Daf Ditty Succah 28: Women in the Succah (?

In Jewish cultures, the sukkah represents and manifests the idea of home and
domestic space, while also symbolizing the danger and possibility of homelessness.
It is often taken to be a symbol for the transience and fragility of Jewish existence
and of life itself. In modernity women have taken up equal roles in culture law and
medicine, So how they now negotiate the ritual spaces of Halacha?

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MISHNA: In the case of one whose head and most of his body were in the sukka and his table
was in the house, Beit Shammai deem it unfit, and Beit Hillel deem it fit. Beit Hillel said to
Beit Shammai: And wasn’t there an incident where the Elders of Beit Shammai and the
Elders of Beit Hillel went to visit Rabbi Yoḥanan ben HaḤoranit and they found him such
that he was sitting with his head and most of his body in the sukka and his table in the house,
and they said nothing to him? Even Beit Shammai did not object. Beit Shammai said to them:
Is there proof from there? That is not what happened; rather, they said to him: If you were
accustomed to act in this manner, you have never fulfilled the mitzva of sukka in your life.

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The mishna continues: Women, slaves, and minors are exempt from the mitzva of sukka. A
minor who does not need his mother any longer is obligated in the mitzva. There was an
incident where the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth just before Sukkot, and
Shammai removed the coat of plaster from the roof, leaving the beams, and roofed with the
beams over the bed for the newborn minor.

GEMARA: With regard to the halakha that women, slaves, and minors are exempt from the
mitzva of sukka, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara answers
that it is as the Sages taught in a baraita that it is stated:

,‫ָהֶאְזָרח‬-‫ ִשְׁבַﬠת ָיִמים; ָכּל‬,‫מב ַבֻּסֹּכּת ֵתְּשׁבוּ‬ 42 Ye shall dwell in booths seven days; all that are home-
.‫ ַבֻּסֹּכּת‬,‫ ֵיְשׁבוּ‬,‫ְבּ ִיְשָׂרֵאל‬ born in Israel shall dwell in booths;
Lev 23:42

“All the homeborn in Israel shall reside in sukkot” Had the verse stated only: Homeborn, it
would have been derived that any homeborn member of the Jewish people is obligated to observe
this mitzva. However, the term with the addition of the definite article: “The homeborn,”
indicates that only certain homeborn members are obligated, i.e., men, to the exclusion of the
women. The word “all” in the phrase: “All the homeborn,” comes to include the minors capable
of performing this mitzva.

§ The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: “The homeborn” is to the exclusion of
women. Is that to say that the term homeborn without the definite article indicates both men
and women? Isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to Yom Kippur that it is stated:

‫ ַבֹּחֶדשׁ‬:‫ ְלֻחַקּת עוָֹלם‬,‫כט ְוָה ְיָתה ָלֶכם‬ 29 And it shall be a statute for ever unto you: in the seventh
-‫ַהְשִּׁביִﬠי ֶבָּﬠשׂוֹר ַלֹחֶדשׁ ְתַּﬠנּוּ ֶאת‬ month, on the tenth day of the month, ye shall afflict your

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 --‫ְמָלאָכה ל ֹא ַתֲﬠשׂוּ‬-‫ְוָכל‬ ,‫ַנְפֹשֵׁתיֶכם‬ souls, and shall do no manner of work, the home-born, or
.‫ ְוַהֵגּר ַהָגּר ְבּתוְֹכֶכם‬,‫ָהֶאְזָרח‬ the stranger that sojourneth among you.
Lev 16:29

“And it shall be a statute forever unto you: In the seventh month, on the tenth day of the month,
you shall afflict your souls and shall do no manner of work, the homeborn, or the stranger that
sojourns among you” . And the term “the homeborn” in that verse comes to include homeborn
women, who are obligated in the mitzva of affliction on Yom Kippur. In that case, the definite
article comes to include women. Therefore, apparently, the term homeborn, without the definite
article, indicates only men. Rabba said: They are each a halakha transmitted to Moses from
Sinai, and the Sages merely supported them with verses as a mnemonic device. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the derivations are contradictory.

The Gemara asks: Which of them is derived from the verse and which is a halakha transmitted
to Moses from Sinai and merely supported by a verse? And furthermore, why do I need the
verse and why do I need the halakha? Isn’t sukka a positive, time-bound mitzva, and the
principle is that women are exempt from all positive, time-bound mitzvot? There is no need for
a special derivation to exempt women from the mitzva of sukka.

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MISHNA: All seven days of Sukkot, a person renders his sukka his permanent residence and
his house his temporary residence. If rain fell, from when is it permitted to vacate the sukka?
It is permitted from the point that it is raining so hard that the congealed dish will spoil. The
Sages told a parable: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a servant who
comes to pour wine for his master, and he pours a jug [kiton] of water in his face to show him
that his presence is not desired. So too, in the sukka, rain is an indication that the Holy One, Blessed
be He, does not want the person to fulfill the mitzva of sukka.

Summary

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Daf Shevui writes:1

Today’s section deals with the traditional exemption of women from the obligation of sukkah.

This midrash derives from an “extra” letter in the Torah the exclusion of women and minors from
being obligated to observe the mitzvah of sukkah. We should note that in these situations we should
not expect the midrash to be a “simple” reading of the Torah. The midrashim are creative, deriving
meaning from the Torah in places that a regular reader would not find it.

The exclusion of women is derived from the letter “heh” , the word “the,” that precedes the word
“homeborn” in Leviticus 23:42. Had the word just been “homeborn” women would have been
included (so the sugya says), but the extra heh comes to exclude them. The word “every” includes
minors in the obligation to sit in a sukkah. Below, the Talmud will ponder this—after all the
Mishnah says that minors are not obligated to sit in the sukkah.

