Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160604               March 28, 2008

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, ISAGANI YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-

MAGSANOC, PERGENITO B. BANDAYREL, JR., GOBLETH C. MOULIC,
ESTANISLAO CALDEZ, and ZENAIDA CALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, BRANCH 5,
and LUZ CORTEZ BABARAN, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the review, setting aside, and
annulment of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79702
dated October 22, 2003 dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners.

The antecedents are as follows:

The Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), in its August 1, 2000 issue, published an article
with the heading "After Bong, who’s next?" 2 The article narrates the death of
Expedito "Bong" Caldez, a photo correspondent of the PDI in Cagayan. In said
article, the family of the deceased correspondent laments the death of their loved
one due to the alleged erroneous diagnosis of Dr. Luz Babaran. 3

Later, in its September 29, 2000 issue, the PDI published another article with the
heading "DOH orders probe of fotog’s death." 4 In said article, it was reported that the
regional Department of Health (DOH) in Tuguegarao City has started investigating
the death of Expedito Caldez following an order from the DOH’s Bureau of Licensing
and Regulation.

On July 25, 2001, based on the two PDI column articles, Dr. Babaran filed a
complaint for Damages,5 Civil Case No. 5850, against herein petitioners. In said
complaint Dr. Babaran alleged, among other things, that: after learning about the
article published in the August 1, 2000 issue of the PDI, she wrote a letter to the
editor of the PDI but she never received any response from the latter; to aggravate
the matter, another article appeared in the September 29, 2000 issue of the PDI and
she was again singled out as having erroneously diagnosed the illness of Expedito
Caldez; the Report6 of the DOH Fact-Finding Committee concluding that her
diagnosis cannot be considered erroneous, was suppressed and was never
published by the PDI; the articles portrayed her as incompetent and one whose
alleged erroneous diagnosis caused the death of Expedito Caldez; and, in causing
the articles to be published, petitioners acted in bad faith.

On September 13, 2001, petitioners filed their Answer 7 with counterclaims. In said
answer, petitioners raised, among others, the following defenses: that the complaint
states no cause of action against them; that the complaint fails and omits to state the
factual premises to support a conclusion that there was malice on the part of the PDI
in publishing the questioned news report; that private respondent failed to allege
"actual malice" on the part of the petitioners; that a case for actionable libel with
claims for damages has not been adequately stated in the complaint; and, that the
complaint fails to establish the basis of petitioners’ liability. 8

Pre-trial was held and terminated, and petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for a
Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defense Raised in the Answer (which is also a
ground for a motion to dismiss).9 In said motion, it was alleged that at the pre-trial on
February 19, 2003, the court noted that one of the defenses raised by petitioners
was that private respondent has not delineated the participation of each of
petitioners in the publication of the alleged libelous articles. 10 Thereupon, private
respondent’s counsel asked for a few days to determine whether the complaint
should be amended to cure its defects. However, private respondent had not moved
to amend the complaint, hence, petitioners filed the motion. 11

In support thereof, petitioners contend that: in libel charges, the participation of each
defendant must be specifically alleged in the complaint, which private respondent
failed to do; and the allegations of the complaint are mere conclusions of law and
opinions of the private respondent.12 Petitioners ultimately prayed that a preliminary
hearing be conducted on their affirmative defense that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action; and that, thereafter, the complaint be dismissed. 13

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss Based on Affirmative Defense.14 In said comment/opposition, private
respondent averred that at the February 19, 2003 pre-trial, the issue of whether or
not the complaint states a cause of action was not raised. As such, it is no longer an
issue to be litigated in the case. Private respondent prayed that the court deny
petitioners’ motion to dismiss.

On May 30, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order 15 denying
petitioners’ motion in this wise:

With this finding and conclusion, the Court finds no further necessity in dwelling at
length on the other issues raised by the defendants. Consequently, the motion for a
Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defense Raised in the Answer (which is also a
ground for a motion to dismiss) is hereby DENIED. The initial presentation of
plaintiff’s evidence is set on July 3, 2003, at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.16

The RTC opined that private respondent’s allegations in her complaint, as well as
her documentary evidence, show that there is sufficient cause of action. It added that
the documentary evidence discloses facts which are sufficient to enable the court to
go beyond the disclosures in the complaint. Considering that the facts alleged in the
complaint which make out the principal cause of action and relief are sufficient, the
case should not be dismissed.17

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 18 but it was denied in the Order19 dated
July 29, 2003.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for
the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction) 20 with
the CA, relying on the ground that:

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND

EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE
ITS FAILURE TO VALIDLY AND SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR LIBEL AGAINST THE PETITIONERS BECAUSE:

A) THE PARTICIPATION OF EACH DEFENDANT (PETITIONER) IN THE

WRITING, EDITING, PRINTING, AND PUBLICATION OF THE NEWS
ARTICLES IN QUESTION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY SET OUT IN THE
COMPLAINT;

B) THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE PURELY

LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND
NOT STATEMENTS OF ULTIMATE FACTS.21

Petitioners prayed among others: that the Orders of the RTC dated May 30, 2003
and July 29, 2003 be annulled and set aside for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion and/or excess of jurisdiction; and that Civil Case No. 5850 be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.22

On October 22, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution 23 dismissing the petition for being
insufficient in form and substance and for presenting no justiciable issue needing
serious consideration by the court. Also, the CA noted that the Order dated May 30,
2003 shows that the RTC had already ruled against petitioners’ affirmative defense
that the complaint states no cause of action.

