How Easily Does a Social Difference

Become a Status Distinction? Gender

Matters
Cecilia L. Ridgeway Kristen Backor
Stanford University Stanford University

Yan E. Li Justine E. Tinkler

Stanford University Louisiana State University

Kristan G. Erickson
Stanford University

Are people quick to adopt status beliefs about a social difference that lead them to treat
others unequally? In a test of status construction theory, two experiments show that men
and women form equally strong status beliefs from only two encounters with others. Men
act powerfully on these new beliefs in their next encounters with others but women do
not, possibly because women face greater social risks for acting on ambiguous status
advantages. Women are just as likely as men, however, to treat someone unequally on the
basis of an established status distinction. This suggests that men are first movers in the
emergence of status distinctions, but women eventually adopt the distinctions as well.
Our results show that people readily transform social differences into status
distinctions—distinctions that act as formidable forces of inequality.

tatus distinctions based on social differ-

S ences such as gender, race, or ethnicity are
consequential for social inequality because they
affect how people are treated and how they treat
others in turn. Status distinctions implicitly bias
the everyday processes through which people
are evaluated, given access to rewards, and
directed toward or away from positions of power
and prestige in society (Berger et al. 1977;
Berger and Webster 2006). The aggregate result
of this unequal treatment is to transform cate-
gorical differences between people into sys-
tematic axes of inequality. A mere difference
Direct correspondence to Cecilia Ridgeway,
Department of Sociology, 450 Serra Mall, Building
120, Stanford, CA 94305-2047 (ridgeway@
stanford.edu).This research was supported by
National Science Foundation grant SES-0417404 to
the senior author. We are grateful to Shelley J. Correll
for comments on an earlier draft of this article.
between people becomes a status difference
when status beliefs develop that associate
greater social esteem and competence with peo-
ple in one category than with those from anoth-
er and these beliefs become widely disseminated
throughout a population (Berger and Webster
2006). Status beliefs become consequential for
inequality at the point when they begin to shape
how people treat one another.
Status distinctions likely develop as initial
beliefs among some individuals, acquire a grow-
ing appearance of social validity or certainty for
those individuals so that they begin to act on the
beliefs, and then eventually spread until they are
widely held in the population (Ridgeway 1991,
2006). Status distinctions thus have dynamic
social histories. Their initial development may
go smoothly or may be disrupted so that some
social differences do not become widely shared
status distinctions and axes of inequality
(Ridgeway and Correll 2006). Established sta-
tus distinctions can also fade if changing social

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2009, VOL. 74 (February:44–62)

