Zone of Proximal Development

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Zone of Proximal Development

a
E. D. Bozhovich
a
Department of Educational Psychology, Moscow
City University of Psychology and Education
Published online: 08 Dec 2014.
To cite this article: E. D. Bozhovich (2009) Zone of Proximal Development, Journal of

Russian & East European Psychology, 47:6, 48-69
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Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. 47, no. 6,
November–December 2009, pp. 48–69.
© 2010 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
ISSN 1061–0405/2010 $9.50 + 0.00.
DOI 10.2753/RPO1061-0405470603
E.D. Bozhovich
Zone of Proximal Development

The Diagnostic Capabilities and
Limitations of Indirect Collaboration
The main idea put forward in this article is that any function within
the zone of proximal development matures within a particular internal
context that includes not only the function’s actual level but also how
susceptible the child is to types of help, the sequence in which these
types of help are offered, the flexibility or rigidity of previously formed
stereotypes, how willing the child is to collaborate, and other factors.
This context can impact the diagnosis of a function’s potential level
of development. The first part of the article analyzes definitions of the
concept “zone of proximal development” and descriptions of this phe-
nomenon in works by L.S. Vygotsky. The second part briefly describes
empirical studies that aim to provide a differentiated assessment of the
diagnostic capabilities and educational effects of means of children’s
indirect collaboration with adults.
The works in which L.S. Vygotsky introduces the concept of a
zone of proximal development and describes the phenomenon that
English translation © 2010 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text © 2008
“Kul’turno-istoricheskaia psikhologiia.” “Zona Blizhaishchego razvitiia: vozmo-
zhnosti i ogranicheniia ee diagnostiki v usloviiakh kosvennogo sotrudnichestva.”
Kul’turno-istoricheskaia psikhologiia, 2008, no. 4, pp. 91–100.
E.D. Bozhovich is a Candidate of Psychological Sciences, professor in the
Department of Educational Psychology, Moscow City University of Psychology
and Education, and director of the Laboratory of Educational Psychology, Rus-
sian Academy of Sciences Institute of Psychology.
Translated by Nora Seligman Favorov.
48
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 2009 49
underlies it were produced primarily in 1932–34. It is difficult to

determine the exact chronology of the stages in which the concept
was developed, and, indeed, there is no compelling reason to do
so. What is important is the concept’s multidimensionality. We
will try to examine how definitions of the concept differ from one
another in terms of aspect and accent.
We start with the following definition.1
“The zone of proximal development defines functions that have
not matured yet, but are in a process of maturing, that will mature
tomorrow, that are currently in an embryonic state; these functions
could be called the buds of development, the flowers of develop-
ment, rather than the fruits of development, that is, what is only
just maturing” (Vygotsky, 1935, p. 42).
The use of “fruits,” “buds,” and “flowers” as metaphors is inter-
esting not only for its expressiveness: it seems to us that it conceals
the beginning of what would become a very important idea for Vy-
gotsky. “Buds” and “flowers” represent different periods in the life
cycle of the plant, and its zone of proximal development is different
for each of these periods, but strictly defined by nature. The upper
boundary of its development in the forthcoming period has been
biologically predetermined. Perhaps this is what suggested to Lev
Semenovich the idea of an upper and lower boundary for the zone
over the course of a child’s development. Unlike a plant, children
have different boundaries not only at different ages but even within
the same age group. Their limits are also predetermined, but in a
different way—by a given function’s individual internal context.
This is why for one child the slightest hint will suffice while another
will need a lengthy explanation.
There is another important aspect to this definition. The term
“function” in Vygotsky’s works has a broad range of meanings: he
uses it not only in the traditional sense, to denote all higher mental
functions (memory, thinking, etc.), but also for multifunctional
mental formations (intellect, voluntariness, awareness of one’s
actions) and skills (literacy, reading). Furthermore, Vygotsky notes
that the concept of zone of proximal development is applicable to
various aspects of child personality (Vygotsky, 1984).
It can be presumed that the term “function” for Vygotsky repre-
50 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY
sented a functioning “psychological system” that has already taken

shape at a certain level (Vygotsky, 1982a). The functioning of the
system is a process that promotes development. Probably in order
to underscore the dynamic, processual aspect of functions, another
definition was formulated—one close to that cited above but at the
same time different from it: “The area of immature but maturing
processes constitutes the child’s zone of proximal development”
(Vygotsky, 1984, p. 267; also Vygotsky, 1996, p. 205). The works
of Lev Semenovich and his disciples demonstrate, with the support

