Professional Documents
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Part 3
gd 04/12
SUMMARY
November 2012
design manual for roads and bridges GD 04/12
Volume 0, Section 2,
Part 3
Summary: This Standard sets out the approach which must be applied in all administrative
and technical aspects when designing, operating and constructing for the
strategic road network, where safety should be a consideration. It updates,
and clarifies, requirements and guidance for addressing safety risks. This
includes planning, preparing, designing and constructing highway works,
maintenance, demolition and improvements, projects and schemes, and
when revising Agency technical standards, specifications and requirements.
This Standard sets out the HA requirements for managing safety and as such
it does not provide legal advice or guidance. This document only applies to
England’s Strategic Road Network.
Volume 0 Section 2
Part 3 GD 04/12 Registration of Amendments
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amendments amendments
November 2012
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DESIGN MANUAL FOR ROADS AND BRIDGES
Part 3
gd 04/12
Contents
Chapter
Part 1
4. General Principles
Part 2
6. Technical Requirements
8. Glossary
9. References
Annexes
November 2012
Volume 0 Section 2 Chapter 1
Part 3 GD 04/12 Introduction and Use of this Document
Part 1
1.3 The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) • in Managed Motorway requirements;
investigated the circumstances that led to the incident
and their report made it clear that the accident had • in the Department for Transport (DfT) ‘Managing
resulted from a highly unlikely and unpredictable chain the accidental obstruction of the railway by road
of events. However, the Government was concerned vehicles’ report; and
about the general issues this crash raised and asked for a
wider investigation into the accidental incursion of road • in Aiming for Zero projects to improve/benefit
vehicles onto the railway. This investigation identified worker safety.
specific actions related to road/rail incursions as well
as more general and fundamental issues to do with the
methods used by the Agency to assess and record safety 1.7 A key requirement of this standard is that
risks, and the documentation of the decision processes appropriate safety risk assessment, evaluation and
linked to the management and or treatment of these. management is undertaken to inform all activities,
projects and decisions. This includes ensuring that
1.4 Since this time the Agency has developed a more the safety risk impacts for different populations
transparent approach to safety risk management and has (see Chapter 2 ‘Defining the People at Safety
been working towards the embedment of this approach Risk’) that the Agency has a responsibility for,
across all of the various areas of the business. along with their safety risk exposure and safety risk
tolerance, are taken into account. It also requires
Objectives that documentation is kept which evidences the
decision making process.
1.5 Agency projects have traditionally used a
prescriptive approach to demonstrating safety, relying
on adherence to detailed standards. These standards
1.10 This Standard is not a legal interpretation of • Transparently – so it is clear why, and how,
the legislation it refers to; as such it does not provide a particular decision was taken.
legal advice or guidance. In the event of queries on the
applicable law, independent legal advice should be sought. 1.14 The processes referenced in this standard should
be applied pragmatically and avoid the creation of
Mandatory Sections a burdensome and bureaucratic process. Instead the
process should be viewed as an opportunity to simply
1.11 Sections of this document containing and effectively record the best judgements of the
mandatory requirements are identified by professionals involved.
highlighted boxes. These requirements are
mandatory and no departures from this standard 1.15 The guidance contained in this standard sets out
will be accepted. Appropriate safety risk existing process and best practice that the Agency and
assessment, evaluation and management must its representatives should already be following.
be undertaken so that a decision can be made
on the basis of what is reasonably required. In 1.16 It should be read in conjunction with the Design
circumstances where reliable data is limited or Manual for Roads and Bridges (DMRB) and the
not available the principles of the standard must Agency’s Health and Safety Management System
still be applied; in these instances the professional contained within the Management Arrangements for
judgment of a competent person will be required Health and Safety (MAHS), where advice and guidance
(please see Chapter 6 for more details). The text including policy statements for traffic officers, workers,
outside boxes contains advice and explanation, construction workers and other parties can be found.
which is commended to ‘users’ for consideration. For advice/support and access to MAHS please contact
the HA team responsible for Health and Safety.
1.12 This Standard gives the approach which 1.17 The guidance in this standard has been developed
must be applied forthwith by all Agency staff and to ensure that all persons affected by the SRN and
supply chain, in all administrative and technical thereby exposed to safety risk are considered. The
aspects when designing operating and constructing safety risk assessment process will itself identify any
the SRN, where safety should be a consideration. disadvantaged or vulnerable people and appropriate
This includes planning, preparing, designing control measures are mandated.
and constructing highway works. This includes
maintenance, demolition and improvements, projects Definitions and Abbreviations
and schemes, and when revising Agency technical
1.18 Terms and references relevant to this standard are
standards, specifications and requirements.
dealt with in Chapters 9, 10 and 11 of this document.
