See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/227085210

Semantic competence and truth-conditional

semantics

Article  in  Erkenntnis · December 1987

DOI: 10.1007/BF00204422

CITATIONS READS

9 5,530

1 author:

H.G. Callaway
Temple University
116 PUBLICATIONS   71 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

What is Interest-group Pluralism? View project

The Varieties of Contemporary Quantum Gravity Theories View project

All content following this page was uploaded by H.G. Callaway on 01 July 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND
TRUTH-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS
Davidson approaches the notions of meaning and interpretation with the aim
of characterizing semantic competence in the syntactically characterized
natural language. The objective is to provide a truth-theory for a language,
generating T-sentences expressed in the semantic meta-language, so that each
sentence of the object language receives an appropriate interpretation. Pro-
ceeding within the constraints of referential semantics, I will argue for the
viability of reconstructing the notion of linguistic meaning within the
Tarskian theory of reference. However, the view proposed here involves a re-
vision of Davidson’s conception of the object of semantic investigation.
Taking (idealized) language-theories as the proper object of semantic charac-
terization, provides solutions to outstanding problems in Davidson’s views,
better approximates the practice in standard model-theoretic semantics, and
incorporates the elements of semantic competence sought for in traditional
theories of lexical analysis. Sources of evidence beyond those emphasized by
Davidson will be invoked in order to allow for the selection of interpretive T-
sentences. In the final section, possible Quinean objections will be consid-
ered.

1. Background for Meaning as Truth-conditions

“To give truth-conditions,” says Davidson, “is a way of giving the meaning
of a sentence.”1 He thus takes up the challenges of a recurrent, appealing, but
difficult perspective on linguistic meaning. Considering only this fragment,
he appears to echo a long line of similar claims in the analytic tradition.
Moritz Schlick, for example, writing in the mid-thirties, held that when we
ask for the meaning of a sentence, “we want a description of the conditions
under which the sentence will form a true proposition, and those which will
make it false”2 But Schlick goes on to equate truth-conditions with verifica-
tion-conditions, while Davidson is not tempted in the least to make this step.

 Slightly revised from Erkenntnis 28, 1988, pp. 3-27.

1. Davidson 1967, “Truth and meaning,” p.24.
2. Schlick 1936, “Meaning and Verification,” see Schlick, 1970, p. 100.
2

The contrast serve to highlight some of the ambiguities of the notion of truth-
conditions in the analytic tradition.
That we see Schlick’s formulations as ambiguous—he equates truth-
conditions both with verification-conditions and with instructions for useis
due to the influence of other philosophers, and Tarski’s work on behalf of the
concept of truth is quite important here. Schlick saw himself as following
Wittgenstein who held in the Tractatus that “to understand a proposition
means to know what is the case if it is true.”3 There are surely important
similarities among the three quotations here. However, Schlick, under
Wittgenstein’s influence, but lacking an alternative to a verificationist con-
ception of truth-conditions, reads verificationism into Wittgenstein. David-
son, under the influence of Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, in contrast,
need not take a view according to which every statement of truth-conditions
must be a statement of verification-conditions. Yet, it is open to him to hold
that in some cases evidential relations will “verge on being constitutive of
meaning.”4
Looking back to Frege’s influence, though the concept of truth is crucial
to his semantic work, one finds that he leaves it undefined. “It seems likely,”
he says in the Logical Investigations, “that the content of the word ‘true’ is
sui generis and undefinable.”5 Such a view could not and did not appeal to
the empiricist element in subsequent analytic philosophy. Thus, though Frege
did not equate truth-conditions with verification-conditions, the impressive
appeal of using Frege’s work on the quantifiers and truth-functional connec-
tives in an account of meaning tended to lend plausibility to verificationism.
Only after Tarski does it become possible to retrace the steps of theory and
attempt a non-verificationist version of truth-conditional semantics. As might
be expected, Davidson’s views along these lines have come into question at a
fundamental level where there is serious doubt concerning his use of the
concept of truth.6 Sentences will count as meaningful even where we cannot
decide on their truth-values, non-logical vocabulary will count as meaningful
in spite of room for doubt or questions regarding its reference or satisfaction
conditions. This much realism comes along with Tarski’s treatment of truth.
Since Tarski’s semantic conception of truth has been primarily an
influence upon the formal semantics of logical theory and special-purpose

3. Wittgenstein 1922, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, 4.024.

4. Davidson 1980, “Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action,” p. 7.
5. Frege 1977, Logical Investigations, p.4.
6. Thus Dummett’s doubts in “What is a Theory of Meaning,” (1974, 1976)
appear to be rooted in intuitionistic scruples concerning attribution of truth-
value to sentences incapable of demonstrative proof. Cf. Dummett, 1974, p.
138; Root and Wallace 1982, “Meaning and Interpretation,” pp. 169-73.
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 3

artificial languages, it was a bold and yet elegant step for Davidson to adapt
Tarskian truth-theory to the semantics of natural language. In doing so, he
had to question the long-standing Quinean distinction between theory of
meaning and theory of reference.7 For, what Davidson proposes, essentially,
is that the resources of the theory of reference suffice to explicate the notion
of meaning. Moreover, though Davidson is indebted to Quine in many ways,
and there are large areas of agreement between the two (including the
rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction), Davidson must work in the
face of Quine’s critique of traditional notions of meaning and synonymy.
Quine’s positive comments on Davidson’s approach to meaning8 signal a
new constructive attitude. Moreover, they underline the appeal of reconstruct-
ing theory of meaning within the theory of reference. Still, this much admira-
tion from Quine’s direction has not prevented some important criticisms.9
Quine’s remarks emphasize the question of how the notion of synonymy
might be expected to enter into Davidson’s construal of linguistic meaning:
What will insure that Davidsonian T-sentences are interpretive rather than
being merely true?
To meet this kind of objection, I will urge, Davidson’s account of mean-
ing must be more thoroughly holistic, and thus in a way more thoroughly
Quinean. Beyond the bare bones of logical form, a sentence has truth-
conditions only relative to an embedding theory which elaborates its logical
consequences in concert with those of other sentences. In “Two Dogmas”
Quine lamented the persistence of the notion that “each statement taken in
isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or information at all”10
He concludes that “it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an
individual statement—especially if it is a statement at all remote from the
experiential periphery.”11 If, in spite of such points, one persists with the aim
of interpreting sentences, then this will only be viable if such interpretations
are given in relation to a theory expressible in the object language.
In contrast with the thrust of Quine’s work, Davidson’s project holds out
hope of support, through formal methods, to both the notion of linguistic
meaning and the notion of belief. A theory of meaning rooted in exten-
sionalistic semantics, even from the standpoint of contemporary linguistics
apparently, is more appealing than no theory of meaning at all—and more