The problem with “the homeborn” excluding women from being obligated for the sukkah is that
the same word is used in the context of Yom Kippur in Leviticus 16:29, and the rabbis use the
word to include women in the Yom Kippur obligation. So which is it—does “the homeborn”
include women (as in the case of Yom Kippur) or does it exclude women (as in the case of
Sukkah)?

Rabbah answers that one of these sets of midrashim is only there to bolster the traditions. In other
words, the rabbis did not derive these laws from the midrash. Rather, they had a tradition and in
order to support it, they created a midrash. Only one of the two cases is actually a midrash that
generated a halakhah.

The main problem alluded to here is that we don’t really need a verse to exempt women from the
sukkah or to obligate them for Yom Kippur. There is a rabbinic rule that women are exempt from
positive time-bound commandments.

Sukkah is a positive commandment (you have to do something, namely sit in a sukkah) and it is
time-bound (you can fulfill the mitzvah during Sukkot only). So why would we need a verse to
know that which we already know.

Second, Rav Judah already said that when it comes to negative commandments which are
punishable, they all apply to men and women equally.

1
https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.28b.8?lang=bi&p2=Daf_Shevui_to_Sukkah.28a.12-28b.11&lang2=bi

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Yom Kippur is a negative commandment (you are prohibited from doing things) and therefore
women are just as liable for it as men.

So to return to our main question—if we already knew from general principles that women were
liable for Yom Kippur and exempt from sukkah, what are these midrashim doing?

Abaye says that without the midrash we might have thought that despite sukkah being a positive
time-bound commandment, women are still liable. One is supposed to dwell in the sukkah as one
does at home. Since at home, husband and wife live in the same building, so too in the sukkah we
might think that both a husband and wife should be there together. To combat this notion the
midrash tells us that women are exempt.

Rava offers another reason why we might have thought that women are liable for the mitzvah of
sukkah, despite it being a positive time-bound commandment. Women are liable for the mitzvot
of Pesah, including the mitzvah to eat matzah. This is true even though this is a positive time-
bound commandment. Sukkot and Pesah both begin on the fifteenth day of the month. So we might
have thought that just as women are liable for the commandments applicable to Pesah, so too they
are liable for the commandments applicable to Sukkot. Therefore the baraita had to teach that
women are exempt from sukkah.

Above we saw that we don’t really need the midrash to teach us that women are excluded from
sukkah. So, the Talmud now asks, why do we need the extra “heh” in front of the word
“homeborn.” What does the “heh” teach? The answer is that it includes converts. Note that this is
closer to the original context of the verse. The word “homeborn” probably originally was intended
to exclude the resident alien (ger toshav). Only an Israelite, according to the verse, is liable for the
mitzvah of sukkah. The rabbis, however, use the extra “heh” to say that the convert is liable, even
though he wasn’t born into Judaism.

The word “homeborn” was used in the midrash alluded to above to teach that women are liable to
“afflict themselves” (fast) on Yom Kippur. However, we don’t need a special midrash for that. It
could have been derived from Rav Judah’s statement that women are liable for all negative
commandments.

The answer is that without the midrash I might have thought that they are not obligated for the
extra affliction, the hour or so we add on to the fast on Yom Kippur. This extra fasting is not
punishable (although it is mandated). Since it is not punishable I might have thought that women
are not liable for it—they are, after all, liable only for things that are punishable. The midrash
comes to teach that they are liable even for this extra amount of fasting.

Today’s section deals with the obligation of a minor to sleep in the sukkah.

Above we saw a baraita (a tannaitic source not from the Mishnah) which used the word “every”
as in “every homeborn” to teach that even minors are obligated to dwell in the sukkah. This is a

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direct contradiction to the mishnah which exempts minors from dwelling in the sukkah.
The Talmud resolves the difficulty by saying that the first baraita refers to a minor who is old
enough to be educated. Such a minor must dwell in the Sukkah. Below we shall see the definition
of this age.

A minor who is too young to be educated is not obligated at all to sit in the sukkah.

Above, the baraita used the word “every” to include a minor in the obligation for sukkah. This
implies that the Torah mandates minors to dwell in the sukkah. But there is a principle that until
the age of bar mitzvah, children are never obligated to observe the commandments. The Talmud
resolves that the verse is just a support—the source of the ruling is rabbinic.

There are two definitions for a child who does not need his mother any more, two definitions that
I think are still applicable today. The first is that the child can relieve himself without help. As a
father of four, I can safely say that passing this hurdle remains one of the signposts of having
reached maturity.

The second is that when the child wakes up, he doesn’t call “Mommy, mommy” until she rescues
him from his bed. A child that wakes up and calls “Mommy” once is already somewhat
independent.

We should note also that both of these are related to the sukkah. Women were exempt from the
sukkah, so a child sleeping in the sukkah would be without his mother. He would also have to be
responsible for taking care of his own needs. A child who still needs to be wiped and can’t make
it through the night without his mother would be better off sleeping in the house.

In the mishnah it looks like Shammai just disagrees with the other sages. He holds that even new-
born infants are liable to sleep in the sukkah, so when his daughter-in-law gives birth, he opens up
a sukkah over her bed.

However, the Talmud at times wants to harmonize variant opinions. It is bothered by the fact there
is a story that disagrees with the opinion preceding it. The Talmud resolves this by saying that
Shammai doesn’t disagree on principle—he agrees that a new-born need not sleep in the sukkah.
He just rules strictly.

Today’s section starts with a new mishnah. The Talmud deals first with the opening clause, which
teaches that one must make the sukkah into a permanent dwelling place. The second clause is the
topic of next week’s daf.