Population 1 – People directly employed by the Agency and who work on the SRN,
e.g. Traffic Officers.
Population 2 – People in a contractural relationship with the Agency, including Agency ‘Workers’
National Vehicle Recovery Contract operatives, all workers engaged in traffic management
activities and incident support services, and any other activities where live traffic is
present, (such as persons carrying out survey and inspection work).
Population 3 – Other parties, including road users, the police and emergency services and
non-motorised ‘Users’ such as equestrians, cyclists and pedestrians, as well as those others
‘Users’
not in a contractural relationship with the Agency, such as privately contracted vehicle
recovery and vehicle repair providers.
Population 4 – Third parties includes any person or persons who could be affected by the
SRN, but who are neither using it, nor working on it, i.e. living or working adjacent to the ‘Other
SRN, using other (non-Agency) transport networks that intersect with the SRN (e.g. local Parties’
roads, railways) and those who are living or working in properties owned by the Agency.
3.1 The safety of ‘Workers’ (see Table 1), is governed 3.4 The principal difference between the populations
by employer responsibilities under Health and Safety defined and then brigaded in Table 1 is the level of
legislation. When considering safety risks to these control that the Agency has over each, e.g. ‘Users’
populations (both planned and incident management), have a responsibility for their own safety and are
the duties of an employer are discharged through responsible for their actions that may affect the safety
compliance with the Management of Health and of others. Whereas ‘Workers’ are acting on behalf of
Safety at Work Regulations 1999. (Regulation 3 deals and representing the Agency and thus their safety risk
with risk assessments). Where the Agency acts as a exposure is controlled by the Agency’s management
designer (either directly or through its supply chain), and operational control processes.
the requirements to address safety risk assessment
for all populations exposed (during construction and 3.5 The activities of ‘Users’ and/or ‘Other Parties’
maintenance works) is covered by the Construction cannot be controlled in the same way as for ‘Workers’.
(Design and Management) Regulations 2007 Instead it is expected that ‘Users’ will comply with
(particularly Regulation 11). the law and the Highway Code and that they will take
account of all the prevailing conditions (including but
not limited to) the weather, road character and condition,
3.2 The Construction (Design and Management) traffic level and composition, and any warning signs.
Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/320), (the CDM The scope of this control is shown in the diagram at
Regulations) define ‘structure’ as including a road. Figure 1.
The CDM Regulations define ‘workplace’ as a
workplace within the meaning of regulation 2(1)
of the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare)
Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3004 as amended) (the
1992 Regulations), other than a construction site. In
regulation 2(1) of the 1992 Regulations ‘workplace’
is defined as ‘any premises or part of premises which
are not domestic premises…made available…as a
place of work…other than a public road’. Thus a
designer must consider the use of a public road in
the context of its use by ‘Users’ (Population 3 from
Table 1) for normal operation only.
Workers
Users
Other Parties
4. General Principles
1 The definition of Road ‘Workers’ used in the Aiming for Zero vision and strategy document does not apply.
Part 2
Stage 9 – Update and refresh the safety risk report when change proposed
5.2 All of the actions described in this chapter • the safety risk on the population; and
and in the technical requirement Chapter 6 must be
executed by competent persons. The competence • the Agency’s safety risk tolerance for this
and approval process is described in Chapter 7. population (see Chapter 6).
Stage 1 – Determine the Scope Stage 4 – Consider Existing Risk Exposure for each
Population
5.3 Describe what is included and what if 5.6 In 2001, the HSE published the report, ‘Reducing
anything is to be excluded from the assessment and Risk, Protecting People’, known as R2P2 (to explain
record this. The scope may be a geographical area their approach to their enforcement role in considering
in the case of a road scheme or the boundaries of a risk tolerability). It explains the concept of ‘trade off’,
decision, e.g. change of process for temporary traffic whereby an increase in the safety risk from one hazard
management at roadworks. In either case the breadth can be balanced by a commensurate decrease in the
of the assessment or the subject of the decision must safety risk of another hazard.
be clearly articulated and documented.
Individual Collective
The safety risk to a single This is the safety risk, to a group
person is used to represent the of people or a population,
risk of all those running the risk, associated with a particular
and a specified outcome. scenario, control measure or
hazardous event.
The risk measure is the probability RISK
of a typical individual member of Quantified as the average number of
one of the constituent populations, fatalities, or fatalities and weighted
e.g. Worker, User or Other Party injuries, per year that would be
being killed or injured during expected to occur.
a year whilst undertaking
a particular activity.
