The Peloponnesian

War

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 CHAPTER 1

The Peloponnesian
War

You couldn’t imagine two cities less alike. Athens was a powerful democracy where
citizens spent their days reclining and discussing politics and culture. Sparta was a
ruthless oligarchy where individuals were born and bred to fight. Athens
controlled a large, mostly coastal territory with its commanding navy, while Sparta
was infamous for its authoritative army. The former had its own empire; the latter
ran the Peloponnesian League. In ethnicity and dialect, too, the Athenians were
Ionian, the Spartans Dorian.

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The Peloponnesian War was bound to happen... eventually.

The two great cities were too

contrary, too dominant to stand in
the other’s shadow. They were
enemies. Man, throughout time,
has found causes, large and small,
over which to wage war.
Jealousies, grudges and human
nature, ever open to corruption
and debasement, push him to the
battlefield.

The Peloponnesian war was no exception.

It was a war that forever changed the Ancient Greek world. It took down the
mightiest city-state, Athens, and established Sparta as the superior power. Costly
campaigns plunged the Peloponnese into a deep poverty, from which they never
really recovered. The event itself was a shift from the earlier, smaller battles to full-
out warfare across the region, initiating atrocities never before seen. It marked the
end of the fifth century BC and the Golden Age of Athens.

This war, while greater than previous skirmishes, was not entirely anomalous. The
two immensely powerful city states had been at each other’s throats for years in the
first Peloponnesian war. They only managed a respite from the violence with the
‘Thirty Years Peace’ treaty in the winter of 446/5 BC. That peace accord,
however, didn’t really last long.

Thucydides, the great historian and the source for most of the information on the
Peloponnesian war, spelled it out clearly: “Peace is an armistice in a war that is
continuously going on.”

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Trouble started brewing as early as 440 BC when some of the Athenian allies
started to revolt. Sparta wanted to take advantage of its weakened enemy, which
would have triggered a major assault. It was held off, however, by another key
player, Corinth.

But the calmness proved fleeting. Alliance breaks, wavering warships, strin-
gent trade sanctions, mutinies and betrayals across the region all threatened to
erode the thin veneer of Grecian stability.

And then Athens infuriated Corinth, their original saviors. Strategically placed
warships stopped the Corinthians from capturing Corcyra, a powerful sea colony
not yet allied to either side. This did not sit well with the budding city-state.

The insults, however, did not stop there. Afterwards Athens instructed Potidaea, a
tributary ally of Athens but a colony of Corinth, to become submissive to the
Athenian Empire.

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Essentially, they were ordered to tear down their walls, send hostages to Athens,
dismiss the Corinthian magistrates from office, and refuse the magistrates that the
city would send in the future. Now Corinth was really angry.

Eventually, in 423 BC, Sparta summoned the members of the Peloponnesian

League to air their grievances with Athens. A debate ensued with the Athenians
(who were present...though not invited). The Corinthians accused Sparta of not
having the gumption to challenge the growing Athenian empire, goading them on
to fight. The Athenians, for their part, retorted that unleashing Sparta’s military
might could have undesired consequences.

In the end, a Spartan majority voted and declared that Athens had broken the
peace agreement... essentially declaring hostility.

And this is how the war began, with a whine and not a bang.

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 CHAPTER 2

Battles and Betrayals

The entirety of the Peloponnesian war is broken into two parts, punctuated by a
brief, and probably very welcomed, armistice. The total engagement, with all its
battles and betrayals, began in 431 BC and finally concluded with complete
devestation in 404 BC. The first collection of campaigns, referred to as the
“Archidamian War” after the Spartan king, lasted a full ten years.

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The plan of attack for the land-loving Spartans and their allies was to surround
the Athenians, thereby depriving them of their productive fields. This, however,
was only partially effective because the Spartans could sustain the siege for just a
few weeks at a time. The hoplites, or infantrymen, were still farmers after all. They
had to return to their own harvest and to quell the occasional slave uprising back
home.

Nonetheless, Pericles, the Athenian

general, advised his men to not
enter into combat with Sparta’s
masterful soldiers on the ground.
They would only fail. Instead, the
Athenians, far superior in naval
warfare, protected the access to
their port with a formidable wall
and relied on the dominance of
their fleet to launch attacks against
their enemy. So far, so good.

That’s when the plague hit.

Perhaps more than any other factor, it was the sweeping disease that weakened
Athens and brought the fair city to her knees. It wiped out over 30,000 citizens,
sailors and soldiers, including their revered general and his sons. It is estimated
that between one-third to two-thirds of the entire Athenian population perished.

After all the bodies had been disposed of, Athens renewed her military ambitions
with emboldened hostility. The general who replaced Pericles, Cleon, embarked
on an aggressive strategy for taking down the Spartans. The Athenians continued
relentlessly with their naval raids, and stretched their military activities into
Boeotia and Aetolia.

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In addition, they began fortifying posts, one of which was near Pylos on a tiny
island called Sphacteria. There the course of the first war turned in Athens's
favour.

