Zambia's Foreign Policy System and the Range of Actors Involved

The Foreign Policy System of Zambia
Author(s): Timothy M. Shaw

Source: African Studies Review , Apr., 1976, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Apr., 1976), pp. 31-66
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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THE FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM OF ZAMBIA
Timothy M. Shaw
"The study of foreign policy is under-developed" (Brecher, 1972

observation is particularly accurate for Africa, where analysis has concen
the role of presidents and on the ideology of states in the international s
small contribution toward the development of foreign policy analysis i
this article focuses on the variety of actors in the foreign policy system
It is an attempt to present an exhaustive typology of actors in the system
an analysis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; it is not concerned either
ideology of Zambia's foreign policy (Shaw, 1976a) or with the str
constraints within which decisionmaklers operate in Zambia (Shaw
Rather, the limited intent of this essay is to provide a comprehensive lis
in the Zambian foreign policy system and to begin to analyze the burea
politics which affect the policy output. The focus is on the relevant pa
operational environment which affects foreign policymaking in Zambia,
on the structures of government and industry, domestic and foreign int
on communication between these actors (Brecher, 1972: 3-4; Brecher, St
and Stein, 1969). Because of problems of research access, information on
is more readily available than information on the processes of decisionma
The most useful analysis of foreign policymaking in Africa remains th
Zartman (1966) on west African states, but this is deficient because insu
attention is paid to the impact of state capitalism and external interest
researchers have limited themselves to a narrow focus, concentrating on the
ministry formally responsible for foreign relations (East, 1973 and Barratt, 1971);
on domestic interests which advance changes in policy (Phillips, 1964: 54-87 and
136-42; Thompson, 1969: 15-27 and 414-37; and Shaw, 1969: 38-54); or on the
impact of domestic structure on the foreign policy system (Idang, 1973: 47-116
and Akinyemi, 1974: 1-36 and 149-201). In his seminal work on Senegal, Skurnik
(1972: 58-59, 184-204 and 275-97) presents the most comprehensive case study
thus far of foreign policy making in Africa. His emphasis is on the impact of
Senghor's philosophy of negritude. The only comparative studies of determinants
of foreign policy in Africa are general and informal (McKay, 1966), or focus on the
foreign office elite (Kirk-Greene, 1974). This paper suggests that the foreign policy
system of any African state includes a wide range of actors, not just the State
House and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If we define the foreign policy system as
the relationship among all actors within the state who have international relations,
then the system includes institutions such as a range of ministries, parastatal
organizations, foreign missions, and local offices of multinational corporations and
international organizations. This essay examines this range of actors in Zambia.
AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (April 1976).

31

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32 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
ACTORS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM OF ZAMBIA
Most analyses of African foreign policies have concentrated on internati

crises and expressions of the national interest. This approach suggests that
focus overlooks most of the international relations of Africa. Despite
international attention directed at crises and wars in Africa, most internatio
behavior on the continent is concerned with routine "low" politics (Shaw, 1
Most international transactions occur in issue areas such as economic ex
rather than over security; these regular relations are supervised by a varie
actors. "High" politics are restricted to senior decisionmakers in a few instit
such as the president's office.
The foreign policy system of Zambia consists of more actors than Presid
Kaunda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bone, 1973a and 1973b, and Pe
1974); it is concerned with the direction, control, and choices of foreign rela
The diversity of actors leads to problems of coordination and multiple advo
especially in new states which lack a tradition of organizational collaboratio
lack of effective national control advances penetration of the national polit
foreign interests and institutions. Because new states are characteris
underdeveloped and dependent, foreign diplomats and corporations are incl
here as authoritative actors in the making of foreign policy choices. As
below, the institutions formally responsible for making foreign policy in a st
Zambia have insufficient funds, staff, or experience, and so adopt many poli
proxy. It is inaccurate to exclude the foreign origin of such policies fro
national foreign policy system. However, the openness of a polity varies acco
to issue area and level of interaction.
The foreign policy system of Zambia includes a different set of actors accordin
to the issue and intensity of the relationship. The primary actors in Zamb
international politics are State House, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the par
and other ministries and parastatals. Crisis management is largely a function of t
office of the president; the foreign relations group at State House is most involv
in high politics, international initiatives, and presidential activities. Zambia's poli
in southern Africa is the responsibility of State House and the Ministries of Defen
and Foreign Affairs; Zambia's policy is also coordinated with the Organisation o
African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee Sub-Regional Office in Lusaka and t
Liberation Centre. This is the organizational center for recognized movements a
is controlled by the president's special representative who is seconded from, and
close touch with, defense (Mtshali, 1972 and 1973). Other African affairs a
coordinated by Foreign Affairs and by the ruling United National Independence
Party (UNIP). In global politics, the national interest is articulated by th
parastatals and Foreign Affairs, and other functional ministries. Table 1 presents
framework for the analysis of Zambia's foreign policy system.
This distribution of responsibilities also coincides with activities within differe
international organizations. Zambia's policy toward southern Africa is compatib
with the OAU strategy and influences its behavior toward the rest of th
international system. The defense of its national interests involves go
neighborliness with other independent states and support of political change in
minority regimes which threaten its sovereignty and ideology. This need for supp
from the OAU and provision of assistance to the liberation movements involves t
office of the president and the Ministries of Defense and Home Affairs; the arm

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FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM OF ZAMBIA 33
Table 1 - THE FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN ZAMBIA
Level of
interaction Primary actors Major issue area
Regional State House and Defence Military and political
Continental Foreign Affairs and UNIP Political and economic
Global Parastatals and Foreign Affairs Economic and political
and air force, home guard, national service, police and para-milit
defend Zambia's territorial and political integrity. The State Ho
group is involved in attempting to resolve factional disputes in the liberation
movements, in suggesting presidential initiatives in the region, and in encouraging
negotiations between the movements and the minority regimes along the lines of
the Lusaka Manifesto.1 Continental relations are concentrated in the OAU and in
eastern Africa and are concerned with political and economic integration. Zambia
has been an active member of the OAU and has contributed to the development of
its policies; it regularly supplies personnel to its secretariat. It advances its national
interests and change in southern Africa by its entente with Tanzania, Botswana,
Mozambique, and Zaire; this grouping advocates change in the minority regimes,
support for the liberation movements, and cooperation among independent African
states. Integration is most advanced in the bilateral Tanzania-Zambia relationship,
which involves presidential, party, ministerial, and infrastructural ties as noted
below. In the international system, Zambia is dependent on the Western economic
system and has developed its parastatal structure to advance its interests in
cooperating with multinational corporations, especially in the mining,
manufacturing, and communications sectors. Its global relations are coordinated by
Foreign Affairs, but also include parastatals, other ministries (especially Finance
and Planning, Mining and Industry), the Bank of Zambia, and foreign and
international organization missions in Lusaka. Continental and global relations are
generally routine, but whenever they reach a crisis, the State House group becomes
involved.2
These three levels of interaction are independent: southern African policy
involves representation at the OAU and the UN and attraction of political and
material support; the role of multinational corporations in southern Africa affects
Zambia's perceptions and treatment of them in Zambia; its attitude toward
military regimes in Africa affects its policy toward similar governments in
countries of particular interest, such as Chile. However, we can distinguish between
the primacy of actors in each issue area and level of interaction. The president, or
the chief executive, is dominant in regional politics, especially those concerned with
security and liberation. Ministries and party dominate continental affairs, which are
thus characterized by a primacy of bureaucratic politics, that is, competition and
bargaining within the government. Finally, in world politics, Zambia's foreign
policy system is characterized by organizational politics, conflict both within and
especially between actors, ranging from ministries and parastatals to missions and
multinationals. Bureaucratic and organizational politics are related to low politics,
whereas presidential dominance is associated with high politics.
The variety of actors and interests in the foreign policy system of Zambia are

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OFFICE OF OFFICE OF MINISTRY OF MINISTRY OF MINISTRY OF
THE PRESIDENT THE PRIME MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOME AFFAIRS COMMERCE
Defence Forces Zambia Information Foreign Relations Immigration, Import and