5.8 For all populations (‘Workers’, ‘Users’ and ‘Other 5.9 These are expressed in Figure 4.
Parties’) there are three regions of safety risk that each
population could find itself in: 5.10 Moving from the bottom to the top of the
triangle in Figure 4 represents increasing ‘safety
• Broadly acceptable – do nothing, (no additional risk’ for a particular hazardous activity (measured
risk controls or analysis required). by the individual safety risk and societal concerns
it engenders). The dark zone at the top represents
• Unacceptable – do something or stop the activity. an unacceptable region. There are three regions in
the TOR framework that inform the Agency’s rules
• Tolerable – test for any reasonably required for decision making.
safety risk controls that are not already
implemented.
save in extraordinary
circumstances
Reasonably practicable
Tolerable Region control measures must be
introduced for risk in this
societal concern
Negligible Risk
Figure 4 – The HSE’s TOR Model or ‘Safety Risk Triangle’
“Workers” “Users”
Greater than
Greater than
1 in 1,000,000
1 in 1,000,000
Broadly
Acceptable
HSE risk
Unacceptable
to “Users”
1 in 10,000
Increasing risk
*Rural A roads 1 in 50,000
Tolerable
*Urban A roads 1 in 100,000
*Motorways 1 in 320,000
1 in 1,000,000
Broadly
Acceptable
5.17 Populations with safety risks that fall into • Work out the safety risk implications (benefits
a broadly acceptable area must be regarded as and disbenefits) for all affected populations,
acceptable and no further risk controls introduced. including consideration of how the control
This means that if a population’s collective risk may affect human behaviour, (ie is there
exposure is located in the broadly acceptable region evidence to suggest that a population may
then further risk assessment is not necessary. behave differently because they feel safer
or less safe);
5.18 A Safety Risk Assessment Tool (see Annex C) • Consider if the option goes far enough to
has been provided to assist decision makers in assessing manage safety risk and if any disbenefits
the broad justification in terms of safety risk alone. This are tolerable (see below); and
tool does not address the other impacts and benefits of
• Revise the option as necessary and repeat
the proposal. Where the Risk Assessment Tool is used,
until the optimum solution for all populations
a copy of the risk matrix assessment, including the
is found.
potential hazards identified and the reasoning behind the
selection of severity, likelihood and Overall Risk Level
should be included within the Safety Risk Report, see
5.21 A hierarchy of control measures exists and
Stage 7 of this chapter.
this is known by the acronym ERIC, which stands
for Eliminate, Reduce, Isolate and Control. When
Stage 6 – Risk Control Decisions
considering control measures; the aim should be to
work down through the hierarchy; this means that the
5.19 Risk control is the process of implementing ideal option will be to eliminate the safety risk you are
measures that take into account the implications seeking to control, but this may be unachievable or
for either A) a single risk or B) a range of the costs disproportionate so the decision maker will
different risks and then what is needed to control progress down through the hierarchy applying benefit
them across the different populations. Final risk cost considerations at each level and to each safety risk
controls must maximise the collective benefit and being addressed. A flowchart for this element of the
demonstrate that controls go far enough to manage process is shown at Figure 72.
Eliminate options,
revise as necessary
and repeat
Determine
preferred option
5.22 Tests for whether control measures go far 5.23 The expected life/duration of the technical
enough or whether any disbenefits are tolerable product, project or scheme will vary according to
depend on the population and the associated the situation, e.g. for a technology product the life
responsibilities of the Agency to manage the may be 10 years, or for a three week maintenance
safety risk exposure to those populations (Chapter scheme it would be the duration of the scheme.
2, Table 1), and the tolerability criteria described For simple, low value control measures, this may
previously (at 5.11 – 5.14). When calculating costs be qualitative and based on the reasoned judgment
and benefits, technical evidence and judgments of a competent professional. However, as the level
must be used to define the expected life/duration of complexity, safety risk or uncertainty increases
of the technical product, project or scheme. The so must the level of quantification of costs and
COBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) manual provides benefits.
guidance on calculating BCR’s and the safety risk
rules for BCR’s are provided at 4.3. The tool at
Annex D may also be helpful.
5.25 In addition, the costs associated with preventing 5.31 An extreme trade off example might be to spend
a fatality should not generally exceed the established £1m to prevent five staff suffering bruised knees is
value of preventing a fatality figure described in likely to be grossly disproportionate; but to spend £1m
‘WebTAG unit 3.4.1’ (Accidents Sub Objective- to prevent a bridge collapse capable of killing five
Table 3: Average value of prevention of road accidents people is likely to be proportionate.
by severity and element of cost).
