MP for CASES Rule 3

BANDA V. ERMITA
 Diretso SC
CASE#1 : Banda v. Erineta
1. preliminary
1.1.1. Action: Petition for certiorari and prohibition
1.1.2. Subject matter: EO 379
1.1.3. Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own
behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office
(NPO).
2. Facts
2.1.1. The National Printing Office was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term
of former President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of
Executive Order No. 285
2.1.2. On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed
Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285
by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities.
2.1.3. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378,
2.1.3.1. government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source
their printing services from the private sector through competitive
bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private
supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was
offered by the NPO
3. Petiioner challeges constitutionality of EO 378 contending that:
3.1. (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal
Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still
exercised legislative powers; and
3.2. (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it
paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
4. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
4.1. ON CLASS SUIT
5. ON CLASS SUIT
5.1. PETITIONERS:
5.1.1. Instituted this case as a class suit
5.2. SC notes:
5.2.1. Board of Optometry v. Colet  courts must exercise utmost caution before
allowing a class suit
5.2.2. Definition of class suit
5.2.2.1. Rule 3 Sec. 12. Class suit.
5.2.2.1.1. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons
5.2.2.1.2. so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties,
 5.2.2.1.3. a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently
numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all
concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
5.2.2.1.4. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to
protect his individual interest.
5.2.3. Requisites of a class suit
5.2.3.1. The subject matter of controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons
5.2.3.2. The parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all to the court
5.2.3.3. The parties bringning the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the interest of all
concerned
6. Issue: Whether or not it is a class suit
6.1. FLAG: No, the case us not a class suit
6.2. LB:
6.2.1. under the law, a class suit need to coply with the requisities [common
interest; numerous; sufficient]
6.2.2. in another case MVRS v. Dawah
6.2.2.1. an element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation
6.2.2.2. the court must consider
6.2.2.2.1. (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive
with the interest of the other members of the class;
6.2.2.2.2. (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to
the total membership of the class; and
6.2.2.2.3. (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party
to speak for the rest of the class.
6.2.2.3. Ibaes v. Roman Catholic  there must be no divergence of opinion
6.3. A: in the case,
6.3.1. The petitioners were not sufficient to represent the class
6.3.1.1. the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who
would be affected by the assailed Executive Order and who were
allegedly represented by petitioners
6.3.1.2. Total number of employees = 549
6.3.1.3. Petitioners = 67 (32 of which executed an affidavit of desistanec) so
only 34 remained
6.3.1.4. Sabi nila may pressure from people with power daw pero sabi ng
SC kahit bilangin pa yung original petitioners sa katotohanan 20 lang
daw yung nag institute kasi only 20 were mentioned in the jurat
6.3.2. There was divergence of opinion
6.3.2.1. A manifestation of desistance was filed by the president of the
National Printing Office workers association
6.3.2.2. It cannot be said that the petitioners sufficiently represent the
interest of the entire class
6.4. C: The instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit
7. Substantive issue
 7.1. Constitutionality of EO 378
8. Petitioners
8.1. Two grounds assailing the constitutionality
8.1.1. President Arroyo cannot amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 by the
mere issuance of another executive order (Executive Order No. 378), only
Congress through legislation can validly amend EO 285
8.1.1.1. [They contend that EO 285 was enacted by Pres. Aquino when she
had legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution ]
8.1.2. the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the eventual
abolition of the NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO
employees.
9. Can the president amend or repeal EO 285
9.1. F: YES, he can
9.2. L: under the law
9.2.1. the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted
power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.
9.2.2. Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora
9.2.2.1. Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives
the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the
functions of the Office of the President.
9.2.2.1.1. Must be in order to achieve Simplicity, Economy, and
Efficiency
9.2.3. Since the president has the power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices
in the OP proper he can implicitly effect less radical or less substantive
changes
9.2.4. Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the
Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that
may be provided for under other laws.
9.2.5. The Court, among others, also traced from the General Appropriations
Act[19] the Presidents authority to effect organizational changes in the
department or agency under the executive structure,
9.2.6. Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which
was reenacted in 2004 (the year of the issuance of Executive Order No.
378), likewise gave the President the authority to effect a wide variety of
organizational changes in any department or agency in the Executive
Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act provides
9.2.7. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he
president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the Administrative Code of 1987
9.3. A:
9.3.1. NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary
(which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of
 the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information
Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
9.3.2. In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal
of any of its functions to be transferred to another agency.
9.3.3. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main
printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and
publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging
efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for
certain government printing jobs,
9.3.4. with the exception of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive
responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as
the Commission on Elections may determine.
9.4. C: Petitioners contention that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 is an
invalid exercise of legislative power on the part of the President has no legal leg
to stand on.
10. On the other claim:
10.1. Petitioner failed to substantiate their claim that there was bad faith in the
issuance of the executive order
CASE#2 : NAVARRO v. Escobido

Go filed a case for replevin and damages  RTC dismissed the case  RTC
reconsidered—Certiorari CA –petition for review on certiorari  SC