Hence, this petition, raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT A COMPLAINT WHICH FAILS TO VALIDLY AND

SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LIBEL BECAUSE:

A) THE PARTICIPATION OF EACH DEFENDANT (PETITIONER) IN THE

WRITING, EDITING, PRINTING, AND PUBLICATION OF THE NEWS
ARTICLES IN QUESTION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY SET OUT IN THE
COMPLAINT;

B) THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE PURELY

LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND
NOT STATEMENTS OF ULTIMATE FACTS; AND
 C) THE COMPLAINT IS VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO FREE PRESS AND TO FREE SPEECH.

SHOULD BE DISMISSED UPON MOTION BY THE DEFENDANTS (PETITIONERS

HEREIN). 24

Petitioners argue that private respondent’s complaint failed to comply with the
requirement in libel cases that the participation of each defendant must be
specifically alleged in the complaint. Petitioners maintain that their divergent
personal circumstances and different legal existence, not to mention the absence of
any professional relationship of two of petitioners with the rest of them, should have
prompted private respondent to specify the participation of each petitioner in the
news gathering, reporting, editing, publication, and circulation of the subject articles.
As such it cannot be determined with certainty from the allegations in the complaint
whose acts and omissions are actually complained of. 25

Also, petitioners added that the material allegations of the complaint are not
statements of ultimate facts but were mere conclusions of law and were merely
private respondent’s opinions.26

Finally, petitioners contend that the complaint violates their constitutionally protected
freedom of speech and of the press. 27

As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. In relation to a complaint, it is
a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. The
question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its
averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a
concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action. As such, the failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the
complaint warrants its dismissal.28 Its essential elements are as follows:

1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created;

2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate

such right; and

3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or
other appropriate relief.

Of the three, the most important is the last element since it is only upon the
occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the
right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief.29 In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, "the
test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer?" To be taken into account are only the
material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other
matters aliunde are not considered. The court may however consider, in addition to
the complaint, the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff,
or admissions in the records.30

When a defendant seeks the dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss,
the sufficiency of the motion should be tested on the strength of the allegations of
facts contained in the complaint and on no other basis. 31 The issue of whether or not
the complaint failed to state a cause of action, warranting its dismissal, must be
passed upon on the basis of the allegations stated therein assuming them to be true
and the court cannot inquire into the truth of the allegations and declare them to be
false; otherwise, it would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to the
plaintiff.32

This Court finds that petitioners raised the threshold question of whether the
complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action.1avvphi1

Hence, the trial court should have granted petitioners’ motion for a preliminary
hearing on the affirmative defenses raised in the answer based on failure to state a
cause of action. This procedure is designed to prevent a tedious, if not traumatic,
trial in case the complaint falls short of sufficiently alleging a cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals

dated October 22, 2003 is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 5, for the trial court to hear and
resolve petitioners’ Affirmative Defenses Raised in the Answer.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123555. January 22, 1999]

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and WESTIN SEAFOOD
MARKET, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

May the lessee which instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an
action for forcible entry with damages against its lessor file a separate
suit with the Regional Trial Court against the same lessor for moral and
exemplary damages plus actual and compensatory damages based on the
same forcible entry?

On grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping, petitioner invokes

established jurisprudence that a party cannot by varying the form of
action or adopting a different method ofpresenting his case evade the
principle that the same cause of action shall not be litigated twice
between the same parties or their privies.1 Petitioner therefore prays for
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May 1995, as
well as its Resolution dated 17 January 1996 denying reconsideration,
which upheld the denial by the Regional Trial Court of petitioner's motion
to dismiss private respondent's damage suit.

The antecedents: On 27 May 1991 petitioner leased to private respondent

Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a commercial building
thereon located at Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of
nine (9) years and three (3) months, i.e., from 2 January 1989 to 30 April
1998, with a monthly rental of approximately P600,000.00. The contract
contained, among others, the following pertinent terms and conditions:

EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS

25. LESSEE hereby agrees that all the provisions contained in this
Contract shall be deemed as conditions, as well as covenants, and that
this Contract shall be automatically terminated and cancelled without
resorting to court action should LESSEE violate any or all said conditions,
including the payment of Rent, CUSA and other charges indicated in the
FLP when due within the time herein stipulated and in any such cases,
LESSEE hereby irrevocably appoints LESSOR, its authorized agents,
employees and/or representatives as his duly authorized attorney-in-fact,
even after the termination, expiration or cancellation of this Contract, with
full power and authority to open, enter, repossess, secure, enclose, fence
and otherwise take full and complete physical possession and control of
the leased premises and its contents without resorting to court action
and/or to summarily disconnect electrical and/or water services thereof,
and that LESSEE hereby irrevocably empowers LESSOR, his authorized
agents, employees and/or representatives to take inventory and
possession of whatever equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise,
appliances, etc., found therein belonging to LESSEE, consignors and/or to
any other persons and to place the same in LESSORs warehouse or any
other place at LESSORs discretion for safekeeping; charging LESSEE the
corresponding storage fees therefor; that in case LESSEE fails to claim
said equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, appliances, etc. from
storage and simultaneously liquidate any liability with LESSOR within
seven (7) days from date of said transfer to LESSORs warehouse, LESSOR
is likewise hereby expressly authorized and empowered by LESSEE to
dispose of said property/properties in a public sale through a Notary
Public of LESSORs choice and to apply the proceeds thereof to whatever
liability and/or indebtedness LESSEE may have to LESSOR plus
reasonable expenses for the same, including storage fees, and the
balance, if any, shall be turned over to LESSEE; that LESSEE hereby
expressly agrees that any or all acts performed by LESSOR, his
authorized agents, employees and/or representatives under the
provisions of this Section may not be the subject of any petition for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction or Mandatory Injunction in court, and that
LESSOR and/or his authorized agents, employees, and/or representatives
shall be free from any civil and/or criminal liability or responsibility
whatsoever therefor.

