5/25/2012

Engineering Code of
Ethics

Canon #1 –
Engineers shall hold paramount the
safety, health and welfare of the Public.

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Hurricane Katrina and the Levees:

An Engineering Disaster

What Went Wrong and Why

Prof. Robert B. Gilbert

Brunswick-Abernathy Professor
Dept. of Civil, Architectural and Environmental Engineering
The University of Texas at Austin

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A “30-90” Storm

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New Orleans

Pacific METSAT:Graphics Link: https://weather.afwa.af.mil/data_links/CPACIR01.GIF

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Elements of Hurricane Protection System

Parishes and Polders in New Orleans

Lake Pontchartrain
GIWW
IHNC
Outfall Canals
Lake
Borgne

MRGO

Mississippi River

10 miles

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Lake
Pontchartrain

New Orleans

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London Avenue Near Mirabeau

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Photo from New York Times

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Forensic Analysis

GET THE FACTS SYNTHESIZE THE FACTS

Interagency Performance ASCE External

Evaluation Task Force Review Panel
(IPET) (ERP)

National Academies
Public
Independent
Forums
Review Panel
VERIFY THE FACTS

Findings

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High Storm Surge

“Low” As-Built Levees

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Levee Overtopping

Fiction versus Fact

“This picture was taken from the third story balcony of
Saint Stanislaus College located next door to Our Lady
of the Gulf church in Bay Saint Louis, Mississippi on
the morning of August 29th, 2005. This is believed to
be the initial tidal wave from Hurricane Katrina.
Katrina The
tidal wave was approximately 35 to 40 feet high. ”

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Storm Surge

d g t 6 AM
Midnight Noon

Levee Overtopping

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Erosion

Erosion Failures

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Erosion Failures

Erosion Failures

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Erosion Failures

Erosion Failures

46 of 50
Breaches

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Stability Failures

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Looking South along 17th Street Canal

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London Avenue Failure

Gap

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Sediment from Breach

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System Problems – Transitions

System Problems - Gates

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System Problems – Pumps

Consequences

Approximately 1,600 Deaths

$30 Billion in Direct Damage
400,000 Residents Left and Never Returned
School and Medical Systems Devastated

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Risk
1.E+00

1.E-01 2005 pre-Katrina

1 E 02
1.E-02
Frequency (per Year) 2011

1.E-03

1.E-04 Risks are Intolerable (International

Guidance for Existing Dams)

1.E-05

1 E 06
1.E-06

1.E-07

1.E-08
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000
Number of Fatalities

The Challenge
Hurricane Protection
Teton Dam System

0.4 Miles Long 350 Miles Long

1 Failure 50 Failures
11 Fatalities 1,600 Fatalities

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The Future

Beware
BEWARE OFof Interfaces
INTERFACES

• Between materials
• Between jurisdictional entities
• Between members of the design team
• Between project participants (owner,
sponsor, designer, and constructor)

Slide Courtesy of Jim Mitchell

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Build In Resilience

• Plan for failure and minimize its

consequences
• Provide for graceful versus catastrophic
failure

Assess, Communicate and

Manage Risk

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Offshore Oil Hurricane Protection

Industry System

$30 Billion Damage $30 Billion Damage

100% Evacuation 80% Evacuation
0 Fatalities 1,600 Fatalities

Become Leaders

• Take charge
• Shape public policy
• Run for office

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 5/25/2012

Code of Ethics

Canon #1 –
Engineers shall hold paramount the
safety, health and welfare of the Public.

References
American Society of Civil Engineers, ASCE (2005), “Preliminary Report on the
Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on
August 29,
29 2005,
2005 ” A Report by the Reconnaissance Teams from ASCE and
UC Berkeley, Report No. UCB/CITRIS – 05/01, http://www.asce.org.
American Society of Civil Engineers, ASCE (2007), “The New Orleans Hurricane
Protection System – What Went Wrong and Why,” A Report by the External
Review Panel of ASCE, In Press, http://www.asce.org.
Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, IPET (2006), “Performance
Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection
System,” Draft Final Report, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
https://ipet.wes.army.mil.
New Orleans Times Picayune,
y , http://www.nola.com.
p
University of California at Berkeley (2006), “Investigation of the Performance of
the New Orleans Flood Protection Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29,
2005,” Independent Levee Investigation Team Final Report,
http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans.

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