11. Preliminary
11.1. Action: Petition for review on certiorari [should have accepted motion to
dismiss]
11.1.1. To set aside CA decision which affirmed RTC
11.1.2. RTC denied Navarros motion to dismiss
12. Facts:
12.1. Go filed two complaints before the RTC
12.1.1. Action: Replevin and/or sum of money with damages
12.1.2. Propert: two motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession
12.2. First Complaint
12.2.1. Go is doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES
12.2.1.1. Buying and selling of motor vehicles
12.2.2. Business Adress: Cagayan de Oro City
12.2.3. Navarrro; Cagayan de Oro
12.2.4. John Doe defendant (nasakanya daw yung vehicle)
12.2.5. Defendant leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle evidenced
by a lease agreement with option to purchase
12.2.5.1. Parties
12.2.5.1.1. Lessor: KARGO enterprises
12.2.5.1.2. Lessee: Navarro
12.2.6. Defendant delivered 6 post dated checks
12.2.6.1. Fith and sixth check were dishonored [P132,666.66]
 12.2.7. Demand: pay or return the vehicle
12.3. Second complaint [same facts except]
12.3.1. Diff. Date (Oct 1, 1997)
12.3.2. Different motor vehicle
12.3.3. Delivered three post dated checks (each 100,000)
12.3.4. Third check was dishonored
12.4. RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases so the sheriff seized the two
vehicles
13. Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated
no cause of action,
13.1.1. Go was not a party ot the Lease Agreements with option to
purchase
13.1.2. *on nNavarros motion both cases were consolidated
13.2. RTC [First decision]
13.2.1. Dismissed the case because the complaints did not state a cause
of action
13.2.2. Motion for reconsideration
13.3. RTC reconsidered
13.3.1. Set aside order of dismissal
13.3.2. on the presumption that Glenn Gos leasing business is a conjugal
property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing
business to file the action against Navarro.
13.3.2.1. Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the
complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Rules).
13.3.3. CA
13.3.3.1. Affirmed decision of the RTC
13.4. Petition of Navarro
13.4.1. Karen Go was not a real party in interest
13.4.1.1. even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo
Enterprises, since it did not have the requisite juridical personality to
sue, the actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go.
13.4.2. RTC erred in ordering the inclusion of Glenn
13.4.2.1. a complaint which does not state a cause of action cannot be
converted into one with a cause of action by a mere amendment or a
supplemental pleading
13.4.2.2. in effect RTC created a cause of action for Karen
13.4.2.3. the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff drastically changed the
theory of the complaints, to his great prejudice.
13.4.2.4. Since Karen Go is the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, the
vehicles subject of the complaint are her paraphernal properties and
the RTC gravely erred when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as a
co- plaintiff.
13.4.3. Navarro likewise faults the lower court for setting the trial of the
case in the same order that required Karen Go to amend her complaints,
claiming that by issuing this order, the trial court violated Rule 10 of the
Rules.
 13.4.4. No prior demand was made
13.4.4.1. Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against
him, Navarro maintains that the complaints were premature because no
prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the
lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.
13.4.5. Navarro posits that since the two writs of replevin were issued
based on flawed complaints, the vehicles were illegally seized from his
possession and should be returned to him immediately.
13.5. Karen Go
13.5.1. She is a real party in interest because she is the owner of the
Kargo enterprises
13.5.1.1. Even if it was only her husband who signed the lease agreement
13.5.1.2. Her husband only signed the agreement as manager
13.5.2. Kargo enterprises is NOT her conjugal property
13.5.2.1. Based on the law and jurisprudence on the matter, all property
acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal property.
13.5.3. The complaint has sufficient cause of action
13.5.3.1. when the RTC ordered her to include her husband as co-plaintiff,
this was merely to comply with the rule that spouses should sue jointly,
and was not meant to cure the complaints lack of cause of act
14. Kargo Enterprise cannot be a party to a civil action
14.1. LB: under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules
14.2. Application
14.2.1. Kargo enterprise is a sole proprietorship
14.2.2. A sole proprietorship is neither a natural person or a juridical
person
14.2.3. Sec. 44 CC enumerates a juridical person
14.2.3.1. (1) The State and its political subdivisions;
14.2.3.2. (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or
purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have
been constituted according to law;
14.2.3.3. (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest
or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and
distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
14.3. the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the title of the
Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as KAREN T. GO doing business
under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, and this identification was repeated in
the first paragraph of the Complaint.
14.4. There is an express statement in the Lease Agreement which pointed
Kargo enterprise as the principal that Glenn represented
15. Whether or not Karen Go is the real party in interest and is the proper party to file
the action
15.1. YES,
15.2. LB:
15.2.1. Under the law it is required that that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the
 party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit
15.3. Application
15.3.1.1. As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party
who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case.
Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-
interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not
state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease
Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
16. The property is conjugal
16.1. LB:
16.1.1. By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved
16.2. Application
16.2.1. No proof was shown it was conjugal nor paraphernal
16.2.2. Presumption it is conjugal
16.2.3. No need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the consent of the other
before performing an act of administration or any act that does not dispose
of or encumber their conjugal property.
17. Glenn need not be joined (?) Karen can institute the action for recovery on her own
17.1.1. LB
17.1.1.1. Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is
governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the
spouses in their marriage settlements.
17.1.2. The rules on partnership suppletorily apply in conjugal partnership
and according to Art. 1811 CC, a partner has an equal right to possess
specific partnership property
18. Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the
properties registered under this name; hence,
18.1.1. both have an equal right to seek possession of these
properties. Applying Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that in
default of contracts, or special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed
by the provisions of this Title, we find further support in Article 487 of the
Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment
with respect to the co-owned property
18.2. ON why the rule on ejectment was applied even though personal property
18.2.1. Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman
18.2.1.1. The rules on conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on
partnership
18.2.1.1.1. Article 108 of the Family Code provides:
18.2.1.1.2. Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with
what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in
 their marriage settlements.
19. in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned
property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his
co-owners.
19.1. Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against
Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which
they co-own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code,
supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on behalf of the
conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the property
in question without the other spouses consent.
19.2. we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the
action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be
impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the
Rules,
20. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground to dismiss the action
20.1. LB:
20.1.1. Macababbad v. Masirag
20.1.2. Under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither
misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action,
20.2. Application
20.2.1. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may
order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity
to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties
20.2.2. . If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party
is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.
Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or
to amend is the action dismissed.
21. Demand not required prior to filing of replecin action
21.1. LB:
21.1.1.1. For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file
an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules,
21.1.1.2. The applicant must show in his affidavit
21.1.1.2.1. That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed,
particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
21.1.1.2.2. That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse
party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief;
21.1.1.2.3. That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of
execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under
custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or
custody; and
21.1.1.2.4. The actual market value of the property.
 21.1.2. We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to
make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an
action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent
to an action for a writ of replevin.
21.1.3. More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim that a
prior demand is necessary, as he has already admitted in his Answers

CASE#3 : BACALSO V. PALIGOS

Respondents filed a complaint  RTC (favor respodnents) CA affirm – petition for
review on certiorari SC

