GUEST EDITORIAL
OF CARTS AND HORSES IN HYDROLOGIC wrong-more often it is totally absent. One is reminded here
MODELING
Historical Perspective
Hydrologic modeling is a relatively new concept and some-
times only a more impressive label for what used to be called
"methods of hydrological computations" until the 1960s.
Thus, one would search in vain for "hydrologic models" in
such applied-hydrology classics as Linsley et a!. (1949, 1958).
Even the famous Handbook of Applied Hydrology (Chow
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1964) mentions the term "hydrologic model" in only one
fourth-order heading in the context of statistical and probabi-
listic data analysis-indeed, the only sentence explicitly re-
ferring to hydrologic models that I could find in this
monumental volume is this: "Hydrologic models considered
here are mathematical formulations to simulate natural hydro-
logic phenomena which are considered as processes or as sys-
tems."
And that is what they are or at least what they are meant
to be: mathematical models of hydrologic processes or sys-
tems.
The "upgrading" of "computational methods" to "math-
ematical models" was brought about by the advent of the
computer and the consequent "mathematization" of many
kinds of analytical and technical work. This produced a burst
of activity in mathematically literate university departments
such as engineering: computer-based mathematical modeling
made attractive to them previously uninteresting empirical dis-
ciplines that had low mathematical content and relied heavily
on manual execution of various numerical and graphical tech-
niques. Such disciplines had evolved from practical needs of
various professions, remained largely within their domain of
interest, and, in the academic environment, were relegated to
the fringes of scientifically more respectable fields.
Hydrology was, of course, a prime example of such empir-
ical disciplines, having evolved chiefly from hydraulic engi-
neering and its need for hydrology-related design parameters
and operational characteristics of various water resource
projects. Here I am deliberately using the term "discipline"
because even today hydrology is only slowly asserting itself
as a science in its own right. These topics were discussed in
greater detail elsewhere (Klemes 1986, 1988).
For hydrology as a science, the invasion of mathematical
modeling was nothing short of a disaster. It has retarded rather
than advanced the development of hydrology because, with
very few exceptions, it focussed all efforts on polishing the
mathematical and computational aspects of methods and tech-
niques, leaving the understanding of the substance at the 1930s
level, where it had been brought by the old guard of profes-
sionals like Hazen, Sherman, Horton, Theis, to name a few.
Even this is an overly optimistic assessment of the actual sit-
uation. In reality, while this limited and fragmented hydrolog-
ical knowledge did exist, it was often deliberately ignored and
avoided by the new generation of modelers. Out of enthusi-
astic naivety or calculated self-interest, they flaunted their hy-
drological ignorance as "absence of bias" and believed (some
still do) that the mathematical rigor of models and the close-
ness of their fit to empirical data are the supreme guarantors
of scientific objectivity and the key to true and reliable hydro-
logic understanding.
The contrast between the new and the old could not be
sharper. The focus of the old guard was the substance and its
hydrology was usually right, though sometimes the mathe-
matics was not. The focus of the new generation of modelers
has been the form: the mathematics is usually correct and it
would be a compliment to say the hydrology is sometimes
J. Hydrol. Eng. 1997.2:43-49.
of a comment physicist Niels Bohr is supposed to have made
to one of his students: "This is not right ... This is not even
wrong!"
Hydrological discoveries of the old school invariably were
the product of extensive personal involvement of its authors
in practical hydrological work related to water resource engi-
neering projects. Their papers have the unmistakable imprint
of mature professionals going seriously about their business
and, in the process, getting ideas on how the current practice
of their profession could be improved. One can see that these
people were not playing games.
On the other hand, this is exactly the impression one gets
from reading papers of the academic hydrologic modelers of
the new generation. While most of them have engineering de-
grees, they have never practiced engineering and, while pos-
turing as hydrologists, they have, for the most part, never se-
riously studied or practiced hydrology either. As I once
characterized a typical academic hydrologic modeler: "Sus-
pended between a technology he does not practice and a sci-
ence for which he has not been trained, his 'research' is nat-
urally guided to performing elaborate pirouettes on the high
wire of techniques connecting the distant poles and holding
him in place" (Klemes 1988a).
