Philosophical Review

Review
Reviewed Work(s): Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. by A.
C. Graham
Review by: Kwong-Loi Shun
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 717-719
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2186091
Accessed: 11-04-2019 23:58 UTC

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 BOOK REVIEWS

structed from the Chuang-tzu, Hsiin-tzu, Meng-tzu, and Lii Spring and Au-
tumn (95-100).
In addition to an introductory chapter that sketches the relevant social,
political, and economic changes of the time, the book emphasizes through-
out its discussion the cultural background to the evolution of different
schools of thought. For example, it highlights the influence of Mo Tzu's
low social status on various aspects of his thinking, such as the absence of
the contrast between the "gentleman" and the "vulgar man" (34), the re-
jection of ceremony and music (41), and the belief in rewarding and pun-
ishing divinities (47). The book also provides a careful elucidation of clas-
sical philosophical concepts, making explicit their evolving connotations as
they occur in different philosophical contexts. Examples include the evo-
lution of the meaning of jen from nobility in the Analects (19-22, 270) to
benevolence in Mencius's thinking (112-13), and of the reference of ch'ing
from what is essential in the thought of Sung Hsing and others (98-99) to
passions in Hsun Tzu's thinking (242, 245). The sensitivity to cultural
background and attention to philological details, together with the exten-
sive use of quotes from primary sources, enable the reader of the book to
really enter into the world of ancient Chinese thought.
The preface makes explicit the plausible assumption that the under-
standing of Chinese philosophy depends on one's philosophizing for one-
self in relation to one's own problems (ix). Accordingly, the book also
devotes attention to aspects of Chinese thought relevant to problems we
feel and to issues discussed in western philosophy. This more philosophi-
cal aspect of the book is explicit in the two appendices that discuss the
classification of Chinese moral philosophies and the relation of Chinese
thought to Chinese language, and in the discussion of the relevance of
Confucius's thinking to contemporary western philosophy (22-31). In ad-
dition, various observations of philosophical interest are made in the con-
text of discussing specific thinkers or schools of thought. For example, the
observations that even the Yangist is not a pure egoist (54-55, 59-61) and
that ancient Chinese thinkers are not concerned with the problem of philo-
sophical egoism (61-63) highlight an interesting contrast with those west-
ern philosophical traditions that take seriously the question of how ratio-
nally to convince the egoist to be moral, and raise the interesting question
of what the point is in seeking a justification of morality that will appeal to
the egoist. Also, though not so presented in the book, the tension Graham
sees in Chuang Tzu's thinking between the "spontaneous" and the "think-
ing" aspects of the ideal person (196-99), and the paradox he detects in
the Lao Tzu concerning how attaining a goal may require one's ceasing to
aim at it deliberately (232), are suggestive of tensions not confined to
Taoist thought. The Confucian emphasis on the spontaneity of the sage's
reactions raises a similar question about reconciling this spontaneity with

718

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 BOOK REVIEWS

the need for deliberation, and the literature on utilitarianism has also
discussed the tension between aiming at the utilitarian goal and being in a
state of mind conducive to attaining that goal. It is possible that these are
tensions that pertain to the understanding of our ethical life more gener-
ally and that carry a broader philosophical significance.
The book is based on a lifetime of scholarly work on Chinese thought.
Given its comprehensive scope and the amount of scholarship that goes
into it, the discussion is inevitably dense at times and as a result sometimes
leaves questions unanswered. Some questions concern matters of interpre-
tation. For example, how can the Yangist valuation of the right (yi) above
life (63-64) be reconciled with an explication of nature in terms of health
and life (56-59)? Why does Graham regard Kao Tzu's dynamic model of
human nature as not faring better than the static model (121)? (Unlike a
willow, which cannot both continue its natural growth and be made into
cups and bowls, it seems that whirling water can both follow its natural
course of flowing outward/downward and at the same time flow either
eastward or westward.) Other questions concern matters of more general
philosophical interest. For example, how exactly are we to understand the
dichotomy between the inner and the outer that Graham, agreeing with
Fingarette, regards as alien to Confucius's thinking (25-27)? (Since the
dichotomy is supposed to emerge in the thinking of Mencius, who pre-
sumably does not subscribe to some form of Cartesian dualism, the di-
chotomy is presumably not to be understood in terms of a Cartesian con-
ception of the mind/body distinction.) Does the general characterization of
Chinese ethical thinking in appendix 1 also distinguish Chinese moral
philosophies from the Humean tradition, which, unlike the Kantian tra-
dition or certain kinds of existentialist thought, does not regard ends as
chosen independently of inclinations (387)? The discussion displays such
subtlety that one cannot help feeling that Graham has ready answers to
these questions, though the answers are not conspicuous in the book.
The book is an expression of first-rate scholarship, and is filled with
deep insights into classical Chinese thought. At the same time, it provides
a comprehensive and well-balanced discussion that is accessible to the gen-
eral reader. It is the rare kind of book that will both be used as a standard
text in introductory courses and be regularly consulted and cited by spe-
cialists working in the field.

KwONG-LOI SHUN
University of California at Berkeley

719

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