TOMAS P.
TAN,
JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G.
HOSANA, Respondent.
Jose and Milagros are married. During
their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought
a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga
City, which lot was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
21229.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to
the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas)
the subject property, as evidenced by a
deed of sale executed by Milagros
herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) executed by Jose in her
favor.6 The Deed of Sale stated that the
purchase price for the lot was
P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No.
21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568
was issued in the name of
Tomas.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed
a Complaint for Annulment of
Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance
and Damages against Milagros, Tomas,
and the Register of Deeds of Naga
City.9 The complaint was filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62,
Naga City.
In the complaint, Jose averred that while
he was working in Japan, Milagros,
without his consent and knowledge,
conspired with Tomas to execute the
SPA by forging Jose's signature making
it appear that Jose had authorized
Milagros to sell the subject property to
Tomas.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he
was a buyer in good faith and for
value.11 Before he paid the full
consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed
he sought advice from his lawyer-friend
who told him that the title of the subject
lot was authentic and in
12
order.  Furthermore, he alleged that the
SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the
property was annotated at the back of the
title.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a cross-claim against
Milagros and claimed compensatory and
moral damages, attorney's fees, and
expenses, for litigation, in the event that
judgment be rendered in favor of
Jose.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC declared Milagros in default
for her failure to file her answer to Jose's
complaint and Tomas' cross-claim.15  signature
On the other hand, it dismissed Tomas'
complaint against the Register of Deeds
since it was only a nominal
party.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the
meritsensued.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibra
During trial, Jose presented his brother,
Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole
witness. Bonifacio testified that he
learned of the sale of the subject property
from Milagros' son.18 When Bonifacio
confronted Milagros that Jose would get
angry because of the sale, Milagros
retorted that she sold the property
because she needed the money.
Bonifacio immediately informed Jose,
who was then in Japan, of the
sale.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose was furious when he learned of the
sale and went back to the Philippines.
Jose and Bonifacio verified with the
Register of Deeds and discovered that
the title covering the disputed property
had been transferred to
Tomas.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bonifacio further testified that Jose's
in the SPA was
forged.21 Bonifacio presented documents
containing the signature of Jose for
comparison: Philippine passport,
complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of
SPA dated 16 February 2002, notice
of lis pendens, community tax certificate,
voter's affidavit, specimen signatures,
and a handwritten letter.
On the other hand, Tomas submitted his
own account of events as corroborated
by Rosana Robles (Rosana), his
goddaughter who he directed to go to the
house of Milagros to confirm if Jose
knew about the sale transaction. Through
a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana
was able to talk to Jose who confirmed
that he was aware of the sale and had
given his wife authority to proceed with
the sale. Rosana informed Tomas of
Jose's
confirmation.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar
y which is offered in opposition
With the assurance that all the
documents were in order, Tomas made a
partial payment of P350,000.00 and
another P350,000.00 upon the execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of
Sale). Tomas noticed that the
consideration written by Milagros on the
Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he
inquired why the written consideration
was lower than the actual consideration
paid. Milagros explained that it was done
to save on taxes. Tomas also learned
from Milagros that she needed money
badly and had to sell the house because
Jose had stopped sending her party making allegations has the burden
money.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence.40 Moreover, the parties must
rely on the strength of their own
RTC: in favor of Jose and nullified the evidence, not upon the weakness of the
sale of the subject property to Tomas. defense offered by their
The RTC held that the SPA dated June 41
opponent. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly
appointed Milagros as his attorney-in- Preponderance of evidence is the weight,
fact, was actually null and void. credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually
CA: affirmed. considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of the evidence" or
ISSUE: "greater weight of the credible
evidence."42 Preponderance of evidence
WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF is a phrase that, in the last analysis,
TOMAS IS SUFFICIENT TO means probability of the truth. It is
ESTABLISH THE ACTUAL PRICE evidence that is more convincing to the
OF THE SALE. court as it is worthier of belief than that
NO. thereto.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare
he paid P700,000.00 for the subject allegation that he paid Milagros the sum
property is a factual question that the CA of P700,000.00 cannot be considered as
had already resolved in the proof of payment, without any other
39
negative.  The CA found Tomas' claim convincing evidence to establish this
of paying P700,000.00 for the subject claim. Tomas' bare allegation, while
property to be unsubstantiated as he uncontroverted, does not automatically
failed to tender any convincing evidence entitle it to be given weight and
to establish his claim. credence.
We uphold the CA's finding. It is settled in jurisprudence that one who
pleads payment has the burden of
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the proving it;44 the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment, rather than
on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment.45 A mere allegation is not
evidence,46 and the person who alleges
has the burden of proving his or her
allegation with the requisite quantum of
evidence, which in civil cases is
preponderance of evidence.
WHETHER THE DEED OF SALE
CAN USED AS THE BASIS FOR
THE AMOUNT OF THE
CONSIDERATION PAID
YES.
Under the law, evidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the issue and not excluded
by the law of the rules. Nowhere in the
rules does it state that a void document is
excluded. Hence, a void document is
admissible as evidence because the purpose
of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain
the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to
enforce the terms of the document itself.
In the case at bar, the deed of sale, while
declared null and void by a positive
provision in the law, is not precluded from
becoming evidence to prove the possibility
that petitioner paid the consideration
stated therein. Thus, the admission of the
deed of sale as evidence is consistent with
the liberal policy of the court to admit the
evidence which appears to be relevant in
resolving an issue before the courts.
allow restitution of what has been given
under it.51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SC does not agree with the petitioner that
the CA erred in relying on the
While the terms and provisions of a void
consideration stated in the deed of sale as
contract cannot be enforced since it is
basis for the reimbursable amount
deemed inexistent, it does not preclude
because a null and void document cannot
the admissibility of the contract as
be used as evidence
evidence to prove matters that occurred
The force and effect of a void contract
in the course of executing the
is distinguished from its admissibility as
contract, i.e., what each party has given
evidence.
in the execution of the contract.
The next question to be resolved is
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in
whether the CA correctly ordered the
a judicial proceeding the truth respecting
reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is
a matter of fact, sanctioned by the Rules
the consideration stated in the Deed of
of Court.53 The purpose of introducing
Sale, based on the principle of unjust
documentary evidence is to ascertain the
enrichment.
truthfulness of a matter at issue, which
A void or inexistent contract has no force
can be the entire content or a specific
and effect from the very
47 provision/term in the document.
beginning.  This rule applies to contracts
that are declared void by positive
The deed of sale as documentary
provision of law, as in the case of a sale
evidence may be used as a means to
of conjugal property without the other
ascertain the truthfulness of the
spouse's written consent.48
consideration stated and its actual
A void contract is equivalent to nothing payment. The purpose of introducing the
and is absolutely wanting in civil deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce
effects.49 It cannot be validated either by the terms written in the contract, which is
ratification or prescription.50 When, an obligatory force and effect of a valid
however, any of the terms of a void contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used
contract have been performed, an action as a means to determine matters that
to declare its inexistence is necessary to occurred in the execution of such
contract, i.e., the determination of what
each party has given under the void
contract to allow restitution and prevent
unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law of these
rules.54 There is no provision in the Rules
of Evidence which excludes the
admissibility of a void document. The
Rules only require that the evidence is
relevant and not excluded by the Rules
for
itsadmissibility.55chanroblesvirtuallawlib
rary
Hence, a void document is admissible as
evidence because the purpose of
introducing it as evidence is to ascertain
the truth respecting a matter of fact, not
to enforce the terms of the document
itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that
with respect to evidence which appears
to be of doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility, the safer
policy is to be liberal and not reject them
on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admit them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent; for the
reason that their rejection places them
beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or
competent. On the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them
or ignoring
56
them. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, even if the deed of
sale was declared null and void by
positive provision of the law prohibiting
the sale of conjugal property without the
spouse's consent. It does not, however,
preclude the possibility that Tomas paid
the consideration stated therein.
The admission of the deed of sale as
evidence is consistent with the liberal
policy of the court to admit the evidence:
which appears to be relevant in resolving
an issue before the courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution
of the deed of sale is basis for the court
to determine the presence of the
essential elements of the sale, including
the consideration paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was
not specifically offered to prove the
actual consideration of the sale and,
hence, cannot be considered by the court.
Tomas is incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was
formally offered by both parties as
evidence.57 Tomas, in fact, formally
offered it for the purpose of proving its
execution and the regularity of the
sale.58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its
regularity necessarily allowed the; lower
courts to consider the terms written
therein to determine whether all the
essential elements59 for a valid contract
of sale are present, including the
consideration of the sale. The fact that
the sale was declared null and void does
not prevent the court from relying on
consideration stated in the deed of sale to
determine the actual amount paid by the
petitioner for the purpose of preventing
unjust enrichment..
The consideration stated in the
notarized Deed of Sale is prima
facie evidence of the amount paid by
the petitioner.
The notarized deed of sale is a public
document and is prima facie evidence of
the truth of the facts stated
therein.60chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prima facie evidence is defined as
evidence good and sufficient on its face.
Such evidence as, in the judgment of the
law, is sufficient to establish a given fact,
or the group or chain of facts constituting
the party's claim or defense and which if
not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient.61chanroblesv
irtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the consideration
stated in the deed of sale
constitutes prima facie evidence of the
amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of
the property to his name. Tomas failed to
adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut or
contradict the consideration stated as the
actual consideration and amount paid to
Milagros and Jose.
The deed of sale was declared null and
void by a positive provision of law
requiring the consent of both spouses for
the sale of conjugal property. There is,
however, no question on the presence of
the consideration of the sale, except with
respect to the actual amount paid. While
the deed of sale has no force and effect
as a contract, it remains prima
facie evidence of the actual consideration
paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to
substantiate his claim that he paid to
Milagros the amount of P700,000.00,
instead of the amount of P200,000.00
stated in the deed of sale. No
documentary or testimonial evidence to
prove payment of the higher amount was
presented, apart from Tomas' sole
testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of
payment is self-serving and insufficient
to unequivocally prove that Milagros
received P700,000.00 for the subject
property.
Hence, the consideration stated in the
deed of sale remains sufficient evidence
of the actual amount the petitioner paid
and the same amount which should be
returned under the principle of unjust
enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person
unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of
another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity,
and good conscience."62 The prevention
of unjust enrichment is a recognized
public policy of the State and is based on
Article 22 of the Civil
63
Code. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The principle of unjust enrichment
requires Jose to return what he or
Milagros received under the void
contract which presumably benefitted
their conjugal partnership.
Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered
Jose to return the amount of P200,000.00
since this the consideration stated in the
Deed of Sale and given credence by the
lower court. Indeed, even Jose expressly
stated in his comment that Tomas is
entitled to recover the money paid by
him in the amount of P200,000.00 as
appearing in the contract.
 LORENZO SHIPPING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATI
ONAL POWER
CORPORATION, Respondent.
NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LORE
NZO SHIPPING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
Lorenzo Shipping is the owner and
operator of the commercial vessel MV
Lorcon Luzon.8 National Power
Corporation is the owner of Power Barge
104, "a non-propelled power plant
barge."9
On March 20, 1993, Power Barge 104
was berthed and stationed at the Makar
Wharf in General Santos City when the
MV Lorcon Luzon "hit and rammed it
Power Barge 104."10
At the time of the incident, Captain
Mariano Villarias (Captain Villarias)
served as the Master of the MV Lorcon
Luzon. However, the MV Lorcon Luzon
was then being piloted by Captain
Homer Yape (Captain Yape), a Harbor
Pilot from the General Santos City
pilotage district.11  subsequently "full astern." Despite his
As underscored by Lorenzo Shipping,
the MV Lorcon Luzon was under
Captain Yape's pilotage as it was
mandatory to yield navigational control
to the Harbor Pilot while docking.12
Captain Villarias testified before the
Board of Marine Inquiry that recalled
that while the MV Lorcon Luzon was
under Captain Yape's pilotage, he
nevertheless "always"13 remained at the
side of Captain Yape. He likewise
affirmed that he heard and knew of
Captain Yape's orders, "because I have to
repeat his order.
