Names: 1. APLATEN, Danielle Faith C.

2. LIM, Charles Johnson D.

Section 1, Rule 72

Montañer, Jr., et. al. v. Shari’a District Court, et. Al

G.R. No. 174975, 20 January 2009

First Division
Puno, C.J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer and had
Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-
Dalupan as their children. On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.

Private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.

Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties
before the Shari’a District Court. The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro
Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr.,
and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montañer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."
Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among others, the
following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an
administrator for the estate of the decedent.

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the grounds that the
Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer,
Sr. because he was a Roman Cotholic, and private respondents’ complaint is barred by
prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and
the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

The Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint and held that
Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the
settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.

Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the petitioners opposed.
The Shari’a District Court denied petitioners’ opposition and it took cognizance of the
said motion. The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence
and ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence,
and pre-trial conference.

Issue:

Whether the Shari’a District Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it set Spl. Civil Action 7-05 for trial.

Ruling:

The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before
the Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo.

We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a
special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special
proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.

Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no
definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding,
respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.
On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status,
right, or a particular fact,"has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration
of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it
bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action.
As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to
determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to
those entitled to the same.

Thus, petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from
being a party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced.
Section 1, Rule 73

Fule v. CA
G.R. No. L-40502, 29 November 1976
First Division
Martin, J.:

Facts:

The two interrelated cases bring to the Supreme Court the question of what the word
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the
appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.

On April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia died intestate, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule, a creditor of the estate
of Amado G. Garcia as well as an illegitimate sister of the latter, filed with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Laguna, a petition for letters of administration. At the same time,
she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, surviving spouse of the
deceased, on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction. She prayed that she be appointed
special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular
administratrix after due hearing.

On July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar issued an order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix. On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been
acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a
party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia. This
was subsequently denied on December 19, 1973.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action
for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings
before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction. Denied of their motion for reconsideration on
March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on
appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of
Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch. Judge
Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special
administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the
office.

Issue:

Whether the word “resides” Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring
to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, refer to residence or
domicile.
Ruling:

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed
by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record."

The Court laid down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." The term
"resides," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules —
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.

The word "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

Thus, with the foregoing definition, the Court ruled that the last place of residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City,
and not at Calamba, Laguna.
 Saludo, Jr. v. American Express International, Inc.
G.R. No. 159507, 19 April 2006
First Division
Callejo, Sr., J.

Facts:

The plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member
of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a
corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other
credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein respondents Fish and
Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and
other court processes at their office address.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of
petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted
from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure
to pay its balance and denied having received the corresponding statement of account.

Petitioner Saludo prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally,
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint.

Respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue
was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. To buttress their
contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in
Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint a quo.

The petitioner, on the other hand, asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in
Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of
the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo
to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all
the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his
district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte
Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax
certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office
messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate
is not determinative of one's residence.

The court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It reasoned,
thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint
was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern
Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell
any and all doubts about his actual residence.

Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same. They
then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo. The appellate
court issued a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court
a quo from conducting further proceedings. The appellate court rendered the assailed
decision granting respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that venue was
improperly laid. The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo
against respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule
on venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced
and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.

Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because
not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that
petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a
resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court referred to his community
tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, which was issued at Pasay City.

Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court
denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for review with
the Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding the venue was improperly laid.

Held:

Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a
personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which
reads:

“SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be

commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case
of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.”

Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the
court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. However, the appellate court,
adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident
of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. The appellate court
committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that
venue was improperly laid in the court a quo.

In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, the Court had the occasion to explain at
length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:

“In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as

employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first
instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the
plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.”

The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised
Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502)
and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29,
1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:

"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides'
mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time
of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi
 termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This
term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it
is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."

Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of

Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in
relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein
for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he
is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a
resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of
election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but
he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was
sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
Section 3, Rule 73

In the Matter of the Intestate, Estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy v.
Camon
G.R. No. L-21034, 30 April 1966
En Banc
Sanchez, J.:

Facts:

The estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of two-fourths (2/4)
share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario in Negros Occidental. That whole hacienda was
held in lease by Emilio Camon since long before the present intestate proceedings were
commenced.

The administrator of the estate moved the court for an order to direct Emilio Camon to
pay the estate's two-forths share of the rentals. Emilio Camon challenged the probate
court's jurisdiction over his person. The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be
made "by mere motion by the administrator but by independent action." The
administrator appealed.

