MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NAGPUR

B.A.LL.B. (Hons.) IV Year Semester- VII

First Open Book Assessment

Course Code and Name: 7.1, Principle of Legislation and Interpretation of Statutes
Name of Student: Mayank Tripathi UID: 17-58

Answer 2.
In the given question at hand, one Mr. Alok who is a businessman residing in Gwalior,MP
obtained a grant of land under Section 14 of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Act,1952 in
favour of many plots existing in the village of Jahangirabad Paragna situated in Ghatampur,
Kanpur. The tehsildar upon the close inspection of the allotted land disputed the allocation of
land to Mr. Alok by the reason that he didn’t fall under the definition of ‘Landless person’
within the meaning of the act. The decision is challenged before the court with Mr. Alok
claiming his right to the allocated land is within the purview of law, in order to decide the
given case certain concepts which relate to the case must be observed and understood, this has
been done below.
At times, if there exist any doubt regarding the use of words in the statute passed by the
legislature, the best recourse that must be taken is to understand the object and intention
behind the act in a manner which is complimentary to the subject and the objective of the
legislature, in a layman’s language it might be understood that the intention that the
legislature has in their mind while drafting the statute must be given paramount importance by
the courts.
When there lie two interpretations to the same statute and both the interpretations are feasible,
the courts should follow the one which enhances the remedy to the matter and question and
undermines the mischief involved therein. This allows the courts to take a progressive stance
in case of conflicting interpretation shaking away the involved difficulties and conundrums,
this was held by the Apex court in case of Bipinchandra Purushottam Patel v. State of
Gujarat, (2003) 4 SCC 642. In a nutshell, it becomes evident that if there arises a situation
which challenges the interpretative approach, the interpretation adopted should be the one
which stands to understand the object and motive of the legislature, this object oriented
approach must be followed to the extent where the interpretation attached therein allows or
permits so as to rule out the legislative obstruction which makes situations futile at times.
The situation in the question given in the factual matrix deals with the Uttar Pradesh
Bhoodan Yagna Act,1952. The act was the result of a long and celebrated movement and has
a phenomenal background attached with it, the act was passed as an aftermath of the long
celebrated movement which was the Bhoodan Movement. This movement was the brainchild
of Acharya Vinoba Bhave, he was a true proponent of this moment and at instances quoted
himself as wanting to achieve union of hearts through a bloodless revolution, his revolution
proved to be truly bloodless in nature. The main aim of the Bhoodan Movement was to
convert the workers as the owners of the land, the revolution didn’t focus on the chunck of the
allocated land but rather instilled a belief that ownership for a meagre land worker is also
possible.
The main focus of this movement was to initiate people in helping the poor or people in need,
the movement was a huge success as it succeeded in calling for the humanitarian soft corner
in people. It inspired people into voluntary acting up and giving up their huge pieces of land
in favour of those who were in need. It can be easily said that it was efforts of Vinobha Bhave
that made this herculean task look like a piece of cake which seems impossible even today.
The focus of the Bhoodan Movement (The Bhoodan Yagna Scheme) was shifted towards the
respective state governments, it was the responsibility of the state governments to form
committees which can further determine the people who were landless and it rested upon
these committees to decide who were the rightful receivers of the land under this scheme. The
target group who were kept in mind of these committees were majorly ‘Landless Labours’
who were involved in the agriculture mode of earning their livelihoods.
In order to understand in a better perspective who “Landless Labourers” actually are, it
becomes pertinent to understand the meaning of such as stated in Section 14 of The UP
Bhoodan Yagna Act,1952. As per the blatant reading of the provision of the act, it is written
that any person who is involved in agriculture but has no land in his ownership or the title to a
land can be called a “Landless Labourer”. The Supreme Court in its decision of UP
Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Braj Kishore,AIR 1988 SC 2239 has answered the same in
affirmative, the court has opined that the meaning of a “Landless person” translates to a
farmer who acquires no possession of land under his name, hence it can also be said that a
landless agricultural labourer can be said to be a “Landless Person” under the ambit of the
act.
Having understood the true meaning of a Landless Labour, we will now strive to find out the
meaning of who exactly can be classified as a “landless person” under the Act.
In the given factual matrix, it has been made clear that Mr. Alok was a businessman hence his
main source of livelihood and sustenance was through business activities. It becomes safe to
conclude that “he was a business man who was granted land” . it becomes of value here that