Foreign and Services Treaties and Citizenship Export Policy
Nationalist Zambia News Agency Agreements and Passports External Trade
Organizations Cabinet Committee Diplomatic Corps Deportation Export
Coordination of on Foreign in Zambia Police Promotion
foreign Affairs Foreign visitors Council
relations International
Organizations
Repatriation of
destitutes
Zambia Foreign
NIEC
Service
Protocol
MINISTRY OF UNIP
DEFENCE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Defence Sub-committee on
Control of foreign affairs
liberation Foreign policy
movements inter-party
relations
Liberation Movements Diplomatic missions Expatriate

OAU Liberation in Zambia personnel
Committee Sub- Aid agencies in
Regional Office Zambia
Offices of
international
organizations
in Zambia
Source: Government Gazette 10(7), Number 1147, 14 January 1974,

annual reports of parastatal institutions, Zimco Directory
1975 and interviews in Lusaka in 1974.
Parastatal sector
Foreign interests
(concentrated in
in Zambia
the Zambia
Industrial and
Manufacturing
Corporation,
ZIMCO)

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MINISTRY OF LANDS,
MINISTRY OF MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES MINISTRY OF POWER
PLANNING AND FINANCE MINES AND INDUSTRY AND TOURISM TRANSPORT AND WORKS
Foreign Aid Agreements Industrial Policy Tourism Railways Policy

Customs and Excise Mines and Mining Airways Policy
Department Policy
FINDECO Nchanga Consolidated ZNTB NTC

Copper Mines NHC ZNEC
Roan Consolidated Zambia Airways
Copper Mines Zambia Railways
MINDECO Tazara
INDECO
MEMACO
Barclays Bank of MINORCO (Anglo-American), Shell, UK

Zambia Ltd. SA and UK Agip and ENI, Italy
Standard Bank of Amax, USAand
Booker McConnell,
Zambia Ltd. Booker McConnell, UK
UKIntersomer and
Fiat, Italy
Grindlays Bank Noranda Mines, Canada
(Zambia) Ltd. Labatts, Canada
Lonrho, UK
Tate & Lyle, UK
ICI, UK
Dunlop, UK
Charter Consolidated, UK
Key: NIEC National Import and Export Corporation MEMACO Metal Marketing Corporation
FINDECO Financial Development Corporation ZNTB Zambia National Tourist Bureau
MINDECO Mining Development Corporation NTC National Transport Corporation
INDECO Industrial Development Corporation ZNEC Zambia National Energy Corporation
NHC National Hotels Corporation
MINORCO Mineral and Resources Corporation

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indicated in Table 2. These actors can be categorized into three types:

(i) government ministries, (ii) parastatal sector, and (iii) private or foreign interest
in Zambia. This typology draws attention to the variety of actors in the system
within different issue areas.3 Although the president's office and the Ministry o
Foreign Affairs attempt to coordinate Zambia's foreign relations, many ministries
and parastatals conduct their own external affairs with minimal reference to officia
or party directives. This approach also suggests that private or external actors ar
treated as authoritative within Zambia, at least for policymaking in particular issue
areas. The parastatal sector itself is partially owned and controlled by foreign
investors; foreign interests include national and international diplomatic missions
and entrepreneurs. Each of these actors makes an input into the development of
Zambia's foreign policy, either in specific issue areas or to the general direction of
its external regulations. They may act as a constraint on new policies or advocate
change in particular relationships. While Zambian officials and institutions attempt
to control and coordinate foreign policy, it would be unrealistic to ignore the
demands and impact of foreign interests and constraints.
THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN ZAMBIA
The general direction and ideology of Zambia's foreign policy is determ

President Kaunda and the select foreign policy group at State House. Dr
the main advocate of "Humanism," and his stature in the international sy
him frequent and prestigious occasions on which to act the role of Z
"philosopher-king." His preoccupations in foreign affairs are with
management, southern Africa, and Africa and the nonalignment movem
the party, he has developed the philosophy of Hulmanism and has begun
to policy. The UNIP Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs gives regular att
the implementation of Humanism as a guideline for the ministry.
structures concerned with foreign relations stand between State House and
government agencies with external relations and provide more specific
interpretations of Zambia's value set for the bureaucracies. Foreign policy is
coordinated, then, at three levels: in State House, in the Central Committee, and at
the Cabinet Committee.
Zambia is a one-party state in which the party is formally supreme: UNIP makes
foreign policy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implements it; the president is
the head of the party as well as head of state. The Minister of Foreign Affairs
recognizes this precedence of the party and to maintain continuity is a member of
its sub-committee on political, constitutional, legal, and foreign affairs. He has
commented in parliament that:
Our foreign policy is indeed determined by the Party to which we all belong.
Foreign policy is discussed by the National Council meetings of the Party; it is
dicsussed at general conferences of the Party and it is discussed at various Party
committees. In fact we have a Sub-Committee of the Central Committee dealing
with foreign policy. This Committee decides on the policy and my Ministry
implements this policy (Daily Parliamentary Debates: Wednesday 13 February
1974 [Number 35t] Column 1399).
All MPs and heads of Zambian missions are included on the UNIP National Council
The chairman of the Central Committee Sub-Committee is now Reuben Kamanga,
who was previously Zambia's first vice-president and chairman of the party's Rural

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Development Sub-Committee. BeforeJune 1975, the chairm

who had been minister of foreign affairs until the December 1973 general
election. Then he chose to remain as a member of the Central Committee which,
under Zambia's novel division of powers, prevented him from standing for election
or for ministerial office. In 1975 President Kaunda appointed him prime minister in
succession to Mainza Chona, and made him an MP. At the same time, apparently
because he had some misgivings about Zambia's advocacy of cooexistence with South
Africa, Vernon Mwaanga was removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
made a member of the party's Central Committee. His successor as Zambia's
representative at the United Nations, Rupiah Banda, was promoted to minister of
foreign affairs, a somewhat meteoric rise for the first Zambian ambassador to Paris
(appointed March 1974).
The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kamanga, formally
takes precedence over the minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Banda, and is normally
included in most presidential and ministerial delegations abroad. With the elevation
of Mr. Mudenda to the prime minister's office, there may now be four centers of
foreign policy activity in Zambia: State House, PM's Office, UNIP, and the
ministry. Before his promotion, Mr. Mudenda had been very influential in the
foreign policy system. With his high standing in the government and party, he had
played the role of senior statesman; he brought to the Central Committee
experience, contacts, and ideas which enhanced his ability to define Zambia's
international interests and ideology. However, foreign affairs take up less of the
sub-committee's time than its other concerns-that is, less than 25 percent of its
deliberations. The new chairman is likely to be less concerned with international
politics; the sub-committee's vice-chairman remains Daniel Lisulo, the Lusaka
lawyer, who concentrates on constitutional and legal policies rather than on foreign
affairs.
The chairman of the UNIP sub-committee has no operational or administrative

responsibilities, but rather gives an overall' direction to Zambia's policy. The
sub-committee meets monthly and includes the foreign minister and other
representatives from UNIP National Council, as well as two other members of the
Central Committee. It is designed as a structure in Zambia's participatory
democracy; its Central Committee members regularly tour Zambia and get feedback
on issues (including foreign policy) from UNIP officials at the general levels of
party organization. The sub-committee considers such comment and discusses
problems brought to it by the minister. The sub-committee is concerned with the
orientation of policy, with values and ideology; it is not concerned with the
structure or procedures of the ministry. The sub-committee makes policy
recommendations to the Central Committee and advocates certain relations to the
minister. The Central Committee and the cabinet coordinate policies and
implementation respectively; State House exercises a superior role in defining and
articulating the nation's policies.
UNIP also has its own transnational inter-party external relations which
supplement those of the government. UNIP was the core of the Mulungushi Club of
UNIP-TANU-UPC; it now has regular contact in the region with TANU, MPR, MCP,
FRELIMO, and BCP to supplement interstate relations with Tanzania, Zaire,
Malawi, Mozambique, and Botswana. Also, UNIP has relations with some parties in
the Socialist International (especially with the Yugoslav Communist Party) and
with the liberation movements of southern Africa. UNIP members are included on