TERMINATION OF LEASE

26. Upon the automatic termination of this lease contract, as the case
may be, LESSEE shall immediately vacate and redeliver physical
possession of the leased premises, including the keys appertaining
thereto, to LESSOR in good, clean and sanitary condition, reasonable
wear and tear excepted, devoid of all occupants, equipment, furniture,
articles, merchandise, etc., belonging to LESSEE or to any other person
except those belonging to LESSOR; that should LESSEE fail to comply
with this provision, LESSOR is hereby given the same rights and power to
proceed against LESSEE as expressly granted in the immediately
preceding section.
Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by
petitioner. As of 19 October 1992 the arrearages amounted
to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of rentals constituted breach
of their contract; thus, pursuant to the express authority granted
petitioner under the above-quoted Secs. 25 and 26 of the lease
agreement, petitioner on 31 October 1992 repossessed the leased
premises, inventoried the movable properties found within and owned by
private respondent and scheduled public auction for the sale of the
movables on 19 August 1993 with notice to private respondent.

On 26 November 1992 private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial

Court of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with
damages and a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.2 The case was raffled to Branch 40 presided over
by Judge Guillermo L. Loja Jr. who issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining petitioner from selling private respondents properties at a public
auction.

On 9 December 1992 Judge Loja inhibited himself from trying the case
and directed its transfer to Branch 34 presided over by Judge Joselito SD
Generoso. Soon after, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the inhibition
of Judge Generoso and the immediate reraffle of the case arguing that the
summary transfer of the case to Judge Generoso was irregular as it was
not done by raffle.

The motion was granted and the case went to Branch 36 presided over by
Judge Francisco D. Villanueva. Thereafter, on 22 December 1992, at the
continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a writ preliminary
mandatory injunction, the parties agreed, among others, on the following:
(a) private respondent would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank in the name of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36,
the amount of P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back
rentals; (b) petitioner would defer the sale of the personal properties of
the Westin Seafood Market, Inc., until a final settlement of the case had
been arrived at; (c) petitioner shall allow private respondent to retrieve
all the perishable goods from inside the leased premises like frozen meat,
vegetables and fish, all properly receipted for; (d) petitioner shall allow
three (3) maintenance personnel of private respondent to enter the
premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the restaurant
equipment; and (e) the parties shall negotiate for the restoration of the
premises to private respondent, and if no settlement be arrived at on or
before January 8, 1993, the hearing on the merits of the case shall
proceed and the disposition of the amount deposited representing the
rental arrearages shall be left to the discretion of the court.
This agreement was incorporated in the order of the court dated 22
December 19923 which in effect terminated for all intents and purposes
the incident on the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction.

Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the
designated bank the amount representing its back rentals. Instead, with
the forcible entry case still pending with the MeTC, private respondent
instituted on 9 June 1993 another action for damages against petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was raffled to
Branch 101 presided over by Judge Pedro T. Santiago.4cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis
pendencia and forum shopping. On 2 July 1993, instead of ruling on the
motion, Judge Santiago issued an order archiving the case pending the
outcome of the forcible entry case being heard at the MeTC for the reason
that "the damages is (sic) principally anchored on whether or not the
defendants (petitioner herein) have committed forcible entry."5 On 2
August 1993 petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order and
reiterated its motion to dismiss the suit for damages.

Before petitioner's motion to dismiss could be resolved, private

respondent filed with the RTC on 18 August 1993 an amended complaint
for damages. On 14 September 1993 it also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for
the Grant of a Preliminary Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. On the very same day, Judge Santiago issued an order (a)
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b) admitting private respondent's
amended complaint, and (c) granting private respondent's application for
a temporary restraining order against petitioner.

Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition on the ground that Judge Santiago acted in
excess of his jurisdiction and/or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint of
private respondent and issuing a restraining order against petitioner; in
allowing private respondent to engage in forum shopping; and, taking
cognizance of the action for damages despite lack of
jurisdiction.6cräläwvirtualibräry

But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to the failure of
petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of Judge Santiago's order of
14 September 1993 which, it explained, was a prerequisite to the
institution of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It also found that the
elements of litis pendencia were lacking to justify the dismissal of the
action for damages with the RTC because despite the pendency of the
forcible entry case with the MeTC the only damages recoverable thereat
were those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property
and not the kind of damages being claimed before the RTC which had no
direct relation to loss of material possession. It clarified that since the
damages prayed for in the amended complaint with the RTC were those
caused by the alleged high-handed manner with which petitioner
reacquired possession of the leased premises and the sale of private
respondents movables found therein, the RTC and not the MeTC had
jurisdiction over the action of damages.7cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court, filed the

instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court alleging that it erred in (a) finding that petitioner failed to avail of
its plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a prior motion for
reconsideration with the RTC; (b) ruling that the trial judge did not act
with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the action for
damages and injunction despite the pendency of the forcible entry case
with the MeTC; and, (c) ruling that private respondent did not commit
forum shopping since the causes of action before the RTC and MeTC were
not identical with each other.