22. Preliminaries
22.1. Parcel of Land (Lot 3781) located in Cebu
22.2. Land in the name of 13 co-owners (Padigos)
23. Facts:
23.1. Respondents (some of the heirs) filed before the RTC of Cebu
23.1.1. Against Bacalso (petitioners)
23.1.2. Complaint for
23.1.2.1. Quieting of title
23.1.2.2. Declaration of nullity of documents
23.1.2.3. Recovery of possession
23.1.2.4. Damages
23.1.3. Alleged that
23.1.3.1. Bacalso secured a tax declaration over the lot without any legal
basis
23.1.3.2. Bacalso have been leasing poirtions of the lot to persons who built
houses
23.1.3.3. Bacalso has been living in a house on the lot
23.2. Petitioners answer
23.2.1. their father Alipio, Sr. purchased via deeds of sale the shares in the
lot
23.2.2. Alipio, Sr. acquired the shares of the other co-owners of the lot by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription through continuous, open, peaceful,
and adverse possession thereof in the concept of an owner since 1949.
23.3. Respondents counterclaim
23.3.1. The deeds of sale on which they base their claim are spurious
23.3.2. Even If they are not laches had set against Alipio, Sr.
23.3.3. The shares of the heirs cannot be acquired by prescription
23.4. Amended complaint (twice)
23.4.1. Some of resp. with leave of court filed an amended complaint to
impleading additional defendants and plaintiffs
23.5. Petitioners contended that the second amended complaint should be
dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties
23.6. Third amended complaint impleding additional plaintiffs
24. RTC decision (in favor of plaintiff)
24.1. Declared
 24.1.1. plaintiff to be entitled to ownership and possession
24.1.2. Deed of absolute sale is null and void
24.2. Pending appeal trial court issued a writ of execution to demolish the
houses
25. Court of Appeals
25.1. Affirmed trail courts decision
26. Petitioner
26.1. Filed a petition for review on certiorari
26.2. Alleged that
26.2.1. CA erred
26.2.1.1. When it ruled that the second amended complaint was valid even if
not all indispensable parties are impleaded
26.2.1.2. When it overlooked the fact that they were in continuous
possession of the land
26.2.1.3. In upholding as true the report of the supposed handwriting expert
that the documents of sale were forgeries (who was not cross-
examined)
27. Respondent
27.1. Admitted that an heir of Simplicio (prolly an org. heir) was not impleaded
27.2. Contended that the omission did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction
because Art. 487 of the Civil code states that any co-owner may bring an action
for ejectment
28. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void
28.1. LB:
28.1.1. Action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents,
recovery of possession and ownership, and damages defines indispensable
parties under Section 7, of Rule 3 (Arcelona v. CA)
28.1.2. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.
29. the resolution of the case hinges on a determination of the authenticity of the
documents on which petitioners in part anchor their claim to ownership of the lot
30. Vao’s statement cannot be relied on
30.1. LB:
30.1.1. Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally
regarded as purely advisory in character.
30.1.2. When faced with conflicting expert opinions, courts give more
weight and credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and scientific
30.1.2.1.
30.2. Application:
30.2.1. In the case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied on the
findings of Nimrod Bernabe Vao (Vao), expert witness for respondents
which found that the signatures and thumbmarks were spurious
30.2.2. 2 expert witnesses
30.2.2.1. Espina (for petitioner)
 30.2.2.1.1. Used 15 specimen signature as standard
30.2.2.1.2. Concluded that the signatures are genuine
30.2.2.1.3. Withstood cross-examination, re-direct and re-cross
examination
30.2.2.2. Vao (for respondent)
30.2.2.2.1. Used the questioned signature themselves
30.2.2.2.2. Did not use standard specimens
30.2.2.2.3. Was not cross-examined to avoid delayed
30.2.3. While differences exist between Gaudencios signatures appearing
on Exhibits 3-3-D and his signatures appearing on the affidavits
accompanying the pleadings in this case,the gap of more than 30 years from
the time he affixed his signatures on the questioned document to the time he
affixed his signatures on the pleadings in the case could explain the
difference.
30.2.4. Respondents brand Maximos thumbmark on Exhibit 7 as spurious
because, so they claim, Maximo did not affix his signature thru a
thumbmark, he knowing how to write.Such conclusion is a non sequitur,
however, for a person who knows how to write is not precluded from signing
by thumbmark.
31. evidence regarding the facts of pedigree of the registered owners and their heirs
does not, however, satisfy this Court
31.1. Gaudencios self-serving testimony uncorroborated;
31.2. it contradicts itself on material points
32. Respondents are guilty of laches
32.1. While, by express provision of law, no title to registered land in derogation
of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred
from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches
32.2. Respondent cannot use the excuse that they only learned of the deed of
sale in 1994 (the year Alipio Sr. allegedly started renting the land)
32.2.1. Because Alipio started tilling since 1950
32.2.2. House was constructed in 1985
32.2.3. These acts of possession could not have escaped respondents
notice given the following unassailed consideration

CASE#4 : Tallorin v. Tarona

This case is about a courts annulment of a tax declaration in the names of three
persons, two of whom had not been impleaded in the case, for the reason that the
document was illegally issued to them.

RTC  CA  RTC  CA SC

33. Facts:
33.1. Taronas filed an action before RTC Bataan
33.1.1. Against Tallorin
33.1.2. for the cancellation of her and two other womens tax declaration
 over a parcel of land
33.1.3. Alleged that unknown to them, in 1981, the Assessors Office of
Morong in Bataan cancelled Tax Declaration 463 in the name of their father,
Juanito Tarona (Juanito), covering 6,186 square meters of land in Morong,
Bataan.
33.1.4. cancellation was said to be based on an unsigned though notarized
affidavit that Juanito allegedly executed in favor of petitioner Tallorin and two
others, namely, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez,
who were not impleaded in the action.
33.1.5. without their fathers affidavit on file, it followed that his tax
declaration had been illegally cancelled and a new one illegally issued in
favor of Tallorin and the others with her.
33.1.6. unexplained disappearance of the affidavit from official files, the
Taronas concluded, covered-up the falsification or forgery that caused
thesubstitution.
33.2. Tallorin filed a belated answer
33.2.1. Alleged that she held a copy of the supposedly missing affidavit of
Juanito who was merely an agricultural tenant of the land covered by Tax
Declaration 463.
33.2.2. Alleged that Juanito surrendered and waived in that affidavit his
occupation and tenancy rights to Tallorin and the others in consideration of
P29,240.00.
33.2.3. put up the affirmative defenses of non-compliance with the
requirement of conciliation proceedings and prescription.
33.3. Tarona alleged that Tallorin should have been declared in default but
Tallorin was actually able to answer before the action of the RTC on the motion
33.4. Tarona filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
34. Court of Appeals
34.1. RTC gravely abused its discretion in admitting Tallorins late answer in the
absence of a motion to admit it
34.2. Even if petitioner Tallorin had already filed her late answer, said the CA,
the RTC should have heard the Taronas motion to declare Tallorin in default.
34.3. Remanded the case to RTC
35. RTC remand
35.1. Declared Tallorin in default
35.2. Directed Tarona to present evidence ex parte
36. RTC judgment
36.1. Annuled tax declaration of Tallorin
36.2. Reinstated tax declaration of Juanito and ordered the issuance of a new
tax declaration for his heirs
36.3. Affidavit authorizing the transfer of the tax declaration had no binding force
since he did not sign it
37. Tallrin appealed to the CA
37.1. Alleged that land was titled in her name
37.2. affidavit only dealt with the surrender of his tenancy rights and did not
serve as basis for canceling Tax Declaration 463
 37.3. he thumbmarked the affidavit
37.4. TC erred in not dismissing the complaint for failure to implead
Margarita Pastelero Vda. De Valdez and Dolores Valdez who were
indispensable parties in the action to annul Juanitos affidavit and tax
declaration in their favor
38. CA judgment
38.1. Affirmed TC decision
38.2. Since she did not assign as error the order declaring her in default and
since she took no part at the trial, the CA pointed out that her claims were in
effect mere conjectures, not based on evidence of record.
39. 1. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to dismiss the Taronas complaint for not
impleading Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez in whose
names, like their co-owner Tallorin, the annulled tax declaration had been issued;
39.1. LB:
39.1.1. Under the law, there is a Compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties
39.2. Application
39.2.1. In the case, Taronas sought the annulment of the tax declaration in
the names of defendant Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez and, in its place, the
reinstatement of the previous declaration in their father Juanitos name.
39.2.2. It is inevitable that any decision granting what the Taronas wanted
would necessarily affect the rights of such persons to the property covered
by the tax declaration.
39.2.3. The cancellation of a tax declaration adversely affects the rights
and interests of such persons over the properties that the documents cover
39.2.4. WHY?  because a tax declaration is a primary evidence, if not
source, of the right to claim title of ownership over a real property
39.2.5. The RTC and the CA annulled Tax Declaration 6164 that belonged
not only to defendant Tallorin but also to Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez
and Dolores Valdez, which two persons had no opportunity to be heard as
they were never impleaded. The RTC and the CA had no authority to annul
that tax declaration without seeing to it that all three persons were
impleaded in the case.
40. Taronas action cannot be dismissed outright.
40.1. Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the
dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and
allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through
motion or on order of the court on its own initiative.
40.2. Only if plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party, despite the
order of the court, may it dismiss the action.
41. There is a need, therefore, to remand the case to the RTC with an order to implead
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez as defendants so they may,
if they so desire, be heard.
42. In view of the Courts resolution of the first question, it would serve no purpose to
consider the other questions that the petition presents.
 42.1. 2. Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling that the Taronas complaint
was barred by prescription; and
42.2. 3. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that Juanitos
affidavit had no legal effect because it was unsigned; when at the hearing of the
motion to declare Tallorin in default, it was shown that the affidavit bore Juanitos
thumbmark.