5.32 At this stage it is appropriate to think about the
sensible review period for the safety risk assessment
5.26 For ‘Workers’ (Populations 1 and 2) and control measures under consideration.
evidence must be presented to demonstrate that
the sacrifice (in terms of time, money or effort) 5.33 The decision about whether or not a control
of doing more would be disproportionate to the measure is justified will often be based on economic
benefits gained from doing it. grounds. Thus if a control measure is being disregarded
then the impact to the population of any potential
5.27 For ‘Workers’ and ‘Users’ it can be increased safety risk stemming from this decision can
reasonable for the safety risks associated with be estimated in cost terms. This then can be compared
individual hazards to increase. However, the with the cost of doing more and thus allow a more
residual safety risk level must remain tolerable and informed decision to be reached. A Cost Benefit tool
the populations subject to the increase in safety has been provided at Annex D to help decision makers
risk is gaining some proportionate level of overall assess whether control measures go far enough. The tool
benefit from the project or decision as a whole. uses an order-of-magnitude technique which provides a
simplified methodology to allow designers to consider,
5.28 Where individual safety risk controls result on comparable terms, the control measure cost savings
in a safety benefit to one population, the outcome against a judgement of the maximum likely change in
for other populations must be that they are not safety risks. This tool should only be used as a filter and
disproportionately adversely affected in safety not a single deciding factor since non-accident related
terms and the residual safety risk to a negatively impacts (e.g. delays) are not taken into account.
affected population must always at least remain
within tolerable parameters.
Stage 7 – Document Safety Risk Decision in a Safety Stage 9 – Update and Refresh the Safety Risk Report
Risk Report when Change Proposed
5.34 Details of the safety risk assessment must 5.37 Safety risk assessments contained within
be recorded in a safety risk report, the detail of a safety risk report are live documents which
which will be commensurate with the matter under must be reviewed and updated throughout the
consideration and will include: life of the project and its subsequent migration
to maintenance and operation as part of the SRN:
• the hazards identified and evidence
considered; • whenever the activity they relate to
changes; or
• details of the safety risk analysis and safety
risk assessment; • when new information or findings from
any investigations or problems reported
• details of safety risk controls considered by Workers/Others means that the outcome
and the rationale for why the final choice of may change;
safety risk control was considered sufficient;
• to reflect any changes in legislation.
• any time limits on the validity of the safety
risk assessment/any known or anticipated 5.38 When risk assessments are updated
changes that would require the safety risk consideration should be given to industry best
assessment to be reviewed; practice, budgets and other duties, change in
situation and ensuring that controls remain
• who did the safety risk assessment (and reasonably required.
evidence that they were competent, see
Chapter 7 for competence requirements).
Stage 10 – Monitor and Review Safety Risk Report
5.35 The scale of the safety risk report will be Assumptions
guided by the complexity of the situation, it may
be a standalone report for a Type C decision and
equally for a Type A decision could be a composite 5.39 The assumptions that were used to:
part or section of another project report.
• inform the risk analysis and assessment;
6. Technical Requirements
• An approach that can be used to guide decision • Take account of all relevant factors.
making.
• Maximise the overall return from available
• How much information decision makers should resources.
document for an audit trail.
• Take account of any implications for others
affected by the decision, in both the short
and long term.
Appraisal of
cost and
benefits
Decision
Making
Understand
Understand risks and
issues uncertainties
Type C Decisions
Type B – These are decisions that could have
Professional Roles some significant operational implications.
6.7 The decision maker should refer to any outputs 6.8 Having characterised the individual features of
from previous safety risk analysis, assessment and the decision (using Table 2) the next step is to determine
evaluation work in relation to the matter under a resultant overall type for each aspect of the decision-
consideration, e.g. if a decision or a feature within it has making process. The ‘characterisation rules’ in Table 3
previously been characterised as a Type C this should should then be used to identify the appropriate decision
inform the current decision level ascribed. All evidence maker; this will usually be decided by the project in
considered (both retrospective and new) should be consultation with the specialist technical advisor.
referenced in the safety risk report.
6.9 When the general approach has been decided 6.11 Whatever criteria, employed, the same
between either Type A, B or C, the decision maker combination must be used for all options under
must then identify how individual options can be consideration so that like for like comparison can
compared to each other. This process is known as be made.
establishing decision criteria. The basic process for
undertaking this task is summarised in Figure 10.
6.12 The preferred option for assessment is Quantitative
6.10 Within the Figure 10 flowchart, value does – either financially (i.e. value in terms of £) or non-
not necessarily mean monetary, i.e. the results of financially (e.g. score out of 100, or absolute value
cost benefits analysis although this will often be the in units other than £). Where it is reasonable to do
case. Non-monetary types of decision criteria are: so, effort should be made to assess decision criteria
financially, as this is the easiest way of making direct
• Direct data – i.e. collision statistics, number comparison between the options. The last resort is
of vehicles. qualitative assessment, (e.g. high/medium/low or good/
average/poor) which should only be used where the
• Safety risk exposure of workers. required effort to collect additional robust information
is disproportionate to the scale of the decision or it is
• Safety risk exposure of users. not practical to quantify the decision criteria (e.g. some
dynamic decision making).