There is merit in the petition. While generally a motion for reconsideration

must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower
court an opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it8 this rule admits of
exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances of the case.9 The filing of the motion for reconsideration
before availing of the remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when the
issue raised is one purely of law,10 or where the error is patent or the
disputed order is void,11 or the questions raised on certiorari are the same
as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower
court.

In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC
petitioner raised the ground that another action for forcible entry was
pending at the MeTC between the same parties involving the same matter
and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue was
elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Clearly,
under the prevailing circumstance, any motion for reconsideration of the
trial court would have been a pointless exercise.12cräläwvirtualibräry

We now turn to the issue of whether an action for damages filed with the
Regional Trial Court by the lessee against the lessor should be dismissed
on the ground of pendency of another action for forcible entry and
damages earlier filed by the same lessee against the same lessor before
the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person

deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, indimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, together with damages and costs. The
mandate under this rule is categorical: that all cases for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall
include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims
for damages and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim
for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed
separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.

This is consistent with the principle laid down in Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule
16 of the Rules of Court which states that the pendency of another action
between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for dismissal of
an action. Res adjudicata requires that there must be between the action
sought to be dismissed and the other action the following elements: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2)
preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be
rendered on the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration.13cräläwvirtualibräry

It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court,

as amended, that a party may not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or moresuits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or
a judgment uponthe merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the other or others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of
Rule 2 as the act of omission by which a party violates a right of
another.14 These premises obtaining, there is no question at all that
private respondent's cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the
suit for damages is the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the leased
premises by the lessor, petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs arise.
Simply stated, the restoration of possession and demand for actual
damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand for damages with
the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry
by petitioner into the leased premises.

A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent

against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are
the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for
actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim
for damages - moral and exemplary in addition to actual and
compensatory - constitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this
runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the
second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent
allegations -

2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with

defendant PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood
Market (hereinafter Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA
corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a
period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998.

2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the

Subject Premises, plaintiff established and now operates thereon the now
famous Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in
actual, continuous, and peaceful physical possession of the Subject
Premises until 31 October 1992.

xxxx

3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the
peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the
exclusion of all others, including defendants herein.

3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession

of the Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain possession thereof
through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of
superior number of men and arms amounts to the taking of the law into
their own hands.

3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the
Subject Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving it of
possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and
intimidation should be condemned and declared illegal for being contrary
to public order and policy.

3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with

their illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and
restore possession thereof, together with its contents, to plaintiff.

xxxx

4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing possession of

the Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant
should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages
which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.

The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges

basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief
prayed for, to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract
of Lease for a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30,
1998 over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market
(hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of
EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A
copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as Annex A.

5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of

Subject Premises, and established thereon the now famous Seafood
Market Restaurant.

xxxx

7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the
benefit of any writ of possession or any lawful court order and with the
aid of approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen
under the supervision of defendant Tejam, forcibly entered the subject
premises through force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on
brute force and in a thunderboltish manner and against plaintiffs will,
unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the subject
premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and
natural possession of the subject premises. The illegal, high-handed
manner and gestapo like take-over by defendants of subject premises is
more particularly described as follows: x x x

8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject

Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures and
equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful
appropriation, seizure and taking of property against the will and consent
of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at public auction and
without the consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-
million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices way below the
market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex B the letter from
defendants dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the
latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at
2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in defendants possession.

xxxx

12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation

of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor
to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease
for the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the
present suit for the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil
Code x x x x
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of
action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased
premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private
respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the
lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the
lessee; (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by
private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs
stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises
causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorney's fees and
costs of suit.

On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary

award consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary
damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000,000.00
and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized
profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs, all based on
the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by petitioner. Since
actual and compensatorydamages were already prayed for in the forcible
entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in
thedamage suit before the RTC byreason of res adjudicata.

The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed
considering that these sprung from the main incident being heard before
the MeTC. Jurisprudence is unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong
is committed - like the unlawful taking or detention of the property of
another - there is but one single cause of action regardless of the number
of rights that may have been violated, and all such rights should be
alleged in a single complaint as constituting one single cause of
action.15 In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the physical possession
of the real property. The question of damages is merely secondary or
incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in
taking possession of a piece of land by means of force and intimidation
against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict or
wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely,
the recovery of possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss
of possession, but only to one action. For obvious reasons, both remedies
cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and independent actions, one
for recovery of possession only, and the other, for the recovery of
damages. That would inevitably lead to what is termed in law as splitting
up a cause of action.16 In David v. de la Cruz17 we observed -

Herein tenants have but one cause of action against their landlord, their
illegal ejectment or removal from their landholdings, which cause of
action however entitles them to two (2) claims or remedies - for
reinstatement and damages. As both claims arise from the same cause of
action, they should be alleged in a single complaint.
A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of
damages may be recovered in one case and the rest, in
another.18 In Bachrach v. Icarangal19 we explained that the rule was
aimed at preventing repeated litigations between the same parties in
regard to the same subject of the controversy and to protect the
defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et
eadem causa.

