San Sebastian College Recoletos

Claro M. Recto Ave., Manila

“LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS:

CASE DIGEST”

Administrative Law, Law on Public Officials and Election Law subject

Submitted to:

HON. Prosec. Ryan Quilala

Submitted by:

Warly G. Pablo
 G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts:

On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued

Administrative Order No. 223 “constituting a Committee for the
preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998.” The
Committee was mandated “to take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” Subsequently, President
Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial
Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the "National
Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted
Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents
Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named
Honorary Chairpersons.

Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial

Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. 4 Petitioner was among
the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9)
directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.

On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng

delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged
anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial
Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon
motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Coseteng’s privilege
speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several
other Senate Committees for investigation.
 On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued
Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent
citizens’ committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its
component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisagwas
appointed to chair the Committee.

The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag

Committee were apparently referred to the Fact-finding and
Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January
27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:

1. That a formal complaint be filed and preliminary

investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the
Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair
Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q.
Peña and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec.
3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD
1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;

2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this

Office, act as the nominal complainant. 6

On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the

Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of
said office.

In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied

petitioner’s motion to dismiss and on July 3, 2000, petitioner
moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the
motion was denied and on October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the
present petition for certiorari.

On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary

Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding "probable cause to
indict respondents Salvador H. Laurel and Teodoro Q. Peña before
the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594." The resolution
also directed that information for violation of the said law be filed
against Laurel and Peña. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved
the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge
against Peña.

In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a

temporary restraining order, commanding respondents to desist
from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court
against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the

ground that he is not a public officer because:

A. Expocorp was a private corporation, not a government-

owned or controlled corporation.

B. The National Centennial Commission (NCC) was not a

public office.

C. petitioner, both as chairman of the NCC and of

Expocorp was not a “public officer” as defined under the Anti-
Graft & Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as NCC and

Expocorp Chair, a public officer, and therefore may be prosecuted
as such by the Ombudsman

Held:
Yes. The characteristics of a public office include the
delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by
contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of
duties, and the designation of the position as an office. The
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government is the most important characteristic in determining
whether a position is a public office or not.
 A public office is the right, authority, and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office include:
1. The delegation of sovereign functions;
2. Its creation by law and not by contract;
3. An oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of
duties; and
4. The designation of the position as an office.
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not
present in the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of
sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive
any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC
being temporary.
The NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.
It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance. In its preamble, A.O. No.223 states
the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998: to effectively showcase Filipino
heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values. The NCC was
precisely created to execute these policies and objectives, to carry
them into effect. It bears noting the President, upon whom the
executive power is vested, created the NCC by executive order. Book
III of the Administrative Code (Office of the President), Chapter 2
(Ordinance Power), Section 2describes the nature of executive
orders:
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. – Acts of the President providing for
rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders. Neither is the fact that the NCC
was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an “ad-hoc body” make said
commission less of a public office. Having arrived at the conclusion
that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a
public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of
whether Expocorp is a private or a public corporation. Even
assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner’s
position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his
Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as
CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and
functions as NCC Chair.
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did
not receive any compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp
Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for
determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The
salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a
salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or
honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the
public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be
characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office
or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees
are attached. But it is a public office.
Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining
the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and
the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to
the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any
actor omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Petitioner thus falls into that category of public officers that may be
prosecuted by the Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Principles:
1. Definition of Public Office and Public Officer: A public office is
the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.

2. Test or Criterion to Determine Whether or Not an Office is a

Public Office: The most important characteristic which
distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that
the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to
the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public that some portion of the sovereignty of the country,
either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time
being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the
powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a
public officer.
 G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

REYES, R.T., J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of
the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by
then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student
regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and
ending on December 31, 2000.
Petitioner discussed the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in
UP Diliman with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC, the
office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc (OSRFI).
President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance
for the proposed renovation. the renovation of Vinzons Hall failed to materialize.
The succeeding student regent, Kristine Bugayong and Christine Jill De
Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa UP, filed a complaint
for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation,
found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian
D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the
Sandiganbayan.
 Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as

amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over
which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction
over the crime of estafa. It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered
by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public
Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling
under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the
RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received the
P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the
coffers of the government.
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a
public officer since she merely represented her peers.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to
receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of
Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the
information that it was among her functions or duties to receive
funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her
official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan ruled that Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court
has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public
official in relation to his office.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is a public officer.

