STUDY GUIDE NO.

3
EVIDENCE

RULE 130

SECTION 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – All persons who

can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or

conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification.

1. People v. Tomentos, 211 SCRA 212

FACTS: A complaint was filed through the Assistant Prosecutor charging

Henry Tomentos with the rape of Salvacion Cabahug.

During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonial evidence of 10

witnesses which include the victim himself. It was established that the
victim is a 21-year old girl with the mind of 8-10 year old, with an IQ of 55
to 69%; that the victim spent 3 years in Grade One. Being mental
retardate, she was able to pass Grade Five with only a 75% average; that
she is not inclined to verbal communication, and if sent to the store to buy
something, a list of the things to buy must be written on a piece of paper
clipped together with the money. There were more proofs presented as to
the victim’s being mentally retarded which were confirmed by a series of
psychological examinations conducted by a medical expert.

ISSUE: Is the victim a competent witness despite her being mental

retardate?

RULING: Yes. Witness is competent even if she could convey ideas only
thru signs or body language. The medical expert on mental health, Dr.
Angel Somera, has proven that the victim does not have hallucinations, is
in touch with reality, no fantasies but only has the tendency to convey
thoughts through some body language like checking the name of the
accused and looking/gazing only at the accused for quite a time when he
was seated side by side with the three (3) other suspected boys in the
locality. This makes her a competent witness as she can convey her ideas
in many forms like signs, writings and body gestures, aside from words.

2. Is a deaf-mute competent to as a witness?

YES, a deaf-mute can be considered competent to be a witness. As

provided in the case of People v. Tormentos, the witness is competent to
testify even if he/she conveys ideas only through signs or body language.

3. People v. Tuangco, G.R. NO. 130331, November 22, 2000 and

contrast it with the case of People v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-27200,
January 20, 1928.

FACTS: The naked cadaver of Aurea Eugenio, a bookkeeper employed by

the Centro Escolar University Credit Cooperative in Manila was found lying
beside a creek about 50 meters away from the national highway in Apalit.
Her body bore multiple stab wounds and her private parts were bloodied
and showed signs of sexual abuse.

Subsequently, two informations were filed in court charging Adel Tuangco

y Dizon, Nelson Pineda Jr. alias “Jun Tattoo” , and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon
alias “Baba” with the crimes of rape with homicide and theft. Tuangco and
‘Baba’ were apprehended and ‘Tattoo’ remained at large. The principal
evidence against the accused consisted of the testimony of an eyewitness,
Silvestre Sanggalan, a deaf-mute. He gave his testimony through sign
language, which was interpreted by a sign language expert. Sanggalan
testified being with the three accused in a beer house during daytime, and
went to loiter in a waiting shed when nighttime came. It was mentioned
that ‘Baba’ and ‘Tattoo’ were drinking Pidol cough syrup during the time.
Sanggalan also testified that upon seeing the victim, the three accused
followed her to the rice fields, subdued her, inserted the cough syrup bottle
inside her genitals and took turns in raping her. He also testified that he
was about 3 and a half meters from the event of the rape. It was testified
further that Tuangco took the victim’s handbag, ‘Tattoo’ took the camera,
and ‘Baba’ took the ring and earrings.
The medico legal corroborated the testimony of the witness when he
testified that there were massive blood clots inside the victim’s genitals
that were made by a hard foreign like object like a bottle.

Tuangco and ‘Baba’ were convicted of Theft and Rape. The Supreme Court
took cognizance of the case on automatic review. Accused-appelant, in
defense, discredit the testimony of the deaf-mute eyewitness pointing out
that because Sanggalan has had no formal schooling in special school for
deaf-mutes, his testimony unclear and his handicap prevented a truthful
narration of what really transpired.

ISSUE: Is the testimony of a deaf-mute credible?

RULING: Yes. A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness.

Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they:
(1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath;
(2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and
(3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter.

Thus, in People vs. De Leonand and People vs. Sasota, the accused was
convicted on the basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute.

Although in People vs. Bustos, the testimony of a deaf-mute was

rejected, this was because there were times during his testimony that the
interpreter could not make out what the witness meant by the signs she
used. In the instant case, the interpreter was a certified sign language
interpreter with twenty-two (22) years teaching experience at the
Philippine School for the Deaf, had exposure in television programs and
had testified in five other previous court proceedings. She possessed
special education and training for interpreting sign language. The trial court
evaluated her competence to put on record with accuracy the declaration
made by witness Sanggalang on the witness stand, and she testified that
she employed the natural or homemade sign method.

Needless to stress, the manner in which the examination of a deaf-mute

should be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial
court in its discretion, and the method adopted will not be reviewed by the
appellate court in the absence of a showing that the complaining party was
in some way injured by reason of the particular method adopted. The
imperfections or inconsistencies cited in appellant’ brief arise from the fact
that there is some difficulty in eliciting testimony where the witness is deaf-
mute, but these do not detract from the credibility of his testimony, much
less justify the total rejection of the same.

What is material is that he knew personally the accused-appellants, was

with them on the fateful night when the incident happened and had
personally witnessed the rape-slay and theft three (3) meters away from
the scene. He did not waver in the identification of the three accused
despite rigorous cross-examination, and positively pointed to the accused -
appellants as the persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her
personal effects. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
Sanggalan, whose testimony was found to be candid and straightforward,
deserves the highest respect of this Court

4. People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015.

FACTS: Esugon was charged for the death of Josephine Barrera. Carl, the
5-year old son of the victim testified that he saw the appellant stabbed the
victim. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to
their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he
related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise
admitted that he did not see very well the perpetra tor because there was
no light. Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although
there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he
saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground
floor through the stairway. The RTC and CA convicted the accused of the
composite crime of robbery with homicide.