As the MV Lorcon Luzon was docking,
Captain Yape ordered the vessel to
proceed "slow ahead," making it move at
the speed of about one (1) knot. As it
moved closer to dock, Captain Yape
gave the order "dead slow ahead,"
making the vessel move even slower. He
then ordered the engine stopped.15
As the MV Lorcon Luzon moved
"precariously close"16 to the wharf,
Captain Yape ordered the vessel to move
backward, i.e., go "slow astern," and
orders, the engine failed to timely
respond. Thus, Captain Yape ordered the
dropping of the anchor.
Despite this, the MV Lorcon Luzon
rammed into Power Barge 104.17
As such, Nelson Homena, Plant Manager
of Power Barge 104 and before the
Board of Marine Inquiry. Captain
Villarias also filed his own Marine
Protest. For his part, Captain Yape filed a
Marine Accident Report. The Board of
Marine Inquiry conducted joint hearings
on the Marine Protests and Captain
Yape's report.18
To forestall the prescription of its cause
of action for damages, National Power
Corporation filed before the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court a Complaint for
Damages against Lorenzo Shipping.19 In
this Complaint, National Power
Corporation recalled the damage
resulting from the ramming, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4. Due to the force and impact of the
ramming, the three (3) nylon ropes of 4
inches [sic] diameter each securing the
barge at the Makar Wharf-Philippines
[sic] Ports Authority Pier was
instantaneously ripped off and the take
[-] off tower of the barge swayed causing
flash over on the 69 KV line tripping the
line and isolated General Santos City
from the Mindanao Grid. Consequently,
the General Santos Power Plant, Power
Barge 102, interconnected with Power
Barge 104, all tripped off causing total
blackout in General Santos City and its
Lorenzo Shipping filed a Motion to
Dismiss grounded on the Regional Trial
Court's alleged lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter and National Power
Corporation's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Lorenzo
Shipping underscored that the dispute
was supposedly within the jurisdiction of
the Board of Marine Inquiry/Philippine
Coast Guard.21 The Regional Trial Court
denied Lorenzo Shipping's Motion to
Dismiss.22
On November 7, 1997, Lorenzo Shipping
filed its Answer. It emphasized that at
the time of the incident, the MV Lorcon
Luzon was commandeered by an official
Harbor Pilot to whom it was
"mandatory . . . to yield operational
control";23 thus, any liability should be
attributed to the Harbor Pilot and not to
the company. It added that "Makar
Wharf is a berthing place only for self-
propelled vessel [sic]."24 As Power Barge
104 was not a self-propelled vessel, it
"had no right to lash itself on the Maka[r]
Wharf. . . . [and] it assumed the risk of
such ramming because [of] its improper
presence[.]"25 Lastly, Lorenzo Shipping
pointed out that National Power
Corporation's action was barred by
laches as four (4) years had lapsed before
it filed its Complaint.
RTC: absolving Lorenzo Shipping of
liability. It concluded that National
Power Corporation failed to establish
Lorenzo Shipping's negligence.
It underscored that while the ramming
was found to have been the result of the
engine's stoppage, no malfunctioning
was recorded before and after the
incident. The Regional Trial Court
further stated that Lorenzo Shipping was
sued in its capacity as the employer of
Captain Villarias and that any liability it
incurred would have been only
subsidiary. Nevertheless, as Lorenzo
Shipping supposedly exercised due
diligence in its selection and supervision
of Captain Villarias, no liability could be
attributed to it.28
CA: reversed
while the MV Lorcon Luzon was under
compulsory pilotage, Captain Villarias,
the vessel's Master, remained to be its
overall commander. It added that he was
remiss in his duties as he did nothing in
the crucial moments when Captain
Yape's orders to go astern appeared to
not have been heeded.31 It cited Article
2180 of the Civil Code32 in that an
employer's liability is primary and not
subsidiary. It further noted that Lorenzo
Shipping failed to show that it exercised
due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Captain Villarias.33
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual damages must
be awarded to NPC
HELD: No.
Under the Rules of Evidence, for
evidence to be admissible, it must be
relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law of these rules. Evidence is
considered to be relevant when there is
a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-
existence. On the other hand, to be
considered competent, evidence must
not excluded by law or by the Rules, it is
said to be competent. For a private
document to be considered as
competent, it must have been
authenticated as provided in Rule 132,
Section 30 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.
In the case at bar, Exhibit "F", being a
private document should have been duly
authenticated. But since there was
noncompliance with Rule 132, Section
20 the said exhibit was ruled to have
been inadmissible for failing to comply.
Thus, it failed the standard of
competency.
Consistent with this, reliance on
National Power Corporation's Exhibit "F"
and its contents, so as to establish the
extent of National Power Corporation's
pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having
been admitted, Exhibit "F" does not
form part of the body of evidence
worthy of judicial consideration.
First, whether Lorenzo Shipping
Corporation is liable for the damage
sustained by Power Barge 104 when the
MV Lorcon Luzon rammed into it,
considering that at the time of the
ramming, the MV Lorcon Luzon was
under mandatory pilotage by Captain
Yape; and
Second, assuming that liability is to be
attributed to Lorenzo Shipping, what
damages, if any, may be awarded to
National Power Corporation.
I
It is not disputed that the MV Lorcon
Luzon, a vessel owned and operated by
Lorenzo Shipping, rammed into Power
Barge 104 while attempting to dock at
the Makar Wharf. Likewise, it is not
disputed that when it rammed into Power
Barge No. 104, the MV Lorcon Luzon
was being piloted by Captain Yape.
What is in dispute is whether Captain
Yape's pilotage suffices to absolve
Lorenzo Shipping of liability.
A Master's designation as the
commander of a vessel is long-settled.
This court's citation in Yu Con v. Ipil47 of
General Review of Legislation and
Jurisprudence explains that "Master" and
"Captain" are synonymous terms:
"The name of captain or master is given,
according to the kind of vessel, to the
person in charge of it.
"The first denomination is applied to
those who govern vessels that navigate
the high seas or ships of large
dimensions and importance, although
they be engaged in the coastwise trade.
"Masters are those who command
smaller ships engaged exclusively in the
coastwise trade.
"For the purposes of maritime
commerce, the words 'captain' and Q
'master' have the same meaning; both
being the chiefs or commanders of
ships.48ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Likewise, in Inter-Orient Maritime
Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission:49
A master or captain, for purposes of
maritime commerce, is one who has
command of a vessel. A captain
commonly performs three (3) distinct
roles: (1) he is a general agent of the
shipowner; (2) he is also commander and
technical director of the vessel; and (3)
he is a representative of the country
under whose flag he navigates. Of these
roles, by far the most important is the
role performed by the captain as
commander of the vessel; for such role
(which, to our mind, is analogous to that
of "Chief Executive Officer" [CEO] of a
present-day corporate enterprise) has to
do with the operation and preservation of
the vessel during its voyage and the
protection of the passengers (if any) and
crew and cargo. In his role as general
agent of the shipowner, the captain has
authority to sign bills of lading, carry
goods aboard and deal with the freight
earned, agree upon rates and decide
whether to take cargo. The ship captain,
as agent of the shipowner, has legal
authority to enter into contracts with
respect to the vessel and the trading of
the vessel, subject to applicable
limitations established by statute,
contract or instructions and regulations
of the shipowner. To the captain is
committed the governance, care and
management of the vessel. Clearly, the
captain is vested with both management
and fiduciary functions.50 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
This notwithstanding, there are
recognized instances when control of a
vessel is yielded to a pilot. Section 8 of
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
Administrative Order No. 03-85,
otherwise known as the Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage
Services, the Conduct of Pilots and
Pilotage Fees in Philippine
51
Ports,  enumerates instances when
vessels are subjected to compulsory
pilotage:
Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service —
For entering a harbor and anchoring
thereat, or passing through rivers or
straits within a pilotage district, as well
as docking and undocking at any
pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or
another, every vessel engaged in
coastwise and foreign trade shall be
under compulsory pilotage.
However, in the Ports of Manila and
Cebu, and in such other ports as may be
allowed by this Authority, Ship Captains
may pilot their vessels engaged in
coastwise trade provided they meet /
comply with the following minimum
qualifications / requirements:
a) Must be properly licensed as a Harbor
Pilot by the Philippine Coast Guard for
Manila, Cebu and other authorized ports;
b) Must have been a Master of an
interisland vessel for at least three (3)
years prior to his application with the
PPA;
c) Must be certified by a government
physician as physically and mentally fit.
Vessels maneuvered by a Special Harbor
Pilot shall be exempt from the payment
of all pilotage
fees.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The second paragraph of Section 8
identifies an instance when control of a
vessel need not be yielded to a pilot.
Section 9 further enumerates exceptions
to compulsory pilotage:
Sec. 9. Exemptions - In the following
cases, pilotage service is not compulsory:
a) Vessels engaged in coastwise
trade undocking at all ports,
except at the ports of Manila,
Cebu, Iloilo, Tacloban, Davao,
Zamboanga, Pulupandan,
Masinloc, and San Fernando,
b) Government vessels,
c) Vessels of foreign governments
entitled to courtesy,
d) Vessels that are authorized by
BOT to engage in daily ferry
service plying between two
places within a port or between
two ports,
e) Phil. Flag vessels engaged in
coastwise trade that depart from
an anchorage,
f) Vessels calling at private ports
whose owners have formally
waived the requirements of
compulsory pilotage.53
Section 32(f) of PPA Administrative
Order No. 03-85 specifies the foremost
responsibility of a Harbor Pilot, that is,
the direction of the vessel being piloted.
In addition, Section 32 (f) spells out the
duration within which the Harbor Pilot is
to fulfill this responsibility. It likewise
provides that the Master's failure to carry
out the Harbor Pilot's orders is a ground
for absolving the Harbor Pilot of
liability:
Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of
the Pilots or Pilots' Association. — The
duties and responsibilities of the Harbor
Pilot shall be as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
....
f) A pilot shall be held responsible
for the direction of a vessel from
the time he assumes his work as a
pilot thereof until he leaves it
anchored or berthed safely;
Provided, however, that his
responsibility shall cease at the
moment the Master neglects or
refuses to carry out his order.54
Consistent with the yielding of control to
a pilot, Section 11 of PPA
Administrative Order No. 03-85 makes
the Harbor Pilot liable for damage
caused by his or her negligence or fault.
The same provision, however,
emphasizes that "overall command" of
the vessel remains in the Master of the
vessel:
Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability
for Damage. — On compulsory pilotage
grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the
service to a vessel shall be responsible
for the damage caused to a vessel or to
life and property at ports due to his
negligence or fault. He can be absolved
from liability if the accident is caused by
force majeure or natural calamities
provided he has exercised prudence and
extra diligence to prevent or minimize
the damage.
The Master shall retain overall command
of the vessel even on pilotage grounds
whereby he can countermand or overrule
the order or command of the Harbor Pilot
on board. In such event, any damage
caused to a vessel or to life and property
at ports by reason of the fault or
negligence of the Master shall be the
responsibility and liability of the
registered owner of the vessel concerned
without prejudice to recourse against said
Master.
