CONFLICTS OF LAW

ATTY. WILLIAM GACETA CARPENTERO

CASE DIGEST

1. Republic v. Ferdinand Marcos, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003 Atup

FACTS:

Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379, “An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been
Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor”.

In the said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by 5 account groups,
using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes, which exceeded the
Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes were frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.

Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the
conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on
December 21, 1990, that the US$356 million belongs deposited in the name of the aforementioned 5 account groups were of illegal provenance. The funds were thereafter remitted to
the Philippines in escrow.

Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted the motion.

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion for summary judgment filed by the petitioner. Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of the Petitioner, approving the General/Supplemental
Agreements.

However, in a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed itself and denied said motion for summary judgment. It ruled that “the evidence offered for summary judgment
of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the
funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established.” Also it reversed itself on the ground that the original
copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions and their authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo.

Issue: Whether or not the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions need to be impleaded in this case.
Held: No. The presentation of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss decision was not de rigueur (REQUIRED) for the public respondent to make findings of fact and
reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayan's decision was not dependent on the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is the Court's.

The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner Republic. What is important is, the Court’s
assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated translations of the
Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.

(Issue on “THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED”) (It might be asked)

Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as they were indispensable parties without whom no complete determination of the issues could be
made. Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived them of their
day in court and denied them their rights under the Swiss constitution and international law

SC: Petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign foundations.

Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. However, failure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the
rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even in the absence of
indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.

Respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render
judgment which, even in the absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it though not on the absent party

2. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122191, [October 8, 1998], 358 PHIL 105-129 Banggat

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, RTC
of Quezon City

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner SAUDIA hired private respondent MORADA as a flight attendant in 1988, based in Jeddah. On 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to party with 2 male
attendants, and on the following morning in their hotel, one of the male attendants attempted to rape her. She was rescued by hotel attendants who heard her cry for help. The Indonesian police
arrested the 2.

MORADA returned to Jeddah, but was asked by the company to go back to Jakarta and help arrange the release of the 2 male attendants. MORADA did not cooperate when she got to Jakarta.
What followed was a series of interrogations from the Saudi Courts which she did not understand as this was in their language. In 1993, she was surprised, upon being ordered by SAUDIA to go to
the Saudi court, that she was being convicted of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with the 2, for what
happened in Jakarta.

SAUDIA denied her the assistance she requested, But because she was wrongfully convicted, Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly
before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country manager.

SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for
the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.

MORADA ALLEGES: Since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.

ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the case

HELD: YES. On the presence of a “Foreign Element” in the case: A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a
“foreign element”. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or
conception. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign
domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by
virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.

COURT disagrees with MORADA that his is purely a domestic case. However, the court finds that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority
to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

BP129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney`y’s fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
(Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:

Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court]

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides,
at the election of the plaintiff.

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness
to her.

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private
respondent) should be upheld.

The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the parties. MORADA through her act of filing, and SAUDIA by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions:

(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and

(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in
the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain
acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to
the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.

In applying “State of the most significant relationship” rule, to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here, although it should
be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private
respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.

NOTE:

These “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could be any of the following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;

(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;

(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;

(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and torts;

(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;

(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;

(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori — the law of the forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of
“procedure” not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and

(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly
contracts of affreightment.

3. Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, [February 5, 2010], 625 PHIL 494-513 Cambe
FACTS:

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married. They had one child, Stephanie. In 1999, the petitioner obtained a divorce decree against the petitioner from the Illinois
court. The said court awarded to him the sole custody of their child. In 2002, the petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their child. The parties chose Philippine
courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In
2004, petitioner sued respondent for the enforcement of the Agreement alleging that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.

ISSUE: WoN the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child

RULING:

The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of
petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus,
jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.

The trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x." This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother
is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.

ISSUE: WoN the Agreement can be enforced

RULING:

No. Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse to support the Agreement’s enforceability. It should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in
this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

4. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 120334 & 120337, [January 20, 1998], 348 PHIL 438-451 Castillo
FACTS: The plaintiff, [Torres], allegedly on a special mission to purchase firearms for the Philippine Senate, purchased a round trip ticket from defendant [Northwest] for his travel to Chicago
and back to Manila. Via defendant’s flight, plaintiff left for United States.

After purchasing firearms and on the way back to Manila, plaintiff checked-in and presented before defendant’s representative his two identical baggage, one of which contained firearms. The
baggage was required to be opened by the defendant’s representative and the supporting evidence to be presented. Plaintiff showed them his authorization from the Philippine government and the
purchase receipts.

Plaintiff was not able to claim one of his baggage upon arrival. His baggage containing firearms was recalled back to Chicago for US Customs Verification. Upon receipt of his baggage, the
firearms were missing. A Personal Property Missing Damage Report was issued by defendant to plaintiff.

Plaintiff then prayed before the trial court that defendant be ordered to pay actual damages, moral damages, temperate damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees . After plaintiff had
presented its evidence, defendant filed a "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Demurrer to the Evidence with Motion for Summary Judgment)".

Trial court: such imprudent act constituted willful misconduct which brought the case beyond the application of Section 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention, thereby depriving NORTHWEST of the
limitation of the liability provided for in said section.

CA: NORTHWEST’s guessing of which luggage contained the firearms amounted to willful misconduct under Section 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention which entitled TORRES to claim actual
damages in excess of the limitation provided for under Section 22(2) of said Convention.

NORTHWEST contests the right of TORRES to actual damages on the following grounds: (1) the loss of firearms was disputed; (2) the finding of willful misconduct was arbitrary; and (3)
TORRES failed to produce a United States license for the shipment of the firearms; hence, the importation was illegal and no damages could arise therefrom. It likewise contended that, even
granting that the firearms were lost, its liability was limited by the Warsaw Convention and the contract of transportation to $9.07 per pound or a total of $640 as the box weighed 70 pounds. 12 It
also denied having acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Issue: Whether or not the Defendant’s (Northwest Airlines) liability for actual damages is limited to that prescribed in the Section 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention

Ruling: NO.

NORTHWEST’s liability for actual damages may not be limited to that prescribed in Section 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention. In Alitalia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 15 we held: chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

The [Warsaw] Convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline’s liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. Such a proposition is not borne
out by the language of the Convention, as this Court has now, and at an earlier time, pointed out. Moreover, slight reflection readily leads to the conclusion that it should be deemed a limit of
liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to a person, or destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any willful
misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary
form of resulting injury. The Convention’s provision, in short, do not "regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier" or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for
some particular or exceptional type of damage.
ON THE ISSUE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOR RECITS ONLY):

Summary judgment is allowed if, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

In this case, NORTHWEST denied in its Answer the material allegations in the complaint and asserted, in fact, that it was not liable for actual damages because the box containing the alleged lost
firearms was the one received by TORRES when he arrived in Manila. It likewise contended that, even granting that the firearms were lost, its liability was limited by the Warsaw Convention and
the contract of transportation to $9.07 per pound or a total of $640 as the box weighed 70 pounds. 12 It also denied having acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

In thus submitting for summary judgment the matter of its liability only to the maximum allowed in Section 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention, NORTHWEST was deemed to have hypothetically
admitted arguendo that the firearms were lost. It did not waive the presentation of evidence that it was not in fact liable for the alleged loss of firearms. And even if it were so liable,
NORTHWEST could still prove at the appropriate time that it was not liable beyond the maximum provided in said Section 22(2). Notably, TORRES prayed for actual damages in the amounts
of(1) $9,009.32 representing the value of the lost firearms; and (2) P39,065 14 representing the cost of his plane tickets.

5. Spouses Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538, [January 22, 1996], 322 PHIL 96-111 De Gala

Spouses Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538, [January 22, 1996], 322 PHIL 96-111

Facts:
Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are husband and wife. They are both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the Philippines. He holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini Ermita, Manila.

On March 9, 1992, private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals
against petitioners.

Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who at the time, was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted the summons, insofar as
he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife, Lourdes A. Valmonte, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf.

Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent
moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent's motion.

In its Order dated July 3, 1992, the trial court, denied private respondent's motion to declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision granting the petition and declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default.
Issue:
Whether in an action for partition filed against her and her husband, who is also her attorney, summons intended for her may be served on her husband, who has a law office in the
Philippines.

Ruling:
We hold that there was no valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte.

In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14 is essential for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he
is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in
personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned by means of either substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, Section 8, or by publication as provided in
Sections 17 and 18 of the same Rule.

On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, Section17.

Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondent's action, which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. As petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, Section 17.

Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the service on her
attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified. We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy
in the foreign country where the defendant resides.

Service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, Section 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the
court. Moreover, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, Section 17. Finally, and most importantly, because there
was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no valid service on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in this case.

6. Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, [April 29, 2003], 449 PHIL 824-838 Delute

Facts:

Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros were lawfully married in 1968. Sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate due to marital differences. Margarita together with her two children
left for the United States.
In 1991, Abelardo commenced a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity. As Margarita was then residing in the United States, the
court ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and at the same time furnishing Margarita a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons
and a copy of the petition at her address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Margarita was given sixty (60) days after publication to file
a responsive pleading. On November 8, 1991, the marriage of Abelardo to Margarita was declared null and void.

Almost nine (9) years later, Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name
"Licaros" inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on November 8, 1991.

Margarita filed a petition for review on certiorari, insisting that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since she was never
validly served with summons. Neither did she appear in court to submit voluntarily to its jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo.

Held:

Yes. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.

As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.

Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or
quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.

At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial
court considered Margarita a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial
service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.

Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects
the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant
has been attached within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a
copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.
The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service (service by publication and furnishing her with a copy of the Order, Summons and a copy of the petition at her address in California thru
the Department of Foreign Affairs) does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may
consider sufficient."

We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect
service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14.

7. Banco Do Brasil v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121576-78, [June 16, 2000], 389 PHIL 87-102 Eliab

G.R. Nos. 121576-78 June 16, 2000

BANCO DO BRASIL, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, and CESAR S. URBINO, SR., respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS

In 1989, Cesar Urbino, Sr. sued Poro Point Shipping Services for damages the former incurred when one of the latter’s ship ran aground causing losses to Urbino. Urbino impleaded Banco Do
Brasil (BDB), a foreign corporation not engaged in business in the Philippines nor does it have any office here or any agent. BDB was impleaded simply because it has a claim over the sunken
ship. BDB however failed to appear multiple times. Eventually, a judgment was rendered and BDB was adjudged to pay $300,000.00 in damages in favor of Urbino for BDB being a nuisance
defendant.

BDB assailed the said decision as it argued that there was no valid service of summons because the summons was issued to the ambassador of Brazil. Further, the other summons which were made
through publication is not applicable to BDB as it alleged that the action against them is in personam.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over Banco Do Brasil.

HELD:

No. Banco Do Brasil is correct. Although the suit is originally in rem as it was BDB’s claim on the sunken ship which was used as the basis for it being impleaded, the action nevertheless became
an in personam one when Urbino asked for damages in the said amount. As such, only a personal service of summons would have vested the court jurisdiction over BDB. Where the action is in
personam, one brought against a person on the basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. When the
defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not
physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.

In the instant case, private respondent's suit against petitioner is premised on petitioner's being one of the claimants of the subject vessel M/V Star Ace. 59 Thus, it can be said that private
respondent initially sought only to exclude petitioner from claiming interest over the subject vessel M/V Star Ace. However, private respondent testified during the presentation of evidence that,
for being a nuisance defendant, petitioner caused irreparable damage to private respondent in the amount of $300,000.00. 60 Therefore, while the action is in rem, by claiming damages, the relief
demanded went beyond the res and sought a relief totally alien to the action.

It must be stressed that any relief granted in rem or quasi in rem actions must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against the defendant. 61 Clearly, the
publication of summons effected by private respondent is invalid and ineffective for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, since by seeking to recover damages from
petitioner for the alleged commission of an injury to his person or property 62 caused by petitioner's being a nuisance defendant, private respondent's action became in personam. Bearing in mind
the in personam nature of the action, personal or, if not possible, substituted service of summons on petitioner, and not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner and validly hold it liable to private respondent for damages. Thus, the trial court had no jurisdiction to award damages amounting to $300,000.00 in favor of private respondent and as
against herein petitioner.1awphil

8. Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, [September 25, 1998], 357 PHIL 536-558 Gonzales, Cyril
8. G.R. No. 128803 September 25, 1998
ASIAVEST LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO HERAS, respondents.

FACTS:

The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court
Judgment. The action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.

The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the
foreign judgment.

Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial costs and an increase in attorney's fees with interest until full payment of the said obligations.

On the other hand, Heras no longer opposed the motion and instead appealed the decision to CA.
The CA rendered its decision reversing the decision of the trial court and dismissing ASIAVEST's complaint without prejudice. It underscored the fact that a foreign judgment does not of itself
have any extraterritorial application. For it to be given effect, the foreign tribunal should have acquired jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. If such tribunal has not acquired
jurisdiction, its judgment is void.

The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with Heras that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery.
Summons should have been personally served on Heras in Hong Kong.

ASIAVEST filed the instant petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling.

The main argument raised against the Hong Kong judgment is that the Hong Kong Supreme Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of HERAS. This involves the issue of whether
summons was properly and validly served on HERAS. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon the defendant are governed by the lex
fori or the law of the forum, 7 i.e., the law of Hong Kong in this case. HERAS insisted that according to his witness Mr. Lousich, who was presented as an expert on Hong Kong laws, there was no
valid service of summons on him.

ISSUE:

WON the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction due to improper notice to the party? YES.
(This involves the issue of whether summons was properly and validly served on HERAS)

HELD:

Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,5 which was the governing law at the time this case was decided by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals, a foreign
judgment against a person rendered by a court having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by the
subsequent title. However, the judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the time since the stipulated fact that Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at
the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, in personam, summons
should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong.

The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be
given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

On the same note, Heras was also an absentee, hence, he should have been served with summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident
defendant who is temporarily absent from the country, because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily
but for good.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals.

9. Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77770, [December 15, 1988], 250 PHIL 504-513 Gonzales, Jashera

G.R. No. 77770 December 15, 1988

ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA, ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO
GOMEZ, ERLINDA GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ CALICDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. GOMEZ (now deceased)
represented by his wife, LETICIA Y. GOMEZ, and children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y. GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y. GOMEZ,
petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro Manila, and SILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, Quezon City, Metro Manila,
respondents.

FACTS

The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0, 11 and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2. The lots were among those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Abran,1 wherein this Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion)
who, together with Consolacion's son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her parcels of land when Consolacion Gomez died intestate. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro Y. Gomez, they
became the absolute owners of the subject lots by virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis Lopez. The lots (formerly portions of Lots 15,16, 34 and 41 covered by Plan Ipd-92) were
subdivided into twelve lots—Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The subdivision plan was duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on 30 November 1963. Petitioners agreed to allocate
the lots among themselves.

After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the
subject lots in petitioners' favor. 2

On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order 3 expressly stating that the decision of 5 August 1981 had become final and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue
the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of 5 August 1981.

On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission (now known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo stating that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the
Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of 5 August 1981, and the order of 6 October 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised
by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of 5 August 1981 should be implemented because it had long become final and executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25 March 1985 setting aside the decision dated 5 August 1981 and the order dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of decrees. 4
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent judge on 6 August 1985 for lack of merit. 5

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court which in turn referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 6

On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered judgment, 7 dismissing the petition.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 10 March 1987. 8 Hence, this recourse.

ISSUES

a) WON respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision of 25 March 1985 which set aside the lower court's earlier decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981

b) WON the respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, have no alternative
but to issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do so being purely
ministerial;

HELD

It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened,
reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court
shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in
relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law,
petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility
until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. 9 This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. 10

Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to the court a quo before its decision became final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would be
pressuring respondent land registration officials to submit a report or study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary deadline for the finality of the court decision.

Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the period before the court's decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but not beyond
the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation
to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the
act of the court. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings ."

10. St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd. v. Grand International Airways, Inc., G.R. No. 140288, [October 23, 2006], 535 PHIL 757-765 Guinto

ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD., petitioner,

vs.

GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 140288 October 23, 2006

Doctrine:

Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, under the rules of comity,
utility and convenience, nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. 1 Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an
action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. 2

A foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or
by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

Facts

Petitioner is a foreign corporation based in Singapore. It is engaged in the manufacture, repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. Respondent, on the other hand is a domestic
corporation engaged in airline operations.

Petitioner and respondent executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification of Airbus A 300 B4-103 Aircraft Registration No. RP-C8882" (First Agreement).
Under this stipulation, they agreed on the following:

· petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and modification works on respondent's aircraft

· mode and manner of payment by respondent of the contract price, including interest in case of default

· that the "construction, validity and performance thereof(contract)" shall be governed by the laws of Singapore

· to submit any suit arising from their agreement to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts

Petitioner undertook the contracted works and thereafter promptly delivered the aircrafts to respondent. The former billed the latter in the total amount of US$303,731.67 or S$452,560.18. But
despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent failed to pay, in violation of the terms agreed upon.

This prompted the petitioner to file an action for sum of money against the respondent with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore. Upon petitioner's motion, the court issued a Writ of
Summons to be served extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent. The court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect service of the summons upon respondent.
However, despite receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the claim.

Singapore High Court – rendered decision in favor of petitioner

Petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 117, Pasay City, a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss.

RTC – denied the motion to dismiss.

CA – reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the petition. Ruling that: the complaint does not involve the personal status of plaintiff, nor any property in which the defendant has a claim or
interest, or which the private respondent has attached but purely an action for collection of debt. It is a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. As
a personal action, the service of summons should be personal or substituted, not extraterritorial, in order to confer jurisdiction on the court.

Arguments of Petitioner:

· the Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person

· the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for having been rendered in violation of its right to due process

Issues:
(1) whether the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the service of summons upon its office in the Philippines
(2) whether the judgment by the Singapore High Court is enforceable in the Philippines

Ruling:
(1) YES

a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or
by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, 4 which in this case is the
law of Singapore.

Here, petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons outside Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court granted "leave to serve a
copy of the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of the Philippines for service of any originating process issued by the Philippines at ground floor,
APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines."5 This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of
the Rules of Court 19966 of Singapore.
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, 7 his deputy or other proper court officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant 8
or by substituted service.9 In this case, the Writ of Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was served upon respondent at its office located at Mercure Hotel (formerly Village Hotel), MIA
Road, Pasay City. The Sheriff's Return shows that it was received on May 2, 1998 by Joyce T. Austria, Secretary of the General Manager of respondent company. 10 But respondent completely
ignored the summons, hence, it was declared in default.

(2) YES

Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment of
default rendered by that court against respondent is valid.

11. Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr., G.R. No. 156848, [October 11, 2007], 561 PHIL 688-711 Josol
FACTS

Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer
Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).

Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the
company established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines.

Todaro alleged that PIL, et al. will hire him first as a consultant then as an employee of the said company for its pre-mixed concrete operations in the Philippines. An exchange of letters took place
where it was initially agreed that Todaro will serve as a consultant with a monthly compensation of USD 15,000. After which, he will be employed on a permanent status.

The parties’ agreement to hire him as a permanent employee never materialized since PIL terminated Todaro’s service.

A complaint for breach of contract was instituted by Todaro..

Issue: WON the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due to a presence of a foreign element?

WON summons were properly served.

Ruling: No. The doctrine of forum non-conveniens requires an examination of the truthfulness of the allegations in the complaint. Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not
mention forum non-conveniens as a ground for filing a motion to dismiss. The propriety of dismissing a case based on forum non-conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more
properly considered a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, the trial court should do so only after vital facts are
established to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.

Summons was not served personally on Klepzig as agent of PIL. Instead, summons was served on De Leon, Klepzig’s Executive Assistant. In this instance, De Leon was not PIL’s agent but a
mere employee of Klepzig. In effect, the sheriff resorted to substituted service. For symmetry, we apply the rule on substituted service of summons on a natural person and we find that no reason
was given to justify the service of PIL’s summons on De Leon.

The Decision dated 27 September 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 January 2003 of the appellate court are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that there was improper service of summons
on Pioneer International, Ltd. The case is remanded to the trial court for proper service of summons and trial.

12. Regner v. Logarta, G.R. No. 168747, [October 19, 2007], 562 PHIL 862-886 Jueves

FACTS: Cynthia Logarta and Teresa Tormis were the daughters of Luis Regner in his first marriage with Anicita Regner. Victoria Regner is the second wife of Luis. In 1999, Victoria alleged that
Cynthia and Teresa with the help of another sibling defrauded Luis, who was then very ill and was unable to write, into placing his thumbmark into a Deed of Donation. In said Deed, Luis
purportedly donated a Proprietary Ownership Certificate pertaining to membership shares in the Cebu Country Club. Victoria alleged that said Deed is void because the placing of thumbmark by
Luis was done without the latter’s free will and voluntariness considering his physical state; that it was done without Luis’s lawyer; that the ratification made by Luis before he died is likewise
void because of similar circumstances.

In the same year, Victoria filed a complaint to annul said deed with the RTC of Cebu. The sheriff could not deliver the summonses against Cynthia and Teresa because apparently, although they
are Filipinos, they are not residing here; they are residing in California. It was only in the year 2000 that one of the summonses was served to one of the sisters, Teresa, when she came back to the
Philippines. Teresa immediately filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Victoria failed to prosecute her case for an unreasonable length of time. Naturally, Victoria opposed the MTD. Teresa,
in her rejoinder, alleged that the case should be dismissed because Cynthia, who is an indispensable party, was not issued any summons, hence, since an indispensable party is not served with
summons, without her who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter there can be no proper determination of the case. The trial court ruled in favor of Teresa; this was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Victoria’s complaint is correct.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the arguments presented by Teresa. The Supreme Court also emphasized: There are generally two types of actions: actions in rem and actions in
personam. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person. The
certificate, subject of the donation, is a personal property. The action filed by Victoria is therefore a personal action. So in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, summons
must be served upon them.
Further, the certificate is indivisible, Cynthia’s and Teresa’s interests thereto can only be determined if both are summoned in court. In personal actions, if the respondents are residents of the
Philippines, they may be served summons in the following order:1. Personal Service;2. If (1) is not possible, Substituted Service;3.If respondent can’t be found because he is abroad but still a
resident of the Philippines, by publication with leave of court. In personal actions still, if the respondents are non-residents, they may be served summons in the following manner:

1.Personal service through the Philippine embassy;

2.By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the courtmay order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by
registeredmail to the last known address of the defendant; or

3.In any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

The above must be with leave of court. In the case at bar, Cynthia was never served any summons in any of the manners authorized by the Rules of Court. The summons served to Teresa cannot
bind Cynthia. It is incumbent upon Victoria to compel the court to authorize the extraterritorial service of summons against Cynthia. Her failure to do so for a long period of time constitutes a
failure to prosecute on her part.

13. Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corp. , G.R. No. 172242, [August 14, 2007], 556 PHIL 822-852 Jungco

FACTS:

Perkin Elmer Asia entered into a distribution agreement with Dakila, a domestic corporation. In the said agreement, Dakila was appointed its sole distributor in the Philippines and thus, it shall
receive commissions for its sales from Perkin Asia. Dakila was supposed to order the products either from Perkin Asia or from Perkin Elmer Instruments Philippines (PEIP), an affiliate of Perkin
Asia, 99 % of the shares of which is owned by Perkin Asia.

However, Perkin Asia unilaterally terminated the agreement with Dakila which caused Dakila to sue both Perkin Asia and PEIP. Dakila filed a complaint for collection of sum of money (an in
personam suit) with a prayer for writ of attachment. The alias summons were, however, served upon Perkin Elmer Asia, a Singapore based sole proprietorship owned by Perkin Asia but was
allegedly, a separate and distinct entity from it.

In response, PEIP filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. Perkin Elmer Asia informed the court of the wrongful service of summon s upon it. Dakila then filed an amended complaint
saying that Perkin Asia is now Perkinelmer that it became a sole proprietorship and changed its name but it’s the same people/interest thus, they should still be accountable for their obligations.
Perkin Asia, herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over its person.

RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss stating that since the action is one for damages, it relates to Perkin Asia’s property and since Dakila alleged in its complaint that Perkin Asia owns
shared in PEIP, the extraterritorial service of summons was sufficient to acquire jurisdiction when the action relates to or the subject matter of which is property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent. CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not jurisdiction was validly acquired.

RULING:

No. This sustains the contention of the petitioner that there can never be a valid extraterritorial service of summons upon it, because the case before the court a quo involving collection of a
sum of money and damages is, indeed, an action In Personam, as it deals with the personal liability of the petitioner to the respondent by reason of the alleged unilateral termination by the former
of the Distribution Agreement.

