national highways
and 710 km of motorways, is largely commercial: 75–80% of traffic. The main domestic artery is
concentrated along the 1,760 km Karachi–Lahore–Peshawar (M9/N5) corridor. This serves 80%
of the urban population and carries over 55% of intercity traffic. The corridor also links Punjab
and the northern parts of the country with international markets through the southern Karachi
area ports, which account for 96% of all trade. About 60% of the port traffic moves along this
 corridor. Other national highways include N55 (Indus Highway), N25, N65, N40, N70, and N35
(Karakoram Highway)”.   

Source: http://www2.adb.org/Documents/RRPs/PAK/37559-PAK-RRP.pdf

On top of that, we have the minor issue of bridges on the River Indus – most of the PA formations
are in cantonment to east of Indus. Exception being the formations under XI and XII Corps in
Peshawar and Quetta. In case of interdiction of N5, Pakistan Army formations will have to cross the
Indus at these points – and from Multan in north to Hyderabad in south, there are grand total of
four such locations. The time required for using these routes to shift troops would not be consistent
with the urgency which PA may face with.

Military Balance

A detailed assessment of this aspect was provided in the previous blog post along with the situation
as was obtained in Mid-2002. To sum up the key points:

 Sutlej River to RYK is considered as responsibility of 31 Corps.

 31 Corps has three divisions –
 14th Infantry Division at Okara
 35th Infantry Division at Bahawalpur
 26th Mechanized Division at Bahawalpur
 From what I know, PA maintains an infantry brigade (60 Infantry Brigade) at RYK.  
 India can deploy a permutation and combination of assets under Southern Command i.e. 21
Strike Corps and 12 Corps.
 There have been suggestions on the internet that in 2002, 31 Corps HQ shifted south from
Bahawalpur to Pano Aqil. The same is quite likely as otherwise, facing the might of an entire Indian
Strike Corps would have been the lone 16 Infantry Division (under 5 Corps, Karachi) based out of
Pano Aqil in northern Sindh (close to Sindh-Pakistan Punjab border).
 From Fort Abbas to RYK is >250 km as the crow flies; so, 31 Corps does manage the defense
of a very large front.
 However, the saving grace is the presence of vast Thar Desert opposite Jaisalmer and
Cholistan Desert opposite Sri-Ganganagar area. Capture of territory in the desert area does not pose
any cost on Pakistan. It will be happy to trade space for time here.
 Pakistan Army is likely to adopt a strategy of defending approaches to important commercial
centers relying on presence of natural + man made defensive structures to impede the advance of
Indian mechanized columns.
 Thar Desert does represent a formidable challenge in itself as any Indian advance deep into
Thar towards Pakistan heartland stretches and exposes Indian logistical tail. Such an advance takes
it away from Indian air cover (and within reach of PAF) and into a more compactly defended
territory.
 Pakistan Army 5 Corps is likely to launch offensive action(s) more from the view point of
disrupting Indian plans than anything else.
 Indian Army may well attack at the seam between AOR of 5 Corps and 31 Corps.
 In my opinion, PA will be forced to induct more troops – especially armor – into this sector.
And this is likely to come from 31 Corps Reserve. Any such dispersal of armor assets will further
reduce the offensive potential of PA Holding Corps and their reserves.
Map of road network in Jaisalmer and Bikaner district which shows presence of road network till
border with Pakistan. This allows India to move formations that much closer to border.

Source: Maps of India

Canal and Evaporation Pond System

Unlike other areas, the water obstacle in this sector consists of two inter-related systems – one, the
usual canal system and other, a system of evaporation ponds.  Both of them are explained in detail
below.

Canal System
The canal system in the study area is fed by Punjnad Barrage on River Chenab. From this barrage,
two main canals off take water – (a) Punjnad Canal (b) Abbassia Canal. The Punjnad Canal runs
towards west of Abbassia Canal and the main body of this canal lies between River Indus and
National Highway 5 (N5). From the perspective of this study, Punjnad Canal is of no interest.
Abbassia Canal on the other hand takes a more easterly course and the main canal and its
major/minor channels lie between Indian border and town of RYK.