Such liability of the owner or Master of
the vessel or its pilots shall be
determined by competent authority in
appropriate proceedings in the light of
the facts and circumstances of each
particular
case.55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accordingly, it is settled that Harbor
Pilots are liable only to the extent that
they can perform their function through
the officers and crew of the piloted
vessel.56 Where there is failure by the
officers and crew to adhere to their
orders, Harbor Pilots cannot be held
liable.57 In Far Eastern Shipping Co. V.
Court of Appeals,58 this court explained
the intertwined responsibilities of pilots
and masters:
[W]here a compulsory pilot is in charge
of a ship, the master being required to
permit him to navigate it, if the master
observes that the pilot is incompetent or
physically incapable, then it is the duty
of the master to refuse to permit the pilot
to act. But if no such reasons are present,
then the master is justified in relying
upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under the
circumstances of this case, if a situation
arose where the master, exercising that
reasonable vigilance which the master of
a ship should exercise, observed, or
should have observed, that the pilot was
so navigating the vessel that she was
going, or was likely to go, into danger,
and there was in the exercise of
reasonable care and vigilance an
opportunity for the master to intervene so
as to save the ship from danger, the
master should have acted accordingly.
The master of a vessel must exercise a
degree of vigilance commensurate with
the circumstances.59 (Citations omitted)
Thus, contrary to Lorenzo Shipping's
assertion, the MV Lorcon Luzon's having
been piloted by Captain Yape at the time
of the ramming does not automatically
absolve Lorenzo Shipping of liability.
Clearing it of liability requires a
demonstration of how the Master,
Captain Villarias, conducted himself in
those moments when it became apparent
that the MV Lorcon Luzon's engine had
stopped and Captain Yape's orders to go
"slow astern" and "full astern" were not
being heeded.
II
As noted by the Court of Appeals,
Captain Villarias was remiss in his
duties. In his testimony before the Board
of Marine Inquiry, Captain Villarias
admitted that about six (6) minutes had
passed before he even realized that there
was an engine failure, let alone acted on
this fact:
Significantly, Captain Mariano Villarias
before the Board of Marine Inquiry
testified as follows: In the Reply it filed
in G.R. No. 181683, Lorenzo Shipping
attempts to douse the significance of
Captain Villarias' inaction for six (6)
minutes as follows:
The Court of Appeals held that Capt.
Villarias was remiss in his duties because
he just stood besides [sic] the harbour
pilot waiting for a response from the
engine department. He could have called
the attention of Capt. Yape on his
miscalculations in the docking
maneuvers of the vessel.
But the Court of Appeals assumed that
the unfolding circumstances on the water
that approached the wharf were in slow
motion and permitted the vessel's captain
to have time to examine the situation and
deliberate on it, make a judgment that the
pilot had given a wrong command, wrest
from him control of the vessel, and
enable the crew down in its belly, at the
time tuned to the voice of the pilot, to
realize that the latter's authority had been
superseded and that the command had
reverted to the captain. As it were, no
evidence was presented to show that the
captain and the crew had all the time
they needed to arrest the momentum of
the vessel to which the pilot had directed
it.61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We disagree.
In the first place, six (6) minutes cannot
be characterized as so quick and fleeting
that it deprived Captain Villarias and his
crew of "the time they needed to arrest
the momentum of the vessel."62 By way
of reference, an entire song of average
length (or longer) could have played in
Captain Villarias' head within those six
(6) minutes. The vessel had been
performing the tedious task of berthing
and had been moving so fast that it was
about to collide with the docks in the
wharf. Given these circumstances, it was
only reasonable for Captain Villarias,
precisely because he was the vessel's
Master, to remain vigilant, to support and
supplement Captain Yape's orders, and to
take evasive and counter measures
should Captain Yape's attempts to safely
berth prove to be ineffectual. The Court
of Appeals' observation is well-taken:
"Even just a minute without any response
from the concerned department could
have alarmed him."63
Lorenzo Shipping counters the
observations of the Court of Appeals by
attempting to paint a picture of absurdity.
It describes the confluence of events as
needing to have been in "slow motion" if
the crew were to timely and properly
react. It conjures images of Captain
Villarias "wrest[ing] from [Captain
Yape] control of the vessel"64 and the
crew thrown into a confused frenzy as
they had to listen to Captain Villarias'
voice.
This manner of arguing fails to impress.
To reiterate, six (6) minutes were more
than enough time for Captain Villarias to
have done something to remedy the
situation. It is not for us to hypothesize
on whether the measures he took would
have been effectual. It remains that for
six minutes, he did nothing. As Master of
the MV Lorcon Luzon, he should have
been on his toes, keen and ready to make
decisions in a split second, especially in
an evidently precarious situation. His
failure to timely act is too glaring to
ignore.
Moreover, both Captain Villarias and
Captain Yape must be presumed to have
been disciplined officers who knew fully
well how to conduct themselves in such a
situation. There is no basis for
contemplating a scenario where the Pilot
and the Master are battling for control of
the MV Lorcon Luzon.
So, too, the crew must be presumed to
have been trained to follow the Master's
commands. It is ridiculous to think that
merely hearing Captain Villarias' voice
in lieu of Captain Yape's would throw
the crew into paralyzed confusion.
Besides, from Captain Villarias' quoted
testimony, the crew was already listening
to both his and Captain Yape's voices.
He admitted that he repeated Captain
Yape's orders. The crew was, thus,
properly disposed to heed instructions
coming from him. If at all, his failure to
timely act despite the crew's presumptive
readiness to heed his command only
highlights his negligence.
III

Equally futile is Lorenzo Shipping's
claim that National Power Corporation
must bear its own losses as it assumed
the risk of injury when it moored a non-
propelled or stationary barge in the
Makar Wharf.
It is pointless to even consider this. Apart
from Lorenzo Shipping's own self-
serving assertions, there is no basis for
holding that Power Barge 104's presence
in the Makar Wharf was improper and
tantamount to an assumption of risk.
Lorenzo Shipping could have very easily
adduced proof attesting to Makar Wharf's
supposedly being exclusive to self-
propelled vessels. It did not. Nowhere in
any of its submissions to this court did
Lorenzo Shipping annex a copy of the
appropriate regulation, if any, that
restricts the use of Makar Wharf to self-
propelled vessels or absolutely prohibits
National Power Corporation from using
it as a berthing place for a power barge.
If at all, the MV Lorcon Luzon's
ramming of a stationary object is even
more damaging to Lorenzo Shipping's
cause. As explained in Far Eastern
Shipping:65
We start our discussion of the successive
issues bearing in mind the evidentiary
rule in American jurisprudence that there
is a presumption of fault against a
moving vessel that strikes a stationary
object such as a dock or navigational aid.
In admiralty, this presumption does more
than merely require the ship to go
forward and produce some evidence on
the presumptive matter. The moving
vessel must show that it was without
fault or that the collision was occasioned
by the fault of the stationary object or
was the result of inevitable accident. It
has been held that such vessel must
exhaust every reasonable possibility
which the circumstances admit and show
that in each, they did all that reasonable
care required. In the absence of sufficient
proof in rebuttal, the presumption of fault
attaches to a moving vessel which
collides with a fixed object and makes a
prima facie case of fault against the
vessel. Logic and experience support this
presumption:
The common sense behind the rule
makes the burden a heavy one. Such
accidents simply do not occur in the
ordinary course of things unless the
vessel has been mismanaged in some
way. It is not sufficient for the
respondent to produce witnesses who
testify that as soon as the danger became
apparent everything possible was done to
avoid an accident. The question remains,
How then did the collision occur? The
answer must be either that, in spite of the
testimony of the witnesses, what was
done was too little or too late or, if not,
then the vessel was at fault for being in a
position in which an unavoidable
collision would occur.66 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
IV
We sustain the Court of Appeals' award
to National Power Corporation of
P300,000.00 as temperate damages.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code spells out
the basic requirement that compensation
by way of actual damages is awarded
only to the extent that pecuniary loss is
proven:
Article 2199. Except as provided by law
or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
The standard for proving pecuniary loss
was explained in PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corp. v. Court of Appeals,67 as
follows:
A party is entitled to adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary
loss actually suffered and duly proved.
Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover
actual damages, the amount of loss must
not only be capable of proof but must
actually be proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or best evidence
obtainable of the actual amount thereof.
The claimant is duty-bound to point out
specific facts that afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory
damages are borne. A court cannot
merely rely on speculations, conjectures,
or guesswork as to the fact and amount
of damages as well as hearsay or
uncorroborated testimony whose truth is
suspect.68 (Citations omitted)
National Power Corporation bewails the
Court of Appeals' observation that the
basis of its claims was "not properly
receipted."69 It counters that it was able
to show by "competent testimonial and
documentary evidence"70 that it must be
compensated for actual damages in the
amount of P876,826.00. It recalls these
pieces of evidence:
a. Testimony of Mr. Nelson
Homena, manager of
Power Barge 104 [who]
testified on the damages
[sic] sustained by said
barge as a result of the
ramming incident caused
by the negligence of M/V
Lorcon Luzon.
b. The "Total Incidental Cost
for Drydock and Repair"
prepared by the Philippine
Shipyard and Engineering
Corporation
("PHILSECO") dated 14
October 1993 was
presented which clearly
enumerated and itemized
the actual damages [sic]
sustained by Power Barge
104 and repaired by
PHILSECO.
c. NPC Disbursement
Voucher No. 093-121304
in the amount of
P6,775,839.02 covering a
period up to 14 January
1994 as proof of payment
made by [National Power
Corporation] to
PHILSECO for drydocking
repairs of Power Barge
104.71
However, Lorenzo Shipping pointed out
fatal flaws in these pieces of evidence.
These flaws led the Court of Appeals to
reconsider its earlier award of actual
damages to National Power Corporation.
Regarding the "Total Incidental Cost for
Drydock and Repair," which was
National Power Corporation's Exhibit
"F" before the Regional Trial Court,
Lorenzo Shipping underscored that when
the Regional Trial Court ruled on
National Power Corporation's Formal
Offer of Evidence, it denied the
admission of Exhibit "F" for not having
been identified nor authenticated. It
emphasized that no witness came
forward to attest to its authenticity and
due execution, let alone allowed himself
or herself to be cross-examined on these
points.72
Regarding Nelson Homena's testimony,
Lorenzo Shipping emphasized that all he
indicated was how he and a certain Mr.
Neri estimated the cost of damage to be
at about P1,000,000.00.73
Regarding Disbursement Voucher No.
093-121304, Lorenzo Shipping pointed
out that while this attests to expenses
paid to PHILSECO, it was silent on the
exact cost paid for the repair of Power
Barge 104.74
Nowhere in any of its submissions to this
court—whether in its Comment in G.R.
No. 181683 or in its Petition and/or
Reply in G.R. No. 184568—did National
Power Corporation rebut the flaws noted
by Lorenzo Shipping. Instead, it merely
insisted on how actual damages are
awarded on the basis of the "best
obtainable evidence,"75 and how it has
supposedly presented "competent
testimonial and documentary
evidence"76 to prove its claims.
National Power Corporation's posturing
fails to impress.
It is basic that any material presented as
evidence will not be considered unless
duly admitted by the court before which
it is presented. Just as basic is that a
private document offered as authentic
evidence shall not be admitted unless its
due execution and authenticity are
established in the manner specified by
Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence:
Section 20. Proof of private document. -
Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be
proved
either:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) By anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be
identified as that which it is claimed to
be.