Thus, being an action In Personam, personal service of summons within the Philippines is necessary in order for the RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, and this is
not possible in the present case because the petitioner is a non-resident and is not found within the Philippines. Respondent's allegation in its Amended Complaint that petitioner had personal
property within the Philippines in the form of shares of stock in PEIP did not make Civil Case No. MC99-605 fall under any of the four instances mentioned in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, as to convert the action In Personam to an action In Rem or quasi In Rem and, subsequently, make the extraterritorial service of summons upon the petitioner valid.

14. Palma v. Galvez, G.R. No. 165273, [March 10, 2010], 629 PHIL 86-100 Maturan

CASE NO. 14

G.R. No. 165273. March 10, 2010.*

LEAH PALMA, petitioner, vs. HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 24; and
PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO, respondents.

ESCRA: (pwede na di apilon kopya)

Summons; Jurisdiction; Methods of service of summons under Section 16 of Rule 14 is not mandatory; Modes of service of a resident defendants in temporarily out of the Philippines. —
In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, 554 SCRA 513 (2008) we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words “may” and “also,” it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed
under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines.
 Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to:

(1) substituted service set forth in section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14;

(2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;

(3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or

(4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Same; Same; Same; A dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the country at the time.—We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and
discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; The filing of motions seeking affirmative relief such as to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgement and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration and considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. —We agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction
over the person of private respondent when the latter’s counsel entered his appearance on private respondent’s behalf, without qualification and without questioning the propriety of the service of
summons, and even filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer.

In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of time to file answer be granted. We
have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. When private respondent earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in
her motions for additional time to file answer, she voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

July 28, 2003 – Leah Palma filed an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz, due to the doctors’ medical malpractice of
removing her right ovary against her will.

Palma subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC:
1. Karla Reyes
2. Myra Mangaser and
3. Psyche Elena Agudo.

Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them.

February 17, 2004 – RTC Iloilo’s process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias summons, with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon Psyche
Elena Agudo thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as Psyche Elena was out of the country.

March 1, 2004 - Psyche Elena’s counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer, saying that he was just engaged by Psyche Elena’s husband as she was
out of the country and the Answer was already due.

March 15, 2004 - Psyche Elena’s counsel filed a Motion for Another Extension of Time to File Answer
● while the draft answer was already finished, the same would be sent to Psyche Elena for her clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Dublin, Ireland;

● counsel prayed for another 20 days to file the Answer.

March 30, 2004 - Psyche Elena filed a Motion to Dismiss

GROUND: RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over Psyche Elena as:
● she was not properly served with summons, since she was temporarily out of the country;

● that service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

Palma filed her Opposition to the motion to dismiss

GROUNDS:
● A substituted service of summons on Psyche Elena’s husband was valid and binding on her;
● that service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by other modes of service, i.e., by personal or substituted service.

May 7, 2004 - RTC Iloilo granted Psyche Elena’s motion to dismiss. Palma’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

GROUNDS:
1. While the summons was served at Psyche Elena’s house and received by her husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at
the time the summons was served. She was not personally served a summons.

2. Even granting that Psyche Elena knew that a complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not validly served with
summons;

3. Substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that Psyche Elena was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of summons on her by
publication.

ISSUES
 1. WON substituted service of summons upon private respondent, a defendant residing in the Philippines but temporarily outside the country is invalid;

2. WON Section 16, Rule 14, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure limits the mode of service of summons upon a defendant residing in the Philippines, but temporarily outside the country,
exclusively to extraterritorial service of summons under section 15 of the same rule;

3. WON by filing two (2) motions for extension of time to file Answer, Psyche Elena had voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of RTC Iloilo pursuant to Section 20, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, hence, equivalent to having been served with summons;

RULING

1st issue and 2nd issue: Substituted service of summons upon Psyche Elena, a defendant residing in the Philippines but temporarily outside the country is valid.

Since Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words “may” and “also,” it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a
defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines.

Other modes of service may be resorted to:

(1) substituted service set forth in section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14;

(2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;

(3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or

(4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Substituted service can be served at a dwelling, house or residence, which refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he
may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It must also be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant.

Considering that Psyche Elena, a Filipino citizen and resident, was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint may be validly served on her through substituted service
under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, the Sheriff’s Return stated that Psyche Elena was out of the country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging
receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on Psyche’s behalf. Psyche also did
not make issues or as to the fact that summons was served at home.

3rd issue: Psyche Elena had voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of RTC Iloilo by filing two (2) motions for extension of time to file Answer, equivalent to having been served with
summons.
RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of Psyche Elena when her counsel entered his appearance on Psyche Elena’s behalf, without qualification and without questioning the
propriety of the service of summons, and even filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer.

In effect, Psyche Elena, through counsel, had already invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of time to file answer be granted. The filing of
motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration,
are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

When Psyche Elena earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in her motions for additional time to file answer, she voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC
and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise.

RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Orders.

15. Hahn v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113074, [January 22, 1997], 334 PHIL 491-507 Miranda

FACTS: Alfred Hahn is a Filipino citizen doing business under the name and style "Hahn-Manila," while, PR Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft (BMW) is a nonresident foreign corp.
existing under the laws of the former Fed. Rep. of Germany.

On March 7, 1967, petitioner executed in favor of PR a "Deed of Assignment w/ Special Power of Attorney," which provides for ASSIGNOR agreeing to transfer and record said transfer of the
said BMW trademark and device in favor of the ASSIGNEE herein with the Phils. Patent Office. Per the agreement, the parties "continue[d] business relations as has been usual without a formal
contract." But, in a meeting with a BMW rep. and the pres. of Columbian Motors Corporation (CMC), Jose Alvarez, petitioner was informed that BMW was arranging to grant the exclusive
dealership of BMW cars and products to CMC.

Petitioner Hahn filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against BMW to compel it to continue the exclusive dealership. He amended his complaint to include an application for
TRO and writs of preliminary, mandatory & prohibitory injunction to enjoin BMW from terminating his exclusive dealership.

The case was docketed in Quezon City RTC, which issued a TRO. Summons & copies of the complaint and amended complaint were served on PR thru the Dept. of Trade and Industry, pursuant
to Rule 14, Sec. 14 of the Rules of Court. The order, summons & copies of the complaint & amended complaint were later sent by DTI to BMW via registered mail and was received by the latter.
Later, an ex parte hearing on the application for the WPI proceeded.

The trial court issued an order granting the WPI. OBMW moved to dismiss the case, contending that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because it (BMW) was a foreign corp. not doing
business in the Phils. And that Hahn was an indentor/middleman transacting business in his name & for his account. Hahn, in opposing, argued that BMW was doing bus. in the Phils. thru him as
its agent, as shown by BMW invoices and order forms used to document his transactions; he gave warranties as exclusive BMW dealer; etc. The trial court deferred resolution of the motion to
dismiss until after trial on the merits citing that the grounds advanced by BMW in its motion did not seem to be indubitable.

The CA ruled that BMW wasn’t doing business in the country and, therefore, jurisdiction over it could not be acquired thru service of summons on DTI. It held that Hahn was mere indentor/broker
& not an agent thru whom PR BMW transacted bus. in the Philippines and dismissed the complaint against BMW. Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:

1. WON BMW is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines/ WON service of summons was proper. YES

2. WON the CA erred in finding that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in deferring action on the motion to dismiss. YES

RULING: The appeal is well-taken

1.) Rule 14, Sec. 14 provides: “Sec 14. Service upon private foreign corp. — If the defendant is a foreign corp., or a nonresident joint stock company or association, doing business in the Phil.,
service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the gov’t. official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its
officers or agents within the Philippines. What acts are considered "doing business in the Phils." are enumerated in Sec. 3(d) of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (R.A. No. 7042) as follows x x
x who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; x x x; That the phrase "doing business x x x "transacts business in its name
and for its own account."

The Court held that Hahn is an agent of BMW. Hahn claimed he took orders for BMW cars and transmitted them to BMW. Upon receipt of orders, BMW fixed downpayment & pricing charges,
notified Hahn of scheduled production month for the orders, reconfirmed the orders by signing - returning to Hahn acceptance sheets. Payment was made by the buyer directly to BMW. Hahn
never paid for the purchase price of BMW cars sold in the Phils., was credited with a commission equal to 14% of the purchase price upon the invoicing of a vehicle order by BMW. Upon
confirmation that the vehicles had been registered in the Phils. and serviced by him, Hahn received an additional 3% of the full purchase price. Hahn performed after-sale services, including
warranty services, for which he received reimbursement from BMW. All orders were on invoices and forms of BMW. Contrary to the appellate court's conclusion, this arrangement shows an
agency. An agent receives a commission upon the successful conclusion of a sale. On the other hand, a broker earns his pay merely by bringing the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is
eventually made.

This Court held that these acts constituted doing business in the Philippines. The arrangement showed that the foreign corporation’s purpose was to penetrate the Philippine market and establish its
presence in the Philippines. In addition, BMW held out private respondent Hahn as its exclusive distributor in the Philippines, even as it announced in the Asian region that Hahn was the “official
BMW agent” in the Philippines.

2.) It is not true then that the question whether BMW is doing business could have been resolved simply by considering the parties' pleadings, as there are genuine issues of facts determined thru
evidence. BMW cannot short circuit the process on the plea that to compel it to go to trial would be to deny its right not to submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court which precisely it denies. Rule
16, 3 authorizes courts to defer the resolution of a motion to dismiss until after the trial if the ground on which the motion is based does not appear to be indubitable.

The private respondent need not apprehend that by responding to the summons it would be waiving its objection to the trial court's jurisdiction. For purposes of having summons served on a
foreign corporation in accordance with Rule 14, 14, it is sufficient to be alleged in the complaint that the foreign corporation is doing business in the Phils. The court need not go beyond the
allegations to determine whether it has Jurisdiction. A determination that the foreign corporation is doing business is only tentative and is made only for the purpose of enabling the local court to
acquire jurisdiction over the foreign corporation through summons. Such does not foreclose a contrary finding should evidence later show that it is not transacting business in the country.

Far from committing grave abuse of discretion, the trial court properly deferred resolution of the motion to dismiss.
16. Communications Materials and Design, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102223, [August 22, 1996], 329 PHIL 487-511 Muana

FACTS: Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC, for brevity) are foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines and duly organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, United States of America filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 a complaint against petitioners COMMUNICATION
MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI, for brevity) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC, for brevity), both domestic corporations, and Francisco S. Aguirre is their President and
majority stockholder. Private Respondents sought to enjoin petitioners from selling or attempting to sell to PLDT and to any other party, products which have been copied or manufactured "in like
manner, similar or identical to the products, wares and equipment of plaintiff, and from using in its corporate name, letter heads, envelopes, sign boards and business dealings, plaintiff's trademark,
internationally known as ITEC; and the recovery from defendants in solidum, damages of at least P500,000.00, attorney's fees and litigation expenses after petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its
contractual commitment as stipulated in their Representative Agreement when petitioners used the knowledge and information of ITEC's products specifications to develop their own line of
equipment and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITEC's own, and offering them to ITEC's former customer.

Petitioners then filed motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) That PRIVATE RESPONDENTS has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without
the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2) that PRIVATE RESPONDENTS is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of the principle of "forum non
conveniens".

After hearing, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injuction.

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to CA under Rule 65 assailing and seeking the nullification and the setting aside of the Order and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Regional
Trial Court. However, the latter court dismissed the petition as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration which prompted petitioner to file before the Supreme Court Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.

In its petition, it argued that since private respondents have no capacity to bring suit here, the Philippines is not the "most convenient forum" because the trial court is devoid of any power to
enforce its orders issued or decisions rendered in a case that could not have been commenced to begin with, such that in insisting to assume and exercise jurisdiction over the case below, the trial
court had gravely abused its discretion and even actually exceeded its jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not PRIVATE RESPONDENTS has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license.

2. Whether or not in insisting to assume and exercise jurisdiction over the case, the trial court had gravely abused its discretion and even actually exceeded its jurisdiction.

RULINGS:

1. NO. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE.

Notwithstanding such finding that ITEC is doing business in the country, petitioner is nonetheless estopped from raising this fact to bar ITEC from instituting this injunction case against it.

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and
benefited by said corporation. 41 To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it.
And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic corporations. 42 One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is
estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity: The principle will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance
with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.

2. NO. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND EXCEED ITS JURISDICTION.

Petitioner's insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non application, of the private international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play.
According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff
in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question plaintiff's standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by
virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.

Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience.4
7 Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so;
provided, that the following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.

The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the court's disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present forum not being the "most convenient" as a
ground for the suit's dismissal, deserves scant consideration.