• Reliability/effect upon congestion.
• Financial.
Establish individual
decision criteria
Acceptable
Figure 10 – Basic Process for Establishing the Decision Criteria and Assessing Options
(see para 6.10 for explanation)
6.13 Type A decision criteria – These are 6.16 The main purpose of establishing decision
decisions which are relatively routine and familiar criteria and valuing individual options against them
so there should be plenty of existing professional is to inform an overall assessment (or valuation)
experience and direct data to inform Type A of the individual decision options. This will then
decisions thus; additional analysis should not be form the basis for a comparison of options in order
needed to inform these decisions. to identify the optimum solution. This is where the
decision maker must consider trade-off, balancing
6.14 Type B decision criteria – These are more decisions and wider implications.
complicated decisions where the Agency is likely
to have some knowledge and experience, but it
is unlikely that there will be sufficient directly 6.17 Further guidance on calculating the Net Present
relevant professional experience or data to form an Value (NPV) and BCR, including what costs and
evidence base. Consequently more formal analysis benefits to include and appropriate discount rates, is
will be required. provided in the HM Treasury Appraisal and Evaluation
in Central Government, the ‘Green Book’.
6.15 Type C decision criteria – these decisions are
more complex and less common there is likely to
be very little if any directly relevant professional
experience or data. Therefore Type C decisions will
need to make significant use of analysis.
Review Safety
Risk Report
7.1 In order to assign appropriate competencies 7.4 Accountability must not be delegated for any
for each function/role involved in developing activity. However, responsibility can be. In practice
an option and taking it forward for a decision this distinction means that an individual who is
through the approval process, it is necessary accountable for completing a step in the decision
first to consider what is involved in each role. making/approval process can delegate the detailed
This consideration is provided by developing checking to another person, but in such a case they
a Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and must be sure that they are delegating the task to a
Informed (RACI) matrix for the process. Table 6 person with sufficient competence.
(overleaf) provides an example of a RACI with
suggested assignments. 7.5 Those who use this standard who are
participants in the safety risk management
process will need to refer to both the RACI and
7.2 The RACI matrix process requires that all of the competency definition charts to be clear about
steps in a process are mapped out and that each role their responsibilities, decision-making levels and
that undertakes an element of the process is identified. competency requirements. Assessing competence
Then appropriate RACI assignments are allocated to is covered later on in this chapter.
fields in the matrix by combining these two factors.
The interpretation of each RACI assignment is given
in Table 5.
Assignment Interpretation
Responsible This person is responsible for action/implementation and typically the individual(s) who
actually complete the task. However, in some circumstances this person may delegate
parts of the work to others, including other organisations. Under these circumstances they
retain responsibility for ensuring that the task is completed. Responsibility can be shared,
with the degree of responsibility on each person determined by the ‘Accountable’ person.
Accountable The individual or group who is ultimately answerable for the function/activity. Includes
‘yes’ or ‘no’ authority and veto power. Only one ‘A’ can be assigned to a function and this
accountability cannot be delegated to another role.
Consulted The individual(s) to be consulted prior to a final decision/action. Communication
should be two way, there being a requirement on whoever is consulted to respond to the
information provided.
Informed The individual(s) who needs to be informed after a decision/action is taken. The
communication is one way. There is no requirement for an informed person to respond.
