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Safety

Uwe EGGERLING
Safety Director
Engineering & Maintenance
Customer Services

Facing the Reality of


Everyday Maintenance
Operations
The aviation maintenance environ-
ment is a challenging working place.
ensure good communication, diag-
nose and fix problems under time
2. Brief Events
Mechanics work in physically de- pressure, read and record various Description
manding conditions, such as high data, and continuously adapt to
above the ground in the aircraft new technologies. The following two events are rep-
structure, or in small confined sur- resentative of a number of similar
roundings. They can be exposed to The Safety First magazine will
dedicate a number of articles to the hazardous engine removal/ installa-
high or low temperatures, and to tion incidents:
demanding shift work. field of maintenance.
The objective is to share the lessons q On the first occurrence, one of
There is an increasing workload
and time pressure to get the aircraft learned and experience reported from the bootstraps failed, causing an
back into service as quickly as pos- the Airbus fleet. It will also raise engine to drop by a distance of
sible after maintenance. Aircraft awareness, and provide recom- three feet (fig. 1).
maintenance requires mechanics mendations for safe maintenance q On the second event, an engine
to follow procedures by the letter, operations.
fell to the ground during its removal.
The forward left chain pulley disen-
gaged while the maintenance team
was performing Aircraft Main-
1. Introduction tenance Manual (AMM) subtask
71-00-00-020-053-A(fig. 2).
Most maintenance engineers can maintenance events involving tools
remember cases where the use of as being at the origin of the event.
a wrong, or inappropriate tool, has The consequences resulting from The reported problems in the use
contributed to difficulties in main- the use of wrong, or inappropriate of the engine tools (the bootstrap),
tenance operations. In most cases, tools, are not always immediately are not related to any one particular
this has lead to additional incurred evident in terms of aircraft dispatch
Airbus type.The majority of these
costs, but on certain occurrences indicators, and, even when they are,
this has even represented a poten- they may not have been reported as incidents are the consequence of
tial threat for the safety of mainte- the origin of the event. one, or a combination of the fol-
nance personnel. lowing reasons:

This article will cover the subject q Use of tools not listed in the
The absence of reliable statistical of tooling issues related to engine AMM, and not approved by Airbus.
figures in how often specific main- removal and installation proce- q Not using appropriately main-
tenance tools have been involved dures. However, the points raised tained tools.
in maintenance errors can be ex- here are illustrative as well of other
plained by the fact that there are no maintenance operations. q A too high pre-load applied to the
specific reporting requirements for tool, which can damage the tool.

Safety first #13 January 2012 - 1/6


3. Use of Non
Approved Aircraft
Maintenance Tools
Depending on the level of the cus-
tomized maintenance program
selected, the investment in the
required Ground Support Equip-
ment (GSE) and tools can become
significant.
Cheap GSE/tools may be offered
from local suppliers, “round the
corner”, as substitutes for approved
or proprietary tools. These may
be copied and manufactured by
non- approved suppliers, and may
therefore not conform to the Airbus
technical specifications.
There have been instances where
tools have been made from incom-
plete, or out-of-date drawings, in-
correct material, and/or according
to wrong protection processes. As
a consequence, it is likely that these
tools will not be of the appropriate
quality, and not perform their intended
function in a safe and satisfactory
manner.
Such non-approved tools can be
categorized into three main groups:
Figure 1 q Airbus and Supplier/Vendor tools
Consequence of manufactured and distributed by
failed bootstrap
non-licensed companies based on
non–controlled drawings.
q Copies of Vendor proprietary
tools bearing the same part number,
but copied from the original by un-
authorized companies.
q “Alternate” tool design sold as
so-called “equivalents”. These tools
have a part number different to the
one given in the manufacturer’s
documentation.
Use of any of the above types of
non-approved tools for mainte-
nance could lead to aircraft or com-
ponent damage and/or personnel
injury. If non-approved tools are
used, the test result may not reflect
that of the approved tool.
Airbus therefore recommends that
Airlines and Maintenance Centers
use only the specific tools called
for in the Airbus and/or Vendor
Figure 2 documentation, and that users ensure
consequence
of disengaged that they are built by the approved
chain pulley manufacturer.