CASE#5 : Crisologo v. jewm agro-industrial

RTCCA (affirmed RTC)--petition for review on certiorari SC

43. Facts:
43.1. Spouses Crisologo filed
43.1.1. two collection cases
43.1.2. before RTC Dacvao
43.1.3. against Limso Et al.
43.2. Respondent JEWM
43.2.1. Successor in interest of a plaintiff in another collection case against
the same defendant
43.3. RTC rendered its decision [case with JEWM]
43.3.1. Based on a compromise agreement between the parties
43.3.2. Defendants were directed to transfer the proeprties to Sy Sen Ben
43.4. Ben -sold Nilda Lam –sold JEWM
43.4.1. The sale was made with the notice lis pendens with the pending
case filed against So Keng Kik
43.5. After a year, sps. Crisologo won the collection case
43.5.1. Defendants were ordered to solidarily pay spouses Crisologo
43.5.2. They moved for execution  writ was issued  Branch sheriff
issued a notice of sale
43.5.3. The sale included properties covered in the name of JEWM
43.6. JEWM filed its affidavit of third party claim and urgent motion ad cautelam
43.6.1. Prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the notice of
sale
43.6.2. Motion was denied
43.6.3. Sps. Crisologo posted a bond to proceed with execution
44. Procedural shizz
44.1. JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer of
issuance of a preliminary injunction
44.1.1. The Register of Deeds of Davao City, Sheriff Robert Medialdea,
John and Jane Does and all persons acting under their direction" were
impleaded as defendants.
44.2. Spouses Crisologo’s counsel appeared and filed in open court their Very
Urgent Manifestation questioning the authority of the said court to restrain the
execution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15.
44.3. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not parties
in the case.
44.4. Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the denial of the
 application for writ or preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their
recognition as parties.
44.4.1. No motion to intervene was filed because they found it
44.4.2. unnecessary
44.5. RTC-Br. 14 denied Spouses Crisologo’s Omnibus Motion and granted
JEWM’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
44.6. denied in the RTC Br.-14’s October 7, 2010 Order for lack of legal
standing in court considering that their counsel failed to make the written formal
notice of appearance.
44.7. JEWM moved to declare the "defendants" in default which was granted in
an order given in open court on November 19, 2010.
44.8. Spouses Crisologo then filed their Very Urgent Manifestation, dated
November 30, 2010, arguing that they could not be deemed as defaulting parties
because they were not referred to in the pertinent motion and order of default.
5
44.9. Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assailing the RTC-Br. 14 orders
44.10. CA denied the application for a TRO, but directed Spouses Crisologo to
amend their petition
44.11. Pending disposition of the Amended Petition by the CA, JEWM filed a
motion on December 6, 2010 before RTC-Br. 14 asking for the resolution of the
case on the merits.
45. RTC
45.1. Ruled in favor of JEWM
46. CA
46.1. denied the Amended Petition filed by Spouses Crisologo for lack of merit.
46.2. writ of preliminary injunction subject of the petition was already fait
accompli and, as such, the issue of grave abuse of discretion attributed to RTC-
Br. 14 in granting the relief had become moot and academic. It further held that
the failure of Spouses Crisologo to file their motion to intervene under Rule 19
rendered Rule 65 inapplicable as a vehicle to ventilate their supposed right in
the case
47. Sps. Crisologo
47.1. CA erred in affirming the RTC- Br. 14 ruling that the action for cancellation
may proceed without them being impleaded.
47.2. They allege deprivation of their right to due process when they were not
impleaded in the case before RTC-Br. 14 despite the claim that they stand, as
indispensable parties
47.3. Gonzales v. Judge Bersamin
47.3.1. Court ruled that pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529, notice must be given to all parties in interest before the
court may hear and determine the petition for the cancellation of annotations
on the certificates of title.
47.4. question the statement of the CA that their failure to file the motion to
intervene under Rule 19 before RTC-Br. 14 barred their participation in the
cancellation proceedings. They put emphasis on the court’s duty to, at the very
least, suspend the proceedings before it and have such indispensable parties
 impleaded.
48. JEWM asserts that
48.1. Spouses Crisologo’s failure to file a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-
intervention, appeal or annulment of judgment, which were plain, speedy and
adequate remedies then available to them, rendered recourse to Rule 65 as
improper; that Spouses Crisologo lacked the legal standing to file a Rule 65
petition since they were not impleaded in the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14;
48.2. Spouses Crisologo were not indispensable parties since their rights over
the properties had been rendered ineffective by the final and executory October
19, 1998 Decision of RTC-Br. 8 which disposed unconditionally and absolutely
the subject properties in favor of its predecessor-in-interest.
49. whether the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of
discretion in failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the
case for cancellation of lien.
49.1. YES
49.2. LB
49.2.1. In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at
the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as indispensable
include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529,
16
49.2.2. In Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that the
cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without
giving notice to the parties annotated in the certificate of title itself.
49.3. Application
49.3.1. undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed
annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons
with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by any order
relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other
words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of
the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders.
49.3.2. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been
joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court,
49.3.3. The trial court should have exercised prudence in denying Spouses
Crisologo’s pleas to be recognized as indispensable parties. In the words of
the Court, "Judge Omelio should be penalized for failing to recognize Sps.
Crisologo as indispensable parties and for requiring them to file a motion to
intervene, considering that a simple perusal of the certificates of title would
show Sps. Crisologo’s adverse rights because their liens are annotated at
the back of the titles.
50. JEWM asserts technical grounds on why the CA did not err in dismissing the petition
via Rule 65. It states that:
50.1. a) The Crisologos could have used other available remedies such as
intervention under Rule 19, an appeal of the judgment, or even an annulment of
judgment, which are, by all means, plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law;
 50.1.1. b) The Crisologos lack legal standing to file the Rule 65 petition
since they were not impleaded in the Branch 14 case.
51. Crisologo cannot be faulted
51.1. The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there
is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
51.2. In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available to Spouses
Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.
51.3. Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of, failing to
use this remedy should not prejudice Spouses Crisologo.
51.4. It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of
indispensable parties, to simply recognize them, with or without any
motion to intervene.
51.5. Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since only the original
25
parties to an action can appeal. Here, Spouses Crisologo were never
impleaded. Hence, they could not have utilized appeal as they never possessed
the required legal standing in the first place.
51.6. And even if the Court assumes the existence of the legal standing to
appeal, it must be remembered that the questioned orders were interlocutory in
character and, as such, Spouses Crisologo would have to wait, for the review by
appeal,
52. Recourse to the CA via Rule 65 would have already been proper, except for one last
issue, that is, Spouses Crisologo’s legal standing to file the same.
52.1. The ‘person aggrieved’ under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the
special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in the
proceedings before the court a quo, or in this case before the COA.
52.2. Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their averment
that the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo in the case
before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the latter’s recourse via Rule 65.
52.3. This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court has
ruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to promote, not frustrate
the cause of justice
53. Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable parties is to
preclude the judgment, orders and the proceedings from attaining finality.