A bill of expenses, such as National
Power Corporation's Exhibit "F", is
considered a private document as it does
not fall under what the Revised Rules on
Evidence defines to be public
documents.77 Accordingly, for it to have
been admitted by the Regional Trial
Court as authentic, Rule 132, Section 30
of the Revised Rules on Evidence must
have been complied with. National
Power Corporation failed in this respect.
Thus, in the words of the Regional Trial
Court, it:
3. Denies the admission of Exhibit "F"
and its submarkings for not having been
properly
identified.78ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is of no consequence that the substance
or contents of Exhibit "F" are such that
they specify an amount. It is of no
consequence that it is purportedly of
such evidentiary weight that it could
definitely establish National Power
Corporation's claims.
Admissibility of evidence and weight
accorded to evidence are two distinct
affairs. Rule 128, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence governs
admissibility and provides that
"[e]vidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law of these rules." When
evidence has "such a relation to the fact
in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence,"79 it is said to
be relevant. When evidence is not
excluded by law or by the Rules, it is
said to be competent.
The weight accorded to evidence is
properly considered only after evidence
has been admitted. To this end, courts
evaluate evidence in accordance with the
rules stipulated by Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence,80 consistent
with basic precepts of rationality and
guided by judicially established
standards. It is improper to even speak of
evidentiary weight when the piece of
evidence in question has not even been
admitted.
Exhibit "F" was ruled to have been
inadmissible for failing to comply with
Rule 132, Section 20 thus, it failed the
standard of competency. Consistent with
this, reliance on National Power
Corporation's Exhibit "F" and its
contents, so as to establish the extent of
National Power Corporation's pecuniary
loss, is misplaced. Not having been
admitted, Exhibit "F" does not form part
of the body of evidence worthy of
judicial consideration.
As National Power Corporation cannot
rely on the "Total Incidental Cost for
Drydock and Repair," it is left to rely on
the testimony of Nelson Hpmena and on
NPC Disbursement Voucher No. 093-
121304.
However, as pointed out by Lorenzo
Shipping, these pieces of evidence fall
short of the standard required for proving
pecuniary loss, which shall be the basis
for awarding actual damages. As regards
Nelson Homena's testimony, all he did
was give an estimate of P1,000,000.00.
Certainly, a mere estimate does not
suffice as proof of actual pecuniary loss.
As regards NPC Disbursement Voucher
No. 093-121304, all it attests to is a
release of funds in favor of PHILSECO
in the total amount of P6,775,839.02,
covering no specific transaction but a
period extending from January 14, 1994.
V through the nature of the injury suffered,
Clearly, National Power Corporation
failed to establish the precise amount of
pecuniary loss it suffered. Nevertheless,
it remains that Power Barge 104
sustained damage—which may be
reckoned financially—as a result of the
MV Lorcon Luzon's ramming into it.
National Power Corporation suffered
pecuniary loss, albeit its precise extent or
amount had not been established.
Accordingly, we sustain the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that National Power
Corporation is entitled to temperate
damages.
Articles 2224 and 2225 of the Civil Code
govern temperate damages:
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate
damages, which are more than nominal
but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not, from the
nature of the case, be provided with
certainty.
Article 2225. Temperate damages must
be reasonable under the circumstances.
Banking on Article 2224's text, which
references "the nature of the case,"
Lorenzo Shipping asserts that temperate
damages can be awarded only in cases
where pecuniary loss may have been
incurred, but whose exact amount,
e.g., injury to commercial credit or
business goodwill, cannot be ascertained.
It argues that because the circumstances
of this case are such that National Power
Corporation could have pleaded and
proved a specific—i.e., ascertained—
amount of pecuniary loss but failed to do
so, temperate damages should not be
awarded.
Lorenzo Shipping is proposing an
erroneous, narrow, and unduly restrictive
construction of Article 2224.
This case is not the first instance that this
court was confronted with the ostensibly
limiting language of Article 2224.
In Republic of the Philippines v.
Tuvera,81 this court already debunked the
notion that temperate damages are
appropriate only in those cases in which
pecuniary loss cannot, "by its nature," be
ascertained:
Temperate or moderate damages avail
when "the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount can not from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty." The
textual language might betray an intent
that temperate damages do not avail
when the case, by its nature, is
susceptible to proof of pecuniary loss;
and certainly the Republic could have
proved pecuniary loss herein. Still,
jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is
clear that temperate damages may be
awarded even in instances where
pecuniary loss could theoretically have
been proved with certainty.
In a host of criminal cases, the Court has
awarded temperate damages to the heirs
of the victim in cases where the amount
of actual damages was not proven due to
the inadequacy of the evidence presented
by the prosecution. These cases
include People v. Oliano, People v.
Suplito, People v. De la Tongga, People
v. Briones, and People v. Plazo. In Viron
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos,
a civil action for damages involving a
vehicular collision, temperate damages
were awarded for the resulting damage
sustained by a cargo truck, after the
plaintiff had failed to submit competent
proof of actual damages.82 (Citations
omitted)
In resolving this case, we have had to sift
through the parties' competing claims as
to who exactly is liable and to what
extent. Reduced to its fundamentals,
however, this case remains to be about
damage sustained by property owned by
National Power Corporation when the
MV Lorcon Luzon rammed into it. This
damage is susceptible to financial
reckoning. Unfortunately for National
Power Corporation, it failed to establish
the precise amount of its pecuniary loss.
This vice of precision notwithstanding, it
would be improper to completely turn a
blind eye to the loss suffered by National
Power Corporation and to deny it, as
Lorenzo Shipping suggests, of any form
of recompense. Under these
circumstances, we sustain the Court of
Appeals' award of temperate damages.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated
Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision dated February 12, 2008 and
Resolution dated September 17, 2008 of
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MIKE STEVE y BASMAN and
RASHID MANGTOMA y
NONI, Accused-Appellants.
In 2003, a buy-bust operation was
conducted by police officers PO3
Mohammad Sugod, Jr. and SPO3
Santiago Gonzales inside the Kimco
Subdivision in Barangay Sauyo, Quezon
City. The buy-bust team was formed due
to the information received from the
residents of the said subdivision
regarding some illegal drug activities.
Surveillances were made.
The team prepared buy-bust money and
PO3 Sugod was assigned as the poseur
buyer. As planned, the team’s informant
made arrangement with the accused-
appellants Mike Steve and Rashid
Mangtoma for the purchase of one kilo
of "shabu". On February 20, 2003, the
team proceeded to the target area. At
around ten (10) in the morning, the
informant communicated to the police
officers of the arrival of the accused-
appellants.
PO3 Sugod transacted with accused-
appellant Mangtoma. A plastic bag
containing (almost) one kilo of "shabu"
was handed over to PO3 Sugod. After
witnessing the transaction, SPO3
Gonzales approached the parties
involved who were also inside the car.
SPO3 Gonzales declared "Pulis kami,
huwag na kayong manlaban pa". The
accused-appellants were arrested and
brought to the police station.
The item of the transaction was seized. It
was subsequently subjected for
laboratory examination in the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory. A
chemistry report manifesting that the
confiscated substance yielded positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
was issued by Forensic Chemist Officer
May Andrea A. Bonifacio.
Both accused-appellants denied the
commission of the crime. They alleged
that a buy-bust operation was never
conducted by the police officers. Both of
them were temporarily staying in the
residence of Spouses Pauto and Armpo
Lilog when the policemen forced their
way into the house. They were arrested
togetherwith the said spouses and a
certain Noro.
In the police station, all of them were
asked to pay the total amount of one (1)
million pesos for their release. As
accused-appellants failed to give any
amount, only Noro and Spouses Pauto
and Armpo Lilog were released.8
RTC: both accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of drug
pushing, specifically in violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the accused-appellants
contended that there were glaring
inconsistencies with the testimonies of
the prosecution’s witnesses pertaining to
the conduct of the buy-bust operation,
and the manner of the alleged
consummation of saleof dangerous drug;
thatthere were procedural lapses on the
part of the buy-bust team to comply with
Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, which
accordingly failed to secure the evidence
related to the arrests, and to protect the
chain ofcustody; and that ultimately, the
prosecution miserably failed to prove the
accused-appellants’ guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 11
However, the CA affirmed in totothe
Decision of the RTC and dismissed the
appeal.12 The appellate court ruled that
the prosecution was able to sufficiently
bear out the statutory elements of the
crime. It explained that the allegation of
frame-up is a banal defense of those
accused in drugrelated cases that is
viewed with disfavorsince, like the
defense of alibi, it is an allegation that
can be easily concocted. Such defense
must adduce clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption or
regularity of official acts of government
officials. Otherwise, the findings of the
trial court with respect to the credibility
ofprosecution’s witnesses shall prevail
over that of the accused.13 It further ruled
that the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses were immaterial to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime
was in fact committed by both accused.
Besides, in criminal cases, the evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses is
addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial judge, whose conclusion thereon
deservesmuch weight and respect,
because the judge has the opportunity to
observe them on the stand and ascertain
if they are telling the truth or not.14
Moreover, the CA held that failure
tocomply with Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 will not render the arrest of the
accused illegal, nor will it result to the
inadmissibility in evidence against the
accused ofthe illegal drugs seized in the
course of the entrapment operation.What
is of utmost relevance is the preservation
of the integrity and maintenance of the
evidentiary value of the confiscated
illegal drugs, for in the end,the same
shall necessarily be the thrust that shall
determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Although it was mentioned that
the justifiable ground for non-
compliance with Section 21 was not very
well expressed by the police officers, this
does not necessarily mean that the
accused-appellants’ arrestwas illegal or
the items seized inadmissible. Said
justifiable ground will remain unknown
in the light of the apparent failure of the
accused-appellants to challenge the
custody and safekeeping of the issue
ofdisposition and preservation of the
subject drugs before the lower court. In
short, they cannot be allowed to question
the police officers’ alleged non-
compliance with Section 21 for the first
time on appeal.15
Lastly, non-coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) by the police officers in
conducting a buy-bust operation does not
render such operation illegal. As pointed
out by the appellate court, Section 86 of
R.A. No. 9165 is silent asto the
consequence of failure to comply
therewith, but this should not be
interpreted as a legislative intent to make
an arrest without the participation of the
PDEA illegal or evidence obtained
pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.16
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE
EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION WAS SUFFICIENT
TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED OF
THE ALLEGED SALE OF SHABU
RULING:
YES.
At the outset, this Court has consistently
ruled that for the successful prosecution
of offenses involving drug pushing or
sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and
seller, object and consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.17 In other words, there
is a need to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused actually sold and
delivered a prohibited drug to another,
and that the former indeed knew that
what he had sold and delivered to the
latter was a prohibited drug.18  vehicle where the said transaction took
To reiterate, what is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, plus the
presentation in court of corpus delicti as
evidence.19
Contrary to the claim of accused-
appellants, the prosecution was able to
clearly recount how the buy-bust
operation20 was conducted, and the
eventual submission of the subject sachet
of "shabu" as part of its evidence. Both
the trial court and the appellate court
appreciated the evidence presented
which certainly established that accused-
appellants sold and delivered the 972.8
grams of "shabu" for a consideration of
₱600,000.00 to PO3 Mohammad Sugod,
Jr. (PO3 Sugod,Jr.), the poseur buyer.
PO3 Sugod, Jr. himself testified that
there was an actual exchange of the buy-
bust money and the prohibited drug. This
fact was further corroborated by the
testimony of SPO3 Santiago Gonzales,
who acted as back-up for PO3 Sugod, Jr.
during said operation. Likewise, it was
shown that accusedappellant Rashid
Mangtoma was fully aware that he was
selling an illegal and prohibited drug as
manifested by him uttering the words:
"Isang kilo yan!;" while accused-
appellant Mike Steve was also inside the
place silently participating with his
consent.