of significant experimental findings, that the most marked differ-
ences are found specifically in this processual aspect of the mind.
One child can enter school with a low IQ and a “large zone,” while
another has a high IQ and a “small zone.” By the end of primary
school, indicators of academic achievement and IQ for the first child
approach those of the second child. For the first child, the learning
conditions proved appropriate to the objectives of development.
For the second, they corresponded to the child’s actual level but
did not address the “zone”; it was already actualized, and these
conditions could not expand it (Vygotsky, 1935).
Discovering and measuring the “zone” was at first described as
a simple procedure: independent work on a learning task followed
by work with an adult on learning tasks of the same or greater
difficulty. But it is simple only at first glance: “[W]hen we apply
the principle of collaboration in order to determine the zone of
proximal development, we have an opportunity to directly study
the very thing that most precisely determines the mental matura-
tion that should come to completion in the next and immediately
following periods of age-related development” (Vygotsky, 1984, p.
265). The word “principle” was not chosen casually. Collaboration
is not something that is used in isolation but a generalized name
for a variety of techniques that help uncover a child’s potential
abilities. Furthermore, as we will see below, it is possible to have
the unseen participation of a partner when that partner is physically
absent at the moment of a child’s activity.
To summarize, the concept of the zone of proximal develop-
ment as seen in the above definitions emphasizes: (a) the latency
of maturing functions; (b) the principle behind their discovery; (c)

the polysemanticism of the term “function”; and (d) the external
and internal determination of its processual developments.
We now turn to those definitions that emphasize the correlation
between the actual and potential levels of a child’s development.
“[T]he discrepancy between mental age, or the actual level of
development, and the level that the child attains when performing
tasks not independently, but in collaboration, is what defines the
zone of proximal development” (Vygotsky, 1982b, p. 247). In this

definition, what the previous propositions said about “maturing”
functions and/or processes seems to have been encoded with the
word “discrepancy.” And here we find a set of symptoms and a
means for establishing this discrepancy. Vygotsky goes on to attempt
to clarify the word “discrepancy,” again using nonterminological
designations—“distance,” “how far this capacity extends.”
A child’s zone of proximal development is the distance between the
level of his actual development, determined with the help of a learn-
ing task performed independently, and the level of a child’s potential
development, determined with the help of learning tasks performed by
the child under the guidance of adults and in collaboration with his
smarter classmates. (Vygotsky, 1935, p. 42)
[W]e give the child, using some form of collaboration, learning tasks
that extend beyond the boundaries of his mental age, and we determine
how far this capacity for intellectual collaboration extends for a given
child and how far this capacity extends beyond the boundaries of the
child’s mental age. (Vygotsky, 1984, pp. 264–65)
These definitions raise a number of questions.
First: Does this “discrepancy,” this “distance” always reveal the
zone of proximal development? After all, children do not always
succeed at learning tasks performed independently even at their
actual level of development. Failure can stem from various features
of the task, its subject matter, or children’s insufficient knowledge
rather than their level of intellect or thinking. In other words, can
we always be sure we are talking about “maturing” functions,
and not “matured” functions that are latent due to a particular
circumstance?
Second: What quantity and type of learning task should be used

to reliably measure the “distance” between the level of actual and
potential development? A child can show a different “distance”
between two levels of development when faced with learning tasks
that demand one and the same function but have different content.
Not only can mental development overall be uneven (as Vygotsky
himself noted), but so can specific functions, since they are always
multidimensional. This means that in identifying the levels of
development of each function it is necessary, as much as possible,

to specifically define the aspect of the function that interests us.
The present-day science of psychology no longer permits us to
talk about thinking in general; it is one thing when it is solving a
classroom learning task (e.g., an arithmetic problem) and another
when it is working on higher-order problems (e.g., searching for
mathematical patterns).
Third: Is it necessary to take into account the nature of collabo-
ration, specifically, the quality of assistance being provided by the
partner? Vygotsky’s works present side-by-side leading questions,
examples, showing and explaining a solution, the beginning of a
solution by an adult who asks the child to continue finding it. In
actuality, is the “distance” between two levels of development also
determined by the type of assistance? For one child a slight prompt
or hint is sufficient while another has to have things clearly shown
and explained. Which type of assistance to choose probably depends
not only on the “size” of the zone of proximal development and its
actual level, but a large number of individual traits.
And there is another nuance: in the last of the above definitions
what is referred to is a “capacity for intellectual collaboration.”
The capacity to perform a learning task in collaboration and the
capacity to collaborate are two different things. The potential lying
within a function’s zone of proximal development might be signifi-
cant, but the ability to collaborate (communicative competence, a
desire to understand the partner’s logic, etc.) may be something
the child lacks or may be poorly developed. In that case, there is
no type of assistance that will necessarily reveal what is hidden
within the “zone.”
It is likely not a coincidence that in the following definition

Vygotsky talks about the “ability to advance” from independent to
collaborative work: “A child’s greater or lesser capacity to advance
from what he can do independently to what he can do in collabora-
tion turns out to be the most sensitive indicator of his developmen-
tal dynamic and the success of his mental activities. It coincides
completely with his zone of proximal development” (Vygotsky,
1982b, p. 248). This “advance” may demand the participation of
many aspects of the child’s cognitive and personality development.