17. Manila Hotel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 120077, [October 13, 2000], 397 PHIL 1-23 Santiago

G.R. No. 120077. October 13, 2000.*

THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER CEFERINA J. DIOSANA AND
MARCELO C. SANTOS, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

FACTS: During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press in Oman, Santos received a letter from Mr. Shmidt, General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China, informing Santos that he
was recommended by his friend. He was offered the same position as printer, but with a higher monthly salary and increased benefits. Santos likewise wrote to Mr. Shmidt and signified his
acceptance of the offer. The Palace Hotel Manager, Mr. Henk, mailed a ready to sign employment contract to Santos. Mr. Henk advised Santos that if the contract was acceptable, to return the
same to Mr. Henk in Manila, together with his passport and two additional pictures for his visa to China.

Santos resigned from the Mazoon Printing Press and wrote the Palace Hotel and acknowledged Mr. Henk's letter. Santos enclosed four (4) signed copies of the employment contract and notified
them his estimated day of arrival in Manila. The employment contract of June 4, 1988 stated that his employment would commence September 1, 1988 for a period of two years. It provided for a
monthly salary of nine hundred dollars (US$900.00) net of taxes, payable fourteen (14) times a year.
Subsequently, after he started to work at the Palace Hotel, Santos signed an amended "employment agreement" with the Palace Hotel, effective November 5, 1988. In the contract, Mr. Shmidt
represented the Palace Hotel. The Vice President (Operations and Development) of MHICL Miguel D. Cergueda signed the employment agreement under the word "noted". After taking a vacation
leave, Mr. Shmidt's Executive Secretary, a certain Joanna suggested in a handwritten note that Santos be given one (1) month notice of his release from employment. Later, the Palace Hotel
informed Santos by letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the Palace Hotel print shop would be terminated due to business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China.

Palace Hotel terminated the employment of Santos and paid all benefits due him, including his plane fare back to the Philippines. Santos was repatriated to the Philippines. He then, through
counsel, wrote Mr. Shmidt, demanding full compensation pursuant to the employment agreement. Mr. Shmidt replied that Santos’ service with the Palace Hotel, Beijing was not abruptly
terminated as the one-month notice clause was followed and Mr. Santos received all benefits due him.

Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt and prayed for an award of actual, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The Palace Hotel
and Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons and neither participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, who subsequently then decided the case against petitioners.

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the POEA, not the NLRC, had jurisdiction over the case. NLRC promulgated a resolution declaring the appealed decision null and void for want of
jurisdiction.

Santos moved for reconsideration and argued that the case was not cognizable by the POEA as he was not an "overseas contract worker." NLRC granted the motion and reversed itself. The NLRC
directed the Labor Arbiter (LA) to hear the case. LA found that Santos was illegally dismissed from employment and recommended that he be paid actual damages equivalent to his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his contract. And thus NLRC then ruled in favor of private respondent. MR by petitioners was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: W/N NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No.

The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.

The Court noted that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that
Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here.

The employment contract. Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where Santos was then employed. He was
hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government.

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so, provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision.37 The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.
Not Convenient. The Court failed to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the case — from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside
the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the
Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.

No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to for the
application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made).

The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Santos signified his acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in
the People's Republic of China.

No power to determine the facts. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing, People's Republic of China.
The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify Santos' retrenchment.

Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the
Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.

This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving foreign employers. Neither is the Court saying that it does not have power over an
employment contract executed in a foreign country. If Santos were an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He is not an
"overseas contract worker" a fact which he admits with conviction.

18. Puyat v. Zabarte, G.R. No. 141536, [February 26, 2001], 405 PHIL 413-434 Said

Facts:

It appears that on 24 January 1994, [Respondent] Ron Zabarte commenced [an action] to enforce the money judgment rendered by the Superior Court for the State of California, County of Contra
Costa, U.S.A. On 18 March 1994, [petitioner] filed his Answer with the following special and affirmative defenses:

xxx

8) The Superior Court for the State of California, County of Contra Costa[,] did not properly acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of and over the persons involved in [C]ase #C21-00265.

9) The Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991 was obtained without the assistance of counsel for [petitioner] and without sufficient notice
to him and therefore, was rendered in clear violation of [petitioners] constitutional rights to substantial and procedural due process.

10) The Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991 was procured by means of fraud or collusion or undue influence and/or based on a clear
mistake of fact and law.
11) The Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991 is contrary to the laws, public policy and canons of morality obtaining in the Philippines and
the enforcement of such judgment in the Philippines would result in the unjust enrichment of [respondent] at the expense of [petitioner] in this case.

12) The Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991 is null and void and unenforceable in the Philippines.

13) In the transaction, which is the subject matter in Case #C21-00265, [petitioner] is not in any way liable, in fact and in law, to [respondent] in this case, as contained in [petitioners] Answer to
Complaint in Case #C21-00265 dated April 1, 1991, Annex B of [respondents] Complaint dated December 6, 1993.

14) [Respondent] is guilty of misrepresentation or falsification in the filing of his Complaint in this case dated December 6, 1993. Worse, [respondent] has no capacity to sue in the Philippines.

15) Venue has been improperly laid in this case.

Zarbate filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that the answer failed to tender any genuine issue as to the material facts and this was granted. Later on, Puyat filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and of forum non conveniens. RTC ruled in favor of Zarbate and CA affirmed such citing that the recognition of the
foreign judgment was based on comity, reciprocity, and res judicata.

Issue: whether there was forum non conveniens? – No.

Ruling:

Petitioner argues that the RTC should have refused to entertain the Complaint for enforcement of the foreign judgment on the principle of forum non conveniens. He claims that the trial court had
no jurisdiction, because the case involved partnership interest, and there was difficulty in ascertaining the applicable law in California. All the aspects of the transaction took place in a foreign
country, and respondent is not even Filipino.

We disagree. Under the principle of forum non conveniens, even if the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may nonetheless refuse to entertain a case for any of the following
practical reasons:

1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence
there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;

3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and

The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.

None of the aforementioned reasons barred the RTC from exercising its jurisdiction. In the present action, there was no more need for material witnesses, no forum shopping or harassment of
petitioner, no inadequacy in the local machinery to enforce the foreign judgment, and no question raised as to the application of any foreign law.

Authorities agree that the issue of whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the above-mentioned principle depends largely upon the facts of each case and on the sound
discretion of the trial court. 28 Since the present action lodged in the RTC was for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, there was no need to ascertain the rights and the obligations of the parties
based on foreign laws or contracts. The parties needed only to perform their obligations under the Compromise Agreement they had entered into.

Under Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment in an action in personam rendered by a foreign tribunal clothed with jurisdiction is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. 29cräläwvirtualibräry

Also, under Section 5(n) of Rule 131, a court -- whether in the Philippines or elsewhere -- enjoys the presumption that it is acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction, and that it is regularly
performing its official duty. 30 Its judgment may, however, be assailed if there is evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. But
precisely, this possibility signals the need for a local trial court to exercise jurisdiction. Clearly, the application of forum non coveniens is not called for.

The grounds relied upon by petitioner are contradictory. On the one hand, he insists that the RTC take jurisdiction over the enforcement case in order to invalidate the foreign judgment; yet, he
avers that the trial court should not exercise jurisdiction over the same case on the basis of forum non conveniens. Not only do these defenses weaken each other, but they bolster the finding of the
lower courts that he was merely maneuvering to avoid or delay payment of his obligation.

19. Philsec Investment Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, [June 19, 1997], 340 PHIL 232-244 Atup

(1488, INC., DRAGO DAIC, VENTURA O. DUCAT, PRECIOSO R. PERLAS, and WILLIAM H. CRAIG – Private Respondents)

Facts: Ducat obtained loans from Ayala and Philsec ($2.5M) secured by shares of stock. 1488 Inc assumed obligation under an agreement. 1488 executed a deed by which it sold to Athona a
parcel of land in Texas, US while Philsec and Ayala extended loan to Athona $2.5M as purchase price. Philsec and Ayala released Ducat after receiving the $2.5M from 1488 and all the shares of
stock belonging to Ducat. 1488, Inc. later on sued Philsec, Ayala and Athona for the balance of the purchase price ($300K) in United States for payment of balance and damages and for fraud.

It was originally instituted US District Court of Texas but the venue was later transferred to US District Court for the Southern District of Tax. Athona impleaded Philsec and Ayala for conspiring
selling price over its market also seeking damages. Philsec and Ayala filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their person but was denied.

Philippines: Philsec and Ayala filed a complaint for sum of money with WPI against private respondents in RTC Makati citing the allegations in the counterclaim in US Court for fraud by selling
the property at a price of 400% more than its true value thus Athona, Philsec and Ayala were induced to enter into the agreement to purchase the Houston property and prated that he return the
excess payment and for damages. Ducat sought to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens and litis pendentia among others.

RTC dismissed that the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the US under forum non conveniens which the CA
affirmed such dismissal.

Issue: Is the dismissal due to forum non conveniens proper? – No.

[1] Not a Ground to Dismiss. - Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the
grounds under Rule 16, §1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly
considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are established,
to determine whether special circumstances” require court’s desistance.

In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the pleadings filed by private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one
of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latter’s debt which was the object of the
transaction under litigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

20. Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, [November 23, 2007], 563 PHIL 572-590 Banggat

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,

vs

MINORU KITAMURA

G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007

FACTS:Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the
Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog
Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision
of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged
by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance &
damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.

Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination
of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written
agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals
may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.
HELD: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of
law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does notautomatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction
and the choice of the lex foriwill often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of a state
can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

In this case, only the 1 st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction
over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the
litigation.In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by
law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the
dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no lawgrants it
the power to adjudicate the claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance &
damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of
lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the
place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the
law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which
state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue to be resolved.Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2 nd phase, the choice of law.
They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are
not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which
law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper
rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1)
dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume
jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws.
While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formalagreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by
foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed
to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this
conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

21. Raytheon International, Inc. v. Rouzie, Jr., G.R. No. 162894, [February 26, 2008], 570 PHIL 151-160 Cambe

FACTS:

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent, an American citizen, entered into
a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration. Respondent filed
before the NLRC a suit against BMSI et al. However, the same was dismissed. Later, he filed an action for damages against the petitioner and the respondents in the Labor case. Petitioner sought
the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim. It asserts that the written
contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of
foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that
renders our local courts inconvenient forums.

ISSUE: WoN the CA erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens

RULING:

The following are the requisites where the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element:

1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that
the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision
 On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the
res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country
where the case is filed.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign
tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to
this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will
become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it
is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require the court’s desistance

22. Singapore Airlines Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107356, [March 31, 1995], 312 PHIL 1081-1092 Castillo

FACTS:

Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract with the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) for the period covering April 16, 1980, to April 15, 1981. Part of
Aramco's policy to its employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess baggage of up to 50 kilograms, as long as it is
properly supported by receipt.

Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment, with a 50-kilogram excess baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said. amount upon presentation
of the excess baggage ticket.

On December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of several employees being investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claim and asked his wife Beatriz in Manila to seek a written confirmation
from SIA that he indeed paid for an excess baggage of 50 kilograms.

In SIA’s records- manager Johnny Koo notified Beatriz who was assisted by a lawyer and threatened them of filing a lawsuit, that SIA is unable to issue certification requested by the spouses
citing that only 3 kilograms were entered as excess and not 50 kilograms

On April 1981. Aramco gave Rayos his travel documents without a return visa. His employment contract was not renewed.

Then the spouses Rayos sued SIA for damages stating his non renewal was caused by SIA.
SIA claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses because the tampering was committed by its handling agent, Philippine Airlines (PAL) and filed a Third party complaint against PAL.

PAL - countered that its personnel did not collect any charges for excess baggage; that it had no participation in the tampering of any excess baggage ticket; and that if any tampering was made, it
was done by Singapore Airline’s personnel.

RTC – rendered Judgement in favor of plaintiff Rayoses and held Singapore airlines liable for damages

- On 3rd party complaint, PAL was also liable to the Rayoses

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT

RULING: YES

There is no question that a third-party defendant is allowed to set up in his answer the defenses which the third-party plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have to the plaintiff's claim. There
are, however, special circumstances present in this case which preclude third-party defendant PAL from benefiting from the said principle.

However, while the third-party defendant; would benefit from a victory by the third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff, this is true only when the third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant have
non-contradictory defenses. Here, the defendant and third-party defendant had no common defense against the plaintiffs' (Rayos) complaint, and they were even blaming each other for the fiasco.