Having come to hydrology after practicing water resources
engineering for more than a decade, during which I gradually
realized how little hydrology I knew and how important its
knowledge was, I was eager to drink from the fountain of
hydrologic knowledge I thought must be hidden behind the
intimidating jargon and algebra-all those convolutions, La-
guerre functions, fractional and other noises, and so On. Alas,
there was no fountain, only sterile desert! After a dozen years
of exposure to practical hydrological problems and participa-
tion in neck-breaking decisions on multimillion investments
made with the knowledge of the large hydrological uncertain-
ties involved, I was literally insulted when I realized that all
what this high-power prestidigitation, posturing as "scientific
hydrology," can teach me is how to fit a line to a few points,
extrapolate a curve by the most abstruse and esoteric means
available, and keep calibrating (i.e., fudging) an arbitrary sys-
tem with an excessive number of the degrees of freedom until
it fits some hydrologic record.
I soon made my displeasure known, deploring' 'the empha-
sis .,. on the fitting of various preconceived mathematical
models to empirical data rather than on arriving at a proper
model from the physical nature of the process itself," warning
that "such approach can hardly contribute to hydrological
knowledge," drawing attention "to the fact that inferences
about physical features of a process, based on operational
models, can be not only inaccurate but grossly misleading"
(Klemes 1974), and pointing out the various malignant facets
of the misguided practices ever since (Klemes 1978, 1982,
1986, 1987, 1988a, 1991, 1994, 1995). However, if this per-
sistence looks like a paranoic obsession, I may say in my de-
fense that, except for the 1974 "Hurst phenomenon" paper,
all the other papers cited were written based on invitations.
This editorial is an elaboration of the argument sketched in
(Klemes 1995). It was written at the suggestion of the editor
of this journal, who has assured me that the message still is
by no means obsolete.
Diagnosing the Problem
There are many causes for the regrettable state in which the
mainstream of hydrologic modeling has been meandering for
the past 30 years or so. They fall into two broad categories
that can be labeled as "scientific" and "socioeconomic."
JOURNAL OF HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING / APRIL 1997/43
 Both have their historic roots, which have been briefly alluded
to earlier. My intent here is to examine, in more detail, the
scientific roots of the situation, touching on the other category
only in passing.
I see the main causes of the scientific sterility of mainstream
hydrologic modeling in the lack of clarity regarding three fac-
tors: (l) the difference between theoretical and empirical mod-
els; (2) the difference between the notions "better model" and
"better fit of a model"; and (3) the meaning of the notion
"theoretical." Let's examine each of them in more detail.
Theoretical and Empirical Models
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The difference between these two kinds of models derives
from the difference between empirical and theoretical knowl-
edge that represent two hierarchical, qualitatively different,
levels of scientific understanding. To put it simply, empirical
knowledge is circumscribed by the statement of facts, while
theoretical knowledge includes their interpretation and expla-
nation. Empirical knowledge tells us what happened, theoret-
ical knowledge tells us why. At each of these two levels, the
knowledge is often effectively and usefully summarized in
mathematical form or mathematical models-and there the
trouble often lies: the mathematical formalism, same in both
cases, may mask the difference in their substance.
The point is that an equation or model does not know what
it is being used to describe in a particular case, what physical
or other entities its symbols are meant to represent, whether
its form is merely an ad hoc choice that happens to fit some
observed, i.e., empirical, pattern or whether it has been arrived
at by consideration of some deeper aspects, which lend it a
more general validity; its algebraic form does not contain in-
formation about the range of its applicability, about the limits
beyond which its symbols can no longer represent the physical
variables whose names they carry. An equation does not know
whether its variables represent anything real at all and it cannot
be made responsible for predicting nonsense, which it some-
times may. These all are land mines scattered across the field
of mathematical modeling, and hydrological models seem to
be exceptionally prone to being crippled by them.
Detection and avoidance of these mines is easier if one steps
back and examines the process by which knowledge is ad-
vanced, how it interacts with what is loosely called practice,
and why we may be striving for an explanation in one case
and be content with description in another.
At any point in history, certain facts are known as well as
understood, some are known and understood poorly or not at
all, and there are many facts yet unknown. From the known
facts, some are found useful for practical purposes and are
exploited to better the standard of living. As a general rule,
the facts that are well understood tend to be more useful than
those understood less. The Darwinist may argue that the va-
lidity of this rule is the very reason why the human mind has
evolved such a strong urge for understanding and explanation
because this urge, called curiosity, gives humans a distinct
"selective advantage." Selective advantage or not (when one
considers how many Pandora's boxes with potentially destruc-
tive contents curiosity has opened up, it sometimes looks more
like a selective disadvantage), curiosity is deeply ingrained in
our genes and it is the driving force behind theoretical models.
On the other hand, there are many facts, which, though not
well understood, have great practical utility such as they are;
this drives the development of empirical models that describe,
organize, and mobilize these facts to facilitate action.