Schematic diagram of the Punjnad Barrage and course of its major canals is given below:

Punjnad Barrage

Source: Water Statistics handbook of Pakistan

Satellite image and route of Abbassia Canal and its major/minor channels is given below:

Analysis
As can be seen from the image above, the city of RYK lies behind a ring of canals.The image also
shows the evaporation ponds, which will be explained subsequently.

Any Indian advance on this axis will face these water obstacles. The obstacles have the potential to
force the Indian columns to advance along a narrow and predictable axis...any such development will
allow PA fight behind prepared defenses with relatively far lesser number of troops than would be
required otherwise. 

Indian Army would not want to fight in a narrow corridor where it cannot bring
the maneuver element of  its mechanized into play. Also, it would ideally want enough real estate to
commit and create disproportionate force levels against the defenders to overwhelm them in shortest
time possible. It would not want to suffer a Thermopylae moment where a lesser force holds out
against a larger one because the larger force could not commit its forces/

Such defenses can also impede the advance thus giving PA enough time to hold out against superior
Indian forces and allow international geo-political pressure to call for a ceasefire.

In terms of width, the width of the canals at which markers in the above image are placed are ~ 20
meters, 5 meters and 25 meters. The width of the canals is not constant across their entire stretch but
fall with in a particular range. Given the spatial distance between the canals, I have not been able to
show them in a single image.

Evaporation Ponds

Ever since I started researching the topic of canals in Pakistan, these water structures came across as
a puzzle. They are in the middle of a desert and had to be man made. But why would anyone do
something of this sort?
Well, the answer is that these ponds are called as Evaporation Ponds and were built as part of
Salinity Control and Reclamation Project (SCARP). There have been many such SCARPs in Pakistan
and one in question were built under SCARP-VI. 

Basically, what happened is this - once the mass irrigation was introduced in the area, the water table
started to rise. This was on account of water seepage from the canals as well as blocking of path of
natural surface drains due to construction of dykes and canals across the path of such natural drains.
In addition to this, there was an issue of rising salinity of ground water...both these effects combine
together led to agricultural areas becoming unsuitable for cultivation. Therefore, projects were
launched to develop a drainage system which takes water away from the fields as well as sub-surface
level into evaporation ponds from where it is lost to the nature.

Here is a more technical explanation:

"Disposal of drainage effluent, especially when it is saline, has always been a problem. In the FESS
Project,surface and sub-surface drainage effluent is being disposed of by gravity through outfall
surface drains into evaporation ponds. The evaporation ponds are a series of inter dunal
depressions locally known as `Tobas' located in the south of the Haroonabad. These ponds are
located in Cholistan situated along the fringe of

Bahawalnager and Bahawalpur districts. In these ponds, drainage effluent is evaporated at high
temperatures and percolates into the groundwater underneath. The area is agriculturally
unproductive as the valley floors are highly sodic, consist of sandy and silty clays and do not
support any vegetation."
Source:DISPOSAL OF DRAINAGE EFFLUENT IN EVAPORATION PONDS OF PAKISTAN
by I. Javed(1) and Abdul Hafeez(2) 
(1)Senior Engineer, (2)Director, International Water-logging and Salinity Research Institute
(IWASRI),Muhammadpura Raiwind Road, Lahore, Pakistan.

So, these ponds are fed by canals which drain water from the agricultural areas. While the initial
objective was agricultural in nature, I think their placement on Indo-Pakistan border gives them
defensive value as well.

Here is a closer look at these ponds.

Evaporation Ponds
There is an additional possibility of the walls of these ponds being breached or, additional water
pumped through canals to cause overflow and general flooding in the area. The sand may become
unsuitable for large scale movement of tracked as well as wheeled vehicles.

Conclusion

Like other areas, Pakistan has built formidable defensive structures which will test the resolve
and resourcefulness of Indian offensive formations. IA will need good engineering support as well as
air-cover as it dashes across the Thar towards its objectives.