This baraita illustrates how one makes the sukkah his “permanent dwelling” during Sukkot. A
person’s permanent dwelling place is defined in several ways. First of all, we keep our nice stuff

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there, not just our temporary stuff our “good” stuff. I realize that this is pretty difficult now, and I
doubt you find many people today who bring their couches out into the sukkah. It’s just not
practical in a time when our houses are generally large and contain many possessions. But at the
least it would seem we could follow this halakhah by bringing out nice dishes, tablecloths, chairs,
and other such items. These give the sukkah a more permanent feel.

Second, one spends most of one’s time in the sukkah. Where we live is defined by where we eat
and where we relax, as well as where we sleep. I realize again that this is not easy. Our homes are
very comfortable and I love lying down on my couch as much as the next person. Still, we should
make an effort to turn the sukkah into the place we dwell, not just the place we eat a few meals
and then go back into the house.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:2

Our Daf cites a braisa: It happened that Rabbi Eliezer spent the Shabbos in Upper Galilee, and
they asked him for thirty decisions in the laws of Sukkah. Of twelve of these he said, “I have heard
them” (and then he told them the decisions); of eighteen he said, “I have not heard.”

Rabbi Yosi ben Yehudah said: Reverse the words: Of eighteen he said, “I have heard them”; of
twelve he said, “I have not heard them.” They said to him, “Are all your words only things of what
you have heard?” He answered them, “You wish to force me to say something which I have not
heard from my teachers.” [He then continued to tell them about his standards.] “During all my life,
no man preceded me to the Study Hall; I never slept or napped in the Study Hall; nor did I ever
leave a person in the Study Hall when I went out (for I was the last to leave); nor did I ever utter
frivolous speech; nor have I ever in my life said a thing which I did not hear from my teachers.”

They said concerning Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai that during his whole life he never uttered
frivolous speech; nor walked four cubits without studying the Torah or without tefillin; nor did
any man precede him in the Study Hall; nor did he sleep or nap in the Study Hall; nor did he think
(about sacred matters) in unclean alleyways; nor did he leave anyone in the Study Hall when he
went out; nor did anyone ever find him sitting in silence, but only sitting and learning; and no one
but himself ever opened the door to greet his disciples; he never in his life said anything which he
had not heard from his teacher; and, except on Erev Pesach and on Erev Yom Kippur, he never
said, “It is time to arise from the studies at the Study Hall,” and so did his disciple Rabbi Eliezer
conduct himself after him.

The Gemora cites a braisa: Hillel the Elder had eighty students. Thirty of them reached the level
of Moshe, fitting to receive the Heavenly presence. Thirty of them reached the level of Yehoshua,
fitting for Hashem to stop the sun in their merit. Twenty reached the level of outstanding students.

2
http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Sukkah_28.pdf

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The greatest of them was Yonasan ben Uziel, while the lowest was Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai.
Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai was fully versed in all aspects of Torah – Tanach, Mishnayos, Gemora
(explanation of the Mishnayos), Halachos, derivations of halachos from verses, close inspection
of the text of the Torah, enactments of the Sages, logical arguments, comparisons of halachos by
similar language, astronomy, mathematical meanings of verses, parables, dialogues of sheidim
(demons), trees, and angels, and large and small things.

The Mishna cites a dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding the minimum
dimensions that are required for a sukkah to be valid. Beis Shammai maintains that the sukkah
must be large enough to accommodate one’s head, most of his body and his table. Beis Hillel
maintains that it is sufficient even if the sukkah cannot accommodate the table.

If a man has his head and the greater part of his body in the sukkah, while the table is in the house,
Beis Shammai declares that the sukkah is invalid, whereas Beis Hillel declare it valid. Beis Hillel
said to Beis Shammai: Once the Elders of Beis Shammai and the Elders of Beis Hillel went to visit
Rabbi Yochanan ben Hachoranis, and they found him with his head and the greater part of his
body in the sukkah, whereas the table was in the house, and they made no objection. They replied:
Do you bring a proof from this? The truth is that they also said to him: If such has been your
regular conduct, you have never performed the mitzvah of sukkah in your lifetime. Women, slaves
and minors are exempt from the obligation of Sukkah, but a minor who is not dependent on his
mother is obligated in the mitzvah of Sukkah. It once happened that the daughter-in-law of
Shammai the Elder gave birth to a child, and he removed the plaster of the roof and put s’chach
over the bed for the sake of the child.

The Gemora asks: From where do we know this? The Gemora cites a braisa: If the Torah would
have said ‘native,’ it would have included every native (even women), but since it says ‘the
natives,’ it excludes women. ‘All’ includes minors. The braisa had stated: ‘The natives’ excludes
women. The Gemora asks: Does that mean that ‘native’ implies both men and women? But has it
not been taught in a braisa: ‘The native’ includes the native women that they are obligated in the
laws of affliction on Yom Kippur, which shows that ‘native’ implies only men!? Rabbah answered:
They are laws based upon an oral tradition, but the Rabbis applied a Scriptural verse to them (as a
support).

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The Gemora asks: Which is based on a Scriptural verse and which is based upon traditional? And
furthermore, what is the necessity for a Scriptural verse or for an oral traditional? Isn’t the mitzvah
of Sukkah a positive commandment which is caused by time, and aren’t women exempt from every
positive commandment that is caused by time? And as to Yom Kippur as well, can it not be derived
from the statement Rav Yehudah made in the name of Rav, for Rav Yehudah stated in the name
of Rav, and so the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The Torah says: A man or woman (who
commits any of the sins of man); the Torah makes a man and woman equal regarding all punishable
(and prohibitions) in the Torah?