CASE#6 : MACAWADIB V. PNP

CA (nullified RTC)--petition for review on certiorariSC

54. Facts:
54.1. Macawadib was a police officer with a rank of Police Super Intendent
54.2. The chief Directorial Staff of the PNP
54.2.1. Issued a general order which enumerated the names of
commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory retirement [by virtue
 of RA 6975
54.2.2. Compulsory retirement age = 56
54.2.3. Petitioner was supposed to retire on January, 11, 2002 as the files
of the PNP Records Management Division indicate that he was born on
January 11, 1946.
54.3. petitioner filed an application for late registration of his birth with the
Municipal Civil Registrar's Office of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In the said
application, petitioner swore under oath that he was born on January 11, 1956.
54.3.1. Application was subsequently approved
54.4. petitioner filed with the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 8, a Petition for
Correction of Entry in the Public Service Records Regarding the Birth Date.
54.4.1.1. He alleged that he was 45 years old
54.4.1.2. He admitted that he erred in entering his birth date as Jan 11, 9146
in the government
54.5. The petition was docketed as a special proceeding
55. RTC decision (favor of petitioner)
55.1. Ordered the chief of the records management to make a correction of the
birth date
55.2. The decision became final and executory
56. respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA,
seeking to nullify the above- mentioned Decision of the RTC on the ground that the
trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the PNP, "an unimpleaded
indispensable party."
57. CA (in favor of respondent)
58. Whether or not PNP is an indispensable partu
58.1. YES
58.2. Legal Basis
58.2.1. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined
as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a failure to implead an indispensable
party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness.
58.2.2. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest
in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made,
1
in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
58.3. The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the
plaintiff.
58.3.1.1.
58.4. Application
58.4.1. the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the integrity and
correctness of the public records in the custody of the PNP, National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC)
which are involved and which would be affected by any decision
rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner. The
aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties
to the proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without whom no final
 determination of the case can be had.
58.4.2. if petitioner's service is extended by ten years, the government,
through the PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits
that would have to be given to petitioner during such extension. Thus, aside
from the OSG, all other agencies which may be affected by the change
should be notified or represented as the truth is best ascertained under an
adversary system of justice.
58.5. Conclusion
58.5.1. the decision of the trial court granting petitioner's prayer for the
correction of entries in his service records, is void. As mentioned above, the
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void
58.5.2. for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
59. Why did the rules for ordinary procedure on indispensable parties applied to this
special proceeding case
60. whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for
failure of the OSG, as government representative, to participate in the proceedings
before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioner's petition for correction of
entries in his service records
60.1. NO
60.2. Legal Basis
60.2.1. This Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of
opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance,
because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of
1
its officials or agents.
60.3. Application
60.3.1. This has no bearing to the validity of the appeal which the petitioner
filed before the CA
60.3.2. Neither can the State, as represented by the government, be
considered in estoppel due to the petitioner's seeming acquiescence to the
judgment of the RTC when it initially made corrections to some of
petitioner's records with the PNP.
61. On petitioner’s claim that he was born in 1956
61.1. The SC doubts that contention
61.2. The late registration of petitioner's certificate of live birth on September 3,
2001 was made forty-five (45) years after his supposed birth and a mere 34
days after the PNP's issuance of its Order for his compulsory retirement. He had
all the time to make such registration but why did he do it only when he was
about to retire?
61.3. The Court, likewise, agrees with the observation of the OSG that, if
petitioner was indeed born in 1956, he would have been merely 14 years old in
1970 when he was appointed as Chief of Police of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. This
would not have been legally tenable, considering that Section 9 of RA 4864,
61.4. It can be argued that petitioner's belatedly registered certificate of live
birth, as a public document, enjoys the presumption of validity. However,
 petitioner merely relied on such presumption without presenting any other
convincing or credible evidence to prove that he was really born in 1956
62. On CSC requirements to change birth cert
62.1. in cases of correction or change of information based on belatedly
registered birth certificates, the CSC no longer requires a court order to warrant
such correction or change of information in its records.
62.2. the CSC imposes the submission of additional evidence that would prove
the veracity of the entries in a belatedly registered birth certificate

CASE#7 : Republic v. Uy

RTC (granted petition to correct birth cert)CA(affirmed RTC)----petition for review on

certiorari SC

63. Dr. Uy filed a petition for the correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth before
RTC(?).
63.1. Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City.
63.2. alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate
daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay6 Her Certificate of Live Birth shows
that her full name is “Anita Sy” when in fact she is allegedly known to her family
and friends as “Norma S. Lugsanay.”
63.3. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all
her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
63.4. her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of
Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the name “Norma S. Lugsanay.” She
also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were
never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother.
63.5. allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name
and citizenship which was supposedly granted.12 However, the National
Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes
64. RTC order
64.1. finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the
case for hearing
64.2. directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and
that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their information and guidance. 14 Pursuant
to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
64.3. respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured
upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the
notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office.
64.4.
65. RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, granting her petition
66. CA
66.1. Affirmed in toto RTC order
66.2. As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondent’s filiation,
the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents were not legally
married and that her siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their surname
is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino.
67. the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to
implead indispensable parties.
67.1. Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
68. respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but
also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by
the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make
68.1. The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on
respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from “Sy” (which
is the surname of her father) to “Lugsanay” (which is the surname of her
mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in
changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights
and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
69. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature
of the proceedings taken.37
70. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the
Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors:
70.1. one given to the persons named in the petition
70.2. and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. 38
71. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford
the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 39
72. While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify
the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of
hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties.40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties
themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; 41 when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; 42 or when a party
is inadvertently left out.43
73. cralaw virtualaw library It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition
for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule
108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated
DATE: April 21, 2015
 