In this appeal, the appellant posits that the adverse testimony of the 5-
year old Carl, being filled with inconsistencies, was not credible, but
doubtful; that unlike him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of
the house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to Carl’s recollection,
the place was not even dark when the stabbing attack on the victim
occurred because his father said that he had turned the light on upon
hearing somebody shouting " Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then
gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house.
ISSUE: Can the testimony of the child be sufficient to convict the accused?

RULING: Yes. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for
disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child
witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule
on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC, 15 December
2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s
competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the
child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court,
motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination
of a child.

5. Can a child be called to testify before the court?

Yes. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, every child is now
presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden
of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate
the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion
of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

SECTION 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity

or immaturity. –

The following persons cannot be witnesses:

(a)Those whose mental condition, at the time of their

production for examination, is such that they are incapable
or intelligently making known their perception to others;

(b)Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them

incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully.
6. People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, Jan. 30, 2013.

FACTS: In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza,
were in front of the sari-sari store of AAA’s mother, BBB, while appellant
was inside the fence of their house adjacent to the said sari-sari store.
Shortly, thereafter, appellant invited AAA to go with him to the kiln at the
back of their house. AAA acceded and went ahead.

Upon seeing appellant and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza, pretending to
look for her one peso coin, followed them until she reached a papaya tree
located three and a half meters away from the place. Analiza hid under the
papaya tree and from there she saw appellant undress AAA by removing
the latter’s shorts and panty. Appellant, however, glanced and saw Analiza.
Frightened, Analiza ran away and went back to the sari-sari store of BBB
without telling BBB what she saw.

Appellant proceeded to satisfy his bestial desire. After undressing AAA,

appellant made her lie down. He then placed himself on top of AAA and
made push and pull movements. Afterwards, appellant stopped, allowed
AAA to sit down for a while and then sent her home.

When AAA arrived at their house around 7:30 p.m., she was asked by her
mother, BBB, where she came from and why she came home late. AAA
replied that she was at the back of their house as appellant brought her
there and had sexual intercourse with her.

Appellant denied having raped AAA. He claimed that on 9 December 2002,

at around 1:00 p.m., he, together with Pio and a certain Dinnes Samson,
was having a drinking spree in the house of one Adolfo Congayao (Adolfo).
They finished drinking at around 6:00 p.m. As he was too drunk, Pio
assisted him in going home. He went to sleep and woke up only at 12:00
midnight as he needed to urinate. He went back to sleep and woke up at
6:00 a.m. of the following day, i.e., 10 December 2002. He was surprised
that AAA charged him with rape. He was then arrested at around 3:00 p.m.
of 10 December 2002..
The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of rape. It was their
argument that the trial court erred in its judgment since there was failure
to establish the accused’ guilt.

ISSUE: Was the testimony of AAA, a mental retardate, sufficient to warrant

the conviction?

RULING: Yes. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the competence and
credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld
by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal
capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the
complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony,
that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously
and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such
crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it has been jurisprudentially
settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone
is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to
convict the accused.

7. Read the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness. Under the said rule:

a. Is it mandatory for the court to assess the competency of the child

witness before allowing him or her to testify? No. It is already presumed
that every child is qualified to be a witness.

b. What is the courtroom environment suitable for a child witness?

As provided under Section 13 on the Rule on Examination of a Child

Witness, to create a more comfortable environment for the child, the court
may, in its discretion, direct and supervise the location, movement and
deportment of all persons in the courtroom including the parties, their
counsel, child, witnesses, support persons, guardian ad litem, facilitator,
and court personnel. The child may be allowed to testify from a place
other than the witness chair. The witness chair or other place from which
the child testifies may be turned to facilitate his testimony but the opposing
party and his counsel must have a frontal or profile view of the child during
the testimony of the child. The witness chair or other place from which the
child testifies may also be rearranged to allow the child to see the opposing
party and his counsel, if he chooses to look at them, without turning his
body or leaving the witness stand. The judge need not wear his judicial
robe.

c. What are the modes of questioning adopted by the rule on examination

of a child witness?

As provided in Section 19 of the same rule, The court shall exercise control
over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of
the truth; (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
developmental level of the child; (3) protect children from harassment or
undue embarrassment; and (4) avoid waste of time.

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.

d. What is SEXUAL ABUSE SHIELD RULE?

The following are the rules as regards the sexual abuse shield rule under
Section 30:

(a) Inadmissible evidence.— The following evidence is not admissible in

any criminal proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:
.
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior; and
.
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged
victim.
.
(b) Exception.— Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim to prove that a person other than the accused was the
source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence shall be admissible.

A party intending to offer such evidence must:

(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered,
unless the court, for good cause, requires a different time for filing or
permits filing during trial; and

(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three
(3) days before the hearing of the motion.

Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in

chambers and afford the child, his guardian ad litem, the parties, and their
counsel a right to attend and be heard. The motion and the record of the
hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a
protective order set forth in Section 31(b). The child shall not be required
to testify at the hearing in chambers except with his consent.

8. LLanto v. Alzona, G.R. No. 150730, January 31, 2005

FACTS: Bernardo Sales and Maria Sales were husband and wife. They have
twelve children, eleven of whom are the present petitioners while the
remaining child, Estela Sales Pelongco, is one of herein respondents. Maria
was the registered owner of a certain parcel of land The property is located
at Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna. 