What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule
is that all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes
without saying that those not therein included cannot be the subject of
subsequent complaints for they are barred forever.20If a suit is brought for
a part of a claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the
plaintiff from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim,
notwithstanding that the second form of action is not identical with the
first or different grounds for relief are set for the second suit. This
principle not only embraces what was actually determined, but also
extends to every matter which the parties might have litigated in the
case.21This is why the legal basis upon which private respondent anchored
its second claim for damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation to Art. 1654 of
the Civil Code,22not otherwise raised and cited by private respondent in
the forcible entry case, cannot be used as justification for the second suit
for damages. We note, not without some degree of displeasure, that by
filing a second suit for damages, private respondent was not only able to
press a claim for moral and exemplary damages which by its failure to
allege the same in its suit before the MeTC foreclosed its right to sue on
it, but it was also able to obtain from the RTC, by way
of another temporary restraining order, a second reprieve from an
impending public auction sale of its movables which it could not anymore
secure from the MeTC before which the matter of the issuance of a
preliminary writ of injunction was already closed.

The foregoing discussions provide sufficient basis to petitioner's charge

that private respondent and its counsel in the trial courts committed
forum shopping. In Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange
Commission23we ruled -

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in

one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another. The principle applies x x x with respect to suits filed
in the courts x x x in connection with litigations commenced in the court x
x x in anticipation of an unfavorable x x x ruling and a favorable case
where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.

This Court likewise elucidated in New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. National

Labor Relations Commission24 that there is forum shopping when the
actions involve the same transactions, the same essential facts and
circumstances. The reason behind the proscription of forum shopping is
obvious. This unnecessarily burdens our courts with heavy caseloads,
unduly taxes the manpower and financial resources of the judiciary and
trifles with and mocks our judicial processes, thereby adversely affecting
the efficient administration of justice. This condemnable conduct has
prompted the Court to issue circulars25 ordering among others that a
violation thereof shall be cause for the dismissal of the case or cases
without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel
or party concerned.

The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by private

respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City contained no
certification of non-forum shopping. When petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the case raising among others the ground of forum shopping it
pointed out the absence of the required certification. The amended
complaint, as well as the second and third amended complaints,
attempted to rectify the error by invariably stating that there was no
other action pending between the parties involving the same causes of
action although there was actually a forcible entry case pending before
the MTC of Quezon City. By its admission of a pending forcible entry case,
it is obvious that private respondent was indulging in forum shopping.
While private respondent conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it had
likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the same forcible
entry, the fact remains that it precisely did so, which stratagem was being
duplicated in the second case. This is a compelling reason to dismiss the
second case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 27 September 1995 and the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City dated 24 September 1993 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to dismiss
Civil Case No. Q-93-16409, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive
Development Corporation, et al.," and the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City to proceed with the proper disposition of Civil Case No. 6589,
"Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development Corporation, et
al.," with dispatch considering the summary nature of the case. Treble
costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 191388               March 9, 2011

ASIA UNITED BANK, CHRISTINE T. CHAN, and FLORANTE C. DEL

MUNDO, Petitioners,
vs.
GOODLAND COMPANY, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The costly consequence of forum shopping should remind the parties to ever be
mindful against abusing court processes.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2 dated June 5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 90114, as well as its Resolution3 dated February 17, 2010, which denied a
reconsideration of the assailed Decision. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the appealed Order dated March 15,
2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the
DENIAL of appellee bank’s motion to dismiss and directing the REINSTATEMENT of
appellant’s complaint as well as the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.4

Factual Antecedents

Respondent Goodland Company, Inc. (Goodland) executed a Third Party Real

Estate Mortgage (REM) over two parcels of land located in the Municipality of Sta.
Rosa, Laguna and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 321672 5 and
3216736 in favor of petitioner Asia United Bank (AUB). The mortgage secured the
obligation amounting to ₱250 million of Radiomarine Network, Inc. (RMNI), doing
business as Smartnet Philippines, to AUB. The REM was duly registered on March
8, 2001 in the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna. 7
Goodland then filed a Complaint8 docketed as Civil Case No. B-6242 before Branch
25 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna for the annulment of the REM
on the ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of the parties’
verbal agreement (Annulment Case).

While the Annulment Case was pending, RMNI defaulted in the payment of its
obligation to AUB, prompting the latter to exercise its right under the REM to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. It filed its Application for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended with the
Office of the Executive Judge of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna on October 19,
2006.9 The mortgaged properties were sold in public auction to AUB as the highest
bidder. It was issued a Certificate of Sale, which was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Calamba on November 23, 2006.

Before AUB could consolidate its title, Goodland filed on November 28, 2006 another
Complaint10 docketed as Civil Case No. B-7110 before Branch 25 of the RTC of
Biñan, Laguna, against AUB and its officers, petitioners Christine Chan and Florante
del Mundo. This Complaint sought to annul the foreclosure sale and to enjoin the
consolidation of title in favor of AUB (Injunction Case). Goodland asserted the
alleged falsified nature of the REM as basis for its prayer for injunction.

A few days later, AUB consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed properties and
obtained new titles, TCT Nos. T-65703111 and 657032,12in its name from the Registry
of Deeds of Calamba.

