Meaning Relations among Predicates

Author(s): Bas C. van Fraassen

Source: Noûs , May, 1967, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May, 1967), pp. 161-179
Published by: Wiley

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214583

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 Meaning Relations among Predicates'

BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN

YALE UNIVERSITY

The point of departure of this paper is a traditional distinc-

tion between two kinds of meaning relations, which we shall call
relations of content and relations of intent. The subject of relations
of intent has so far remained relatively unexplored. We intend to
argue briefly that this subject fonns a legitimate and in all likeli-
hood fruitful field of semantic inquiry, to explore the means
whereby relations of intent may be formally represented, and to
describe and investigate a class of artificial languages (semi-
interpreted languages) in which statements concerning relations of
intent may be formulated.

1. RELATIONS AMONG PREDICATES

Traditionally, logicians have distinguished between two sorts

of relations among predicates: relations of extension and relations
of meaning. Extension has proved to be a relatively unproblematic
subject; for further reference, we list here the three main relations
of extension which may obtain between two predicates F and G:

a. F extensionally overlaps G if and only if there is something

of which both F and G are true.
b. F is extensionally included in G if and only if all things of
which F is true are such that G is also true of them.
c. F is extensionally identical with G if and only if each is
extensionally included in the other.

'The theory of meaning relations presented here was developed in

connection with a formalization of event language, as part of my Ph.D. dis-
sertation (University of Pittsburgh, 1966) which was written under the direc-
tion of Dr. Adolf Grunbaum. I should also like to acknowledge my debt to Dr.
N. D. Belnap Jr., University of Pittsburgh, and Dr. Karel Lambert, West
Virginia University.

161

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 162 NOtS

These ar
of Venn
when we
possible
But cont
for this.
The sub
or unpro
area hav
between
the trad
contensive relations) and relations of intent (or: intensive rela-
tions). I shall begin by explaining this distinction.
The content of a predicate is the set of predicates which are,
by the definition of F, true of a thing of which F is true. Thus
G belongs to the content of F (G is contensively included in F) if
the conventional definiens of F is a conjunction of G and some other
predicates. My content is what Keynes called the conventional in-
tension.2 It also seems to fit fairly well what Bradley, Bosanquet,
and Lewis meant by intension, Kant by Inhalt and the Port-Royal
Logic by comprehension.3
To explain the notion of intent, it may be easier to begin
with a listing of traditional characterizations. The intent of a predi-
cate has been characterized as:

"the whole range of objects real or imaginary to which the

name can be correctly applied, the only limitation being that
of logical conceivability.'"4
"the classification of all possible or consistently thinkable
things to which the term would be correctly applicable."5
"the range, which comprehends those possible kinds of ob-
jects for which the predicate holds."6

2 J. N. Keynes, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic (London, 1894),

p. 24.
'F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logtc (London, 1922) 1, 168;
B. Bosanquet, Logic (Oxford, 1911), 1, 44; I. Kant, Sammttiche Werke, ed.
G. Hartenstein (Leipzig, 1868), Bd. 8, p. 93; C. I. Lewis, "The modes of
meaning," in Linsky (ed.) Semantics and the Philosophy of Language
(Urbana, 1952), p. 238; Arnauld and Nicole, The Port-Royal Logic, trans.
T. S. Baynes (Edinburgh, 1850), p. 49.
4Keynes, p. 30
'Lewis, p. 238
R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1958), p. 239

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 MEANING RELATIONS AMONG PREDICATES 163

These authors did not use the term "inten

tive extension," Lewis "comprehension" (an unfortunate usage,
given the Port-Royal tradition), and Carnap "intension." Bradley
and Bosanquet assimilated intent to extension (or vice versa); pre-
vious writers seem not to have distinguished these two notions.
Of the two notions content and intent, the former is the
clearer; appeal to conventional definitions is not problematic in the
way in which appeal to possible entities is.7 But it would not do to
limit a discussion of meaning relations to contensive relations. For
this would amount to relinquishing any inquiry into meaning rela-
tions among predicates not definable in terms of each other. Thus
each of the following sentences would seem to be true (speaking
naively) in virtue of the meanings of the relevant predicates:
(i) Whatever is red, is coloured.
(ii) Whatever is red (all over), is not green (all over).
(iii) Nothing is warmer than itself.

But an appeal to conventional definitions will not establish the

truth of these propositions.8 For example, to be coloured is not to
be red-and-something else. Nor is being red the same as being
coloured-and-something else (unless this something else is being
red itself). So (i) is not true in virtue of contensive meaning rela-
tions between "is red" and "is coloured." For this reason it is not
fruitful to ban the notion of intensive meaning relation from the
class of acceptable semantic concepts. The remainder of this paper
is devoted to an explication of this notion.