Consequently, the corpus delicti or the
subject drug was seized, and
subsequently identified as a prohibited
drug through a forensic report admitted
in evidence by the parties as stipulated.
Taken collectively, the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs by accused-appellants
was indeed established beyond
reasonable doubt in the present case.
Where the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, and in this case their testimonies
as well, the findings of the trial court are
not to be disturbed unless the consideration
of certain facts of substance and value,
which have been plainly overlooked, might
affect the result of the case. It cannot be
overemphasized that in cases involving
violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence
should be given to the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses
especially when they are police officers who
are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary.
In this regard, the defense failed to show
any ill motive or odious intent on the part of
the police officers to impute such a serious
crime that would put in jeopardy the life
and liberty of an innocent person, such as in
the case of accused-appellants.
Additionally, in weighing the testimonies of
the prosecution’s witnesses vi-sà-vis that of
the defense, it is a well-settled rule that in
the absence of palpable error or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
judge, the trial court’s evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed
on appeal.
would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.24
However, as correctly pointed out by the
RTC and the CA, failure to strictly
comply with the prescribed procedures in
the inventory of seized drugs does not
render the arrest of the accused-
appellants illegal or the item
seized/confiscated from them
inadmissible.
The essential thing to consider is "the
preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized inthe
determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused."25 Hence:
From the point of view of jurisprudence,
we are not beating any new path by
holding that the failure to undertake the
required photography and immediate
marking of seized items may be excused
by the unique circumstances of a case. In
People v. Resurreccion, we already
stated that "marking upon immediate
confiscation" does not exclude the
possibility that marking can be at the
police station or office of the
apprehending team. In the cases of
People v. Rusiana, People v. Hernandez,
and People v. Gum-Oyen, the
apprehending team marked the
confiscated items at the police station
and not at the place of
seizure.1âwphi1 Nevertheless, we
sustained the conviction because the
evidence showed that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items seized had
been preserved.To reiterate what we
have held in past cases, we are not
always looking for the strict step-by-step
adherence to the procedural
requirements; what is important is to
ensure the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. We
succinctly explained this in People v. Del
Montewhen we held:
We would like to add that non-
compliance with Section 21 of said law,
particularly the making of the inventory
and the photographing of the drugs
confiscated and/or seized, will not render
the drugs inadmissible in evidence.
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules
of Court, evidence is admissible when it
is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For
evidence to be inadmissible, there should
be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule,
the evidence must be admitted subject
only to the evidentiary weight that will
[be] accorded (to) it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or
statement in said law or in any rule that
will bring about the nonadmissibility of
the confiscated and/or seized drugs due
to non-compliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. The issue
therefore, if there is non-compliance with
said section, is not of admissibility, but
of weight — evidentiary merit or
probative value — to be given the
evidence. The weight to be given by the
courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each
26
case.  (Emphasis supplied and citations
omitted)
From the testimonies of the police
officers in the case at bench, the
prosecution established that they had
custody of the drug seized from the
accused-appellants from the moment
they were arrested, during the time they
were transported to the police station,
and up to the time the seized prohibited
drug was submitted to the crime
laboratory for examination. As regards to
the handling of the seized drug, there are
no conflicting testimonies or glaring
inconsistencies that would cast doubt on
the integrity thereof as evidence
presented and scrutinizedin court. It is
therefore safe to conclude that, to the
unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show
without a doubt that the evidence seized
from the accused-appellants at the time
of the buy-bust operation was the same
one tested, introduced, and testified to in
court. This fact was further bolstered by
the stipulations entered into between the
parties as to the testimony of Forensic
Chemist Bonifacio.27 Needless to say, the
integrity of the evidence against accused-
appellants was indeed preserved.
By way of resume, although this Court
finds that the police officers did not
strictly comply with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
such noncompliance did notaffect the
evidentiary weight of the drug seized
from the accused-appellants because the
chain of custody of the evidence was
shown to be unbroken under the
circumstances of the case. Similarly,
Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165 issilent as to
the consequence of failure to comply
therewith; hence, the same shall not be
considered as a sole ground to make an
arrest withoutthe participation of the
PDEA illegal or evidence obtained
pursuant to such anarrest inadmissible.
Note that the subject drug confiscated
from the accused-appellants was
properly accounted for and forthrightly
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for its extensive examination. rule finds an even more stringent
Consequently, considering the pieces of application where said findings are
evidence presented by the prosecution, sustained by the CA.29 This Court does
the mere denial of and the allegation of a not find any convincing reason to depart
frame-up by accused-appellants should from the ruling of the trial court, which
fail. As correctly pointed out by the was affirmed by the appellate court.
appellate court, the defense of frame-up Thus, We affirm the assailed Decision of
in drug cases requires strong and the appellate court and uphold the
convincing evidence to overcome the conviction of both accusedappellants.
presumption that the law enforcement
agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. On
the other hand, courts generally view the
defense of denial with disfavor due to the
facility with which an accused can
concoct it to suit his or her defense. As
evidence that is both negative and self-
serving, this defense cannot attain more
credibility than the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who testify
clearly, providing thereby positive
evidence on the various aspects of the
crime committed.28
Again, findings of fact of the trial court
as to the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight and respect when
no glaring errors, gross misapprehension
of facts, and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The rationale behind
this rule is that the trial court is in a
better position to decide the credibility of
witnesses, having heard their testimonies
and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during trial. This
 EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
In the morning of October 22, 1975,
complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his
client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of Pintor’s complainant's
residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office
of the City Fiscal of Cebu against
Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, they
made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn,
August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned
appellant, who is a Gaanan, to come to
his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon
Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant went
to the office of Laconico where he was
briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D',
tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When Atty. Pintor called up, Laconico
requested appellant Gaanan to secretly
listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension
so as to hear personally the proposed
conditions for the settlement. Appellant
heard complainant enumerate the
following conditions for withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer
acceptable, and that the figure had been
increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of
the P8,000.00 had been made together
with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00
no longer for the teacher Manuel
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in
persuading his client to withdraw the
case for Direct Assault against Atty.
Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty.
Laconico before the students of Don
Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don
Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to
another school or another section of Don
Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty.
Laconico on the Maltreatment case
earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at
the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas
Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the
Direct Assault Case against Atty.
Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue
teaching at the Don Bosco Technical
School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the
settlement of the Direct Assault Case to
the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty.
Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, Atty. Pintor called
up again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money. (tsn, March
10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
Atty. Pintor called up again and
instructed Laconico to give the money to
his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways.
Laconico who earlier alerted his friend
Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant
Atty. Pintor himself should receive the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33).
When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by
agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Gaanan executed on the following day an
affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to
the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico
were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA
No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE:
RULING:
There is no question that the telephone
conversation between complainant Atty.
Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was
"private" in the sense that the words
uttered were made between one person
and another as distinguished from words
between a speaker and a public. It is also
undisputed that only one of the parties
gave the petitioner the authority to listen
to and overhear the caller's message with
the use of an extension telephone line.
Obviously, complainant Pintor, a
member of the Philippine bar, would not
have discussed the alleged demand for an
P8,000.00 consideration in order to have
his client withdraw a direct assault
charge against Atty. Laconico filed with
the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew
that another lawyer was also listening.
We have to consider, however, that
affirmance of the criminal conviction
would, in effect, mean that a caller by
merely using a telephone line can force
the listener to secrecy no matter how
obscene, criminal, or annoying the call
may be. It would be the word of the
caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by
the sensitive nature of electronic
equipment and the extra heavy loads
which telephone cables are made to carry
in certain areas, telephone users often
encounter what are called "crossed
lines". An unwary citizzen who happens
to pick up his telephone and who
overhears the details of a crime might
hesitate to inform police authorities if he
knows that he could be accused under
Rep. Act 4200 of using his own
telephone to secretly overhear the private
communications of the would be
criminals. Surely the law was never
intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this
petition, however, revolves around the
meaning of the phrase "any other device
or arrangement." Is an extension of a
telephone unit such a device or
arrangement as would subject the user to
imprisonment ranging from six months
to six years with the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification for a
public officer or deportation for an alien?
Private secretaries with extension lines to
their bosses' telephones are sometimes
asked to use answering or recording
devices to record business conversations
between a boss and another businessman.
Would transcribing a recorded message
for the use of the boss be a proscribed
offense? or for that matter, would a
"party line" be a device or arrangement
under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones
or extension telephones are not included
in the enumeration of "commonly
known" listening or recording devices,
nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices
contemplated by law. He maintains that
in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later
Rep. Act No. 4200) was being
considered in the Senate, telephones and
extension telephones were already
widely used instruments, probably the
most popularly known communication
device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone
party line would be punishable was
discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet,
when the bill was finalized into a statute,
no mention was made of telephones in
the enumeration of devices "commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph,
detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape
recorder or however otherwise
described." The omission was not a mere
oversight. Telephone party lines were
intentionally deleted from the provisions
of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an
extension telephone is embraced and
covered by the term "device" within the
context of the aforementioned law
because it is not a part or portion of a
complete set of a telephone apparatus. It
is a separate device and distinct set of a
movable apparatus consisting of a wire
and a set of telephone receiver not
forming part of a main telephone set
which can be detached or removed and
can be transferred away from one place
to another and to be plugged or attached
to a main telephone line to get the
desired communication corning from the
other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or
cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording
the communication. There must be either
a physical interruption through a wiretap
or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed
in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200
as the use thereof cannot be considered
as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension
in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in
statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken
as detached and isolated expressions, but
the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any
of its parts. (see Commissioner of
Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc.,
66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com
any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444),
we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of
the Civil Code stipulates
that 'however general the
terms of a contract may be,
they shall not be
understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and
cases that are different
from those upon which the
parties intended to agree.'
Similarly, Article 1374 of
the same Code provides
that 'the various
stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted
together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all
of them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the phrase
'all liabilities or obligations
of the decedent' used in
paragraph 5(c) and 7(d)
should be then restricted
only to those listed in the
Inventory and should not
be construed as to
comprehend all other
obligations of the decedent.
The rule that
'particularization followed
by a general expression
will ordinarily be restricted
 to the former' is based on
the fact in human
experience that usually the
minds of parties are
addressed specially to the
particularization, and that
the generalities, though
broad enough to
comprehend other fields if
they stood alone, are used
in contemplation of that
upon which the minds of
the parties are centered.
(Hoffman v. Eastern
Wisconsin R., etc., Co.,
134 Wis. 603, 607, 115
NW 383, cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules
of Court (Evidence), 1973
ed, pp. 180-181).
Hence, the phrase "device or
arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No.