Abaye answered: Indeed Sukkah is derived from an oral traditional, and still it is necessary. For I
might have thought that since ‘you shall dwell’ implies in the same manner as you ordinarily live;
just as one's permanent dwelling is for a husband and wife, so too the Sukkah must be for a husband
and wife; therefore he informs us that it is not so. Rava said: It is necessary, since I might have
thought that I should derive the fifteenth from the fifteenth of the Festival of Matzos (Pesach): Just
as there women are bound by the obligation, so too here as well women are bound; therefore we
were informed that this is not so.

The Gemora asks: And now that you say that Sukkah is based upon an oral traditional, why is the
Scriptural verse necessary? The Gemora answers: It is to include converts. I would have thought
that ‘the natives in Israel’ said the Torah, but not converts; therefore it informs us that this is not
so. The Gemora repeats a question asked earlier: And as to Yom Kippur as well, can it not be
derived from the statement Rav Yehudah made in the name of Rav?

The Gemora answers: The verse is necessary to include the additional affliction (that one should
begin afflicting himself a certain amount of time before Yom Kippur actually starts); as I might
have thought that since the Torah excluded the additional affliction from punishment and warning,
women are entirely exempt from it; therefore he informs us that they are subject to the obligation.

All the seven days of the Festival a man must make the Sukkah his permanent dwelling and his
house his temporary dwelling. If rain fell, when may one be permitted to leave it? It is when the
porridge would become ruined. They propounded a parable: to what can this be compared? It is to
a slave who comes to pour the cup for his master, and he poured a pitcher over his face.

The Gemora cites a braisa: All the seven days, one should make the Sukkah his permanent dwelling
and his house his temporary dwelling. In what manner? If he had beautiful vessels, he should bring
them up into the Sukkah, beautiful linens, he should bring them up into the Sukkah; he should eat
and drink and relax in the Sukkah.

The Gemora asks: From where do we know this? It is from that which was taught in a braisa: You
shall dwell implies: in the same manner as you ordinarily live. Therefore they said: All the seven
days, one should make his Sukkah his permanent dwelling, and his house his temporary dwelling.
In what manner? If he has beautiful vessels, he should bring them up into the Sukkah, beautiful
linens, he should bring them up into the Sukkah, he should eat and drink and relax in the Sukkah;
he should also analyze his Torah study in the Sukkah.

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The Gemora asks: But is it so? Didn’t Rava say, Scripture and Mishnah should be studied in the
Sukkah, but Gemora should be studied outside the Sukkah? The Gemora answers: There is no
difficulty, for the braisa refers to reviewing (which should be done inside the Sukkah), whereas
Rava was referring to analyzing a matter (which had not been previously studied).

As Great as Moshe

The Gemara states that Hillel had many great students, thirty of whom were worthy that the Divine
Presence should rest on them like it did on Moshe our teacher.

The Rashbam in Bava Basra 134a writes that the reason they did not have the Divine Presence rest
on them was due to the sins of the generation. We find in a few instances in the Gemara that one
Amora referred to another Amora by the name Moshe, which implies that that Amora was
comparable to Moshe in his generation.

The Rambam writes (Hilchos Teshuvah 5:2) that anyone amongst the Jewish People has the
potential to be as righteous as Moshe Rabbeinu. This is a sobering thought. Even in our generation,
which is considered by many to be the lowest generation ever, one can strive to be as great as
Moshe Rabbeinu.

The Aruch writes that the Gemara in Sanhedrin states that animals do not have the concept of
marriage. Nonetheless, the Torah accorded the animals in the times of Noach who did not
cohabitate with other species the status of being married.

Rabbi Yaakov Galinsky Shlita said that this teaches us that someone in our generation who does
not become influenced by the outside world could be as great as Rabbi Akiva Eiger in his
generation. Let us take this lesson to heart during the High Holidays, as we each strive to become
the best that we possibly can, and our efforts should lead us to inspire all those around us.

SITTING IN A SUKAH IN THE RAIN

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:3

The Mishnah states that one is permitted to leave the Sukah when it rains, but only when the rain
is enough to spoil the "Mikpeh" (a certain type of thick, cooked dish). The Mishnah implies that
one is merely permitted, but not required, to leave the Sukah. This seems to be the ruling of
the REMA (OC 639:7) who writes that one who eats in the Sukah in the rain does not receive any
reward for his act, and he is called a "Hedyot," a fool. The Rema's words imply that there is
no prohibition to stay in the Sukah in the rain. Rather, one merely fulfills no Mitzvah by doing so.

3
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/sukah/insites/su-dt-028.htm

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The ONEG YOM TOV (OC 49) asks that the SHULCHAN ARUCH (beginning of OC 638)
rules that the wood used to build a Sukah is prohibited mid'Oraisa to be used for any other purpose
for the duration of the festival, as the Gemara (9a) says. This prohibition includes both the wood
of the walls and that of the Sechach. The Rema there adds that even a verbal stipulation before the
festival does not permit the wood in the event that the Sukah collapses.

The Gemara (Rosh Hashanah 28a) teaches that when a person makes an oath not to derive any
benefit from a house, he is not permitted to sit in the house. This implies that sitting in a house is
considered a form of benefit from the house. Similarly, sitting in a Sukah is considered a form of
benefit from the Sukah.

Accordingly, one should be prohibited from sitting in the Sukah when it rains, since he does not
fulfill the Mitzvah at that moment and he derives personal benefit from the walls and Sechach
which protect him from the rain. Why, then is he permitted to remain in the Sukah when it rains?
The Oneg Yom Tov suggests that perhaps the prohibition to derive personal benefit from the wood
and Sechach of a Sukah applies only to forms of usage that conflict with the Mitzvah of Sukah
(as TOSFOS implies in Shabbos 22a), such as when one dismantles the Sukah to use its wood.