Mr. Alok was a landless business person whose main income source was from certain
business activities and no profit was accrued by any land under his name.
Affirming the stance on this contention, that the person was a businessman the allocation was
challenged by the tehsildar, demanding his land allocation to be retracted to which Mr. Alok
contended. The Allahabad High Court in Braj Kishore case, while interpreting the meaning of
“Landless Person” has done so without any caveats and provisos thereto and has hence
applies a plain and ordinary approach for interpretation of the provisions of the statute in
question, which is a “landless person” is any person without the possession of the land or its
title to his name.
This contention of the respondent was furiously set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and
opined that the purposive approach while applying to the act must be of paramount
importance in the matter at hand, the court said that one must try to understand the thinking of
the then legislature while passing this act. The object and purpose becomes of utmost
importance as it might be understood that the legislature while passing this act would’ve
meant people without land as people belonging from a poor strata of society at the time when
such legislation was passed. The then existing legislature couldn’t have fathomed a world
where sustenance of an individual can be shifted from an agricultural based economy to the
one where trade and business is involved. The court said that while interpreting the meaning
of a “landless person”, the philosophy of the act must be kept in mind. The Apex court
emphasised that both the sections 14 & 15 of the Act must be read in consonance with each
other so as to clear the air in case a confusion may arise.
The Supreme Court also stated that ‘plain’ and ‘ordinary’ meaning rule although always relied
upon cannot be effectuated in the case at hand because it serves to defeat the purpose of the
act which ultimately provides for the upliftment of the downtrodden class, the major motive
of the “Bhoodan Movement” is to restore imbalance and promote equilibrium in the society
for which if plain meaning is relied upon would render the act, motiveless.
When sections 14 & 15 of the act are read in coherence it can be observed that the meaning
“Landless agricultural Labourer” is quite exhaustive and accurate, it mean only and only a
landless agricultural involving person and not a person without land carrying out a business
activity.
The court applied its reasoning propunded as “mischief rule” by Lord Denning’s book ‘The
Discipline of Law’. It states that a judge should not limit himself to the bare reading of the
statute, they shouldn’t simply go with the plain or grammatical meaning given to them by the
statute. They should put their own minds and thoughts to it in order to enquire into the
mischief, which gave rise to the conflict in the statute and try to ward-off the evil causing
such problem. One must understand the background and the purpose for which this mischief
rule was enacted in order to do so, the backdrop of this rule must be understood.
In the current factual question, the happening of events occurred in the year 1972. Whereas
the amendment of ‘landless agricultural labourers’ mentioned in the U.P Bhoodan Yagna
Samiti case was put into effect in the year 1975. Also, while applying the principles of
mischief rule in examining the expression ‘landless persons’ results in only one stream
conclusion that is land can’t be allocated to a landless business income generating individual
but only to landless adriculturists with no other means of sustenance. The evolution of
mischief rule and the case laws by the virtue of which the concept was propounded needs to
be discussed as well.
The rule of purposive interpretation or mischief rule was laid down in the Heydon’s case,
(1584) 3 Co.76 ER 637, also known as ‘Heydon’s Rule’ ,it says, “when the material words
are capable of bearing two or more constructions the court should observe four matters
while construing that act. They are, what was the law before the making of the Act, what
was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide, what is the remedy that the
Act has provided, and what is the reason of the remedy”. The rule then directs that the courts
must adopt that construction which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, that
is the remedy must suppress the mischief caused as a result. The main aim of the rule is that
the courts’ should identify the mischief which existed before passing of the statute and then if
more than one construction is possible, favour that which will eliminate the mischief so
identified. In applying a purposive construction a word of caution is necessary that the text of
the statute is not to be sacrificed and the court cannot rewrite the statute on the assumption
that whatever furthers the purpose of the Act must have been sanctioned.
The rule was applied in motion for the first time in India in the case Bengal Immunity Co v
State of Bihar,AIR 1955 SC 661. The court put the rule to application and use in construction
of Article 286 of the Constitution to cure the mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the
free flow of inter-state trade and commerce in India. In Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907, it was observed “that the recourse to object and policy of
the act or consideration of the mischief and defect which the act purports to remedy is only
permissible when the language is capable of two constructions. Its used when the literal