This is the first thing that should be clear to the prospective
modeler: empirical models do not, and are not meant to, ex-
plain what is behind data, but merely describe their observed
patterns. But is the description itself the purpose? Is it the
beauty of the pattern that is to be captured, perfected, dis-
44/ JOURNAL OF HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING / APRIL 1997
J. Hydrol. Eng. 1997.2:43-49.
played, believed in? The doyen of hydrology, James Dooge,
proclaimed quarter of a century ago: "Models are to be used,
not to be believed in!" (Dooge 1972). Until the advent of the
"modeling revolution" in the 1960s, it was clear that empir-
ical hydrologic models were meant to be used for applied pur-
poses, not for the narcissistic self-gratification of modelers,
which later (increasingly) seemed to be the case and prompted
Dooge to make his admonition.
When this is clear, it becomes obvious that a theoretical
model should ask questions while an empirical model should
summarize answers already available and summarize them
simply and effectively, without spurious ornamentation.
An empirical model may, of course (and usually does) rep-
resent the first step in the development of a theoretical model:
it can inspire a question about the prototype that can be fol-
lowed up, thus starting an iterative learning loop-called the
scientific method-which is the basic tool for the construction
of theoretical models. On the other hand, when all relevant
questions have been answered (a very unlikely situation in
practice), the final theoretical model can be regarded as an
exhaustive empirical model since the sum total of answers and
explanations it contains (explicitly or implicitly) do represent
the known facts (indeed, some philosophers hold that all
knowledge is ultimately empirical, since even the theoretical
causal laws are, in the end, only facts repeatedly confirmed by
experience).
It can happen that a theoretical model will end up having
the same form as the initial empirical model, the only differ-
ence being that the form has been justified by deeper knowl-
edge. For example, an empirical unit hydrograph model may
well come out as an appropriate theoretical model if the basin
is confirmed, by other independent investigations, to function
as a linear system.
The most essential difference between theoretical and em-
pirical models is the asymmetry in their inferential potential,
which is the consequence of their hierarchical relationship: an
adequate form of an empirical model can be deduced from a
valid theoretical model but the reverse is not true-the form
of an adequate theoretical model cannot be deduced from a
valid empirical model. This asymmetry emerges very clearly
when we examine the difference between a better model and
a better fit of a model.
Better Model and Better Fit of a Model
Model is generally defined as a representation of some pro-
totype. This representation is never perfect and exhaustive-
if it were, the model would not be the prototype's model, but
its duplicate. It is thus better to say that model is a simplified
representation of a prototype, one that preserves some of its
characteristics but omits others. A "better model" can be de-
fined only relative to the features of the prototype that are
important for a satisfactory function of the model; the more
of such features the model represents the better it is.
A hydrologic model is supposed to represent mathematically
the results of transformations that specified water inputs un-
dergo during their passage through a river basin or its parts.
It follows that the model will be the better, the more faithfully
it represents the essential features of the dynamics of the pro-
cesses that cause these transformations. This in turn requires
that the dynamics be known to the modeler, and the only way
he or she can acquire such knowledge is to consult the pro-
totype. Thus the general scheme for making a better model is
to apply the scientific method: construct a model based on the
available observations (data) and the existing theoretical
knowledge (which may well be zero) or an initial hypothesis
about the dynamics and, if the results do not agree with the
empirical evidence, go back to the prototype, check the dy-
namics through experiments or new observations, modify the
 model on the basis of the new knowledge, and so on. This
process of improvement of the model is schematically illus-
trated in Fig. l(a).
In theory, this method of making a model better applies
equally to theoretical and empirical models because results of
a better theoretical model can, in principle, be summarized in
the form of a better empirical model. However, to paraphrase
George Orwell, in practice it applies "more equally" to the-
oretical models than to empirical ones. This is so because the
overriding purpose of an empirical model is to summarize (the
results of) what is known and give it to a client who may
already be waiting impatiently to use it in his project. So there
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is a strong disincentive to go back to the prototype (collect

more data, do experiments and perhaps theoretical research)
even if the result is not fully satisfactory and as long as the
client "can live with it" (after all, it could be an open-ended
exercise-it could take years, there is no guarantee of success YES

and the need for the project is here and now!). And so, as
Rogers (1983) once matter-of-factly summarized the typical
situation, the scientist or engineer yields to the various admin-
istrative and legal requirements and tries "to do the best he
can under the situation."
In practice, "doing the best" is improving the fit of the
model to the available data. It does not require going back to
the prototype and gather new information-all it needs is to
have one run the model in a "do loop" a few times and adjust
a parameter here and there to reduce some formal error func-
tion to improve the goodness of fit. This process is schemat-
ically illustrated in Fig. I(b).