A real estate mortgage contract was purportedly executed by Maria, who

was already deceased at that time, and Bernardo in favor of herein
respondent Dominador Alzona. Respondent Estela Sales Pelongco signed as
an instrumental witness to the mortgage contract. Respondent Ernesto
Alzona admitted that while he was a co-mortgagee of his brother,
Dominador, his name does not appear in the mortgage contract. The
mortgage was subsequently foreclosed for alleged failure of Bernardo and
Maria to settle their obligation secured by the said mortgage. The property
was thereafter sold in a mortgage sale conducted on December 20, 1990
wherein Ernesto Alzona was the highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate
of sale was awarded to Ernesto and he executed a Consolidation of
Ownership over the property. Accordingly, the TCT issued in the name of
Maria Sales was cancelled.

Subsequently, petitioners caused the inscription of an adverse claim on the

title to the property.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the defendants  Dominador Alzona
and Ernesto Alzona and against Estela Sales dismissing plaintiffs’
complaint.
Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, petitioners filed an appeal with the
CA.

The CA rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the RTC but deleting
the attorney’s fees awarded to petitioners.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution issued by

the Court of Appeals 

Hence, present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees in good

faith.

RULING: Yes. In the instant case, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial
court that Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees in good faith. The trial
court gave credence to Ernesto’s testimony that he conducted a credit
investigation before he approved the loan sought and the property
mortgaged. It is well settled in our jurisdiction that the determination of
credibility of witnesses is properly within the domain of the trial court as it
is in the best position to observe their demeanor and bodily movements.
Further, findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect, and even
finality, unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of
weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
by the trial judge which, if considered, would have affected the case.
These findings are binding on this Court especially when affirmed by the
appellate court.

9. Is a person charged with multiple cases of perjury and false testimony

qualified to be a witness?

Yes, for as long as he is not convicted of such charges since the law
specifically provides that there Is disqualification when there is conviction.
10. People v. Umali, G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991.

FACTS: Francisco Manalo was investigated by operatives of the Tiaong,

Quezon Police Department for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act which
was filed against him in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City.

Aside from said case, accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other
charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes against
property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal Jail, and
sought the help of Francisco to identify the source of the marijuana. In
return he asked the policeman to help him in some cases pending against
him. He did not negotiate his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as
he has entered a plea of guilty.Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation
Division gave Manalo four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from
sources known to him. Few minutes thereafter, Manalo returned with two
(2) foils of dried marijuana which were allegedly bought from the accused
Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a
statement on the manner and circumstances of how he was able to
purchase marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali.

After securing a search warrant, with the help of Manalo’s affidavit,

supported by the toils of marijuana, the police operatives, went to the
house of Gloria Umali, in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan, served the
search warrant and were able to confiscate from the person of Gloria Umali
the four P5.00 bills with serial numbers as reflected in the police blotter
and a can of milo, containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves.
Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of “not,
guilty” as accused Suzeth Umali remained at large. After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision finding accused Gloria Umali guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the witness Francisco Manalo is

credible to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: Yes. The phrase “conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law” takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that
persons “convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false
testimony” are disqualified from being witnesses to a will.”

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-
mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does not
involve the probate of a will, the court rule that the fact that said witness is
facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness.

The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the
absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive (People v.
Melgar, G.R. No. 75268, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in the
absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by
improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

11. Give an example of a law providing for conviction of a crime as a

disqualification to be a witness.

An example of which is when the case is about perjury then if a witness

has been convicted of perjury then he may be disqualified to be a witness.

12. Northwest Airlines V. Chiong, G.R. No. 155550, January 31,

2008.

FACTS: Respondent Steven Chiong was supposed to depart for San Diego,
California for an employment as an engineer of TransOcean’s vessel M/V
Elbia. Thus, on April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International
Airport. Marilyn Calvo, the Liaison Officer of Philimare (Philippine agent of
TransOcean), met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to
the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiong’s seaman
service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiong’s passport was duly
stamped, after complying with government requirements for departing
seafarers. Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest (the airline) check-
in counter. When it was Chiong’s turn, the Northwest personnel informed
him that his name did not appear in the computer’s list of confirmed
departing passengers. Chiong was then directed to speak to a "man in
barong" standing outside Northwest’s counters from whom Chiong could
allegedly obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong approached the "man
in barong" who demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefor. Without the
said amount, and anxious to board the plane, Chiong queued a number of
times at Northwest’s Check-in Counter and presented his ticket. Ultimately,
he was not able to depart for San Diego.

Thus, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before the
RTC. Northwest contradicted, reiterating that Chiong had no cause of
action against it because per its records, Chiong was a "no-show"
passenger.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chiong was able to prove by preponderance of

evidence his claim for breach of contract.

RULING: Yes. A witness’ relationship to the victim does not automatically

affect the veracity of his or her testimony. While this principle is often
applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in
this case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness’ relationship with a party does
not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where the
quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is
no reason why the same principle should not apply in civil cases where the
quantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence.

SECTION 22. Testimony confined to personal knowledge. – A

witness can testify only to those facts which he or she knows
of his or her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his or her own perception.

13. Mancol, Jr. v. DBP, G.R. No. 204289, November 22, 2017

FACTS: Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), scheduled an

Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale over a residential lot with a two-storey
building (subject property) covered by TCT and with Tax Declaration with
a purchase price of P1,326,000.
In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner) executed a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr.
(Mancol, Sr.), to represent and negotiate, on his behalf, the sale of the
subject property. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated
Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of
Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis. DBP then issued an Official
Receipt (O.R.) No. 3440018 dated October 13, 2004, in the name of
Fernando R. Mancol, Jr., paid by Fernando M. Mancol, Sr., in the amount of
P265,200, as initial payment for the purchase price of the subject property.
During the negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to:
(1) arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name,
including the payment of capital gains tax (CGT); and (2) to get rid of the
occupants of the subject property.