Options or Determine Define Project All types – R All types – A All types – C All types – C
feasibility stage the scope of Scope
the safety risk
assessment
Define safety All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
baseline –C –C
objectives
Characterise All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
Project Features –C –C
Agree Preferred Identify the Hazard All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
Option hazards identification –C –C
Identify and Confirm project All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
consider justification –C –C
organisational
safety risk
tolerance
Identify the All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
Agency’s safety –C –C
risk tolerance for
each population
High level safety Understand All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
risk analysis safety risks –C –C
and safety risk associated with
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Responsibility and Decision-making Levels Project HA Project HA Technical HA Regional Professional Professional
for Tasks Consultant/ Sponsor Specialist Manager Safety Advisor Roles
Designer
Establish current All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
level of safety –C –C
risk for each
population
Identify the All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
overall safety –C –C
risk benefit/
disbenefit
between options
considered
Development Detailed safety Understand All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B – C Type B – C Type C – C
Stage risk analysis and safety risks Type C – C Type C – C
detailed safety associated with
risk assessment option for all
populations
during all
phases of
implementation
Identify the All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
Agency’s safety –C –C
risk tolerance for
each population
Chapter 7
7/3
7/4
Safety risk Identify potential All types – R Type A – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
Control safety risk –A –C
control options
Understand All types – R Type A – A All types – C Type B and C Type B and C Type C – C
implications for –A –C
each individual
population
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safety risk Type C – C Type C – C
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Develop project All types – R All types – A All types – I All types – I Type B and C – I Type C – I
safety plan
Part 3 GD 04/12
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Responsibility and Decision-making Levels Project HA Project HA Technical HA Regional Professional Professional
for Tasks Consultant/ Sponsor Specialist Manager Safety Advisor Roles
Designer
Construction or Document safety Ensure delivery All types – R All types – R Type C – C All types – A Type C – C Type C – C
implementation risk decision in a is as per the plan
stage safety risk report and all safety
risk controls
implemented
Document All types – R All types – R Type C – C All types – A Type C – C Type C – C
changes in
project safety
plan and develop
further as
necessary
Operation Handover of Validate All types – R All types – R Type C – C All types – A Type C – C Type C – C
safety risk report assumptions
to operators and clarify any
uncertainties
Update and Review All types – R All types – R Type C – C All types – A Type C – C Type C – C
fefresh the safety performance
Keep safety All types – R All types – R Type C – C All types – R Type C – C Type C – C
documentation
up to date
Chapter 7
7/5
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Roles, Responsibilities and Competence Part 3 GD 04/12
Level Description
Can lead/direct 1 Direct and plan the work of others and teams
Can guide and show 2 Lead peer review, check and verify the work of others
Can do independently 3 Undertake the function independently (though may receive contributions
from others)
Can contribute 4 Contributes to the work of others but doesn’t undertake the function
independently
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Competence areas/functions Description Levels of competence achievement
1 2 3 4
Safety risk terminology Hazard, safety risk, hazard identification, safety risk analysis,
safety risk assessment (or evaluation), safety risk control,
safety risk management, safety risk versus uncertainty
Legal context HSWA, MHSW Regs, CDM, Road Traffic Act, Highways
Act, Duty of care, corporate manslaughter, role of the HSE,
reasonably required
Define appropriate criteria Tolerability of safety risk, safety risk trade off (including
Gather analyse, assess and HA methodologies, event trees, fault trees, bow-tie, cause-
evaluate relevant data consequence, risk modelling, measures of safety risk, data
for safety risk analysis (and what to do if no data)
Analyse safety risk control Hierarchy of safety risk control, approaches to determining
options and decide preferred ‘reasonableness’ and procedures for actively managing
options safety risks
Chapter 7
assurance; procedures for review of current approach;
potential issues with the current approach
7/7
8. Glossary
Term Explanation
Agency The Highways Agency.
Assumptions Assumptions are required in order to assess the degree of severity
and likelihood of the hazard.
Construction and maintenance Person whose job it is to perform construction and maintenance tasks
worker on projects, from within a safe working area.
CDM Regulations The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations.
Decision Maker The individual or group of individuals appointed with a mandate to consider
and determine safety risks at a defined level in accordance with this standard,
and identified on the project specific RACI charts. Decision Makers may be
in the Overseeing Organisation supply chain or the Overseeing Organisation
depending on the safety risks being considered and the requirements of the
project specific RACI chart. Decision Makers in the Overseeing Organisation
supply chain will also ensure that all the information pertinent to resolution of
the safety issue to be considered by the Overseeing Organisation is available
for that decision to be made.
Designer A person, group of persons or organisation performing the duties of a designer
as defined by the CDM Regulations 2007.
Design Standards The standards and specifications containing Mandatory Requirements
and used by the highway authority and stipulated as such in a standards
management system, other policy documents, contracts (e.g. ‘Employers
Requirements’) or a design brief or design statement.
Departure or Departure from A non-compliance with a Mandatory Requirement of a Declared Standard.
Standard(s)
Design Manual for Roads and The Stationery Office publication containing current standards, advice notes
Bridges (DMRB) and other guidance documents relating to the design, maintenance, operation
and improvement of motorways and trunk roads.
GALE Globally At Least Equivalent – a method of safety risk management
appropriate where safety improvements to ‘Users’ are not sought.
Hazard A source of potential harm which poses a threat to ‘Users’, ‘Workers’,
or third parties.
Highway Authority An organisation that is responsible for the maintenance of public roads.
Term Explanation
Measures of impact Needs to reflect the purpose of the safety risk assessment. Typical measures
of impact used by the Agency include:
• Number of collisions.
• Number of casualties.
• Number of fatalities.
• Numbers of killed or seriously injured (KSIs).
• Fatalities and weighted injuries (FWI).
Mitigation measure The aim of mitigation is to reduce or alleviate the hazard safety risk through
the use of qualitative or quantitative actions. After the initial hazard analysis
the drafter of the technical requirements should be able to identify possible
mitigations.
National Vehicle Recovery Persons employed as part of the HA National Vehicle Recovery Service.