Furthermore, this advance may be extended over time; over the
course of contact with a partner the child may learn to collaborate
and the partner may gradually discover which types of assistance
the child responds to. This “advance” is a special process at the
boundaries between two levels of development.
This brings us to the last definition we will examine.
“The divergence between the level of problem solving achieved
with guidance, with the assistance of adults, and the level of problem
solving achieved independently defines a child’s zone of proximal
development” (Vygotsky, 1956, p. 447).
The level of problem solved is certainly a new aspect of the
concept and phenomenon. The level of problem solving has spe-
cific features: it can take the form of lengthy deliberation or an
instant guess; it can be relatively simple (e.g., using an analogy)
or original, subtle, elegant, and unexpected for the partner. The
search for an answer can be a strictly logical train of thought or a
process of overcoming misconceptions or finding the way out of
“dead ends.”
Could the differences we pointed out between definitions of the
zone of proximal development actually be different verbal expres-
sions of one and the same thought? Could the fact that they lack
semantic uniformity simply be the result of stylistic laxity in a man
who never had a chance to edit his texts? Whatever the case may
be, we will try to look at this from another angle.
In contemplating the problem of mental development and the
methods for studying it, various aspects of this phenomenon, tech-
niques for empirically objectifying, measuring, and interpreting it,
were given verbal expression that perhaps was not always clear.
At the same time the concept’s context inevitably expanded along
with the range of problems associated with it. If this is so, then the
zone of proximal development is an entire aggregate (perhaps a
system) of phenomena and processes, each of which demands spe-
cial investigation. At the same time it is not simply one indicator of
development (however capacious), but rather its only multivariate
unified symptomatology. Attempts to systematize it, to hierarchi-
cally arrange it, are already being undertaken. They lead to a more
general question—the question of the zone’s structure.
The idea proposed by L.F. Obukhova and I.A. Korepanova
appears promising. It posits that the “zone” has a center and
periphery defined in terms of how a child maintains and realizes
different positions in collaboration with adults while performing
an external productive action (Korepanova, 2004; Obukhova and
Korepanova, 2005). However there may be many answers to the
question of what should be sought in the center and what in the
periphery. They depend on a number of objective and subjective
factors, in particular, what material the action is being performed
on (a real or ideal object); the nature of the learning task (dis-
crimination, transformation, construction of an object); the type
of assistance the adult is providing (active interaction with the
subject or indirect collaboration mediated by teaching tools in the
absence of the adult).
In a recent paper by V.K. Zaretskii, two pedagogically essential
objectives of collaboration were identified: (a) mastery of specific
subject matter that has posed problems for the child; and (b) the
child’s work to overcome difficulties not just for the sake of mas-
tering the material, but to acquire experience in overcoming them
(Zaretskii, 2007). These objectives can a priori, through the will of
the researcher, define the center and periphery of the “zone.” How-
ever, one doubt arises here. The author asserts that when children
encounter difficulty they wind up in a “problem situation.” How-
ever, encountering difficulty is simply a trigger for the emergence
of a problem situation. In reality it arises only with the experience
of the novelty of the problem, of the unexpectedness of an encounter
with difficulty, with the problematization of existing knowledge.
And this can be avoided even during collaboration; then difficulty

arises but the problem situation does not, and the result can be the
accumulation of experience avoiding difficulty.
Thus in addition to regarding the “zone” of proximal develop-
ment as a sort of integral and, undoubtedly, very substantial symp-
tom of development, its different aspects must be studied separately,
its symptoms must be differentiated. This is practically unavoid-
able, if only due to the multifaceted nature of such phenomena as
collaboration, the level of academic success, the level of problem