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
 
2 Consolidated Petitions
 filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court
 Concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46)
o Which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum
resources within Tañon Strait
o Tanon Strait - a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of
Negros and Cebu
 Petitions:
o G.R. No. 180771 - original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Injunction
 Seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to
nullify the same for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution,
international, and municipal laws
o G.R. No. 181527 - original petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
 Seeks to nullify Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued
by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection
with SC-46
 to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46
 To compel public respondents to provide petitioners access
to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil
Exploration Project
 
PARTIES:
 G.R. No.180771
o Resident Marine Mammals (petitioner here)
 are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
o Are JOINED by Gloria Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio
 Who are acting as their legal guardians and friends
 AKA "Stewards"
 Who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
marine species
o IMPLEADED (as unwilling co-petitioner) is former President Macapagal-
Arroyo
 FOR her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN
Charter to protect the Tanon Strait (among others)
 G.R. No. 181527
o Petitioners:
 Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC) (petitioner
here)
 a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization,
established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII
  Cerilo Engarcial
 Ramon Yanong
 Francisco Labid
 IN their personal capacities and as representatives of the
subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu
 
 RESPONDENTS:
o FOR both:
1. Late Angelo Reyes (then Secretary of the Department of Energy
(DOE)
2. Jose Atienza (then Secretary of DENR)
3. Leonardo R. Sibbaluca (then DENR - Regional Director for Region
VII AND Chairman of the Tanon Strait Protected Seascape Management
Board)
4. Japan Petroleum Exploration, Co., Ltd. (JAPEX)
 a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan
with a Philippine branch office
5. Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS)
 As the alleged agent Philippine agent of JAPEX
o G.R. No. 181527:
1. IMPLEADED as additional public respondents:
 Alan Arranguez (as then Director of EMB, Region VII)
 Antonio Labios (as then Region Director of DOE, Region VI)
 
 CASE#8 Resident Marine Mammals v.Reyes
FACTS:
 June 2002 - PH (acting thru DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract (GSEC 102)
o WITH JAPEX
o Contract
 Involved geological and geophysical studies f the Tanon Strait
 Studies included surface geology, sample analysis, reprocessing of
seismic and magnetic data
 JAPEX (assisted by DOE) also conducted geophysical & satellite
surveys
 Also oil and gas sampling in Tanon Straot
 December 2004 - DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 into SC-46
o FOR the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources
in a block covering approximately 2, 850 square kilometers offshore the
Tanon Strait.
 May 9 - 18, 2005 - JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tanon Strait
o A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering around 751 km was also
done to determine the area's underwater composition
o JAPEX committed to drill 1 exploration well during the 2nd sub-phase of
the project
  SINCE the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan
& Pinamungajan (where the Tanon Strait was declared a protected
seascape in 1988) ------> JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements (pursuant to PD No.
1586)
 
 January 2007 - The Protected Area Management Board of the Tanon Strait
(PAMB-Tanon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001
o WHEREIN the Board adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
commissioned by JAPEX AND favorably recommended the approval of
JAPEX's application for an ECC
 
 March 2007 - the Envi. Management Board (EMB) of DENR Region VII granted
an ECC (Environmental Compliance Certificate) to the DOE and JAPEX for the
exploration project in Tanon Strait
 Nov. 2007 - JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well (depth of 3, 150 meters)
near Pinamungajan town (western Cebu province)
o Drilling lasted until Feb. 2008
 
 AS SUCH, Petitioners applied to the SC for redress
o Seeking that the respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for
violation of the 1987 Constitution and other laws
 
 SOS filed a Motion to Strike its name as a respondent
o Ground: that it is NOT the Philippine agent of JAPEX
o Also submitted the branch office application of JAPEX which identified
JAPEX's resident agent
o THAT SOS was just a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil & gas
exploration activities in the PH
o WAS Opposed by RMM & Stewards
 Ground: that it was premature, proforma, and dilatory
 Claimed THAT SOS admitted that "it is in law a privy to JAPEX"
SINCE it did the drilling and other exploration activities at Tanon Strait
under the instructions of JAPEX
 THAT since JAPEX had not yet been joined in the case --> SOS's
name should not be dropped from the parties
 They should just notify or ask JAPEX to join in its motion to
enable proper subsitution
 ALSO asked to IMPLEAD JAPEX Philippines as a co-respondent /
substitute of its parent company JAPEX
 This Opposition was also adopted by Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center
 
 SC: Feb. 2012 Resolution
o Required parties to submit their respective memoranda
 
  March 2012 - JAPEX PH (thru special appearance) filed a Motion to Admit its
Motion for Clarification
o WHERE they asked if they should considered the Feb Resolution as the
SC's order of JAPEX PH's inclusion in the case BECAUSE it had yet to be
impleaded
o THAT JAPEX PH had already dropped exploration activities in Tanon
Strait back in 2008, AS SUCH rendering this case moot
o Also filed a Motion for Extension of Time to filed its Memorandum
 SC:
o ON Motion for Clarification: JAPEX PH is a real party-in-interest in these
cases
 JAPEX PH has no separate personality from its mother foreign
corporation
o ON Motion for Extension of Time: Was granted
 ON 2nd Motion for Extension: Denied
 
 
PETITIONERS (Resident Marine Mammals, Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center, et al.):
 Negative ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in Tanon Strait
o THAT fish catch was reduced by 50 - 70%
o THAT before the seismic survey --> average harvest per day would be
from 15 - 20 kilos
 BUT After --> could only catch 1 - 2 kilos
o THAT the "reduced fish catch" was due to the destruction of the "payao"
(fishing addredating device / artificial reef)
o THAT there were incidents of "fish kill" observed by local fisherfolk
o THAT the Environment Compliance Certificate is invalid because
consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre requisite
to the issuance of the ECC were not held prior to the ECC’s issuance.
o THAT during the seismic surveys and drillings, the fisherfolk were barred
from entering and fishing within a 7 km radius from the point where the oilrig
was located
 WHICH was greater than the 1.5 km radius "exclusion zone" stated
in the Initial Environmental Examination
o THAT DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued an ECC
to DOE and JAPEX without ensuring the strict compliance with procedural
and substantive requirements under the Environmental Impact Assessment
System, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations
o THAT despite several requests for copies of all the documents pertaining
to the project in Tañon Strait, only copies of the PAMB-Tañon Strait
Resolution and the ECC were given to the fisherfolk.
 