 HOW EASILY DOES DIFFERENCE BECOME STATUS?—–45
conditions undermine their validity so that peo-
ple become less likely to act on them. For exam-
ple, ethnic differences among Whites in the
United States, such as being Irish or Italian,
have lost status significance in recent decades.
To gain an analytic purchase on the dynamic
processes by which status distinctions develop,
we need to better understand the key juncture
in this process: At what point do new status
beliefs become powerful enough to affect the
way people treat one another?
How easily do people form status beliefs
about a social difference that are sufficiently
firm as to cause them to treat others unequally
on the basis of the difference? If people are
quick to leap to status assumptions that shape
their behavior toward socially different others,
then status distinctions have the potential to
develop readily in populations and to act as a
formidable force for social inequality. An answer
to this question is essential for understanding the
power of the processes by which status inequal-
ities emerge in society.
This article addresses this question by draw-
ing on status construction theory, a contempo-
rary theory of how status beliefs develop and
spread widely throughout a population
(Ridgeway 1991, 2000, 2006; Troyer 2003;
Webster and Hysom 1998). We also draw on evi-
dence suggesting that gender matters at the ini-
tial point when people begin treating others
according to a newly emerging status distinction.
The literature on gender stereotyping suggests
that women will be more cautious about acting
on newly forming status beliefs. Using two
experiments, we evaluate how easily people
form status beliefs that cause them to treat oth-
ers unequally. Each experiment allows us to
examine the process separately for men and for
women.
STATUS BELIEFS
Status beliefs associate social worthiness and
competence at “the things that count” with rec-
ognized social differences. Unlike the in-group
favoritism that can arise from the simple per-
ception of group difference, status beliefs are
consensual. They are accepted or conceded as
a matter of social reality by those they disad-
vantage as well as those they advantage (Brewer
and Brown 1998; Tajfel and Turner 1986).
Status beliefs have the character of a social
reputation because they are beliefs about which
categories or groups are more respected. They
are beliefs about what “most people” think or,
in the case of newly forming status beliefs, what
most people would think if they were exposed
to the social difference. An assumption that sta-
tus beliefs are widely shared, and thus socially
valid, gives status beliefs force in social relations
because it implies that others are likely to treat
one in terms of those beliefs. Social validity is
the collective dimension of legitimacy, a sense
that others will accept something in a situation,
whether or not the actor approves (Weber
1968:31–33). If others are likely to treat actors
according to an implied status belief, then actors
must take those beliefs into account in their
own behavior. As we shall see, the apparent
social validity of status beliefs is an important
determinant of people’s willingness to treat oth-
ers according to those beliefs (Berger, Ridgeway,
and Zelditch 2002).
STATUS CONSTRUCTION THEORY
Status construction theory describes a set of
processes that are capable of creating status
beliefs and spreading them widely in a popula-
tion (Ridgeway 1991, 2006; Webster and Hysom
1998). The theory focuses on the local contexts
in which people from different categories of a
social difference encounter one another. It
argues that under certain conditions, these local
encounters create experiences that induce par-
ticipants to form status beliefs about their social
difference. Furthermore, such local encounters
spread status beliefs because participants carry
them into other encounters and “teach” them to
new participants by treating them in accord
with the belief. The result is a diffusion process
that can spread status beliefs widely throughout
a population.
When do beliefs formed in local contexts
spread widely in a population? And which cat-
egory of a social difference will be cast as high-
er status? To answer these questions, the theory
turns to the social structural conditions that
frame the local contexts in which people from
different categories encounter one another.
Particularly important is whether people from
one category are structurally advantaged in
some factor, such as material resources or tech-
nology, that provides a systematic advantage in
46—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
gaining influence over those from another cat-
egory. If this is the case, then status beliefs
favoring the advantaged group are likely to
overwhelm counter beliefs in the population
and spread to become widely held
(Ridgeway1991, 2006).
According to the theory, local encounters
cause participants to form status beliefs by pre-
senting them with apparently valid associations
between a social difference and indicators of
esteem and competence, such as influence and
deference (Ridgeway 2000, 2006). Specifically,
when people from different categories of a rec-
ognized social difference must regularly coop-
erate to achieve their goals, hierarchies of
influence and esteem are likely to develop in
these intercategory encounters just as they do in
virtually all cooperative, goal-oriented encoun-
ters. The formation of this hierarchy creates a
shared reality for the participants in which a per-
son from one category, say an A, is more active,
influential, and apparently more competent,
while the other person, a B, is cast into the role
of reacting to the A. The hierarchy develops
implicitly through many small behaviors so its
origins are obscure for the participants while the
social difference is salient. Through the unfold-
ing of events, it is simply revealed that the A is
more proactive, influential, and competent, and
the B is more reactive and apparently less com-
petent.
Because both As and Bs participate in these
events, the patterns that they enact appear con-
sensual. As a result, the social validity of what
the pattern reveals about As and Bs becomes dif-
ficult for the participants to deny. If subsequent
encounters repeat the same pattern, either in
the way the actor is treated or in behavior the
actor witnesses between others, the apparent
consensual support for this pattern seems even
broader. Eventually, even the Bs are forced to
concede, as a matter of social reality, that “most
people” would rate As in general as higher sta-
tus and more competent than Bs. The repeated,
consistent appearance of consensus in the local
situations “bootstraps” the formation of status
beliefs. It pushes actors to presume that most
others outside the local contexts would also
accept such a belief as valid. If others will
accept a pattern that links the social difference
to esteem and competence, then the actor has
good reason to form a status belief about that
difference too, if for no other reason than to
anticipate and manage the likely behavior and
judgments of others. According to status con-
struction theory, then, encounters between
socially different actors create status beliefs by
presenting their participants with apparently
valid local realities in which differences in influ-
ence and competence are associated with a
social difference.
Once actors form an initial status belief about
a social difference, what affects whether they act
on it and treat others in new situations accord-
ing to the belief? When status beliefs are shared,
they act as common knowledge that allows
actors to coordinate their behavior (Chwe 2001).
The sense that a status belief is socially valid is
the sense that it will be accepted by most oth-
ers and therefore can be relied on to help actors
anticipate the behavior of others and effective-
ly coordinate their own behavior. While a valid
status belief coordinates behavior, action on a
status belief of uncertain validity risks a failure
of coordination and a potentially confusing and
embarrassing social breach. Action on beliefs of
uncertain social validity, therefore, is poten-
tially awkward and socially costly.
This suggests that for an actor to transfer a
fledgling new status belief to a different situa-
tion, and spontaneously treat another according
to that belief, it must appear to be a convincingly
valid indicator of how people from different
social categories are likely to behave. As a result,
initial status beliefs are likely to require some
degree of further validation before they become
a basis for behavior (Berger et al. 2002). Status
construction theory assumes that the validity of
a new status belief is further strengthened by
subsequent encounters that support it and under-
mined by those that contradict it (Ridgeway
1991, 2006). Multiple, consistent, and clearly
valid local experiences are likely necessary to
induce new status beliefs that are strong enough
to affect actors’ treatment of others.
DOES GENDER MATTER IN ACTING
ON INITIAL STATUS BELIEFS?
Nothing in status construction theory’s argu-
ments implies that the process should differ by
gender. As we shall see, tests of the theory have
found no gender differences in the initial for-
mation of status beliefs about social differences
(Ridgeway et al. 1998; Ridgeway and Correll
2006; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). Decades
 HOW EASILY DOES DIFFERENCE BECOME STATUS?—–47
of research on expectation states similarly shows
no systematic differences between men and
women in the likelihood that they will treat oth-
ers unequally on the basis of established status
differences, with the occasional exception of the
status characteristic of gender itself (see Berger
and Webster 2006; Foschi and Lapointe 2002;
Rashotte and Webster 2005).
Status construction theory’s arguments do
imply, however, that acting on status beliefs of
uncertain validity is socially risky. There is evi-
dence from research on gender that the social
risk of asserting influence over another without
the backing of a valid status advantage is greater
for women than for men, other things being
equal (Eagly and Karau 2002; Rudman and
Fairchild 2004; Rudman and Glick 2001). While
men and women do not appear to differ in their
propensity to form status beliefs or act on well
established beliefs, they may differ in their ini-
tial willingness to act on emerging beliefs
because of the different risk environments that
they face.
Cultural beliefs about gender (i.e., gender
stereotypes) carry not only descriptive infor-
mation about how men and women are cultur-
ally assumed to be, but prescriptive information
about how they should be (Fiske 1998). The
principal prescriptive requirement for women is
that they appear communal in interpersonal
relations (Cancian 1987; Eagly and Karau
2002). Women are expected to appear relative-
ly kind, helpful, concerned about others, and
generally “nice.” The difficulty is that this
requirement to be communal is culturally per-
ceived to conflict with the assertion of superi-
ority or dominance. As Rudman and Glick
(2001) show, the assertion of superiority is per-
ceived as “not being nice” and thus as a viola-
tion of prescriptive gender expectations for
women. As a result, unless a woman’s right to
do so is clearly legitimated in a particular situ-
ation, her assertion of influence over another can
provoke a negative “backlash” reaction from
others of both sexes (Rudman and Glick 2001).
A number of studies demonstrate these backlash
reactions to women’s assertions of superiority
(see Rudman and Fairchild 2004). Rudman and
Fairchild (2004) show that actors generally rec-
ognize the sanctions they face for violating pre-
scriptive gender expectations and thus try to
avoid them.
Expectation states research on legitimacy
shows that similar backlash reactions can occur
when lower status actors attempt to assert them-
selves in relation to higher status actors (i.e., get
“above” their place) without a clearly estab-
lished right to do so (Berger et al. 1998;
Ridgeway, Johnson, and Diekema 1994). The
backlash reactions that women’s violations of
prescriptive communality elicit are in addition
to those that status violations can invoke. They
thus can occur even in situations where gender
status is not typically salient, such as in all
female groups. Due to the distinctive cultural
requirements for communality to which women
are held, women are particularly at risk of receiv-
ing negative reactions to their “unjustified”
assertions of superiority, even compared with
other lower status actors.
All else being equal, women may face a high-
er risk of incurring negative sanctions or social
costs than would men for acting on a newly
formed status belief of uncertain social validi-
ty. It therefore seems plausible that women
require more validation of their new status
beliefs before acting on them. There are two
sides to this process. Women are likely to be cau-
tious about asserting a status advantage over
another on the basis of a new belief. To a less-
er extent, the same prescriptive gender expec-
tations are also likely to make women reluctant
to grant another woman a status advantage over
them if that advantage is “unjustified” (i.e.,
based on a belief of uncertain validity).
People are likely to require multiple valid,
consistent experiences before forming new sta-
tus beliefs that are sufficient to shape the way
they treat others, and women may require more
such experiences than men. But how many is
“multiple”? Do people treat a social difference
as a status distinction after just a few experi-
ences, say two or three? Or do people require
extensive confirmation before acting? What, if
any, are the gender differences in this process?
The answers affect the potential ease and speed
with which status distinctions develop and
spread in a population to become axes of social
inequality.
EVIDENCE OF STATUS BELIEF
FORMATION IN LOCAL CONTEXTS
To address these questions empirically, it is use-
ful to review what we already know about the
48—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