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Zambian delegations to foreign states and to international organizations; they

participate in Zambia's representation and are socialized into international
diplomacy and issues. Party leaderships in the region meet regularly to discuss party
and government structures and strategies and to encourage relations among sections
of the parties, such as youth and women's groups.
The dominance of State House and UNIP in determining the foreign policy of
Zambia is not complete. In particular issues or crises, other institutions within the
system may be effective. The diplomatic community and multinational
corporations in Zambia may determine Zambia's policies in specific issue areas,
such as policies toward international institutions or international exchange. The
dependence of Zambia is not only a structural constraint on its foreign policy
choices, it is also expressed through the influence of foreign diplomats and
entrepreneurs in Zambia. They maintain a close association with members of the
national elite and participate informally in the direction of Zambia's foreign policy.
Some diplomatic missions in Lusaka may provide research and intelligence materials
to Zambian officials to advance their decisionmaking over, say, domestic politics in
the white-ruled states of southern Africa. They may even suggest organizational
reforms and regulations for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself. Zambia claims
that there have been "many examples of South African financial and material
support to opposition parties and groups in Zambia" (Zambia 1964-1974: 6;
McKay, 1971; and Mtshali, 1970b). However, because the Zambian elite has
generally been uncritical of collaboration with external interests, it has permitted
the development of a comprador class which depends on linkages with external
capital and groups (Shaw, 1976b). The transfer of foreign tastes and technology,
the dominance of the materialist ethic (Tordoff, 1974: 395), and the dilemmas of
an import-substitution policy (Seidman, 1974) all reinforce Zambia's continued
dependence on external actors.
The diplomatic presence has grown rapidly in Lusaka from seventeen accredited
missions in 1965 to fifty-eight in 1973 and ten offices of international organizations,
as indicated in Table 3. There are now approximately 300 diplomats in Zambia. This
resident diplomatic community and visits by foreign delegations and dignitaries are
controlled by the Protocol Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is
headed by an under-secretary with the rank of ambassador and includes two senior
and four ordinary protocol officers, two of whom are normally in attendance at
Lusaka International Airport. The chief of protocol and these officers supervise the
activities of diplomats in Zambia and so formally control their access to decision-
makers. They limit the movement of the diplomats outside of Lusaka in the
interests of state security: diplomats need to give forty-eight hours notice in seeking
permission to travel outside the city or to the university campus. Protocol Division
is informed of all changes in diplomatic personnel and issues identity cards to
approved representatives. The chief of protocol communicates with the diplomatic
community through the dean of the diplomatic corps; they both can apply social
and legal sanctions against offending diplomats.
Protocol regulates the size of missions in Zambia and monitors their propaganda
activities. It is particularly sensitive about direct relations between diplomats and
Zambians and is meant to approve invitations to official diplomatic functions. It
publishes the diplomatic list each year and makes arrangements for state and
ministerial visits on the instructions of State House, where it coordinates events
with the president's special assistants on international politics. It also arranges

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Table 3 - DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION TO ZAMBIA 1965-1973, INCLUDING
DIPLOMATIC STAFF RESIDENT IN LUSAKA
Sept/65 Mar/66 Oct/66 Aug/67 Nov/68 Nov/69 Nov/70 Aug/71 Sept/72 Oct/73
Algeria A2 A2
Australia A2 A2
Austria C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1
Belgium E 2 E 2 E 1 E 1 E 1 E 3 E 3 E 2 E 2
Botswana HC 2 HC 2 HC 2 HC 3 HC 5 HC 5
Brazil Al Al Al
Bulgaria A2 A2
Burundi A2 A2
Cameroon A3
Canada A4 A4 A2 A2 A2 A2 HC 2 HC 3
Chile E 1 E 1 E 1 E 1 E 1 E 1
China E 5 E 5 E 5 E 5 E 4 E 3 E 19 E 25 E 29 E 28
Cuba A2
Czechoslovakia E 1 E 3 E 3 E 3 E 4 E 8 E 8 E 6 E 5 E 6
Denmark C 1 C i C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 2 E 2 E 2 E 2
East Germany 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 4
Egypt (UAR) E 3 E 3 E 4 E 4 E 4 E 4 E 4 E 7 E 5 E 4
Ethiopia Al Al Al
Finland C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 0 2
France E 2 E 4 E 3 E 5 E 5 E 2 E 10 E 13 E 12 E 10
Ghana HC 4 HC 5 Al
Greece C 1 C 1 C 1 C 2 C 2 C 2 C 2
Guinea A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2

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Table 3 (cont'd)
Guyana HC 6
Holy See E 2 E 2 E 2 E 2 E 2 E 1 E 2 E 2 E 2
Hungary A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 h2
India HC 3 HC 3 HC 3 HC 3 HC 4 HC 7 HC 8 HIC 9 HC 11 HC 12
Ireland C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 2 C 2 C 2 C 2
Israel E 1 E 2 E 2 E 3 E 3 E 3 E 2 E 2 E 2
Italy C 2 C 1 E 2 E 2 E 2 E 9 E 9 E 9 E 6 E 6
Ivory Coast A4 A4 A4
Jamaica A3 A3
Japan Al Al Al A2 A2 E 2 E 3 E 4 E 5
Kaiya HC 4 HC 7 HC 7 HC 8
Korea (North) E 3 E 5 E 4 E 9 E 8
Liberia Al A1 Al
'Malawi HC 4
Netherlands E 2 E 2 E 2 E 3 E 3 E 4 E 4 E 4 E 4
Nigeria HC 3 HC 3 HC 4 HC 6
Norway C I C 1i C i C C 1 C 1 C 1 C 4 C 4 C 4
Pakistan A2 A2 A2
Peru E 1 E 1
Poland E 1 E 1 A2 A2 A2 A2
Romania A2 A2 A2 E 8 E 10
Senegal A3 A3 A3
Sierra Leone A3 A3

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Table 3 (cont'd)
Somalia E 3 E 4 E 3 E 3 E 3
Spain A2 A2 A2 A2
Sri Lanka Al
Sudan Al Al
Swaziland Al Al
Sweden C 1 C 1 C 2 E 1 E 2 E 3 E 3 E 3 E 4 E 11
Switzerland A4 A2 A2 C 2 C 2 C 2
Syria A2 A2 A2 A2 A2
Tanzania HC 3 HC 5 HC 5 HC 5 HC 6
& Tobago A3 A3
Turkey Al Al A1
USSR E 6 E 6 E 5 E 9 E 8 E 21 E 24 E 23 E 24 E 22
UK HC 15 HC 15 HC 15 HC 13 HC 14 HC 38 HC 38 HC 36 HC 30 HC 31
USA E 11 E 11 E 10 E 12 E 10 E 10 E 11 E 12 E 11 E 11
West Germany E 2 E 2 E 3 E 3 E 2 E 8 E 6 E 7 E 7 E 6
Yugoslavia E 1 E 2 E 1 E 2 E 2 E 6 E 6 E 6 E 6 E 7
Zaire E 4 E 3 E 3 E 4 E 4 E 7 E 5 E 6 E 6 E 5
UNDP 0 5 0 6 0 5 0 5 0 6 0 10 0 10 0 12 0 10 0 11
UNICEF 0 3 0 5 0 5 0 4
UNHCR 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3
ECA 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 5 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 4 0 4 0 5
ILO 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
WHO 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 5 0 8 0 10 0 6

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Table 3 (cont'd)
Namibia 0 1 0 1 0 2
FAO 0 1 0 0 0 1
UNIDO 0 1 0 1 0 1
OAU 0 2 0 2
UNESCO 0 1 0 1 0 0
Key: E Embassy
HC High Commission
C Consulate
0 Office
A1 Accredited, resident in Nairobi
A2 Accredited, resident in Dar es Salaam
A Accredited, resident in Addis Ababa
A Accredited, resident elsewhere in Africa
Source: List of diplomatic, consular and trade missions and
international organizations