4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed
to comprehend instruments of the same
or similar nature, that is, instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to
tapping the main line of a telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation
or presence cannot be presumed by the
party or parties being overheard because,
by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or
recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument
which is very common especially now
when the extended unit does not have to
be connected by wire to the main
telephone but can be moved from place '
to place within a radius of a kilometer or
more. A person should safely presume
that the party he is calling at the other
end of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third
party listening as in the case of a
party line or a telephone unit which
shares its line with another. As was held
in the case of Rathbun v. United
States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-
138):
Common experience tells
us that a call to a particular
telephone number may
cause the bell to ring in
more than one ordinarily
used instrument. Each
party to a telephone
conversation takes the risk
that the other party may
have an extension
telephone and may allow
another to overhear the
conversation. When such
takes place there has been
no violation of any privacy
of which the parties may
complain. Consequently,
one element of 605,
interception, has not
occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled
that the conduct of the party would differ
in no way if instead of repeating the
message he held out his hand-set so that
another could hear out of it and that there
is no distinction between that sort of
action and permitting an outsider to use
an extension telephone for the same
purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that
penal statutes must be construed strictly
in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of
doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or
not an extension telephone is included in
the phrase "device or arrangement", the
penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone. In the
case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA
542, 562, we explained the rationale
behind the rule:
American jurisprudence
sets down the reason for
this rule to be the
tenderness of the law of the
rights of individuals; the
object is to establish a
certain rule by conformity
to which mankind would
be safe, and the discretion
of the court limited.
(United States v. Harris,
 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780,
20 S Ct 609; Braffith v.
Virgin Islands (CA3) 26
F2d 646; Caudill v. State,
224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d;
Jennings v.
Commonwealth, 109 VA
821,63 SE 1080, all cited
in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The
purpose is not to enable a
guilty person to escape
punishment through a
technicality but to provide
a precise definition of
forbidden acts." (State v.
Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737,
quoted in Martin's
Handbook on Statutory
Construction, Rev. Ed. pp.
183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also
ruled that on the construction or
interpretation of a legislative measure,
the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional
Records will show that not only did our
lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion
of an extension telephone as a prohibited
device or arrangement" but of greater
importance, they were more concerned
with penalizing the act of recording than
the act of merely listening to a telephone
conversation.
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers
intended to discourage, through
punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of
organized groups from installing devices
in order to gather evidence for use in
court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the
telephone users. Consequently, the mere
act of listening, in order to be punishable
must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or
others of similar nature. We are of the
view that an extension telephone is not
among such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court dated
August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of violation
of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known
as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
SO ORDERED.
 ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented
by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and
HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES,
Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, respondents.
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old
Rosendo Alba ("respondent"),
represented by his mother Armi Alba,
filed before the trial court a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and
damages against Rosendo Herrera.
Rosendo denied that he is the biological
father of Rosendo and also denied
physical contact with Armi.
Armi also filed a motion to direct the
taking of DNA paternity testing to
abbreviate the proceedings. He
presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr.
Halos was an Associate Professor at De
La Salle University where she taught
Cell Biology. She was also head of the
University of the Philippines Natural
Sciences Research Institute ("UP-
NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory. She
was a former professor at the University
of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon
City, where she developed the Molecular
Biology Program and taught Molecular
Biology.
In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the
process for DNA paternity testing and
asserted that the test had an accuracy rate
of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.4
Rosendo opposed DNA paternity testing
and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. He further argued that
DNA paternity testing violates his right
against self-incrimination.
RTC: granted Armi’s motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner,
respondent and Armi Alba.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT A DNA TEST
IS A VALID PROBATIVE TOOL IN
THIS JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE FILIATION.
RULING:
yes.
Under the law, evidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not
otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules
of Court.
Evidence is considered to have been
relevant if it has such a relation to the fact
in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence. While Section 49 of Rule 130
provides that in expert testimony, the
opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or
training, which he is shown to possess, may
be received in evidence, such rule is not a
legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA
analysis because evidence of collateral
matters is allowed when it it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in
issue.
Further, jurisprudence has already held that
there is no question to the admissibility of
DNA test results as evidence in the court.
What is to be considered for the
admissibility of the test results is whether or
not the laboratory has complied with the
appropriate standards and controls, and the
availability of their testing data and results.
Vallejo Case has set the guidelines in
assessing the probative value of the DNA, to
wit: how the samples were collected, how
they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
********
While it is true that in 1997, the Supreme
Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA
testing is not yet recognized in the
Philippines and at the time when he
questioned the order of the trial court, the
prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case;
however, in there is a 2002 ruling in
People vs Vallejo Case discussing that
there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as
admissible object evidence in Philippine
courts.
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court
recognized DNA analysis as admissible
evidence. On the other hand, as to
determining the weight and probative
value of DNA test results, the Supreme
Court provides, which is now known as
the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the
following data:
how the samples were collected,
how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the
samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples,
whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting
the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the
Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted
from US jurisprudence (Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The
Daubert Test is a test to be employed by
courts before admitting scientific test
results in evidence. More specifically,
the Daubert Test inquires:
Whether the theory or technique can be
tested,
Whether the proffered work has been
subjected to peer review,
Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
Whether the method at issue enjoys
widespread acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared
that in filiation cases, before paternity
inclusion can be had, the DNA test result
must state that the there is at least a
99.9% probability that the person is the
biological father.   However, a 99.9%
probability of paternity (or higher but
never possibly a 100% ) does not
immediately result in the DNA test result
being admitted as an overwhelming
evidence.
It does not automatically become a
conclusive proof that the alleged father,
in this case Herrera, is the biological
father of the child (Alba). Such result is
still a disputable or a refutable evidence
which can be brought down if the Vallejo
Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there
is less than 99.9% probability that the
alleged father is the biological father?
Then the evidence is merely
corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination,
submitting to DNA testing is not
violative of the right against self-
incrimination.
The right against self-incrimination is
just a prohibition on the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence)
from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it
may be material. There is no “testimonial
compulsion” in the getting of DNA
sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot
properly invoke self-incrimination.
An Overview of the Paternity and
Filiation Suit
Filiation proceedings are usually filed
not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as citizenship,13 support
(as in the present case), or inheritance.
The burden of proving paternity is on the
person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child.
There are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action
which parties have to face: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and child.14
A prima facie case exists if a woman
declares that she had sexual relations
with the putative father. In our
jurisdiction, corroborative proof is
required to carry the burden forward and
shift it to the putative father.15
There are two affirmative defenses
available to the putative father. The
putative father may show incapability of
sexual relations with the mother, because
of either physical absence or
impotency.16 The putative father may
also show that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of
conception.
A child born to a husband and wife
during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate.17 The child’s legitimacy may
be impugned only under the strict
standards provided by law.18
Finally, physical resemblance between
the putative father and child may be
offered as part of evidence of paternity.
Resemblance is a trial technique unique
to a paternity proceeding. However,
although likeness is a function of
heredity, there is no mathematical
formula that could quantify how much a
child must or must not look like his
biological father.19 This kind of evidence
appeals to the emotions of the trier of
fact.
In the present case, the trial court
encountered three of the four aspects.
Armi Alba, respondent’s mother, put
forward a prima facie case when she
asserted that petitioner is respondent’s
biological father. Aware that her
assertion is not enough to convince the
trial court, she offered corroborative
proof in the form of letters and pictures.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied
Armi Alba’s assertion. He denied ever
having sexual relations with Armi Alba
and stated that respondent is Armi Alba’s
child with another man. Armi Alba
countered petitioner’s denial by
submitting pictures of respondent and
petitioner side by side, to show how
much they resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily
become credibility contests. We now
look to the law, rules, and governing
jurisprudence to help us determine what
evidence of incriminating acts on
paternity and filiation are allowed in this
jurisdiction.
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family
Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate
children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence,
the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special
laws.
The Rules on Evidence include
provisions on pedigree. The relevant
sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about
pedigree.—The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may
be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives.
It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree.—The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to
the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may
be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of
the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engraving on
rings, family portraits and the like, may
be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court’s rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as
evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim
v. CA,20 a case petitioner often cites, we
stated that the issue of paternity still has
to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and
written acts by the putative father. Under
Article 278 of the New Civil Code,
voluntary recognition by a parent shall
be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing. To be effective,
the claim of filiation must be made by
the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the
putative father.21 A notarial agreement to
support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence.22 Letters
to the mother vowing to be a good father
to the child and pictures of the putative
father cuddling the child on various
occasions, together with the certificate of
live birth, proved filiation.23 However, a
student permanent record, a written
consent to a father’s operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative
father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing.24 Standing alone,
neither a certificate of baptism25 nor
family pictures26 are sufficient to
establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence
seemingly limit evidence of paternity and
filiation to incriminating acts alone.
However, advances in science show that
sources of evidence of paternity and
filiation need not be limited to
incriminating acts. There is now almost
universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive on non-
paternity, although inconclusive on
paternity.27
In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,28 the
result of the blood grouping test showed
that the putative father was a "possible
father" of the child. Paternity was
imputed to the putative father after the
possibility of paternity was proven on
presentation during trial of facts and
circumstances other than the results of
the blood grouping test.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,29 the child,
the mother, and the putative father
agreed to submit themselves to a blood
grouping test. The National Bureau of
Investigation ("NBI") conducted the test,
which indicated that the child could not
have been the possible offspring of the
mother and the putative father. We held
that the result of the blood grouping test
was conclusive on the non-paternity of
the putative father.
The present case asks us to go one step
further. We are now asked whether DNA
analysis may be admitted as evidence to
prove paternity.
DNA Analysis as Evidence
DNA is the fundamental building block
of a person’s entire genetic make-up.
DNA is found in all human cells and is
the same in every cell of the same
person. Genetic identity is unique.
Hence, a person’s DNA profile can
determine his identity.30
DNA analysis is a procedure in which
DNA extracted from a biological sample
obtained from an individual is examined.
The DNA is processed to generate a
pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is
taken. This DNA profile is unique for
each person, except for identical
twins.31 We quote relevant portions of
the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order
with approval:
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic
blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid). It is exclusive to an individual
(except in the rare occurrence of
identical twins that share a single,
fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging
throughout life. Being a component of
every cell in the human body, the DNA
of an individual’s blood is the very DNA
in his or her skin cells, hair follicles,
muscles, semen, samples from buccal
swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four
bases. They are known
as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosin
e) and T (thymine). The order in which
the four bases appear in an individual’s
DNA determines his or her physical
makeup. And since DNA is a double-
stranded molecule, it is composed of two
specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-
C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the
above base pairs distributed in a
particular sequence. This gives a person
his or her genetic code. Somewhere in
the DNA framework, nonetheless, are
sections that differ. They are known
as "polymorphic loci," which are the
areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling,
tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA
fingerprinting/genetic tests or
fingerprinting). In other words, DNA
typing simply means determining
the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a
DNA sample obtained or extracted, a
molecular biologist may proceed to
analyze it in several ways. There are five
(5) techniques to conduct DNA typing.
They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment
length polymorphism); "reverse dot
blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was
used in 287 cases that were admitted as
evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of
November 1994; mtDNA process;
VNTR (variable number tandem
repeats); and the most recent which is
known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain
reaction) based STR (short tandem
repeats) method which, as of 1996, was
availed of by most forensic laboratories
in the world. PCR is the process of
replicating or copying DNA in an
evidence sample a million times through
repeated cycling of a reaction involving
the so-called DNA polymerize
enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and
can match two (2) samples with a
reported theoretical error rate of less than
one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA
typing, "matches" are determined. To
illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests
are done to identify a suspect in a
criminal case, the evidence collected
from the crime scene is compared with
the "known" print. If a substantial
amount of the identifying features are the
same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed
to be a match. But then, even if only one
feature of the DNA or fingerprint
is different, it is deemed not to have
come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of
human DNA show variations between
people. In each of these regions, a person
possesses two genetic types
called "allele", one inherited from each
parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic
scientist looks at a number of these
variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile. Comparing next
the DNA profiles of the mother and
child, it is possible to determine which
half of the child’s DNA was inherited
from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological
father. The alleged father’s profile is then
examined to ascertain whether he has the
DNA types in his profile, which match
the paternal types in the child. If the
man’s DNA types do not match that of
the child, the man is excluded as the
father. If the DNA types match, then he
is not excluded as the
32
father.  (Emphasis in the original)
Although the term "DNA testing" was
mentioned in the 1995 case of People v.