Issue:

Whether Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Ruling:

The organic act creating courts of first instance, amongst others, allocates within its
jurisdictional boundaries "all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or value of
property in controversy, amounts to more than ten thousand pesos."

But here, the court sits as a probate court. Said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. For these purposes, property in
the hands of the estate's administrator comes within the power of the probate court.

The amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated. Accordingly, the right to collect
the rentals is still in a fluid state. That right remains to be threshed out upon a full-dress
trial on the merits. Because of all of these, the money (rentals) allegedly due is not
property in the hands of the administrator; it is not thus within the effective control of the
probate court. At best that money is debt to the estate — not against the estate. Recovery
thereof, we are persuaded to say, should be by separate suit commenced by the
administrator.

Paula vs. Escay, et al., teaches that:

"When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against
whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's jurisdiction, the demand
can not be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action
against the third person."

Camon is a third person. Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by
motion, into the administration proceedings.
 Vda. De Manalo v. CA
G.R. NO. 129242, 16 January 2001
Second Division
De Leon, Jr., J.:

Facts:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila died intestate and was survived by his
wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio
Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin,
Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo,
who are all of legal age. Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and
in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop.

Herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio
Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda
filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of
their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing and directing the
publication of the order. The date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an
order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government." However, the trial
court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners were
granted time within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Petitioners sought to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of the oppositors but was however subsequently denied by the trial court. Thus
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals stating that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Finding the contentions untenable,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition.

Held:

The instant petition is not impressed with merit. It is a fundamental rule that in the
determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of
the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A
careful scrutiny of the petition is that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.
In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard
the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by
raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be
emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special
jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be
properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always
been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained
in the answer.
There is no merit to the argument of the petitioners that if the petition were to be
considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule
16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue
of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners
contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.

Article 222 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. A civil action is thus an action
filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.
 Lim v. CA
G.R. No. 124715, 24 January 2000
Second Division
Buena, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is
the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334. Private
respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations
formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties
covered under the Torrens system.

Pastor Y. Lim died intestate and herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly
represented by her nephew George Luy, filed a joint petition for the administration of the
estate of Pastor Y. Lim. Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included
in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting of lis
pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent.

In an order, the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court, granted the private
respondents' twin motions. Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended
petition stating all the properties, businesses, bank accounts of Pastor Lim, and that these
were conjugal in natures as it was acquired during the existence of his marriage with
petitioner. the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an order, thus:

“Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the annotation of
lis pendens in case said annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled
said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 51282.

Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123,
236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant petition.

SO ORDERED.”

The probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator and Miguel Lim and
Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after
which letters of administration were accordingly issued.

In an order, the probate court denied anew private respondents' motion for exclusion. the
probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an order the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under
enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to produce
and submit to the special administrators, through this Honorable Court within (5)
five days from receipt of this order their respective records of the savings/current
accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or
corporations above-mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done
concerning savings/current accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this
court order.

xxx-xxx-xxx

SO ORDERED.”
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari, with an urgent prayer for a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals
questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court wherein the
CA rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents. Rufina Luy Lim filed with the
SC a lone assignment of error stating that the CA erred in reversing the orders of the
lower court.

Issue:

Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.

Held:

The provisions of Republic Act 7691, which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa
Blg 129 provides that the determination of which Court exercises jurisdiction over
matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent. Sec. 3.
Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate

proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in
proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of
which must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's, litigation expenses and costs shall be included in the
determination of the filing fees, Provided further, that where there are several
claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the
same or different transactions;

xxx-xxx-xxx

In PASTOR, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS, the SC held that the question of ownership is
an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.

Further, in VALERA vs. INSERTO, the Court made an exposition on the probate court's
limited jurisdiction:

Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has
no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all
other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly,
to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the
interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception
being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved
by the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction
as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a
jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice
which may be waived. . . .

. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the

Torrens title is not in the decedent's name but in others, a situation on which this
Court has already had occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours)
 Conde v. Abaya
G. R. No. 4275, 23 March 1909
En Banc
Arellano, J.:

Facts:

Casiano Abaya, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Abaya, died on the 6th of April
1899; although unmarried, Casiano begot a son and a daughter with one Paula Conde. On
the 6th of November, Paula Conde moved to the settlement of Casiano’s estate intestate,
and was appointed as the administrator of the aforementioned estate which was then
opposed by Casiano’s brother, Roman, whom stated that he is the nearest relative of the
deceased. The court granted Roman’s claim, and declared him to be the sole heir of the
decedent, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde.