7. Cf. Quine 1953, “Notes on the Theory of Reference,” p. 130, and Davidson
1967, “Truth and Meaning,” p. 310. Similar views are expressed by Hintikka
in the opening pages of 1969, “Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.”
8. Cf. Quine 1974, “On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma.”
9. Cf. Quine 1977, “Review of Evans and McDowell,” p. 226.
10. Quine 1951, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” p. 41.
11. Ibid., p.43.
4

appealing than a completely behavioristic ersatz. But, if Davidson’s program

is to be even initially plausible, it must bridge the perceived gap between
semantic theory for formal languages and formal semantics for natural
language, a problem which has doubtlessly bothered many of Davidson’s
sympathetic readers. Only by bridging this gap can Davidson hope to
influence semantic theory in linguistics. For, where a formal truth-theory
appears to provide at best mere paraphrase, rather than interpretations of
expressions of natural language, it will claim little attention from those who
seek to characterize semantic competence of native speakers.

2. Description or Paraphrase?
It is important to ask, then, if a good fit can be expected between Davidson’s
program and the empirical objectives of semantic theory in linguistics.
Davidson’s intent is clear. He is “not interested in improving on natural
language, but in understanding it.” He views “canonical notations as devices
for exploring the structure of natural language”12 Davidson himself empha-
sizes, however, that we must expect a truth-theory “to rely on something very
much like Tarski’s sort of recursive characterization of satisfaction, and to
describe the object language in terms of familiar patterns created by
quantification and cross reference, predication, truth-functional connectives
and so on.”13 This quite naturally leads one to the question of whether there
are, in natural language, such semantic structures to be described. Can we
plausibly regard canonical notations which are suitable for construction of a
truth-theory as providing anything more than loose paraphrase? Again, could
the logical tradition from Frege through Quine have really been so wrong in
thinking that it was revising natural language for scientific purposes generally
and logical purposes in particular?
In spite of such question, there has been some positive response to
Davidson’s program from linguists and those more influenced by semantic
theory in linguistics. Most noteworthy is Fodor’s view in The Language of
Thought. In the central argument of the book, Fodor invokes the assumption
that “one understands a predicate only if one knows the conditions under
which sentences containing it would be true.” He goes on to recommend
reading Davidson, “for a useful introduction to the general program of
analyzing meaning in terms of truth”14 Like Chomsky, Davidson views
empirical semantics as a contribution to a psychological theory of speaker’s

12. Davidson 1977, “The Method of Truth in Metaphysics,” p. 203; cf. also
Davidson 1970, “Semantics for Natural Language,” p. 63.
13. Davidson 1974, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” p. 151.
14. Fodor 1979, The Language of Thought, pp. 59-60.
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 5

competence. For example, writing of an interpretation theory for an alien lan-

guage, Davidson says, it may “be used to describe an aspect of the inter-
preter’s competence at understanding what is said.” Moreover, “we may
maintain that there is a mechanism in the interpreter that corresponds to the
theory.” Still, in contrast with Chomsky, Davidson does not insist “that all
interpreters know the theory,” rather, “it is enough if they know the required
consequences.”15
The basic problem here is to understand the description of expressions of
natural language in Davidsonian terms. Questions regarding the internal
representation of speaker’s semantic competence or the psychological reality
of a theory of meaning constitute a further problem. Though Chomskian
formalisms are specifically designed for the task of describing natural lan-
guage, many a theorist has gasped at the prospect of attributing Chomskian
linguistic descriptions to language in the mouth of the native speaker. It may
seem even less plausible, then, to hold that what counts as proper logical
form, by the lights of contemporary logic (and further results of Davidson’s
program!), depending as this does upon the syntax of formal languages, has
been there all along “in the head” or otherwise. Can we really expect to
describe the semantic features of natural language accurately in such terms?
Thus, we seem to come to a dilemma for Davidson’s program. Davidson
aims to be descriptive, and a truth-theory must therefore bring out something
that is already there, including certainly the logical form of sentences of
natural language and reference or satisfaction conditions for non-logical
vocabulary. But, there are reasons to doubt that sentences of natural language
have the kind of systematic logical form they must have in order to be
captured by a truth-theory. Discounting the prospects of a pre-established
logical harmony among all languages, then, it appears that Davidsonian
semantics for natural language must be either formal and not genuinely
descriptive or descriptive but not fully formal.
While I believe this problem can be answered, focusing on it will serve to
emphasize the radical character of Davidson’s construal of the notion of
meaning and highlight crucial elements. Thus, Davidson suggests, by way of
answering Tarski’s similar doubts concerning formal semantics for natural
language, that we need only consider fragments of natural language where
formal difficulties do not arise. We are not to reform natural language where
it is incapable of formal treatment (because it contains its own truth predicate,
for example, and thus generates the semantic paradoxes), but rather we are
only to deal with a language in so far as a formal treatment is possible.

15. Davidson 1974, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” p. 141.

6

“Much of what is called for,” Davidson says, “is just to mechanize as far
as possible what we do by art when we put ordinary English into one or
another canonical notation.” The objection to this point will likely be that the
logician’s paraphrase to canonical notation often ignores much of what it sets
out to paraphrase. Still, Davidson insists that “if we know what idiom the
canonical notation is notation for, we have as good a theory for that idiom as
for its kept companion.”16 This is just to say, then, that for Davidson
“adequate” paraphrase to canonical notation preserves meaning.
What counts as adequate paraphrase, and even what counts as correct
canonical notation is open to question and development on Davidson’s view,
so that the picture of meaning he proposes is to that degree vague. Still, it
remains clear that on Davidson’s views we capture the meanings of sentences
and other expressions of a natural language when we are able to relate such
expressions to canonical notation in a thorough and systematic way. Thus,
where it is objected that not all of natural language can be put into canonical
notation and that this is exactly what leads one to hold that the logician’s
language constitutes a reform of natural language, Davidson must evoke or
reiterate the fact that he is attempting to explicate the notion of linguistic
meaning. Davidson’s reform is not a reform of natural language, rather he
reforms the theoretical notion of linguistic meaning. When natural language
does not come over into canonical notation (even with Davidson’s
expansions, e.g., his analysis of adverbs or indirect discourse), then this
merely shows the extent of reform involved in Davidson’s construal of
meaning. This reply will not suffice to answer all problems in Davidson’s
program, but it is important to see that it does provide answers to problems
related to the unsystematic character of natural language.
Seen from this perspective, the question of whether a Davidsonian truth-
theory can be regarded as genuinely descriptive comes to depend upon the
acceptability, in overall terms, of Davidson’s conceptions of meaning and
logical form. In a very important sense, this result is to be expected. To know
if we have an adequate semantic description, we must know what counts as
falling within the domain of semantics. To know if we have captured the
meaning of an expression, we must also know what meaning is. What to
count as an adequate description is a question which cannot be totally
divorced from the considerations which enter into decisions between theore-
tical frameworks. It should, therefore, be no surprise if we employ our best
theory of logical form, quantification, truth-functional connectives, variables
and so forth to describe an alien language.