However, he counters that this suggestion is implausible for a number of reasons. First, the Gemara
in Shabbos (22a) says that one may not count money in front of the Chanukah lights because of
"Bizuy Mitzvah" (disgrace to the Mitzvah). This implies that even when there is no prohibition
against using the Mitzvah object for personal use (because of "Huktzah l'Mitzvaso"), there still
should be a prohibition against disgracing the Mitzvah object ("Bizuy") by using it for personal
use. Second, the Gemara later in Sukah (37b) says that one may not smell a Hadas branch which
has been set aside for the Mitzvah of Arba'as ha'Minim, because it is "Huktzah l'Mitzvaso."
Smelling the Hadas does not conflict with the Mitzvah for which the Hadas was designated, and
yet the act is still prohibited. Third, the Gemara earlier (9a) compares the Mitzvah of Sukah to the
Mitzvah of Korban Chagigah. Just as one is prohibited to derive benefit from a Korban Chagigah
in any manner, even if that benefit does not conflict with the Mitzvah, so, too, one should be
prohibited to derive any form of benefit from a Sukah.

Why, then, is one not prohibited from sitting in a Sukah when it rains?

(a) The ONEG YOM TOV answers that the Torah's prohibition against using the material of the
Sukah for personal benefit does not apply when a Sukah collapses. In such a case, to benefit from
the Sukah is prohibited only mid'Rabanan (as the MISHNAH BERURAH (OC 638:5) writes).
Similarly, perhaps when one covers the top of the Sukah (and temporarily renders it invalid), he is
prohibited only mid'Rabanan from using the Sukah for personal benefit. If the prohibition is only
mid'Rabanan, then it is likely that the Rabanan did not prohibit one from deriving personal benefit
from the Sukah through as simple an act as sitting in the Sukah when it rains, because such an act
is in no way disgraceful to the Sukah.

Why, though, should one be permitted to sit in a Sukah when it rains when the Sukah
is not covered?

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The Gemara says that "the Torah was not given to angels" (Yoma 69a). For that reason, the
Kohanim are permitted to wear the Bigdei Kehunah even after they have completed the Avodah,
because it is impossible to remove the clothing at the very moment that they complete the Avodah.
For the same reason, one should be permitted to sit in a Sukah after the Mitzvah of Sukah has been
completed.

This logic, though, should apply only when one was in the Sukah before it started to rain. In such
a case, he may remain in the Sukah even though he no longer fulfills the Mitzvah, because "the
Torah was not given to angels." Why, though, may one enter a Sukah when it is already raining?
Perhaps the principle that "the Torah was not given to angels" removes the Torah prohibition to
enter the Sukah in the rain and makes it prohibited only mid'Rabanan. If the prohibition is
mid'Rabanan, then perhaps the Rabanan did not apply the prohibition against benefiting from a
Sukah in a situation where one merely wants to sit in the Sukah in the rain, since that act is not
disgraceful to the Sukah.

(b) The CHAZON YECHEZKEL (2:5) writes that the reason why one may sit in a Sukah in the
rain is the reason that the Oneg Yom Tov initially suggested and then rejected. The prohibition
applies only to forms of usage that conflict with the Mitzvah of Sukah. One may not benefit from
the Sukah when that form of benefit detracts from its utilization as a Sukah.

In the case of the prohibition against smelling the Hadas, it is clear from the Gemara that the only
reason smelling is prohibited is because the Hadas is commonly used for its aroma. When one
designates the Hadas for the Mitzvah, he thereby sets it apart from its most common use. This is
in contrast to the Esrog, for example, which one is permitted to smell during Sukos because its
most common use (the rest of the year) is not its aroma. The prohibition against smelling the object
of a Mitzvah applies only to a Hadas, and not to other Mitzvah objects.4

When the Gemara earlier (9a) compares the Mitzvah of Sukah to the Mitzvah of Korban Chagigah,
the Gemara's intention is to teach that just as an object is Kadosh because it is designated to be
used for a Korban, so, too, an object (such as a Sukah) can become "set aside (Huktzah) for a
Mitzvah" when it is designated for a Mitzvah. The comparison does not teach that one is prohibited
to derive any form of personal benefit from a Sukah just as one is prohibited to derive any form of
benefit from a Korban Chagigah, even if that benefit does not conflict with the Mitzvah.5

The Chazon Yechezkel cites support for his answer from the Gemara earlier (10b). The Gemara
there relates that the servant of Rav Ashi placed a wet cloak on top of the Sukah to dry. Although
that act involved benefiting from the Sechach of the Sukah, it was permitted because it did not
detract from the use of the Sukah.

4
The RASHBA adds that if one uses Hadas branches as the walls for his Sukah (because fragrant wood makes good walls), then
he is permitted to smell them during Sukos. This is because he uses it only as a piece of wood and not as the object of an actual
Mitzvah.
5
The Chazon Yechezkel does not address the question from the Gemara in Shabbos (22a), which says that one may not count
money in front of the Chanukah lights. Perhaps there is an obvious difference between the two cases. There, it is clearly a disgrace
to the Mitzvah of the Chanukah lights for one to count money in front of them. In the case of one who sits in a Sukah to protect
himself from the rain, he merely sits underneath the object of the Mitzvah, an act which is not disgraceful to the Mitzvah.