On comparing Figs. l(a) and l(b), we see that the first pro-
cess tries to make the model better with respect to the proto-
type while the second does so only with respect to itself: the
first tries to improve the representation of the substance, the
second of the form. Since this form is determined by the pat-
tern of the original data, which, in the second case, is the only
information about the substance that ever enters the picture,
there is no way the second process can improve the model
(a) (b)
YES YES
~ ~
BETTER BETTER
FIT OF A
MODEL MODEL
FIG. 1. Difference between Procedures Aimed at: (a) Improve-
ment of a Model; (b) Improvement of the Fit of a Model
ND~
YES
~
BETTER
MODEL
FIG. 2. General Model-Building Procedure
substantially-there is nothing more to be learned about the
prototype, no matter how many times the loop is repeated. It
is the inviolable axiom of the modeling process that the pro-
totype is the horse and the model is the cart it is pulling; thus
the basic message of this essay is that one cannot get ahead
by putting the cart before the horse.
Unfortunately for the advancement of hydrology, this is ex-
actly what the mainstream of hydrological modeling has been
doing for the last 30 years-pretending that a meticulous pol-
ishing of the fits of the various empirical models will trans-
form them into sound theoretical models! No wonder the result
has been stagnation, since, as my friend and colleague (one of
the best hydrologists I have met), Fred Morton, used to say:
"They are spinning the wheels of a car stuck in the mud."
It has to be emphasized that some amount of polishing is
legitimate and usually necessary in every kind of modeling as
it is, for instance, in every kind of writing: it is a rare occasion
that nothing can be improved on a first draft. Thus there is
usually secondary fitting, or calibration, loop within the pri-
mary modeling loop shown in Fig. l(a). Accordingly, under
the magnifying glass, Fig. I(a) would usually appear as shown
in Fig. 2, which illustrates the general process of model build-
ing.
Theoretical-What Does It Mean?
There is a widespread misconception about the meaning of
the notion •'theoretical," which reinforces the misconceptions
about modeling discussed earlier. It derives from the fascina-
tion with mathematics. This is a very common phenomenon
among nonmathematicians, who often view mathematics as
the purest and highest theory whose pronouncements have the
final authority about everything in this world and are unchal-
lengeable by definition because, if the mathematics is rigorous,
they are exact. Thus a curve drawn through a few points, if it
can be expressed by a mathematical equation, automatically
JOURNAL OF HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING / APRIL 1997/45

J. Hydrol. Eng. 1997.2:43-49.

 becomes a theoretical model and commands a degree of re-
spect that would make it blush with embarrassment if it were
aware of it.
This then often leads to the practice-deplored, for in-
stance, by the illustrious statistician Box (l976)-that a le-
gitimate physical problem is redefined as a mathematical prob-
lem for which a theory exists, and then a solution of this
mathematical problem is automatically regarded as a valid the-
oretical solution of the physical problem. This approach is
most dangerous when extrapolation of such redefined mathe-
matical formulation is believed to be a valid theoretical ex-
trapolation of the behavior of the original physical variable.
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Nonhydrological Analogy
My purpose here is, of course, to demonstrate the fallacy
and danger of the foregoing misconceptions in the context of
hydrologic modeling, but, before referring to hydrology, I will
first introduce a nonhydrological analogy to better sensitize the
reader to the general essence of the problem.
The value of analogies is in facilitating an outsider's view
of a problem known to us only from the inside, by transposing
it into a context outside our personal emotional attachments,
which often prevent us from seeing the obvious. It is best
suited for giving an overall view rather than a detailed one, a
hint rather than a proof. To serve this purpose, an analogy
must not be carried too far. I hope the following example,
using an anthropological analogy, meets this criterion.
Anthropology studies man as an animal, including his in-
dividual and collective behavior and his physical features such
as longevity, body size, etc. Apart from their intrinsic interest
in the study of the human animal, some anthropological data
serve to obtain "design parameters" in various industries; for
example, longevity in the life-insurance business and body size
in the clothing industry.
These users process anthropological data of interest by var-
ious statistical techniques and fit them with various mathe-
matical models to derive the design parameters needed, but
there is a clear understanding that their models have no in-
trinsic anthropological value. If, for example, an anthropolo-
gist wanted to know more about the limits of human life span,
he would certainly not turn to the formula used for compiling
mortality tables and refine the estimation of its parameters,
examine its asymptotic behavior, use it for generating large
synthetic samples, fit these with other formulas, etc. Rather,
he may seek advice from experts in physiology, geriatrics, nu-
trition, etc.