16. Davidson 1967, p. 29.

 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 7

It is not a question of a pre-established logical harmony among all

languages. Davidson’s approach does presuppose, I think, that natural
languages serve certain common purposes and that they have identifiable
structures suited to serve such purposes. To view a natural language in terms
of Davidson’s conception of meaning is to view it with a selective eye, no
doubt. In spite of all outward variety and variation, one aims to abstract those
features which enable a language to express a potential infinity of inter-
related truths, making use of finitely statable means. In fact this is
substantially the same perspective we take on ordinary language if we set
about to reform it for logical and scientific purposes. Thus, it is no accident if
interpretations of natural language can be given in an idiom approximating
the logician’s canonical notation. Given Davidson’s conception of meaning,
this is just about what we should expect.
Thus, in so far as native idiom comes over into canonical notation, based
on empirical evidence, then there will be grounds for describing native
expressions in terms of their logical form or other standardized semantic
features. But what does not come over into canonical notation, once sufficient
evidence has been considered, can be counted as inessential from a semantic
perspective. It is not after all the native theory of logical form or meaning that
we want to capture. It is rather the actual practical employment of language
as this is relevant to our own best picture of logical form and of meaning.

3. Language and Language-Theory

As might be expected, there are difficulties concerning synonymy in
Davidson’s extensionalistic approach to meaning. The overall question is
how close to an intuitive notion of synonymy and interpretation we can
approximate, making use of the resources of the theory of reference. My
main conclusion will be that it is possible to get somewhat closer than
Davidson has so far indicated. To see why and how, we must first continue
the investigation of semantic competency within truth-conditional semantics
by looking at some objections to Davidson’s approach.
“For many words,” Putnam argues, “an extensionally correct truth-
definition can be given which is in no sense a theory of the meaning of the
word.” Thus consider the following which might appear as part of the finite
base of a truth-theory:

‘water’ is true of x iff x is H2O.

Putnam’s point is that if we are giving a truth-theory for the language of a

pre-scientific community, “most people don’t know that water is H2 O.” Thus,
8

he concludes, “this formula in no way tells us anything about the meaning of

the word.”17
If speakers cannot be said to know that water is H2 O, then surely we
misinterpret them if we make use of ‘H2 O’ in our T-sentences and truth-
theory. If, for instance, we claim to understand a language L when we have a
mass of T-sentences such as the following,

‘Lakes are full of water’ is true-in-L iff lakes are full of H2 O.

and supposing that no speaker of L know that water is H2 O, then surely a

mistake has been made. If Davidson is correct in holding that a theory of
meaning can be given which proceeds from a specification of reference or
satisfaction conditions for the non-logical vocabulary of the object language,
then it seems clear, in light of Putnam’s objection, that not just any exten-
sionally equivalent specification of satisfaction conditions will be equally of
interest. Still Davidson can be found to say that if, in our truth-theory, the
object language predicates and the meta-language predicates “have the same
extensions then this might be enough.”18 The reason this is not enough is that
we expect an adequate interpretation to capture the native speaker’s
conceptual system in some fashion. If the native community knows no
chemistry, then it is a mistake to equate their ‘water’ with out ‘H2O’, for the
latter word does indeed involve some chemistry. Moreover, it seems clear
that there will be a “fact to the matter” on the point. Whether chemical theory
is present in the native culture is not something that could be easily ignored.
What stands out here is the need to indicate the kind of evidence which will
lead to a correct specification of satisfaction conditions. For, indicating the
reference of native expressions, from the standpoint of our own ontology or
our own best theory, may well be part of what we want from a theory of
meaning, as Putnam stipulates; however, it is certainly not all that we want.
Rather, in accordance with the concept of semantic competence, we want to
state satisfaction conditions for native expressions, so far as possible, without
extinguishing the distinctive traits of the native conceptual system, their
belief system or their ontology.
So apparently, giving truth-conditions for all the sentences of a language
is not the same as giving a theory of meaning for that language. Davidson,
moreover, is well aware of the general problem sketched here. This shows in
his concern to find “further reasonable and non-question begging constraints”
on the acceptability of T-sentences.19 Clearly, one will hope for empirical

17. Putnam 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” p. 259.

18. Davidson 1974, p. 151.
19. Ibid., p. 152.
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 9

constraints in order to meet the demands of semantics viewed as a branch of

empirical linguistics.
In constructing a truth-theory, according to Davidson, we are first of all to
construct T-sentences on the basis of the empirical evidence. “The evidential
base for the theory will consist of facts about the circumstances under which
speakers hold sentences of their language true.”20 The logical particles of
grammar must be identified and in the end, we must construct a finite axiom
system which will logically imply an infinite number of T-sentences,
including all the attested T-sentences. One way to put the problem pointed
out by Putnam, then, is to ask what constraints on the acceptability of T-
sentences are going to lead the theorist to make a correct choice between
extensionally equivalent correlations of object language predicates and meta-
language predicates. We need further constraints, because taking note of facts
about the circumstances in which speakers hold sentences of their language
true will be necessary but not sufficient. To obtain acceptable T-sentences,
we need to be able to choose between various possible characterizations of
the observable circumstances. If Karl says ‘Es regnet’ and we observe what
are (in fact) fully appropriate circumstances for the use of this expression, we
might formulate a T-sentence the right-hand side of which makes use of ‘It is
raining’. But, perversely, on the basis of the same evidence, we might instead
equate ‘Es regnet’ with ‘Liquid H2 O is precipitating from the atmosphere’.
Making a choice here cannot depend merely on evidence concerning the
circumstances in which the expression ‘Es regnet’ is held true. So, further
constraints will be needed. To say that these must be non-question-begging
constraints is to say that they should not make use of problematic semantic
terms. It will not do to simply require that the sentence on the right of a T-
sentence must translate or interpret the native sentence. We want to know
what evidence will allow us to approximate this goal.
A quite similar problem arises from J. A. Foster’s contribution to Truth
and Meaning. For present purposes, I will borrow the more concise
formulation Quine provides in his review of the book. Thus, consider the
general form of a T-sentence:

S is true-in-L iff p.

