CHAPTER 11 — PLANT OPERATION
Chapter
Plant Operation
Basic BWR Operation
Control of the BWR during normal operation is
simple, largely because the direct cycle creates a strong
interrelationship between the three primary operating
conditions: reactor thermal power, pressure, and water
level. Because they are strongly interrelated, these
conditions can be automatically controlled. Thermal
power, and hence steam flow rate, is changed in a
BWR by changing either the re-circulation flow rate
or control rod position. Steam dome pressure in the
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is automatically
maintained at a constant value by controlling the
opening of the main turbine control valves or, if the
pressure increases significantly, by opening the turbine
bypass valves to allow some of the steam to bypass
the turbine and go directly to the main condenser.
Reactor water level is automatically maintained at a
constant level by controlling the speed of the reactor
water feed pumps and, hence, the feedwater flow rate.
By coordinating the control of pressure, water level,
and reactor power, the ABWR can be operated in a
load-following mode for automatic load-following
operations. Above 65% power, automatic load
following is achieved by only changing re-circulation
flow. Below this level, power is controlled by using
control rods.
Plant startup and shutdown operations are also simple
in the ABWR. During plant startup, control rods are
withdrawn to bring the reactor to criticality. RPV
heatup, pressurization and initial power ascension are
achieved by continuing to withdraw the control rods.
Reactor power is increased in this way until, in order
of events, the main turbine is synchronized, the first
load is applied to the generator and the automatic
re-circulation flow control range is reached. When this
11
last condition is reached, reactor
power is increased by increasing the
re-circulation flow rate exclusively.
During full power operation, the
turbine accepts the steam generated in
the reactor and operates in a “turbine-
follow-reactor” mode.
For a plant shutdown, the reverse
sequence occurs. After the control rods
are fully inserted, reactor cooldown
and decay heat removal are
accomplished by bypassing steam to
the main condenser and by operation
of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
System.
Operating Map
The ABWR operating map is a steady-
state representation of reactor power
vs. re-circulation flow (Figure 11-1).
The nearly horizontal lines are control
rod lines representing prescribed
control rod patterns. The nearly
vertical lines are lines of constant re-
circulation pump speeds. Any
operational path that changes the
power and flow from one condition to
another condition through control rod
maneuver and/or re-circulation flow
change can be traced on this figure.
Operation in certain areas of the
power-flow map is prohibited in order
to (1) maintain core thermal limits, (2)
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CHAPTER 11 — PLANT OPERATION

130
avoid operation above the licensed TEN OF TEN INTERNAL PUMPS OPERATING
120
power level, (3) avoid conditions 110
PERCENT PUMP SPEED
0 0 NATURAL CIRCULATION
113% NOMINAL

1 30 M 105% NOMINAL
RA
where core instability may occur, (4) 100
2 40
3 50 100% POWER = 3926 MWt
P OW
E RS
C
B LO
CK
4 60 6 AL AL
M AW
avoid regions not analyzed, or (5) 90
5 70
6 80
7 90
100% FLOW = 52.2 X10 kg/h
100% SPEED = 157 rad/s
TH
ER

RO
D WIT
HD
R

7
8
OL

PERCENT POWER
8 99
prevent operation where excess 80 C ON
TR
5
6

PERCENT ROD LINE

moisture in the steam may be carried 70 A
B
102
100
B
3
4

C 80 2
to the main turbine. Although the 60 D
E
60
40
A
1
C
REGION IV
F 20
50
power-flow map indicates possible 0
40 REGION III
operating states, normal plant 30
D

operation is along the 100% control 20

E REGION II
REGION I
rod line (i.e., Curve B in Figure 11-1). 10 TYPICAL F
STEAM SEPARATOR LIMIT
STARTUP PATH
In this figure, normal plant startup and 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
shutdown trajectory is indicated. PERCENT CORE FLOW
Automatic protective interlocks
prevent operation outside prescribed Figure 11-1 ABWR Power-Flow Map
limits or initiate automatic reactor
shutdown if required.
associated with the initiation or shutdown of safety-
related equipment. Manual operation of any equipment
from the main control console is always available on
Plant Startup and demand.