2. INTENSIVE MEANING RELATIONS

There is, in my opinion, no strong reason to attempt to expl

cate the notion of the intent of a predicate. Since this notion on
makes its appearance in connection with the description of a cer
tain kind of meaning relations, it is these relations themselves t
which we must address ourselves. The remarks quoted above fro
Keynes, Lewis, and Carnap, suggest that the following statemen
were regarded as definitions:
d. F intensively overlaps G if and only if G is true of some
possible object of which F is true

7 For a critical account of the notion of 'possible entities', cf. Quine,

Methods of Logic (New York, 1959), pp. 201-202.
8 For supporting arguments, see J. G. Kemeny, "Analyticity vs. Fuzzi-
ness", Synthese, XV (1963), pp. 57-80.

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 164 NOUS

e. F is intensively included in G if and only if G is true of

any possible entity of which F is true

For us, these do not qualify as definitions, because discourse about

possible entities is just as much in need of explication as discourse
about meaning relations.
But although d. and e. cannot be taken as definitions, they
are not without value. For they furnish us with two important cri-
teria of adequacy for our explication. Traditional logic texts do en-
gage in discourse about possible entities, and this discourse is sub-
ject to certain principles. The most important of these is that what
is actual, is possible. From this it is concluded that if something is
the case about some actual entities, then it must a fortiori be the
case about some possible entities. This has an immediate conse-
quence for the relation of intensive overlap:

Criterion I. If F extensionally overlaps G, then they also overlap

intensively.

A corollary is this: if F is intensively included in G, then the

extension of F must be part of the extension of G. In general, the
intensive relations 'force' the extensive relations of inclusion, while
the extensive relations 'force' the intensive relations of overlap.9
Secondly, it is very important to note that the phrases "some
possible entity" and "all possible entities" have the form "some A"
and "all A". These expressions have a certain logic, exhaustively
studied by traditional logic, and faithfully observed also in dis-
course about possibles. This suggests that quantification theory
which makes possible an adequate representation of all extensional
relations, is formally also a candidate for the representation of all
intensive relations. I propose:

Criterion II. There is a complete formal analogy between the struc-

ture of relations of intent and the structure of relations of exten-
sion.

This principle has an interesting history. At the turn of the century

there was considerable bias against any consideration of intension
in logic. Frege and Russell were exceptions of course; Peano and
his student Padoa explicitly adopted the extensional point of view.
So did Venn, who credits much of de Morgan's and Boole's success

'Cf. C. I. Lewis & C. H. Langford, Symbolic Logic (Dover, New York

1959) p. 49.

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 MEANING RELATIONS AMONG PREDICATES 165

to the disregard of intension. Both Venn and Schr6der included

substantial arguments in their treatises on logic for preferring the
extensional to the intensional point of view.'0 Their arguments, like
those of similarly inclined logicians in our own day, consist largely
in listing the multifarious difficulties which according to them
would be introduced by taking intension into account. More impor-
tant here seems to me to be the early logical work of E. Husserl,
in which he argued that the standard logic of class relations can
also be interpreted as a theory of relations of intent. Venn was of
the opinion that Husserl's theory is not truly a logic of intension,
but this appears to be because Venn thought exclusively of content
while Husserl thought of intent."l
Although Husserl's attempt no longer has much technical in-
terest, it appears to be the clearest early formulation of the princi-
ple t-hat if a relation of intent obtains, then the analogous relation
of extension also obtains. For this reason I propose that this be
called Husserirs thesis. This thesis is explicitly accepted by Lewis
and Langford.12 They point out that the converse must of course
be rejected: if a given relation of extension obtains, it does not fol-
low that the analogous relation of intent also holds. From this they
conclude that an adequate logic would be one which deals with
both kinds of relation. Such a logic would need to represent the
relations of intent and those of extension in different ways.

The Boole-Schrbder algebra is inadequate to such complete

representation of the logic of terms, though it is completely
applicable to the relations of extension, and likewise com-
pletely applicable to the relations of intension.'3

We turn now to the task of providing an acceptable explication of

intensive meaning relations which will satisfy our two criteria of
adequacy.

3. INTERPRETATION OF INTENSIVE RELATIONS

When a concept is to be given an interpretation, the question

necessarily arises: interpretation in terms of what? There would

0 A. Padoa, La Logique D46ductive (Paris 1912) pp. 24-25, and J. Venn,

Symbolic Logic (London 1894, Ch. 19), both provide interesting historical dis-
cussions of this matter.
" Venn, loc. cit.; M. Farber, Foundations of Phenomenology (New York
1962) pp. 76-79.
a Op. cit. p. 49
13 Op. cit. p. 69. That "intension" refers here to what we call "intent"
may reasonably be inferred from the penultimate paragraph of p. 66.

