Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Effectiveness: A Multi-Frame,
Multi-Sector Analysis
Consider the saga of Roger Smith. Shortly after he became chief exec-
utive officer of General Motors in 1981, Smith was hailed as a bold and
visionary leader. Six years later, Smith (Fortune, August 3,1987) himself
ruefully said, "I'm not as smart as people said a few years ago, and not
as dumb as they say now" (p. 26). Business Week ran a cover story under
the title, "General Motors: What Went Wrong? Eight Years and Billions
of Dollars Haven't Made its Strategy Succeed."
In 1979, General Motors earned $3.5 billion on sales of $63 billion, and
it held nearly half the American car market. During Smith's tenure,
G M s earnings, adjusted for inflation, were stagnant. In 1987, Ford
earned more than General Motors for the first time in 60 years. By the
time Smith retired in August, 1990, he had made history. He closed
more plants, laid off more workers, and reduced GMs market share
more than any of his predecessors. Despite this record, Smith was al-
ways sure that he was on the right track and continued to see success
just around the comer (Bolman & Deal, 1991).
Roger Smith shared a problem with many other leaders-his thinking
and strategies stayed on the same course, despite abundant evidence
Human Resource Management, Winter 1991, Vol. 30, Number 4, Pp. 509-534
0 1992 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0090-4&48/92/040509-26
that something different was needed. Smith was trapped in a structural
and technological view of the world (Bolman & Deal, 1991, pp. 427-430).
He restructured all of G M s vehicle operations, and spent billions of
dollars on his vision of a corporation with paperless offices and
robotized assembly plants. Even though the changes were dramatic and
far-reaching, GM got steadily weaker. Smith had a limited understand-
ing of human resource (HR) management. He assumed that the main
problem with G M s workers was that they were overpaid; he never
considered that they might be underled. Nor did he seem to understand
the symbolic dimension of leadership. When, during Chrysler’s darkest
days, Lee Iacocca cut his own salary to $1 a year as a symbolic gesture,
Smith missed the point and was unimpressed (Lee, 1988).He missed the
same point again in 1982 when he announced an improved bonus pro-
gram for top executives “about a month after a UAW had agreed to a
new contract involving an estimated $2.5 billion in wage and benefit
concessions under a principle that management and employees would
share equally in financial sacrifice” (Kanter, 1983, p. 347). Douglas
Fraser, the union president, said that the workers felt ”double-crossed,”
and that he had never seen them so upset (Kanter, 1983, p, 347).
Leaders, like everyone else, view their experience through a set of
preconditioned lenses and filters. They often resist questioning their
view of how an organization works-or might work better. When their
frames of reference fit the circumstances, they can understand and
shape human experience. When they do not, their frames freeze into a
distorted picture that traps them in their misconceptions. They explain
failure by blaming circumstances rather than questioning their own in-
ability to read and respond to the situation at hand.
Over the years, scholars have spent considerable time and energy
trying to identify the characteristics, traits, or styles of effective leaders.
Policymakers and others have spent even more on programs designed to
improve leadership skills. Yet research and training often have produced
disappointing results. Why? Perhaps we have been looking in the wrong
place and have been giving too little attention to how leaders think. A
faulty diagnosis rarely leads to effective action, and misreading the sit-
uation can undermine even a leader of exceptional stature and skill. In
this paper, an effort to operationalize a model of how leaders see their
worlds is reported. Are there patterns in the images or lenses they
employ? Are leaders with multiple frames more effective than those
with a singular focus? Under what conditions can leaders learn to be
more flexible in defining situations accurately?
The concept of frames has many synonyms in the social science liter-
ature-schema or schemata (Lord & Foti, 1986; Fiske & Dyer, 1985;
Fiedler, 1985), maps (Weick & Bougon, 1986), images (Morgan, 1986),
frames of reference, representations (Lesgold & Lajoie, 1991; Frensch &
Sternberg, 1991; Voss & Wolfe, 1991), paradigms (Gregory, 1983; Kuhn,
1970), pictures (Mitroff, 1985), and implicit organizing theories (Brief &
Downy, 1983). The different labels share an assumption that individuals
see the world in different ways because they are embedded in different
world views. Because the world of human experience is so complex and
ambiguous, frames of reference shape how situations are defined and
determine what actions are taken. The research here uses the framework
developed by the authors (Bolman and Deal, 1984,1991), which divides
theories of organizations into four traditions which we have labeled
frames (see Figure 1).