formation of status beliefs in encounters ly? Also, can we document gender differences
between people from different social categories. in this process? We conducted two experiments
Computer simulations confirm that a status to examine these questions, an initial test and
belief about a social difference could plausibly then an improved, more important second study.
diffuse widely in a population if local encoun-
ters create and spread status beliefs as status EXPERIMENT 1
construction theory argues (Ridgeway and
Balkwell 1997). Therefore, empirical investi- METHOD
gations have focused on whether local contexts OVERVIEW. The 2 ⫻ 2 design of the experiment
actually do induce their participants to form crossed the status of a subject’s own categori-
status beliefs as claimed. Experiments show cal group in the status beliefs to be induced
that men and women form similar, clearly (high or low) with the gender composition (all
defined status beliefs about a previously uneval- male or all female) of their encounters. We
uated categorical difference from only two con- excluded mixed-sex encounters from the design
sistent, repeated encounters with those of the to avoid confounding the status effects of gen-
other category (Ridgeway et al. 1998; Ridgeway der (which are salient in mixed-sex settings)
and Erickson 2000). Another experiment con- with the effects of newly formed status beliefs
firms that the formation of status beliefs in
(Wagner and Berger 1997). We randomly
these encounters turns on social validity, as the
assigned 98 undergraduates (46 males and 52
theory claims (Ridgeway and Correll 2006).
females) to conditions within sex, resulting in
This suggests that status beliefs not only form
23 males and 26 females each in the high and
as the theory predicts, but they do so rather
low status conditions. All subjects participated
quickly for both men and women.
in three dyadic encounters, each time with a dif-
Experiments support other important ele-
ferent same-sex partner, in which the pairs
ments of the theory, including the idea that bias-
worked on consecutive rounds of a cooperative
ing factors like material resources shape the
decision-making task. In each encounter, sub-
nature of the status beliefs that people form
jects’ partners differed from them on a newly
(Ridgeway et al. 1998). Experiments also con-
introduced social difference.
firm that people spread status beliefs by treat-
The first two rounds induced status beliefs
ing others according to the status belief, creating
about the new difference by replicating proce-
a diffusion process that disseminates status
dures from a key status construction experi-
beliefs in the population (Ridgeway and
ment (Ridgeway et al. 1998). This study
Erickson 2000).
demonstrated that encounters create status
The power of this diffusion process depends
beliefs favoring one categorical group over
on how quickly status beliefs become suffi-
another when a group possesses an advantage
ciently valid for people to act on them in a new
in material resources (in this case, pay) that is
encounter. The theory’s argument that people do
reflected in influence advantages in intercate-
eventually act on their new status beliefs in sub-
gory encounters (as pay differences typically
sequent encounters derives from expectation
are) (Stewart and Moore 1992). After two
states research that shows that people transfer
rounds following these procedures, subjects
modifications of existing status beliefs to new
completed a measure of their status beliefs about
situations (Markovsky et al. 1984). Existing
the new social difference. They then worked
status beliefs, however, already have general
on round 3 of the task with a new same-sex
validity in society (i.e., they are assumed to be
partner who also differed from them on the new
shared by most people), which facilitates their
distinction. In round 3, we examined whether
transfer to new situations. The transfer of a
subjects treated this partner according to their
newly formed status belief from one situation
new status beliefs by deferring to a partner
to the next is a more uncertain process.
believed to be high status and not deferring to
Our question now becomes, if people report
a partner believed to be low status.
clear status beliefs after only two consistent
encounters, are these beliefs already so strong
that people will spontaneously transfer them to PROCEDURES AND MANIPULATIONS. Following
the next encounter and treat others according- Ridgeway and colleagues (1998), subjects first
 HOW EASILY DOES DIFFERENCE BECOME STATUS?—–49
completed a brief background information form
about education, prizes won, and employment
history. To create a salient but unevaluated social
difference between subjects and their partners,
subjects then completed a “personal response
style test” in which they chose between pairs of
paintings by Klee and Kandinsky, based on
which they preferred. The abstract, purely visu-
al nature of the test, borrowed from social iden-
tity studies of “mere difference,” was designed
to minimize possible confounding associations
with established social or behavioral differences
(Tajfel and Turner 1986). We told subjects that
the test differentiates between two types of peo-
ple, S2s and Q2s, whose distinct response styles
are stable aspects of their selves. Supposedly,
there are roughly equal numbers of S2s and
Q2s in the world. Next, we told subjects that
“based on the information the laboratory has”
they had been assigned to a pay rate either $3
above (high in-group status conditions) or $3
below (low in-group status conditions) that of
their round 1 partner. They then learned that they
were either an S2 or a Q2 and their partner was
the opposite (a Q2 or an S2). Participants signed
a pay sheet suggesting that other S2s and Q2s
similarly differed somewhat in pay. Whether
subjects were S2s or Q2s was counterbalanced
within conditions.
Seated in a separate room, subjects then
began work via an audio link with their round
1 partner on a 10-trial, computerized, coopera-
tive decision task, completing a brief question-
naire at the end. Next, subjects learned that
their round 2 partner also differed from them on
the S2/Q2 distinction and in pay. They began
work with this partner over the verbal link on
an additional 10 trials of the task.
The “meaning insight” task required subject-
partner teams to correctly associate English
words with one of three words supposedly from
a reconstructed language. On each trial, subject
and partner made an initial choice, verbally dis-
cussed this choice, and then privately entered
their final choice. The theory argues that influ-
ence differences will induce status beliefs in
encounters. Pay differences typically lead to
influence differences by creating differences in
confidence and assertiveness (Stewart and
Moore 1992). To ensure that this happened so
that clear influence hierarchies arose, the round
1 and round 2 partners were confederates who
acted hesitantly and deferentially when the sub-
ject was better paid (high in-group status con-
ditions) and confidently and assertively when
the subject was lower paid (low in-group status
conditions) (see Ridgeway et al. 1998). To track
influence, confederate-partners announced a
different initial choice than the subject on 8 of
10 trials in round 1, and 7 of 10 trials in round
2. Subjects’ acceptance of influence is the per-
cent of these disagreement trials in which sub-
jects changed their final responses to agree with
their partners’ choices.
Clear influence hierarchies developed in both
rounds; subjects deferred to their partners in low
status conditions (mean acceptance of influ-
ence, 80 percent) but resisted their partners’
influence in high status conditions (mean influ-
ence, 48 percent). Subjects clearly perceived
these hierarchies. Differences between ratings
(on 9-point scales) of their own influence and
that of their partners favored them in high sta-
tus conditions (mean difference = 1.99) and
favored their partners in low status conditions
(mean difference = –2.67). Neither actual nor
perceived influence differed by gender. Rounds
1 and 2 created two encounters for subjects in
which the partners who differed from them on
the S2/Q2 distinction also consistently differed
from them in pay and influence.
MEASURES OF STATUS BELIEFS. At the end of
these two encounters, subjects responded to 7-
point semantic differential items. The items
asked how “most people” and, separately, how
the subject personally view the typical S2 and
the typical Q2 in terms of status (respected–not
respected, high status–low status, leader–fol-
lower, powerful–powerless), competence (com-
petent–incompetent, knowledgeable–not
knowledgeable, capable–incapable), and social
considerateness (considerate–inconsiderate,
cooperative–uncooperative, likeable–unlike-
able, pleasant–unpleasant). All these scales were
reliable, as indicated by Cronbach’s alphas rang-
ing from .77 to .95 (average = .87). The “most
people” scales for status and competence con-
stitute the primary measure of status beliefs
about the S2/Q2 distinction because they cap-
ture the distinctive reputational nature of such
beliefs.
ACTING ON STATUS BELIEFS. We began round
3 by telling subjects that they would now work
50—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

on the task with a third same-sex partner, also
from the opposite S2/Q2 group. We gave no
information about this partner’s pay level. This
time, subject and partner worked via computer
without an audio link and exchanged initial
choices without discussion. The round 3 part-
ner was actually a programmed other who pre-
sented a constant stimulus to which subjects
could potentially react differently based on their
newly formed status beliefs. The programmed
partner’s initial choices disagreed with those
of the subject on 9 of the 12 task trials. The
extent to which subjects deferred to their round
3 partners by changing their answers to agree
with the partner provides our primary measure
of whether subjects transferred their new status
beliefs to these partners and treated them
unequally on the basis of those beliefs. A short
post-round questionnaire, using a 7-point scale,
asked subjects how capable they thought S2s
(Q2s) were compared to Q2s (S2s) at most tasks
in general. This provides a measure of whether
subjects continued to report status beliefs about
the S2/Q2 distinction after round 3.
RESULTS
FORMING STATUS BELIEFS. The first task is to
ascertain whether male and female subjects
formed clear status beliefs about the S2/Q2 dis-
tinction after round 2. The top half of Table 1
displays the mean ratings (on 7-point scales) that
subjects in each condition thought “most peo-
ple” would assign to their in-group and to the
other group on scales evaluating status, com-
petence, and considerateness. We analyzed these
rating measures with mixed model ANOVAs
in which status condition (i.e., in-group
pay/influence) and sex were between subject

Table 1. Experiment 1: Mean Perceived Evaluations of In-Group and Other Group (with Standard
Deviations)