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 166 NOUS

seem to be no one answer to all questions of this form, no pana-

cea for bestowing meaningfulness and philosophical respectability
on a new theoretical term. There are of course slogans: we may
ask for operational procedures, verifiability, reduction to the famil-
iar. But such slogans give little guidance in a specific case. For
example, if statement a. in section 1. reduces extensional overlap
to the familiar, does statement d. in section 2. do so for intensive
overlap? It has the same pattern, and uses no new, artificial or
indeed unfamiliar terminology. To the contrary, only after reflec-
tion on what d. might mean cuts through its guise of familiarity do
we feel doubts that it has any literal significance at all.
Similarily, we might have phrased a. as follows:

a*. F extensionally overlaps G if the set which is the extension

of F overlaps the set which is the extension of G.

We might then similarly rephrase d. in terms of properties, inten-

sions or attributes. And we might argue, for example, that property
is a more familiar concept than set, the latter being of relatively
recent (nineteenth century) vintage. And that sets are abstract en-
tities not further identifiable; true, they satisfy the axioms of at
least one of the proposed set theories (we hope), but we can also
state axioms satisfied by properties. Quine has advanced serious
doubts regarding the existence of properties, but Russell had no
less embarrassing puzzles regarding sets. Most of us know how to
play the 'set' language game, but neither do we have much diffi-
culty playing the 'property' language game.
This line of argument seems to me to be equally inappropri-
ate. Not that I wish to deny the above assertion that the status of
sets is not much clearer than that of properties-rather, I doubt
entirely the relevance of this approach. Sets are not needed to in-
terpret relations of extension (a* is not needed, given a.), and
neither do I think that properties are needed to interpret relations
of intent.
The concept of stynonymy, understood either as identity of
content or identity of intent is a concept belonging to semantics,
just as are, for example, the concepts of denoting and identity of
denotation. When we ask for an interpretation of a semantic con-
cept, we may merely be requesting a definition in terms of other
semantic concepts. In this sense, the question will not apply to the
simpler, more basic concept of the discipline. We cannot take ex-
ception to the claim of semantics to have its own technical con-

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 MEANING RELATIONS AMONG PREDICATES 167

cepts. But this does not rule out the continued demand for an inter-
pretation of these concepts: in that case, however, answers which
go outside semantics proper must be acceptable. Such a demand
for interpretation can only be construed as a request that we show
the concepts in question to have a significant role.
There is in fact an obvious field which may provide such a
grounding for semantic concepts, namely, pragmatics. And I pro-
pose accordingly that we construe the demand for an interpreta-
tion of semantic concepts as answerable by the exhibition of a clear
pragmatic counterpart. For example, the semantic statement "The
tenn W denotes the object 0" has as pragmatic counterpart "The
person X uses the term W to refer to the object 0 (at time t)."
The exhibition of a pragmatic counterpart does not define the se-
mantic concept. It is perfectly legitimate to use the semantic con-
cept of denotation, even if no term is used to refer to the same
t-hing by all persons or even by any person at all times. The use of
the semantic concept signals a certain level of abstraction, which
involves disregarding the vagaries of contextual factors, idiosyn-
cratic usage, changes in usage with time, and so on.14 But had the
concept of denotation no clear pragmatic counterpart, its use would
have no clear relevance to the study of language at all.
So now our task is to provide similar pragmatic counterparts
to relations of intent. For brevity, we shall look only at identity of
intent, which we regard as one plausible explication of synonymy.
The pragmatic counterpart to "F is intensively identical with G" is
"F and G are synonymous for X (at time t)." But what is meant
by the latter? Notwithstanding the well-known puzzles and doubts
which have been raised regarding synonymy, it seems to me that
the literature contains sufficient grounds for regarding "F and G
are synonymous for X" as in no way more problematic than "X uses
W to refer to 0'. We may briefly recount the relevant points here.
An early, but very thorough discussion, is Carnap's "Meaning
and Synonymny in Natural Languages"'J5 In particular he holds that
proper interrogation of the person X will provide factual evidence
for or against the assertion that two terms are synonymous for X.
Thus he describes how a linguist might determine the intention of
"Pferd" for a German Karl.

4 Cf. Church's review of Nielsen's disparagement of such abstraction,

The Journal of Symbolic Logic XXVII (1962), p. 118.
15 Phil. Studies, VI (1955), pp. 33-47. Reprinted as Appendix D. of
Meaning and Necessity.