Petitioner paid the balance in the amount of P1,060,800, Thereafter, DBP,

through its executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, in petitioner's favor.
Petitioner made a deposit with DBP for the payment of the CGT and
documentary stamp tax (DST) in the amount of P99,450. DBP
acknowledged the deposit and issued O.R. No. 3440537.
Years later, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement,
returned to the petitioner all the pertinent documents of the sale and
issued a Manager's Check. Petitioner filed a Complaint for damages for
breach of contract against DBP before the RTC of Calbayog City.

DBP answered that the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale stated no
condition that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to eject the
occupants thereon.

During trial, testified that he was the one ordered by the DBP to bring the
necessary documents to BIR-Catbalogan. Mancol, Sr. testified that after the
execution and delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, DBP verbally agreed
to facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the CGT, and to cause
the vacation of the occupants of the house and lot.

The RTC Decision ruled in favor of the petitioner,

Thereafter, DBP moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's Decision. DBP
alleged, among others, that the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr.
were hearsay because their statements were based on facts relayed to
them by other people and not based on their personal knowledge.
The RTC Order granted DBP's motion and dismissed petitioner's complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, Villanueva and
Mancol, Sr., should be given probative value to establish the alleged
contemporaneous verbal agreement in the sale contract.

Ruling: No. The admissibility of the testimonial evidence as an exception to

the parol evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has weight.
Admissibility of evidence should not be confounded with its probative
value.

"The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence,

while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade." The admissibility of a particular item
of evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests by which its
reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered with other evidence
admitted in the case in arriving at a decision as to the truth. The weight of
evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of
the witnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical
effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case.
"Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence
are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of
whether the admitted evidence proves an issue." "Thus, a particular item
of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence."

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts
that he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived
from his own perception. A witness may not testify on what he merely
learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned, read or heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the
witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only
limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written
statements.
The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact.
A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be
called upon for that purpose because his testimony derives its value not
from the credit accorded to him as a witness presently testifying but from
the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of his information.

14. What is the concept of INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENT?

This means that only the fact that such statements were made

is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule
does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. That
is, when an opinion may be admitted as evidence, such as an opinion a
witness is admissible In evidence to prove the truth, which is supported by
his opinion. For example, an opinion of an expert witness may be received
in evidence.

15. People v. Lobrigas, et al., G.R. No. 147649           December

17, 2002.

FACTS: Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante were

charged with murdering Felix Taylaran by beating him. Upon arraignment
the accused-appellant Frank Lobrigas pleaded not guilty. The antecedent
facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

The victim Felix Taylaran was a regular farmhand of Castor Guden. On

February 19, 1996, he asked for permission not to work for it was raining
and he had to go to the store of Teodorico Mante. At 4:00 p.m., Felix
returned to Castor Guden’s house with bruises on his face and injuries all
over his body. He told Castor that he was mauled by accused-appellant
Frank Lobrigas, accused Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante at the store.
Felix spent the night in Castor’s house and left the following morning to go
to the seaside house of Lorie Aguilar, his cousin, to heal his wounds in the
saltwater. However, the next day, Felix Taylaran died.

Rosa Taylaran Solarte, daughter of the victim, testified that a day after the
mauling, her father came to her house and told her that he was beaten up
by Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante. He told her that
he was in pain and felt weak. He then went to the house of Lorie Aguilar
apparently to recuperate.

ISSUE: Does the testimony made by Solarte constitutes independent

relevant statements? YES.

RULING: A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in

evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2)
the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites concur in
the case at bar.

However, the declaration made by the victim to his daughter does not
satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because they were made a
day after the incident and the exciting influence of the startling occurrence
was no longer present.

Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solarte’s testimony on what her father

told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct from hearsay,
and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the
fact that they had been uttered. Under the doctrine of independently
relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is
relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule
does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible as evidence.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary,
for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

16. Espineli v. People, G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014.

FACTS: Espineli together with Sotero and three others shot Alberto Berbon
in the head and different parts of the body causing his instantaneous death
and thereafter immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car. An
Information for Murder was filed before RTC. Meanwhile, the NBI arrested
Reyes for another crime. He confided to the NBI that he was willing to give
vital information regarding the Berbon case. Reyes claimed that he saw
accused and Sotero board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm
and armalite, and that accused told Sotero that “ayaw ko nang abutin pa
ng bukas yang si Berbon.” Subsequently, Reyes jumped bail and was never
again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial reduced his statement into writing and
testified on these facts during the trial. Prosecution also presented a
witness who testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to three persons
and identified the said car from the photographs. Accused filed a Demurrer
to Evidence without leave of court.

RTC convicted the accused for Murder. On appeal, CA convicted the

accused for Homicide.

Accused filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner anchors his

quest for the reversal of his conviction on the alleged erroneous admission
in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Reyes for being hearsay and
inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn statement should not have been
given probative value because its contents were neither confirmed nor
authenticated by the affiant. He emphasizes that there was no direct
evidence linking him to the crime.

ISSUE: Is the statement of the witness admissible in evidence? YES.