Condition
Low In-Group Pay/Influence High In-Group Pay/Influence
Female Male Female Male
Mean of “Most People’s” Evaluations
—Status
———In-Group 3.96 (1.05) 4.37 (.89) 5.58 (.96) 5.62 (.77)
———Other Group 5.52 (1.01) 5.20 (.95) 3.84 (.91) 3.62 (.80)
———Difference –1.56 (1.49) –.83 (1.45) 1.74 (1.49) 2.00 (1.36)
—Competence
———In-Group 4.68 (1.20) 4.99 (.93) 5.67 (.85) 5.61 (.65)
———Other Group 5.58 (.87) 5.28 (.95) 4.36 (1.07) 4.32 (.87)
———Difference –.90 (1.44) –.29 (1.42) 1.31 (1.55) 1.29 (1.23)
—Considerate
———In-Group 5.63 (1.22) 5.48 (.96) 5.09 (.93) 4.22 (1.20)
———Other Group 3.92 (1.10) 4.04 (1.40) 6.21 (.73) 5.80 (.63)
———Difference 1.70 (1.40) 1.43 (1.76) –1.13 (1.06) –1.59 (1.52)

Mean of “Personal” Evaluations

—Status
———In-Group 3.95 (1.18) 4.07 (1.14) 5.35 (1.02) 5.33 (.92)
———Other Group 5.31 (.86) 4.95 (.92) 3.94 (.91) 3.71 (1.04)
———Difference –1.36 (1.56) –.88 (1.57) 1.40 (1.64) 1.62 (1.73)
—Competence
———In-Group 5.32 (1.09) 5.33 (1.13) 4.77 (1.24) 5.46 (.85)
———Other Group 5.35 (.95) 4.77 (1.15) 4.47 (1.00) 4.46 (.96)
———Difference –.03 (1.72) .57 (1.63) .29 (1.66) 1.00 (1.28)
—Considerate
———In-Group 5.84 (1.34) 5.78 (1.00) 5.63 (1.02) 5.07 (1.06)
———Other Group 3.59 (1.37) 3.89 (1.51) 6.41 (.71) 5.98 (.70)
———Difference 2.25 (1.92) 1.89 (1.99) –.79 (.90) –.91 (1.22)
 HOW EASILY DOES DIFFERENCE BECOME STATUS?—–51
factors and reported ratings of in-group versus
other group were a within subject factor.
The top left quadrant of Table 1 shows the sta-
tus and competence ratings reported by sub-
jects in conditions in which their in-group was
lower paid and less influential (low in-group sta-
tus conditions). Both males and females in these
conditions reported that most people would rate
the typical member of their own S2/Q2 group
as lower status and less competent than the typ-
ical member of the other group. Males and
females who were consistently more influential
and better paid than members of the other group
(high in-group status conditions) thought most
would rate their in-group as higher status and
more competent than the other group (top right
quadrant of Table 1).
The easiest way to grasp this pattern is to look
at the mean differences between ratings of the
in-group and the other group in terms of status
(Table 1, row 3) and competence (Table 1, row
6). For males and females in low in-group
pay/influence conditions, these difference scores
are negative, indicating that the in-group was
rated lower than the out-group on both scales.
For males and females in high in-group
pay/influence conditions, the difference scores
are positive, showing that the in-group was rated
more highly than the other group. These ratings
of status and competence show the classic struc-
ture of status beliefs in which individuals in
both the status advantaged group and the status
disadvantaged group agree that the advantaged
are higher status. In the ANOVAs, this pattern
of results is reflected in powerful interaction
effects between in-group pay/influence condi-
tion and the perceived rating of the in-group ver-
sus the other group. For “most people’s” ratings
of both status and competence, this interaction
is highly significant (for status, F = 108.57, p
< .001; for competence, F = 43.33, p < .001) and
there are no differences by gender in these rat-
ings (p > .30 for all tests).
While ratings of “most people’s” views best
reflect the reputational nature of status beliefs,
it is also interesting to examine subjects’ per-
sonal ratings of S2s and Q2s. The bottom half
of Table 1 presents these results, shown as mean
ratings of a subject’s in-group and the other
group. As in previous studies, personal ratings
were very similar to estimates of most people’s
views (Ridgeway et al. 1998; Ridgeway and
Correll 2006). Subjects in high pay/influence
conditions agreed that their in-group was high-
er status than the other group, just as those in
low pay/influence conditions conceded that their
in-group was lower status than the other group
(F = 64.01, p < .001). At a personal level, how-
ever, subjects resisted the idea that there were
competence differences between the S2/Q2
groups (F = 1.38, n.s.).
Also as in previous studies, the ratings for the
in-group and other group of social consider-
ateness, for both “most people” and the subject
personally (Table 1, rows 7 to 9 and 16 to 18),
show a compensatory pattern. Members of
groups perceived as higher status (i.e., high
pay/influence groups) were seen as less social-
ly considerate than members of groups rated as
lower status (for “most people’s” ratings, F =
99.72, p < .001; for personal ratings, F = 83.74,
p < .001). Research suggests that this compen-
satory pattern is typical of cultural beliefs about
status differences between social groups in
North America (Conway, Pizzamiglio, and
Mount 1996).
As expected, after two consistent encoun-
ters, subjects did form status beliefs about the
S2/Q2 distinction that favored the group whose
members had a pay and influence advantage.
Subjects formed these beliefs even when they
cast their own S2/Q2 group as lower status.
Importantly, there were no gender differences in
the formation of status beliefs.
ACTING ON STATUS BELIEFS. The question,
then, is did subjects transfer these new status
beliefs to the round 3 partner and treat that part-
ner unequally on the basis of them? As Figure
1 shows, male subjects clearly did but female
subjects did not. Males in in-group low status
conditions deferred to their partner’s influence
in 54 percent of the round 3 disagreement tri-
als. Those in the in-group high status conditions
accepted their partner’s influence in only 40
percent of the trials, a significant difference in
an ANOVA (simple main effect of in-group sta-
tus for males, F = 6.27, p = .014). Females, in
contrast, accepted their round 3 partner’s influ-
ence at an intermediate rate (43 and 46 per-
cent) that shows no effects (F < 1, n.s.) of the
clear status beliefs they reported at the end of
round 2.
If females failed to act on their status beliefs
in round 3, it was not because they gave up
those beliefs. At the end of round 3, subjects in
52—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Figure 1. Experiment 1: Round 3 Acceptance of Influence by In-Group Status and Gender
low status conditions still rated their in-group
as relatively less capable at most tasks than the
other group (mean = 3.85), compared with how
those in high status conditions rated their in-
group (mean = 4.77, F = 20.59, p < .001). There
were no gender differences in this tendency (for
both main and interaction effects p > .20).
Were women perhaps more reluctant than
men to treat others according to new status
beliefs because women themselves are a low sta-
tus group? Yet, an examination of another low
status group, racial minorities, shows that minor-
ity subjects do not differ substantially from
Whites in their tendency to treat their round 3
partner differentially.1 In a regression of round
3 acceptance of influence with gender, status
condition, and their interaction in the model, the
main effect of race (White versus Other) is not
significant (p > .20). Because an inspection of
the data showed a slight trend toward White
1
Because teams were same sex and subjects did
not know the race of their partners, it is unlikely that
the status implications of either gender or race were
immediately salient for subjects. Instead, this analy-
sis and a similar analysis for Experiment 2 ask
whether the cumulative experience of the status dis-
advantages of being female or non-White in the
United States creates a similar, learned hesitance to
act on new status beliefs.
males treating their round 3 partners more dif-
ferentially based on status condition than do
other groups, we added a 3-way interaction
effect (gender, status, and race) to the regression
model, but this, too, is not significant (p > .20).
These analyses are limited by the fact that our
group of non-White subjects, while reasonably
large (39 non-Whites, 50 Whites, and nine miss-
ing values on race), was a heterogeneous com-
bination of Asians, Latinos, and African
Americans who vary in racial status. We thus
cannot rule out the possibility of an effect of
belonging to a low status group, in addition to
the distinctive gender effect. Only gender, how-
ever, significantly predicts reluctance to act on
new status beliefs, perhaps because cultural
expectations for communality are more strong-
ly associated with women than with other low
status groups.
SUMMARY
The results of the first experiment are clear.
After two consistent encounters that presented
participants with apparently valid associations
between a social difference and influence and
esteem, male subjects formed status beliefs that
they were willing to transfer to their next
encounter with a person from the other catego-
ry and to act on them by treating that person
unequally. Women also formed status beliefs
 HOW EASILY DOES DIFFERENCE BECOME STATUS?—–53
that were indistinguishable from men’s, but they
did not act on these beliefs in their next
encounter. The greater risk for women of treat-
ing another unequally on the basis of uncertain
beliefs may have made them more cautious