Held:
Yes. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while the first
part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and
trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities, or educational foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a
board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No.
1606. Thus, her position as a board of regent (UP student regent) is
among those enumerated and the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over her.
It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction
over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. while the first part of
Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by
express provision of law.
 G.R. Nos. 147026-27 September 11, 2009

CAROLINA R. JAVIER, Petitioner,

vs.
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts:
On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, or otherwise
known as the "Book Publishing Industry Development Act", was
enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the State's goal in
promoting the continuing development of the book publishing
industry, through the active participation of the private sector, to
ensure an adequate supply of affordable, quality-produced books
for the domestic and export market.
To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the creation of
the National Book Development Board (NBDB or the Governing
Board, for brevity), which shall be under the administration and
supervision of the Office of the President. The Governing Board
shall be composed of eleven (11) members who shall be appointed
by the President of the Philippines, five (5) of whom shall come from
the government, while the remaining six (6) shall be chosen from
the nominees of organizations of private book publishers, printers,
writers, book industry related activities, students and the private
education sector.
Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board for a term of
one year. During that time, she was also the President of the Book
Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a hold-
over capacity in the following year. On September 14, 1998, she
was again appointed to the same position and for the same period
of one year. Part of her functions as a member of the Governing
Board is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international
book publishing bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was issued by
the Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid
International Book Fair in Spain on October 812, 1997. Based on
her itinerary of travel, she was paid P139,199.00 as her travelling
expenses. Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the
scheduled international book fair did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate, embezzle
and convert to her own personal use and benefit the
aforementioned amount of ₱139,199.00, Philippine currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
Petitioner Javier then filed a Motion to Quash Information,
averring that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction as the original
information did not allege that she is a public official who is
classified as Grade "27" or higher. Neither did the
information charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to
a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or
employee and that she belongs to the Governing Board only as a
private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may
not be charged under R.A. No. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. They held
that the National Book Development Board is a statutory
government agency and the persons who participated therein even if
they are from the private sector, are public officers. Further, the
offense is office-related because the money for her travel abroad
was given to her because of her Directorship in the National Book
Development Board.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Javier is a public officer.
2. Whether or not the crimes of the petitioner is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Held:
The powers and functions of the NBDB lead us to conclude
that they partake of the nature of public functions. A public office is
the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector
to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the
purpose of the government is achieved. She was appointed to the
Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which
the law was enacted are achieved. Moreover, the Court is not
unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-
Graft Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government. Thus, pursuant
to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected
or appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the
President to Governing Board of the NBDB. The fact that she is not
receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No.
8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive
per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every
meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one’s
appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the
government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so
elected or appointed is still considered a public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public
officer as any person who, by direct provision of law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in
the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of
its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public
officer. Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions
in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a
public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions
in the government whether as an employee, agent, and subordinate
official, of any rank or classes. In fine, the petitioner is a public
officer.
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following: Sec.
4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: “All other
national and local officials classified as ‘Grade 27’ and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The Petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions and
Order of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, Respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for
Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now
deceased), a relative of Villapando’s wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of
Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost.
Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente,
Palawan. A Contract of Consultancy dated February 8, 1999 was
executed between the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and
Tiape whereby the former employed the services of Tiape as
Municipal Administrative and Development Planning Consultant in
the Office of the Municipal Mayor for a period of six months from
January 1, 1999 to June 30, 1999 for a monthly salary of
₱26,953.80.
On February 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M.
Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The complaint was resolved against
Villapando and Tiape and the two were charged for violation of
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Villapando holding that
there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should
a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so
long as the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the
law. It stated that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with
absence or lack of legal qualification. A person who possessed the
required legal qualifications for a position may be temporarily
disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the
one year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other
hand, one may not be temporarily disqualified for appointment, but
could not be appointed as he lacked any or all of the required legal
qualifications imposed by law.
The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Held:
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the
qualifications for a position are provided by law and that it may well
be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a
position may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public
position by reason of the one-year prohibition imposed on losing
candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from temporary
disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee possesses all
the qualifications stated in the law.
There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this
interpretation. On the contrary, legal disqualification in Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code simply means disqualification under the
law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing
candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to
any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
Villapando’s contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division’s interpretation of the term legal disqualification lack
cogency. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
circumscribed lexically. Legal disqualification cannot be read as
excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom
the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of
1991.