Ruling: Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in

part on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of
a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the
purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement,
or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or
falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such
statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the
statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of
the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence
of such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant
statements. The testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was
investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard
petitioner telling Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon”
and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber
pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car, cannot be
regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent
Segunial’s testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such
statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on February 10,
1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration of
facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness’ oral testimony. Moreover,
NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is incompetent to
testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’ statement. Verily then, what the
prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such
narration of facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the
truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of
an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that
Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial.
In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and
the hearsay rule does not apply.

Section 23. Disqualification by reason of marriage

During their marriage, the husband or the wife, cannot

testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants.

17. What is MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE in the concept of

qualification of a witness?

A spouse cannot testify in any case where the other spouse is a party,
whether for or against him or her, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
AFFECTED SPOUSE.
18. Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005.

FACTS: A criminal case for arson was filed by Susan Ramirez against her
brother-in-law Maximo Alvarez. the private prosecutor called Esperanza
Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her
husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. In the course of
Esperanza’s direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed
“uncontrolled emotions,” prompting the trial judge to suspend the
proceedings. Subsequently, Maximo, through counsel, filed a motion to
disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification. The trial court issued
the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza, prompting Susan to file a
petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA nullified the order of the RTC.

ISSUE: Can Esperanza testify against her husband? YES.

RULING: Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “Sec.
22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.—During their marriage, neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other
or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.” The reasons given for the
rule are: 1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife; 2. If
one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of
perjury; 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of
private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to
prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of
domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases
for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the
exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the
commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife
was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six
months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented
reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying
the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the
innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of
Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated
by this Court in Francisco14), “it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity.”

19. After the finality of an action for declaration of absolute nullity of

marriage of the spouse, can one of the latter testify against the other?

20. People v. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401 October 1, 1998.

FACTS: On or about September 17, 1988, in the Municipality of Kaputian,

Province of Davao, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping with Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, who are
charged with Murder in a separate information, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, with the use of a bolo and an iron-bar, assault,
hack and stab his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., on the different parts of
his body, thereby inflicting upon him wounds which caused his death, and
further causing actual, moral and compensatory damage to the heirs of the
victim.

Accused-appellant's case for parricide was tried jointly with the murder
case filed against his coaccused, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita who,
however, withdrew their "not guilty" plea during the trial and were
accordingly sentenced.

The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its

witnesses accused-appellant's brother Leo Quidato, appellant's wife Gina
Quidato, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio Mara.
On September 16, 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, herein
accusedappellant, and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita,
went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the copra,
Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left.
Bernardo and accused-appellant went back to Sitio Libod.

According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day, September 17,
1988, accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their
house. She overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in-law's house
to get money from the latter. She had no idea, however, as to what later
transpired because she had fallen asleep before 10:00 p.m.

Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidato's testimony on the ground that

the same was prohibited by the marital disqualification rule found in
Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Her testimony was, however, allowed by the judge only against the other
two accused.

Issue
WON the testimony of Gina Quidato, wife of the accused-appellant
Bernardo Quidato, Jr., may be admitted in evidence against the latter

Held
No. With regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be
disregarded, accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the
marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the court a quo, the
disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the
wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina
Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which
was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case. This testimony cannot,
however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise
of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without
violating the marital disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly
cannot be done indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law students.
Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's testimony, as well as
of Reynaldo and Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on
record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to accused-appellant.

Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

communications

The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in

confidence in the following cases:

(a) The husband or the wife, during or after their marriage,

cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the atter’s direct
descendants or
ascendants;

21. What is MARITAL COMMUNICATION RULE and what are its

requisites?

The marital privilege rule, under Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides that the husband or the wife, during or after the marriage,
cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants.

The requisites for this rule to apply:

1. The husband and wife are LEGALLY MARRIED;
2. The privilege is invoked with respect to a confidential communication,
oral or written, between the spouses DURING the said marriage;
and
3. That the communication is CONFIDENTIAL
4. That there is no case between the husband and wife
22. What are the differences between Marital Disqualification Rule and
Marital Communication Rule?

a) The Marital Disqualification Rule requires that one of the spouses be a

party to a case. Whereas, the Marital Communication Rule does not require
that (one of the spouses be a party to a case)
b) The Marital Disqualification Rule applies to any fact. Whereas, the
Marital Communication Rule refers only to confidential communications
during the marriage
c) The Marital Disqualification Rule is claimable only during the marriage.
Whereas, the Marital Communication Rule is claimable during the marriage
or afterwards (even when the marriage is already dissolved). What is
important is that the communication was made or given while they were
still married.

(b) An attorney or person reasonably believed by the client

to be licensed to engage in the practice of law cannot,
without the consent of the client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him or her, or his or
her advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney’s secretary,
stenographer, or clerk, or other persons assisting the
attorney be examined, without the consent of the client and
his or her employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity, except in the
following cases:

23. Belen v. People, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017.

FACTS: Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, then a practicing lawyer and now a former
Judge, filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D.
Belen, Sr. before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City,
which was assigned to then Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Suñega-
Lagman for preliminary investigation.

Petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing but was then dismissed by

Lagma. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify), the contents of which
later became the basis for the filing by ACP Suñega-Lagman of the case of
libel against Belen.

The trial court stressed that the following allegations and utterances
against
ACP Suñega-Lagman in petitioner's Omnibus Motion are far detached from
the controversy in the estafa case, thereby losing its character as
absolutely privileged communication: (1) "manifest bias for 20,000
reasons"; (2) "the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful assumptions were
tarnished in silver ingots"; (3) "the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and
convoluted frame of mind"; (4) "corrupted and convoluted 20,000
reasons"; (5) "moronic resolution"; (6) "intellectually in􀀹rm or stupid
blind"; (7) "manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity"; (8) "idiocy and
imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal"; and (9) "a fraud and a quack bereft
of any intellectual ability and mental honesty."