about acting on their new beliefs without addi-
tional validation (and more resistant to other
women who did seem to act on them).
Although Experiment 1 offers a useful first
test of our arguments, it has distinctive limita-
tions. The structure of the experiment as three
consecutive encounters within a single session
raises two concerns. The length of this three-
round session caused considerable fatigue
among subjects, which may have introduced
noise into the results and created an unreliable
appearance of gender differences in behavior.
Also, because round 3 took place in the same
setting that created the status beliefs, we cannot
be certain that even male subjects would have
taken their new status beliefs with them after
they left the setting.
Finally, the first experiment used procedures
to induce status beliefs that associate pay and
influence differences with the difference dis-
tinction. Research confirms status construction
theory’s argument, however, that the association
between the difference distinction and appar-
ently valid influence differences alone is suffi-
cient to produce status beliefs (Ridgeway and
Erickson 2000). But are beliefs formed without
the backing of pay or resource differences also
sufficiently certain after just two encounters so
that people will transfer them to a new encounter
and act on them? The answer to this question
affects the ease and speed with which status
beliefs can spread in a population to create axes
of inequality. We designed a second experiment
to address these concerns and otherwise improve
on the first experiment.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
OVERVIEW. The principal part of Experiment 2
had two phases. The first phase induced status
beliefs about the S2/Q2 distinction by drawing
on procedures from Ridgeway and Erickson
(2000) that associate the distinction with influ-
ence differences without supporting pay dif-
ferences. The second phase took place one to
three days later and examined whether partici-
pants would spontaneously treat a new partner
according to the status beliefs. The experiment’s
2 ⫻ 2 design again crossed the status position
of the participants’ own categorical in-group in
the induced beliefs (high or low) with the gen-
der composition of the encounters (all male or
all female). We again excluded mixed-sex
encounters to avoid the confounding effects of
gender status. There were 25 to 26 participants
in each of the four conditions for a total of 103
subjects (52 males, 51 females).
We added a set of contrast conditions to this
main experiment. An additional 33 subjects
worked on only the Phase 2 task with a partner
described as either higher (eight males and nine
females) or lower (eight males and eight
females) than them in an established status dis-
tinction (educational attainment). Expectation
states researchers consistently find that both
men and women treat educational attainment as
a socially valid status distinction by deferring
to those with more education and resisting def-
erence to those with less education (see Berger
and Webster 2006).
Adding these contrast conditions serves two
purposes. First, by measuring treatment on the
basis of both newly formed status beliefs and
established status on the same task with the
same subject population, we can be certain that
any gender differences detected are limited to
the tendency to act on newly formed status
beliefs, as theorized, rather than associated with
status behavior more broadly. Second, these
conditions offer a benchmark measurement of
the effects of an established status difference on
the Phase 2 task against which we can gauge the
extent to which newly formed status beliefs
affect subjects’ unequal treatment of their part-
ners.
MAIN EXPERIMENT PROCEDURES AND MEAS-
URES. Phase 1 of the main experiment began
with the creation of a salient categorical dis-
tinction among participants using the S2/Q2
“personal response style” test described earli-
er. Subjects then participated in two same-sex,
task-oriented encounters, first as a member of
a two-person decision-making team and then as
a member of a three-person team. In the first
team, the partner differed from the subject on
the S2/Q2 distinction. In the second team, one
teammate was of the same S2/Q2 category as
the subject; the other teammate was from the
54—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
opposite category. Both teams were thus inter-
category encounters.
Teams consisted of the subject, seated in a
separate room, and teammates linked by audio
and computer hook-ups. In the first team, sub-
ject and partner worked together verbally on
10 trials of the “meaning insight” task used in
Experiment 1. In in-group low conditions, the
partner, who was a confederate, acted confi-
dently and nondeferentially toward the subject.
In in-group high conditions, the confederate
partner acted hesitantly and deferentially. As
expected, this again caused clear influence hier-
archies to develop between subjects and their
partners that favored the subjects in in-group
high conditions (mean partner’s influence: males
= 33 percent, females = 37 percent) and favored
the partners in in-group low conditions (mean
influence: males = 90 percent, females = 79
percent). These influence hierarchies were less
differentiated for females than for males (F =
4.45, p < .05), but there were no gender differ-
ences in the perceived influence of self and
partner in these teams (F < 1, n.s.). Perceived
influence differences favored the self in high
conditions (mean difference = .86) and favored
the partner in low conditions (mean difference
= –3.31).
In the second team, subjects worked on anoth-
er 10 trials of the task with two different team-
mates. In this team, the teammates were
assigned to discuss task choices on behalf of the
group while the subject listened as the evalua-
tor (see Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). The
teammates were actually taped interactions in
which the teammate who was categorically dif-
ferent from the subject asserted influence over
the teammate of the subject’s own category on
100 percent of the seven disagreement trials in
the in-group low conditions. In the in-group
high conditions, the categorically different team-
mate deferred (i.e., was influential on only 33
percent of the disagreement trials) to the team-
mate from the subject’s in-group. Influence
rates were identical on male and female tapes.
The combination of two types of teams in
Phase 1 was designed to increase the validity of
the association that subjects experienced
between the categorical difference and influence
and apparent competence, while keeping session
length at a feasible two encounters. In the first
team, subjects experienced an influence hier-
archy arising between themselves and a cate-
gorically different other. In the second team,
they witnessed a similar hierarchy arise among
categorically different others. At the end of
Phase 1, subjects completed the measures of sta-
tus beliefs described in Experiment 1. These
status belief scales again proved reliable
(Cronbach’s alphas .71 to .94, averaging .86).
Subjects returned to the lab one to three days
later for Phase 2. To further validate the status
beliefs that subjects formed in Phase 1, the
experimenter greeted them by saying, “You’re
an S2 (Q2) right? Well, that makes sense. I lis-
tened to the tapes of your Phase 1 groups.”
Subjects then worked via computer with a new
same-sex partner from the other category (actu-
ally a programmed other) on a new version of
the “meaning insight” task. This completely
computerized version was structured like the
standardized tasks that expectation states
researchers use to document the effects of estab-
lished status distinctions such as race, gender,
education, and occupation (Berger et al. 1977;
Troyer 2002). It consisted of 25 trials in which
the subject makes an initial choice of two task
options, learns the partner’s initial choice, and
then makes a final choice. On 20 of the trials,
the partner’s initial choice disagrees with the
subject’s choice. Subjects’ status-based treat-
ment of their Phase 2 partners was indicated by
the proportion of these disagreement trials in
which subjects changed their responses to agree
with their partners.2 If subjects spontaneously
treat their new partners according to the status
beliefs created in Phase 1, then this acceptance
of influence rate should be significantly high-
er for those in in-group low conditions than
those in in-group high conditions. At the end of
Phase 2, subjects completed the status belief
measures once again.
CONTRAST CONDTIONS. Subjects in the con-
trast conditions completed only the Phase 2
task. In low educational status conditions, the
2 Rather than use the conventional expectation
states measure of resistance to influence, p(s), we
report our results in Experiment 2 as acceptance of
influence, which is 1–p(s), to maintain comparabil-
ity with the acceptance of influence measure in
Experiment 1. The Experiment 1 measure cannot be
converted to p(s) without error because there were
three rather than two choice options on each trial.
 HOW EASILY DOES DIFFERENCE BECOME STATUS?—–55