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Safety

4. Non Appropria- Manual


hoist
A380 rear
bootstrap
tely Maintained structure

Tools
Some GSE/tool devices require
regular maintenance to be per-
formed, as specified by the GSE/
tool manufacturer. Adherence to
the GSE/tool maintenance instruc-
tions will contribute to a failure-
free operation, and reduce the risk
of personnel injuries.

As an example, let us consider the


Figure 3
bootstrap (fig. 3). It consists of two A380 bootstrap
main parts: structure

q The bootstrap structure, which is


the interface between the pylon and
the lifting device. This structure
has to be periodically inspected and
tested. A visual inspection should
be done at each tool use. If any
cracks or impacts are identified, the
tool should not be further used.
Periodical tests consist of applying
a load to the structure (125% of
the Working Load Limit for Airbus
tooling). Measurements are taken
before and after the test, and should
provide the same result. If the load Needle
dynamo-
test provides different results, the meter
tool is damaged and should be dis-
carded.

q The lifting device (chain hoist),


which is the interface between
the structure and the assembly to
lift (the engine cradle). The lift-
ing device is a device available on
the market. The suppliers of the
lifting device specify the main-
tenance recommendations to be
applied. Typically, a visual inspec-
tion should be done every time the
tool is used, and the friction brakes
should be inspected at specified in-
tervals.
Investigations of several cases
of engine drops have determined
that the hoist maintenance had
never been done, and that the brak-
Figure 4
ing system was either damaged or Needle
showed presence of oil. dynamometer

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5T Electrical
hoist
2T Electrical
hoist

Supervision
System

Figure 5
Electric
bootstrap tool

5. Too High
Pre-Load Applied
to the Tool
The engine installation procedure
with the bootstrap system consists
of two main phases:
q The lifting phase is the operation
dedicated to lift up the engine from
the ground to the pylon. This phase
stops when the engine mounts start
to enter in the pylon shear pins.
q The approaching phase is the op-
eration dedicated to engage the pylon
shear pins in the engine mount and Operator 1
to have contact between engine Lifting Control
of the left Side
mount and the pylon.

The bootstrap system is equipped


with needle dynamometers (fig. 4)
indicating the applied loads.The Figure 6
Operation Operator 3 Operator 3
approaching phase is sensitive be- of electric Global task Lifting Control
cause the technicians have to con- bootstrap overview of the right Side
tinuously monitor the loads applied
on the bootstrap system. Several order to ensure a balanced bootstrap The AMM provides the references
mechanics, working as a unit, are movement and an adequate load for the standard tool, which in com-
required to perform this operation. monitoring at all times. An overload bination with the described proce-
They have to ensure proper com- may cause a life threatening struc- dures ensures a safe operation during
munication amongst the team in tural failure of the bootstrap. engine removal and installation.

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Safety

6. Electric References
Bootstrap Tool
In addition to the standard tool Document Title Recommendations
required by the AMM, Airbus has OIT A300/A310/A300-600 - Ata Failure of hoist fittings or
developed a new “electrical bootstrap” 999.0063/96 54/71 - Engine dropping during bolts, caused by static
tool (fig. 5). removal/installation. overload. This will occur
It offers a number of enhancements, when stirrups of the rear
including easier handling and im- bootstrap beam cable jam
proved load monitoring, and requires in pulleys. AMM tasks
less mechanics. It is therefore safer to modified to provide cau-
operate. tions associated to jam-
ming.

The main features of this new GSE OIT A340 ata 71, engine removal Operators reported during
are: 999.0114/97 installation amm procedure. engine removal engine/
q Wireless electrical hoists cradle assembly rotated
around forward bootstrap
q Integrated dynamometers hoisting point. Forward is
q A load supervision system. heavier than aft, and if not
cranked correctly can end
up being in a nose down
The lifting control achieved for position. AMM procedure
the right and left hand side, as well revised.
as for the forward and aft hoists
is performed by remote control OIT A319/A320/A321 -ATA 71- Use of another manufac-
devices (fig. 6), which include inte- 999.0042/00 Consequences of utilizing ture tooling, during which
grated load control displays. A non-certified Airbus tooling one winch failed, causing
warning system prevents any risks for engine change. the engine to drop, causing
of overload. minor damage. Recom-
mendations to use ap-
proved Airbus tooling.