14
(This approach also seems to be the view of TOSFOS in Shabbos 42b, DH v'Ein, and 45a, DH
Ela. Tosfos there explains that a flame that was lit for use as a Shabbos light may be moved
(according to Rebbi Shimon), because moving it does not detract from the Mitzvah. One is
prohibited, however, to use the oil that drips from the lamp, because at the time the flame was lit
the removal of the oil would have detracted from the Mitzvah.)

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:6

In the context of discussing Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus and his teacher, Rabban Yochanan ben
Zakkai, the Gemara mentions that Hillel ha-Zaken had eighty students – thirty who are described
as deserving of divine revelation like Moshe Rabbeinu, thirty who merit the cessation of heavenly
orbits as did Yehoshua bin Nun, and twenty average students. The greatest of his students
was Yonatan ben Uziel; the least of them was Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai.

In what fields was the “least of the students” expert?

It was said of Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai that his studies included the written Torah, the Mishnah,
the Gemara, the Halakhot, and Aggadot; the subtle points of the Torah and the minutiae of the
Scribes; the inferences from minor to major and analogies; astronomy and geometry (the simple
meaning of the word in Greek is land measurements, but it was commonly used to mean
engineering or mathematics in general); the language of the ministering angels; the language of
the demons, the whisper of the palms, washer’s proverbs and fox fables, and matters great and
small.

The report on Yonatan ben Uziel was that when he would sit and study Torah, a bird that flew
above his head would immediately burn up.

We have surprisingly little biographical information about Yonatan ben Uziel. His life’s work, for
which he is best known and remembered, is his translation of the books of Nach (nevi’im)
into Aramaic. It is not clear whether the translation that we have today is actually the one that he
wrote, or whether it is based on his work. In any case, it is not simply a translation, but a free
interpretation, which includes many details and elucidations. Although a translation into Greek
already existed at the time, his work was groundbreaking in that it included interpretations beyond
the simple meaning of the words and was done according to – and with the approval of – the Sages
of his generation.

We find that Yonatan ben Uziel was so well regarded during his lifetime, that even Shamai ha-
Zaken, who served as the Av Bet Din, sought him out to discuss issues of halakha with him.

6
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_sukkah2733/

15
Rav Yaakov Reisher (1) was asked whether it is appropriate to declare a communal fast day if it
is cloudy during a particular month and it is not possible to make the brachah of ‫קידוש לבנה‬.7

Rav Reisher began his analysis of the issue with our Gemara which indicates that rain during
Sukkos indicates that Hashem is rejecting our service. Seemingly, the same concept would apply
if it is cloudy and we are unable to make a brachah on the moon, which is a form of greeting the
Divine Presence. Rav Reisher proceeds to suggest a difference between the two cases.

Our daf discusses one who began to serve Hashem and with the arrival of the rain, finds his service
rejected. This is different from one who did not yet begin his service of Hashem in the first place.
Take for example the opinion of some Poskim (2) that on the first night one must eat in the sukkah
even if it is raining.

Why is rain on the first night different from rain on any subsequent night?

Explains Rav Reisher that rain is only a rejection if it arrives after one began to serve Hashem. But
on the first night, where one has not begun this service of Hashem, the rain is not a rejection and
there is no reason to leave the sukkah. Rav Reisher ultimately rejects this approach and instead he
cites the Gemara (3) that teaches that one who wants to do a mitzvah but due to circumstances
beyond his control is unable to fulfill it, he is nevertheless credited with the mitzvah. Thus, since
the people wanted to make the brachah on the new moon but were prevented from fulfilling the
mitzvah because it was cloudy, they are credited with the mitzvah. Furthermore, even regarding
rain on Sukkos we only find that one should leave the sukkah with their head bent over in
submission (4) but we never find that they would decree a fast day because it rained on Sukkos.
Therefore there is no reason to declare a fast day when the brachah on the new moon the brachah
on the moon could not be made.

7
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Sukkah%20028.pdf

16
Karen Miller Jackson writes:8

Our daf explores the question of women’s requirement to sit in a sukkah. While
this sugya (discussion) could easily be dismissed as outdated and archaic when viewed through
a modern feminist lens, a deeper reading of the text suggests the rabbis themselves grappled with
competing values when deciding whether or not to exempt women from the mitzvah of sitting in
a sukkah.

The mishnah states:

Women, slaves and minors are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah. A minor who does not need
his mother any longer is obligated in the mitzvah.

There was an incident where the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth just before
Sukkot, and Shammai removed the plaster (from the roof, exposing the beams) and
placed s’chach (sukkah roofing) over the bed for the newborn minor.

The mishnah groups women alongside slaves and young minors who are exempt from sitting in
the sukkah. Shammai goes to extreme measures — removing the plaster of the roof and turning
the house itself into a sukkah — to ensure that his newborn grandson “sits” in the sukkah. It does
not seem to occur to him that his daughter-in-law might want to sit in the sukkah too.

But though Shammai the Elder did not appear to give the matter much thought, the talmudic
discussion on this mishnah reveals that later rabbis struggled with the notion of women’s
exemption from sukkah. The mitzvah to sit in a sukkah commemorates the miracle of God’s
safeguarding the children of Israel as they wandered in the desert (Leviticus 23:42-43). Women,
of course, were among those protected in the desert — so shouldn’t they partake in this mitzvah?
(This is pointed out by the talmudic commentary Tosafot.) After all, women are obligated in other
holiday-related mitzvot because of the talmudic principle “they too were part of the miracle” (see
Megillah 4a and Pesachim 108b for example).

Although today’s page doesn’t explicitly employ this argument, it does includes a number of
linguistic arguments for including women:

(1) The verse (Levitiucus 23:42) says that an “ezrach” (homeborn citizen) is required to dwell in
a sukkah, and this same word is used to derive women’s obligation in “inui” (suffering) on Yom
Kippur.

