Rights of the Accused: The Trial

G.R. No. 187728

Mari v. Gonzales
Peralta, J.

Summarized by Sophia Sy

RTC dismissed the rape case against PO1 Paloma for the failure of prosecution
to prosecute. Complainant filed a petition claiming GAOD against RTC judge. SC found
the petition bereft of merit invoking the right of the accused to a speedy trial.

IMPORTANT PEOPLE
PO1 Rudyard Paloma – accused, private respondent
Hon. Rolando Gonzales – RTC judge, public respondent

FACTS
1. Nov. 4, 2004 – a preliminary investigation in MCTC was commenced against
PO1 Paloma for allegedly raping private complainant AAA in her boarding
house at Sogod, Southern Leyte on Oct. 10, 2004
2. Nov. 18, 2004 – warrant of arrest was issued and respondent was
incarcerated at the municipal jail.
3. Nov. 20, 2004 – Respondent’s Motion for Bail was granted. (petitioner did not
appear)
4. Records of the case were transmitted to RTC pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26
and respondent was committed to detention on June 27, 2008 after the
prosecutor’s office filed an Information for rape.
5. Arraignment was set on July 3, 2008 but was rescheduled to Oct. 31 as
nobody appeared for the prosecution.
6. Private prosecutor filed a Motion for Cancellation of Hearing citing as reason
the pendency of complainant’s petition for transfer of venue. RTC denied the
Motion ruling that such was not a sufficient reason to suspend proceedings
and also due to accused’s right to a speedy trial.
7. Nov. 24, 2008 – Pre-trial: No one appeared for the prosecution.
8. Jan. 16, 2009 – Day of hearing: Prosecution again did not appear but filed an
Urgent Motion for Cancellation stating it only received notice of the hearing on
Jan 14 and had to attend to another case on the same date of hearing.
9. RTC dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to prosecute pursuant
to RA 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998). Hence this petition.

ISSUE with HOLDING

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 1. W/N public respondent committed GAOD in rashly dismissing the rape case
against private respondent? NO.
 Petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
o Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in
either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement
must be presented. SC is a court of last resort.
o However, the Court also finds sufficient reason to relax the rule in this
case as it also involves the issue of double jeopardy, necessitating a
look into the merits of the petition.

 Change of venue proceedings filed by petitioner is not excluded in the

computation for periods of delay
o Petitioners invoke Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA
8493), now incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of the RoC. 1
o A reading of the provision would show that the only delays that may be
excluded from the time limit within which trial must commence are
those resulting from proceedings concerning the accused. Hence, the
time during which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private
complainant is pending, cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty
(30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court.
o Besides, the 30 day limit has already been breached since the private
prosecutor received the pre-trial order on Dec. 3, 2008, and the
provincial prosecutor on Dec. 2, making Jan 2, 2009 the latest date
when the trial should have commenced. But due to non-appearance of
the prosecution on the Dec. 12 hearing, the RTC was constrained to
reset the hearing on Jan 16 w/c is already well beyond the limit.

 Accused’s right to a speedy trial was violated.

o The petitioners by obstinately refusing to comply with RTC’s directives
to commence presentation of evidence and by filinf motions fot
cancellation on the day of hearing appeared to be intentionally
delaying court processes.
o Section 7, Rule 65 of the RoC which provides that the [p]etition [under
Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
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SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence: (a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited
to the following: x x x x (5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of
cases or transfer from other courts;

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 issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the
case. Hence the RTC was correct in dismissing petitioner’s motions for
postponement merely due to pendency of proceedings for transfer of
venue.
o The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended
over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.
o An accused's right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was
deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c)
assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice
caused by such delay. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
o Here, the private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty
on two occasions: during the MCTC preliminary investigation
(November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005); again, when an Information
for rape was issued (June 27, 2008 until January 16, 2009). Because
of private respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in trying the
case would cause him great prejudice.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petition DISMISSED.

DOCTRINE
An accused's right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining
whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance
are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of
the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.