One of the defenses available to SIA was that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, that is, it had no valid claim against SIA. SIA investigated the matter and discovered that tampering was, indeed,
committed, not by its personnel but by PAL's. This became its defense as well as its main cause of action in the third-party complaint it filed against PAL.

PAL could have used the defense that the plaintiffs had no valid claim against it or against SIA. This could be done indirectly by adopting such a defense in its answer to the third-party complaint
if only SIA had raised the same in its answer to the main complaint, or directly by so stating in unequivocal terms in its answer to SIA's complaint that SIA and PAL were both blameless

PAL opted to deny any liability which it imputed to SIA's personnel. It was only on appeal — in a complete turn around of theory — that PAL raised the issue of no valid claim by the plaintiff
against SIA. This simply cannot be allowed.

A third party complaint involves an action separate and distinct from, although related to the main complaint. A third party defendant who feels aggrieved by some allegations in the main
complaint should, should aside from answering the third party complaint, also answer the main complaint.

In the case at bar, appellate court was in error when it opined that SIA's answer inured to the benefit of PAL for the simple reason that the complaint and the third-party complaint are actually
two separate cases involving the same set of facts which is allowed by the court to be resolved in a single proceeding only to avoid a multiplicity of actions. Such a proceeding obviates the need of
trying two cases, receiving the same or similar evidence for both, and enforcing separate judgments therefore.

While such a complaint speaks of a single suit, a third-party complaint involves an action separate and distinct from, although related to the main complaint. A third-party defendant who feels
aggrieved by some allegations in the main complaint should, aside from answering the third-party complaint, also answer the main complaint.
23. Dumez Company of France v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82340 (Resolution), [August 12, 1991], 277 PHIL 576-583 De Gala

Dumez Company of France v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82340 (Resolution), [August 12, 1991], 277 PHIL 576-583

Facts:

Petitioner Dumez Company of France ("Dumez") is a French corporation which hires Filipino workers through Eastern Construction Company, Inc. ("ECCOI"), a corporation domiciled in
the Philippines. Sometime in 1984, Dumez required four (4) Senior Draftsmen at a proposed wage of US$600.00 per month for its project in Riyadh Saudi Arabia. Upon approval by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") of its corresponding request, petitioner alleges, ECCOI summoned these draftsmen and gave each of them copy of their respective Manpower
Requisition Slip which indicated their name, category ("Senior Draftsmen") and monthly basic salary (US$600.00). Among the draftsmen hired was private respondent Florante Jose.

Since ECCOI has no personality in Saudi Arabia, the draftsmen signed another set of overseas employment agreements with Dumez. Though the employment agreements of the other three
(3) Senior Draftsmen reflected the amount of US$600.00 as the monthly base salary and US$2.50 as the normal hourly rate, that of private respondent, however, showed the amount of US$680.00
monthly base salary but with the same hourly rate of US$2.50. Petitioner avers that it discovered the discrepancy in respondent's monthly base salary. This was subsequently communicated to the
Philippine office. ECCOI explained in an affidavit that the discrepancy was due to a typographical error.

Petitioner also claims that Florante Jose was informed that the necessary correction would have to be made on his salary and was requested to sign new contract papers showing his correct
monthly basic salary, but that Jose insisted on being paid US$680.00 a month. Petitioner eventually acceded by paying US$680.00 for services rendered subject, however, to the condition that Mr.
Jose would be transferred to a new job classification that would match his desired salary scale.

Petitioner found that no job with a higher classification was at that particular time available. On 9 February 1985, Mr. Jose's services were terminated on the ground of "surplus employee,
excess of manpower and retrenchment." Private respondent was repatriated to the Philippines.

On 13 September 1985, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the POEA. The POEA in its decision dated 9 April 1987 dismissed the complaint for lack of merit,
holding that the termination of private respondent's services was for a just cause in accordance with Article 284 of the Labor Code and that the requirement of notice was duly complied with.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in its decision dated 20 January 1988 reversed the POEA, and ordered petitioner Dumez to pay private respondent's salary
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract term of one (1) year in the amount of US$680.00 per month at the peso equivalent thereof at the time of payment. It held that the dismissal
was not due to "surplus employee, excess of manpower and retrenchment" but rather to "wage distortion" which is not one of the valid grounds for termination of employment under the Labor
Code.

Issue

Whether or not the dismissal was proper. No.

Ruling:
 It is clear from the facts here that the amount of the monthly salary base was a prime or essential consideration of the parties in signing the employment contract. Mutual mistake, however,
prevented the proposed contract from arising. Each of the parties signed the employment agreement bearing a different salary rate in mind.

The discrepancy was explained by ECCOI because of a typing error overlooked because of the volume of paperwork involved in documenting the persons recruited and hired. Petitioner
cannot escape the fact, however, that it was due to its own error or negligence in the clerical processing of the employment papers that mutual mistake attended the execution of the contract.
Negligence causing damage to another may generate liability though both parties may be innocent of any deliberate fraud. Thus, it has been held by this Court that as between two (2) innocent
persons, he whose negligence has enabled a third party to cause the damage shall bear the loss.

Though petitioner in the case at bar was clearly innocent of deliberate wrong doing, the failure of the administrative systems of petitioner created some basis for private respondent's belief
(or hope) that he was accepting a US$680.00 monthly salary and thus generated a mutual mistake which occasioned some damage or loss on the part of private respondent. On general principles of
equity, petitioner should compensate private respondent.

24. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896, L-27937, [March 29, 1974], 155 PHIL 228-400 Delute

FACTS: An American citizen from Texas, Linnie Jane Hodges, died in the Philippines, leaving certain properties, both real and personal, in our country. In her will, she made her husband, Mr.
Hodges, her only heir. She likewise stated in the will that upon her husband’s demise, the undisposed properties from her estate would be given equally among her own brothers and sisters. Some
five years later, Mr. Hodges, also a citizen of Texas, died. The administrator of the estate of Mr. Hodges, the PCIB, claims that the designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges was an
attempted substitution, but cannot be given effect because it is not a simple nor
a vulgar nor a fideicommissary substitution, and that under American law, the estate of Mrs. Hodges consists of 1/4 of the total conjugal estate.

Issues:
1. w/n the designation of Mrs. Hodges’ brothers and sisters valid? NO
2. If under Texas law, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is less than 1/4, how much must be regarded as her estate?

HELD:
1. The designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges is not a valid substitution (not a simple or vulgar substitution because the will does not say that said relatives would inherit if
Mr. Hodges would predecease, be incapacitated, or should repudiate the inheritance; and not a fideicommissary substitution for Mr. Hodges was not obliged to preserve and transmit said
properties to the relatives of Mrs. Hodges). But this does not mean that no effect should be given to their designation, for the truth is that they were also instituted to said remaining
properties. The institution of Mr. Hodges partakes of a resolutory condition, this is really a resolutory term, because Mr. Hodges would surely die, sooner or later that is, ownership of the
inherited properties would end at his death (that is, while he was free, as owner, to dispose of the properties inter vivos, he was not free to do so mortis causa). The institution of Mrs.
Hodges’ brothers and sisters is on the other hand an institution subject to a suspensive condition (this is really a suspensive term), their inheritance having become vested at the time of
Mrs. Hodges’ death, but only operative upon the death of Mr. Hodges.
2. With respect to the second issue, the allegation of the PCIB that Mrs. Hodges’ estate is 1/4 of the total mass is a judicial admission of a fact (the existence of the foreign law being a fact),
and by the principle of estoppel, would prevent the PCIB from alleging that Mrs. Hodges’ estate is less than 1/4.
25. Suntay v. Suntay, G.R. Nos. L-3087 & L-3088, [July 31, 1954], 95 PHIL 500-553 Eliab

Suntay vs. Suntay

G.R. No. L-3807 and L-3088, July 31, 1954

In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy. During his lifetime,
he married twice, the first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had several children. The second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son, petitioner Silvino
Suntay.

Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While the second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition for the probate of the last will
and testament of the deceased which was claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November, 1929. The petition was denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing
thereof. After the pacific war, Silvino, claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January, 1931
and probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or the will executed in Amoy
China on November, 1931.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in the Philippines

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.

Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of

Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will

and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate
thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate of allowance of a will and
therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court
and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings
personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines.

26. Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. L-55960, November 24, 1988, 167 SCRA 737 Gonzales, Cyril
26. G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

Sy Kiat, a chines national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real and personal properties in the Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less.

Aida Sy-Gonzales, et. al. filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration claiming among other things that they are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina.

The petition was opposed by Yao kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China and that one of her children, Sze Sook Wah, should be the administrator of
the deceased.

The Court of First Instance decided in favor of Yao Kee’s petition but was modified and set aside by the court of appeals.

ISSUE:

WON Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese Law and Custom conclusive?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid, but it is not sufficient to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with
Chinese law and custom.

A custom "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory and must be proved as a fact according to the rules of
evidence and that a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence.

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law of China on marriage.

In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as that of the Philippines.

27. Willamette Iron & Steel Works v. A.H. Muzzal, G.R. No. L-42538, May 21, 1935 Gonzales, Jashera

WILLAMETTE IRON & STEEL WORKS vs A.H MUZZAL

GR L-42538, May 21, 1935
FACTS
Defendant is former resident of the State of California, now residing in the Philippine Islands. He has a liability to pay for obligations contracted by a
California corporation of which he is a stockholder at the time the said debt was contracted.
Pursuant to sec 322 of the Civil Code of California:
SEC. 322. Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and
personally liable for such proportion of all its debts and liabilities contracted or incurred during the time he was a stockholder as the amount of stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of
the
subscribed capital stock or shares of the corporation. Any creditor of the corporation may institute joint or several actions against any of its stockholders, for the proportion of his claim payable by
each, and in such action the court must (1) ascertain the proportion of the claim or debt for which each defendant is liable, and (2) a several judgment must be rendered against each, in conformity
therewith. If any
stockholder pays his proportion of any debt due from the corporation, incurred while he was such stockholder, he is relieved from any further
personal liability for such debt, and if an action has been brought against him upon such debt, it must be dismissed, as to him, upon his paying the costs, or such proportion thereof as may be
properly
chargeable against him. The liability of each stockholder is determined by the amount of stock or shares owned by him at the time the debt or liability was incurred; and such liability is not
released by any subsequent transfer of stock.

ISSUES
1. WON the foreign law is properly proved
2. WON the California law must be enforced

HELD
1. Yes. Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, since the year 1918, under oath, quoted verbatim Section 322 of the California Civil Code and stated that said
section was in force at the time the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff were incurred, i. e., on November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928. This evidence sufficiently established the fact
that the section in question was the law of the State of California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these
sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law.
The foreign law is a matter of fact.

2. Appellant argues that since the law of California, as to the liability of stockholders of a corporation, is different from and inconsistent with the Philippine Corporation Law the courts here should
not impose liability provided in that law upon a resident of these Islands who is a stockholder of a California corporation. The defendant cannot now escape liability by alleging that theCalifornia
law is unjust and different from the inconsistent with the Philippine Corporation Law.

28. Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, G.R. No. L-11622, L-11668, [January 28, 1961], 110 PHIL 686-711 Guinto

CIR v. FISHER

G.R. No. L-11622, January 28, 1961

Facts:

CIR questions the exemption made by the Tax Court in exempting Fisher from paying inheritance tax on the shares of stock in the mining corporation. The Tax Court here used as basis the
reciprocity rule under the NIRC and with that it applied the exemption as provide by California Revenue and Taxation Code. Here, one of the arguments of the CIR was that the said proviso
was not duly proven.

To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein respondents, testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue
and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited:

· article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring's California Code,

· a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company Inc,

· and as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.

Issue: Was the law properly pleaded and proven?

Ruling: YES

The Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in
the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now Rules of Court) will convince one that these
sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law ." In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.

29. Yap v. Solicitor General, G.R. No. L-1602, [September 9, 1948], 81 PHIL 468-470 Josol

Facts: Bienvenido Yap was born of Chinese parentage, married to Gloria Lim, a native, born of a Chinese father and by this union he had two children born in Capiz, Wilfred Yap on May 26,
1944 and Roubin Yap on April 12, 1946.

He applied for Filipino citizenship which the lower court granted.

Issue: WON the lower court did not err in approving Bienvenido Yap’s application?

Ruling: The Solicitor General argued that that applicant has failed to establish that the laws of China grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens thereof.

The Supreme Court ruled on record is a document supposed to be a copy of the Chinese law of citizenship, where it appears that a Filipino can acquire Chinese citizenship by naturalization. That
applicant presented a copy of the Chinese law certified by a clerk of court of Cebu. The pronouncement is in a way supported by the fact that Exhibit E carries the dry seal of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. It appearing also that Filipinos are given the right to acquire Chinese citizenship.