As Feller (1957) observed, "We hesitate to admit that man
can grow 1000 years old, and yet current actuarial practice
admits no bounds to the possible duration of life. According
to formulas on which modern mortality tables are based the
proportion of men surviving 1000 years is of the order of
magnitude of one in IO I036 [read 10 to power 1036]_a num-
A
ber with 1027 billions of zeros. This statement does not make
sense from a biological or sociological point of view."
Similarly, the distribution of human heights (and various
body sizes) can usually be well fitted with the normal distri-
bution model, and its use in the clothing industry for the sizing
of products is very useful despite the absurdity of the distri-
bution's infinite tails. Again, this model has no intrinsic an-
thropologic value even if fitted to the empirical data using the
most refined and efficient methods. Within the range of the
actual observations it describes the pattern of their distribution
quite well; but what can anthropology learn from it, for ex-
ample, about the limits of human heights? Would any anthro-
pologist, not to mention an underwear manufacturer, seriously
entertain an idea that a human being can be 10 m (or -10
cm, for that matter) tall because the scientifically fitted theo-
retical distribution model assigns a definite nonzero probability
46/ JOURNAL OF HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING / APRIL 1997
J. Hydrol. Eng. 1997.2:43-49.
to such heights? I would not dare to ask them for fear that it
may be regarded as an insult to their intelligence.
The analogy is straightforward up to this last question. With
no hesitation we can substitute hydrology for anthropology,
water resources engineering for the clothing industry, and, say,
a log-Pearson distribution model fitted to maximum annual
flows for the normal model fitted to human heights. It holds
even in the operational context since the log-Pearson distri-
bution model of annual flow maxima can be equally useful to
the engineer for the sizing of culverts and spillways as the
normal models for the distributions of sizes of various parts
of the human body are to manufacturers of shoes and under-
wear. In theory there is no reason for not extending the anal-
ogy even into the scientific domain since we can ask the le-
gitimate question: "Would any hydrologist, not to mention a
water resource engineer, seriously entertain an idea that there
can occur a Mississippi River flood on some three-mile-long
Rock Creek because the scientifically fitted log-Pearson' 'the-
oretical distribution model" of the Rock Creek floods assigns
to it a definite nonzero probability?"
Back to Hydrology
Unfortunately, here the analogy breaks down but, simulta-
neously, becomes most revealing because, in hydrology, the
answer to the last question is "Yes, very often they would."
Those who do say "yes" to similar questions typically think
of themselves as "stochastic hydrologists." Anthropology will
be safe from the hydrological disease until some underwear
manufacturer, on becoming professor, considers himself or
herself a stochastic anthropologist.
To be fair, in hydrology the absurdity of extrapolation of
empirically chosen mathematical formulas beyond the limits
of observation is sometimes not as transparent as in the pre-
ceding anthropological analogies. But this is the very reason
why hydrologists and professionals applying hydrology should
be doubly alert to the danger it represents and why they should
be clear about its root cause-the failure to appreciate the
difference between a descriptive model of empirical facts and
a theoretical model, which embodies the dynamics of the phys-
ical process that has produced them. Needless to say, here the
term theoretical implies a physical, i.e., hydrological, theory
of the process or system. To avoid ambiguity, I have often
used the term "physically based" instead of "theoretical."
Failure to see the foregoing difference has a long tradition
in hydrology and I certainly cannot claim to be the first to
have noticed it. Well, before I was born, Horton, for example,
felt it necessary to stress this matter and brought it to the
attention of the hydrologic community in the following words
(Horton 1931):
The use of empirical generalizations under proper con-
ditions is neither avoidable nor undesirable. It is, however,
important to recognize the nature of the physical processes
involved and their limitations in connection with the use of
statistical methods and empirical formulas. It may happen
that several different types of formulas will give excellent
fit to the data within the limits of observation but it is im-
portant to use the formula which not only fits the data but
which gives rational results for the limiting or boundary
conditions. Hydrologic literature contains many empirical
generalizations which if extended would lead to absur-
dities ... Rock Creek cannot produce a Mississippi River
flood-any more than a barnyard fowl can lay an ostrich
egg....
It is ironic that in the same era when Horton was elevated
to the position of "Patron Saint" of scientific hydrology, with
awards and medals bearing his name, hydrology embraced the
 modeling paradigm, which turned its back on the Hortonian
spirit and his specific warning that "[while] the best possible
use should be made of all the available data .,. [this] rule
must often be tempered according to the necessities of econ-
omy of labor and with due regard to the avoidance of metic-
ulous accuracy" (Horton 1931). Hydrological modelers often
did the very opposite: the "necessities of economy of labor"
being drastically reduced by the computer, they not only
stopped paying "due regard to the avoidance of meticulous
accuracy," but also made the cultivation of it their main pre-
occupation. And, as if to flaunt their disdain for the Hortonian
spirit, hydrologic modelers have pursued this "meticulous ac-
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curacy" most vigorously in the fitting of exactly those "sta-
tistical and empirical formulas ... which if extended would
lead to absurdities."