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 168 NOtS

The linguist could simply describe for Karl cases, which he

knows to be possible, and leave it open whether there is any-
thing satisfying those descriptions or not. He may, for exam-
ple, describe a unicorn (in German) by something correspond-
ing to the English formulation "a thing similar to a horse, but
having only one horn in the middle of the forehead". Or he
may point toward the thing and then describe the intended
modification in words . . . or, finally, he might just point to a
picture representing a unicorn. Then he asks Karl if he is will-
ing to apply 'Pferd' to a thing of this kind.16

Carnap describes this procedure as that of a linguist who is deter-

mining the 'intension' of "Pferd" for Karl at that time-'intension'
in the sense of "range, which comprehends those possible kinds of
objects for which the predicate holds." Thus he is clearly refer-
ring to what we call intent. In a note on this paper, Chisholm ar-
gued that Carnap's account is an oversimplification, and Carnap
agrees with this.17
We may object more specifically both to the procedure of
the linguist described (e.g. what experimental safeguards is he
using with respect to this sort of questioning?) and to the inter-
pretation in terms of a 'range of possibles' which Carnap puts on
the results of this procedure. Neither objection would apply, as far
as I know, to Arne Naess' study Interpretation and Preciseness,
which satisfies the standards of empirical investigation in psychology
and sociology, and does not state its conclusion in Carnap's objec-
tionable terms.18 The hypotheses tested by Naess are of the form "A
and B are synonymous for X at t", and the testing is by means
of questionnaires. Questions are of the form "Can you imagine cir-
cumstances in which you would use A but not B?"
To have empirical procedures for the confirmation of asser-
tions of synonymy-for-X, is perhaps already enough to welcome
these assertions as legitimate. But for the philosopher the questions
remains what exactly these procedures establish. Does the person
for whom A and B are synonymous rely on an insight into the es-
sences of things? Or is he the unwitting slave of definitional con-

6 Meaning and Necessity, p. 238

17 R. Chisholm, "A note on Carnap's meaning analysis", Phil. Studies, VI
(1955), pp. 87-89; R. Catnap, "On some concepts of pragmatics", Phil. Studies
VI (1955), pp. 89-91, reprinted as Appendix E. of Meaning and Necessity.
18 A. Naess, Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to the theory
of communication (Oslo, 1953).

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 MEANING RELATIONS AMONG PREDICATES 169

ventions established by the social contract of an earlier generation?

With respect to this kind of question, the correct answer appears
to be that of G. Maxwell and W. Sellars.'9 Maxwell points out that,
for example, Quine's article "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is pred-
icated on the assumption that statement of the form '- means
-' (for John, for the seventeenth century English, . . .) are state-
ments "ostensibly confirmable or disconfirmable by data concern-
ing actual linguistic practices". But, he argues, this ignores the pre-
scriptive force of such statements. We may spell out the implied
analysis in some detail.
It is to be noted that a questionnaire on linguistic usage
might ask two kinds of questions. It might ask the subject about
his actual linguistic behaviour so far, eg.:

(i) Have you ever (to the best of your knowledge) come across
anything which you call an A but of which you said that it was
not a B?

It would be very surprising to find such an entry on any question-

naire concerning synonymy. One expects the second kind of ques-
tion: questions dealing with linguistic commitment:

(ii) Would you call something an A if you knew it to be a B?

Faced with this kind of question, the subject may express a long-
standing commitment ("Of course notl"), or a new intention ("I
have in the past, but now I think that is wrong."). Or he may
have to make a decision, because prior to the questionnaire, the
question may never have arisen. The reasons for this commitment,
intention, or decision can be of various sorts. It may be that he
believes the usage in question to be "incorrect", "not standard",
"not the Queen's English", and that he wishes to conform to norms
which (he believes to) exist in his society. Or he may be concerned
with the emotive effect on others. Or again his grounds may be
largely inductive: he may adhere to a theory so strongly that he
wishes to replace at least part of his prescientific framework with
t-his theory.
The difference between questions (i) and (ii) is that the
former inquires about factual belief, and the latter about commit-
ment or intention. It is certainly not a difference of retrodiction

9 C. Maxwell, "The Necessary and the Contingent", Minnesota Studies

in the Philosophy of Science, III (1962), pp. 398-404; W. Sellars, Science,
Perception and Reality (New York 1963), Chs. 10, 11.