solving, and, especially, the learning task and function.
The type of problem—standard or nonstandard—is of particular
significance. Standard problems (even if they are not necessarily
solvable by analogy) demand variability of reasoning and of the
operational composition of actions within the confines of available
information. A nonstandard problem, as a rule, presumes the actu-
alization of different strata of experience that has been spontane-
ously acquired and derived through education, the incorporation
of intuition, and the verification of conjectures through rational
reasoning, which demands going beyond the bounds of present
and obvious conditions and, to an even greater extent, beyond the
boundaries of familiar means of working with material. The best-
known problems of this sort are those described in the works of
Ia.A. Ponomarev (1960, 1976).
In the case of “functions,” they can be so complex that their
different aspects develop at different rates. For example, within
the framework of a child’s intellect, the different operations of
classification, analogy, and building syllogisms can all be at dif-
ferent levels. Any assessment test can catch these differences, but
IQ is nevertheless measured as an overall indicator. The situation
is just as complicated when it comes to studying speech cognition.
For example, understanding an utterance presumes, in addition to
knowledge of the lexical content of language and the fundamentals
of syntax, sensitivity to such phenomena of language as the mean-
ing of metaphor, inversion, and stylistic flourishes that add to the
primary meaning, and so on. Speech cognition also includes special
functions such as understanding subtext, guessing the meaning of
unfamiliar words based on context, developing hypotheses about
the situation of the utterance, and so on. Based on a number of our

studies we can assert that adolescent schoolchildren can reliably
distinguish correctly and incorrectly constructed sentences, but
they cannot always see the difference between permissible and
desirable forms of utterances on the one hand, and permissible
and undesirable forms of utterances on the other. Knowledge of
language and about language is not the only or even the most
important thing when it comes to distinguishing between these
forms. The most important thing is knowledge of individual

semantics and the stylistic sense that speakers of a language de-
velop. If knowledge is an indicator of the level of education, then
“sensing” linguistic reality—linguistic intuition—is a symptom
of development. This means that these two things must have their
own specialized diagnosis.
When conducting diagnostic work and all the varieties of cor-
rectional and developmental work, it is fitting to have immediate
collaboration between a child or a small group of children and an
adult. But for classroom-style teaching, indirect collaboration can
be achieved through teaching tools (textbook models, algorithms,
worksheets), which are subtle forms of collaboration. Vygotsky
wrote of this indirect collaboration, “When a pupil is at home
solving problems after being shown a model in class, he contin-
ues to act in collaboration, although at the moment the teacher is
not standing beside him. . . . This assistance, this collaboration is
invisibly present, contained in the child’s apparently independent
solution” (Vygotsky, 1982b, 257–58).
We now turn our attention to the word “model.” This is a widely
used teaching tool. It cannot be a diagnostic tool for the zone of
proximal development of a number of functions, in particular in
the area of linguistic competence. Our model typology has already
been described (Bozhovich, 2008), so for now we address only
what is known as “ready-made models.”
A ready-made model problem, used usually in textbooks,
demonstrates only the result of an action. When working with such
models a schoolchild is confronted with a need to discover an ac-
tion “crystallized” into a ready-made product and leading to the
creation of analogous products. In this type of model there are two
subtypes: models from which an unambiguous action is derived—a

technique for solving a particular type of problem—and models
that conceal a number of possible options, since the problem itself
can have several solutions.
For the first subtype we have chosen the name “template model,”
since once the technique has been discovered, work can be per-
formed based on a formal grammatical and linguistic mechanism
by reproducing one and the same operation on the material as-
signed. Here is one such model where an active construction must

be transformed into a passive one: “The storm tore the boat from
its moorings” versus “The boat was torn from its moorings by the
storm.” We have named the second subtype an “example model,”
and this type of problem cannot be solved mechanically. Take
the example of the sentence, “The little hut disappeared under
snowdrifts.” There are at least three solutions here: “The little hut
was completely buried by snow,” “The little hut was covered by
snowdrifts,” and “The little hut could barely be seen under the
snow.” Several overall approaches can be conceived for solving
problems based on this model using lexical and phraseological
mechanisms. In a special study we came up with a unit of analysis
for the processes used by children in solving such problems. What
we used for this unit was the method for seeking their solution.
Given a wide variety of individual approaches, we succeeded in
identifying three invariant components: a reference, operational,
and emotional-volitional component. Specifically this makeup of
methods was common among them, rather than any specific content
of each component.
The reference component concerns the features of the linguistic
material on which the pupil focuses first and foremost (semantic,
grammatical, stylistic, whole complexes of features).
The operational component is the operations—in aggregate and
sequence—that the child performs in solving the problem. They
differ from one another based on the predominant references pupils
focus on in the linguistic material; and the reference itself is medi-
ated by specific operations, which depend on the features that the
pupil sees first in the material.
The emotional-volitional component is not simply the emotional
context within which the problem is solved, but the effort that
children expend in seeking the solution. It was noticed that pupils
sought solutions to some problems (even among those of the same
type) with greater determination while others inspired little effort
and were left without a solution. This component is very closely
tied to the different aspects of a child’s linguistic experience (verbal,
academic) and sense of language.
We will briefly describe the techniques and process for solving
problems, first without the use of models and then based on the
two types of models. In other words, first we present the actual
level of a particular aspect of linguistic competence and then the
zone of its proximal development, manifested through the use
of models. This aspect of linguistic competence can be called
semantic-syntactic function: it permits the speaker of a language
to determine the possibility/impossibility and desirability/undesir-
ability of an expression with a particular content (meaning) using
a specific syntactic form.
Eighth-graders (111 in all) were given an assignment without
models that featured sentences that had been given a passive con-
struction using a formal grammatical or lexical-phraseological
mechanism as well as some that had not been so transformed. In
accordance with the instructions for the assignment, the pupil could
give one of three answers for each sentence: a positive response (a
version of the transformed sentence); a negative solution—a strike
through (—) indicating that the sentence could not be transformed;
and an indefinite answer (?) if the pupil was unable to determine
whether or not a positive solution was possible.
The experiments identified three main ways of solving the
problems, and subjects were arranged into three corresponding
groups.
The first approach was characterized by a predominant orienta-
tion toward the sentence’s semantic features and how they related
to formal grammatical features. Work with semantics was not
limited to pupil attention toward the sentence referent. It dealt with
the meaning of the sought-after passive sentence (in particular, the
randomness/nonrandomness of a state or action; the spontaneity
of events, etc.). Typical statements by the subjects included: “There