On the element of publication, the trial court noted that the Omnibus
Motion
was not sent straight to ACP Suñega-Lagman, but passed through and
exposed to be read by third persons, namely: prosecution witnesses Flores
and Enseo who are the staff in the receiving section of the OCP of San
Pablo City, as well as Michael Belen, the son and representative of Nezer in
the estafa case.

CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Anent the applicability of the rule on absolutely privileged communication,

the CA ruled in the negative because the subject statements were
unnecessary or irrelevant in determining whether the dismissal of the
estafa case filed by petitioner against Nezer was proper, and they were
defamatory remarks on the personality, reputation and mental witness of
ACP Suñega-Lagman.

In seeking his acquittal of the crime charged, one of petitioner’s arguments

was that the CA erred in ruling that the privileged communication rule is
inapplicable.
ISSUE: WON the privileged communication rule is inapplicable, thus the
conviction of Belen of the crime of libel was proper

RULING: A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not

actionable, even if the author has acted in bad faith. This class includes
allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or
motions or during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as
well as answers given by the witness in reply to questions propounded to
them in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or
statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive to
the questions propounded to said witnesses.

The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are
considered
privileged is not only because said pleadings have become part of public
record open to the public to scrutinize, but also to the undeniable fact said
pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and
legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before
the courts for proper administration of justice and, therefore, of general
public concern. Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations
substantially true because they can be supported by evidence in good faith,
the contents of which would be under scrutiny of courts and, therefore,
subject to be purged of all improprieties and illegal statements contained
therein. In fine, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the
administration of justice.

The absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the
presence of malice, if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the
cause in and or subject of the inquiry. Sarcastic, pungent and harsh
allegations in a pleading although tending to detract from the dignity that
should characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are absolutely
privileged, if relevant to the issues.

The statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed before the OCP of San
Pablo City as a remedy for the dismissal of his estafa complaint during
preliminary investigation, fall short of the test of relevancy. An examination
of the motion shows that the following defamatory words and phrases
used, even if liberally construed, are hardly material or pertinent to his
cause, which is to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of his estafa
complaint and the disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman from further
acting on the case.

24. The elements of attorney-client privileged communication are:

1. There must be an attorney-client relation

2. There must be a communication made by the client to the attorney or
an advice given by the attorney to his client;
3. The communication or advice must have been given in confidence;
4. The communication or advice must have been given either in the course
of the professional employment or with view to professional employment.

25. Canon 21 of the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS

OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS
TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his
client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the
consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees
or associates or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the
same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client,
give information from his files to an outside agency seeking such
information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data
processing, or any similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to
partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to
prevent those whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using
confidences or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's
affairs even with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a
particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.

26. Saura v. Agdeppa, AC No. 4426, February 17, 2000.

FACTS: Two administrative complaints were filed by complainants Ramon

Saura, Jr. and Helen S. Baldoria, before the Court charging herein Atty.
Lalaine Agdeppa for violation of her lawyer's oath and disregard of Sections
15, 22, 25, 31, and 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. The two (2)
complaints are related and arose from the handling of the respondent of a
settlement case involving a piece of property owned in common by the
petitioners with their other siblings, Macrina, Romeo and Amelita, all
surnamed Saura, who were then the administrators of the said property of
the late Ramon E. Saura who died intestate on May 15, 1992.

It appeared that herein respondent refused to disclose the amount of the

sale or account for the proceeds of the properties involved in the
settlement of estate which was sold to Sandalwood Real Estate and
Development Corporation.

The National Grievance Investigation Office of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines recommended that for continued defiance to answer the
administrative charges against her, respondent was recommended to be
penalized with a fine of P10,000.00 and suspension from practice for one
year in each of the two cases pending against her.

Respondent contended that she was not accorded due process and she
could not answer the administrative charges against her without divulging
certain pieces of information in violation of the attorney-client privilege.

ISSUE: WON respondent was correct in contending that the attorney-client

privilege rule is applicable
RULING: No. First. The respondent was given notice on various occasions
but she chose to ignore them and failed to exercise her right to be heard.

Since respondent repeatedly ignored the notices sent to her by this Court,
we cannot be expected to wait indefinitely for her answer. While
respondent may have changed her address and did not, thus, receive the
previous notices, still, on March 2, 1998, she came to know of the Supreme
Court Resolution dated June 19, 1995.

Second. The request for the information regarding the sale of the property
and to account for the proceeds is not a violation of the attorney-client
privilege.

The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The petitioners

are only asking for the disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for
the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have the right to ask for such
information since they own the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon E.
Saura and as co-administrators of the property. Hence, respondent cannot
refuse to divulge such information to them and hide behind the cloak of
the attorney-client relationship.

27. Can a lawyer invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his or her client?

Yes, when information relating to the identity of client may fall within the
ambit of the privilege when the client’s name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

28. Regala v. Sandiganbayan, Sept. 20, 1996.

FACTS: The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the
Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for
the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in
UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC and more that twenty other
coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel
Corporation Shares. Among the defendants named in the case are herein
petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and
Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all
were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and
Cruz
Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law
Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which
included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business
associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental
services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders.

More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the

law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's
equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the
shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their
clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the
assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As
members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul
Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers pray that they be excluded as party-defendants.

PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in
favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.

Petitioners, however, argued that they are prohibited from revealing the
identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as
lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained
during such lawyer-client relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the name of petitioners’ client(s) in the case at bar.

HELD: No. As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be

shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our
jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke
the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
1. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client
relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not
attach until there is a client.
3. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship.
4. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party
should, as a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is
entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the
dark against unknown forces.

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified

by some important exceptions.
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity
for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged.
3. Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys
client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish
the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a

client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the clients name itself
has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences. The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the
case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at
least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged
client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very
fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance
(without which there would be no attorney-client relationship). The link
between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service
sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG
itself.

The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which
constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they accede
thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor
of their clients covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that
the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers,
regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and setup of
the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional
advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of
assignment
covering their clients’ shareholdings. There is no question that the
preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioner’s legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an
integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the
very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's

name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to
build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of
Baird, that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict the (client) of a... crime." An important distinction must be made
between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit
purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose
of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might
have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney
about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the
same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within
the exception because whether or not the act for which the advice turns
out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure
leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might
lead to possible action against him. The court has no choice but to uphold
petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the
instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the
clients name is not privileged information.

By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but
worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer
relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor
of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact
from petitioners a link that would inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a crime.

i. Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services or advice of

the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone
to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or
reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud;

29. Give an example applying the above-mentioned exception to the

attorney-client privileged communication.

An example of which when a client asks advice from his lawyer on how to
hide or destroy evidence or to launder his profits through a legitimate
business.

ii. Claimants through the same deceased client. As to a

communication relevant to an issue between parties who
 claim through the same deceased client, regardless of
whether the claims are by testate or intestate or by inter
vivos transaction;

30. Give an example applying the above-mentioned exception to the

attorney-client privileged communication.

An example of which is related to succession, such as when there is a will,

it may be disclosed so as to determine the true claimant of the inheritance.

iii. Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication

relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his or
her client, or by the client to his or her lawyer;

31. Give an example applying the above-mentioned exception to the

attorney-client privileged communication.

An example of which is when there is an issue of breach between the two,

the lawyer may disclose such fact in order to determine the truth.

iv. Document attested by the lawyer. As to a communication

relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to
which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or

32. Give an example applying the above-mentioned exception to the

attorney-client privileged communication.

When, for example, the issue is a document such as a notarized will, the
lawyer may disclose such fact if relevant to a certain issue.

v. Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter

of common interest between two or more clients if the
communication was made by
any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common,
when offered in an action between any of the clients, unless
they have expressly agreed otherwise.
33. Give an example applying the above-mentioned exception to the
attorney-client privileged communication.
When such lawyer is a lawyer for two clients, he may disclose the
communication to either of them when it is relevant to the matter.

(c) A physician, psychotherapist or person reasonably

believed by the
patient to be authorized to practice medicine or
psychotherapy cannot in a
civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined
as to any
confidential communication made for the purpose of
diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s physical, mental or
emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction,
between the patient and his other physician or
psychotherapist. This privilege also applies to persons,
including members of the patient’s family, who have
participated in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient
under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist.

A “psychotherapist” is:

a) A person licensed to practice medicine engaged in the

diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, or

b) A person licensed as a psychologist by the government

while similarly engaged.

34. What are the requisites of the PRIVILEGE OF PHYSICIAN AND

PATIENT?

The following are its requisites:

1. The privilege is claimed in a CIVIL case;

2. It is a claim against a person DULY AUTHORIZED to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics;
3. The information was acquired by such person WHILE ATTENDING to the
patient in his professional capacity;
4. The information is NECESSARY to enable the person to act in his
professional capacity;
5. The information is CONFIDENTIAL; and
6. If disclosed the information will blacken the reputation of the patient.

35. Lim vs. CA, G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.

FACTS: On 25 November 1987, private-respondent filed a petition for

annulment of marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly
suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia, before, during, after
the marriage, and until the present. Private respondent's counsel presented
3 witnesses, one of whom was the Chief of the Female Services of the
National Mental Hospital. Petitioner's counsel filed an opposition alleging
that the testimony sought 10 be elicited from the witness is privileged since
the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that the witness
would be presented as an expert witness i and would not testify on any
Information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional
capacity.
The Sower court and CA denied the motion and allowed the witness to
testify as an expert witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not an attending physician is qualified to be an expert

witness, without violating the physician-patient privileged communication
rule.

HELD: Yes. The statutory physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed,

is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in
response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
physical or mental condition of a patient whom he has attended
professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical
facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional
knowledge he may have concerning such patient. The physician must base
his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding
from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through
the physician-and-patient relationship.

If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal

professional knowledge of the patient's condition, he should not be
permitted to testify as to his expert opinion.

36. Is the physician-patient privilege rule violated by permitting a

physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly
hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental condition
of a patient whom he has attended professionally?

No. The statutory physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not

violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in
response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
physical or mental condition of a patient whom he has attended
professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical
facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional
knowledge he may have concerning such patient. The physician must base
his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding
from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through
the physician-and-patient relationship.

37. Krohn vs. CA, G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994

Facts: Edgar and Paz were married. Paz underwent psychological testing
purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. Edgar was able to secure
a copy of the confidential psychiatric report. He later then filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage with Paz and cited the said report. Edgar
took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
confidential psychiatric evaluation report. This was objected on the ground
that it violated the rule on privileged communication between physician
and patient.

ISSUE: Whether or not the privileged communication was violated.