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 170 NOt-S

and prediction, as my examples might suggest at first sight. I

would, for example, answer no to the question whether I shall ever
say of something which I know to have a heart, that it does not
have kidneys-at least if the answer is meant to be a prediction.
On the other hand, I can easily envisage circumstances that would
make this prediction false, for the reason for my answer is not a
linguistic commitment. The difference is approximately that be-
tween the repentant but pessimistic drunk who says "I don't think
that I will stay on the wagon", and the unrepentant, optimistic
drunk who utters those same words, in a slightly different tone
of voice.
Having established that relations of intent do have clear
pragmatic counterparts, we may now use them in semantics. But
now it may well be thought that this is a hollow victory. For these
semantic concepts, as opposed to those of denotation and exten-
sion, have no application in the semantics of logic and mathemat-
ics. The artificial languages constructed in formal semantics, and
which suffice for the semantic study of mathematics and logic (in-
cluding intuitionist and modal logics) are adequately discussed in
terms of denotation and extension. Nor does there appear to be
any need here for any other kind of language.
We have no intention of disputing this. But logic and mathe-
matics are not the only subject of philosophical inquiry. In spe-
cific, many attempts have been made to apply formal methods to
the empirical sciences. And there we find just the sort of state-
ments whose truth or falsity derives from relations of intent: wit-
ness our example "Nothing is warmer than itself."20 Recalling Car-
nap, the reader may dismiss these examples as follows: such state-
ments are meaning postulates, and would appear among the axioms
of a complete formalization. I rather doubt that this analysis pro-
vides us with a very faithful model of scientific theories.2' In par-
ticular, it is striking to note that the best way to distinguish 'mean-
ing postulates' from 'ordinary' postulates is by the fact that the
former are the ones which the physicists do not state in their mono-
graphs and texts. Rather than speculate any further on possible
applications, however, we shall now turn to the task of providing
intensive meaning relations with a formal representation.

20 Cf. Maxwell and Sellars, op. cit.

21 I have attempted to provide an altemative, using the machinery of
sections 4 and 5 below, in my forthcoming "On the Extension of Beth's
Semantics of Physical Theories".

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MEANING RELATIONS AMONG PREDICATES 171

4. REPRESENTATION OF INTENSIVE RELATIONS

Relations of extension are pictorially represented by means of

Venn diagrams. But in what, exactly, does the use of a Venn dia-
gram consist? It consists in the choice of a set S (the set of
points inside the square) and a function f (the function which
assigns a part f(F) of S to each predicate F). The parts, or sub-
sets, of S, and the function f, together represent the relations of
extension among the predicates, provided only:

(i) f( F) and f( G) overlap if and only if there is something which

is both F and G;
(ii) f(F) is included in f(G) if and only if all things which are F
are also G.22

According to our criterion II, the intensive meaning relations

should be capable of exactly the same kind of representation. That
is, we should be able to choose some set T and function g by
which we can likewise represent the intensive relations. The map-
ping of the predicates by g into the subsets of T needs to satisfy:

(iii) g(F) and g(G) overlap if and only if F intensively over-

laps G;
(iv) g(F) is included in g(G) if and only if F is intensively in-
cluded in G.

There is certainly no need to speak of the members of g(F) as

being all the possible entities of which F is true. On the contrary,
we may choose T to be a set of chairs, or the set of points in
a certain spatial region. In particular, we may use the ordinary
Venn diagrams.
The other criterion at which we arrived specffies that the re-
lations of intent and the relations of extension 'force' each other
into a certain pattern. What this means exactly is the following:
it is always possible to choose S and f such that S is part of T,
and f(F) is part of g(F) for every predicate F. For this is ex-
actly equivalent to: f( F) must be included in f( G) if g( F) is part
of g(G), and g(F) must overlap g(G) if f(F) overlaps f(G). As
long as we are dealing with monadic predicates, we can still easily

22We refer to Venn diagrams in which all regions are speciffed as

'occupied' or 'not-occupied'; if this is not so, some relations of extension are
left unrepresented.

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 172 NO&S

draw this on paper: we get a Venn diagram within a Venn dia-

gram. We can also apply the traditional terminology of 'possibles'
provided we 'bracket' its metaphysical commitments. We would
then say: the set S represents the existents, which form part of the
possibles (represented by T). And the set f(F) represents the set
of real things of which F is true, which of course is part of the
set of possible things of which F is true.
When a set is used as T is above, for the representation of
intensive meaning relations, I propose to call it a logical space. In
my opinion, this is fully in accordance with the use of that tenr
by Wittgenstein.23 We may show this by considering two examples
of logical spaces: the space of locations on my desk, and the 'space'
in which objects are located by virtue of their colour (colour spec-
trum). In the first place my predicates might include "is at least
one foot from the back of the desk" and "is no more than half a
foot from the back of my desk". These predicates are intensively
disjoint: no object can be such that both these predicates are true
of it. (More colourfully: no possible object falls under both predi-
cates.) In the second case my predicates may include "is scarlet"
and "is red"; of these the first is intensively included in the second.
(Any possible object which is scarlet, is (a possible object which
is) red.) In the first case, the set of points on the desk top can
be T, and g assigns to the predicates the regions suggested by the
English meaning of the expressions in question. In the second case,
we represent the colour spectrum, say by a straight line segment;
the set of points on this segment is T, and the parts of this line
segment assigned by g to the predicates must be such that g(scar-
let) is part of g(red).
When we construct an artificial language, we may introduce
such a logical space if we wish to have object-language counter-
parts to assertions such as "F is intensively included in G." (In the
sense that O A may be the object-language counterpart of "A is
valid" in a modal system.) Such a construction will therefore spec-
ify three things:

28 Similar concepts are explored by R. Kauppi ("Ueber den Begriff des

Merkmalraumes", in Proc. 11th International Congress of Philosophy, Amster-
dam 1958, Pt. V) and H. Weyl ("The Ghost of Modality", in Philosophical
Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. M. Farber (Cambridge, Mass.
1940)). I conjecture that the historical origin of Wittgenstein's notion of logical
space is the use of vector spaces in physics ("phase space", "configuration
space").

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MEANING RELATIONS AMONG PREDICATES 173

A. The syntax of the language: its vocabulary and grammar.

B. The logical space of the language-a set-and an interpretation
function.
C. The models of the language.

When the definition of an artificial language comprises only A. and

C., as is usually the case, it is often called an 'uninterpreted lan-
guage'. When it comprises B. as well, I propose we call it a semi-
interpreted language. In the next two sections I shall describe two
kinds of semi-interpreted languages, and describe some of their
properties.

5. INTENSIVE RELATIONS AND S5

We shall begin by describing a very simple case, which never-

theless will show an important connection between intensive
meaning relations and modal logic. It seems most natural to classify
semi-interpreted languages by their syntax. The first syntax we de-
scribe, S*, thus gives rise to the class C(S*) of semi-interpreted
languages. The syntax S* is as follows:

Vocabulary: One singular term b

Various monadic predicates: F, G, ....
Logical signs: , &, ->, (,).
Grammar: The atomic well-formed fonnulas (wffs) consist of a
predicate followed by a singular term: Fb, Gb, . . .
If A and B are wffs, then so are ~A, (A & B),
(A ->B)

All the languages in the class C(S*) have this syntax. The logical
space must in each case be some nonempty set H, and the inter-
pretation function f must assign to each predicate F some subset
f(F) of H. Now we turn to the notions of model, truth, and val-
idity. We define these for an arbitrary member L of C(S*), whose
logical space and interpretation function we denote as H and f.

Models: A model for L is an ordered couple < loc,X >, where X is

some entity and loc a function defined only for X, such
that loc(X) e H. We call loc(X) the location of X in H.

It will be clear from the following truth-definition that the term b

is used as the name of this individual X.

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 174 NOUS

Truth: Eve
h(Fa) = f(F)
h(A & B)=h(A)rnh(B)
h(Q---A) =H - h(A)
h(A- B) = H if h(A) c h(B)
A A, the null set, otherwise
The sentence A is true in the model < loc,X > for L
only if loc(X) E h(A).

We may paraphrase this as follows: the truth-set of a sentence

A(b) is the set of positions which the individual denoted by b
may have in the logical space to make A(b) true.

Validity: The sentence A is valid in L if and only if it is true in

every model for L.
The sentence A is universally valid (in C(S*)) if and
only if it is valid in every language L belonging to C( S*).

It is very easy to see that all the theorems of classical propositional

logic (with primitives & and ) are universally valid sentences in
this class of languages. But what sort of arrow is our --. ? The
answer is that it is the S5 arrow, in the following precise sense: the
set of universally valid sentences of C(S*) is exactly the set of
theorems of the Lewis modal system S5.24
Moreover, our truth-definition for A -* B is a very natural
one. Each of our sentences is about the individual denoted by the
term b, so we can write A- B also as A(b) -> B(b). Doing so,
we see that the sets h(A) and h(B) are exactly those which are
being used to represent the relations of intent between the predi-
cates A(- -) and B(- -). Our truth-definition now amounts to:

A-- B is true if and only if A(- -) is intensively included

in B(- -)

or, in the older terminology,

A -* B is true if and only if all possible things which

are also B.

24 To prove this, it suffices to notice that a logical space, interpretation

function, and model together generate a normal S5, matrix in the sense of
H-N. Castanfeda, The Journal of Symbolic Logic XXIX (1964), pp. 191-192,
and that conversely every such matrix gives rise to a logical space, interpreta-
tion function, and model for the syntax S*.