Teehankee, Jr.,33 it was only in the 2001
case of Tijing v. Court of Appeals34 that
more than a passing mention was given
to DNA analysis. In Tijing, we issued a
writ of habeas corpus against respondent
who abducted petitioners’ youngest son.
Testimonial and documentary evidence
and physical resemblance were used to
establish parentage. However, we
observed that:
Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)
DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using
short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. xxx
For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when completely
obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said result is to deny
progress. Though it is not necessary in
this case to resort to DNA testing, in
[the] future it would be useful to all
concerned in the prompt resolution of
parentage and identity issues.
Admissibility of DNA Analysis as
Evidence
The 2002 case of People v.
Vallejo35 discussed DNA analysis as
evidence. This may be considered a 180
degree turn from the Court’s wary
attitude towards DNA testing in the
1997 Pe Lim case,36 where we stated that
"DNA, being a relatively new science,
xxx has not yet been accorded official
recognition by our courts." In Vallejo,
the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs
taken from the rape victim matched the
accused’s DNA profile. We affirmed the
accused’s conviction of rape with
homicide and sentenced him to death.
We declared:
In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.37
Vallejo discussed the probative value,
not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By
2002, there was no longer any question
on the validity of the use of DNA
analysis as evidence. The Court moved
from the issue of according "official
recognition" to DNA analysis as
evidence to the issue of observance of
procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that
had a significant impact on jurisprudence
on DNA testing: People v.
38
Yatar  and In re: The Writ of Habeas
Corpus for Reynaldo de
39
Villa.  In Yatar, a match existed
between the DNA profile of the semen
found in the victim and the DNA profile
of the blood sample given by appellant in
open court. The Court,
following Vallejo’s footsteps, affirmed
the conviction of appellant because the
physical evidence, corroborated by
circumstantial evidence, showed
appellant guilty of rape with homicide.
In De Villa, the convict-petitioner
presented DNA test results to prove that
he is not the father of the child conceived
at the time of commission of the rape.
The Court ruled that a difference
between the DNA profile of the convict-
petitioner and the DNA profile of the
victim’s child does not preclude the
convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.
In the present case, the various pleadings
filed by petitioner and respondent refer
to two United States cases to support
their respective positions on the
admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence: Frye v. U.S.40 and Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.41 In Frye
v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of
murder. Frye appealed his conviction to
the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia. During trial, Frye’s counsel
offered an expert witness to testify on the
result of a systolic blood pressure
deception test42 made on defendant. The
state Supreme Court affirmed Frye’s
conviction and ruled that "the systolic
blood pressure deception test has not yet
gained such standing and scientific
recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would
justify the courts in admitting expert
testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far
made." The Frye standard of general
acceptance states as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or
discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is
difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well
recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
In 1989, State v.
43
Schwartz  modified the Frye standard.
Schwartz was charged with stabbing and
murder. Bloodstained articles and blood
samples of the accused and the victim
were submitted for DNA testing to a
government facility and a private facility.
The prosecution introduced the private
testing facility’s results over Schwartz’s
objection. One of the issues brought
before the state Supreme Court included
the admissibility of DNA test results in a
criminal proceeding. The state Supreme
Court concluded that:
While we agree with the trial court that
forensic DNA typing has gained general
acceptance in the scientific community,
we hold that admissibility of specific test
results in a particular case hinges on the
laboratory’s compliance with appropriate
standards and controls, and the
availability of their testing data and
results.44
In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 further modified
the Frye-Schwartz standard. Daubert wa
s a product liability case where both the
trial and appellate courts denied the
admissibility of an expert’s testimony
because it failed to meet
the Frye standard of "general
acceptance." The United States Supreme
Court ruled that in federal trials, the
Federal Rules of Evidence have
superseded the Frye standard. Rule 401
defines relevant evidence, while Rule
402 provides the foundation for
admissibility of evidence. Thus:
Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" is defined
as that which has any "tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States,
by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence governing expert testimony
provides:
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
Daubert cautions that departure from
the Frye standard of general acceptance
does not mean that the Federal Rules do
not place limits on the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Rather, the judge
must ensure that the testimony’s
reasoning or method is scientifically
valid and is relevant to the issue.
Admissibility would depend on factors
such as (1) whether the theory or
technique can be or has been tested; (2)
whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication;
(3) the known or potential rate of error;
(4) the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique’s
operation; and (5) whether the theory or
technique is generally accepted in the
scientific community.
Another product liability case, Kumho
Tires Co. v. Carmichael,46 further
modified the Daubert standard. This led
to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000
and which now reads as follows:
If scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2)
the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
We now determine the applicability in
this jurisdiction of these American cases.
Obviously, neither the Frye-
Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-
Kumho standard is controlling in the
Philippines.47 At best, American
jurisprudence merely has a persuasive
effect on our decisions. Here, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the fact
in issue and is not otherwise excluded by
statute or the Rules of Court.48 Evidence
is relevant when it has such a relation to
the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.49 Section 49
of Rule 130, which governs the
admissibility of expert testimony,
provides as follows:
The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown
to possess may be received in evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal
obstacle to the admissibility of DNA
analysis as evidence. Indeed, even
evidence on collateral matters is allowed
"when it tends in any reasonable degree
to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue."50
Indeed, it would have been convenient to
merely refer petitioner to our decisions
in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate
that DNA analysis is admissible as
evidence. In our jurisdiction, the
restrictive tests for admissibility
established by Frye-
Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into
the weight of the evidence.
Probative Value of DNA Analysis as
Evidence
Despite our relatively liberal rules on
admissibility, trial courts should be
cautious in giving credence to DNA
analysis as evidence. We reiterate our
statement in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.51]
We also repeat the trial court’s
explanation of DNA analysis used in
paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist
looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a
DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA
profiles of the mother and child, it is
possible to determine which half of the
child’s DNA was inherited from the
mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The
alleged father’s profile is then examined
to ascertain whether he has the DNA
types in his profile, which match the
paternal types in the child. If the man’s
DNA types do not match that of the
child, the man is excluded as the father.
If the DNA types match, then he
is not excluded as the father.52
It is not enough to state that the child’s
DNA profile matches that of the putative
father. A complete match between the
DNA profile of the child and the DNA
profile of the putative father does not
necessarily establish paternity. For this
reason, following the highest standard
adopted in an American
53
jurisdiction,  trial courts should require
at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the
Probability of Paternity ("W") prior to a
paternity inclusion. W is a numerical
estimate for the likelihood of paternity of
a putative father compared to the
probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals. An appropriate
reference population database, such as
the Philippine population database, is
required to compute for W. Due to the
probabilistic nature of paternity
inclusions, W will never equal to 100%.
However, the accuracy of W estimates is
higher when the putative father, mother
and child are subjected to DNA analysis
compared to those conducted between
the putative father and child alone.54
DNA analysis that excludes the putative
father from paternity should be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the
value of W is less than 99.9%, the results
of the DNA analysis should be
considered as corroborative evidence. If
the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then
there is refutable presumption of
paternity.55 This refutable presumption of
paternity should be subjected to
the Vallejo standards.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution provides that "no person
shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." Petitioner asserts that
obtaining samples from him for DNA
testing violates his right against self-
incrimination. Petitioner ignores our
earlier pronouncements that the privilege
is applicable only to testimonial
evidence. Again, we quote relevant
portions of the trial court’s 3 February
2000 Order with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an
accused in a criminal case or from the
respondent in a paternity case, contrary
to the belief of respondent in this action,
will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only
to evidence that is "communicative" in
essence taken under duress (People vs.
Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The
Supreme Court has ruled that the right
against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence)
from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it
may be material. As such, a defendant
can be required to submit to a test to
extract virus from his body (as cited in
People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance
emitting from the body of the accused
was received as evidence for acts of
lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23
Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the
mouth was received as proof (US vs.
Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by
the judge for the witness to put on pair of
pants for size was allowed (People vs.
Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can
compel a woman accused of adultery to
submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of
the privilege is the restriction
on "testimonial compulsion."56
The policy of the Family Code to
liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children, is
without prejudice to the right of the
putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses.57 Where the evidence to aid
this investigation is obtainable through
the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be
considered subject to the limits
established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its
President, Mr. RICARDO
BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-
BANGAYAN, Respondent.
BSB Group Inc., is presided by Ricardo
Bangayan. The company employed as
cashier Sally Bangayan.
Allegedly, Sally deposited in her
personal account in the security bank the
checks paid by the companys customers.
However, in the complaint affidavit filed
to the prosecutor, as well as in the
information, it merely mentioned that the
cashier took away a cash money from the
company with intent to gain. It did not
mention about the two checks allegedly
deposited and encashed to the bank.
In convicting her for qualified theft. The
RTC considered as admissible the
testimony of the bank officer who
testified that indeed during those period,
there were two checks encashed and
deposited in the personal account of
Sally.
The accused raised the defense of non
admissibility of the testimony of the
bank since it is violative of RA 1405
which prohibits the inquiry of bank
deposits being highly confidential.
CA reversed and ruled that these are
inadmissible.
Petitioner BBS argued that the cash
involved is the subject matter of
litigation hence inquiry and testimony of
the bank are admissible.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE BANK
DEPOSITS IN THE RECORD OF
THE BANK AS WELL AS ITS
TESTIMONY ARE ADMISSIBLE.
RULING:
NO.
Under the law, theft is the deprivation of
personal property of one by another with
intent to gain. Thus, it necessitates that
evidence presented must prove that the
offender has unlawfully taken money
belonging to another. Thus, the allegation
of theft of money, hence, necessitates that
evidence presented must have a tendency
to prove that the offender has unlawfully
taken money belonging to another. In cases
of estafa, the offense may be established
through the presentation of checks
involved.
I
n the case at bar, the information filed
against respondent accuses her theft and
not of estafa. Thus, while the checks could
have been proof tending to establish
respondent's criminal intent, it is still
irrelevant to the case, and thus,
inadmissible. While petitioner tried to draw
a connection between the evidence subject
of the instant review, and the allegation of
theft in the Information by claiming that
respondent had fraudulently deposited the
checks in her own name, such argument is
only to their prejudice because it seeks to
establish the commission of another crime
which is not theft.
***
What indeed constitutes the subject
matter in litigation in relation to Section
2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly
and amply addressed in Union Bank of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, in
which the Court noted that the inquiry
into bank deposits allowable under R.A.
No. 1405 must be premised on the fact
that the money deposited in the account
is itself the subject of the action.
In this case, Given this perspective, we
deduce that the subject matter of the
action in the case at bar is to be
determined from the indictment that
charges Bangayan with the offense, and
not from the evidence sought by the
prosecution to be admitted into the
records.
In the criminal Information filed with the
trial court, respondent Bangayan,
unqualifiedly and in plain language, is
charged with qualified theft by abusing
BBS petitioners trust and confidence and
stealing cash in the amount of
P1,534,135.50. The said Information
makes no factual allegation that in some
material way involves the checks subject
of the testimonial and documentary
evidence sought to be suppressed.
Neither do the allegations in said
Information make mention of the
supposed bank account in which the
funds represented by the checks have
allegedly been kept.