G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON
C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance
Services Department of the Commission on Elections,
respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed
petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000,
then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of
petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On
February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again
the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a "Temporary"
capacity.
March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec
Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent
Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum
address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner
requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the Law.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and
the right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that
their ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions
on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its
Chairman and members.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law
Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on
the independence of the COMELEC.

Issue/s:
1. Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were
prohibited under the Constitution.
2. Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were
temporary in character.
Held:
1. No. There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no
longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a
final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the
exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of
the President. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed
because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed
appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on
the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of
 the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent
to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim
appointment of a by-passed appointee.
Thus, The ad interim appointments and subsequent
renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do
not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there
were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.

2. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment

because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress. The second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until
such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can
no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and
irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or
designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power.
A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment
 that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to
the three independent constitutional commissions, including
the COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint
permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. The
ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the
President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.

G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner,

vs.
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN,
respondents.
PADILLA, J.:

Facts:
In August 1987, President Cory Aquino designated petitioner
Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights. In December 1987, she extended to Bautista a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. Bautista
took her oath of office and immediately discharged her functions
and duties.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her
presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on
January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under CoA's review
hence filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the immediate
issuance of a TRO before the SC, to declare "as unlawful and
unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any action of
the CA on her lawfully extended appointment on the ground that
they have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to
review her appointment.
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino
appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights but he was not able to sit in his
appointive office because of Bautista’s refusal to surrender her post.
Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides The Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed
by the President. Their tenure in office shall be at the pleasure of
the President. Thus, Bautista may be subsequently removed as
well.
Acting on petitioner’s amended petition and supplemental
urgent ex- parte motion, the Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order directing respondent Mallillin to cease and desist
from effecting the dismissal, courtesy resignation, removal and
reorganization and other similar personnel actions.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the appointment of the Chairman and
Members of the CHR require the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
2. Whether or Not Bautista’s appointment is an ad interim
appointment?

Held:
1. No. Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, it
follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman
of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or participation
of the Commission on Appointments.

To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman

and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not
specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the
Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit,
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution
in the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim

appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very
nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to
appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments
are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but
appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is,
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments,
cannot be ad interim appointments.
 G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
Araullo vs. Aquino III

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP),
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing
the DAP.
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal
that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an
additional P50 Million each as incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estrada's revelation, Secretary Florencio
Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases
to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program explaining that
the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a
program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion.
Secretary Abad clarified that the funds had been released to
the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; and that
it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made
because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up
spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of
the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down.
The revelation also prompted Maria Carolina Araullo,
Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme
Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
was: DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
But Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain
laws particularly the General Appropriations Act (GAA) (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49
of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
When he assumed office in the middle of 2010, President
Aquino made efficiency and transparency in government spending a
significant focus of his Administration. Yet, although such focus
resulted in an improved fiscal deficit of 0.5% in the gross domestic
product (GDP) from January to July of 2011, it also unfortunately
decelerated government project implementation and payment
schedules.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: “No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Whether or not the DAP, and all other executive issuances allegedly
implementing the DAP, violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution.
2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
3. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
4. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause.
5. Whether or not the doctrine of operative fact applicable in the
case.
Held:
1. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the executive and
is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate
the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29, Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn
from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by
law would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via
the DAP.
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to
stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the
context of the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a
function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during
the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate
to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress
did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to
do during the Budget Execution Stage. The President, in
keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had
sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to
adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic
situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose.
He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded
under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP,
and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under
the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense
because the money had been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under
Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
2.   No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse
to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national government
 budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.

3. No, the transfers made through the DAP were

unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP,
this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for
the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also

contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the
GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within
the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the
GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them
in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate,
they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were
not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects
is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

Lastly, DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what

was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of
“savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under
the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year.
But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
 declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.

4. No. The challenge based on the contravention of the

Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of funds
under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The
allegations about Senators and Congressmen being unaware
of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about
some of them having refused to accept such funds were
unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the
Executive discriminated against some legislators on the
ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not
of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal
Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law
should be an issue to be raised only by parties who
supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would
be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated
against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for
the requirement is that only such affected legislators could
properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of
equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial
in their situation. The requirement was not met here.
Consequently, the Court was not put in the position to
determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To have the
Court do so despite the inadequacy of the showing of factual
and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the
outcome would not do justice to those for whose supposed
benefit the claim of denial of equal protection has been made.

5. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the

legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. We find
the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and
implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP
proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences
resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be
ignored or could no longer be undone.
 To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a
void or unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act
is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive,
including those that are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in
nature. The Court held so in Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council.

Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that

the applicability of the operative fact doctrine should be
limited to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the
executive department that are accorded the same status as
that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.
Thus, the minority concludes that the phrase ‘executive act’
used in the case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank
refers only to acts, orders, and rules and regulations that have
the force and effect of law. The minority also made mention of
the Concurring Opinion of Justice Enrique Fernando in
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, where it was supposedly
made explicit that the operative fact doctrine applies to
executive acts, which are ultimately quasi-legislative in nature.

The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It

has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to
reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone.
The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what
they received especially so that they relied on the validity of
the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of
the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good
faith.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the

petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the
following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and
related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in
violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the

implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without
complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in
the General Appropriations Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the

Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices
outside the Executive; and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that

were not covered by any appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act.
 G.R. Nos. 217126-27 November 101 2015
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman, - Petitioner,
vs
COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and JEJOMAR ERWIN S.
BINAY, JR., Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty.
Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas “Ching” Enciso VI before the Office of
the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati, accusing them of
Plunder and violation of Republic AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices
Act in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
Consequently, the Ombudsman put together a Panel of
Investigators to look into the matter. The Panel filed a Complaint
against Binay, Jr., et al., charging them with six administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Services, and six criminal
cases. As to Binay Jr., the Complaint alleged that the procurement
and construction of the Parking Building was plagued with several
anomalies:
1. During Binay, Jr.’s first term, from 2010-2013, he issued a
Notice of Award and approved the release of funds to Hilmarc’s
 Construction Corporation (Hilmarc) for Phases III, IV, and V of
construction, despite the fact that there had been no
publication and no architectural design; and
2. During his second term, from 2013-2016, he once again
approved the release of funds to pay the remaining balance
owed to Hilmarc for construction, and to MANA Architecture
and Interior Design Co. for design and architectural services.
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special
Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and
administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases. Thereafter, on
March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for
each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their
respective counter-affidavits.
Before he was able to comply, however, the Ombudsman
issued a preventive suspension order against him, based on the
following grounds: First, the evidence against Binay, Jr. was strong.
The losing bidders and the members of the Bids and Awards
Committee of Makati City had attested to the alleged irregularities,
the documents on record negated the publication of bids, and the
disbursement vouchers, checks, and receipts showed that there had
been a release of funds; Second, the administrative offenses with
which he was charged, if proven true, would have warranted
removal from public service under the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS); and Third,
Binay, Jr.’s position gave him access to public records and the
ability to influence possible witnesses, and his continued stay in
office would have prejudiced the investigation.
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order
was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon
Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.’s staff.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying
for: (1) The nullification of the preventive suspension order; and (2)
A TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. According to him,
he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous
activity attending any of the five phases of the construction of the
Makati Parking Building. Moreover, he claimed that the
Ombudsman had failed to show that the evidence of his guilt was
strong enough so as to warrant the issuance of a preventive
suspension order.
DILG National Capital Region caused the implementation of
the preventive suspension order. Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V.
Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor. The
CA issued granted Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding
Pena, Jr.’s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
On March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition
before the Supreme Court, assailing the CA’s Resolution, which
granted Binay, Jr.’s prayer for TRO.
The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to
grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770 or
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 which states that no injunctive writ
could be issued to delay the Ombudsman’s investigation unless
there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is
outside the latter’s jurisdiction. In his comment, Binay, Jr. argues
that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically
grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of government, including the Office of the
Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this
case when said office issued the preventive suspension order
against him.
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to
its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is
irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The
Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which shouldhave been raised by
Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that,
at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed
acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for
reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman’s plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy.
2. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the
main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453.
3. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue
a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman; -YES
4. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine –NO

Held:
1. Yes. A common requirement to both a petition
for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner
has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. This case tests the constitutional and
statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government
institutions - namely,the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue
of transcendental public importance that demands no less
than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the
equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public
officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As
such, the Ombudsman’s direct resort to certiorari and
prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to
move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in
CA-G.R. SP No.139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the
CA, is justified.