is no actor here. This is a force of nature, it can be made passive” or
“In this sentence, the occurrence is important, the actor is not im-
portant.” This kind of approach to linguistic material was combined
with a versatility of the transforming action’s operational component.
Advancing from formal grammatical attempts at transformation to
lexical-phraseological ones occurred without difficulty, without
“getting stuck” on a particular form. Pupils checked their results for
idiomatic viability, semantic correspondence to the original active

form, and stylistic acceptability. The emotional-volitional component
of the way in which the problem was solved was manifested in an
anticipatory “sense” of the possible result of the solution, an intuition
of a positive answer in one case and a negative one in another. This
determined the persistence with which a solution was sought or the
speed with which it was given up on.
The second approach that subjects used was characterized by
a predominant orientation on formal grammatical features, with
analysis of the assigned material moving from form to the con-
straints imposed by the semantics “gleaned” from the sentence.
Children very rarely focused on the meaning of the construction;
they tied their search and assessment of attempts to the sentence
referent. The predominant focus on form of construction was com-
bined with a rigidity in the operational component of the action
of transformation. Children attempted to mechanically eliminate
the subject from the sentence and make the predicate fit into the
template for a passive verb. They did not anticipate a solution at
first, only episodically and on the basis of their own attempts.
At the same time, when focus was on the sentence referent, some
children expressed a rather interesting idea, that the sentence from
which the subject was mechanically removed was incomprehensible
because it was taken out of context (“If there were other sentences
in front of the sentence or after it then it would be possible to under-
stand it and switch it”). The emotional-volitional component was
associated less with the search for a solution than with uneasiness
about the unfamiliar nature of the task (which did not lend itself
to solution through a template).
The third approach used by subjects featured a focus exclusively

on the formal grammatical aspect of the sentence, the performance
of formal operations, an almost total absence of attempts to draw
on lexical-phraseological linguistic resources, and unsystematic
formal grammatical and idiomatic verification of the construction
that was devised. Work on the sentences that did not lend themselves
to formal grammatical alteration usually came to a close when the
pupils became convinced that “you cannot take the subject out of
the sentence and you cannot construct a sentence without it.” The
only semantic aspect in the work of these children came when they
checked the comprehensibility of the sentence. But the reason they
came up with to explain the “incomprehensibility” of their version
was based on a falsehood: the sentence was labeled incomprehensible
“because here there is a noun, and the sentences that are the easiest
to transform have pronouns.” The only emotional content was an
unpleasant experience of the negative (—) and indefinite (?) answers.
They made the children uneasy and were perceived as indicators of
their failure. They did not make predictions about the solution either
initially or during their attempts.
Let us look at how the work of these three groups of subjects
changes when they can rely on models, that is, when they are able
to work indirectly with an adult. In so doing we will try to answer
the following questions.
• Do the processual features of the work—the approach to
solving syntactic synonymy problems—change depending
on the type of model (and if so, then how)?
• Is the model a diagnostic instrument that reveals the
zone of proximal development of the semantic-syntactic
function?
Each of the three groups was divided into two halves: one was
given an assignment first based on template models and then on
example models; for the other group the order was reversed.
Something common to all the findings collected was that in
moving to the first assignment (using either model type) there was
a reduced rate of success for pupils of all groups. Furthermore, the
sharpest reduction occurred among subjects from the first, most