RULING: No. The person against whom the privileged is claimed is not 1
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the
patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by the
medical practitioners. Neither can his testimony be considered a
circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the
force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report.

38. Chan vs. Chan G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013.

FACTS: Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody
of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally
deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for
detoxification and rehabilitation.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim

Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly
confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a
physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine
and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when
he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to "be
allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces
tecum.

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were
covered by physician-patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC
sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her
motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing
grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
CA upheld the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether hospital records be admissible in court.

RULING: Yes with patient’s consent. No without patient’s consent.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him
—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the
patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling
the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with
the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

(d) A minister, priest or person reasonably believed to be so

cannot, without the consent of the affected person, be examined
as to any communication or confession made to or any advice
given by him or her, in his or her professional character, in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister
or priest belongs.

2. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE

Section 25. Parental and filial privilege - No person shall be

compelled to testify against his or her parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct
descendants, except when such testimony is indispensable in a
crime
against that person or by one parent against the other.

39. Distinguish PARENTAL PRIVILEGE FROM FILIAL PRIVILEGE.

In parental privilege, the witness cannot be compelled to testify against his

child or other direct descendant. Whereas in filial privilege, the witness
cannot be compelled to testify against his parent or other direct ascendant.

40. Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010.

FACTS: Spouses Lee (Father) and Keh (Mother) immigrants from China
entered the Philippines with their 11 children in 1930s. The 11 children are
collectively known as the Lee-Keh Children. In 1948, Lee brought from
China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-
Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a
relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s 8
children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed that they,
too, were children of Lee and Keh.

NBI investigation ensued initiated by 11 Lee-keh’s children which resulted

that Keh the mother of the 11-children could not be the mother of the 8-
children due to age constraints. It was also found out that the father, Lee,
is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to
conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own
legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family
and secure their future.

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the
Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of
Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38
years old at the time. Another of the Lee’s other children, Mariano Lee, was
born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old,
and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lee’s other
children, Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she
supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight

On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the
certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other
children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate
her true mother’s name.
The 11-Leh-keh’s children wanted Tui, the presumed mother of 8-children,
to testify in court that indeed the 8-children are hers via request for
issuance of subpoena ad testificandum. Tiu moved to quash the motion on
the ground of Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on
parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.

On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena. CA . The CA ruled that
only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be
quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether my invoke filial privilege for she is the stepmother of

Petitioner Emma Lee.

RULING: NO. Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them
because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A stepdaughter has
no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former
unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter
binds a person with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

SECTION 26. Privilege relating to trade secrets. – A person cannot

be compelled
to testify about any trade secret, unless t
he non-disclosure will conceal fraud or
otherwise work injustice. When disclosure is directed, the court
shall take such
protective measure as the interest of the owner of the trade
secret and of the parties and the furtherance of justice may
require.

41. Air Philippines Corporation v. Pennswell, Inc. G.R. No.

172835, December 13, 2007.

FACTS: Pennswell sold and delivered to Air Philippines Corporation

industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants amounting to
P450,000.00. When Air Philippines refused to pay the obligation, Pensswell
filed a collection case before RTC Makati. In its Answer, Air Philippines
alleged that: it refused to pay because it was defrauded in the amount of
P600,000.00 by Pennswell for its previous sale of 4 items; said items were
misrepresented by Pennswell as belonging to a new line, but were in truth
and in fact, identical with products it had previously purchased from
Pennswell; and, Pennswell merely altered the names and labels of such
goods. During the trial, Air Philippines filed a motion to compel Pennswell
to give a detailed list of the chemical components and the ingredients used
for the products that were sold. Pennswell opposed the motion for
production, contending that the requested information was a trade secret
that it could not be forced to disclose.

ISSUE: Whether Penswell can be compelled to disclose its formula.

Ruling: NO. Trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The
protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade secrets is evident in our
laws.

Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation

Code, expressly provides that the court may issue an order to protect trade
secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information belonging to the debtor

Revised Penal Code: Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The

penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge,
employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial establishment
who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the
industry of
the latter.

Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997

SECTION 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. - Any

person who causes or procures an officer or employee of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to divulge any confidential information regarding the
business, income or inheritance of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was
acquired by him in the discharge of his official duties, and which it is
unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who publishes or prints in any
manner whatever, not provided by law, any income, profit, loss or
expenditure appearing in any income tax return, shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two thousand pesos (₱2,000), or suffer imprisonment
of not less than six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, or both.

Republic Act No. 6969, or the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear
Wastes Control Act of 1990, enacted to implement the policy of the state to
regulate, restrict or prohibit the importation, manufacture, processing, sale,
distribution, use and disposal of chemical substances and mixtures that
present unreasonable risk and/or injury to health or the environment, also
contains a provision that limits the right of the public to have access to
records, reports or information concerning chemical substances and
mixtures including safety data submitted and data on emission or discharge
into the environment, if the matter is confidential such that it would divulge
trade secrets, production or sales figures; or methods, production or
processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or distributor; or would
otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position of such
manufacturer, processor or distributor

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or

compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it
is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or
process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in
compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. A trade
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of
information that: (1) is used in one's business; and (2) gives the employer
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
possess the information. Generally, a trade secret is a process or device
intended for continuous use in the operation of the business, for example,
a machine or formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized
customer list. It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary
rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar
innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property, and
ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the
trade secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or
through a "confidential relationship." American jurisprudence has utilized
the following factors to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's
business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others
involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of
the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing
the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained
through an independent source.