“The trouble,” as Quine puts Foster’s point, “is that a true T-sentence remains
true when the translation represented by ‘p’ is augmented by conjoining any
irrelevant but true sentence to it; and this corruption can be worked into the

20. Ibid.
10

finite axioms themselves.” We thus produce, argue Foster and Quine, “a T-

sentence which fails the translation requirement.”21
In his “Reply to Foster,” Davidson does not explain how we are to select
the proper T-sentences or the proper truth-theory. It is clear, however, that he
aims to have empirical constraints on the acceptability of T-sentences that
will serve to eliminate whatever does not pass the translation requirement. “A
theory which passes the empirical test,” Davidson says, “is one that can be
projected to unobserved and counterfactual cases.”22 Apparently, then,
Davidson hopes to eliminate the troublesome T-sentences by means of
empirical tests which will show them to be unlawlike. For, it is only lawlike
generalizations which we expect to stand up to such “unobserved and
counterfactual cases.” Unfortunately, Davidson does not, to my knowledge,
tell us enough about the appropriate constraints on T-sentences. Without this,
his view appears seriously incomplete. We may hope to complete this aspect
of the program, finding constraints on our T-sentences in the theory of action
and /or belief, as Davidson has more recently suggested.23 However,
Davidson’s appeal to these further domains, though well argued and
interesting, is at the same time a retreat from his claim that a truth-theory “is
tested by evidence that T-sentences are simply true.”24 All well and good. An
orderly retreat is surely called for here. The objection due to Foster and Quine
shows that Davidson must somehow draw on empirical evidence to select
appropriate T-sentences and an appropriate truth-theory. Not just any true T-
sentences will serve the purposes of interpretation; and a truth-theory must be
selected which will generate appropriate T-sentences. It remains to be seen,
however, whether we will have to retreat as far as the theory of action and
decision theory in order to find the needed constraints on truth-theories.
What we have here is a methodological problem: How can we select
appropriate T-sentences, and what evidence will allow for the selection of
appropriate T-sentences? Yet, this methodological question reflects back
upon Davidson’s conception of the proper object of semantic investigation. In
speaking of a language, Davidson is most often concerned with a language
taken as an infinite set of sentences specified by a finite number of formation
rules. This is a syntactic conception of language, and he aims to provide
semantic characterization of a language so conceived. But as I have urged
elsewhere,25 in standard referential semantics, it is not language in this sense

21. Quine 1977, “Review of Evans and McDowell,” p.226.

22. Davidson 1976, “Reply to Foster,” p. 174.
23. Cf. Davidson 1980, “Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action.”
24. Davidson 1973, p. 134.
25. Cf. Callaway 1981, “Semantic Theory and Language: A Perspective,” pp. 64-
67.
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 11

which is interpreted, but rather always a theory in a language. To put the

same point in a slightly different way, in standard model-theoretic semantics,
no interpretation of non-logical vocabulary will be neutral between all
theories expressible in the syntactically specified language. Yet, the problems
we have found in Davidson’s approach certainly are tied up with the need to
interpret non-logical vocabulary. This much is certainly clear: we need to
bring empirical evidence to bear in order to select between alternative
interpretations of non-logical vocabulary, as in Putnam’s problem. I wish to
suggest, then, that part of the problem concerning the selection of appropriate
T-sentences and an appropriate truth-theory arises from placing too much
emphasis upon a syntactic concept of language; it is not the syntactic
language itself which calls for interpretation but rather discourse conducted in
the syntactically specified language.26 But in order to develop the point more
fully, I will need to backtrack a bit.
Thus, let Σ represent a theory, that is a proper subset of the syntactically
specified language L, closed under deduction. If ‘F’, a predicate of L, is
interpreted by assigning it to a subset of a domain D, then it will either be
assigned to a non-empty set or to the null set. The interpretation thus either
provides that ‘(Ex)Fx’ ε Σ or it will provide that ‘~(Ex)Fx’ ε Σ. My point is
that no such interpretation of ‘F’ is neutral between all alternative theories
expressible in the language L. Further, if we interpret two individual
constants ‘a’ and ‘b’ and ID(‘a ’) = ID(‘b’), then ‘a=b’ ε Σ; and if ID(‘a’) ≠
ID(‘b’), then ‘a=b’ Σ. Similar points hold regarding the interpretation of any
pair of predicates ‘F’ and ‘G’. An interpretation of the pair of predicates will
correlate with theories or systems with either logically imply sentences such
as ‘(x)(Fx only if Gx)’, ‘(x)(Gx only if Fx)’ and ‘(x)(Fx if and only if Gx)’ or
do not. In the absence of this kind of interpretation it is difficult to see how it
would be possible to attribute quantificational structure to the sentences of a
language at all. For, identification of quantificational structure depends upon
the identification of quantificational modes of inference, and this in turn de-
pends upon identification of relationships between the interpretations of items
of non-logical vocabulary. However, such relationships between the
interpretations of items of non-logical vocabulary belong, properly, to a
theory expressed in the syntactically specified language. Thus, since
Davidson’s program is committed to identifying quantificational structure in
the sentences of a language under interpretation, this brings along with it the
further commitment to interpreting theories or belief-systems expressed in the
language. It is not sufficient to draw on evidence of what sentences are held