Structural Frame
The human resource frame focuses attention on human needs and as-
sumes that organizations that meet basic human needs will work better
than those that do not. Human resource leaders value relationships and
feelings; they seek to lead through facilitation and empowerment. They
tend to define problems in individual or interpersonal terms and look for
Political Frame
Symbolic Frame
The symbolic frame sees a chaotic world in which meaning and pre-
dictability are social creations, and facts are interpretative rather than
objective. Organizations develop cultural symbols that shape human
behavior unobtrusively and provide a shared sense of mission and iden-
tity. Symbolic leaders instill a sense of enthusiasm and commitment
through charisma and drama. They pay diligent attention to myth, ritu-
al, ceremony, stories, and other symbolic forms.
STRUCTURAL
The labels in italics in each quadrant arc the competing values models from Quinn (1988, p. 48).
Labels in parenthcscs arc from Kimberly and Quinn (1984, p. 304).
This article reports two investigations into how leaders use frames:
how many they use, which ones, and with what consequences. The first
study is a qualitative investigation of how leaders frame their experi-
p < .05.
** p < .01.
p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
Quantitative Investigations
The items for each scale were selected from a larger pool generated by
the authors and their colleagues. The instrument was pilot tested on
populations of both students and managers to assess the internal relia-
bility of each scale. The instrument is now in its third iteration, and
internal reliability is very high: Cronbach‘s alpha for the frame measures
ranges between .91 and .93. The instrument has two parallel forms: one
for individuals to rate themselves and another in which their colleagues
(superiors, peers, subordinates, etc.) can rate them.
Measures of Efectiveness
Questions
Our research was guided by two broad hypotheses. The first is that
the capacity to reframe is a critical issue in success as both manager and
leader. In a world of increasing ambiguity and complexity, the ability to
use more than one frame should increase an individual's ability to make
clear judgments and to act effectively. The second hypothesis builds on a
contextual view of leadership: Different situations required different pat-
terns of thinking. In some organizations, for example, an inability to
One way to test how well the frames correspond to managers’ think-
ing is to find out whether they see the items from each frame as clus-
tered together. We used factor analysis of responses to the leadership
instruments to explore this question, using both self-ratings (how I see
myself) and colleague ratings (how they see my behavior). The analyses
consistently produced factors associated with the four frames. The factor
structures are somewhat different for self and colleague-ratings, but in
both cases all four frames emerge clearly. Table 4 shows factor analyses
for two different samples of colleague raters: 1,331 higher education
raters (mostly from the United States) and 1,238 raters from Singapore.
The higher education raters were mostly other administrators. The Sing-
apore raters were primarily teachers, but also included administrators
and community members.
Using a conventional procedure (principal components analysis, with
varimax rotation of all factors with an eigenvalue > l), the four largest
factors correspond to the frames. Table 4 shows that the factor loadings
are remarkably similar for the two samples, particularly in the light of
the significant linguistic, cultural, and contextual differences. We have
found similar results for other populations, though the population of
American school administrators was an exception. The factor analysis
there produced three factors: structural and human resource factors that
are very similar to those reported in Table 4, and a third factor that
combines the symbolic and political frames. The factors are usually very
clean. When items do bleed across frames, they arise from overlap of the
symbolic frame with either the human resource or political frames. How-
ever, the political and human resource frames show little overlap with
each other, and none of the other frames overlaps with the structural
dimension.