Finally, things were looking up for Athens. They started taking advantage of
Sparta’s greatest weakness: Helots.

Helots were essentially slaves that made

the Spartan system possible. By doing
the farm work, they freed up the
citizens’ time to become expert soldiers.
However, they were also prone to revolts
- and the Athenian presence at nearby
posts helped spur them on. Without
their working class, Sparta would have a
hard time of surviving.  

The Athenians rejoiced after the Battle

of Pylos in 425 BC, when they defeated
the Spartans and captured between 300
and 400 soldiers. However, this joy did
not last long. The Spartans fought back
with their own belligerent general,
Brasidas. He raised an army and took the Athenian silver mines, a crucial source
of funding.

Interestingly enough, it was Thucydides, the famous historian, who was supposed
to have saved the Athenian silver mines. Maybe it’s not so strange then that he said
the following: “War is a matter not so much of arms as of money.”  

However, Thucydides failed to arrive at the mines in time to defend them and
consequently was exiled for his failure. Fortunately for us, this meant he was able

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to communicate with both sides, gaining a unique perspective which he later
recorded in his major work, History of the Peloponnesian War.

The Athenians also knew that silver was pretty key. And so, they tried to retake
their productive metallic mines... but, maybe not so tragically, the bellicose
generals from both sides, Brasidas and Cleon, were killed in the fight.

With no hawkish fame seekers to push the men into action, it was hard to keep
warring. In fact, this resulted in the Peace of Nicias, which spanned 6 years.

‘Peace’, however, might be a little bit of an overstatement. There were still plenty
skirmishes. Alliances were created and broken and large forces navigated the seas
and lands... war was just a shot away.

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 CHAPTER 3

The Sicilian
Expedition

The Peloponnesian war has been raging for 16 odd years, with the latter six under
a suspicious title of ‘peace’. The dominance of the Athenians had been
questioned and the first set of battles ended inconclusively. It’s no wonder then
that the war began again, this time with the aim of deciding, once and for all, who
ruled the Grecian world.

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And so, the second part of the Peloponnesian War began after what was
euphemistically termed the ‘Sicilian Expedition’.

The Sicilians were, in fact, allies of the Athenians, though very distant. Under
normal circumstances, they would probably have gone unnoticed.
And perhaps they would have this time...except for the fact that these islanders
were Ionian, just like the Athenians...and they were under attack by the people of
Syracuse, who happened to be ethnic Dorians, just like Athens’ great enemy,
Sparta. As a cunning way to get back at their real foe, therefore, the Athenians saw
an opportunity to get involved.

Power can be a dangerous thing. Those who hold it, don’t like losing it, and so
make decisions that affect the lives of countless others. Seated in their comfortable
havens, they command young men to death in the name of gods, kings and
country. Along with the fallen soldiers are those whose lands are destroyed, whose
sons are subjected to famine, whose wives and daughters are slain. These are the
innocents caught in between, the residents of random places, where the strongest
states battle for power, seemingly without end...

Ethnic alliances and wars of opportunity were not the

only reasons for the Athenians to sail to Sicily. Another
plan was afoot.

They wanted to conquer Sicily…to use as a starting

point for conquest in Italy and Carthage.

Alcibiades was the Athenian in charge of the expedition

and a crucial character from here on out in the
Peloponnesian War.

Unfortunately, right before the renowned general and his

army headed off, some religious statues were damaged,

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nay mutalitated. Alcibiades was accused. He tried to resolve the issue before
leaving for Sicily, knowing that it could take an unfortunate turn if he was not
there to defend himself.

But the powers that be forcibly bid him farewell and he took his crew on the
perilous journey. Predictably, Alcibiades was commanded back for the trial
promptly upon arriving on the foreign coast. Fearing he would be condemned
unjustly, he decided not to return to Athens. Instead, Alcibiades defected and went
to the Spartan side…bringing with him the Athenian stratagems to take over
Sicily.  

The Athenians just lost their main player.

The trouble, however, did not stop there. Upon landing on the island, the
Athenian army made a classic mistake. They weren’t prepared for the winter and,
unlike the Spartans, they were unaccustomed to feeling uncomfortable. So they
took a break from the weather and tried to conserve their resources.

This gave the Syracusans just enough time to call their Dorian brothers, the
Spartans, for help. Sparta was more than happy to lend a hand to spite their
former foe… especially knowing from
Alcibiades how important the island was in the
grand Athenian war strategy.

So Sparta sent General Gylippus to Sicily with

reinforcements and they swiftly defeated the
shivering Athenian forces.
But the Athenians did not tuck in their tail and
turn. Nicias, our previous Athenian
peacemaker, called for reinforcements. When
these additional armies arrived, vicious battles
ensued, though eventually, the Athenians
realised they had to retreat. They prepared to

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do so at once, but were stopped in their tracks. A bad omen, a lunar eclipse, took
place, and so the superstitious Athenians delayed their withdrawal.
This moment’s hesitance cost them greatly. The Spartans met their fleeing fleet
before they could escape. A huge sea battle raged, and the Athenians were
defeated once more. This time all survivors were killed or enslaved.
The war was back on.