SIL 71-020 Engine removal/installation Attachment bolt failure due


procedure with "bootstrap to excessive shear load,
system". due to asymmetrical load-
ing configuration created
by blockage of bootstrap
7. CONCLUSION cable. Best practice rec-
ommendations provided to
The use of non approved, non ap- prevent dropping of engine.
propriately maintained or improp-
erly used aircraft maintenance tools TEB number: 98F71201000 021 A340
represent safety hazards that need 340A3009-2 200/300 bootstrap modification
to be properly addressed.
Airbus therefore recommends to: TEB number: 98F71201006036 A340
340A3162-2 500/600 bootstrap modification The previous lift from YALE
q Use only GSE/tools specified
in the Airbus and/or Vendor docu- is no longer procurable for
TEB number: 98F71201006034 A330 GE
mentation and to ensure that they the bootstrap application,
330A3036-2 bootstrap modification
are built by the approved manufac- it was replaced by a new
turer. AERO ref from YALE. The
TEB number: 98F71201006030 A330 RR
TEB also remind the basic
q Adhere to the GSE/tool manu- 330A3037-2 bootstrap modification
maintenance to perform
facturers maintenance instructions. on a YALE hoist.
TEB number: 98F71201006032A330 PW
q Closely follow the procedures
330A3038-2 bootstrap modification
described in the Aircraft Mainte-
nance Manual. TEB number: 98D71203501001 Single
320A3197-2 Aisle bootstrap modification

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Safety

Safety First
The Airbus Safety Magazine
For the enhancement of safe flight through
increased knowledge and communications

Safety First is published by the All articles in Safety First are present- Contributions, comment and feed-
Flight Safety Department of Air- ed for information only and are not back are welcome. For technical
bus. It is a source of specialist safe- intended to replace ICAO guidelines, reasons the editors may be required to
ty information for the restricted use standards or recommended practices, make editorial changes to manu-
of flight and ground crew members operator-mandated requirements or scripts, however every effort will
who fly and maintain Airbus air- technical orders. The contents do not be made to preserve the intended
craft. It is also distributed to other supersede any requirements mandated meaning of the original. Enquiries
selected organisations. by the State of Registry of the Opera- related to this publication should
tor’s aircraft or supersede or amend be addressed to:
any Airbus type-specific AFM, AMM, Airbus
Material for publication is FCOM, MEL documentation or any
obtained from multiple sources Product Safety department (GS)
other approved documentation. 1, rond point Maurice Bellonte
and includes selected informa-
tion from the Airbus Flight Safety 31707 Blagnac Cedex - France
Confidential Reporting System, Articles may be reprinted without Fax: +33(0)5 61 93 44 29
incident and accident investiga- permission, except where copy- safetycommunication@airbus.com
tion reports, system tests and right source is indicated, but with
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tained from sources within the Airbus is not the author, the con-
airline industry, studies and re- tents of the article do not necessarily
ports from government agencies reflect the views of Airbus, neither
and other aviation sources. do they indicate Company policy.

A320 © Airbus S.A.S. 2012 – All rights reserved. Proprietary documents.


Safety
Edition January 2012
The Airbus Safety Magazine
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CONTENT:
q A320 Family / A330 Prevention
and Handling of Dual Bleed Loss
q The Fuel Penalty Factor new A320 By taking delivery of this Brochure (hereafter “Brochure”), you accept on behalf of your company to
q The Airbus TCAS

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comply with the following guidelines:


q A380: Development of the
Flight Controls - Part 1
q Facing the Reality of Everyday
Maintenance Operations

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Issue 13

Safety First, #13 January 2012. Safety First is 3 This Brochure and the materials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, or licensed
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