Singapore
US Higher School
Education Administration
Sample Sample
Frame (N = 1331 raters) (N = 1238 raters)
Structural
Strongly emphasizes careful .79 .74
planning, clear timelines
Has extraordinary attention to detail .75 .67
Develops and implements clear, .75 .72
logical policies
Approaches problems with facts and .73 .68
logic
Uses logical analysis and careful .72 .70
thinking
Strongly believes in clear chain of .67 .60
command
Human resource
Shows high sensitivity and concern .85 .74
for others’ needs
Shows high support and concern for .84 .74
others
Is consistently helpful and .a3 .76
responsive to others
Builds trust through open, .77 .71
collaborative relationships
Listens well and is unusually .71 .72
receptive to others’ input
Gives personal recognition for work .64 .56
well done
Political
Is politically very sensitive and .78 .67
skillful
Gets support from people with .73 .72
influence and power
Is a very skillful and shrewd .74 .68
negotiator
Is usually persuasive and influential .68 .60
Succeeds in the face of conflict and .63 .54
opposition
Anticipates and deals adroitly with 59 .60
organizational conflict
Symbolic
Is highly charismatic .71 .a
Sees beyond current realities to .63 .50
create exciting opportunities
Communicates strong and .63 .60
challenging sense of mission
Is highly imaginative and creative .57 .59
Models organizational aspirations .51 .56
and values
Figure 3 depicts means on each frame for each of the four popula-
tions. The most typical pattern, found in both American samples, is to
have scores on the structural and human resource frames that are some-
what higher than those on the political and symbolic dimensions. The
international corporate sample, on the other hand, is very high on the
structural frame and very low on the symbolic with the human resource
and political frames falling in between. The Singapore school admin-
istrators was similar to the two groups of American educators, except for
an unusually high mean score on the symbolic frame.
There are some mean differences among the samples, though they
may not be very meaningful. For example, the Singapore school admin-
istrators had high ratings on every frame, while the corporate sample
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
Each cell shows the variables that were statistically sigruhcant in the r e p s i o n , ranked
in order of size of the standard regression coefficient.
pany: It has plenty of structural thinking and more is not better. More
effective managers and leaders in that context tended to be stronger in
those frames where the corporation is weakest.
(4) The optimal pattern offrame orientations is more consistentfor leadership
than for management #ecfimess. Table 6 shows "effectiveness patterns"
for both management and leadership effectiveness for each group, based
on the variables that were significant predictors in the regression equa-
tions. The chart represents a hypothesis, based on our data, about what
managers need to do well in order to be effective in different contexts. To
the degree that the hypothesis is valid, it has important implications for
what managers should try to learn and organizations should try to de-
velop. The symbolic and political frames are part of the leadership effec-
tiveness patterns for all four samples, but there is less consistency for
managerial effectiveness. This raises a question worth further explora-
tion: Are the qualities of effective managers more situational than the
qualities of effective leaders?
(5) Most educational programs for managers focus on management rather
than leadership. Our data strongly suggest that political and symbolic
orientations are keys to effective leadership. Yet the literature and our
own experience lead us to believe leadership development programs
typically focus mostly on structural and human resource issues. For
some fifty years, much of the social psychological research on leadership
(for example, Bales, 1970; Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939; Fleishman &
Hams, 1962) has focused particularly on two dimensions: one relating to
structure and task, the other to people and social interaction. Those
same two dimensions appear in some of the most widely used models
for developing "leadership" (Blake & Mouton, 1985; Hersey, 1984). On
the other hand, Kotter (1985, pp. 12-13) rummaged through some
19,000 pages of management textbooks and found very few instances in
CONCLUSION
Lee G . Bolman is Lecturer on Education and Director of the National Center for
Educational Leadership at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. A spe-
cialist in leadership and organizational behavior, his publications include Re-
framing organizations: Artistry, Choice and Leadership (written with
Terrence E.Dea1). Bolman has been a consultant to corporations, public agencies,
universities, and public schools in the United States, Asia, Europe, and Latin
America. At Harvard he has also serued as educational chairperson of hoo execu-
tive development programs, the Institute for Educational Management and the
Management Development Program. He has been director and board chair of the
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ENDNOTE