I never cease to be amazed by how otherwise reasonable
people fall into the trap of believing that, by embellishing
purely empirical models with refined mathematical formal-
isms, they somehow can breeze a "hydrological soul" into
them and transform them into "theoretical hydrological mod-
els" that make sense even when extended far beyond the range
of observation. In the past, I even used to test empirically the
validity of such beliefs when opportunities offered themselves,
which only reinforced my conviction that such beliefs are mis-
guided and futile. Two examples will illustrate my experience.
Almost 20 years ago, a noted stochastic-hydrologist friend
asked me for a set of flood peak discharge data to test his new
regional flood-frequency model; he explicitly requested that I
give him no other information except the numbers. For a hy-
drologic modeler to tell me he wants no hydrological infor-
mation on the hydrologic prototype he is modeling has always
been one of the best ways to stir my blood-and so I sent to
my friend a set of fabricated numbers. As expected, his model
duly produced from them a "theoretical(!) regional(!!)
flood(!!!) distribution." Since I still have the computer
printout with the results in my files, I can reveal in confidence
that, for example, the 1O,OOO-year flood for the region is
2.5181. While the units are not known (as requested, I sup-
plied numbers only), the magnitude of the flood must be me-
ticulously accurate because the parameters of the theoretical
distribution model are given to eight decimal places. To the
credit of the investigator, I must say that he detected some
peculiarities in my data, namely that some of the computed
model parameters pointed to a "small homogenous region,"
while others to a "large heterogenous region." I assured him
he was right on both counts: the small region was my desk,
the large region was my imagination.
About 15 years ago, another hydrologist friend tried to con-
vert me to his belief (which he called basic postulate) that if
a model provides a really accurate approximation then its
structure and parameters must correspond to the physical prop-
erties of the prototype. "Hence," he wrote, "the structure and
parameters of well fitted equations can clarify the hidden phys-
ical structure of the natural process.... [to achieve this, it is]
only necessary to have an exact fit [based on] long data series
to meet strict statistical requirements.... " To prove his point,
he offered to infer the "hidden physical structure" of some,
unknown to him, basin just by fitting his model to a reasonably
long record of monthly precipitation and runoff. I supplied him
with such data from a small research basin in the Canadian
shield, with the total area of 0.35 km 2 , very little soil, and with
its steep granite slopes circling a good-size lake whose outflow
represented the total basin runoff. I made this choice in order
to have a basin whose physical structure was clear-in this
case, and for the requested monthly data, it was an almost
perfect example of a single, slightly nonlinear, reservoir.
Based on a very good fit of his model, the hydrologist iden-
tified the following three physical components in the runoff:
J. Hydrol. Eng. 1997.2:43-49.
(1) surface flow with lag time less than one month; (2) shallow
subsurface flow with lag time about two months; and (3) deep
ground-water flow with lag time of about seven months. Of
course, only the first component was physically realistic. The
second had nothing to do with an shallow subsurface flow
(which was negligible and all safely in the lake within a few
days at most), but was in fact a part of the recession limb of
the surface outflow hydrograph, the part of the precipitation
delayed by the lake routing effect. However, by far the most
interesting was the third component, which beautifully falsi-
fied the hydrologist's basic postulate and compromised the al-
leged physical meaning of his model. There was absolutely no
"seven-month delayed outflow," whether surface or ground
water, all the carryover being completed within one or two
months, depending on whether precipitation occurred at the
beginning or end of a calendar month. However, there were
mild autumn rains, which usually occurred about seven months
after the main runoff event, the spring snowmelt. These rains
caused a small bump on the outflow hydrograph, which the
model wrongly identified as runoff delayed by deep ground-
water seepage from the spring. I then proposed to my friend
an exact test based on synthetic data simulated by an exact
model of a hypothetical system of the prescribed form but my
offer was declined.
Both of the foregoing models, by the way, are good empir-
ical models and can be useful in practical applications where
nothing more than a concise representation of known facts is
required. However, it is the modeler's responsibility to know
that facts and not nonsense are being represented. I perceive
avoidance or repudiation of this responsibility as misguided,
whether it is in theoretical or empirical modeling.