meaning of the statute leads to injustice or absurdity and does not fulfil the object and
purpose of the statute”.
In the present case given in hand ‘landless persons’ as a word is potentially capable of
bearing two constructions with regards to the facts of the case. Firstly, “Landless Agriculture
Labourers” having earning their income solely from the means of agriculture that is
cultivation of crops and farming with no other income source. Secondly, “Landless person
indulged in business” who rely upon trade and commercial business for earning their
livelihood. Considering the object and the purpose of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act which
was examined in the U.P Bhoodan Yagna Samiti case and have been explained above and
also the application of mischief rule, ‘landless persons’ can only be perceived as ‘Landless
Agricultural Labourers’ and not ‘Landless Businessman’ as the latter interpretation will
defeat the purpose and the intention of legislature and those of the legislators by the virtue of
which the statute came to fruition. By this interpretation the mischief of landless businessman
getting grant by fraud and misrepresentation will be suppressed and the remedy of granting
this land to landless agriculturalists will be advanced. Hence, Mr. Alok who is a businessman
by profession and has a continuous channel of income by a source which is trade and
commerce and is not helpless when it comes to providing enough for his sustenance cannot be
granted land under the act as well as he is not fit to be deemed as a “Landless Agricultural
Labourers” based upon various rules of interpretation and judicial precendents pronounced
by the Apex court and hence the claim that Tehsildar has put in allocation of his land stands to
be true and the land so allocated to Mr. Alok must not remain under his possession.
Answer 1.
The premier function of a proviso in a statute is to act as an exception and to tackle a situation
which would otherwise be falling within the meaning of the general language of the main
enactment, that is the governing statute, a proviso exists so as to confine its meaning to a
certain set of scenarios. It is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in
terms too general to be quite accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment in
order to qualify it or create it as an exception to what is in the enactment, ordinarily a proviso
cannot be said to be interpreting a general rule or notion. Usually, a proviso is not meant to go
beyond the ambit of a provision for which it has been acted upon, the main motive and the
aim of a proviso is to carve out a substantial difference and act an an exception to the
governing provision or the main provision and is not applicable to any other provision
whatsoever contained in the statute.
In the words of Lord Macmilan in the landmark case of Madras & Southern Maharatta Rly
Co Ltd v Bezwada Municipality, AIR 1944 PC 71:
“The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would
otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined
to that case.”
The rule in general governing the interpretation of a proviso is that the proviso per-se must
not be taken in its absolute strict literal sense but is necessarily and willingly to remain
limited to the provision for which it has been designated and meant for, that is it should play
only a restrictive limited role and act as per the ambition of the section that it was meant to be
a part of. The court are restricted to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge its scope.
The proviso must reasonably be conveyed by the words used therein. When one finds a
proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of
the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. A proviso must be
construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. Where
the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of
the section as the proviso speaks the later intention of the makers. When a proviso is
repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later
Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. However, where the section is
doubtful, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation; but when it is clear, a proviso
cannot imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the section. The proviso is
subordinate to the main section. A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for
compelling reasons. Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant
caution. A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision.
Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be held a
repeal of the section as the proviso speaks the later intention of the makers. When a proviso is
repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later
Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. However, where the section is
doubtful, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation; but when it is clear, a proviso
cannot imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the section. The proviso is
subordinate to the main section. A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for
compelling reasons. Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant
caution. A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision.
Acting as a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception
to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general