Table 2. Experiment 2: Mean Perceived Evaluations of In-Group and Other Group (with Standard
Deviations); Phase 1

Condition
Low In-Group Influence High In-Group Influence
Female Male Female Male
Mean of “Most People’s” Evaluations
—Status
———In-Group 3.73 (1.05) 3.75 (.83) 5.65 (.71) 5.45 (1.05)
———Other Group 5.25 (.80) 5.64 (.68) 3.63 (1.15) 3.57 (.88)
———Difference –1.52 (1.55) –1.89 (.96) 2.02 (1.59) 1.88 (1.73)
—Competence
———In-Group 4.59 (.91) 4.87 (.98) 5.64 (.76) 5.41 (.98)
———Other Group 5.31 (.82) 5.54 (.74) 4.24 (1.12) 4.28 (.86)
———Difference –.72 (1.11) –.67 (1.19) 1.40 (1.41) 1.13 (1.60)
—Considerate
———In-Group 5.75 (.92) 5.76 (.69) 4.63 (1.02) 4.07 (1.14)
———Other Group 3.43 (1.11) 3.57 (1.09) 5.96 (.68) 5.71 (.92)
———Difference 2.32 (1.67) 2.19 (1.53) –1.27 (1.62) –1.13 (1.52)

Mean of “Personal” Evaluations

—Status
———In-Group 3.63 (1.24) 4.18 (1.25) 5.24 (.89) 5.39 (.87)
———Other Group 5.13 (.93) 5.34 (.71) 3.76 (1.13) 3.53 (1.08)
———Difference –1.51 (1.80) –1.15 (1.47) 1.48 (1.55) 1.87 (1.79)
—Competence
———In-Group 4.99 (.95) 5.62 (.96) 5.35 (.99) 5.23 (.87)
———Other Group 4.73 (1.03) 4.99 (1.13) 4.64 (1.13) 4.59 (1.15)
———Difference .26 (1.32) .63 (1.43) .71 (1.35) .64 (1.54)
—Considerate
———In-Group 5.88 (1.21) 6.03 (.77) 4.69 (1.18) 4.75 (1.21)
———Other Group 3.12 (1.16) 3.21 (1.05) 6.06 (.68) 5.64 (1.03)
———Difference 2.77 (2.04) 2.82 (1.44) –1.37 (1.35) –.89 (1.70)

same-sex partner was presented to these under-
graduate subjects as a PhD candidate at their
university. In high educational status condi-
tions, the partner was described as a freshman
at the community junior college.
RESULTS
FORMING STATUS BELIEFS. Both male and female
subjects in the main experiment formed clear
status beliefs by the end of Phase 1. The top half
of Table 2 shows the results of our primary indi-
cators of status beliefs: the comparisons between
how subjects thought “most people” would rate
their in-group and the other group in terms of
status and competence. As the difference scores
show, subjects formed clearly differentiated sta-
tus beliefs favoring the group that was consis-
tently high influence in their encounters.
Subjects in high in-group influence conditions
thought most people would rate their own group
as higher status and more competent, but not as
considerate as the other group (top right quad-
rant of Table 2). More importantly, subjects in
low in-group influence conditions (top left quad-
rant of Table 2) thought that most people would
evaluate their group as significantly lower sta-
tus and less competent than the other group,
albeit nicer. Mixed model ANOVAs reflect these
results in substantial interaction effects between
in-group influence and the ratings of in-group
versus other group (for status, F = 156.42, p <
.001; for competence, F = 54.95, p < .001; for
consideration, F = 143.98, p < .001). There are
no significant gender effects in the ANOVAs of
status and competence ratings (Fs < 1.0, n.s.),
indicating that men and women formed similar
status beliefs at the end of Phase 1.
As in the first experiment, subjects’ person-
al evaluations of the differences between their
56—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Figure 2. Experiment 2: Phase 2 Acceptance of Influence by In-Group Status and Gender
own and the other group corresponded fairly
closely to their estimates of “most people’s”
views (bottom half of Table 2). Again, the dif-
ference is that in personal evaluations, subjects
in low in-group influence conditions resisted the
idea that their in-group was less competent than
the other group even though they conceded that
their in-group was significantly lower status.
Reflecting these patterns, ANOVAs show inter-
action effects between in-group influence and
in-group/other group ratings for status (F =
84.28, p < .001) and consideration (F = 144.42,
p < .001) but not competence (F < 1, n.s.).
These patterns of personal evaluations do not
vary by gender (Fs < 1, n.s.).
ACTING ON STATUS BELIEFS. Both men and
women reported clear status beliefs at the end
of Phase 1, but did they act on these beliefs
days later when encountering a new partner in
Phase 2? As Figure 2 shows, once again, men
clearly did but women mostly did not. Men in
low in-group status conditions accepted their
Phase 2 partner’s influence 49 percent of the
time, but in-group high status men deferred to
their new partner’s choices only 34 percent of
the time.3 This difference, which is clearly sig-
3 Because the metric of the Phase 2 acceptance of
influence measure differs from the equivalent meas-
nificant in an ANOVA (simple main effect of in-
group status for males, F = 10.09, p = .002),
shows that men did treat the categorical differ-
ence between themselves and their partners as
a status distinction, even though they acquired
these status beliefs through just two encounters
with categorically different others.
As Figure 2 also reveals, women in low in-
group status conditions treated a new partner
just as deferentially as did men, accepting her
influence 50 percent of the time. Unlike men,
however, women in the high in-group status
condition did not act on their status advantage
with a new partner. Instead, these women also
accepted their new partner’s influence 50 per-
cent of the time.4
ure in Experiment 1, only relative differences between
conditions, not absolute scores, can be compared
between experiments.
4 Our design did not include equal status condi-
tions, in which subjects simply completed the Phase
2 task with a partner who differed from them on the
S2/Q2 distinction, because the introduction of the
social difference alone would create in-group
favoritism effects that would confound the baseline
measurement of equal status influence (Brewer and
Brown 1998). Status studies that use influence meas-
ures similar to ours show that men’s equal status
influence rates are not systematically different than
women’s and are below those that men show in high
status situations (see Wagner and Berger 1997). This
 HOW EASILY DOES DIFFERENCE BECOME STATUS?—–57
The full meaning of these results for men
and women in the main conditions becomes
clearer when we compare them with our find-
ings for similar subjects in the contrast condi-
tions. Both men and women in our contrast
conditions treated their partners unequally on the
basis of educational status. Those who believed
they had lower educational status than their
partner deferred to their partner’s choices 48
percent of the time (SD .17). Those who thought
they had higher educational status accepted
their partner’s influence 35 percent of the time
(SD .18), a significant difference in an ANOVA
(F = 4.32, p < .05). Importantly, there are no
gender differences in the unequal treatment of
partners on the basis of educational status (main
effect of gender, F = 2.50, p = .13; gender by
status interaction, F < 1, n.s.).
Strikingly, the extent to which men treated
their partners unequally on the basis of the
S2/Q2 distinction in the main conditions (49
versus 34 percent deference) is almost identical
to the inequality of treatment (48 versus 35 per-
cent deference) that all subjects in the contrast
conditions displayed toward partners based on
an established status distinction, education.
These findings suggest that for men, at least, the
power of encounters to transform social differ-
ences into status distinctions is formidable.
For women, the contrast conditions confirm
that women from the same population as those
in the main conditions were no more reluctant
than men to treat others unequally on the basis
of an established status distinction. Rather,
women’s hesitance to assert a status advantage
was limited to the context of newly formed sta-
tus beliefs. Women’s reluctance to act on their
new status advantage in the main conditions
did not occur because these women were less
likely than similar men to accept that people like
them were higher status than people like their
partners. Not only were women’s status beliefs
the same as men’s at the end of Phase 1, they
were also no different from men’s when meas-
ured again at the end of Phase 2 (see Table 3).
Even after their encounters with the constantly
suggests that the gender difference we observe is
not because men are generally more resistant to influ-
ence than women, except in low status situations, but
instead is more likely due to women’s reluctance to
assert a status advantage of uncertain validity.
disagreeing partner in Phase 2, both men and
women retained basic status beliefs about the
S2/Q2 distinction (as shown by the difference
scores for “most people’s” evaluations of status,
competence, and consideration [see the top half
of Table 3]). This characteristic pattern of results
remains significant in mixed model ANOVAs
(interaction effects between status condition
and ratings of in-group/other group, for status
F = 55.07, p < .001; for competence, F = 19.36,
p < .001; for consideration F = 56.25, p < .001).
The results do not vary by gender (all Fs < 1,
n.s.). Even personal beliefs (bottom half of
Table 3), although weaker, kept much of the
shape of status beliefs at the end of Phase 2
(interaction effects between status condition
and ratings of in-group/other group, for status
F = 35.32, p < .001; for competence, F < 1, n.s.;
for consideration F = 55.06, p < .001). They do
not show systematic gender differences (3-way
interaction of status condition, ratings of in-
group/other group, and gender, for status, F =
3.44, p = .10; for competence and consideration,
Fs < 1.09, n. s.).
Recall that in the first team of Phase 1, the
influence hierarchies that women in the main
conditions experienced were less differentiated
than those of men. Did this have an effect on
their willingness to treat their partners unequal-
ly in Phase 2? The differences between men’s
and women’s hierarchies in Phase 1, however,
occurred primarily in low in-group status con-
ditions. Men and women in these conditions
did not differ in their treatment of their Phase
2 partners. Along with the fact that there are no
gender differences in perceived influence hier-
archies in Phase 1, this suggests that this is not
the best explanation for the gender differences
in behavior that we observed in Phase 2.
Because racial minorities did not differ from
Whites in their tendency to act on their status
beliefs in Phase 2, it also seems unlikely that
women’s reluctance to act on their status advan-
tage was primarily a result of the fact that
women are themselves a lower status group. A
regression of Phase 2 acceptance of influence
with gender, status condition, and the interac-
tion of the two in the model shows no main
effect of race (p > .30). Unlike the first exper-
iment, inspection revealed no race by sex trends
in the data, as we confirmed by adding a 3-way
interaction term to the model (gender, status, and
race) that proved nonsignificant ( p > .25).
58—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table 3. Experiment 2: Mean Perceived Evaluations of In-Group and Other Group (with Standard
Deviations); Phase 2