Decision is affirmed.

30. Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-22733, [September 25, 1968], 134 PHIL 122-131 Jueves

FACTS: The adjoining properties of the plaintiff [Heras] and the defendant [Benedicto] formerly belonged to one owner, MIRIAM R. HEDRICK . On Septebmer 29, 1917, the said MIRIAM R.
HEDRICK sold a portion of the lots to CLARO M. RECTO, and retained for herself Lots Nos. 10 and 24. A copy of the Escritura de Compra-Venta in favor of Claro M. Recto is attached hereto
and made a part hereof as Annex "B".

By virtue of said Escritura de Compra-Venta (annex "B") but before the new survey mentioned in "parrafo septimo" thereof was undertaken, CLARO M. RECTO obtained a separate title, TCT.
No. 7755 issued on October 2, 1917,

The property purchased by CLARO M. RECTO from MIRIAM R. HEDRICK became the subject of a series of transfers , towit: Recto to Emmanuel Conty and from Conty to Salvador
Benedicto(defendant).

MIRIAM R. HEDRICK, as owner of the remaining lots Nos. 10 and 24 subsequently obtained a new and separate title, wherein both Lots were consolidated and designated as Lot No. 12 and
likewise, Lots Nos. 8, 9, 22, and 23 were consolidated and designated as Lot No. 11.

The property of MIRIAM R. HEDRICK, became the subject of a seriesof transfers, to wit: sold by Hedrick to How Kwo Hsein to General Security and Investment Co. to Vicente Heras.

Sometime in 1941, the plaintiff [Heras] demolished the entire building situated on his property.

The trial court likewise found that the easement of way was found entirely within the property of Benedicto, contrary to the stipulation in the deed of sale between Miriam R. Hedrick and Claro M.
Recto that it should be between their properties, with each contributing an equal portion of his property. According to the court, this was the reason why Recto, Benedicto's predecessor-in-interest,
who had earlier asked for a resurvey in accordance with the deed of sale, subsequently withdrew his motion, after finding that the passageway was located entirely within his property.

Accordingly, the court directed both parties to contribute equally to the maintenance of a three to four-meter-wide passageway between their properties, with the property line running at the
middle of the passageway. It rejected Benedicto's claim that the easement had been extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of the necessity for a passageway.

The petitioner argues that since 14 years had elapsed from the time the building on Heras' property was demolished in 1941 to 1955 when this action was begun (during which period he assumed
that the passageway ceased to be used because Heras' property had direct access to the street), the easement must be deemed to have been extinguished.
ISSUE: WON the easement have been extinguished.

HELD: The petitioner merely assumes that the passageway in question had not been in use since 1941 because the property of Heras has since gained direct access to San Marcelino street with the
demolitionof his house. For another, even if we assume that the period of prescription based on nonuser is 10 years, the very testimony of the petitioner Benedicto shows that it was only in 1946
that he had the passageway walled in by constructing a fence, and since the present action was filed in 1955, granting that article 631 of the Civil Code is applicable, the prescriptive period has not
yet elapsed.

Nor can presumptive renunciation by Heras of the use of the said passageway be inferred. It would appear from the record that Heras started the construction of an apartment building on his parcel
of land after the demolition of his house in 1941, and that although interrupted by World War II, construction was continued in 1955. Since it is patent from the stipuation of facts that the easement
in question is mainly a vehicular passageway, the obvious need for such passageway to the rear portion of the projected apartment building negates any presumptive renunciation on the part of
Heras.

Moreover, the easement in this case is perpetual in character nd was annotated on all the transfer certificates of title issued in the series of transfers from Miriam R. Hedrick through to the
respondent Heras, and in the transfer certificates of title issued in the series of transfers from Claro M. Recto through to the petitioner Benedicto. Since there is nothing in the record that would
point to a mutual agreement between any of the predecessors-in-interest not between the petitioner and the respondent themselves with respect to the discontinuance or obliteration of the easement
annotated on the titles, the continued existence of the easement must be upheld and respected.

31. Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119602, [October 6, 2000], 396 PHIL 383-405 Jungco

Facts: Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon
the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in
Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11, 1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m. The master (captain) of
the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel’s third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port
at 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way. The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel at mile
172. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again
experienced some vibrations.These occurred at 4:12 a.m.It was then that the watch officer called the master to the bridge. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it
was in the centre of the channel. He then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the
double bottom tanks. At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River,thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a
vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of
unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
Issue: Whether or not the Venezuelan law should be applied.

Held: No. It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official
publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise
presented as evidence.

Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2)
It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.
The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his
office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the case. With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the
written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the
statute.

32. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112573, [February 9, 1995], 311 PHIL 203-227 Maturan

CASE No. 32
G.R. No. 112573. February 9, 1995.*

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY, INC., respondents

ESCRA (for ref only)

Courts; Judgments; Jurisdiction; A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown.— It is also proper to presume
the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

A court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. —Under
Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction
and has regularly performed its official duty.
 Same; Same; Same; The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.— Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the
Japanese court, j In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void,
and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it.

Same; Same; Same; It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of
the forum.—It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this
case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP.

Same; Same; Same; It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is
invalid.—As to what this law is, is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what
that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons
and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.

Same; Same; Same; In the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked.—
Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the
Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.

Same; Same; Same; The extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty.—Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was
filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have
assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption
but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner: Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (Northwest, for brevity)

· American corporation

Respondent: C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc., (hereinafter SHARP)

· Philippine corporation

Case: to enforce a judgment rendered in favor of NORTHWEST by a Japanese court against SHARP.
Timeline:

May 9, 1974 - Northwest and Sharp, through its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby Northwest authorized Sharp to sell its air transportation
tickets.

March 25, 1980 – Northwest sued Sharp in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages, because Sharp was unable to remit the proceeds of
the ticket sales made by them on behalf of Northwest under the said agreement.

April 11,1980 – The 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of summons against Sharp.

The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to receive court processes was
in Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980.

April 24, 1980 - bailiff returned to the defendant's office to serve the summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept the same claiming that he was no longer an employee of the defendant.

After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at the head office of the defendant in
Manila.

July 11, 1980 - the Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels upon Sharp’s head office in Manila.

August 28, 1980 - Sharp received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit the writ of summons. Despite receipt of the same, Sharp failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.

January 29, 1981 – The Tokyo Court proceeded to hear Northwest’s complaint and rendered judgment ordering Sharp to pay Northwest:

· 83,158,195 Yen; and

· damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed

March 24, 1981 - Sharp received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit a copy of the judgment. Judgment became final and executory because Sharp did not appeal the judgment.

May 20, 1983 – Since Northwest was unable to execute the decision in Japan, Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 54.

July 16, 1983 - Sharp averred that the judgment of the Japanese Court sought to be enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and
proper notice to the defendant and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact. Trial ensued.

April 21, 1989 - Sharp filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence based on two grounds:
(1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and
(2) the said judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without due process of law.

RTC Ruling:

June 21, 1989 – RTC Manila granted the Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence, dismissed complaint of Northwest.

GROUNDS:
· foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering that this is an action in personam;

· the Japanese Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because jurisprudence requires that the defendant be served with summons in Japan in order for the
Japanese Court to acquire jurisdiction over it

· the process of the Court in Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in the case before the Japanese Court of the case
at bar.

CA Ruling: sustained the trial court.

GROUNDS:
· RTC was correct on its reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait wherein it was held that "the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the
person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state."

· In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons within the forum is required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant (Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto,
125 SCRA 230)

· To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is necessary (Dial Corp. vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA 739).

Distinguished action in personam (resident defendant) & action in personam (non-resident defendant), re: when jurisdiction is acquired.
Resident - if by personal, substituted or constructive service conformably to statutory authorization
Non-Resident – ONLY if he is served personally within the jurisdiction of the court resident defendant.
Northwest: since Sharp maintains branches in Japan, it is considered a resident defendant. (so personal, substituted or constructive service of summons when made in compliance with the
procedural rules is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render judgment in personam).

ISSUE: WON a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its
principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed.

RULING: YES
It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly,
the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.

In the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter
is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.

Section 14, Rule 14 ROC:

if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made:

(1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or,
(2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or
(3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to wit:

(a) the Insurance Commissioner, in the case of a foreign insurance company;

(b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and

(c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.

Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan. Hence, service on the designated government official or on any of
SHARP's officers or agents in Japan could be availed of.

As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the Philippines after the two attempts of service had
failed.16 The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme
Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila.
Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper
government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not valid
under Philippine laws holds no water.

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and
the giving of due notice therein. (BASIS: Section 50, Rule 39 ROC & Section 3 of Rule 131)

The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends
that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over
it.

Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.

It is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is, is a question of fact, not
of law.

It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact.

Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 - it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof.

33. Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc., G.R. No. 140047, [July 13, 2004], 478 PHIL 269-297 Miranda

FACTS:

State Organization of Buildings (SOB) in Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy–Medical Rehabilitation Center in Baghdad (Project) to Ajyal Trading and
Contracting Company (Ajyal), a firm duly licensed in Kuwait.

3-Plex International, Inc., represented by the Spouses Santos, a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal. However since it was not
accredited under the Phil. Overseas Construction Board (POCB), it had to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI. VPECI entered into an agreement that the execution of the project will be under
their joint management.
To comply with the requirements of performance bond and an advance payment bond, 3-Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial
institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service contracts abroad.

VPECI and the Ayjal Trading and Contracting Co. (joint venture) entered into a service contract with the SOB for the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy Medical Center Phase 2 to
be completed within a period of 18 months. Under the contract, the joint venture would supply manpower and materials, and SOB would refund the former 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar
and the 75% in US dollars at the exchange rate of 1 Dinar to 3.37777 US Dollars.

The construction was delayed in commencing due to some setbacks and difficulties. Upon foreseeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline, the joint venture contractor worked for the renewal
of the Performance Bond up to December 1986. As of March 1986, the status of the Project was 51% accomplished, meaning the structures were already finished. The remaining 47% consisted in
electro-mechanical works and the 2%, sanitary works, which both required importation of equipment and

Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Sent a telex to Philguarantee demanding full payment of its performance counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI requested Iraqi government to recall the telex for being
in contravention of its mutual agreement that the penalty will be held in abeyance until completion of the project. It also wrote a protest to the SOB since the Iraqi government lacks foreign
exchange to pay VPECI and the non-compliance with the 75% billings in US dollars.

Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidian Bank. The Central Bank then authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment of
the performance counter-guarantee for VPECI’s project. Philguarantee then sent letters to VPECI demanding the full payment of the amount it paid pursuant to Al Ahli pursuant to their joint and
solidary obligation under the deed of undertaking and surety bond. VPECI failed to pay prompting Philguarantee to file the case.

The RTC ruled against Philguarantee and held that it had no valid cause of action against VPECI, that the joint venture contractor incurred no delay in the execution of the Project. Considering the
Project owner’s violations of the contract which rendered impossible the joint venture contractor’s performance of its undertaking, no valid call on the guarantee could be made. Furthermore, no
valid notice was first made by the Project owner SOB to the joint venture contractor before the call on the guarantee. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: What law should be applied in determining whether the respondent contractor has defaulted in the performance of its obligations under the service contract?

HELD: Philippine law.

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be
governed by the lex contractus or "proper law of the contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly (the lex loci intentionis) - none in this case.

It must be noted that in the United States and Europe, the two rules that now seem to have emerged as "kings of the hill" are (1) the parties may choose the governing law; and (2) in the absence of
such a choice, the applicable law is that of the State that "has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties Another authority proposed that all matters relating to the time,
place, and manner of performance and valid excuses for non-performance are determined by the law of the place of performance or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is undoubtedly
always connected to the contract in a significant way.
In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether
respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or
similarity, otherwise known as the processual presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
ours.

According to Art 1169 of the Civil Code: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner what is incumbent
upon him.

As found by the lower courts: the delay or non-completion of the project was caused by factors not imputable to the respondent, it was rather due to the persistent violations of SOB, particularly its
failure to pay 75% of the accomplished work in US dollars. Hence, the joint venture does not incur in delay if the other party(SOB) fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.

Petitioner as a guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion, that is, it cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all legal
remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the creditor. It could also set up compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the principal debtor VPECI. In this case,
however, the petitioner has clearly waived these rights and remedies by making the payment of an obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully due the creditor and demandable of the
principal debtor.

34. EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 145587, [October 26, 2007], 563 PHIL 1-36 Muana

FACTS: Private respondent ELEAZAR S. GRAN, an OFW recruited by EDI, a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), and deployed by ESI to
work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia instituted a complaint against the latter recruitment agencies, OAB (his principal employer), Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and
Western Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City, for underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal after his employment was terminated by OAB on
the grounds of Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency primarily on your salary and contract duration, Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the
recruitment agency[,] vide OAB letter ref. F-5751-93, dated October 3, 1993, and Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or instructions (non-submittal of daily activity
reports despite several instructions).

Labor Arbiter ruled against Gran. According to the latter that there was neither underpayment nor illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter found that Gran failed to refute EDI's allegations; namely, (1) that
Gran did not submit a single activity report of his daily activity as dictated by company policy; (2) that he was not qualified for the job as computer specialist due to his insufficient knowledge in
programming and lack of knowledge in ACAD system; (3) that Gran refused to follow management's instruction for him to gain more knowledge of the job to prove his worth as computer
specialist; (4) that Gran's employment contract had never been substituted; (5) and that Gran was paid a monthly salary of USD 850.00, and USD 350.00 monthly as food allowance.

Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter decided that Gran was validly dismissed from his work due to insubordination, disobedience, and his failure to submit daily activity reports.
Dissatisfied, Gran filed an Appeal with the NLRC. The latter reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It ordered that ESI, EDI, and OAB to be jointly and severally liable to pay the complainant
Eleazar Gran the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS (US$16,150.00) representing his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his contract.
Unconvinced of the NLRC's reasoning, EDI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The Court denied the petition to set aside the NLRC Decision citing that EDI failed to prove that private
respondent was terminated for a valid cause and in accordance with due process.
Hence it filed Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision and Resolution rendered by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent was legally dismissed by reason of incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience.

RULING: NO. PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment contract. A
contract freely entered into is considered law between the parties; and hence, should be respected. In formulating the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.35

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play.36 Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.37 Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us.
In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence that the employer should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and just.

EDI failed to establish any such bases to show how petitioner found Gran incompetent.

EDI failed to discharge the burden of proving Gran's insubordination or willful disobedience. As indicated by the second requirement provided for in Micro Sales Operation Network, in order to
justify willful disobedience, we must determine whether the order violated by the employee is reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and pertains to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show that the order of the company which was violated—the submission of "Daily Activity Reports"—was part of Gran's duties as a
Computer Specialist. Before the Labor Arbiter, EDI should have provided a copy of the company policy, Gran's job description, or any other document that would show that the "Daily Activity
Reports" were required for submission by the employees, more particularly by a Computer Specialist.

Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local employment or recruitment agencies and not the foreign employer, they should have adduced additional evidence to convincingly show that
Gran's employment was validly and legally terminated. The burden devolves not only upon the foreign-based employer but also on the employment or recruitment agency for the latter is not only
an agent of the former, but is also solidarily liable with the foreign principal for any claims or liabilities arising from the dismissal of the worker.48

Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to incompetence, insubordination, or willful disobedience.

35. Crescent Petroleum Ltd. v. M/V "Lok Maheshwari", G.R. No. 155014, [November 11, 2005], 511 PHIL 248-268 Santiago
G.R. No. 155014. November 11, 2005.*

CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., petitioner, vs. M/V “LOK MAHESHWARI,” THE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA, and PORTSERV LIMITED and/or TRANSMAR
SHIPPING, INC., respondents.

PUNO, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Vessel is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned by respondent SCI, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and principally owned by the
Government of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla, a South Korean company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to Transmar. Transmar further
sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv. Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.

Portserv requested petitioner Crescent, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products for the use and operation
of oceangoing vessels, to deliver bunker fuelsto the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels
and related services, petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk, another Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery
of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.

Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery
receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine
Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.

Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V ‘Lok Maheshwari’"
in the amount of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount within a period. The period lapsed and several demands were made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to
petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional expenses for interest,
tracking fees, and legal fees.

While the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before RTC Cebu an action "for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.

Summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. For failing to file their respective answers and upon motion of petitioner
Crescent, the trial court declared respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar in default. Trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioner Crescent. Upon appeal by respondents
Vessel and SCI, they, among other things, submitted a copy of Part II of the Bunker Fuel Agreement between petitioner Crescent and Portserv containing a stipulation that New York law governs
the "construction, validity and performance" of the contract; and certified copies of the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Lien Act of the United States (U.S.), some U.S. cases, and some
Canadian cases to support their defense. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. MR by petitioner was denied. Hence, the recourse.

ISSUE: W/N the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: No.

Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, RTCs exercise exclusive original jurisdiction “(i)n all actions in admiralty and maritime where the demand or claim
exceeds two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) or in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000).” Two (2) tests have been used to determine
whether a case involving a contract comes within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of a court—the locational test and the subject matter test. The English rule follows the locational test
wherein maritime and admiralty jurisdiction, with a few exceptions, is exercised only on contracts made upon the sea and to be executed thereon. This is totally rejected under the American rule
where the criterion in determining whether a contract is maritime depends on the nature and subject matter of the contract, having reference to maritime service and transactions. In International
Harvester Company of the Philippines v. Aragon, we adopted the American rule and held that “(w)hether or not a contract is maritime depends not on the place where the contract is made and is to
be executed, making the locality the test, but on the subject matter of the contract, making the true criterion a maritime service or a maritime transaction.” A contract for furnishing supplies like the
one involved in this case is maritime and within the jurisdiction of admiralty. It may be invoked before our courts through an action in rem or quasi in rem or an action in personam.

Petitioner Crescent bases its claim of a maritime lien on Sections 21, 22 and 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1521 (P.D. No. 1521), also known as the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978.

P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 was enacted “to accelerate the growth and development of the shipping industry” and “to extend the benefits accorded to overseas shipping
under Presidential Decree No. 214 to domestic shipping.” It is patterned closely from the U.S. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 and the Liberian Maritime Law relating to preferred mortgages. Notably,
Sections 21, 22 and 23 of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 are identical to Subsections P, Q, and R, respectively, of the U.S. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, which is part of the
Federal Maritime Lien Act. Hence, U.S. jurisprudence finds relevance to determining whether P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 applies in the present case.

Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one—the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign—Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of
the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Balancing these basic interests, it is inconceivable that
the Philippine court has any interest in the case that outweighs the interests of Canada or India for that matter.

P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 is inapplicable following the factors under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Like the Federal Maritime Lien Act of the U.S., P.D.
No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 was enacted primarily to protect Filipino suppliers and was not intended to create a lien from a contract for supplies between foreign entities
delivered in a foreign port.

Applying P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and rule that a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of the law to develop the domestic
shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum
shopping.

The submission of petitioner is not in keeping with the reasonable expectation of the parties to the contract. Indeed, when the parties entered into a contract for supplies in Canada, they could not
have intended the laws of a remote country like the Philippines to determine the creation of a lien by the mere accident of the Vessel’s being in Philippine territory.

In light of the interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-
charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and
the supplies were delivered in Canada. The arbitration clause contained in the Bunker Fuel Agreement which states that New York law governs the “construction, validity and performance” of the
contract is only a factor that may be considered in the choice-of-law analysis but is not conclusive. As in the cases of Gulf Trading and Swedish Telecom, the lien that is the subject matter of this
case arose by operation of law and not by contract because the shipowner was not a party to the contract under which the goods were supplied.

36. Cadalin v. POEA ,G.R. No. L-104776, December 5, 1994 Said

G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO
A. DEL MUNDO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET.AL.
FACTS:
Consolidated cases.

Cadalin et al. in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from the recruitment by Asia International
Builders (AIBC) and employment by Brown and Root International (BRI) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston Texas engaged in construction while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of foreign principals. Their complaint prayed for payment of
unexpired portion of the employment contract which was pre-terminated and the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserve funds, fringe benefits, unremitted SSS premiums,
among others.

Foreign Law involved: Labor Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provisions provide for holiday pay, rest day, payment for extra hours, entitlement for leaves. Pretermination without proper
notice entitles compensation, and lastly the payment of leaving indemnity (separation pay).

NLRC applied that Amiri Decree (Bahrain Law) setting aside rule on pleading and proof despite only having a simple copy of such law. The Decree provides for greater benefits than those
stipulated in the overseas contract. NLRC believed that where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the
overseas employment contract.

Contents of the Contract: [Prepared by AIBC and BRII] It provided that Bahrain law shall apply if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein. However, there was
a proviso that stated that compensation of the employee may be adjusted downward so that the total computation plus non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to their compensation.
ISSUE: Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law. -Philippine Law

RULING:
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131
[1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing
that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription of
actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws
of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our
Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were
inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict
of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

37. Pakistani Airlines v. Ople, G.R. No. 61594, September 28, 1990 Atup

FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate
contracts of employment, one with private respondent Farrales and the other with private respondent Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent
portion as follows:

5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY

This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties.
 xxx xxx xxx

6. TERMINATION

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month
before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.

xxx xxx xxx

10. APPLICABLE LAW:

This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of
or under this agreement.

Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing training. Base station was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.

Roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters,
informing them that they will be terminated effective September 1, 1980.

Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE).

PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from
abroad sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to
discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.

Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that
the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to 3 years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular
and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full
backwages.

Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for
settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.

We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties
agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.

The contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign
corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights
to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.

Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.
Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law
of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.

Petition denied.

(NOTE)

Another Issue: petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was governed by
the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code.

A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an
absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, “provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.” Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law,
especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away
applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and
parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to appraise the
contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations.

38. Bank of America v. American Realty Corp., G.R. No. 133876, [December 29, 1999], 378 PHIL 1279-1304 Banggat
Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation
GR 133876
December 29, 1999

Facts: Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor
who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage,
which was granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate
mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.

Issue:

WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Held: Yes.

1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other
words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this
purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such
remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.

In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt
to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate
mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing extra-judicially the
mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.

2. Conflicts of Law

Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest
by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.

We rule in the negative.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved
as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal

law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

39. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 133498, [April 18, 2002], 431 PHIL 11-22 Cambe

FACTS:

Respondent, through its Japan Branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement with petitioner, authorizing the latter to sell its air transport tickets. Petitioner
failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, for which reason, respondent filed a collection suit against petitioner before the Tokyo District Court which rendered judgment ordering petitioner to
pay respondent.

Unable to execute the decision in Japan, respondent filed a case to enforce said foreign judgment with the RTC Manila. However, the case was dismissed on the ground of failure of the
Japanese Court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The Court decided in favor of the respondent which was executed by the RTC. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 assailing the aforequoted order.

ISSUE: WON CF Sharp is liable to pay additional interest on top of the 6% interest imposed in the foreign judgment.

RULING: In ruling that the applicable conversion rate of petitioner’s liability is the rate at the time of payment, the Court of Appeals cited the case of  Zagala v. Jimenez,  interpreting the
10

provisions of Republic Act No. 529, as amended by R.A. No. 4100. Under this law, stipulations on the satisfaction of obligations in foreign currency arc void. Payments of monetary obligations,
subject to certain exceptions, shall be discharged in the currency which is the legal tender in the Philippines. But since R.A. No. 529 does not provide for the rate of exchange for the payment of
foreign currency obligations incurred after its enactment, the Court held in a number of cases  that the rate of exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the
11

time of payment.
 The repeal of R.A. No. 529 by R.A. No. 8183 has the effect of removing the prohibition on the stipulation of currency other than Philippine currency, such that obligations or transactions
may now be paid in the currency agreed upon by the parties; Obligations in foreign currency may be discharged in Philippine currency based on the prevailing rate at the time of payment. —The
repeal of R.A. No. 529 by R.A. No. 8183 has the effect of removing the prohibition on the stipulation of currency other than Philippine currency, such that obligations or transactions may now be
paid in the currency agreed upon by the parties. Just like R.A. No. 529, however, the new law does not provide for the applicable rate of exchange for the conversion of foreign currency-incurred
obligations in their peso equivalent. It follows, therefore, that the jurisprudence established in R.A. No. 529 regarding the rate of conversion remains applicable. Thus, in  Asia World Recruitment,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court, applying R.A. No. 8183, sustained the ruling of the NLRC that obligations in foreign currency may be discharged in Philippine currency
based on the prevailing rate at the time of payment. The wisdom on which the jurisprudence interpreting R.A. No. 529 is based equally holds true with R.A. No. 8183. Verily, it is just and fair to
preserve the real value of the foreign exchange-incurred obligation to the date of its payment.