Such models are meaningless if we want to gain hydrolog-
ical insight into what is not yet known-if we are interested,
say, in the shape of the upper tail of the flood distribution of
Horton's Rock Creek per se, in a way similar to an astron-
omer's interest in the distribution of frequencies in the spec-
trum of the Aldebaran. What is there to be learned about this
tail if, based on some log-Pearson III best fit to a few observed
floods barely representing the body of the distribution, we pre-
sume the answer to be known? What are the hydrological rea-
sons for the belief that this model will faithfully describe the
shape of the tail all the way into the nebulous heights of
1O,OOO-year and million-year floods-as one distinguished
American hydrology professor once insisted to me, dismissing
my scepticism as a "complete disregard of the very founda-
tions of the theory of mathematical statistics?"
What an irony! When Karl Pearson developed his system
of frequency distributions in response to the appeal of his bi-
ologist colleague (Weldon) for mathematical tools to help him
analyze his morphological measurements of shrimps and shore
crabs, Pearson always consulted Weldon about the probable
biological limits to which his curves could be reasonable ex-
trapolated. Now, more than a century later, hydrologists are
consulting the extrapolated Pearson's curves when they seek
answers regarding the probable hydrological limits of floods!
If the deterministic modelers should be tempted to applaud
me for rightly debunking their stochastic counterparts, they
should pause. One does not have to look any further than, for
example, the unit hydrograph, to see that they have little rea-
son for complacency. Let's just recall how this useful empir-
ical concept has been redefined as "unit response of a linear
system," which was then almost beaten to death by all kinds
of rigorous theory (of linear systems, of course, not of hydro-
logical systems), including Fourier and Laplace transforms,
Laguerre analysis, time-series analysis, matrix methods, mo-
ment matching, cumulants. etc. All this prestidigitation has
contributed next to nothing to the understanding of hydrolog-
ical systems, which, as some rudimentary hydrological inves-
JOURNAL OF HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING / APRIL 1997/47
 tigations will readily reveal, generally behave as nonlinear
systems. Ironically, it took a theoretical probabilist to tell hy-
drologists as much (Moran 1975): " ... entirely different phys-
ical models may lead to the same stochastic behavior ... This
is the situation in studying rainfall runoff [where the response]
may be highly nonlinear it is clear that nonlinearity is an
all pervading problem Thus many questions remain un-
answered.' ,
A more recent example is provided by the current obsession
to assess the hydrological impact of climate change using sce-
narios of theoretical possibilities. These are invariably con-
structed as combinations of all hypothesized changes in the
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forcing variables, such as precipitation and temperature, which
are then fed into various deterministic conceptual models to
generate the changed runoff. Each of these combinations is
presented as theoretically possible, although some of them can
be completely impossible because of their physical incompat-
ibility within the accepted theory of atmospheric physics.
Their claimed theoretical possibility of course relates to the
possible combinations of independent random variables into
which the forcing variables have been redefined without the
slightest effort to find out whether this assumption is jus-
tified-and often even in spite of clear evidence to the con-
trary. Still more disturbing and dangerous is that results of
such modeling are routinely presented as, say, "sensitivity of
runoff to climate change," rather than as sensitivity of models
to arbitrary changes in their forcing variables, which is what
they really are.
The preceding examples give an idea about the substance
of the modeling problem in hydrology but not about its per-
vasiveness and magnitude. Nobody has captured the latter
facet better than Harvard's late Fiering (1976):
Fascination with automatic computation has encouraged
a new set of mathematical formalisms simply because they
now can be computed; we have not often enough asked
ourselves whether they ought to be computed or whether
they make any difference ... we build models to serve
models to serve models to serve models, and with all the
computation, accumulated truncation, roundoff, sloppy
thinking, and sources of intellectual slippage, there is some
question as to how reliable are the final results.
It was during this era that the term "hydrologic modeling"
acquired a new meaning and a rather unsavory aftertaste.
Are Hydrologic Modelers Dumb?
This question invariably comes to mind when one encoun-
ters some of the primitive misconceptions and practices de-
scribed earlier. Of course they are not dumb! Just the oppo-
site-they are too bright and too clever to be of any benefit
to the science of hydrology. Some of the misconceptions de-
scribed have been discretely kept behind a smoke screen of a
carefully cultivated fuzziness, which has proved to be enor-
mously helpful in keeping many modelers in business. Be-
cause, as Fiering (1976) already observed twenty years ago,
"It seems clear that some models are pressed because profes-
sors are promoted and consultants are consulted in proportion
to their generation of sophisticated, mathematically-oriented
models. This is too bad."
Some 10 years ago, during a coffee break at a conference
on flood probability modeling and related issues, my conver-
sation with one brilliant professor was along the following
lines: "Tell me, what is driving you to do all these things?