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meetings for heads of missions with the president or minist

attempts to provide a conducive environment and suitable rules in which the
resident diplomatic community can represent foreign governments to Zambia and
contribute to the making of foreign policy. However, with a small, youthful staff
and a wide range of functions, it clearly is incapable of monitoring all diplomatic
activities in Lusaka. Missions of both states and international organizations are
located in Zambia not only to encourage bilateral relations but also to gather
information on southern Africa. Diplomats in Zambia can readily communicate
with the liberation movements, refugee organizations, and UN agencies concerned
with the region.
The international politics of trade and investment are concentrated within
Zimco (Sklar, 1975 and Martin, 1973), aside from direct relations between foreign
entrepreneurs and the Zambian economy. The international relations of its major
manufacturing branch, Indeco, are in turn centered in the group's technical services
department. This is managed by a Canadian who is part of CIDA's technical
assistance support to Indeco. This centralization and coordination of Indeco's
external relationships was undertaken
for Indeco to use its size and procure the best terms possible whether dealing with
foreign investors (as possible partners) or procuring goods and services. This
aspect has become increasingly important, as the Group has had on occasions to
appeal to international financiers for support on certain projects (Indeco: 4).
The chairman has also asserted that it is
in the field of international relations that Indeco has begun to forge links which
are truly in line with our national policy of non-alignment.
Whilst long-standing commercial relations have naturally existed with British

institutions, it is gratifying to report the strengthening of the bonds between
Indeco and organisations in the following countries: Australia, Canada, People's
Republic of China, Italy, Japan, Germany, Israel, and the United States of
America. Contacts with the United Nations specialist agencies are also continuing
(Indeco: 7).
In 1973, on a group turnover of K286m, Indeco made a profit after taxation of
K15m, of which K8m was attributable to outside shareholders. In 1974, K9m of
K22m profit made on a turnover of K332m went to external shareholders. It also
pays K2.5m annually for goodwill in the form of patents and rights to trademarks.
Table 4 lists the major foreign partners of Zimco subsidiaries.
UNIP and State House see the present parastatal structures as transitional from
foreign ownership to local Zambian control. The party has not been critical of the
compromise with external capital as it foresees new structures involving Zambian
management, ownership, and control in designs for participatory democracy.
However, the socialization of the present national management into the
multinational system may check progress toward any devolution of control and
responsibility. Protracted bargaining before the self-management of the copper
mines was finally settled in October 1974 (after fifteen months of negotiations) is
indicative of the problems associated with the transition from partial to full state
ownership. But self-management in Zambia does not mean an end to dependence
on foreign capital, technology, skills, and products. Although the copper mines now
have Zambian managers, the minority shareholders still provide services. Alitalia
lost the management contract for Zambia Airways when it became self-managing;
Air Lingus now provides substantial technical and training services. Although

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Table 4 - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ZIMCO
Foreign
Major foreign partners ownership
i) Zimco subsidiary companies
Nchanga Consolidated Minerals and Resources 49%

Copper Mines Corporation Limited (MINORCO)
(Anglo-American Corporation)
SA and UK
Roan Consolidated Mines Amax, USA 49%
ii) Mindeco subsidiary companies
Mindeco/Noranda Noranda Mines, Canada 49%
Mokambo Development Company Geomin, Rumania 49%
iii) National Import and Export Corporation (NIEC) subsidiary companies
Consumer Buying Corporation Booker McConnell, UK 33%

of Zambia (ZCBC)
National Drug Company Booker McConnell, UK 49%
NIEC Agencies J. L. Morison Sons & Jones, UK 49%
iv) National Transport Corporation (NTC) subsidiary companies
Zambia Tanzania Road Services Tanzania, Government 66%

Intersomer and Fiat, Italy
v) Zambia National Energy Corporation (ZNEC) subsidiary companies
Agip Zambia Agip, Italy 50%
Indeni Petroleum Refinery ENI, Italy 50%
Tazama Pipelines Tanzania Government and 33%

ENI, Italy
Shell & BP Zambia Shell, UK 49%

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Table 4 (cont'd)
vi) Indeco subsidiary companies
Indeco Brewering and Distilling Group
National Breweries Lonrho, UK 49%
Zambia Sugar Company Tate & Lyle, UK 49%
Zambia Breweries Labatts, Canada 45%
Duncan, Gilbey & Duncan, Gilbey & Matheson, UK 58%

Matheson, Zambia
Indeco Chemicals Group
Kafironda ICI, UK 46%
Kapiri Glass Products Coutinho, Caro, West Germany 35%
Nitrogen Chemicals of Kobe Steel, Japan 1%

Zambia
Zambia Oxygen British Oxygen, UK 49%
Indeco Manufacturing Group
Kafue Textiles Amenital and Taxtilconsult,

Liechtenstein
Barclays Overseas and Common-

wealth Development
Corporations, UK
Livingstone Motor Fiat and Intersomer, Italy 30%

Assemblers
Motor Parts Distributors Grindlays Bank International, UK 25%
Metal Fabricators of Phelps Dodge and Continental 49%

Zambia Ore, USA
Svenska Metallverken, Sweden
Dunlop Zambia Dunlop, UK 77%

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Table 4 (cont'd)
Indeco Building Supplies and Engineering Group
Chilanga Cement Commonwealth Development

Corporation, UK
Lusaka Engineering Intersomer, and Piacenza, Italy 40%
Indeco Rural Enterprise Group
National Milling Charter Consolidated and

Spillers, UK
Rucom Industries UNDP
NB. Other Zimco holding companies - Findeco, National Hotels Corporation

(NHC), Metal Marketing Corporation (MEMACO) and Zambia Fisheries and
Fish Marketing Corporation - have no significant foreign shareholders.
Sources: Indeco Annual Report, 1973 and 1974 and Zimco Directory, 1974 and 1975

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Zambia's economic relations are concentrated in Europe, it has also begun to

diversify its relations with east Africa. Bilateral ties with Tanzania, for example, are
processed very differently from relations with Britain or West Germany.
ZAMBIA, TANZANIA, and SOUTHERN AFRICA:

HUMANISM AS PARTY POLICY
Zambia's relations with Tanzania are close and informal; this bilateral link is
managed in a distinctive manner. Unlike other dyads, this relationship is most
decentralized and multiple (Bone, 1973a, and Show, 1976c). Although the two
countries at independence were back to back, looking south and east respectively,
their common interest in African development and liberation led to a close
relationship between Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere. Their shared perspective on
the problems of unity, freedom, and development led to an exchange of views
which has produced compatible policies on state control, political participation,
leadership codes, etc. With UDI, the relationship widened into functional
cooperation, especially in communications, with the building of the TanZam road
and Tazama oil pipeline, the establishment of TanZam Roadways, and the decision
to build the Tazara Railway with Chinese assistance (Mutukwa, 1971 and 1975).
The development of the relationship led to a diffuse set of relations, most of which
are now at ministerial level. The presidents continue to meet regularly, but now
there are routine relations between ministries, both foreign and home affairs, and
communications, industry, finance, etc. Although bilateral integration has yet to
reach the level achieved over time within east Africa, the relationship has become
informal, multiple, and free from protocol (Bone, 1968).
The primary actors in this bilateral community are both State Houses, parties,
ministries of foreign and home affairs, and the two High Commissions. The
Tanzania high commissioner in Lusaka was previously permanent secretary for
foreign affairs in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania attaches considerable importance to this
mission, and Mr. Katikaza has developed and expanded relations with both Zambia
and BLS, to which he is accredited but nonresident. He has a special status in the
diplomatic corps and has ready access to State House and ministries in Zambia. The
regular interaction between the two countries has led to an identity of views on
many issues, such as southern Africa, Biafra, the Middle East, etc. Although there
are differences of emphasis or timing, the foreign policies of Tanzania and Zambia
are mutually supportive. In particular, State Houses and Foreign Affairs exchange
notes and ideas frequently and maintain consistent views on crucial issues such as
the liberation movements, the OAU, and the nonaligned movement.
Foreign policy in both states is directed by the president, with the ministry
serving to implement these orientations; in neither state is the party particularly
dominant in external relations (Shaw, 1969 and 1974). Although the two states
have distinctive histories, societies, structures, and values, their development and
international strategies have converged. A common political perspective and style
has legitimized and stimulated functional relations. The two states and foreign
policy systems are both interdependent and integrated. However, UNIP and other
bodies in Zambia are determined never to become dependent on one route for
external trade as the inherited dependence on Rhodesia (Anglin, 1973). Intimacy
with Tanzania is checked, therefore, by a determination to diversify