26. Cf. Gochet 1986, Ascent to Truth, A Critical Examination of Quine’s Philosophy,
p. 63.
12

true, when engaged in radical interpretation. Rather, the proper interpretation

of non-logical vocabulary and with this the selection of an appropriate truth-
theory depends upon and must be linked to a particular theory expressible in
the object language. We must draw on evidence of logical relationships
among native sentences in order to see what theories or belief-systems are
held true. Since, as we have seen, interpretations of items of non-logical
vocabulary will differ, in quite significant ways from theory to theory, there
is every reason to believe that focusing, in this way, on native theory will
allow for a selection between alternative matchings of object language
vocabulary and meta-language vocabulary in a truth-theory.
If we must always interpret theories, in something like the logician’s
sense of the term, then it seems to follow that what is wanted in interpreting a
given linguistic community by means of a truth-theory is to match theory in
the object language with theory in the meta-language. This is to say, first of
all, that the patterns of inference observed among sentences of the object
language are highly relevant to the task of providing a proper interpretation.
This is so not merely because detection of such logical relationships provides
a key to the identification of the logical particles, but also because one needs
to identify non-logical axioms of the native belief-system(s). These can be
expected to have a great semantic significance. Secondly, by matching theory
in the object language with theory in the meta-language, we can reasonably
expect to better capture the native conceptual system. For example, if we
match the native ‘water’ with our own ‘H2O’, as in Putnam’s objection, this
is a mistake. What the mistake consists in, however, is the fact that the latter
word, but not the native expression is enmeshed in sophisticated chemical
theory. The mistaken interpretation is not ruled out merely by consulting the
observable circumstances in which the natives hold sentences containing
‘water’ true. But it will be ruled out if we find that there is no system of
native sentences held true, logically related in the fashion that sentences of
chemical theory are related. Observation of circumstances in which native
sentences are held true will suggest hypotheses. However, decision between
such hypotheses is better seen as a matter of seeing the place of a native
sentence within a relevant belief system.
Consider again Foster’s objection. The problem is to find a principled
way to exclude irrelevant material. If ‘S is true-in-L iff p’ conforms to the
evidence provided by the observable circumstances in which speakers hold
the sentence S true, then so will ‘S is true-in-L iff (p & the earth moves)’. We
could construct a truth-theory to capture the latter T-sentence instead of the
former, so we need an explanation of how evidence could lead us to select the
interpretive T-sentence. Once again, we must draw on evidence of logical
relations among native sentences. Having identified the native belief-system,
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 13

we will find that this provides a standard of relevance. Sentences are

intuitively relevant to each other when logically related by some more or less
viable theory. In order to show that a T-sentence is acceptable, one must seek
to show, on the basis of evidence concerning patterns of inference among
native sentences, that a given T-sentence relates two sentences with similar
inferential roles. In short, we get closer to an intuitive notion of interpretation
or translation if we set as a goal the formulation of a notational variant of
native theory, making use of our own vocabulary and syntax.
The importance of interpreting theories in the object language, and taking
the native language-theory27 as the object of semantic investigation, is
emphasized if we consider the problem of interpreting non-observational
native vocabulary. Since there is no directly discernible relationship between
non-observational sentences and observable circumstances of their use, there
is no way to correlate non-observational vocabulary of the object language
with our own vocabulary, except by means of empirical evidence of logical
relationships serving to relate non-observational sentences to each other and
to observational sentences. When we reflect that all observational vocabulary
is in some degree theoretical as well, the importance of interpreting theories
in the object language is ramified.
The overall point is that drawing on evidence of patterns of inference
among native speakers, in a specific speech community, we can hope to
identify native theory, including non-logical axioms of the native belief-
system. The perspective is that a semantic characterization of a language will
only cohere when focused on the elucidation of a belief-system expressible in
the syntactically specified language: that the selection of interpretive T-
sentences, and an appropriate finite base for a truth-theory, must be guided by
evidence of logical relationships among sentences as used by a particular
linguistic community. Nor should one expect that the speech community
relevant to a given truth-theory will always be so broad as to coincide with
the community making use of the syntactically identified language. On the
contrary, since a truth-theory is here focused on a belief-system (or, to
idealize, on a theory), any difference in belief between speakers could, in
principle, be used as a dividing line between different speech communities.
However, the pragmatics of research will surely serve to focus interest upon
belief-systems which are massively prevalent among important groups of
speakers. One might, therefore, attempt to give a semantic theory for basic
English for instance, though it will also be possible to focus more narrowly
on sub-groupsfor instance the language-theory of a specific religious de-
nomination, or one might select any group of speakers sharing a cluster of

27. I borrow this term from Follesdale 1973, p.291.

14

(mostly unstated) beliefs held in common. The focus in any case, will be
upon just those beliefs which are unquestionable, or virtually unquestionable
within the relevant speech community.28
A further adaptation of Tarski’s notion of a truth-theory suggests itself at
this pointone which can be fairly said to build upon Davidson’s application
of truth-theories to inter-linguistic interpretation. Given that evidence of
logical relationships among sentences will suffice for the identification of
non-logical axioms of the native belief-system, such non-logical axioms
could be built into the finite base of a truth-theory and thereby simulate
traditional theories of lexical analysis. Suppose, for example, that we have or
want a truth-theory for a German-speaking community, the consequences of
which include the following:

(1) ‘Ein Junggeselle ist ein unverheirateter Mann’ is true

in Germanc iff a bachelor is an unmarried man.

Generating the T-sentence will require a finite base which matches the
appropriate vocabulary.

(A) x satisfies ‘Junggeselle’ iff x is a bachelor.

(B) x satisfies ‘unverheiratet-’ iff x is unmarried.
(C) x satisfies ‘Mann’ iff x is a man.

Suppose further that available evidence serves to establish that ‘Ein

Junggeselle ist ein unverheirateter Mann’ is a non-logical axiom of the
language theory or semantic dialect Germanc. If so, the point may be
expressed within the truth-theory by augmenting the finite base with the
following clause:

(D) x satisfies ‘Junggeselle’ iff x is a man and x is unmarried.

Such a clause has the effect of analyzing relevant items of non-logical

vocabulary within the truth-theory, marking the non-logical axioms29 and
exhibiting aspects of the native conceptual system. With the addition of (D),
we will generate within the truth-theory not only T-sentences like (1), and (2)
below,

28. ‘Meaning’ in a more intuitive sense, is plausibly a systematizing selection from

this broader domain.
29. Which is intended here to include what would otherwise count as ‘meaning
postulates.’
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 15

(2) ‘Jacob ist ein Junggeselle’ is true-in-Germanc iff Jacob is a

bachelor.

(3) ‘Jacob ist ein Junggeselle’ is true-in-Germanc iff Jacob is a man

and Jacob is unmarried.