Service Operatives
Professional Safety Advisor A group comprising Safety Risk and Health and Safety specialists that
Group provide advice to Chief Highway Engineer.
Project Anything that involves work or an activity on or affecting the SRN,
including surveys and inspections and construction, maintenance, upgrading,
improvement and renewal projects.
Project Feature A high level property of the project that can be expected to affect safety
management requirements.
Project Manager Person representing the Agency’s interests on the project and to whom
the Project Consultant reports.
Project Sponsor Any person working for the Agency, representing the Agency’s interests
on the project.
Project Safety Risk The process of managing safety risks associated with project(s).
Management
Safety Risk The combination of the likelihood and the consequence of a specified hazard
being realised. It is a measure of harm or loss associated with an activity.
Safety Risk Analysis A procedure to identify threats and vulnerabilities, analyse them to ascertain
the exposures, and highlight how the impact can be eliminated or reduced.
Safety Risk Assessment The overall process of safety risk identification, safety risk analysis and safety
risk evaluation.
Safety Risk Evaluation A process that takes the output of safety risk analysis and compares each
safety risk level against the safety risk tolerance and prioritises safety risk
controls.
Safety Risk Management The overall process of safety risk assessment, plus processes for assigning
ownership of safety risks, taking actions to control them and then monitoring
and reviewing progress.
Term Explanation
Safety Risk Measures The outputs from safety risk analysis should be expressed in terms
of appropriate safety risk measures. These may include measures of:
• individual safety risk;
• collective safety risk.
The decision to present results in terms of individual or collective safety risk
will be based on the intended use of the information.
Safety Objective A statement describing what if any contribution a project will deliver from
a safety perspective, generally associated with managed motorway projects
where the project is promoted on congestion reduction grounds.
Safety Risk Tolerance The threshold levels of safety risk exposure that, with appropriate approvals,
can be exceeded, but which when exceeded will trigger some form of
response (e.g. reporting the situation to senior management for action).
Normative – separate documents referenced within the standard (unless otherwise stated, the most recent versions
of the separate documents should be referenced.
11. enquiries
All technical enquiries or comments on this Standard should be sent in writing as appropriate to:
This document was notified in draft to the European Commission in accordance with Directive 98/34/EC,
as amended by Directive 98/48/EC.
Qualitative Quantitative
A1.1 Qualitative safety risk analysis methods generally A1.5 Quantitative safety risk analysis produces a single
assess the likelihood and impact components of safety point (absolute) value of safety risk, e.g. safety risk
risk using non-numerical, descriptive terms, e.g. high, of 2.3KSIs/yr. This is good for:
medium, and low. Results are often presented in a
likelihood-impact matrix. • detailed analysis of smaller numbers of
hazards, each of which has a range of possible
A1.2 This type of safety risk analysis is generally used consequences;
where there is a need for a quick prioritisation of a large
number of disparate safety risks. It is not generally • taking data into account;
appropriate where:
• situations where there is a need to obtain a
• there is a requirement for a detailed analysis of reasonable estimate of the overall (total) safety
whether or not targets have been met; risk for an activity or hazard.
• there is a need to take numerical data into A1.6 This type of analysis is not generally appropriate
account; for analysis of large numbers of disparate safety risks.
Semi-quantitative
Table B1 – Motor Vehicle Traffic by Road Class (TSGB 2011, Table TRA0202b)
B1.8 The following equations show how the numbers B1.11 The following schematic shows a possible
were derived for motorways. The numbers for ‘A’ tolerance criteria framework for road users. There
roads are derived in a similar manner. Note that the is no statutory basis for road user safety risk upon
intermediate numbers presented here have been subject which we have drawn the criteria that determine the
to rounding for presentation purposes so may not boundaries between the three regions in the framework:
generate the same final results. unacceptable; tolerable and broadly acceptable.
However, the numbers shown are the same as those
u = a / c = 98.2 × 109/42.9 × 106 = 2,291 used in the Tolerability of Risk framework used by the
v = e / c = 135/42.9 × 106 = 3.1×106 HSE for fatality risk to members of the public.
w = 1 / v = 1/3.1 × 10-6 = 318,324
B1.12 Based on the simple analysis shown above and
x = (a × b) / d = (98.2 × 109 × 0.79) / 35.3 × 106 = 2,202 using the proposed numbers we can map the average
y = (e × b) / d = (135 × 0.79) / 35.3 × 106 = 3.0×10-6 annual road user risk of fatality onto it and it can be
z = 1 / y = 1/3.0 × 10-6 = 331,183 seen that in all cases the road user annual risk of fatality
is firmly in the ‘tolerable’ region defined by the criteria
B1.9 It can be seen that there is very little difference suggested. In this form it should be clear that whilst the
in the results when the analysis is based on either total annual risk of road user fatality is tolerable on all road
numbers of registered vehicles or total numbers of car types considered here, motorways are the safest roads
driving licences. and are some six times safer than rural ‘A’ roads.