Petitioners then filed on December 11, 2006 a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to a
Temporary Restraining Order in the Injunction Case. 13 They brought to the trial
court’s attention Goodland’s forum shopping given the pendency of the Annulment
Case. They argued that the two cases both rely on the alleged falsification of the real
estate mortgage as basis for the reliefs sought.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (Injunction Case)

On March 15, 2007, the trial court acted favorably on petitioners’ motion and
dismissed the Injunction Case with prejudice on the grounds of forum shopping and
litis pendentia.14 The trial court explained that the Injunction Case and the Annulment
Case are both founded on the same transactions, same essential facts and
circumstances, and raise substantially the same issues. The addition of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction does not vary the similarity between the
two cases. The trial court further noted that Goodland could have prayed for
injunctive relief as ancillary remedy in the Annulment Case. Finally, the trial court
stated that any judgment in the Annulment Case regarding the validity of the REM
would constitute res judicata on the Injunction Case.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals15 (Injunction Case)

Goodland appealed16 the same to the CA.

Meanwhile, AUB filed an Ex-Parte Application for Writ of Possession on December
18, 2006, which was granted on March 15, 2007. The writ was issued on March 26,
2007 and AUB obtained possession of the foreclosed properties on April 2, 2007.

On June 5, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, which ruled in favor of
Goodland and ordered the reinstatement of the Injunction Case in the trial court. 17

The CA rejected petitioners’ contention that Goodland’s appeal raised pure

questions of law,18 which are within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Rule
45.19 Instead, it found Goodland’s Rule 41 appeal to be proper because it involved
both questions of fact and of law. The CA held that a question of fact existed
because petitioners themselves questioned in their Brief the veracity of Goodland’s
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. 20

The CA conceded that Goodland’s Brief failed to comply with the formal
requirements, which are all grounds for the dismissal of the appeal, 21 e.g., failure of
the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of its brief on all
appellees and absence of page references to the record. However, it relaxed the
rules so as to completely resolve the rights and obligations of the parties. The CA,
however, warned Goodland that its future lapses will be dealt with more severely. 22

The CA further ruled against petitioners’ argument that the delivery of the foreclosed
properties to AUB’s possession has rendered Goodland’s appeal moot. It explained
that the Injunction Appeal involving the annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure sale
can proceed independently of petitioners’ application for a writ of possession. 23

The CA then concluded that Goodland was not guilty of forum shopping when it
initiated the Annulment and Injunction Cases. The CA held that the reliefs sought in
the two cases were different. The Annulment Case sought the nullification of the real
estate mortgage, while the Injunction Case sought the nullification of the foreclosure
proceedings as well as to enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of petitioners. 24 The
CA further held that aside from the difference in reliefs sought, the two cases were
independent of each other because the facts or evidence that supported their
respective causes of action were different. The acts which gave rise to the Injunction
Case (i.e., the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings) occurred long after the filing of
the Annulment Case.25

The appellate court also held that any decision in either case will not constitute res
judicata on the other. It explained that the validity of the real estate mortgage has no
"automatic bearing" on the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. 26

Moreover, according to the CA, the fact that Goodland stated in its Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping in the Injunction Case that the Annulment Case was pending
belied the existence of forum shopping. 27

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 on July 2, 2009, which was denied in
the assailed Resolution of February 17, 2010. 29

Hence, the instant petition.

Ruling in G.R. No. 190231 (Annulment Case)

Contemporaneously with the proceedings of the Injunction Case, the earlier

Annulment Case (Civil Case No. B-6242) was also dismissed by the trial court on the
ground of forum shopping on August 16, 2007. 30

Goodland filed an appeal31 of the dismissal to the CA, which appeal was granted.
The CA ordered on August 11, 2009 the reinstatement of the Annulment Case in the
trial court.32

AUB then filed with this Court a Petition for Review, 33 docketed as G.R. No. 190231
and entitled Asia United Bank and Abraham Co v. Goodland Company, Inc.

On December 8, 2010, the Court’s First Division reversed the CA ruling and resolved
the appeal in AUB’s favor.34 The sole issue resolved by the Court was whether
Goodland committed willful and deliberate forum shopping by filing Civil Case Nos.
B-6242 (Annulment Case) and B-7110 (Injunction Case).lavvphil The Court ruled
that Goodland committed forum shopping because both cases asserted non-consent
to the mortgage as the only basis for seeking the nullification of the REM, as well as
the injunction of the foreclosure. When Goodland did not notify the trial court of the
subsequent filing of the injunction complaint, Goodland revealed its "furtive intent to
conceal the filing of Civil Case No. B-7110 for the purpose of securing a favorable
judgment." Thus, the Court concluded that the trial court was correct in dismissing
the annulment case with prejudice. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 11, 2009 decision and
November 10, 2009 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 9126[9] are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 16, 2007 and December 5, 2007 orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25 in Civil Case No. B-6242 are
REINSTATED.35

Goodland filed a Motion for Reconsideration 36 but the same was denied with finality
in the Court’s Resolution dated January 19, 2011.