40. Nagarmull v. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-22470, [May 28, 1970], 144 PHIL 72-78 Castillo

FACTS:

In May 1949, Soorajmull Nagarmull, a foreign corporation based in Calcutta, agreed to sell to Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company, a domestic corporation, Hessian bags, shipment of which was to
be made in equal installments of 425 bales per month for July, August, September, and October 1949. However, Nagarmull was unable to deliver the complete amount of goods, resulting in a
balance of 154 bales for July, August, and September. Binalbagan-Isabela then sent a letter dated 29 September asking for the shipment of the shortage.

On 01 October 1949, the Indian Government increased the export duty of jute bags from 80 to 350 rupees per ton, prompting Nagarmull to ask Binalbagan-Isabela to increase its letter of credit to
cover the goods that were due and will be shipped that same month. Binalbagan agreed. Subsequently, Nagarmull asked Binalbagan-Isabela to further increase its letter of credit to cover the 154
bales from July, August, and September, which it will also be shipping. This time, Binalbagan-Isabela refused.

In February 1951, Nagarmull put forth its claim against Binalbagan-Isabela with the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal for Arbitration in Calcutta. There, Binalbagan-Isabela, represented by
the Philippine Consulate General, contended that if the goods had been delivered by Nagarmull on time pursuant to the terms of the contract, there would have been no increased export taxes to
pay because said increased taxes became effective only in October 1949. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce ruled in favor of Nagarmull and ordered Binalbagan-Isabela to pay the sum of 18,562
rupees and 8 annas. The Calcutta High Court affirmed the award.
Nagarmull sought to enforce its claim by filing an action with the Court of First Instance of Manila, which ruled in its favor. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the
same to the Supreme Court as it involved only questions of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal of Arbitration , as affirmed by the Calcutta High Court, is enforceable in the Philippines.

HELD: No, it is not enforceable.

It is true that under the provisions of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment for a sum of money rendered by a foreign court "is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title", but when suit for its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, said judgment "may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact".

There is no question at all that Nagarmull was guilty of a breach of contract when it failed to deliver 154 Hessian bales which, according to the contract entered into with Binalbagan-Isabela,
should have been delivered to the latter in the months of July, August and September. Had these 154 bales been delivered in accordance with the contract, the increase in the export taxes due upon
them would not have been imposed because said increased export tax became effective only on 01 October 1949.

To avoid its liability for the aforesaid increase in the export tax, Nagarmull claims that Binalbagan-Isabela should be held liable on the strength of its letter of 29 September 1949 asking Nagarmull
to ship the shortage. This argument is unavailing. When Binalbagan-Isabela demanded that Nagarmull deliver the shortage of 154 bales, it did nothing more than to demand that to which it was
entitled as a matter of right.

41. Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114323, [July 23, 1998], 354 PHIL 830-851 De Gala

Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114323, [July 23, 1998], 354 PHIL 830-851

Facts:
 The petitioner is a foreign corporation controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. The present conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent has its roots in a contract entered into between both parties on February 26, 1983 whereby the private respondent
undertook to supply the petitioner 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the amount of $477,300.00 by opening an
irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter.

The oil well cement was loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute
between the shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point destination.

Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had already received payment and despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well
cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that the private respondent would replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class "G" cement cost
free. However, the Class "G" cement did not conform to the petitioner's specifications.

The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract. On July 23, 1988, the arbitrator, resolved the
dispute in petitioner's favor. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award in its favor, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun, India (foreign court), praying that
the decision be made "the Rule of Court" in India. Subsequently, the said court directed the private respondent to pay the filing fees in order that the latter's objections could be given consideration.
Instead of paying the required filing fees, the private respondent sent a letter inquiring how much is the court fee to be paid.

Without responding to the above communication, the foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the
private respondent and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court.

The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; (2) lack of cause of action; and (3) plaintiffs claim or demand
has been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. On January 3, 1992, the RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action even though it upholds the
petitioner's legal capacity to sue. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with
the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award.

Issue:

Whether or not the foreign judgment can be validly enforced. YES

Ruling:

The pertinent portion of the judgment of the foreign court reads:

ORDER

Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of conditions of award decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree . The
plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant (US$ 899,603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand six hundred and three point seventy seven only) along with 9%
interest per annum till the last date of realisation.
 As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree". This is a categorical declaration that the foreign court adopted the
findings of facts and law of the arbitrator as contained in the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains an exhaustive discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the parties,
and the arbitrator's evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as the foregoing is deemed to have been incorporated into the foreign court's judgment the appellate court was in error when it described the
latter to be a "simplistic decision containing literally, only the dispositive portion".

The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the
validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

The Supreme court held in many decisions that in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts,
or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered
differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has held that the lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and procedure.
Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator's findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the
same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction
cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

42. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, [August 11, 2010], 642 PHIL 420-438 Delute

Facts:

Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen through naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent (Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a
Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner went back to Canada due to work commitments; however, when he came back he was shocked to discover that the respondent is having an
affair with another man. Thus, petitioner went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce.
The divorce decree took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.

Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that he wants to marry. Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed
the petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.

Accordingly, the petitioner subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to
Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Ruling: No.
No, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as a basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

43. Boudard v. Tait, G.R. No. L-45193, April 5, 1939 Eliab

G.R. No. L-45193 April 5, 1939

EMILIE ELMIRA RENEE BOUDARD, RAYMOND ANTONIN BOUDARD,

GINETTE ROSE ADELAIDE BOUDARD and MONIQUE VICTOIRE BOUDARD, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

STEWART EDDIE TAIT, defendant-appellee.

Ramirez and Ortigas for appellants.

FACTS: The appellant Emilie Boudard, in her capacity as widow of Marie Theodore Boudard and as guardian of her coappellants, her children born during her marriage with the deceased,
obtained a judgment in their favor from the civil division of the CFI of Hanoi, French Indo-China for a sum, plus interest. The judgment was rendered against Stewart Tait who had been declared
in default for his failure to appear at the trial before said court.

The judgment, was based on the fact that Marie Theodore Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart Eddie Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of said Tait, although “outside of the
fulfillment of a duty”.

Trial court (in the Philippines) dismissed the action for enforcement of the Hanoi decision based principally on the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Hanoi to render the judgment in question, for
the execution of which this action was instituted in this jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was discovered in the decision itself of the Court of Hanoi which states that the appellee was not a
resident of, nor had a known domicile in, that country.
The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively proves that neither the appellee nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased Marie Theodore Boudard
had never, at any time, been his employee. The appellee’s first intimation of his having been sued and sentenced to pay a huge sum by the civil division of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi was
when he was served with summons in the present case.

ISSUE: WON the decision in Hanoi can be executed here.

HELD: NO

The appellants failed to show that the proceedings against the appellee in the Court of Hanoi were in accordance with the laws of France then in force; and as to the second point, it appears that
said documents are not of the nature mentioned in sections 304 and 305 of Act No. 190. They are not copies of the judicial record of the proceedings against the appellee in the Court of Hanoi,
duly certified by the proper authorities there, whose signatures should be authenticated by the Consul or some consular agent of the United States in said country.

Moreover, the evidence of record shows that the appellee was not in Hanoi during the time mentioned in the complaint of the appellants, nor were his employees or representatives. The rule in
matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country
before the proceedings.

It can not be said that the decision rendered by the Court of Hanoi should be conclusive to such an extent that it cannot be contested, for it merely constitutes, from the viewpoint of our laws, prima
facie evidence of the justness of appellants’ claim, and, as such, naturally admits proof to the contrary.

44. Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (1808) Gonzales, Cyril

Buchanan v Rucker (1808) 9 East 192
FACTS:

The plaintiff sued a nonresident of Tobago in Tobago courts by posting a summons near the Tobago court house door.

That summons was valid under Tobagonian law.

The defendant declined to appear.

The court in Tobago entered a judgment against him.

The plaintiff then sought to enforce his Tobagan judgment in England.

ISSUE:
WON the judgement of foreign court in personal action can be enforced over a non-resident defendant which service of summon was made through mere posting? No.

RULING:

The presumption in favor of recognition of a private right acquired under foreign law does not cover a personal judgment when the court rendering it was without jurisdiction over the defendant.

In response to this audacious claim, Lord Ellenborough quipped “Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world?” ‘No’, was his answer.

It concluded that judgment could not be entered against "one who never was present in or subject to the jurisdiction.

45. Philippine Aluminum v. FASGI, G.R. No. 137378, October 12, 2000 Gonzales, Jashera
Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs FASGI Enterprises
GR 137378

Facts:
On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (“FASGI”), a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America, entered
into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated (“PAWI”), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. (“FPS”), an Italian corporation. The
agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the United States of aluminium wheels manufactured by PAWI. FASGI then paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels.
Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with the contract.

On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District
Court for the Central District of California. In the interim, two agreements were entered by the parties but PAWI kept on failing to discharge its obligations therein. Irked by PAWI’s persistent
default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of California the agreements for judgment against PAWI.

On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a complaint for “enforcement of foreign
judgment”, before RTC Makati. The Makati court, however, dismissed the case, on the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The lower court
ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was
made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels. This situation amounted to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the RTC said, agreements
which the California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter’s authorization. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed this decision.

Issue: WON the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign judgment.
Held:
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice
in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction,
it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client’s authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his
client’s interest. However, PAWI failed to substantiate this complain with sufficient evidence. Hence, the foreign judgment must be enforced.

Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court based its judgment, this cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment. PAWI claimed that there was collusion and
fraud in the signing of the agreements. Although the US Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this
jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the
court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to
the very existence of the cause of action – such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract – is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement
of the foreign judgment.

46. Querubin v. Querubin, G.R. No. L-3693, July 29, 1950 Guinto

Margaret Querubin vs Silvestre Querubin

July 29, 1950 G.R. No. L-3693

DOCTRINE:
Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines. Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the Court which rendered it did
not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties.

FACTS:

In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married petitioner Margaret Querubin, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 'They had a daughter, Querubina.

Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental cruelty." Silvestre filed a countersuit for divorce alleging Margaret's infidelity. In 1949, the Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the divorce
and awarded "joint custody" of the child. Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home subject to reasonable visits by both parties. Both parents were re strained from taking Querubina out of
California without the permission of the Court.
On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre under an interlocutory decree (although the child was still kept in the neutral home) because at the time of the trial, Margaret was living with
another man.

Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was modified. Since she had then married the man she was living with and had a stable home, the Court granted custody to Margaret with
reasonable limitations on the part of the father.

Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on November of the same year, went to the Philippines and stayed in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, with the intent of protecting the child from the
effects of her mother's scandalous conduct. He wanted the child to be raised in a better environment.

In 1950, Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of Querubina urder the interlocutory decree of the California Court. She claims that under
Art. 48 of Rule 39, the decree of the Los Angeles Court, granting her the child's custody, must be complied within the Philippines.]

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the decree of a foreign court may be complied with in the Philippines.

Ruling: NO

"The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change with the circumstances. The first decree awarded the custody of the child to the father, prohibiting the mother from taking the child to her
(Margaret's) home because of her adulterous relationship with another man. The decree was amended when Margaret was not in Los Angeles.

Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines. Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the Court which rendered it did
not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties.

In general, a decree of divorce awarding custody of the child to one of the spouses is respected by the Courts of other states "at the time and under the circumstances of its rendi tion" but such a
decree has no controlling effects in another state as to facts and conditions occurring subsequently to the date of the decree; and the Court of another state may, in proper proceedings, award
custody otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent to the decree which justify the decree to the interest of the child.

In the case at bar, the circumstances have changed. Querubina is not in Los Angeles, she is in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, under her father's care. It is a long way from one place to the other. Neither can
Margaret prove that she can pay the cost of passage for the minor. She is not a packet of cigarettes one can send by mail.

Neither can she answer for Querubina's support, care and education. In comparison, the father has shown both interest in the child and capacity to provide for the needs of the child."

47. Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005 Josol
Facts: On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens 2 who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or
military forces during the Marcos regime. 3 The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations
of international law.

On 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty
Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996.

The present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff
class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages.

The Marcos estate filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-payment of correct filing fees. The estate allege that petitioners only paid P410.00 as docket and filing fees for the enforcement of
a judgment awarding USD 2.25 billion.

Respondent Judge Ranada issued an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice.

Issue: What is the effect of a foreign judgment that has attained finality?

Ruling: Where a foreign judgment, awarding money claims against an estate, has attained finality and a complaint for its enforcement is filed in Philippine court, such foreign judgment may still
be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact.

Sec. 48 of Rule 49: Effects of foreign judgments – The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

b.) In case of judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing,
while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both
cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the
party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an
undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law.
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the
Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the
question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any
other issue which may legitimately be presented before the trial court.