Shutdown The ABWR can reach 100% power from a cold

To ensure consistent and error-free
operation, plant startup and shutdown
operations are automated. The startup
and shutdown sequences are divided
into a number of small, automated
sequences. For example, during
startup, establishment of condenser
vauum, critiality, heatup, pres-
surization, turbine synchronization,
shutdown condition in less than 25 hours, and in less
than 5 hours from a hot condition (all control rods
fully inserted). Figure 11-2 shows the key steps in the
plant startup sequence, and Figure 11-3 shows the key
steps in the plant shutdown sequence. Normally, during
shutdown, the reactor internal pumps (RIPs) continue
to run at minimum speed until the reactor vessel is
flooded in preparation for refueling. However, if the
REACTOR WATER LEVEL

power ascension by control rods, and REACTOR PRESSURE

power ascension by re-circulation flow REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE

are all automated sequences. The GENERATOR POWER

operator, however, initiates automatic TURBINE SPEED

sequences after checking that all

prerequisites of a given sequence are
satisfied. In cases where a mode
change involves safety-related Heat & Drywell Turbine Power Ascension
Pressurization Inspection Startup (12.5 hrs)
equipment (e.g., repositioning of the (6 hrs) (1.5 hrs) (NMS Calibration,
Additional Feed Pumps,
Reactor
reactor mode switch during a startup Critical
Heat Balance Calculation)
(1-2 hrs)
or shutdown), the computer system
will prompt the operator to take a
manual action. There is no automation
Figure 11-2 ABWR Startup Sequence

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 CHAPTER 11 — PLANT OPERATION

REACTOR WATER LEVEL

service, full power operation can be
restored in a short time.
REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE

For plants electing to have a full

REACTOR VESS
EL PRESSURE generator load rejection without
reactor scram capability, a 110%
GENERATOR
OFF LINE turbine bypass system is provided. The
automatic response to a full load
REACTOR POWER
rejection consists of (1) rapid opening
of the turbine bypass valves when the
turbine control valves trip, (2)
Reactor shutdown by
coreflow reduction &
Reactor
depressurization
RHR shutdown
cooling reduction of reactor core flow and
control rod insertions via turbine
bypass valves power, and (3) insertion of a pre-
selected number of control rods. The
reactor power is reduced to
Figure 11-3 ABWR Shutdown Sequence
approximately 60% by these automatic
water level within the vessel is raised above the actions. The operator can achieve
separator spillover, natural circulation alone is further power reduction through
sufficient to transfer the core decay heat to the additional control rod insertions. If the
downcomer region of the RPV, where it is removed generator can be re-loaded, full power
by the RHR System. operation can be rapidly restored.

Automatic Response to Automatic Load-

Transients Following
For certain transient events, such as the trip of one
Capability
reactor feedpump, condensate pump, control rod drive Grid requirements for frequency
(CRD) hydraulic pump, or reactor internal pump, the control, load regulation, and load
ABWR is designed to remain on-line with no change following can be met by the ABWR.
in power. This is facilitated by automating the The automatic process control systems
responses to such transients. in the ABWR enable the reactor to
respond to changes in turbine/load
Other transients will require a power reduction. This
demand so that the generated steam
latter class of transients includes the loss of feedwater
flow matches that required by the
heating, tripping of two or three reactor internal
turbine to maintain proper load and
pumps, partial generator load rejection, full load
frequency operation. In the 65% to
rejection (for plants electing to have a large turbine
100% power range, the power change
bypass system), tripping of one main condenser
rate capability is approximately 1% per
circulating water pump, or high main condenser
second using only re-circulation flow
pressure. Response to this type of transient is also
changes. Below 65%, the power
automated and involves reducing reactor power to
change rate is approximately 2.5% per
within the capability of the remaining operable
minute using control rod motion. All
equipment. When the failed equipment is returned to