competent group (9–11 percent). Among subjects from the two
other groups, the success rate fell 2–5 percent. The model, while an
aid in solving the problem, was at the same time a factor inhibiting
the free manifestation of verbal experience and intuition.
The picture changed with the second assignment using models.
The success rate for subjects in the first group increased whichever
order of model was used, but to different degrees. When they moved
from the example model to the template model, the number of cor-
rect answers exceeded the baseline level (i.e., the level established
before the models were introduced) by more than 10 percent;
when the sequence was reversed the increase was ≈ 2 percent. This
indicates that the example model is more effective at preventing
the template approach from being used in the first place than it is
at eliminating an already-established tendency to use it based on
previous influence of the template model. The means of perform-
ing the task in this group did not change, it was just refined: the
children more often found precise and stylistically subtle versions
of lexical-phraseological transformations and search tests were
activated. For this group the model was less a tool for identifying
the semantic-syntactic function’s zone of proximal development as
it was a methodological means for training and refining a sense of
language. Development also came into play, but rather than reveal-
ing the “zone,” these exercises deployed the actual level.
Among subjects in the second group, a weakly expressed but nev-
ertheless positive success dynamic was seen only in the subgroup
that started with the template model and moved to the example
model. The number of correct solutions based on the example
model increased by 4 percent compared with the baseline level.
While this model helped children overcome a tendency to follow a
template, when the model sequence was reversed it did not prevent
this tendency—the success rate using the template model after the
example model did not change. This is the opposite of what hap-
pened with the first group. Regarding this subgroup it can be said
that the example model concealed children’s potential. But these
potentialities were unstable and fragile. The pupils who advanced
from working with the example model to working with the template
model lost the experience that they acquired from the first model.
The means for coming up with solutions began to change, but was
dependent on having the model right there at the moment. Nonethe-
less, the very fact that these children exhibited an orientation at least
on the sentence referent when solving problems without models and
later were more successful using the example model suggests that
the semantic-syntactic function as an aspect of linguistic competence
lies within the zone of their proximal development.

When it came to the third group, it also manifested a marked
situational dependence on models and their sequence; the method
varied depending on the model. However, unlike the second group,
here there was no positive dynamic when children worked first
with the template model and then with the example model—the
number of correct solutions barely reached the baseline level for
problem solving (without models). This means that the afteref-
fect of the template turned out to be stronger than the influence of
the example. And when the sequence was reversed, so were the
results: when moving from example to template, the success rate
increased by almost 7 percent when compared with the baseline.
This subgroup was close to the analogous subgroup of the first
group; that is, the example model was more effective at prevent-
ing the tendency toward using a template approach than it was
at eliminating it after its initial influence. Regarding this group
(and the second one) it can be asserted that the example identifies
capabilities of subjects—albeit erratic—hidden within the zone of
proximal development of the semantic-syntactic function that is
part of linguistic competence.
It therefore appears that the way all subjects performed their task
was situationally dependent not only on the type of model, but on
the sequence in which models were presented, but how dependent
they were varied based on children’s own assets—their linguistic
experience, and stereotypes generated by the previous model.
To what extent did the children themselves perceive the model
as a form of help and something that increased their success in
solving problems?
In response to the experimenter’s question, “Did you need

models to complete this sort of assignment?” the majority of
children who used the first approach replied: “Of course,” “Yes,
I needed them,” and so on. In response to the question “Why?”
they replied: “You feel more confident, especially when you have
to change words in the sentence or shorten the sentence,” “The
model doesn’t hurt, even if you know what to do.” In other words,
it is as if the example model expands children’s ability to use their
own speech experience; that is, to act within the bounds of the
function’s actual level.
Children from the second group also asserted that they needed
the models: “This model [pointing to example] is different. It’s bet-
ter,” “You can find other words. And with them it sometimes works
out better.” For them the example model is a factor, something that
both teaches and actualizes the resources of speech experience; for
the researcher it is a diagnostic tool.
Subjects from the third group were very reluctant to discuss the
negative and indefinite types of answers: (—) and (?). They were
seen as evidence of their own failure, even though the experimenter
accepted these responses as valid and legitimate. Of the example
model they said, “It doesn’t help. After all, the sentence uses differ-
ent words,” “I stopped looking at that model. It’s too vague. This
one [pointing to template] is better.” At some point, or even from
the very start, after taking a look at the example model, the children
began to ignore it. They failed to find in it another (nontemplate)
principle for transforming constructions and saw in the model only
a particular solution to a particular problem. In actuality, this model
promoted a higher success rate for them, but only in cases where it
was shown first and children’s actions were not influenced by the
template approach to solving the problem.
We now return to the questions we raised above.
Approaches to solving syntactic synonymy problems did not
change for all subjects. Those in whom an approach appropriate
to the problem had already taken shape needed the model only as
a factor boosting their confidence in performing the task. Those
in whom the semantic-syntactic function of linguistic competence
had formed to a limited extent (at the level of understanding the