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communications and links; the independence of Mozambique and Angola will

advance this concern and enhance Zambia's role as the core of central Africa (Shaw,
1975c).
In addition to advancing its national interests, Zambia is an advocate of political
change in southern Africa (Hall, 1973). Its diplomacy includes the exertion of
pressure on Western states and on international and transnational organizations to
support the liberation movements in southern Africa (Mtshali, 1971 and Anglin,
1976c). Zambia provides transit facilities for the freedom fighters under strict rules
and participates in OAU policy toward the movements. Responsibility for these
nationalist organizations is with State House; the president has his own personal
representative at the Liberation Centre to monitor the activities of the parties
permitted in Zambia. The OAU Liberation Committee also has a subregional office
in Lusaka, headed by a Zambian, Mr. M.K. Simumba. The need for control was
revealed with the assassination of Henry Chitepo and factional feuding in ZANU in
1975; Zambia has also taken risks of internal disorder in its support of the
movements. Zambia has advocated the provision of support to the liberation
movements and has encouraged humanitarian and educational assistance from the
UN system and from Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and Canada;
Zambian officials participate in the administration of such aid both to refugees in
Zambia and of transit privileges to the liberated areas.
Zambia's crucial frontier-state role in the liberation struggle has implications for
its foreign policy: it is constrained in its relations with the West because of Western
association with the white regimes of southern Africa. It is unwilling to antagonize
states which support the movements, and it places conditions on its assistance to
the parties. Political change in southern Africa will have a profound impact on the
geo-politics of Zambia and increase its foreign policy options. The response of
disengagement from southern Africa is central to Zambia's foreign policy behavior
and' values (Anglin, 1975b). The prospects of majority rule in most of southern
Africa will permit Zambia to revise its southern Africa policy and renew links with
the southern African economic complex; this is one of the imperatives of detente
(Shaw, 1976a).
The foreign policy of Zambia includes a set of largely compatible values, all of
which are incorporated in its national ideology of Humanism (Humanism Radio
Commentaries): nonalignment, Pan-Africanism, nonracialism, and anticolonialism
(Mwaanga, 1972 and 1974). Zambia also advocated internationalism and
nonviolence, but these notions tend to be subordinate to ideas of confronting
racism and inequalities. The preamble to UNIP's constitution includes a declaration
on Zambia's foreign policy:
The Party pledges to support for all people waging just struggles for national
liberation from colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and racism; and.., the
Party shall work to enhance the development of Pan-Africanism, African Unity
and non-alignment (UNIP Constitution: 4).
The objectives of the party, in addition to the promotion of development,
humanism, and equality, include cooperation with progressive movements to
eradicate "colonialism, racialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and discrimination
and to strive for the attainment of African Unity" (UNIP Constitution: 5).
According to the ten-year plan of UNIP, which is to operate from 1974 to
1984, the foreign policy of the humanist state will continue to advance "justice,
peace, freedom and prosperity at home and to maximize our contribution to

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bridge-building in international cooperation in order t

and security for mankind" (UNIP National Policies:
party's policies can be divided into three groups: African considerations,
international diplomacy, and foreign trade (UNIP National Policies: 69, 70). In
Africa, UNIP advocates a strengthening of both the east and central African regions
and of the OAU; it sees the region as a basis for interregional economic, technical,
and political cooperation on the continent; and the OAU as an instrument for
African independence, development, and world image. UNIP will also continue to
pursue the total liberation of Africa and will work for functional cooperation in the
continent to advance its self-reliance and prosperity. Zambia's global diplomacy will
advocate nonalignment, good neighborliness, noninterference, and international
peace and stability. UNIP sees these notions as a defense against imperialism and
neocolonialism, advancing the sovereign equality of all nations, and leading to
mutual understanding and international cooperation respectively. Finally, UNIP
will pursue a foreign trade and economic policy consistent with Zambia's interests
and will maximize its international trade and economic cooperation as a basis for
understanding and peace.
UNIP has attempted to incorporate a diverse range of interests into its foreign
policy projections for the next decade. This is one response to the various demands
made in the foreign policy system. It is an attempt to enhance the
representativeness and control of the party. However, not all these policies are
compatible, and they are not ranked according to importance or implementation.
The generality of party guidelines is unhelpful to ministries involved in
international relations and is part of Zambia's acquiescent adaptation toward the
international system (Shaw, 1976b).
THE ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ZAMBIA
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made a bid to exercise a monopo

Zambia's international relations. The development of state structures has inc
the number of units in the national bureaucracy with external linkage
ministry has not been able to control the flow of communications between th
diverse range of institutions and the external environment; it wants to act
only channel of communications if it is to manage Zambia's external af
properly and so control sufficient resources to implement changes in foreign p
direction. The Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, like the fore
offices of many new states (Boyce, 1975) has a limited capacity for action. I
small and inexperienced; it lacks the ability to effectively monitor issue
analyze trends. It is rarely able to seize the initiative and is likely to react to
rather than to determine them. Only in its region, in southern or eastern Af
affairs, is Zambia capable of taking significant initiatives, and this capabilit
largely a function of State House rather than the ministry (Anglin, 1975a).
The dependence of Zambia is symbolized by assymetrical relations betwee
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the foreign offices of large powers. There are
twice as many foreign diplomats in Zambia as Zambians in the Ministry of Fo
Affairs, and Zambia receives far more visiting delegations than it sends abr
Because of such limitations, the ministry concentrates on a few i
areas-economic and political affairs-and on relations with a few states an
organizations-leading African and international actors, the OAU, UN,

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Commonwealth (Shaw, 1975a). Even in these se

monitor events-let alone to direct them-is limited
with routine responses to demands and issues; th
the level of minister and State House. The preside
foreign affairs may take the initiative, as over
Community or negotiations between Frelimo and
in southern Africa, but the ministry is not organ
from routine interactions. It lacks the experience
than on the instructions of other ministries or
intellectual nor the technical resources to direct i
tends to adopt policies by proxy, at the suggestio
international organizations. With insufficient sta
matters and cannot place sufficient emphasis
Zambia's inheritance of subordination.
East (1973) suggests that the lack of control by foreign ministries is typical of
new states; the growth of interministerial functional cooperation and the absence of
a clear set of policy guidelines is a function of the smallness of foreign offices in
such states. However, in Zambia the minister of foreign affairs has tried to regain
the initiative and reassert his ministry's dominance in external relations. He has
criticized the propensity of certain public servants to undertake unnecessary foreign
travel; he complained that "most of the trips abroad have been arranged by
ministries, departments or parastatal organisations who seem to run foreign
ministries of their own in total disregard of the only Ministry of Foreign Affairs
which is recognised by the House" (Daily Parliamentary Debates: Wednesday
23 January 1974 [Number 35h] Column 404). To assert the dominance of foreign
affairs in the foreign policy system, the minister advocated greater use of Zambia's
diplomats overseas to advance Zambia's interests and image in the interests of
economy and coordination: "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, must be
viewed as a huge public relations organ of the Government, which also provides the
framework through which Zambia conducts her international affairs (Daily
Parliamentary Debates: Wednesday 23 January 1974 [Number 35h] Column 405).
The minister has demanded a larger role for his ministry in the control of
Zambia's external affairs. In addition to not being asked to brief delegations, the
Ministry has sometimes not even been informed of certain external negotiations:
"we have wasted a lot of money in the past by sending delegations to go and
initiate agreements which could have been initiated by our diplomatic
representatives. If we do not allow our diplomatic missions to perform this
particular function, then we can as well close them" (Daily Parliamentary Debates:
Wednesday 13 February 1974 [Number 35t] Column 1389). The problems of
coordination are revealed in the history of Zambia's attempt to join the East
African Community. The growth of ambiguity over whether to become full or
partial members was reflected in uncoordinated comment and representation;
Zambia's delegations changed both membership and position often, and this
contributed to the withdrawal of the application in 1972 after five years of
increasingly spasmodic bargaining (Ballance, 1971: 48-61; and Bone, 1968).
One response to the diversity of actors in the foreign policy system and to the
demise of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been to make its officers more
professional. The then minister of foreign affairs, Vernon Mwaanga, revived plans to
make Zambia's diplomatic corps larger and more professional. The ministry has