(2) One might have assumed that the Torah’s word to “dwell” in the sukkah implies that just as a
man and woman dwell together at home, they would dwell together in a sukkah, hence a woman
would be required to sit in a sukkah as well.

8
Myjewishlearning.com

17
(3) The Torah uses the word “the fifteenth” in describing both the obligation to eat matzah and sit
in a sukkah, therefore one might assume that just as women are obligated in the former, they should
be in the latter.

Ultimately the Talmud concludes that because there is no logical or midrashic reason women are
exempt, and the rabbis themselves generate plenty of arguments they should be obligated, the
exemption must therefore be based on the legal fallback principle of “the law transmitted
to Moses from Sinai” — perhaps to release them from a requirement they were not always free to
fulfill properly. However, the Talmud’s back and forth reflects voices which would in theory
support women’s desire to fulfill the mitzvah of sitting in the sukkah, leaving open the door of the
sukkah for empowered women in the future.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:9

The Mishna (Sukkah 2:8) in our daf (Sukkah 28a) rules that ‘a ‫( קטן‬minor) who does not need his
mother is [rabbinically] obligated in [the mitzvah of] Sukkah’, which then prompts the Gemara
(Sukkah 28b) to explore what is meant by the phrase ‘who does not need his mother’?

According to the academy of Rabbi Yannai, this refers to a young boy who is independently able
to clean up after himself having defecated. While according to Rabbi Shimon, this refers to a young
boy who – upon waking up from his sleep – does not immediately cry out !‫‘ – אמא‬Mother!’ (nb.
as the Piskei Tosfot on Massechet Chagigah explains, this definition is due to the fact that the core
mitzvah of sukkah is sleeping in the sukkah. Given this, a child who – upon having a disturbed
night’s sleep – doesn’t cry out for their mother should ideally sleep in the sukkah).

However, the Gemara then challenges Rabbi Shimon’s definition because ‫‘ – גדולים נמי קרו‬older
people also cry out [for their mother]!’. Consequently, the Gemara suggests that Rabbi Shimon’s
teaching can be explained to mean that it refers to a young boy who – upon waking up from his
sleep – does not repeatedly cry out‫‘ – !אמא! אמא‬Mother! Mother!’, meaning that it refers to a child
who does not just want their mother’s presence (and thus cries out for her once), since many older
people also want their mother’s presence, but instead, is overcome with a feeling that they
completely need her presence (and thus cries out for her repeatedly).

Reflecting on this teaching, Rabbi Yissachar Dov Eicharn explains in his ‘Sefer Pi Kohen: Peninim
B’Avodat HaShem’ p. 272 that a connection can be made between this idea and a teaching found
in Brachot 32b where we are taught: ‘Rabbi Chama the son of Rabbi Chanina said: “If someone
sees that they have prayed and have not been answered, they should go back and pray again, as it
says, ‘Hope to Hashem, strengthen yourself and He will give you courage, and hope to Hashem’”
(Tehillim 27:14).’ As Rabbi Eicharn explains, this is because by repeatedly praying to God, we
show that we truly need God – just like the child who repeatedly calls out to their mother in their
hour of need illustrates that they truly need their mother.

Sadly, as pointed out by Rav Soloveitchik in his essay ‘Redemption, Prayer, Talmud Torah’, too
many of us fail to acknowledge our needs and this is one of the reasons why so many of us struggle

9
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

18
with prayer. However, ‘for Judaism, need-awareness constitutes part of the definition of human
existence.’

Ultimately, while many of us should be able to get through a night’s sleep without waking up and
crying for our parents, to be human is to have needs, and while each of us need others on occasion,
all of us need God. As such, we should harness the power of prayer to call out to God and, through
doing so, communicate our needs to our Creator.

Rabbi Avrohom Sebrow writes:10

The Gemara in our daf (Sukkah 28a) relates that Hillel the Elder had 80 students. Thirty of them
were of the stature that they should have merited the Divine Presence descend upon them as it did
on Moshe Rabbeinu. Nevertheless, at that point in Jewish history, there was no longer any
prophecy. The generation was not sufficiently righteous that there should be individuals with that
level of Divine inspiration.

Another group of 30 students were of such great stature that it was fitting that the sun should stand
still (as it appears to us) for them as it did for Yehoshua. The remaining group of 20 students were
somewhere in the middle of the first two groups.

The greatest of all of Hillel’s students was Yonasan ben Uziel. When he studied Torah, birds that
were flying overhead were immediately scorched. It is interesting to note that the Gemara implies
that this phenomenon did not occur while Hillel himself was studying Torah. Rebbe Menachem
Mendel of Kotzk explains that Hillel achieved a higher level of greatness than his student. The
birds potentially could have been scorched when he learned as well. However, he was able to
conceal the awesome power that his Torah contained.

A visitor to Radin on Tishah B’Av once watched the Chofetz Chaim closely. He wanted to be
inspired by the Chofetz Chaim’s recital of Kinnos. However, to his surprise and consternation, the

10
http://www.5tjt.com/no-one-gets-left-out/

19
great tzaddik recited Kinnos in the same manner as everyone else. Yet, later that evening, he passed
by the Chofetz Chaim’s home and witnessed his uncontrollable sobs. In public, the Chofetz Chaim
didn’t want to demonstrate an extra piety over anyone else.