Given a good number of T-sentences like (3), generated by a specific truth-

theory, that truth-theory has a better claim to serve as a theory of
interpretation.
The example illustrates one type of sentence which might plausibly be
regarded as involving a non-logical axiom of a given speech community.
Non-logical axioms will certainly include many sentences that would be
regarded as analytic, by the friends of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Still,
this category of non-logical axioms will also include sentences which would
never be regarded as analytic, e.g., ‘All matter has weight’, or ‘The earth
moves’, or even false sentences such as ‘The earth stands always motionless’,
given a society with a Ptolemaic astronomy. In identifying non-logical axi-
oms, one focuses on what is treated as unquestionable, or virtually
unquestionable, within the relevant linguistic community. There is no call
here for a theory of necessary truth, and no justification for such a theory. On
the contrary, supposed analytic truths assume a more modest and appropriate
status, on this account, even as we pass over the notion of analyticity in
theoretical linguistics.

4. Evidence for Language-Theories

Certain general considerations strongly suggest that there is evidence
available sufficient to identify such language-theories. Assume, contrary to
Davidson, that different linguistic communities do employ conceptual
systems which are alternatives to our own. It follows, given plausible
assumptions, that we are, in fact, able to become aware of such alternative
systems. This point alone insures that there is sufficient evidence available to
identify the conceptual system of alien linguistic communities.
We expect, moreover, that systems of concepts quite divergent from our
own will most likely be found where language is less observational and more
theoretical in character. Thus, if we are able to detect and identify alternative
conceptual systems, it appears to follow that even the non-observational
aspects of a language-theory are semantically determinate enough to rule out
their arbitrary interpretation. Otherwise, talk of alternative conceptual
systems will fail of application.
Clearly, the observable circumstances in which theoretical or non-
observational sentences are held true will not themselves determine an
16

interpretation, thus other sources of evidence become more crucial when it

comes to interpreting non-observational language. We understand non-
observational language by seeing how it fits into a system—we detect the
logical relationships of theoretical sentences to each other and the
relationship of such a theoretical system to observation sentences. A possible
difficulty with this argument arises, however, from Davidson’s criticisms of
the notion of conceptual scheme or system.30 Thus I will briefly consider
Davidson’s positions on this notion before proceeding.
The basic problem in Davidson’s view is that he makes the criteria of
difference in conceptual scheme much too strong. Detection of an alternative
scheme, in Davidson’s critique, is made to depend upon “two kinds of cases
that might be expected to arise: complete and partial failures of
translatability.”31 Davidson’s arguments are polemical. The target is
“conceptual relativism,” and responsibility for the assumption of
untranslatable languages is attributed, not entirely without reason, to positions
due to Worf, Kuhn and Feyerabend. But while Davidson is correct to reject
the notion of untranslatable languages, and the positions he criticizes do
appear to involve some such claims, its seems clear that Davidson has con-
strued the target of his critique too widely.
Talk of alternative conceptual schemes does not always imply claims
regarding failures of translatability, nor need it involve such claims. For
instance, in his reply to Davidson’s paper, Quine offers “a measure of what
might be called conceptual distance between two languages.” The proposal
depends explicitly upon the possibility of acceptable translations. What Quine
has in view here, evidently, is that an acceptable translation of a sentence of
one language might be considerably longer than the sentences translated. A
handy short term in the first language may require some elaborate description
in the second language, for instance. I conclude, then, that Davidson has not
demonstrated that talk of alternative conceptual systems requires com-
mitment to untranslatable languages.
On the contrary, Quine is correct in sensing “a conflation of truth and
belief” in crucial portions of Davidson’s critique.32 An overly robust version
of the principle of charity leads Davidson to think that an alien language
expressing an alternative conceptual scheme must engender so much
disagreement as to make translation impossible. “Given the underlying
methodology of interpretation,” he holds, “we could not be in a position to
judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own.”33

30. Cf. Davidson 1974, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” pp. 183-198.
31. Ibid., p. 185.
32. Quine 1981, “On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma,” p. 39.
33. Davidson 1974, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” p. 197.
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 17

The lesson in this, however, is that Davidson’s version of the principle of

charity is so strong as to threaten a linguistic version of naive realism. One
can agree with Davidson that the possibility of interpretation depends upon
finding areas of “massive agreement” with those who we wish to translate.
However, it is unclear why Davidson thinks that finding such areas of
massive agreement should be incompatible with fairly substantial dis-
agreements and conceptual contrast. This problem in Davidson’s view may
arise from too much emphasis upon the interpretation of sentences one at a
time.
Consider, then the example of Newtonian and Einsteinian physics,
discussed by Kuhn and Davidson. Any comparison of the two systems will
depend upon the massive agreement in the experimental predictions of the
two theories. But it seems clear that the disagreements and conceptual
contrasts can also be understood. Einstein does introduce an alternative to the
conceptual system of classical physics, just as Newton had introduced an
alternative to the conceptual system passed down from Aristotle. We
understand that Einstein had to disallow, for instance, familiar sorts of
inference involving the notion of simultaneity. We understand that for
Einstein the metric of space and time is not independent of the presence of
matter and that the measurement of mass is linked with that of velocity. My
point is just that massive agreement does not eliminate the possibility of
disagreement and conceptual contrast in such scientific cases. Rather, Ein-
stein’s revisions of classical physics could be understood as revisions, and
understood as claims concerning a familiar domain when seen against the
background of wide-ranging agreement concerning predictions and
experimental results in relatively ordinary circumstances.
I take it that what is relatively unclear about the notion of conceptual
system is the distinction between conceptual system and matters of fact and
belief. I assume that this distinction cannot be made sharp. It is a matter of the
relative importance of a change in theory and a matter of the systematic effect
that a change has within an on-going system of beliefs. The present
perspective is that we need not worry about just what differences amount to
differences in concepts. Rather different conceptual systems are here to be
understood in terms of different theories. I suppose that we can capture and
characterize whatever theory we may want to investigate and do so in the
detail needed to capture important or interesting contrasts.
The main conclusion, then, is that there is evidence available sufficient to
interpret and understand the language-theory of an alien community, based
upon investigation of the logical relations among native sentences. Initial
interpretations of native observation sentences may be faulty in any given
case, and such initial interpretations need to be checked from a perspective
18

informed by an appreciation of the systematic connections among

observation sentences and sentences with a more theoretical character.
Consideration of domestic cases can be quite useful in illustrating the
point. One needs to consider sentences alike, or substantially alike, in terms
of the observable circumstances in which they are held true and then consider
how logical relationships in a system of beliefs serve to distinguish such
sentences. Take the example of the following two sentences:

(1) The man has been dismissed.