rule. It was held in the landmark case of State of Punjab & Anr. v. Ashwani Kumar & Ors
that:
“if the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which
are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso”.
The main function that a provisio aims to achieve are as follows:
To remove something from the main provisio; To qualify something contained in the main
provision; A proviso is not interpreted as a general rule. Where the main provision is not
clear, a ‘proviso’ can be looked into to ascertain the meaning and scope of the main
provision; When the main provision is clear; a ‘proviso’ cannot expand or limit it and a
‘proviso’ to a particular section is applicable only to the filed covered by such section but not
to any other field.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgement of S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R.
Pattabiraman,AIR 1985 SC 582 exhaustively analyzed aforementioned judicial precedents
and stated the four purposes of the proviso. These include:-
i. To qualify or expect certain provisions from the main enactment;
ii. It may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by
insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the
enactment workable;
iii. It may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment
and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and
iv. It may be used merely to act as an options addenda to the enactment with the sole
object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.
It is cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only
embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the
main revision which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. The proper function
of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general
language of the main enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case.
Also in the case of Union of India v. Sanjay Kumar Jain the function of proviso was
declared that it qualifies or carves out an exception to the main provision. Also in Vishesh
Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, the Supreme Court held that a proviso cannot be permitted by
construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision. In Union of
India v. Dileep Kumar Singh, it has been held that though a proviso does not travel beyond
the provision to which it is appended, golden rule is to read the whole Section, inclusive of
the proviso in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a
harmonious construction.
In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal v. M/s. Shelly Products, the Supreme Court while
interpreting the proviso to Section 240 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 clarified that where a
proviso consists of two parts, one part may be declaratory but the other part may not be so.
Therefore, merely because one part of the proviso has been held to the declaratory, it does not
follow that the second part of it is also declaratory. Since proviso (b) to Section 240 of the
Act is declaratory, it was held to be retrospective in operation.
In Shimbhu v. State of Haryana, the Apex Court held that a proviso should be construed in
relation to the main provision. But, in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of Tamil
Nadu, the apex court clarified that where the main provision is clear and unambiguous,
recourse to the proviso cannot be taken to interpret it. In State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath, the
Supreme Court held that the proviso has to read as an exception to the main provision of a
section. Sometimes more than one provisos are attached with the section. If there is any
repugnancy between the two provisos, the latter shall prevail.
So a proviso cannot be used to enlarge the scope of the principal section. From its very
nature, it only engrafts an exception or limitation to the main clauses. A proviso is supposed
to apply to that which immediately precedes it in the statute unless the context indicates that
it was intended to have a wider scope. The proviso may qualify any part of the enactment, or
the legislative intent.
So, the following can be said to be a settled priciples for a proviso:
i. When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the
proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject matter of the
proviso.
ii. A proviso must be contoured with reference to the preceding parta of the clause to
which it is appended.
iii. Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be
held a repeal of the section as the proviso speaks the later intention of the makers.
iv. Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation;
but when it is clear, a proviso cannot imply the existence of words of which there is
no trace in the section.
v. The proviso is subordinate to the main section.
vi. A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling reasons.
vii. Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant caution.
viii. A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into general harmony with the
terms of the section should prevail.
ix. When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the
absolute terms of a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one.
x. A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision.
xi. There are certain limitations of proviso as internal aid to construction and these are:
xii. Proviso is constructed in relation to the section to which it is appended.
xiii. The ambition and scope of enacting sections cannot be widened or curtailed by the
proviso.