Condition
Low In-Group Status High In-Group Status
Female Male Female Male
Mean of “Most People’s” Evaluations
—Status
———In-Group 4.04 (.92) 4.08 (.86) 5.07 (.90) 5.09 (1.02)
———Other Group 5.13 (.87) 5.34 (.88) 3.92 (1.09) 3.81 (1.06)
———Difference –1.10 (1.50) –1.26 (1.27) 1.15 (1.76) 1.28 (1.94)
—Competence
———In-Group 4.67 (1.01) 4.83 (1.02) 5.13 (.70) 5.13 (.76)
———Other Group 5.04 (.80) 5.13 (.81) 4.40 (1.04) 4.46 (.83)
———Difference –.37 (1.16) –.29 (1.19) .73 (1.24) .67 (1.19)
—Considerate
———In-Group 5.11 (1.11) 5.34 (.93) 4.30 (1.09) 4.04 (.98)
———Other Group 3.83 (1.12) 4.05 (1.05) 5.57 (.85) 5.17 (1.01)
———Difference 1.28 (1.99) 1.29 (1.57) –1.27 (1.62) –1.13 (1.52)

Mean of “Personal” Evaluations

—Status
———In-Group 4.38 (.75) 4.44 (1.03) 4.71 (.80) 5.20 (1.04)
———Other Group 4.88 (.66) 5.13 (.92) 4.02 (.94) 3.62 (5.13)
———Difference –1.51 (1.80) –1.15 (1.47) 1.48 (1.55) 1.87 (1.79)
—Competence
———In-Group 4.68 (.93) 5.41 (1.06) 4.81 (1.01) 5.04 (1.14)
———Other Group 5.00 (.92) 4.62 (1.04) 4.80 (.91) 4.74 (1.14)
———Difference –.32 (1.27) .67 (1.53) .71 (1.35) .64 (1.54)
—Considerate
———In-Group 5.15 (1.01) 5.55 (1.20) 4.51 (1.08) 4.61 (.93)
———Other Group 3.76 (1.21) 3.79 (1.12) 5.20 (.77) 5.43 (.89)
———Difference 1.39 (1.84) 1.76 (1.90) –.69 (1.21) –.83 (1.31)