Issue37

The parties present several issues for the Court’s resolution. Most of these address
the procedural infirmities that attended Goodland’s appeal to the CA, making such
appeal improper and dismissible. The crux of the case, however, lies in the issue of
whether the successive filing of the Annulment and Injunction Cases constitute forum
shopping.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners maintain that Goodland is guilty of forum shopping because it sought in

the Annulment Case to annul the REM on the ground that it was falsified and
unlawfully filled-out; while in the Injunction Case, Goodland wanted to nullify the
foreclosure sale arising from the same REM on the ground that the REM was
falsified and unlawfully filled-out. Clearly, Goodland’s complaints rise and fall on the
issue of whether the REM is valid. This requires the presentation of the same
evidence in the Annulment and Injunction Cases. 38

Goodland’s Arguments

Goodland counters that it did not commit forum shopping because the causes of
action for the Injunction and Annulment Cases are different. The Annulment Case is
for the annulment of REM; while the Injunction Case is for the annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Goodland argues that any judgment in the Annulment
Case, regardless of which party is successful, would not amount to res judicata in
the Injunction Case.39

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court."40 The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed
were explained in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company: 41

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous
case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata);
and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers (splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata).

Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the
different cases filed. Cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another."42

The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM
(due to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of
Goodland’s right to the mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for
the nullification of the REM. The Injunction Case involves the same cause of action,
inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of
title. While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is
ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of
the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title), the cause of
action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same — the alleged
nullity of the REM. Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing forum
shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with
different prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still forum shopping even if
the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise
substantially the same issues.43

There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the
propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity
of the REM, which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of the
causes of action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be
ruled upon in both, and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each
other. This is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum
shopping.

The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the parties should add
different grounds or legal theories for the nullity of the REM or should alter the
designation or form of the action. The well-entrenched rule is that "a party cannot, by
varying the form of action, or adopting a different method of presenting his case,
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated."44

The CA ruled that the two cases are different because the events that gave rise to
them are different. The CA rationalized that the Annulment Case was brought about
by the execution of a falsified document, while the Injunction Case arose from AUB’s
foreclosure based on a falsified document. The distinction is illusory. The cause of
action for both cases is the alleged nullity of the REM due to its falsified or spurious
nature. It is this nullity of the REM which Goodland sought to establish in the
Annulment Case. It is also this nullity of the REM which Goodland asserted in the
Injunction Case as basis for seeking to nullify the foreclosure and enjoin the
consolidation of title. Clearly, the trial court cannot decide the Injunction Case without
ruling on the validity of the mortgage, which issue is already within the jurisdiction of
the trial court in the Annulment Case.

The recent development in Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., 45 which
involved substantially the same parties and the same issue is another reason for
Goodland’s loss in the instant case. The issue that Goodland committed deliberate
forum shopping when it successively filed the Annulment and Injunction Cases
against AUB and its officers was decided with finality therein. This ruling is
conclusive on the petitioners and Goodland considering that they are substantially
the same parties in that earlier case.

Given our ruling above that the Injunction Case ought to be dismissed for forum
shopping, there is no need to rule further on the procedural infirmities raised by
petitioners against Goodland’s appeal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 5, 2009

Decision of the Court of Appeals and its February 17, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R.
CV No. 90114 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 15, 2007 Order
of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna DISMISSING Civil Case
No. B-7110 is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-53564 February 27, 1987

JUAN BAYANG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BENIGNO BIONG, respondents.

Rodrigo Matutina for petitioner.

Luceniano E. Lancin for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Sometime in November 1969, Juan Bayang filed a complaint for quieting of title with
damages against Benigno Biong in the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte,
Branch 1, docketed as Civil Case No. 1892. 1 In 1970, while the case was pending,
Biong succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiff of the land in question and remained
there until January 25, 1978. 2 On February 21, 1972, the case was decided in favor
of Biong, but the Court of Appeals on December 8, 1977, reversed the trial court,
declaring in the dispositive portion of its decision:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and appellants

are hereby declared owner of the property in litigation, and defendant-
appellee are (sic) hereby ordered to pay appellant the sum of P56.40
as the latter's share in the proceeds from the sale of the copra derived
from the third harvest of coconuts from the same land, and P1,000.00
as attorney's fees, and costs of Litigation. 3

This decision became final on February 2, 1978.

On February 6, 1978, Bayang filed a second case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2589,
with the CFI of Surigao del Norte, Branch II, seeking to recover from Biong the
incomes earned from the same land from 1970 up to the quarterly incomes from
1978 until the said land was delivered to the plaintiff. 4 At the pre-trial conference
held on July 10, 1978, the counsel for Bayang admitted that as of January 25, 1978,
Biong had already surrendered possession of the land in question to Bayang. 5 On
August 16, 1978, Biong filed a motion for summary judgment, reiterating the
affirmative defense of res judicata raised in his answer dated April 12, 1978, insofar
as it related to the incidents concerning the case prior to January 25, 1978. 6 An
opposition to this motion was duly filed by Bayang. 7

The trial court, after considering the arguments of the parties, granted the motion
and rendered a summary judgment on October 30, 1978. 8 The said decision was
sustained by the Court of Appeals, and Bayang is now before us in this petition for
review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

His assignment of errors raises two basic submissions, to wit:

1. Civil Case No. 2589 should not have been decided by summary judgment.

2. The judgment in CA-G.R. No. 54720-R (appeal from judgment in Civil Case No.
1892) did not constitute res judicata as to bar Civil Case No. 2589.

Both contentions are incorrect. We rule for the respondents.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals quoted the following excerpt from Singleton v.
Philippine Trust Co.  9 on the nature and functions of the summary judgment:

Summary judgment is one of the methods sanctioned in the present

Rules of Court for a prompt disposition of civil actions wherein there
exists no serious controversy. The procedure may be availed of not
only by claimants, but also by defending parties who may be the object
of unfounded claims. A motion for summary judgment assumes that
scrutinizing of the facts will disclose that the issues presented by the
pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently unsubstantial
as not to be genuine issues, or that there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts or where the facts appear undisputed and certain from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits.