Answer 5.
(i) Preamble as an aid to construction of a Statute
The Preamble to the Act contains the aims and objectives sought to be achieved, and is
therefore, part of the Act. It is a key to unlock the mind of the law makers. The Preamble of a
statute like the Long Title is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to construction.
Although not an enacting part, the Preamble is expected to express the scope, object and
purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the Long Title. It may recite the ground and
cause of making the statute,the evils sought to be remedied or the doubts which may be
intended to be settled.
the Preamble is expected to express the scope, object and purpose of the act comprehensively.
It may recite the ground and cause of making the statute. Preamble highlights the reason and
spirit of every statute along with the intention of the legislature in passing the statute. The
Preamble being a part of the statute can be read along with other portions of the cct to find out
the meaning of words in the enacting provisions as also to decide whether they are clear or
ambiguous. The Preamble to the Constitution of India embodies and reflects the fundamental
values, philosophy and objectives on which the Constitution is based. Pandit Thakur Das
Bhargava, member of the Constituent Assembly, summed up the importance of the Preamble
in the following words: “The Preamble is the most precious part of the Constitution. It is
the soul of the Constitution. It is the key to the Constitution... It is a jewel set in the
Constitution... It is a proper yardstick with which one can measure the worth of the
Constitution.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning &
Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 724 explained as to when the preamble acts as an aid to
construction of statutes. The Hon’ble court decided that “Preamble is not an enacting
provision and when read by itself alone it is weighed down by the other enacting provision
present in a statute which act as an aid to construction, therefore when the enacting
provisions are clear by themselves then the usefulness of preamble as an aid to
construction decreases”.
In case of AG v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, (1957) 1 All ER 49 while
speaking for the court Mudholkar J, stated that it is one of the cardinal principles of
construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the Preamble must be disregarded
though, where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the Preamble may be
resorted to explain it. Again, where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is
clear must be intended to have a limited application, the Preamble may be used to indicate to
what particular instances, the enactment is intended to apply. We cannot, therefore, start with
the Preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we could be justified in
resorting to it, nay, we will be required to do so, if we find that the language used by the
Parliament is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact the Parliament intended that
it should have a limited application.
Some of the Limitations of Preamble being an aid to the interpretation of statute are