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MEANING RELATIONS AMONG PREDICATES 175

or again, if we think of the model as specifying

affairs with respect to the individual being talk

A -> B is true if and only if whatever is A, is B, under all

possible conditions.

This discussion does not throw new light on the nature of S5, which
has long been known to admit of such interpretations. But it places
the relation of intensive inclusion in a familiar frame of discussion.

6. THE UNRESTRICTED QUANTIFIER

The languages of the class C(S*) provide a means for codify-

ing the intensive meaning relations among monadic predicates.
But we clearly must also consider the question how we could rep-
resent all possible intensive meaning relations among an arbitrary
set of predicates of various degrees. The problem is exactly anal-
ogous (due to criterion II) to the problem: Venn diagrams picture
extensional relations among monadic predicates, but how could
we represent all possible extensional relations among an arbitrary
set of predicates of various degrees? And the answer to this is of
course provided by quantification theory, using quantifiers over
the domain of discourse. Hence we can expect to solve our problem
through the use of quantifiers ranging over logical space. And this
is indeed already suggested by those who talked about relations of
intent through the use of such phrases as "for all possible things".
Let us write the universal quantifier over the logical space as
"(/x)", and read it "for all possible x". This reading is of course
purely heuristic. The kinds of things which make up the member-
ship of logical space is essentially arbitrary: they may be chairs,
points, vectors, cabbages, kings, or bits of sealing wax. This quan-
tifier, which is to provide the explicans for discourse about possi-
bles has already appeared in the work of many logicians; for ex-
ample, Stahl, Lejewski, Prior, Rescher, and Leonard. Of these, only
Leonard has given an interpretation which is not vague and not
metaphysical.25 Leonard's semantics for this quantifier involves the
use of non-referring singular terms, which makes it technically a
bit more complicated than our own.26 It is instructive to note that

26 H. S. Leonard, "Essences, Attributes, and Predicates", Proceedings of

the American Philosophical Association, XXXVII (Oct. 1964), pp. 25-51.
26 This is not an objection to Leonard's ingenious approach. The main
reason I prefer the use of logical spaces is an intended application: see my
forthcoming paper mentioned in footnote 21.

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 176 NOtS

all these logicians agree that (/x) has at least the properties of the
ordinary quantifier and either state or conjecture that the proper-
ties of (/x) are exactly the properties of (x). We shall see below
that this is demonstrably so for the present interpretation.
Let us take a concrete example: a language which has predi-
cates F,G, . . ., of various degrees, variables x,y, . . ., the quan-
tifier (/x), and so on. The sentence (/x)(FxDGx) has as in-
tended interpretation:
The predicate F is intensively included in the predicate G.
It is read as:

All possible x which are F, are also G.

Given that the language has a logical space H and an interpreta-

tion function f, it is true in any given model provided:
f(F) c f(G)

But a model will have a domain of discourse, each member of

which also has a location in the logical space H. How can we ex-
press the statement that, say, all the members of the domain of
discourse belong to the extension of F? For this purpose we in-
troduce a predicate El, to be read as "exists". We write the state-
ment as usual as (x) (Fx D Gx), but this is short for:

(/x)(E!x D *Fx D Gx)

So that in general (x) . . . means (/x)(E!x . . .). This state-
ment has as intended meaning:
Tle predicate F is extensionally included in the predicate G.

It is read as:

All actual x which are F, are also G.

And it is true in any given model provided

f(E! ) r f(F) c f(G)

where f(EI) is exactly the set of elements of H which are locations

of members of the domain of discourse.27
Before we make this precise, and extend it to polyadic predi-
cates, we must discuss a possible objection. This objection has its
origin in the idea (or slogan) that the quantifier of a language is
27 For simplicity we assume that each member of the domain has a
distinct location in the logical space.

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MEANING RELATIONS AMONG PREDICATES 177

the 'carrier of its ontological commitment'. Our quantifier (/x)

ranges over the logical space H; ordinary quantifiers are defined in
terms of (/x) and the predicate El. But that means that we do not
really have a quantifier ranging over the domain of discourse at
all. Does it not follow then that we are open to the charge -
leveled by Quine against Carnap - that extension has been en-
tirely eliminated from our language? In a statement quoted by Car-
nap, Quine asserts:

Every language system, in so far as it uses quantifiers, assumes

one or another realm of entities which it talks about. The
determination of this realm is not contingent upon varying
metalinguistic usage of the term 'designation'. . . , since the
entities are simply the values of the variables of quantifica-
tion .... The question of what there is from the point of
view of a given language . . . is the question of the range of
values of its variables.28