RESPONDENTS:
 THAT Petitioners (Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards) do NOT have legal
standing
  THAT SC 46 does NOT violate the 1987 Constitution and other laws
 THAT ECC was issued legally and properly
 THAT Public Respondents may NOT be compelled by Mandamus to furnish
petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC46
 THAT petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief
 THAT issues raised are moot and academic --> SC 46 had been mutually
terminated since June 21, 2008
 
 
ISSUES:
1. WON Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have Locus Standi
2. WON Service Contract 46 is legal
 
 
HELD:
 
1. ON moot and academic:
o NO.
o Exceptions to moot and academic:
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;
3. The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
o HERE --> although SC 46 was terminated, it is necessary to resolve this
petitions BECAUSE almost all of the 4 exceptions are present here
 
2. ON Locus Standi of Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
o The issue of WON animals/inanimate objects should be given legal
standing in actions before courts of law --> NOT New in animal rights and
environmental law
o Dissent by JUSTICE Douglas on Sierra Club v. Mortion:
 Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a
legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes.
 The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an
acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases.
 The ordinary corporation is a “person” for purposes of the
adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual,
aesthetic, or charitable causes.
 So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes,
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that
feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modern life. T
 The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it
sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter,
 fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who
are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life.
 The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of
life that is part of it.
 Those people who have a meaningful relation to that
body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a
zoologist, or a logger—must be able to speak for the values
which the river represents and which are threatened with
destruction.
o REASON why animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give
animal and inanimate objects standing ---> BECAUSE of the need to comply
with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court
 Ex. RoC: Parties in a suit must either be natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law
 SO if they cannot show that they are real parties-in-interest -->
cases may be dismissed
o HOWEVER in PH --> locus standi in environmental cases has been given
a more liberalized approach.
 Current trend -> towards simplification of procedures and facilitating
court access in environmental case
 Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases:
 Allows for a "citizen suit" and permits any Filipino citizen to
file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental
laws
 Sec. 5: Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
 Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue
an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties
to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen
(15) days from notice thereof.
 The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish
all affected barangays copies of said order. Citizen suits filed
under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by
their respective provisions
 EXPLANATION: this is to further encourage the protection of
the environment
 This collapses the traditional rule on personal and
direct interest --> on the principle that humans are
STEWARDS of nature
 ALTHOUGH case was filed in 2007, it has been consistently
held that rules of procedure “may be retroactively applied to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
 affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
 ALSO even before the Rules were made, SC has
always taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi
in environmental cases
o AS SUCH --> the need to give Resident Marine Mammals legal standing
has been ELIMINATED by our Rules --> allowing Filipino citizens, as a
steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws
 NOTE: Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not
just in representation of the named cetacean species.
 zAS SUCH, the Stewards (Ramos and Eisma-Osorio) having
shown in their petition that there may be possible vioaltions of laws
concerning the habitat of the Mammals, are declared to possessed
legal standing to file this petition
 
3. ON Impleading Former President Macapagal - Arroyo as an Unwilling Co-
Petitioner:
o NO. This is incorrect.
o Rule 3, Section 10: "Unwilling co-plaintiff - If the consent of any party who
should be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant
and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint."
 SO --> if plaintiff is unwilling ---> they become defendants --> which
would give the Court jurisdiction over him or her --> and through this he
or her can properly be impleaded.
 Unwilling party's name CANNOT simply be included in a petition
without his or her consent = to denial of due process
o ALSO the reason cited by Stewards for including the former President is
NOT sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner
 Impleading her for an act she made in the performance of the
functions of her office --> is contrary to public policy against embroiling
the President in suits "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention"
 
 
4. ON Legality of Service Contract No. 46
o ON SC 46 to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution:
 Section 2: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production
 sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
 The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
 The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
 The President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.
 The President shall notify the Congress of every
contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within
thirty days from its execution.
 La Bugal - B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:
 The deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987
Constitution did NOT amount to a ban on them per se
 ConCom Deliberations:
 the "Service Contracts" referred to which were
deleted --> were actually referring to service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution, ALTHOUGH with safety
measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent
during the martial law regime
 SO service contracts in ConCom -> are agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance
 ConCom was NOT planning to ban them --> they
were going to permit service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors, BUT with safety measures to
prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm
established in the para 1 of Section 2 of Article XII.
 This provision reserves or limits to Filipino
citizens -- and corporations at least 60 percent of which is
 owned by such citizens -- the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources.
 This was prompted by the perceived
insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for
foreign investments in the EDU for minerals and
petroleum resources.
 SO -> Agreements Involving Technical or Financial
Assistance are Service Contracts with SAFEGUARDS
 SO in the new Service Contracts
 These are between:
1. foreign corporations acting as
contractors and
2. the government as principal or
“owner” of the works.
 Here the Foreign contractors provide
capital, technology and technical know-how, and
managerial expertise in the creation and operation
of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the
government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB),
actively exercises control and supervision over the
entire operation
 AS SUCH -> paragraph 4 (with the safeguards in
place) is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII
 Safeguards SC enumerated in La Bugal:
 "Such service contracts may be entered into only with
respect to:
 Minerals
 Petroleum
 and other mineral oils
 This grant is subject to the following requirements:
 The service contract shall be crafted in
accordance with a general law --> that will set standard
or uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions
and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
 The President shall be the signatory for the
government because, supposedly before an agreement
is presented to the President for signature, it will have
been vetted several times over at different levels to
ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public
scrutiny.
 Within thirty days of the executed agreement,
the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
  FOLLOWING these guidelines --> SC finds that SC46
is null and void FOR noncompliance with the requirements of
the 1987 Constitution
 
 
o ON Guidelines NOT followed:
1. The General Law on Oil Exploitation (there IS a General law)
 PD No. 87 or The Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972
 Governs the disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the PH
 Enacted by former Pres. Marcos
 To promote the discovery and production of indigenous
petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or
foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the
Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government
 Still valid law although enacted before the 1987 Constitution
 IF it intended to be repealed, it would have been done
so by the Congress
 Implied repeals --> are not lightly presumed --> so
NO.
 If construction is against Constitution, interpret it in a
way so that it will be in harmony with it
 SO there is a general law which prescribes the standards or
uniform terms, conditions, requirements for service contracts
involving oil exploration and extraction
 HOWEVER --> exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in
the present case may be allowed ONLY through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.
 