 If the preamble itself is ambiguous then of course it is of no assistance to the

judges in the interpretation of the application of the Law.
 The preamble is of no assistance where the body of the statute contains certain
exceptions or qualifications to the operation of the general purpose of the law.
 It might be the case that the preamble is telling you something opposite of what
the enacted words are telling you. So in such situations where it might be the case
that the kind of objects and the scope of the law which enshrined in the provisions
of the preamble if it is a narrower one whereas the enacting words are expensive
one then of course in such situation the preamble is not going to assist you
because you cannot use preamble for the purpose of limiting the otherwise clear
enacted words of the law.

The application of preamble as an aid to construction can also be understood by the following
illustrations. In the case of Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 510 the
construction of certain provisions of Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 along
with the preamble of the act was under contention. The preamble said “Whereas with a view
to putting a check on the growing tendency of landlords to eject or dispossess tenants from
their holdings and in the wider national interest of increasing the production of foodgrains, it
is expedient to make provisions for the protection of tenants in Rajasthan from ejectment or
dispossession from their holdings.” Section 4 of the Ordinance provided that during the
continuance of the Ordinance no tenant could be ejected or dispossessed and by section 15
power was conferred upon the Government to exempt any person or class of persons from the
operation of the Ordinance. Dealing with the contention of section 15 it was observed that the
section does not itself indicate the grounds on which exemption can be granted, but the
Preamble to the Ordinance sets out with sufficient clearness ‘the policy of the Legislature’
and as that governs section 15 of the Ordinance, the decision of the Government thereunder
cannot be said to be unguided. In the case of Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani,AIR
2009 SC 1058 Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 was under contention. Use of the
word “may” in section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act which provides “A marriage may be
solemnized between any two Hindus” has been construed to be mandatory in the sense that
both parties to the marriage must be Hindus as defined in section 2 of the Act. It was,
therefore, held that a marriage between a Christian male and a Hindu female solemnized
under the Hindu Marriage Act was void. This result was reached also having regard to the
Preamble of the Act which reads “An Act to amend and codify the law relating to marriage
among Hindus.” Thus, concluding in the words of Supreme Court verdict in the case of
Tribhuvan Prakash Nayyar v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 540 a Preamble is a key to
open the mind of the Legislature, but it cannot be used to control or qualify precise and
unambiguous language of the enactment. In Global Energy Ltd. v. Central Electricity
Regulatory Commission, it was held that the object of legislation should be read in the
context of the Preamble. In Maharashtra Land Development Corporation v. State of
Maharashtra, it was held that Preamble of the Act is a guiding Light to its interpretation.
Another important example is found in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973
SC 1461 wherein the apex court strongly relied on the Preamble to the Constitution of India
in reaching a conclusion that the power of the Parliament to amend the constitution under
Article 368 was not unlimited and did not enable the Parliament to alter the Basic Structure of
the Constitution. In Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. NTC (South Maharashtra), the
Supreme Court while interpreting certain provisions of the Textile Undertakings (Take over
of Management) Act, 1983 held that when the language of the Act is clear, preamble cannot
be invoked to curtail or restrict the scope of an enactment. A Preamble retrospectively
inserted into an earlier Act is not of much assistance for gathering the intention of the original
Act. Similarly, it seems the repeal of a Preamble simpliciter will not affect the construction of
the statute.

(ii) Ejusdem Generis

Ejusdem Generis means “of the same kind and nature”. It is an ancient doctrine, commonly
called Lord Tenterden's Rule, dating back to Archbishop of Canterbury's Case in 1596.
When a list of two or more specific descriptors are followed by more general descriptors, the
otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any,
of the specific words that precede them. In this rule a specific word, class or species needs to
be mentioned so that the whole statute revolves around it and the statute will be only meant
for these specific words. However the specific words should not have a wide approach as
they would exhaust the whole statute. This rule provides that where words of specific
meaning are followed by general words, the general words will be construed as being limited
to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those enumerated by the specific
words. To invoke the application of ejusdem generis rule, there has to be a distinct genus or
category. The specific words must apply not to the different objects of a widely differing
character, but, to something, which can be called a class or kind of objects. Where this is
lacking, the rule will not be applicable. For the invocation of the rule, there must be one
distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to different objects of a widely
varying character but to words, which convey things or object of one class or kind, where this
generic unity is absent, the rule cannot apply. The rule can be illustrated by a reference to the
decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Kerala Cooperative Consumers’ Federation
Ltd v CIT (1988) 170 ITR 455 (Ker). In this decision, the court was required to interpret the
meaning of the phrase 'Body of Individuals'. It has said that in construing the words ‘Body of
Individuals’ occurring in section 2(31) of the Income Tax Act along-side the words
‘Association of Persons’, the words ‘Body of Individuals’ would have to be understood in the
same background, context and meaning given to the words ‘Association of Persons’. The
Supreme Court in Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd v UOI, AIR 1989 SC 1019, while
interpreting the expression ‘any other process’ appearing along-with the words 'bleaching,
mercerizing, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberizing, shrink-proofing, organic
processing in section 2(f) of the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944 (as it stood prior to its
substitution by Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985) read with Notification No 230 and 231 dated
15th July, 1977 with the aid of the principle of Ejusdem Generis has said that the foregoing
words, which precede the expression ‘or any other process’ contemplate process, which
import a change of a lasting nature must share one or the other of these incidents. The rule of
Ejusdem Generis applies as mentioned by the Supreme Court in Amarchandra Chakrabotry
v Collector of Excise, AIR 1972 SC 1863 when:

 The statute contains an enumeration of specific words;

 The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;

 That class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;

 The general item follows the enumeration;

 There is no indication of a different legislative intent.

In Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, the validity of the Rajasthan Land Reforms
and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 was impugned. One of the tenures was known as
Bhomichar tenure and it was contended that its holders were not jagirdars. It was held: We
agree with the petitioners that a jagir can be created only by a grant, and that if it is
established that Bhomichara tenure is not held under a grant, it cannot be classed as a jagir.
We do not base this conclusion on the ground put forward that the word ‘Jagir’ in Article 31-
A of the Constitution should be read Ejusdem Generis with ‘other similar grants’, because,
the true scope of the rule of ‘Ejusdem Generis’ is that words of a general nature following
specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same
nature as those specified and not its reverse, that specific words which precede are controlled
by the general words which follow.
In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the question was whether the appellant was entitled
under Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, to requisition, as for a
public purpose, premises for housing a member of a foreign consulate. The sub-section
provided that the State Government may requisition for the purpose of a State or any other
public purpose. The High Court held that the words ‘any other purpose’ should be read
‘Ejusdem Generis’ with the purpose of the State that accommodation for a member of the
foreign consulate staff is a ‘purpose of the Union’ and hence the State Government was not
entitled to requisition. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held: With great respect, we
are constrained to say that the ‘Ejusdem Generis’ rule of construction, which found favour in
the court below for reaching the result that the words ‘any other public purpose’ are restricted
to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has scarcely any application. Apart
from the fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits, and general or
comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly
restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must
comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied.
In Lilavati Bai v. Bombay State, the petitioner was the widow of a tenant of certain premises
and she had vacated from such premises. Finding the premises vacant, the respondent
requisitioned the premises under Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948,
for the public purpose of housing a government servant. One of the contentions of the
petitioner was that under the Explanation to the sub-section there would be deemed to be a
vacancy when the tenant ‘ceases to be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy, eviction
or assignment or transfer in any other manner of his interest in the premises or otherwise’,
and that the words ‘or otherwise’ should be construed as Ejusdem Generis with the words
immediately preceding them. It was held:
The rule Ejusdem Generis sought to be expressed in aid of the petitioner can possibly have no
application. The legislature, when it used the words ‘or otherwise’, apparently intended to
cover other cases which may not come within the meaning of the preceding clauses, for
example, a case where the tenant's occupation has ceased as a result of trespass by a third
party. The legislature intended to cover all possible cases of vacancy occurring due to any
reasons whatsoever. Hence, far from using those words Ejusdem Generis with the preceding
clauses of the explanation, the legislature used those words in an all-inclusive sense. The rule
of Ejusdem Generis is intended to be applied where general words have been used following
particular and specific words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that
the legislature presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense that is to say, as
belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific words.
Ejusdem Generis is (a) an enumeration of different subjects in an Act, general words
following specific words may be construed with reference to the antecedent matters, and
the construction may be narrowed down by treating them as applying to things of the same
kind as those previously mentioned, unless of course, there is something to show that a
wider sense was intended. (b) If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, then the
general words are construed as embracing a larger genus.
This is a rule of language employed by the courts when a situation arises that may not have
been foreseen when the statute was being drafted. It will bring within the meaning of the
statute things that are of the same class or genus as those mentioned within the statute itself.
Thus, if specific items are listed, plus a general term (for example, houses, offices, rooms or
other places), the general term of other places will include things only of the same class as the
specific list, in this case indoor places.
General words in a statute should be taken ordinarily in their usual sense. General words,
even when they follow specific words, should ordinarily be taken in their general sense,
unless a more reasonable interpretation requires them to be used in a sense limited to things
Ejusdem Generis with those specifically mentioned. If, however, the particular words exhaust
the whole genus, the general words must be understood to refer to some larger genus.
The doctrine of Ejusdem Generis is only part of a wider principle of construction, namely,
that, where reasonably possible, some significance and meaning should be attributed to each
and every word and phrase in a written document. That being the object of the doctrine, it is
difficult to see what difference it can make whether the word 'other' is or is not used,
provided-and this is essential-that the examples which have been given are referable to a
clearly ascertainable genus.