GUEVARA vs. GUEVARA, et. al.

G.R. No. L-5405. January 31, 1956.

No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court.

Overview:
Respondent brought a suit against petitioner to recover a portion of land alleging that said portion should correspond to her by way of
legitime. It turns out such portion was sold by the deceased, Victorino (P &R’s father) to petitioner. This case eventually reached the
SC, where it ordered the probate of Victorino’s will. Acting on this decision, respondent commenced a special proceeding for probate of
the will where she alleged that the testamentary provision regarding a certain hectare of land has been de jure revoked by reason of the
testator’s alienation of the said land. Petitioner moved to dismiss said petition.

The lower Court initially denied said motion but subsequently granted the same. It likewise denied respondent’s amended petition for
probate. CA, on appeal, reversed said decision and ordered CFI to reinstate said petition. SC affirmed CA.
This is a sequel to, and aftermath of, a previous litigation between the parties that reached the SC, through the former CA.

FACTS:
Four years after her father’s death, respondent, believing that former died intestate, brought a suit against petitioner to recover a portion
of land registered in petitioner’s name, alleging that said portion should correspond to her by way of legitime. It appears, however, that
her father, Victorino, executed a will. The case reached the former CA and was decided in favor of Rosario, but upon certiorari, was
modified by the SC, ordering the probate of Victorino’s will.

Acting on this decision, Rosario commenced a special proceeding for probate of Victorino’s will. She alleged in said petition that the
testamentary provision regarding a certain 259 hectare of land has been de jure revoked by reason of the testator’s alienation of the
said land. This said provision states, among others, that 21.6171 hectares of the 259 is given to the respondent. However, prior to his
death, Victorino sold the southern half of the hectare to his son, herein petitioner, and expressly recognized him as the owner of the
northern half as well.

In response, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (a) the petition itself alleged that the will was revoked; (b) that
'whatever right to probate the parties may have has already prescribed'; and (c) that the purpose of the probate was solely to have
petitioner Rosario declared an acknowledged natural child of the deceased.

Such motion was initially denied but upon MR, was subsequently granted on the ground that Rosario Guevara's petition did not ask for
the probate in toto of the will, contrary to the order of the SC; that her right to petition for the probate of the testament of Victorino had
prescribed; and that her action for judicial declaration of acknowledgment had likewise prescribed.

Thus, Rosario filed an amended petition for the probate of the will in toto.

CFI – denied petition for the probate of the will in toto, as well as the MR.
CA – reversed dismissal of petition for probate and ordered the lower court to reinstate the petition

ISSUE 1: W/N probate proceedings may be barred by statute of limitations

RULING: NO. Reason and precedent reject the applicability of the Statute of Limitations to probate proceedings, because the same are
established not exclusively in the interest of the heirs, but primarily for the protection of the testator's expressed wishes, which are
entitled to respect as a consequence of his ownership and right of disposition. Inasmuch as the probate of wills is required by public
policy, the State could not have intended to defeat the same by applying thereto the statute of limitations of action.

The provision of Article 756 of the old Civil Code (1042 of the New) and of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, reiterating those of the old
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), point out that the presentation of a decedent's will to the competent court has always been deemed
by our law as more of a duty than a right, and the neglect of such obligation carries with it the corresponding penalty and it is
inconsistent with that policy that the court should refuse to admit wills to probate, without inquiry into their validity. It is not without
purpose that Rule of Court prescribes that any 'person interested in the estate may,  at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed'.

ISSUE 2: W/N probate of the will can be dispensed with

RULING: NO. Under section 1 Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to
the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with a will without
first securing its allowance or probate by the court because (1) the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or
personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and (2) the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot
be dispensed with and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial.

They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the
presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law
enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case.

FALLO: CA decision AFFIRMED.