-Thus it appears that in Quine's view, a semi-interpreted language

with (/x) can be used only to talk about the elements of its logi-
cal space.
This is patently false, since it is possible to formulate all the
usual assertions about the domain of discourse in such a language.29
And this does hinge on what 'designation' means here. Let us sup-
pose that the value assigned to a variable x is the element h of
H. Then if h is the location of some element d of the domain of
discourse, then x designates d. And otherwise, x designates nothing
at all; it certainly does not designate its value h. The sentence
(/x) (E!xD Fx), which we abbreviate as (x)Fx, means that what-
ever can be designated by x belongs to the extension of F. Upon
proper understanding of the term "designates", t-his is entirely com-
patible with the fact that the variables range over H, and do not
range over the set of designata.
Furthermore, caution must be exercised when some tradi-
tional reading of the fornulas is used. For example, it would be
pure confusion to say that (/x)Fx means that every element of H
belongs to the intent of F. Certainly, that statement is true if and
only if every element of H belongs to the set f(F). But the set

28Meaning and Necessity, p. 196

29 And it is not possible to formulate any assertions about the elements
of the logical space except logical and numerical ones (such as that it contains
at least one element, that it contains at least two elements, and so on).

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 178 NOUS

f(F) is only a set being used to represent the intensive meaning

relations between F and other predicates.
We can now turn to a precise description of this kind of semi-
interpreted language; then we shall be able to specify exactly the
sense in which (/x) has exactly the same formal properties as the
standard quantifier (x). The class of languages in question is that
which arises from the syntax S; so we shall call this class C(S). The
syntax S is as follows:

Vocabulary: Variables: x, y, z, . . . x1, X2. . . . .

Predicates of various degrees: F , G ,
Logical signs -, &, (/x), (,), -, E!
Grammar: The atomic wffs are of the form Fnx1 . . . x., E!x, and
X-= X2

If A, B are wffs then so are (,-A), (A & B), (/x)A

Statements are wffs in which no variable occurs free.

The logical space H (of an arbitrary member L of C(S)) we again

specify to be an arbitrary non-empty set. The interpretation func-
tion f is defined for every predicate, and if Fn is an n-ary predi-
cate, then f(Fn) is a set of n-tuples of elements of H.30
A model for L is a couple < loc,D>, of which D is any set,
possibly empty, and loc is a function with domain D and range H.
For simplicity's sake, we specify loc to be a one-one function, so
that it assigns distinct locations in H to distinct members of the
domain.
To define truth in a model, we must refer to assignment func-
tions: an assignment function d is defined for every variable x and
assigns it an element d(x) of H. We write "d' = sd" for "d' is like
d everywhere except perhaps at x". Then we define "The wff A of
L is true in the model M = <loc,D> relative to the assignment d",
briefly "MT (d, A)", as follows:

MT (d, E!x) iff d(x) = loc (k) for some element k of D;

MT (d, x1 = x2) iff d(x1) = d(x2);
MT (d, FnX1. * xn) iff [d(xi.),. .d(xn)] is amember of
f(Fn);
MT (d, -A) iff not MT (d, A);
MT (d, (A & B)) iff MT (d, A) and MT (d, B);
MT (d, (/x)A) iff MT (d', A) for every d'- =d

"? Note that we have listed El among the logical signs instead of with
the predicates; this simplifies the presentation somewhat.

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MEANING RELAT[ONS AMONG PREDICATES 179

If A is a statement, then we may say that A is true in M pro-

vided MT(d,A) for every d; otherwise A is false in M. Further-
more, A is a valid statement of L provided it is true in every
model for L, and A is a universally valid statement (of C(S) ) if
and only if it is a valid statement of every language L in C(S).
The reader will have no difficulty seeing that the usual quan-
tification and identity theory remains valid for any member L of
C(S). Moreover, we have the following completeness theorem:

The universally valid statements of C(S) are exactly the the-

orems of standard quantification-cum-identity theory.31

This is the precise form of the assertion that (/x) has the same
formal properties as (x). Note that any given member L of C(S)
will in general have valid statements which are not quantifica-
tional theorems. These residual valid statements reflect the mean-
ing relations among the predicates represented by means of H and
f. They are essentially what Carnap called the "meaning postu-
lates". This term is misleading here, however, because the mean-
ing structure may be so complex that no formal postulate system
can capture all these residual valid statements (the theory of the
subject may be essentially incomplete, by Godel's theorem). In this
sense our method of logical spaces is essentially stronger than
Carnap's method of meaning postulates.

81 For proof, see section II.C.5 of my dissertation (footnote 1). The

reasoning is essentially similar to that which we applied to C(S*) and S5
above.

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