(2) The man has been asked to leave.

In a given English-speaking community, we may find no difference, over a

large range of cases, regarding observable circumstances which lead our
speakers to hold the two sentences true. Yet, in spite of that, the non-logical
axioms of the relevant belief system do allow for semantic discrimination
between the two sentences and the two expressions ‘dismissed' and ‘asked to
leave’. For example, we will find universal or near universal agreement on
the truth of sentences somewhat like the following:

(A) If someone has been dismissed, then he has been given

permission
to leave by a proper authority.

However, the corresponding sentence making use of ‘asked to leave’ will not
command universal assent.

(B) If someone has been asked to leave, then he has been given
permission to leave by a proper authority.

Thus, the required distinction between the interpretations of (1) and (2) might
be arrived at by considering the logical form of the sentences (1) and (2) plus
their logical relationship to (A) and (B)—the differing truth-values being
attributed to (A) and (B), this aspect of the native belief-system, is the crucial
point. The example is not as simple as could be desired, of course, since we
presuppose an understanding of ‘permission’ and ‘proper authority’. But this
is just to say that we expect evidence for speakers’ universal assent to
something like (C).

(C) If someone has permission to act in a certain way, then permission

has been given by proper authority.
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 19

The complication serves to emphasize the fact that we understand relatively

observational language in terms of its logical relationship to an entire system
of non-logical axioms.
Notice that given (1) plus (A) we get (3) as a logical consequence.

(3) The man has been given permission to leave by proper authority.

So, if speakers hold (1) true and make an immediate inference to (3) (or
generally countenance such an inference), this is also a kind of evidence for
regarding (A) as a non-logical axiom. Indirectly, it is also evidence for
distinguishing our interpretations of (1) and (2), especially since we find no
immediate inference from (2) to (3).
All of this adds up to empirical evidence for different interpretations of
the terms ‘dismissed’ and ‘asked to leave’. Given the kinds of evidence
sketched here, there are grounds for attributing different satisfaction
conditions to ‘x is dismissed’ and ‘x is asked to leave’, even if we observe no
situation where native speakers hold (1) true and (2) false or vice versa. (Our
informants might, for instance be mostly observing from the distance and not
hear the actual words used.) However, once we gain a broader picture of the
native language-theory, e.g., the connections between ‘dismissed’, ‘permis-
sion’ and ‘authority’, then we might also gain further insight into the way in
which the observable situation is theory-laden for the native observer. That is,
for instance, an alien investigator of our English-speaking community might
come to notice verbal or non-verbal signs or symbols of authority which will
allow a finer discrimination between the situations in which (1) and (2) differ
in attributed truth-value. With the native language-theory in hand, we can
also expect to come to see the world in the way the natives do.

5. Quinean Objections
There are, of course, important objections which might be made to the kind
of proposal sketched above. For example, there are sure to be Quinean
objections arising out of that much discussed cluster of views associated with
the indeterminacy of translation, the inscrutability of reference and
ontological relativity. These views have been under discussion for more than
twenty-five years now, dating from the publication of Word and Object. The
great problem, following so much detailed discussion, is to still see the
general outline of the forest after so much detailed study of so many trees.
Davidson, I think, has already made substantial inroads on this problem,
in spite of the fact that he often seems to sympathize with Quine’s thesis of
the indeterminacy of translation. If we accept Davidson’s view that we can
reasonably describe an alien language by relating it to standard quantification
20

theory, that this is no imposition or revision but rather captures something

objectively present, then indeterminacy of translation has already been
stripped of a very large part of its significance. This much translation is only
accomplished in Chapter Two of Word and Object by means of the metho-
dology of analytic hypotheses, and is thereby afflicted, on Quine’s view, by
the indeterminacy of translation.
Davidson remarks, in “Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” that “on my
approach, the degree of indeterminacy will...be less that Quine con-
templates.” The reasons for this are “partly because I advocate adoption of
the principle of charity on an across-the-board basis, and partly because the
uniqueness of quantificational structure is apparently assured if convention T
is satisfied.”34
Davidson appears to take the teeth out of the indeterminacy thesis. “If
there is indeterminacy,” he says, “it is because when all the evidence is in,
alternative ways of stating the facts remain open.”35 Quine himself, in the
review article cited above, approves of McDowell’s characterization of the
indeterminacy thesis “as a version...of the strong verificationist objection to
realism in a theory of meaning..”36 For Quine, that is, there are no facts to the
matter if we impute quantificational structure when translating. For example,
in Word and Object, he objects to a test for synonymy of two predicates ‘F’
and ‘G’ on the basis of whether the native is willing to assent to the standing
sentence ‘All F’s are G’s and vice versa’ “following any stimulation that
might be imposed at t.” Quine’s objection is that where languages other than
our own are involved, co-extensiveness of terms is not a manifestly clearer
notion than synonymy or translation itself; it is no clearer than the
considerations, whatever they are...that make for the contextual translation of
the identity predicate, the copula, and related particles.”37 In short, the
objection is that to test for synonymy of terms we must assume the translation
of the logical apparatus, but since the latter is subject to indeterminacy of
translation, so is the former. Davidson’s position, on the contrary, is that since
we can discover the native equivalents of our standard quantified logic, we
should also be able to provide correlations of non-logical vocabulary in the
finite base of our truth-theory. We should, that its, be able to find reasonable
interpretations of native terms. That we can translate native terms, it should
be noted, is something assumed in my proposal above regarding the aim of
interpreting theories.