Paula Conde filed a petition claiming that even though the relationship alleged by Roman
was indeed true, she claims that her right was superior over his and moved for a hearing
of the matter, praying that she be declared to have preferential rights over the estate.
Judgement was held stating that the estate of Casiano should recognize Teopista and Jose
Conde to be natural children of Casiano, and that the petitioner Paula should succeed to
the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of the decedent.
Furthermore, the court declared that she (Paula) is the only heir of the property of the
intestate estate, to the exclusion of Roman.

Issue:

Whether or not Paula Conde may enforce an action in the acknowledgement of the
natural child from Casiano Abaya during special proceedings for the administration and
distribution of an intestate estate.

Held:

No.

An acknowledgment can only be demanded by the natural child and his descendants
whom it shall benefit, and should they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such person
as legally represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is
under her authority. A private action is in question and the general rule must be followed.
It may so happen that the child dies before four years have expired after attaining
majority, or that the document supporting his petition for acknowledgment is discovered
after his death, such death perhaps occurring after his parents had died, as is supposed by
article 137, or during their lifetime. In any case such right of action shall pertain to the
descendants of the child whom the acknowledgment may interest.

Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during
his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while
the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last
during his whole life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can
only be exercised against the latter.

Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal
character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time
during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the
heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while insane, or after action
had been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised
against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of
the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some
instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the
existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.

But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by
him. It can not be transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.
 Portugal and Portugal, Jr. v. Portugal-Beltran
G.R. NO. 155555, 16 August 2005
Third Division
Carpio Morales, J.:

Facts:

Jose Portugal (Portugal Sr) contracted two marriages. The first is with one Paz Lazo in
1942 whom he had a daughter named Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, the herein
respondent, and the second marriage is with Isabel e la Puerta in 1948, who gave birth to
a boy named Jose Douglas Portugal, Jr., the petitioners herein.

Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. Died intestate in 1985. In 1988, Leonila executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person, adjudicating to
herself the Caloocan parcel of land, and was subsequently registered in her name.

After that, the petitioners filed a complaint against Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit
of Adjudication and TCT issued in her name, alleging that Leonila is not related
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, Sr. hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel
of land, and accordingly prayed that said TCT be canceled and a new one be issued in
their name.

A Pre-Trial Order was issued, but after that the trial court dismissed the case for lack of
cause of action and lack of jurisdiction without resolving the issues as stated in the pre-
trial order, on the ground that petitioner’s status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate court.

Issue:

Whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as

heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent's Affidavit of
Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.

Held:

If the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are
no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to
file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and
settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had
been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-
opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or
properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate

court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the
case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish
the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with
the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of
the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had
already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over
the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to
still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
 Jardeleza v. Spouses Jardeleza
G.R. No. 167975, 17 June 2015
First Division
Bersamin, J.:

Facts:

Sps. Gilda and Ernesto commenced a civil action against Sps Melecio and Elizabeth,
JMB Traders and Teodoro Jardeleza raffled to Branch 33 of the RTC. However during
the pendency of the case Ernesto died. Hence special proceedings were commenced in
RTC Branch 38 and Teodoro was appointed as administrator. Teodoro in his capacity as
administrator filed a motion to dismiss on the civil action on the ground that Melecio was
also an heir of Ernesto thus the properties subject to the action for reconveyance should
be advances to inheritance and the action for reconveyance be heard in the special
proceedings. Motion to dismiss was granted. Gilda contended that the in RTC as probate
court cannot determine ownership of the property, thus motion to dismiss should have
been dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC as probate court can resolve issue of ownership?

Held:

NO.

The determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the
determination of Branch 38 of RTC in the special proceedings with regard to ownership
shall be for the purpose of inventory and the determination is not final is without
prejudice to the right of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a
proper action.

Jurisdiction of RTC as a probate court relates only to matters on settlement of estate and
probate of will of a deceased person and does not extend to the determination of a
question of ownership that arises during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the
property is alleged to belong to the estate unless the claimants to the property are all heirs
of the deceased and they agreed to submit the question for determination by the probate
or administration court and the interests of third parties are not prejudiced or unless the
purpose is to determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the
inventory in which case the probate or administration court may decide prima facie the
ownership of the property, but such determination is not final and is without prejudice to
the right of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action.
Section 1, Rule 74

Hernandez v. Andal
H. R. No. L-273, 29 March 1947
En Banc
Tuason, J.:

Facts:

Cresencia, Maria, Aquilina, Pedro and Basilia Hernandez are brother and sisters, who
acquired in common a parcel of land from their deceased father. Maria and Aquilina sold
to the spouses Andal a portion thereof, which they purport to be their combined shares by
virtue of a verbal partition made among the siblings Hernandez.