2. President was NOT the signatory to SC46 and the same was NOT
submitted to Congress
 ALTHOUGH PD 87 is a satisfactory general law, the 2 other
conditions (President is a signatory to SC 46 and that the Congress
be notified of such a contract) was NOT followed --> so it is NULL
and VOID
 NCC 1306: The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
 Para. 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution:
 Requires that the President himself should enter into any
service contract for the exploration of petroleum
 IN THIS CASE:
 SC 46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by
the DOE thru its then Secretary (Perez, Jr.) contrary to the
requirement
  ALSO public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that
the Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of
the contract
 ON "Alter Ego Principle"
 Josen v. Torres:
 Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment
of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
 WHILE requirement in executing service contracts under the
Constitution may seem like formalities --> they take a bigger role
 they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the
Constitution to “eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent
during the martial law regime.
 SO they are NOT just formalities, which will only render a
contract unenforceable but NOT void if not complied
 They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute,
but in the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will
nullify the contract.
 Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to
harmonize the 1987 Constitution with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 87 --> it must be shown that the government agency or
subordinate official has been authorized by the President to enter
into such service contract for the government.
 Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the President
subsequently approved of such contract explicitly.
 
 
o ON Service Contract No. 46 to OTHER LAWS:
1. Section 12 of R.A. No. 9147 (Wildlife Resources Conservation and
Protection Act)
 Bans all marine exploration and exploitation of oil and gas deposits
2. THAT Section 14 of R.A. No. 7586 (National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 / NIPAS Act)
  Which allows the exploration of protected areas for the purpose of
information-gathering, has been repealed by Section 27 of Wildlife
Resources Act
3. THAT SC 46 is anathema (someone or something that is very strongly
disliked) to R.A. No. 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998) (protects
the rights of the fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal waters with
the exception being limited only to research and survey activities)
 
 ALTHOUGH SC has already ruled that SC 46 is null and void, SC should
still rule on its validity vis-a-vis other pertinent laws
 SO this can serve as a guide for the Government when executing
service contracts involving not only the Tañon Strait, but also other
similar areas
 
 ON Tanon Strait as a Protected Seascape (declared thru Proclamation
No. 1234, by Pres. Ramos)
 Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands
of Cebu (in the East) and Negros (in the West)
 It harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life (including several
endangered species of dolphons and whales)
 Former President Estrada also constituted the Tanon Strait
Commission (thru EO No. 76) to ensire optimum and sustained use
of the resources in that area without threatening its marine life
 BUT this was abolished in 2002 by former President Arroyo
(thru EO No. 72)
 
 R.A. No. 7586 (National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992 / NIPAS Act)
 Was enacted by the Congress to secure the perpetual existence of
all native plants and animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected areas.
 These areas possess common ecological values that were
incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural
heritage.
 The system encompasses outstandingly remarkable areas
and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare
and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic
zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or
marine
 It classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to
maintain essential ecological processes and life support systems,
to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of
resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to
the greatest extent possible
 The following protected areas were established under the NIPAS
Act:
  Strict nature reserve;
 Natural park;
 Natural monument;
 Wildlife sanctuary;
 Protected landscapes and seascapes;
 Resource reserve;
 Natural biotic areas; and
 Other categories established by law, conventions or
international agreements which the Philippine Government is a
signator
 Section 4 of NIPAS:
 a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set
aside due to their unique physical and biological significance,
managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against
human exploitation.
 
 SO --> through Proclamation 1234 --> Tanon Strait = protected area
(under the category of Protected Seascape)
 Protected Seascape (NIPAS Act) -> an area of national significance
characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while
providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and
tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this
areas
 SO a management plan for each area must be designed to
protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural
conditions
 Consistent with this is the requirement that an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any
activity outside the scope of the management plan
 AND UNLESS an ECC under the EIA system is obtained
--> no activity inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS
Act shall be implemented
 
 The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in
1978 under PD No. 1586
 Prohibits any person, partnership, or corporation from undertaking
or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas
without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative
 PURSUANT to this --> Proclamation No. 2146 was enacted
 Which identified the areas and types of projects to be
considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of
EISS
 ALSO --> DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-03
 Provided for EISS's Implementing Rules and Regulations
  This defines an environmentally critical area as “an area
delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant
environmental impacts are expected if certain types of
proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or
implemented in it”
 SO --> before a project (“any activity, regardless of scale or
magnitude, which may have significant impact on the
environment) is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an
EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages
on the environment
 EIA in DETAIL:
 process that involves evaluating and predicting the likely
impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on the
environment during construction, commissioning,
operation and abandonment
 ALSO includes designing appropriate preventive,
mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these
consequences to protect the environment and the
community’s welfare.
 The process is undertaken by, among others, the project
proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review
Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders
 
 CONCLUSION:
 Under Proclamation No. 2146, Tanon Strait is an environmentally
critical area (having been declared as a protected area in 1998)
 THEREFORE: any activity outside the scope of its
management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an
ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects
of such activity on its ecological system.
 
 ON SC 46 falling under the exceptions mentioned in Section 14 of the
NIPAS Act:
 TRUE that restriction found under the NIPAS Act are not without
exception
 HOWEVER: while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying
for energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act
--> this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to
undergo an EIA under Section 12
 NIPAS should be construed as a whole
 AS SUCH --> Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is
not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in
Section 12
 INSTEAD Section 14 provides for additional requisites before
any exploration for energy resources may be done in
protected areas.
  
 ON Late time in securing an ECC:
 Respondents admitted that ECC was only secured prior to the 2nd
sub-space of SC 46 (which required the drilling of an oil exploration
well)
 Meaning --> when the seismic surveys were done in the
Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was
done.
 Unless seismic surveys are part of the management plan of
the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of
Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1586
 "No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or
operate any such declared environmentally critical project
or area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative."
 The respondents’ subsequent compliance with the EISS for the
second sub-phase of SC-46 cannot and will not cure this violation.
 PENALTY provided:
 Under PD. NO. 1586:
 Section 9. Penalty for Violation. - Any person,
corporation or partnership found violating Section 4
of this Decree, or the terms and conditions in the
issuance of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate, or of the standards, rules and regulations
issued by the National Environmental Protection
Council pursuant to this Decree shall be punished
by the suspension or cancellation of his/its
certificates and/or a fine in an amount not to exceed
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for every
violation thereof, at the discretion of the National
Environmental Protection Council.
 Under the NIPAS Act:
 Section 21. Penalties - Whoever violates this Act or
any rules and regulations issued by the Department
pursuant to this Act or whoever is found guilty by a
competent court of justice of any of the offenses in
the preceding section shall be fined in the amount of
not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor
more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000), exclusive of the value of the thing
damaged or imprisonment for not less than one (1)
year but not more than six (6) years, or both, as
determined by the court:
  Provided, that, if the area requires rehabilitation or
restoration as determined by the court, the offender
shall be required to restore or compensate for the
restoration to the damages:
 Provided, further, that court shall order the eviction of
the offender from the land and the forfeiture in favor
of the Government of all minerals, timber or any
species collected or removed including all
equipment, devices and firearms used in connection
therewith, and any construction or improvement
made thereon by the offender.
 If the offender is an association or corporation,
the president or manager shall be directly
responsible for the act of his employees and
laborers:
 Provided, finally, that the DENR may impose
administrative fines and penalties consistent with
this Act.
 
 
 MOREOVER --> SC46 was NOT only for gathering information BUT also
for the parties' rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum
production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the
area
 WHILE PD No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a
service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized --> the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law
passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.
 AND Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration
and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait --> no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
 
 
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service
Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution,
Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.
 
SO ORDERED.
74.