34. Davidson 1974, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” p. 153.

35. Ibid., p. 154.
36. Quine 1977, “Review of Evans and McDowell,” p. 228.
37. Quine 1960, Word and Object, p. 54.
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 21

My conclusion does not guarantee, however, that it will always be

possible to rule out all alternatives to a favored interpretation of a native
language-theory. Perhaps it will always be possible to formulate alternative
interpretations of a native language-theory which cannot be ruled out given
the evidence available. Still, it does not follow from this alone that there is no
fact to the matter in settling on one particular interpretation.
The “empirical slack” of theories strongly suggests that where we have a
theory in the home language, we can always invent new theories designed to
cover the same evidence and the same domain as the established or favored
theory. Thus, once having translated a theory expressed in an alien idiom into
our own, we could then proceed to invent a slightly different theory covering
the same domain—thus producing an alternative translation. But, if the
significance of such facts regarding the empirical slack of theories does nor
force an ontological agnosticism regarding the referents of our own best theo-
ries, (a kind of position the orthodox Quinean avoids), then it seems
reasonable to hold that ontological relativity has no greater significance as
applied to translation. This is to say that one must choose between arguing
from the inscrutability of reference to the indeterminacy of translation or
accepting the paradigms of the Tarskian theory of reference. Because, as
Quine puts it, radical translation begins at home.
One comes to suspect that alternative language-theories in the home
idiom, whether formulated directly as accounts of natural phenomena, or
proposed as interpretations of an alien system, will bear one of two relations
to each other. They will be strong alternatives, such that we suspect that some
evidence might decide between them, or they will be weak alternatives, i.e.,
plausibly regarded as mere notational variations. I do not suggest that this
distinction between theories which are strong or weak alternatives to each
other will always be clear-cut and straight-forward. Indeed, this distinction
can be no more clear-cut than the prospects of finding new evidence as
required by a theory. Sometimes we just have to wait and see. But sometimes
there will be very reasonable grounds for believing that no evidence will
decide between two theories: in such cases it is reasonable to speak of
notational variation. Any notational variation in our own idiom will be as
good as any other for the purpose of interpreting an alien language-theory.
Quine makes good use of the concepts of truth and reference. “Within our
own evolving doctrine,” he says, “we can judge truth as earnestly and
absolutely as can be.”38 But, if we judge of truth “as absolutely as can be,”
and this is truth as elucidated within the Tarskian theory of referential
notions, then this is surely to say that where we have good reasons to believe

38. Quine 1960, Word and Object, p. 25.

22

that a sentence is true, e.g., ‘There are men,’ then we have the same good
reasons to judge of the reference of our words, i.e., that ‘men’ denotes or is
satisfied by men. If we take truth and reference seriously within our own
evolving viewpoint, then whatever there is to the thesis of the inscrutability of
reference does not, obviously, forbid earnest judgments of truth and
reference. The kernel of truth in the doctrine seems to come down to the fact
that we can only make judgments of reference, or assign reference to terms,
given the perspective of a theory we take to be true. But however this may be,
as I have argued elsewhere,39 it is surely a pointless exercise to merely
imagine possible reinterpretations of our theory, or distinctions we do not
make, and on such grounds remain agnostic concerning the reference of our
words. Davidson’s program, since it is an application of the Tarskian theory
of reference to inter-linguistic interpretation, attempts to carry this point over
into the case where we interpret the words of others. “Translation,” Quine
says, “arrests the free-floating reference of the alien terms only relative to the
free-floating reference of our own terms, by linking the two.”40 But, if we can
and must “judge truth as earnestly and absolutely as can be,” and reference
and truth go together, as in Tarski’s work, then “the free-floating reference of
the alien terms,” is sufficiently arrested by relating them to our own. At least
the inscrutability of reference does not suffice to demonstrate the contrary.

References
Callaway, H. G. 1979, “Reference, Variables and the Empty Universe,”
Logique et Analyse 85-86. pp. 85-98.
1981, “Semantic Theory and Language: A Perspective,” Philosophical
Topics, Summer, pp. 61-70.
1985, “Meaning without Analyticity,” Logique et Analyse, 109, pp. 41-60.
Chomsky, Noam, 1977, Language and Responsibility, Pantheon Books, New
York.
Chomsky, Noam, 1980, Rules and Representations, Columbia University
Press, New York..
Davidson, Donald, 1967, “Truth and Meaning,” Synthese 17, 304-23;
reprinted in Davidson 1984, pp. 17-36.
1970, “Semantics for Natural Language,” reprinted in Davidson 1984, pp.
55-64.
1973, “Radical Interpretation,” Dialectica 27, 313-28; reprinted in
Davidson,1984, pp. 125-140.

39. Cf. Callaway 1985, “Meaning without Analyticity,” pp. 8ff.

40. Quine 1981, “Things and their Place in Theories,” p.20.
 SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS 23

1974, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” Synthese 27, pp. 309-23;
reprinted in Davidson 1984, pp. 141-154.
1974, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual System,” Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47; reprinted in
Davidson 1984, pp. 183-98.
1976, “Reply to Foster,” in Evans and McDowell (eds) 1976, pp. 33-41;
reprinted in Davidson 1984, pp. 171-80.
1977, “The Method of Truth in Metaphysics,” reprinted in Davidson 1984,
pp. 199-214.
1980, “Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action,” Grazer
Philosophische Studien 2, pp. 1-12.
1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
1985, “Incoherence and Irrationality,” Dialectica 39, pp. 345-54.
Dummett, M., 1974, 1976, “What is a Theory of Meaning?” Part I. In
Guttenplan 1974; Part II in Evans and McDowell 1976.
Evans G. and J. McDowell, 1976, Truth and Meaning, Essays in Semantics,
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Fodor, J. A., 1979, The Language of Thought, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.
Follesdal, D., 1973, “Indeterminacy of Translation and Underdetermination
of Theory,” Dialectica 27, pp. 289-301.
Foster, J. A., 1976, “Meaning and Truth Theory,” in Evans and McDowell
(eds) 1976, pp. 1-32.
Frege, G., 1977, Logical Investigations, Yale University Press, new Haven.
Guttenplan, S. (ed), 1975, Mind and Language, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Gochet, P., 1986, Ascent to Truth, A Critical Examination of Quine’s
Philosophy, Philosophia Verlag, Munich.
Hintikka, J., 1969, “Semantics for Propositional Attitudes,” in Models for
Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Putnam, H., 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in Putnam 1975, Mind,
Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, pp. 215-271.
Quine, W. V., 1951, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” reprinted in Quine
1953, pp. 20-46.
1953, From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.
1953, “Notes on the Theory of Reference,” in Quine 1953, pp. 130-38.
1960, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge.
1974, “On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma,” in Quine 1981, pp. 38-42.
1977, “Review of Evans and McDowell,” Journal of Philosophy 74, pp.
225-41.
 24

1981, Theories and Things, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

“Things and their Place in Theories,” in Quine 1981, Theories and Things,
pp. 1-23.
Root, M. and J. Wallace, 1982, “Meaning and Interpretation,” Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic 23, pp. 157-73.
Schlick, M., 1936, “Meaning and Verification,” Philosophical Review, 45.
Excerpted in Lehrer and Lehrer 1970, Theory of Meaning, Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., pp. 98-112.
Wittgenstein, L., 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge and
Keagan Paul, London.

View publication stats