Again, these findings are limited by the fact that
the non-White group, while substantial (44 ver-
sus 59 Whites), was racially diverse.
Women’s unwillingness to act on their new
status beliefs in Phase 2, like in Experiment 1,
appears to have something to do with gender
itself. Furthermore, women’s hesitance to act on
their new status beliefs seems to pertain to gen-
der in the context of newly forming status beliefs
rather than to gender differences in status behav-
ior more generally.
SUMMARY
Despite procedural differences, the results of
Experiment 2 are strikingly similar to those of
Experiment 1. This increases our confidence
about the reliability of the findings. Experiment
2 used different, less restrictive procedures for
inducing status beliefs in Phase 1 and posed a
more stringent, time displaced test of subjects’
willingness to spontaneously take their beliefs
to a new context and act on them there. We
combined this more stringent test of action on
beliefs with an improved measure of whether
subjects act on status beliefs in new situations.
To these we also added countervailing proce-
dures to modestly increase the validity of the
beliefs and, therefore, the likelihood that they
would be acted on. Despite these differences, we
once again find that men and women formed
similar beliefs after two consistent encounters,
but men treated others unequally on the basis of
these beliefs in their next encounters, while
women mostly did not. Yet we also find that sim-
ilar men and women did not differ in their ten-
dency to treat others unequally on the basis of
an established status distinction (i.e., educa-
tion).
 HOW EASILY DOES DIFFERENCE BECOME STATUS?—–59
These findings suggest that men form status
beliefs that they are willing to act on rather
quickly, but women appear to require more con-
firming experiences that validate those beliefs
before acting on them. Because women treat
others according to established status distinc-
tions just as men do, it seems likely that the
women, too, would eventually act on these new
status beliefs. The processes by which local
encounters with different others transform social
differences into status distinctions seem to move
more slowly for women than for men.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our findings make three distinct contributions.
Primarily, they provide the first demonstration
of just how easily people, or at least men, trans-
form a social difference into a status distinction.
In addition, they document gender differences
in the process that have implications not only for
gender dynamics but for the dynamics by which
status distinctions emerge. Finally, they docu-
ment a key link in status construction theory’s
account of how encounters between people from
different social categories can lead to widely
held status beliefs about social differences.
Repeated encounters between people from
different social categories, when they present
valid, consistent associations between a cate-
gorical difference and influence and compe-
tence, have a powerful capacity to induce status
beliefs with implications for unequal treatment.
After only two such encounters, men were will-
ing to treat a new partner unequally based on a
difference distinction that they had just learned
about. In the second study, the extent of differ-
ential treatment they displayed toward this new
partner was comparable to that which both men
and women showed toward a partner who dif-
fered from them in an established status dis-
tinction, education. Essentially, the men had
transformed the new difference into a full-
fledged status characteristic.
What are the implications of the fact that
these results are based on undergraduate par-
ticipants? Because of the powerful effects of the
student peer role, college is a time of unusual-
ly egalitarian relations among fellow students.
It therefore seems improbable that student sub-
jects would be more likely to form status dis-
tinctions, and treat other students accordingly,
than would participants from more status-
ordered worlds of work and community.
Furthermore, because participants were will-
ing to treat others unequally on the basis of
beliefs formed from the relatively minimal and
insignificant encounters of an experiment, it
seems likely that the socially meaningful
encounters that make up people’s actual lives are
at least as powerful in their capacity to induce
status beliefs that quickly become a basis for
unequal treatment. These results suggest that, for
men at least, encounters between socially dif-
ferent actors have a powerful capacity to trans-
form social differences into systematic axes of
inequality, as status construction theory sug-
gests.
What does it mean that we were able to doc-
ument clear gender differences at the key junc-
ture at which social differences become a basis
for unequal treatment? Although women in both
studies formed new status beliefs as readily as
men, they were not willing to act on these beliefs
in their next encounters. Because college life is
less gender differentiated than most contexts,
this gender difference is unlikely to be an arti-
fact of the undergraduate population. The first
problem is to explain the gender difference we
found. The second is to consider its implications
for the dynamic processes by which widely
shared status beliefs emerge.
Status construction theory argues that initial
status beliefs require validation before affecting
behavior because action on beliefs of uncertain
validity can be socially costly (Ridgeway 2006).
Gender research further shows that the risk of
incurring such costs, all else being equal, is
greater for women than for men (Rudman and
Fairchild 2004). This, we argue, makes women
more cautious about acting on newly forming
status beliefs.
We do not, however, have direct evidence to
confirm that this differential risk environment
produced the gender differences we observed.
Nevertheless, we do have evidence that under-
cuts some alternative explanations. Because the
differences we observed were between men and
women in same-sex rather than mixed-sex
encounters, the status of the gender distinction
itself is unlikely to have been salient for the
participants. It is therefore unlikely to account
for the differences we observed (see Ridgeway
and Smith-Lovin 1999). Also, other effects of
belonging to a lower status group in society are
unlikely to fully account for women’s behavior.
60—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Members of another low status group, racial
minorities, did not significantly differ from oth-
ers in their tendency to act on new status beliefs
(but our ability to test for race effects had some
limits). Finally, in our second study, women
from the same subject population as those who
were reluctant to act on new status beliefs were
no less likely than men to treat others unequal-
ly based on a fully established status distinction.
Putting this evidence together suggests that
the cause of the differences we observed pertains
specifically to newly forming, not yet socially-
established status beliefs and to processes more
strongly associated with gender than status.
This contextual evidence substantially increas-
es the plausibility of our argument that women
are more cautious than men about asserting sta-
tus over another on the basis of new beliefs
because of the risks of violating prescriptive
gender expectations that they treat others “nice-
ly” (i.e., communally). To a lesser extent, these
same prescriptive expectations for communal-
ity make women reluctant to defer to other
women (who should also be “nice”) on the basis
of uncertain status beliefs. Interestingly, in the
second experiment, which had stronger proce-
dures for creating valid beliefs, women did defer
similarly to men in low status conditions but still
did not assert status in high status conditions.
Having documented these gender differences in
the initial emergence of status beliefs, an impor-
tant task for future research is to directly test the
differential risk environment hypothesis.
What are the implications of women’s com-
parative reluctance to act on newly acquired
status beliefs? If status beliefs are partly spread
by people acting on them, then women’s greater
hesitation may slow the diffusion of emerging
status beliefs in society. It is unlikely, however,
to actually stop the diffusion process because
men and women interact frequently in our soci-
ety (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999).
Although women might require more validating
experiences before acting on new status beliefs,
they are likely to gain those experiences from
men who treat them according to new beliefs
and whom they witness treating others accord-
ing to the belief (Ridgeway and Erickson 2000).
Men who act more quickly on status beliefs
will, through their actions, confirm the beliefs
for women so that women will act on them as
well.
Taken together, these results suggest that peo-
ple in everyday encounters readily transform the
salient social differences that divide them into
status distinctions and act on them in ways that
spread these distinctions throughout a popula-
tion. Status distinctions are thus likely to emerge
readily in populations and act as powerful forces
for social inequality. As people enter newly
forming organizations, for instance, we should
not be surprised when they quickly form local
status distinctions that continue to order organi-
zational life for years to come (Troyer 2003).
Furthermore, group differences that are highly
salient in an interdependent population are
unlikely to remain unordered differences for
long. Structural conditions will typically deter-
mine which group becomes higher status. If, for
example, changing political circumstances or
increasing immigration raise the salience of an
ethnic distinction in a population (e.g., the Arab,
non-Arab distinction in the recent United States)
when there is already a material inequality
between the groups, that distinction will likely
be transformed into a systematic status charac-
teristic that disadvantages even well-off mem-
bers of the newly low status group.
Status distinctions have dynamic histories
and can fade with changing structural condi-
tions. Also, the emergence of new status beliefs
may sometimes be disrupted so that a difference
does not acquire broad significance as a status
distinction. Evidence indicates, for instance,
that acts of resistance that challenge the link
between a social difference and status in initial
local encounters can interrupt the formation of
status beliefs by undermining their apparent
validity (Ridgeway and Correll 2006). Some
status beliefs will crumble while others take
hold. This is an important direction for future
research. Yet the ease with which new status dis-
tinctions emerge suggests that some form of
status distinction will remain a powerful force
of social inequality that is not easy to suppress.
Cecilia L. Ridgeway is the Lucie Stern Professor of
Social Sciences in the Department of Sociology at
Stanford University. She has published extensively on
status processes, groups, gender, and social psy-
chology. Her current research addresses the role that
social hierarchies in everyday interaction play in
stratification and social inequality, especially in
regard to gender. She is past editor of Social
Psychology Quarterly and recipient of the 2005
Cooley-Mead Award for career contribution to social
 HOW EASILY DOES DIFFERENCE BECOME STATUS?—–61
psychology and the 2008 SWS Feminist Lecturer
Award.
Kristen Backor is a PhD candidate in Sociology at
Stanford University and the head research assistant
at the Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of
Society (SIQSS). Her research focuses on the inter-
section of social psychology, science and technolo-
gy, and emotions.
Yan E. Li is a PhD candidate in the department of
Sociology at Stanford University. Her research com-
bines theoretical inquiries of micro-level founda-
tions of social inequality and empirical examinations
of how immigrants are affected by race and gender
inequalities both socioeconomically and ideologi-
cally.
Justine E. Tinkler is an Assistant Professor of
Sociology at Louisiana State University. Broadly,
her research focuses on how social psychological
processes perpetuate macro-level inequality. Her
recent work examines how cultural beliefs, privi-
leges, and norms of interaction slow the effectiveness
of laws aimed at reducing race and gender inequal-
ity. Recent publications on this topic appear in Social
Psychology Quarterly (with Yan Li and Stefanie
Mollborn) and in Law and Social Inquiry. Current
projects also include an analysis of how gender influ-
ences the decision making of venture capitalists and
an examination of implicit attitudes about transracial
families.
Kristan G. Erickson received her doctorate in soci-
ology from Stanford University in 1998. Her research
interests include social psychology, status process-
es, adolescent development, and family processes.
Her published work includes papers in American
Journal of Sociology, Child Development, Journal of
Adolescent Research, Youth and Society, and Journal
of Youth and Adolescence.
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