sentence referent) manifested an ability lying within the zone of
proximal development only when a model helped them find an ap-
proach that enabled them to overcome the constraining influence
of the template approach. Finally, subjects who did not focus on
the overall meaning of the construction before working with the
models were not able to find it while working with models either.
But on an unconscious level they began to change their approach
to solving the problems, relying specifically on those models that

demonstrated the lexical-phraseological relationships within the
linguistic material.
This suggests that a ready-made model can be used as a tool
in discovering the zone of proximal development. But findings
based on its use must be analyzed differently depending not only
on the actual level of development of a given function, but on the
features of subjects’ speech experience as well as their capabilities
and limitations in comprehending the problem-solving principle
“crystallized” within the model and the flexibility/rigidity of ste-
reotypes generated by the previous model.
Similar but more quantitatively expressed results were obtained
during the study of another function of speech cognition and us-
ing another diagnostic tool. The study was conducted jointly with
A.V. Zhilinskaia (2004) and its object was the semantic function
of speech competence: the comprehension and interpretation of
metaphoric meaning of linguistic units, in this case phraseologisms.
The context of the sentence into which the phraseologism was
incorporated served as both the tool for diagnosing the zone of
proximal development of this function and the means of providing
pedagogical help to subjects.
A first series within the experiment was conducted to determine
subjects’ actual level of knowledge and comprehension of Russian
phraseology. Fifth- through seventh-graders (seventy-seven in all)
were given twelve phraseologisms and asked to explain their mean-
ing. In the experiment’s second series the children had to explain
the meaning of these same phraseologisms, now incorporated into
sentences. Context, of course, contributes to comprehension of any
unit of language, since it mobilizes not only speech experience,

but also so-called background knowledge, that is, people’s general
conception of reality that has been gained through their cognitive
and emotional experience (Shabes, 1989). However a phraseolo-
gism’s meaning may or may not “be illuminated” for the speaker
of a language within the context of the sentence, depending on the
size of the semantic function’s zone of proximal development. If
this function’s “zone” is small, then the context will neither provide
a clue for understanding and interpreting the linguistic sign nor

serve as a means of indirect collaboration.
For both series of the experiment, subject responses for each
phraseologism were rated using a three-point system: 0 for an
incorrect interpretation of the phraseologism, in particular, a
literal one; 1 point for an imprecise interpretation that was close
to the appropriate one; and 2 points for a precise and complete
interpretation. The maximum number of points a subject could
earn for each series’ assignment was 24, while the minimum was
0. Scores for each of the assignments were summarized using
the following ranges: 0–6; 7–12; 13–18; and 19–24. Using these
ranges, subjects were sorted into four groups based on the results
for each assignment.
We were primarily interested in the movement of subjects from
group to group when moving from the first assignment to the sec-
ond. This permitted us, first of all, to differentiate subjects based
on the zone of proximal development of their semantic function
and, second, to evaluate the effectiveness of the methodological
tool itself for uncovering “zones.” The experiment demonstrated
the following.2
From the first group, those who earned the lowest scores on
the first assignment (0–6 points), 72.2 percent advanced to groups
with higher scores based on the results of the second assignment.
Primarily (50 percent of pupils), they moved to the next group up,
the second group (7–12 points), while 16.7 percent moved into the
third group (13–18 points) and 5.5 percent moved into the fourth
group (19–24 points).
From the second group, which earned average to low scores in
the first assignment (7–12 points), 83.3 percent moved to a higher

group. Again, most (73.3 percent) moved one group up, to the third
group (13–18 points), while 10 percent moved to the fourth group
(19–24 points).
From the third group, which earned average to high scores in
the first assignment (13–18 points), 55.5 percent advanced to the
highest (fourth) group.
Those who had been in the highest (fourth) group from the begin-
ning earned perfect scores on the second assignment (24 points).