After the sale, Cresencia attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal but the latter
refused to sell the same. Later, Andal resold the same to Maria and Aquilina. Maria and
Aquilina alleged that there had been an oral partition among them and their brother and
sisters, and that there are witnesses ready to prove such partition. However, Cresencia
asserted that under the Rules of Court, parol evidence of partition is inadmissible.

Issue:

Whether or not oral evidence is admissible in proving a contract of partition among heirs

Held:

Oral evidence is admissible in proving a contract of partition among heirs for as long as
no rights of creditors ar involved.

As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be
reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing
evidence to prove the transactions.

Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, “is for evidential purposes
only.” The Civil Code, too, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public
instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so
that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be
compelled to execute the document. It must be noted that where the law intends a writing
or other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so
in clear and unequivocal terms.

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court contains no such express or clear declaration
that the required public instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an
inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. The requirement that a
partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims.
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice. It must follow that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come
into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected.

No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by law.
Section 4, Rule 74

Sampilo et. al. V. CA

GR No. L-10474, 28 February 1958
En Banc
Labrador, J.:

Facts:

Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left 4 parcels of land in San Manuel,
Pangasinan. He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and
nieces, children of the deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any
judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that the deceased Teodoro
Tolete left no children or ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother,
sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, alone to inherit the above
properties.
On the same day, the widow of the decedent executed a deed of sale of all the above
parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000.00. On June 17, 1950,
Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000.00.
In March , 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the
estate of Teodoro Tolete, and having secured her appointment as administratix, brought
the present action on June 20, 1950. The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de
Leon had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and the invalidity of the sale.
Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint states no cause
of action; and that if such cause exists, the same is barred.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgement for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera,
declaring that the affidavit of adjudication and the deeds of sale as all null and void. The
case was appealed to the CA. It held that the sale is valid as to the one half share of the
land.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera’s right of action to recover her and her co-
heirs’ participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to
recover was filed.

Held:

Yes. The right of action to recover had not yet prescribed.

There are two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is
required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the
extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law
(Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title
of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer for rights
violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no
mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did
not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt
that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound
thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner
deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they
may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the
distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they
are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to
their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part in the
settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no
direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert
their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to
them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express
legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process
of law.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit,

is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such
settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no
mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.

The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an
extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition,
is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74
have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have
taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.

There is nothing in Section 4 of Rule 74, or in its source (Section 596 of Act 190), which
shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a
bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against
third persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is
contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the
Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in
the chapter which defines the statute.
 Spouses Benatiro v. Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos,
G.R. No. 161220, 30 July 2008
Third Division
Austria-Martinez, J.:

Facts:

Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children,
namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and
Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in
Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by Tax Declaration (TD) under the name of
Agatona Arrogante.

On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, respondent Gloria filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) a petition for Letters of Administration, entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was
opposed by Gloria's brother, Francisco. In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both
parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that
the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date
issued an Order appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate.

Subsequently, in the Order dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the
Intestate Estate hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother,
oppositor Francisco, together with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray,
Francisco's counsel, manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle the
case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C.
Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the
parties and to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the court. In the same
Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a
project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval
of the court.

The CFI then, after receiving the report on the project of partition, disapproved the claim
of respondent Gloria for the sum of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly
disregarded by the heirs present during the conference. Furthermore, the court, in an
Order, appointed Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate. On May 25, 1979,
administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of land
constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a
consideration of the sum of P36,000.00. Respondents, upon learning that the tax
declarations, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were
canceled and subsequently new tax declarations were issued in favor of Columba, filed a
complaint against petitioner before COSLAP of the DOJ, which in turn dismissed the
case due to lack of jurisdication.

On July 16 2001, Salud Cuyos et. al. Filed a petition for annulment of the order of the
CFI in Cebu. The CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order.

Issue:

Whether or not the heirs are bound by the order of the CFI.

Held:

In Cua v. Vargas, in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively
notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless
of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has
been duly published, the Court held:

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The

rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice
of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice
that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is
agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said
deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement
has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the
publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who
had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of
execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and
was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.
In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed
either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before
the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do
not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is
invalid insofar as they are concerned.

In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998
and filed the petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that
respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed
order. It bears stressing that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not
prescribe.