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begun to create a career foreign service, which will maxim

recruitment and promotion; it has also expanded the num
create flexibility. The increase in the number of senio
headquarters was to allow more heads of missions to be ci
thus maximizing ministerial control:
We are currently engaged in an exercise to overhaul the foreig
completely. Government has decided to establish a career forei
from though part of the civil service, but in which officers w
realise their careers. To achieve this, attempts have been m
opportunities through the creation of no less than twenty
Secretary level. To this will, I hope, be added other more se
when completed new recruits should find no difficulty in rea
(Daily Parliamentary Debates: Wednesday 23January 197
Column 406).
Vernon Mwaanga hoped that the professionalization of
corps would lead to greater efficiency and control thr
interministerial transfers and greater continuity in posts.
lost many senior diplomats to both parliament and par
accept political appointments of senior politicians in de
pressure to recruit more women and to provide a nationw
minister has responded positively to these demands; impro
to better representation abroad. Now that the head of each
under-secretary of ambassadorial rank, transfers within t
facilitated:
We have decided to establish a career service to ensure that the people that we
train do stay and make a career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.... There will
be a system of inter-changeability between officials in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and serving diplomats abroad. What we have proposed to do, Sir, is to
establish and strengthen the departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
which will eventually be headed by people who will hold the rank of Ambassador
so that if we have to transfer an Ambassador, say, from Rome to the ministry
headquarters, it will be easier for us to send a head of department from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to become an Ambassador abroad (Daily
Parliamentary Debates: Wednesday 13 February 1974 [Number 35t]
Column 1385).
Related to the problem of circulation of officers is the issue of foreign service

training. At independence some Zambian foreign service officers were attached to
Commonwealth missions or foreign offices to get some experience on the job.
Zambia has yet to institutionalize training procedures either within the country or
with external institutions. It has yet to establish either a regular institute, such as
that arranged at Makerere University by the Carnegie Endowment or UNITAR in
the 1960s, or the courses on diplomacy provided by the Institute of Public
Administration in Uganda and the University of Nairobi in the 1970s (Kirk-Greene,
1974). The National Institute of Public Administration in Lusaka (Dresang, 1974
and Wood, 1974) arranged three courses for new diplomats in the early 1970s but
abandoned these in 1974 for a fortnight's residential seminar for Zambian
ambassadors and high commissioners. The new generation of senior officials
received talks from Central Committee and cabinet members and lecturers from the
university and Institute of Public Administration (Seminar Programme for Zambian
Ambassadors, 1974). Middle-rank officers continue to be trained at Oxford,
Columbia, and other centers of diplomatic instruction.

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The minister has pledged to improve the performance of

inefficiency, and eliminate irregularities in the appointm
Petitioners to the Chona Commission, the National Commission on the
Establishment of a One-Party Democracy in Zambia, were critical of the excessi
number of Zambian missions and of the practice of MPs also being members of th
foreign service. They advocated the establishment of a career foreign service an
appointments below head of mission to be made by the Common Services
Commission; and they demanded that all Zambian delegations to international
conferences should be knowledgeable and capable (Report of the National
Commission, 1972: 32-33). The government response to these proposals was
positive, excepting the reduction of Zambian missions while taking steps to reduce
the number of staff abroad. It considered any reduction in missions to "be
imprudent if cordial diplomatic relations were to be maintained" (Summary of
Recommendations, 1972: 16). This has led to a reduction of staff overseas from an
establishment of 170 in 1972 to 137 in 1974, as indicated in Table 5.
The average size of a Zambian mission is eight, down from the average of ten in
1972. Typically, the mission includes a head of mission (undersecretary), counselor
(assistant secretary), first secretary (principal), second secretary (senior executive
officer), either an accountant or communications officer, a personal secretary, a
typist, and a receptionist.4 Between 1973 and 1974, the rank of principal was
divided into assistant secretary and principal, with one assistant secretary being
attached to each mission. This change in the establishment facilitated the
appointment of senior personnel in early 1974. The decline of the establishment
overseas has reduced the differences in size between missions. Although the Zambia
High Commission in London continues to be much larger than any other mission, it
has been reduced from an establishment of twenty-five to one of twenty-one; the
smallest missions remain those in Lagos and Rome (both down from six to four).
The ranking of missions according to size has changed little with the reduction of
staff abroad, with London, New York, and Washington continuing to be the largest,
and Rome and Lagos the smallest. Gaberones and Dar es Salaam remain as the
largest missions in Africa, with Nairobi and Kinshasa declining most in size. Most of
the smaller missions continue to be located in Africa.
The decline in overseas posts has upset the balance in the ministry between staff
abroad and in headquarters. As indicated in Table 6, 1974 was the first time that
staff in headquarters had exceeded those overseas. One of the problems confronting
new foreign offices in Africa has been the lack of coordination and control in the
ministry. Zambia appears to have begun to confront this problem by recalling
almost twenty percent of its overseas staff between 1972 and 1974. This will also
have an impact on the characteristic distribution of senior officers in African
foreign ministries; typically, most are located abroad, leaving insufficient
experienced staff to coordinate policies at headquarters. Again, Zambia has begun
to confront this problem: maturation may be associated with this new balance of
staff at home and overseas.
In March 1974, at the time of Zambia's first major domestic training session for
its senior diplomats, the distribution of mission heads was revised, as indicated in
Table 7. Although the ministry wants to gain stability and excellence among its
officers, recruitment from outside the ministry for senior staff persists, and
frequent reshuffles continue. While the president seeks to maintain an ethnic
balance among senior politicians and civil servants, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Table 6 - ESTABLISHMENT IN HEADQUARTERS AND ABROAD, BY
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Rank HQ A HQ A HQ A HQ A HQ A HQ
Minister 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
Minister of State 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 - 6
Parliamentary Secretary 1 -. 1-
Permanent Secretary 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
Under Secretary 2 10 2 10 2 13 5 14 2 -
Assistant Secretary 2 - 2 - 3 - - - 5
Senior Officers 3 - 3 - 4 - 10 - 11
Principals 10 25 10 25 10 32 16 31 16 32
Other Officers 12 2 12 2 9 4 20 5 24 5
Senior Executive Officers 1 16 1 16 - 19 - 20
Executive Officers 12 11 12 11 20 14 28 - 2
Clerical and Secretarial 21 52 23 52 38 66 42 68 42 6
67 116 69 116 89 148 125 138 135 140 1
Source: Establishment Register

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Table 7 - DISTRIBUTION OF ZAMBIAN DIPLOMATS AS OF APRIL 1974
Abidjan Albert Kalyati (ex-Nairobi)

Addis Ababa Kalengwa Kangwa (ex-Stockholm)
Belgrade Rankin Sikasula (ex-Bonn)
Blantyre Winston Kamwana
Bonn Ephraim Chibwe (ex-Permanent Secretary, Planning and Finance)
Cairo Harry Nzunga (ex-Permanent Secretary, Western Province)
Dar es Salaam Robert Makasa
Gaberones Gilbert Yeta (ex-Permanent Secretary, Southern Province)