We are inclined to hypothetically view the differences in these
advances not as indicators of the upper and lower limits of the
function’s zone of proximal development at a given age, but as
individually differentiated lower limits. The upper limits can be
found only through subsequent, more difficult assignments (using,
for example, metaphoric text).
Analysis of children’s specific responses—interpretations of
phraseologisms—permits us to identify certain types of dynamics
for semantic function under conditions of indirect collaboration.
These types are:
• Did not know the phraseologism’s meaning and did not
glean it from context;
• Did not know the phraseologism’s meaning but intuitively
guessed it from context;
• Did not know the phraseologism’s meaning but understood
it exactly from context;
• Without context only intuitively guessed the meaning
of the phraseologism and with context understood it
precisely;
• Knew and understood the meaning of the phraseologism
and context did not add anything.
The first of these types of dynamics for the level of semantic
function indicates a very low sensitivity to context. It is typical
for pupils from the first group who did not advance to a higher
group based on the results of the second assignment. In addition
to low sensitivity to context, there is another reason this group did
not show improvement in moving from the first assignment to the

second. These children know from verbal practice the meaning
of certain (not many) phraseologisms, but in general they do not
take into account, are not clearly aware, that figurative meanings
are typical for this stratum of language. They therefore often try
to give a literal interpretation of the phraseologism if they are not
familiar with it from verbal practice.
The second, third, and fourth types of dynamic for the level of
function development provide the clearest evidence that context can

be a very effective instrument for diagnosing the function’s zone
of proximal development. It can also be a tool for teaching and
expanding children’s competence if they understand that a phrase-
ologism is a special linguistic sign that always features metaphor.
These types of relationships between the levels of development of
this function are typical for those children who have a high sensi-
tivity to context. It should be noted that these relationships can be
used to qualitatively differentiate the space of the “zone” (“I didn’t
know, and I guessed,” “I didn’t know, but I understood perfectly,”
“I guessed, and I knew just what it meant”).
In all groups there were children whose performance did not
improve on the second assignment. But this is not necessarily
evidence that the function’s zone of proximal development was
limited in scope. There could be another explanation: certain
children’s lack of sensitivity to context made it an unsuitable
tool for diagnosing the function’s zone of proximal development
in them; there were other tools for uncovering the potential of
these children.
As for the fourth type of dynamic for the level of the function’s
development, for children who knew and understood the meaning
of the assigned phraseologism, the context was neither a diagnostic
nor a learning tool. They had outgrown this tool and perhaps even
this learning task. These are children who already acquired a sig-
nificant volume of phraseological material in their native language
and understood that its meaning must be metaphoric.
Special studies have established that, overall, linguistic compe-
tence in a particular child—whether a preschooler or schoolchild—
develops unevenly when it comes to various linguistic subsystems:

phonetic, morphological, lexical, phraseological, syntactic, and
stylistic (Bozhovich, 2002; Bozhovich and Kozitskaia, 1999). And
this means that in order to study the processes by which this com-
petency develops through these subsystems and in order to uncover
the specificity of particular functions that comprise competency as
a psychological system, we must, in each case, find the appropriate
tools for indirect collaboration. This is particularly important for
the classroom system of teaching.
Notes
1. All emphases in quotes from Vygotsky are added.—E.B.
2. Experimental data are presented here in summarized form. Distribution by
grade (class) is presented in Zhilinskaia’s cited work (2004). In these summarized
data, 100 percent represents the makeup of each group based on the results of
the first assignment completed.
References
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Zone of Proximal Development

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Zone of Proximal Development

underlies it were produced primarily in 1932–34. It is difficult to

sented a functioning “psychological system” that has already taken

of Lev Semenovich and his disciples demonstrate, with the support

of maturing functions; (b) the principle behind their discovery; (c)

zone of proximal development” (Vygotsky, 1982b, p. 247). In this

Second: What quantity and type of learning task should be used

development of each function it is necessary, as much as possible,

It is likely not a coincidence that in the following definition

many aspects of the child’s cognitive and personality development.

And this can be avoided even during collaboration; then difficulty

collaboration, the level of academic success, the level of problem

the situation of the utterance, and so on. Based on a number of our

forms. The most important thing is knowledge of individual

subtypes: models from which an unambiguous action is derived—a

signed. Here is one such model where an active construction must

of events, etc.). Typical statements by the subjects included: “There

idiomatic viability, semantic correspondence to the original active

The third approach used by subjects featured a focus exclusively

sharpest reduction occurred among subjects from the first, most

lies within the zone of their proximal development.

In response to the experimenter’s question, “Did you need

had formed to a limited extent (at the level of understanding the

to solving the problems, relying specifically on those models that

unit of language, since it mobilizes not only speech experience,

a clue for understanding and interpreting the linguistic sign nor

the first assignment (7–12 points), 83.3 percent moved to a higher

ning earned perfect scores on the second assignment (24 points).

not show improvement in moving from the first assignment to the

function development provide the clearest evidence that context can

develops unevenly when it comes to various linguistic subsystems:

the classroom system of teaching.

———. 1982a. “O psikhologicheskikh sistemakh.” In Sobranie sochinenii v

Vygotskii.” Kul’turno-istoricheskaia psikhologiia, no. 3, pp. 96–104

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