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CHAPTER 11 — PLANT OPERATION
of these operations are significantly
faster than required to respond to load
and frequency changes.
ABWR load-following operation is
fully automated. In this manner, the
ABWR operates in the “turbine-
follow-reactor” mode.
Automated
Response to
Design Basis
Accidents
In the event of a design basis accident,
operator action is not required for an
indefinite period. This capability is
achieved by automatic initiation of (1)
reactor protection systems for reactor
shutdown, containment isolation, and
emergency core cooling, (2) suppres-
sion pool cooling and reactor scram
on high pool temperature (to mitigate
an inadvertent safety-relief valve
opening event) and (3) boron injection,
feedwater flow runback, and insertion
of control rods by electric-mechanical
means should there be an anticipated
transient without scram (ATWS)
event. These features enhance overall
plant safety and allow operators, if
necessary or appropriate, to take
control of the accident response.
Flexibility in Fuel
Cycle Length
One of the advantages of ABWR and
BWR operation in general is the
11-4
degree of flexibility in designing the fuel management
plan. This is due primarily to the strong negative void
coefficient associated with the direct cycle (two-phase)
flow in the core. At the end of a planned fuel cycle,
when all control rods have been fully withdrawn, the
ABWR can maintain full power operation for an
extensive length of time by increasing the core flow
rate (up to 110%) due to the built-in capacity margin
of the ABWR internal re-circulation pumps. The
increased core flow will reduce the average core void
content and thus increase reactivity and maintain
balanced reactor power.
At the end of this increased core flow operation, the
reactor can still continue its operation at a gradually
reduced power level, or a “coastdown operation”,
during which the reactor power will gradually decrease
at a slow rate. This is again due to the negative void
feedback mechanism where lower power level is
automatically regulated (or balanced) due to slightly
decreasing voids and thus slightly increasing core
reactivity. BWR coastdown operation can maintain a
coastdown final power level of about 85% rated power.
Finally, an operation with reduced feedwater
temperature can also increase core reactivity, thus
maintaining a higher power level for a longer period
of time at the end of the cycle. The ABWR incorporates
design features to gradually reduce feedwater
temperature.
All of these operations can extend the plant fuel cycle
up to the order of a couple of months, thus providing
significant flexibility for plant operation and outage
planning.
Technical Specifications
Plant operation (and maintenance) is governed by a
set of technical specifications (Tech Specs). The
purpose of these Tech Specs is to ensure that (1)
required systems will be available in the event of an
accident and (2) the plant will always remain within
analyzed conditions.

Technical specifications also govern maintenance, and
the ABWR Tech Specs, in particular, allow for online
maintenance, a key element in achieving very short
outage lengths. By taking full advantage of design
features such as the three ECCS divisions, four
divisions of safety instrumentation and control, and
low core damage frequency, the ABWR Tech Specs
provide a sufficient time to perform maintenance of
inoperable equipment during plant operation. For
example, one full ECCS division may be taken out of
service for inspection and maintenance for fourteen
days before it must be returned to service. Thirty days
are allowed for a division of safety instrumentation
out of service because the remaining three divisions
of instrumentation still provide a single-failure-proof
capability. The comparable time for one emergency
diesel generator is fourteen days.
Emergency Plant
Operation
Symptom-based emergency procedure guidelines for
the ABWR enable a very simple approach for the
operators to deal with accidents, without having to
identify the cause of the accident. For the ABWR, only
a few key plant parameters need be monitored. These
parameters provide simple and clear entry conditions
into emergency operating procedures (EOPs). Only a
few parameters will need to be controlled in an ABWR
during an emergency: reactor pressure, reactor power,
reactor water level, and containment conditions such
as pressure and temperature. The objective of the EOPs
is to provide the necessary steps for the operator to
bring the reactor to a safe, cold shutdown condition.
The ABWR EOP is thus very much simplified.
There are primarily four simple control strategies, one
each for control of the RPV, primary containment,
secondary containment, and site radioactivity. Each
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CHAPTER 11 — PLANT OPERATION
of these strategies provides for the
proper operations to control specified
parameters. In extreme degraded
conditions, contingencies are also
specified to bring the plant to a safe
condition.
Summary
Due to inherently safe BWR design
principles and improved design
features, the ABWR provides for
substantial operation simplicity and
flexibility. Simple plant automatic
processes, for example, control reactor
water level, pressure, and power.
Power changes are easily made by
changing reactor re-circulation flow
rate or control rod position. Automatic
load-following capability provides for
system frequency control, load
regulation, and periodic load cycling.
Full load rejection capability allows for
fast power recovery after grid
disturbances. Highly automated
normal plant operation provides simple
startup, shutdown, and transient
response capability. For design basis
accidents, the ABWR is designed to
not require operator action for 72 hours
through automation of selected system
automation. Through safety system
redundancy in the design, the technical
specifications provide for extended
periods for maintenance of equipment
during operation. Simple symptom-
based emergency operating strategies
and procedures enable the operators to
place the plant in a safe condition
should an accident occur.
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