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 CHAPTER 4

Athens’ Last Stand

The year is 413 BC and the battle between Sparta and Athens continues to rage.
The war, which saw a brief 6 year peace, is now back on after Athens’ bitter defeat
in Sicily. The Spartans had sent aid to their allies on the island, but that did not
fully satiate their desire for domination.

Sparta wanted to do more … they wanted to destroy Athens.

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This brings us to the second segment of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartans still
had their secret weapon, Alcibiades, the former Athenian General who was
charged with religious crimes. Alcibiades, knowing Athens’ weakest points,
convinced Sparta to build a fortification in Decelea, a strategic post right outside
of Athens. This would prevent all overland shipment to the Athens, forcing the
city to get their supplies by boat, which was much more costly.

This additional expense was then combined with the nearby disrupted silver mines
and the 20,000 freed Athenian slaves, resulting in a serious economic crisis for
Athens. Their treasury and emergency reserve fund of 1,000 talents was swiftly
dwindling away. Their only remaining course of action was to raise taxes or
tributes from their allies, which wasn’t a popular decision.

At this point, both parties pumped more troops and ships into Sicily.

The Corinthians, the Spartans, and others in the Peloponnesian League all sent
reinforcements to Syracuse.

The Athenians, however, did not withdrawal. Instead, they brought their own
additional men, around 5,000 troops and another hundred ships... but it
didn’t do the Athenians any good.

The Spartan hero, Gylippus, won all the land wars in Sicily and smartly advised
the Syracusans to build a navy, in case the Athenians wanted to escape. Sure
enough, the Athenians tried and were defeated. Eventually the entire Athenian
fleet was destroyed and virtually the whole army sold into slavery.

This was Athens’ lowest moment.

Everyone believed her empire was over. Her best men had already died or
defected and she was without money, strength or moral. Clearly the Athenians had

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overestimated their own abilities and were now about to face the truth of their
limits.

But Athens didn’t die. Even though her allies revolted against her, the treasuries
were empty, and the Syracuences were on the offense with a ship to attack, aided
by support in Persia... Athens still had a few things working on her favor.

For instance, the other side was slow in bringing their ships to the Aegean. Some
of their allies returned with hopes of protection and the Persians were slow in
furnishing the promised funds.

In addition, Athens had a backup plan. In a prudent moment, she had saved
some money and 100 ships for a rainy day.

These were immediately released.

With these ships out warring, the Athenian

government was taken up by an
oligarchical revolution, run by 400 men.
Peace was finally possible. The fighting
fleets now based on the island of Samos,
however, did not recognise the new rulers
and the possibility of a ceasefire. In fact, in
411 BC they engaged the Spartans at the famous Battle of Syme . The runaway
fleet then appointed Alcibiades as their leader and continued the war until the
Athenian democratic government was reinstituted.

Even though Alcibiades was condemned as traitor, he was still influential in

Athens. He wanted to restore democracy in a diplomatic manner, so he managed
to persuade the renegade ships to not attack Athens, but instead turn their
weapons on the Spartans in the battle of Cyzicus. Finally the Athenians had a

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turning point, they obliterated the Spartan fleet, helping to re-establish the
financial basis of the Athenian Empire.

Between 410 and 406 BC, Athens managed to actually win battles, recover
territory and resurrect their fiscal stability. Almost all thanks to Alcibiades.

This happy Athenian moment did not last long.

Though it would not at first appear to be the case, things went back to bad at the
naval battle of Arginusae.

The Athenians actually won, losing only 25 ships compared to Sparta’s 70.
Unfortunately the weather was so bad that the Athenians did not finish off the
Spartan fleet, nor rescue their stranded crew. This lead to a very controversial trial
which ended with the execution of Athens’ six top naval commanders. This action
depleted the navy’s intelligence, experience and moral.  

Then the Spartans promoted a new general, Lysander. He was navy-savvy and a
diplomat who cultivated fresh relations with the Persians. In 405 BC, Lysander
initiated a cunning attack on Hellespont,
the Athenian bread basket, which if
destroyed, would threatened widespread
starvation.

The Athenian fleet had no choice but to

engage in battle and they were crushed.  

Eventually, after facing starvation and

disease from the never ending siege,
Athens surrendered in 404 BC. The
defeat was immense. The city was
stripped of its walls, its fleet, and all of
its overseas possessions. In addition to
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this, Corinth and Thebes required retribution, demanding that the city be
destroyed and all the people enslaved.

Sparta, Athens’ arch-enemy, then did something very remarkable.

Instead of continuing with their warlike ways, Sparta announced their refusal to
destroy a city that had previously done so much good. They would take Athens
into their own system and ultimately save it from the other city-states, revealing
the clemency of the Spartans once and for all.  

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