You are not stupid. You know that all this theorizing and math-
ematical legerdemain is sterile and has next to nothing to do
with the real flood probabilities, especially for the very high
floods. You could do so much useful work if you put your
48/ JOURNAL OF HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING / APRIL 1997
J. Hydrol. Eng. 1997.2:43-49.
talents to it!" He said "Look, I suppose it is true that society
may not be getting its money's worth out of my work. But
these problems are very interesting to me, I simply love to do
it. And, as long as society is willing to pay me for what I do
I will keep doing it." I appreciated his sincerity and had to
agree that, though useless for the advancement of statistical
hydrology, his work had an undeniable practical value.
Many Horses, other than hydrology, are pulling the cart of
hydrologic modeling. One of them was born out of the intrin-
sic difficulty of accomodating hydrological engineering (by
which I mean the application of hydrological knowledge in
solving engineering problems) in the academic environment.
For example, a professor of surgery can (must!) do surgery on
real live people; a professor of electrical engineering can build,
say, a real adaptive antenna in his laboratory; a mechanical
engineering professor can build, say, an actual centrifugal liq-
uid separator or a better mouse trap; a professor of hydraulic
engineering can build, test, and meaningfully improve at least
a scale model of a spillway for a specific real dam; and so on.
But, if it is often difficult even for a hydraulic engineering
professor to satisfy the (no doubt very reasonable) Simons
(1992) postulate that "People posing as hydraulic engineers
should, in fact, be hydraulic engineers!", it is even more dif-
ficult for a hydrological engineering professor. There is vir-
tually nothing else for him to do than polish methods for the
computation of hydrology-related design parameters in gen-
eral, since a professor normally is not responsible, in any real
engineering sense, for design parameters for an actual levee
on the Mississippi River or even for a culvert to pass a rock
creek under a local dirt road. And so, if he cannot, or is not
motivated to, switch from the science of engineering compu-
tations to the science of hydrology and become a true hydrol-
ogist who is able and willing to harness the hydrology horse
to pull his modeling cart, he is more or less doomed to "per-
form the elaborate pirouettes on the high wire of techniques"
I mentioned earlier. It is, then, in his best interest to muddle
the water and cultivate fuzziness in the understanding of hy-
drologic modeling.
Collusion of other factors has helped push the cart of hy-
drologic modeling off the road: even a very sophisticated and
impressive-looking hydrologic model is cheaper than main-
taining a modest observation program in the field. In the era
of budget cuts, this has made modeling an attractive alternative
even to agencies that used to do solid hydrologic work in the
past. It is easier and more fun to play with a computer than
to face the rigors of fieldwork, especially hydrologic field
work, which usually is most intensive during the most adverse
conditions. It is faster to get a result by modeling then through
acquisition and analysis of more data, which suits managers
and politicians as well as staff scientists and professors to
whom it means more publications per unit time and thus an
easier passage of the hurdles of annual evaluations and other
paper-counting rituals. And it is more glamorous to polish
mathematical equations (even bad ones) in the office than
muddied boots (even good ones) in the field.
And, to repeat, hydrologic modelers are no fools.
Conclusions
The philosopher, George Santayana, has said: "Those who
do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it." This
editorial may help those hydrologists and engineers who are
too young to remember themselves, or too busy to have no-
ticed, see what has led to the rather unenviable state of hy-
drologic modeling, and perhaps even provide some hints on
how to prevent the fulfillment of Santayana's prophecy.
It appears that the danger of its fulfillment in hydrology is
less acute today than it was, say, a decade ago because, faced
with the possibility of large-scale detrimental (and potentially
 irreversible) anthropogenic effects on hydrological and related
systems, more people seem to be appreciating the late Hall's
(1971) warning that: "While we may be able to take stop-gap
measures, ... we cannot serve society honestly until hydrology
is researched, understood and taught as a single system."
During my recent visits to some American and Australian
universities and research facilities, I saw many more examples
of solid hydrological research and honest investigative mod-
eling than I was used to seeing on similar occasions, say, 15
years ago. Thus I can end this editorial on a note of cautious
optimism-after all, computer games have become old hat
and the generation that introduced them into hydrology has
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now reached the retirement age.
ACKNOWL;,EDGMENT
I am obliged to Stephen J. Burges of the University of Washington for
bringing to my attention the 1931 paper of Robert Horton.
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V. Klemes
Chief Hydrologist (Retired), Environment Canada
3460 Fulton Road, Victoria, BC. V9C 3N2, Canada
JOURNAL OF HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING / APRIL 1997/49