B1.10 For the purposes of establishing relatively
simple numbers that are consistent with the analysis
above we would propose the following average annual
risk of fatality to road users of:
Motorways 1 in 320,000
Urban ‘A’ roads 1 in 100,000
Rural ‘A’ roads 1 in 50,000
1 in 10,000
Motorways, 1 in 320,000
1 in 1,000,000
Broadly acceptable
Discussion
1. The numbers used to generate this analysis are based on the TSGB and so do not represent the SRN exactly.
2. The analysis is based on all road motor vehicles with a refinement for car vehicles only.
3. The analysis is conservative in that it assumes that the population of road users is determined by the number
of registered vehicles or car vehicle licences. This is the same as assuming an average vehicle occupancy of
1.0 whereas we know that it varies between 1.2 and 1.5. If occupancy were taken into account this would
result in a decrease in the average vehicle kms per road user with an associated reduction in the annual
individual risk of fatality.
Probability that harm will occur Most common potential severity of harm e.g.
1 Extremely unlikely Highly improbable, never known 1 Minor harm Minor damage or loss no injury
to occur
2 Unlikely Less than 1 per 10 years 2 Moderate harm Slight injury or illness, moderate
Volume 0 Section 2
damage or loss
Part 3 GD 04/12
November 2012
3 Likely Once every 5–10 years 3 Serious harm Serious injury or illness, substantial
damage or loss
4 Extremely likely Once every 1–4 years 4 Major harm Fatal injury, major damage or loss
5 Almost certain Once a year 5 Catastrophic harm Multiple fatalities, catastrophic loss
or damage
Volume 0 Section 2 Annex D
Part 3 GD 04/12 Cost Benefit Tool
Introduction Step 3
D1.1 This tool is an order-of-magnitude technique D1.6 Obtain the total number of accidents equivalent
which provides a simplified methodology to allow to the savings in whole life cost (N1)
decision makers to consider, on comparable terms, the
N1 = ΔC/A
whole life cost savings of non-inclusion of a control
measure against the decision maker’s judgement of D1.7 To obtain an equivalent annual accident figure
the maximum likely change in annual traffic accidents (N2), it is suggested that N1 is divided by the time
arising from the non-inclusion. limits of the decision/scheme/project/life.
Method Step 4
D1.2 The methodology suggested here only applies D1.8 Compare the annual number of accidents
to localised changes to the infrastructure that are likely equivalent to the savings in whole life cost (N2)
to have no more than a minimal impact on other parts against the designer’s judgement of the maximum
of the network. This method of appraisal focuses increase in annual accident numbers likely to be caused
on comparing potential increases in the number of by the Decision from the design parameters required
accidents (the impacts) against whole life cost savings by the Standard. Note: This can only be an order-of-
from the infrastructure (the benefits). The analysis magnitude assessment not a detailed calculation.
concentrates on safety effects, without considering
vehicle, operating and time costs. Site evaluation
D1.3 The methodology for the appraisal has the D1.9 It is stressed that this technique does not provide
following steps: an ‘answer’; it is simply an aid to designers in balancing
cost savings against possible increases in potential
Step 1 accident risk. The technique will be particularly helpful
where the ‘accident equivalent’ of the whole life cost
D1.4 Obtain the savings in whole life costs (ΔC). saving is substantially larger (perhaps by several
These are derived using the following expression: orders of magnitude) than any possible risk that could
reasonably be expected to result from the decision, or
ΔC = C2 – C1 vice versa. But, even where this is the case, the designer
where C2 represents the whole life cost of the control should ultimately judge whether the decision is likely
measure(s), while C1 represents the whole life cost with to be justified or not.
the control measure(s) incorporated. Scheme evaluation
Step 2 D1.10 Where the application of the above technique
shows that the decision may be associated with accident
D1.5 Obtain the typical cost of an average accident
disbenefit costs and these costs outweigh the potential
(A) for the relevant road type using the information
whole life cost savings, the decision maker should:
published in the latest version of ‘Reported Road
Casualties Great Britain’ which is published annually. It • Consider the other non-safety benefits and their
can be found on the Department for Transport’s website. relative importance.
This document gives the average cost of the prevention
of accidents for each injury category and different road • Consider the scale of overall (macro level)
types. Select the appropriate figure for the particular predicted scheme safety benefits for all design
decision site. elements and how these compare with the (micro
level) accident disbenefit costs at the geographic
location of the site and determine if the overall
safety benefits are justified, i.e. macro level
benefits minus the sum of individual micro level-
related disbenefits.