As such, from the indictment itself, it
can hardly be inferred from the
indictment itself that the Security Bank
account is the ostensible subject of the
prosecutions inquiry. Without needlessly
expanding the scope of what is plainly
alleged in the Information, the subject
matter of the action in this case is the
money amounting to P1,534,135.50
alleged to have been stolen by
respondent, and not the money
equivalent of the checks which are
sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus,
it is that, which the prosecution is bound
to prove with its evidence, and no other.
Therefore, It comes clear that the
admission of testimonial and
documentary evidence relative to
respondents Security Bank account
serves no other purpose than to establish
the existence of such account, its nature
and the amount kept in it. It constitutes
an attempt by the prosecution at an
impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit
account the privacy and confidentiality
of which is protected by law. On this
score alone, the objection posed by
respondent in her motion to suppress
should have indeed put an end to the
controversy at the very first instance it
was raised before the trial court.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in
all criminal prosecutions, that the
constitutive acts of the offense must be
established with unwavering exactitude
and moral certainty because this is the
critical and only requisite to a finding of
guilt. 31 Theft is present when a person,
with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, takes the personal
property of another without the latter’s
consent. It is qualified when, among
others, and as alleged in the instant case,
it is committed with abuse of
confidence.32 The prosecution of this
offense necessarily focuses on the
existence of the following elements: (a)
there was taking of personal property
belonging to another; (b) the taking was
done with intent to gain; (c) the taking
was done without the consent of the
owner; (d) the taking was done without
violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things; and (e) it
was done with abuse of confidence.33 In
turn, whether these elements concur in a
way that overcomes the presumption of
guiltlessness, is a question that must pass
the test of relevancy and competency in
accordance with Section 334 Rule 128 of
the Rules of Court.
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence
sought to be suppressed in this case 
the testimony of Marasigan, as well as
the checks purported to have been stolen
and deposited in respondent’s Security
Bank account  are relevant, is to be
addressed by considering whether they
have such direct relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence; or whether they relate
collaterally to a fact from which, by
process of logic, an inference may be
made as to the existence or non-existence
of the fact in issue.35
The fact in issue appears to be that
respondent has taken away cash in the
amount of ₱1,534,135.50 from the
coffers of petitioner. In support of this
allegation, petitioner seeks to establish
the existence of the elemental act of
taking by adducing evidence that
respondent, at several times between
1988 and 1989, deposited some of its
checks to her personal account with
Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the
incongruence between the allegation of
theft of cash in the Information, on the
one hand, and the evidence that
respondent had first stolen the checks
and deposited the same in her banking
account, on the other hand, by
impressing upon the Court that there
obtains no difference between cash and
check for purposes of prosecuting
respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is
mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking
connotes deprivation of personal
property of one by another with intent to
gain, and it is immaterial that the
offender is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen because
the deprivation relative to the offended
party has already ensued from such act of
execution.36 The allegation of theft of
money, hence, necessitates that evidence
presented must have a tendency to prove
that the offender has unlawfully taken
money belonging to another.
Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains
in attempting to draw a connection
between the evidence subject of the
instant review, and the allegation of theft
in the Information by claiming that
respondent had fraudulently deposited
the checks in her own name. But this line
of argument works more prejudice than
favor, because it in effect, seeks to
establish the commission, not of theft,
but rather of some other crime 
probably estafa.
Moreover, that there is no difference
between cash and check is true in other
instances. In estafa by conversion, for
instance, whether the thing converted is
cash or check, is immaterial in relation to
the formal allegation in an information
for that offense; a check, after all, while
not regarded as legal tender, is normally
accepted under commercial usage as a
substitute for cash, and the credit it
represents in stated monetary value is
properly capable of appropriation. And it
is in this respect that what the offender
does with the check subsequent to the act
of unlawfully taking it becomes material
inasmuch as this offense is a continuing
one.37 In other words, in pursuing a case
for this offense, the prosecution may
establish its cause by the presentation of
the checks involved. These checks would
then constitute the best evidence to
establish their contents and to prove the
elemental act of conversion in support of
the proposition that the offender has
indeed indorsed the same in his own
name.38
Theft, however, is not of such character.
Thus, for our purposes, as the
Information in this case accuses
respondent of having stolen cash, proof
tending to establish that respondent has
actualized her criminal intent by
indorsing the checks and depositing the
proceeds thereof in her personal account,
becomes not only irrelevant but also
immaterial and, on that score,
inadmissible in evidence.
We now address the issue of whether the
admission of Marasigan’s testimony on
the particulars of respondent’s account
with Security Bank, as well as of the
corresponding evidence of the checks
allegedly deposited in said account,
constitutes an unallowable inquiry under
R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental
law has not bothered with the triviality of
specifically addressing privacy rights
relative to banking accounts, there,
nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a
legitimate expectation of privacy
governing such accounts. The source of
this right of expectation is statutory, and
it is found in R.A. No. 1405,39 otherwise
known as the Bank Secrecy Act of
1955. 40
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It
hopes to discourage private hoarding and
at the same time encourage the people to
deposit their money in banking
institutions, so that it may be utilized by
way of authorized loans and thereby
assist in economic development.41 Owing
to this piece of legislation, the
confidentiality of bank deposits remains
to be a basic state policy in the
Philippines.42 Section 2 of the law
institutionalized this policy by
characterizing as absolutely confidential
in general all deposits of whatever nature
with banks and other financial
institutions in the country. It declares:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever
nature with banks or banking institutions
in the Philippines including investments
in bonds issued by the Government of
the Philippines, its political subdivisions
and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or
office, except upon written permission of
the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or
in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.1avvphi1
Subsequent statutory enactments43 have
expanded the list of exceptions to this
policy yet the secrecy of bank deposits
still lies as the general rule, falling as it
does within the legally recognized zones
of privacy.44 There is, in fact, much
disfavor to construing these primary and
supplemental exceptions in a manner that
would authorize unbridled discretion,
whether governmental or otherwise, in
utilizing these exceptions as authority for
unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts.
It is then perceivable that the present
legal order is obliged to conserve the
absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits.45
The measure of protection afforded by
the law has been explained in China
Banking Corporation v. Ortega.46 That
case principally addressed the issue of
whether the prohibition against an
examination of bank deposits precludes
garnishment in satisfaction of a
judgment. Ruling on that issue in the
negative, the Court found guidance in the
relevant portions of the legislative
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and
House Bill No. 3977, which later became
the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the
absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No.
1405 actually aims at protection from
unwarranted inquiry or investigation if
the purpose of such inquiry or
investigation is merely to determine the
existence and nature, as well as the
amount of the deposit in any given bank
account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an
examination of or inquiry into the
deposit of B&B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law.
It merely required Tan Kim Liong to
inform the court whether or not the
defendant B&B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for purposes
of the garnishment issued by it, so that
the bank would hold the same intact and
not allow any withdrawal until further
order. It will be noted from the
discussion of the conference committee
report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House
Bill No. 3977which later became
Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not
the intention of the lawmakers to place
banks deposits beyond the reach of
execution to satisfy a final
judgmentThus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of
the record, I should like the Chairman of
the Committee on Ways and Means to
clarify this further. Suppose an
individual has a tax case. He is being
held liable by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue [(BIR)] or, say, ₱1,000.00
worth of tax liability, and because of this
the deposit of this individual [has been]
attached by the [BIR].
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only
apply after the court has pronounced
sentence declaring the liability of such
person. But where the primary aim is to
determine whether he has a bank deposit
in order to bring about a proper
assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is
not allowed by this proposed law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of
procedure and under the Civil Code, the
attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for
instance that there is a preliminary
attachment which is for garnishment or
for holding liable all moneys deposited
belonging to a certain individual, but
such attachment or garnishment will
bring out into the open the value of such
deposit. Is that prohibited by... the law?
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the
extent that the inquiry... is made only for
the purpose of satisfying a tax liability
already declared for the protection of the
right in favor of the government; but
when the object is merely to inquire
whether he has a deposit or not for
purposes of taxation, then this is fully
covered by the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere
investigation into the existence and the
amount of the deposit.
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such
deposit. x x x47
In taking exclusion from the coverage of
the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the
instant case posits that the account
maintained by respondent with Security
Bank contains the proceeds of the checks
that she has fraudulently appropriated to
herself and, thus, falls under one of the
exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405
 that the money kept in said account is
the subject matter in litigation. To
highlight this thesis, petitioner avers,
citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and
Trust Co.,48 that the subject matter of the
action refers to the physical facts; the
things real or personal; the money, lands,
chattels and the like, in relation to which
the suit is prosecuted, which in the
instant case should refer to the money
deposited in the Security Bank
account.49 On the surface, however, it
seems that petitioner’s theory is valid to
a point, yet a deeper treatment tends to
show that it has argued quite off-
tangentially. This, because, while
Mathay did explain what the subject
matter of an action is, it nevertheless did
so only to determine whether the class
suit in that case was properly brought to
the court.
What indeed constitutes the subject
matter in litigation in relation to Section
2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly
and amply addressed in Union Bank of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,50 in
which the Court noted that the inquiry
into bank deposits allowable under R.A.
No. 1405 must be premised on the fact
that the money deposited in the account
is itself the subject of the action.51 Given
this perspective, we deduce that the
subject matter of the action in the case at
bar is to be determined from the
indictment that charges respondent with
the offense, and not from the evidence
sought by the prosecution to be admitted
into the records. In the criminal
Information filed with the trial court,
respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain
language, is charged with qualified theft
by abusing petitioner’s trust and
confidence and stealing cash in the
amount of ₱1,534,135.50. The said
Information makes no factual allegation
that in some material way involves the
checks subject of the testimonial and
documentary evidence sought to be
suppressed. Neither do the allegations in
said Information make mention of the
supposed bank account in which the
funds represented by the checks have
allegedly been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred
from the indictment itself that the
Security Bank account is the ostensible
subject of the prosecution’s inquiry.
Without needlessly expanding the scope
of what is plainly alleged in the
Information, the subject matter of the
action in this case is the money
amounting to ₱1,534,135.50 alleged to
have been stolen by respondent, and not
the money equivalent of the checks
which are sought to be admitted in
evidence. Thus, it is that, which the
prosecution is bound to prove with its
evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of
testimonial and documentary evidence
relative to respondent’s Security Bank
account serves no other purpose than to
establish the existence of such account,
its nature and the amount kept in it. It
constitutes an attempt by the prosecution
at an impermissible inquiry into a bank
deposit account the privacy and
confidentiality of which is protected by
law. On this score alone, the objection
posed by respondent in her motion to
suppress should have indeed put an end
to the controversy at the very first
instance it was raised before the trial
court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of
Marasigan on the particulars of
respondent’s supposed bank account
with Security Bank and the documentary
evidence represented by the checks
adduced in support thereof, are not only
incompetent for being excluded by
operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are
likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch
as they do not appear to have any logical SO ORDERED.
and reasonable connection to the
prosecution of respondent for qualified
theft. We find full merit in and affirm
respondent’s objection to the evidence of
the prosecution. The Court of Appeals
was, therefore, correct in reversing the
assailed orders of the trial court.
A final note. In any given jurisdiction
where the right of privacy extends its
scope to include an individual’s financial
privacy rights and personal financial
matters, there is an intermediate or
heightened scrutiny given by courts and
legislators to laws infringing such
rights.52 Should there be doubts in
upholding the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits against affirming
the authority to inquire into such
accounts, then such doubts must be
resolved in favor of the former. This
attitude persists unless congress lifts its
finger to reverse the general state policy
respecting the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits.53
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20,
2005, reversing the September 13, 2004
and November 5, 2004 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is
AFFIRMED.