2. Yes. According to the Court, this limits the remedy

against decisions or findings of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45
appeal. The assailed provision attempts to increase the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence; hence it is ultra vires. The Court concludes that
the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 petition. In this case, the basis for the CA’s
subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr’s main petition
for certiorari is found in Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129,
states that the Court of Appeals shall exercise original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. In view of the concurrence of these
courts’ jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts should be followed. Further, the power of a
court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides
with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes,
and other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction
into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, When Congress creates a court and delimits its
jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is
exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman
misconceives, because it does not define, prescribe, and
apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act
on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts,
particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP
129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead,
through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional
remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral
and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power.
Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be
manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefore,
there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers
principle. Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of
procedure without the Court’s consent thereto, it remains that
the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive
 writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr.

3. No. By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a

penalty but only a preventive measure. Jurisprudential law
establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as
preventive measure and suspension as penalty.
OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any
provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its
preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her
office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She
advances the idea that "in order to further ensure her office's
independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs
traditionally obtainable from the courts," claiming that said
writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or
political pressure would." Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the
first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's
independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional
bodies. the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers
three (3) things:

I. Creation by the Constitution, which means

that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges,
be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto
is made;

II. Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that

the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom
to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane
to [its] functions; hence, its budget cannot be
strategically decreased by officials of the political
branches of government so as to impair said
functions;
 III. Third: insulation from executive supervision
and control, which means that those within the
ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an
internal authority. Evidently, all three aspects of
independence intend to protect the Office of the
Ombudsmanfrompolitical harassment and
pressure,so as to free it from the "insidious
tentacles of politics.”
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot
be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which
are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even
justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be
exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a
provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension
order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating
the office from political harassment or pressure.
4. As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's
resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive
writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation
doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing
the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case
ofGovernor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution
directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the
cases ofAguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia,and
again,Governor Garcia, Jr.Thus, by merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time,
unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that
the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its
legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly
issued.

The condonation doctrine is a principle which connotes

this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will
be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law.
Hence, the SC simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. It was a doctrine
adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and
thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by – the
current legal regime. In consequence, this case led to the
Supreme Court abandoning such condonation doctrine that
originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following
the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by
the CA.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been

for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorariinCA-G.R.
SP No. 139453on the merits. However, considering that the
Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay,
Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty
of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, for the present
administrative charges against him, the said CA petition
appears to have been mooted.313As initially intimated, the
preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that,
at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the
Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more
purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the
office's process of investigation in the instant administrative
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

 G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

VITUG, J.:

Facts:
The case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees
of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation against
petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-
Graft andCorrupt Practices Act. In Oct 1988, Santiago approved the
application for legalization of the stay ofabout 32 aliens. Her act
was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith. Two other
criminal cases,one for violation of the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were also filedwith the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-
94555 and No. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan,
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the
arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00)
Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical
appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in
a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional
liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would
warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by
the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come
unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an
order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash
bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a
recognizance.
The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until
05June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her
physical appearance in court. After a long series of appeals and
court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the
latter moved for the suspension of Santiago from office who was
already a senator by then,. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate
president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and to
defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. Her
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner then filed a
motion for bill of particulars with the Sandiganbayan averring that
the names of the aliens were conspicuously omitted in the
complaint. Later, the OSP and Ombudsman consolidate the
amended information.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to
Redetermine Probable Cause and to dismiss or quash said
information. The prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to issue an order. This led to the assailed decision of the
Sandiganbayan, resolving to suspend petitioner, now a Senator.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the act of the Sandiganbayan valid.
2. Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a
member of the Senate withoutviolating the Constitution.

Held:
1. Yes. It is within the authority of the Sandiganbayan to
order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019.
RA 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to
have committed the acts with which he has been charged. It is
also the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the
information filed before it. The court reiterated that the
preventive suspension is not a penalty since if acquitted, the
accused is reinstated to his previous position plus back wages.
The order of suspension under RA 3019 is different from the
power of Congress to discipline its members under the
Constitution. The constitutional provision is a punitive
measure imposed by the Senate or HOR upon an erring
member. On the other hand, R.A. 3019 does not exclude from
its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.
2. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be
deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from
Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim
simply recognizes each of the three co-equals and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government
has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own
sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from
unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. It
would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to
issue an order of suspension upon determination of the
validity of the information filed before it.
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form
and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course. In issuing the preventive
suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered
to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public
officials and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage
the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case
No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to
render this decision for future guidance on the significant
issue raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is

DISMISSED. No costs.