Kinshasa Jordan Munkanta (ex-Chief of Protocol)
Lagos Senti Loloma (ex-Minister of State for Health)

London Putteho Ngonda (ex-Addis Ababa)1
Lubumbashi Peter Kwalombota (ex-District Governor, Chingola)
Moscow Denny Sibajemi (ex-Ottawa)
Nairobi Matiya Ngalande (ex-Cairo)
New York Motto Nkhama (ex-Bonn)
Ottawa Dunstan Kamana (ex-Moscow)
Paris Rupiah Banda (ex-Director, NAMBoard)2

Peking Andreya Masiye (ex-Nigeria)
Rome James Mapoma (ex-Permanent Secretary, Trade and Industry)
Stockholm Miss Gwendoline Konie (ex-Under-Secretary, Office of the
Prime Minister)
Washington Siteke Mwale (ex-Abidjan)
1 In June 1975 made Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2 In June 1975 made Minister of Foreign Affairs, having in the interim

been transferred to New York
Sources: Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail 22 March and

24 April 1974.

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Table 8 - ZAMBIA'S DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD: DATE OF OPENING
Sept/65 Mar/66 Oct/66 June/67 Sept/6
Country Dat
Openi
J 4 J 'H 4. d d 4J H
t I : I I V 1 IV3 3 I
Botswana 1968 - - - - - - - - HC 4 H
Canada July 1973 -

China March 1968 - - - - - E 2
Egypt (UAR) November 1964 E 3 E 3 E 4 E
Ethiopia(OAU) 1965 E 3 E 4 E 4 E 3
Ghana November 1964 HC 3 HC 3 -
Italy 1970 - - - - - - - -
Ivory Coast June 1968 _ - - - - - E
Kenya August 1968 - - HC 3 HC
Malawi October 1970 - - - -
Nigeria 1965 HIC 2 HIC 2 HIC 2 H
Tanzania December 1964 HC 2 HC 2 HC 3 HC 4 HC
UN December 1964 O 3 O 2 0 3 0 3 0
USSR June 1965 E 3 E 3 E 4 E 5 E
UK October 1964 11C 6 HC 8 HC 9 liC 6 IC s18 H

USA October 1964 E 4 E 5 E 4 E 4 E
West Germany November 1966 - - - - - - E

Zaire - K December 1964 E 3 E 3 E 4 E 4
Zaire - L October 1964 C 3 C 3 C 2 C 2
Sources: Government Directory and List of Diplomatic Missions

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is likely to have its professional interests subordinated

control and patronage.
The opening and closing of Zambian missions is one in
relations between Zambia and particular countries. O
Zambia has developed rapidly, if spasmodically. At indep
the first missions were opened in London, Washington,
followed quickly in November 1964 by missions in
December 1964 by offices in Dar es Salaam and the Unit
first preoccupied by relations with the metropole, the
African diplomacy, and international organizations. In 1
in Addis Ababa, headquarters of the OAU, Lagos, and
Bonn was the only one opened in 1966, whereas the mis
one which was closed (due to the military coup which ov
offices were opened in 1967, but in 1968 three were ope
Nairobi-and the High Commission in Lagos was close
decision to recognize Biafra (Anglin, 1971). No missions
in 1970 new offices were opened in Blantyre and Rome.
Commission was reopened after the detente with Nigeri
Nigerian civil war. July 1973 was a month of activity, wi
Ottawa, Stockholm, and Belgrade, followed in June 1974
Paris. The development of representation abroad is shown
The structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
response to new demands and changes in representation
maintained an orthodox structure which combines area an
1969: 304; and Kirk-Greene, 1974). It has typically
divisions-one for political affairs, the other for administ
represents a selection of organizational charts for the m
fourth reorganization in 1974. The ministry has grown
international relations have developed and has taken o
certain times, such as the Bureau of International Confer
to prepare for the 1970 Summit of Non-Aligned States in
characteristically included an under-secretary or ministe
for political affairs, and desks for Africa, international o
As the ministry has grown, so have the sections to contro
coordinate its politics in the several regions of the w
administration typically involve the largest number of
affairs has a smaller staff because regional politics are c
rather than in the ministry.
The ministry is characterized by a high turnover of s
level and below, partially because of the president's cont
balances, and partially because of the paucity of
government. Table 10 presents information on the o
minister of foreign affairs in Zambia. The minister
administrative secretary-general of the OAU at the 1974
withdrew his candidacy in favor of a Cameroonian,
countryman Ekangaki. The most recent shuffle of senio
policy system occurred in June 1975, when in addition to
minister, President Kaunda appointed a new permanent se
Putteho Ngonda, high commissioner in London, Zam

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Table 9
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1967 and 1968
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Parliamentary Secretary
Permanent Secretary
Administration Political Affairs
Under-Secretary Under-Secretary
Protocol
Africa International
Organisations,
Treaties & Aid
mission. On average, a minister of foreign affairs in Zambia holds the

than two years, accentuating problems of continuity and coordination
Zambia has one of the largest foreign ministries in Africa, but one of the
smallest in the Commonwealth (Kirk-Greene, 1974: 308; East, 1973; Shaw, 1969:
301). Expenditure on the ministry of foreign affairs has risen rapidly, from under
K1 million in 1965 to almost K5 million in 1972 (Financial Report). However, as
suggested in Table 11, the ministry is responsible for only one percent of total
government expenditure, a level which is characteristic of new states (Shaw, 1969:
300). Salaries account for a third of the ministry's expenditure, the rest going for
administration, especially travel and accommodation, and for memberships in
international organizations. The ministry's salary scales are the same as those for
officers in the Zambian civil service, but are, of course, supplemented by allowances
for overseas service.
In the second National Development Plan, for 1974-76, it was envisaged that
the ministry would spend K2,402,000 on capital projects, some K480,000 in 1972,
as indicated in Table 12.
Although the ministry has a modest budget, it regularly overspends i

authorized expenditure, as indicated in Table 11. In 1972, for example
over-expenditure amounted to nearly K2 million, or almost double the authorized
expenditure. Such over-expenditure is indicative of the lack of administrative and
political control exerted by headquarters in Lusaka. The auditor-general is
continually critical of the lack of budgetary control over expenditures by Zambian
missions abroad. In 1971 and 1972, the significant amounts of unauthorized
expenditure by missions included excessive baggage allowances, extravagant use of
medical practitioners, purchase of superfluous cars and furniture, wasteful renting
of office and residential accommodation, unauthorized phone calls, large deficits on
personal advances to officers, etc. The over-expenditure included accidenrts to
official cars, purchase of unsound or unnecessary buildings, unnecessary and
unauthorized travel. The propensity to live well is shown in two purchases for the
houses of heads of mission: in Blantyre "an amount of K217 was spent on

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Table 9 (cont'd)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973
Permanent Secretary
I
Under Secretary
Protocol Africa and Asia Administration Europe and America U
I I II I I I I
Southern OAU & East West & China, Accounts Personnel Special Information Lib
Africa & Central Africa, North Japan & Duties Docum
Middle Africa India & Africa Australia Property/ North &
East Pakistan Finance Registry South
Am
Communication E

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Table 9 (cont'd)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974
Permanent Secretary
Protocol Division Political Aff
II
Chief of Protocol Under
I
Deputy Chief of Protocol
I I I ! I
Protocol Communications Economic Administration Finance Treaties Africa
& & Organ
Technical Middle
Assistance East
Sources: Government Directory and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lusaka.