We hold that there was no genuine or triable issue of fact raised by the parties, in
view particularly of the affirmative defense of res judicata invoked by the private
respondent. That defense is sustained.

A long line of decisions has consistently held that for res judicata to apply: a) the
former judgment must be final; b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and d) there must be between the first case and the second case identity of
parties, identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action. 10

The decision in Civil Case No. 1892 became final and executory on February 2,
1978. There is no dispute that the trial court which rendered that decision had
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties to the proceeding. The case was
tried on the merits. The parties to Civil Case No. 1892 and the subsequent Civil
Case No. 2589 are the same petitioner and private respondent now before us.

The petitioner would draw a distinction between the land in dispute in Civil Case No.
1892 and the income from that land being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589. But that is
in our view splitting hairs to split a cause of action. The subject-matter is essentially
the same in both cases as the income is only a consequence or accessory of the
disputed property. We cannot agree that there are involved here two causes of
action calling for two separate cases. The claim for the income from the land was
incidental to, and should have been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for,
ownership of the land.

We note that while the first case was pending, the private respondent, by the
petitioner's own account, "succeeded in dispossessing" him of the disputed
land 11 and that at the pretrial conference on Civil Case No. 2589, Bayang's counsel
admitted that Biong had vacated the said property as of January 25, 1978. 12 This
means that from 1970 to the date the respondent surrendered the property in 1978,
Biong was presumably collecting and enjoying the income therefrom to the exclusion
of the petitioner.

Civil Case No. 1892 was commenced in November 1969 and was finally decided
only on February 2, 1978. The private respondent entered the disputed property in
1970 and left it only in 1978. For about seven years, therefore, the petitioner made
no move at all to amend his complaint to include a claim for the income supposedly
received by the private respondent during that period.

Under Rule 10, Section 6, of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 6. Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. — Upon motion of a

party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as
are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth
transactions, occurrence or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party should plead thereto, it shall so order,
specifying the time therefor.

In the case of Jalandoni v. Martin-Guanzon, 13 this Court declared through Justice

J.B.L. Reyes:

As to the value of the plaintiff's share in the products of the land during
the time that the former action was pending (which are the damages
claimed under the second cause of action), their recovery is now
barred by the previous judgment. These damages are but the result of
the original cause of action, viz., the continuing refusal by defendants
in 1941 to recognize the plaintiff's right to an interest in the property. In
the same way that plaintiffs claimed for their share of the produce from
1941 to 1947, these later damages could have been claimed in the first
action, either in the original camplaint (for their existence could be
anticipated when the first complaint was filed) or else by supplemental
pleading. To allow them to be recovered by subsequent suit would be a
violation of the rule against multiplicity of suits, and specifically of
sections 3 and 4 of Rules 2 of the Rules of Court, against the splitting
of causes of action, since these damages spring from the same cause
of action that was pleading (sic) in the former case No. 573 between
the same parties (Blossom & Co., Inc. v. Manila Gas Corporation, 55
 Phil. 226; Santos v. Moir, 36 Phil. 350; Pascua v. Sideco 24 Phil. 26;
Bachrach Motor Co. v. Icarangal 68 Phil. 287).

And in another case, 14 the same jurist declared:

Urtula, as defendant in the expropriation case, could have raised the

matter of interest before the trial court even if there had been no actual
taking yet by the Republic and the said court could have included the
payment of interest in its judgment but conditioned upon the actual
taking, because the rate of interest upon the amount of just
compensation (6%) is a known factor, and it can reasonably be
expected that at some future time, the expropriator would take
possession of the property, though the date be not fixed. In this way,
multiple suits would be avoided. Moreover, nothing prevented appellee
from calling the attention of the appellate courts (even by motion to
reconsider before judgment became final) to the subsequent taking of
possession by the condemnor, and asking for allowance of interest on
the indemnity since that followed the taking as a matter of course, and
raised no issue requiring remand of the records to the Court of origin.

As the issue of interest could have been raised in the former case but
was not raised, res judicata blocks the recovery of interest in the
present case. (Tejedor vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494; Phil. Engineering Corp.,
et al. vs. Ceniza, etc., et al., L-17834, 29 Sept. 1962). It is settled that a
former judgment constitutes a bar, as between the parties, not only as
to matters expressly adjudged, but all matters that could have been
adjudged at the time (Rule 39, sec. 49; Corda vs. Maglinti L-17476,
November 30, 1961; Rodriguez vs. Tan, 48 Off. Gaz. 3330).

Clearly, then, Civil Case No. 2589 is barred by the previous judgment in Civil Case
No. 1892. This being so, it should follow that the trial judge committed no grave
abuse of discretion in deciding the latter case by summary judgment.

We are not unmindful of the argument that affirmance of the challenged decision of
the respondent court will result in the unjust enrichment of Biong at the expense of
Bayang. This assumes, of course, that the petitioner could have proved his right to
the income he now claims belatedly. The point is that he did not make the proper
claim at the proper time and in the proper proceedings, and he cannot do it now.
Whatever right he might have had is now deemed waived because of his neglect.

Nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa. This has to be so if litigants are to
be spared the annoyance, anxiety and expense that could otherwise be inflicted
upon them endlessly by capricious, malicious or vindictive suitors.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismiss and the appealed decision is affirmed. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.