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Table 10 - MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ZAMBIA
September 1964 to September 1967 Simon Kapwepwe
September 1967 to January 1969 Reuben Kamanga
January 1969 to August 1969 Elijah Mudenda
August 1969 to October 1970 Kenneth Kaunda
October 1970 to December 1973 Elijah Mudenda
December 1973 to June 1975 Vernon Mwaanga
June 1975 Rupiah Banda
Source: Government Directory and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lusaka
carpeting for the bathroom and toilet in the High Commissioner's resident" (Report
of the Auditor General, 1971: 21), while in Washington costs for the new
ambassador's residence included "the purchase of twenty-five lamps of various
types for K2,008, thirteen plaques for K231 and seventeen ash-trays for K102"
(Report of the Auditor General, 1972: 24).
The minister of foreign affairs has appealed for understanding over Zambia's
propensity to overspend budgets of its foreign missions. Its twenty missions are
staffed by eighty-five officers, with families, and the minister has asked for
sympathy from Parliament for "their long suffering colleagues abroad." He also
expressed his determination "to bring unconstitutional expenditure in the Ministry
and Missions abroad to an end" (Daily Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday
23 January 1974 [Number 35h] Columns 403 and 405), while asking for tolerance
of Zambia's inability to control all the costs of its overseas representation. But to
date, Zambia's diplomats have engaged in more conspicuous consumption than
most Zambian officials, and some have been unable or unwilling to meet the
demands of the leadership code for an end to entrepreneurial activity. Zambian
diplomats, like many of their professional colleagues, appear to enjoy, if not to
exploit, the privileges of the diplomatic circuit.
CONCLUSION
This essay is intended as one small contribution to our lack of informatio

understanding about the making of foreign policy in African states. It has f
on the range of actors involved in the foreign policy system of Zambia and
problems of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In no sense is this work exhaus
it is hoped that the typology of actors and data on the structure of the f
office will lead to comparative analysis and to research on the process of f
policymaking. It is presented as a modest contribution to ending the negle
such institutions in Africa as noted by Kirk-Greene (1974: 319): "to date th
of the foreign service cadres has dramatically been the missing factor in the
of the foreign relations of African states."

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Table 11 - RECURRENT EXPENDITURES FOR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (IN K 000)*
1970 1971 1972
Headquarters
Emoluments 354 327 307

Recurrent departmental charges 1,7051 446 600
Memberships in international
organisations** 285 133 362
Special expenditure*** 2 1 6
Totals for headquarters 2,346 907 1,275
Missions abroad
Emoluments 904 1,354 1,432

Recurrent departmental charges 1,504 1,739 2,025
Special expenditure** 269 249 71
Totals for missions 2,677 3,342 3,528
Totals for Ministry 5,023 4,249 4,803
Missions as % total expenditure 52 75 70
Ministry as % total government expenditure 1.3 1.2 1.5
Headquarters expenditure over

authorised provision 226 27 420
Missions expenditure over

authorised provision 451 713 1,508
* KI = US$ 1.6 approximately.

** UN, OAU, Commonwealth, UNIDO, UNDP, etc.
*** Office equipment, vehicles, furniture, etc.
1 Included K 900,000 for Non-Aligned Summit Conference
Source: Financial Report

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Table 12 - DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF
Project Cost Years

Headquarters for Ministry, Lusaka K500,000 1973-76
Chancery and Ambassador's Residence, Cairo K100,000 1973-76
Chancery and Ambassador's Residence, Lilongwe K200,000 1973-76
Chancery Plot, Lagos K200,000 1973-76
Ambassador's Residences in Washington, K642,000 1973-76
Rome and elsewhere
Chancery, Addis Ababa K100,000 1973-76

Chancery, Dar es Salaam K380,000 K200,000 in 1972
Housing, Gaborone K 40,000 1972
Radio links K240,000 1972
Source: Second National Development Plan, 284.
NOTES
This paper was prepared while the author was Lecturer in International Politics
University of Zambia and was presented in an earlier version at the Internationa
Association Conference, Washington, D.C., in February 1975. He is most appreciat
permission granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Zambia to undertake this rese
for the patience of senior party and ministry officials in responding to inquiries. He is
grateful for the encouragement and assistance of Douglas Anglin, Robert Molteno,
Howell.
1. The Lusaka negotiations between Frelimo and the Portuguese government in June and
September 1974, the December 1974 Zimbabwe understanding between both the four
liberation movements and the Rhodesian government, the August 1975 Pretoria agreement and
Victoria Falls talks were all arranged largely by Mark Chona, President Kaunda's special
assistant on foreign affairs. His own "shuttle diplomacy" between Lusaka and Lisbon, and
between Lusaka, Pretoria, and Salisbury have earned him the accolade of "Zambia's
Dr. Kissinger." For more comprehensive analyses of detente in southern Africa, see Anglin
(1975a) and Shaw (1976a).
2. The State House foreign policy group has been most active over southern Africa issues,
especially over the continuing problem of Rhodesia. It monitored and responded to events such
as Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in late 1965 (Sklar, 1974, and Lubetsky,
1967), the closure of the Rhodesian border in early 1973, and the death of two Canadians in
the Victoria Falls gorge in mid-1973 (Shaw, 1976c).
3. This typology may be contrasted with the diagram of "institutions and roles in
intra-African policy-making" in Zartman (1966: 132). He focuses on the advisers and
lieutenants around the president and the party, whereas the concern of this research is with
other actors as well, such as other ministries, diplomatic missions, and multinational
corporations.
4. This finding is very similar to that of Kirk-Greene (1974: 288), who suggests that a staff
of eight is the average for all African states' missions abroad. Tanzania tends to have rather
more and smaller missions than most African states (Shaw, 1969: 315).

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Zambia's Foreign Policy System and the Range of Actors Involved

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Zambia's Foreign Policy System and the Range of Actors Involved

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The Foreign Policy System of Zambia

Author(s): Timothy M. Shaw

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/523851

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"The study of foreign policy is under-developed" (Brecher, 1972

AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (April 1976).

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ACTORS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM OF ZAMBIA

Most analyses of African foreign policies have concentrated on internati

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Table 1 - THE FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN ZAMBIA

Regional State House and Defence Military and political

Continental Foreign Affairs and UNIP Political and economic

Global Parastatals and Foreign Affairs Economic and political

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Defence Forces Zambia Information Foreign Relations Immigration, Import and

Liberation Movements Diplomatic missions Expatriate

Source: Government Gazette 10(7), Number 1147, 14 January 1974,

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Foreign Aid Agreements Industrial Policy Tourism Railways Policy

FINDECO Nchanga Consolidated ZNTB NTC

Barclays Bank of MINORCO (Anglo-American), Shell, UK

MINORCO Mineral and Resources Corporation

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indicated in Table 2. These actors can be categorized into three types:

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN ZAMBIA

The general direction and ideology of Zambia's foreign policy is determ

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Development Sub-Committee. BeforeJune 1975, the chairm

The chairman of the UNIP sub-committee has no operational or administrative

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Zambian delegations to foreign states and to international organizations; they

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DIPLOMATIC STAFF RESIDENT IN LUSAKA

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A1 Accredited, resident in Nairobi

A2 Accredited, resident in Dar es Salaam

A Accredited, resident in Addis Ababa

A Accredited, resident elsewhere in Africa

Source: List of diplomatic, consular and trade missions and

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meetings for heads of missions with the president or minist

Whilst long-standing commercial relations have naturally existed with British

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i) Zimco subsidiary companies

Nchanga Consolidated Minerals and Resources 49%

Roan Consolidated Mines Amax, USA 49%

ii) Mindeco subsidiary companies

Mindeco/Noranda Noranda Mines, Canada 49%

Mokambo Development Company Geomin, Rumania 49%

iii) National Import and Export Corporation (NIEC) subsidiary companies

Consumer Buying Corporation Booker McConnell, UK 33%

National Drug Company Booker McConnell, UK 49%

NIEC Agencies J. L. Morison Sons & Jones, UK 49%

iv) National Transport Corporation (NTC) subsidiary companies

Zambia Tanzania Road Services Tanzania, Government 66%

v) Zambia National Energy Corporation (ZNEC) subsidiary companies

Agip Zambia Agip, Italy 50%

Indeni Petroleum Refinery ENI, Italy 50%

Tazama Pipelines Tanzania Government and 33%