If Yonasan ben Uziel was Hillel’s greatest student, who was on the other end of the spectrum?
Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai. Yet we find that before Hillel passed away he proclaimed that
Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai would be “a father in wisdom and a spiritual father of all future
generations.” Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai assumed the office of Nasi, the leader of Klal Yisrael,
at the time of the Churban. He had five outstanding disciples. Among them were Rebbe Yehoshua
and Rabbi Eliezer. They in turn taught Rebbe Akiva. Rebbe Yehuda HaNasi, the redactor of the
Mishnayos, studied under Rebbe Akiva’s students. The Talmud that we have today can be traced
directly back to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai.

A rebbe once remarked, can you imagine if Hillel had decided to only focus on his greatest
students? On the flip side, can you imagine if Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai sat dejected in class?
After all, there were 79 students better than him? What if he decided to give up on his studies?

But Hillel taught all his talmidim, from the strongest to the weakest. He did not ignore student
number 80. Further, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai himself didn’t give up in the face of stronger
talmidim. He persevered until he became the leader of all Klal Yisrael.

Steve Moss is a credit-risk manager for a multinational financial-services firm. (Years ago, in his
capacity as a vice-president with American Express/Shearson Lehman Hutton, he directed a
donation of a truckload of computers and accessories to be delivered to Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim.
One of those computers had a full-height 10-megabyte hard drive!) During the summers, Steve
coaches archery at a camp in New Hampshire. Understandably, the vast majority of kids do not
practice their archery skills during the year. The summer is usually the only time they have to learn

20
and master these skills. Consequently, their performance is reflective of the coach who has but a
few short weeks to teach them these skills.

A highlight of the summer is the Robin Hood Invitational Tournament, where many camps
compete in archery. Almost invariably, Steve’s camp wins the tournament. Steve explained that
the format of the tournament is that in any given age group, the top six scores are counted. Other
camps may have one or two superstars in each age group. Their coaches focus on the kids with the
most latent talent. However, Steve focuses on all the campers. In any given age group, his first-
and second-ranked camper may very well score worse than similarly ranked archers from a
different camp. Yet he always wins with “bench”: positions 3, 4, 5, and 6. Other coaches in the
tournament tend not to focus on those campers who don’t seem to have the knack for archery. But
in Steve’s group the lower-ranked members carry the team. It’s this philosophy of focusing on the
weaker students that ensures his camp victory year after year.

Positive Time-Bound Mitzvot

21
By Laurie Novick,
Rav Ezra Bick, Ilana Elzufon, and Shayna Goldberg, eds. write:11

Positive Time-Bound Mitzvot

After discussing women’s and men’s obligation to observe negative mitzvot (here),
the mishna turns its attention to positive commandments:

‫ז‬:‫משנה קידושין א‬

‫ אחד אנשים ואחד נשים‬,‫ וכל מצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמה‬.‫ אנשים חייבין ונשים פטורות‬,‫וכל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמה‬
.‫חייבין‬

Mishna Kiddushin 1:7

And all positive mitzvot that are time-bound, men are obligated and women are exempt. And all
positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, both men and women are obligated.

“Zeman geramah,” literally means ‘time causes it.’ Rambam explains that these obligations apply
only at specific times:

‫ז‬:‫פירוש המשניות לרמב”ם קידושין א‬

.‫ ושלא באותו הזמן אין חיובה חל‬,‫ומצות עשה שהזמן גרמה היא שחובת עשייתה בזמן מסויים‬

Rambam, Commentary to the Mishna, Kiddushin 1:7

“Mitzvat Aseh she-hazeman geramah” means that the obligation to perform it applies at a
certain time, and that at other times the obligation does not apply.

11
https://www.deracheha.org/positive-time-bound-mitzvot/

22
In general, men and women are equally obligated in positive non-time-bound commandments.
These include loving our fellow person, returning a lost object, giving tzedaka, affixing a mezuza,
and many other essential elements of Jewish observance.

The mishna tells us that, as a rule, men are obligated in positive time-bound commandments while
women are not. Before we explore this category further, it is important to remember its context.
Overall, the mishna has divided mitzvot into four major categories (positive time-bound, positive
non-time-bound, negative time-bound, and negative non-time-bound). Women are generally
obligated in three out of four.

In fact, out of the 613 Torah-level mitzvot, there seem to be only eight instances where women are
exempted specifically from positive time-bound mitzvot: reciting Shema, donning tzitzit,
laying tefillin on the head and on the hand, hearing shofar, taking lulav, dwelling in the sukka, and
counting the omer. This is not a long list.

Why does the exemption from this single category loom large?

Rabbinic Enactments

Rabbinic laws usually follow the patterns set by Torah law:

.‫גיטין סה‬

.‫כל דתקון רבנן כעין דאורייתא תקון‬

Gittin 65a

All that our rabbis enacted, they enacted on the model of Torah law.

Since Rabbinic law typically conforms to the paradigm set by Torah law, does the exemption from
positive time-bound commandments extend to rabbinic commandments?

Rabbeinu Tam writes explicitly that women are obligated in rabbinic-level time-bound mitzvot:2

‫שו”ת ספר הישר לרבנו תם סימן ע‬

‫דמ’ ]דמצוות[ עשה דרבנן שוה בכל‬

23
Rabbeinu Tam, Responsa Sefer Ha-yashar 70

For positive rabbinic commandments are equal[ly obligatory] for everyone [man and woman].

Other Tosafists disagree, and maintain that women are exempt from rabbinic-level positive time-
bound mitzvot.

‫תוספות מגילה כד‬

‫לנשים דפטורים ממצות עשה שהזמן גרמא אפילו מאותן שאינן אלא מדרבנן‬

Tosafot Megilla 24a, s.v. Mi She-lo

To women, who are exempt from positive time-bound mitzvot, even from those that are only
rabbinic.

Despite the position of Rabbeinu Tam, the halachic consensus is that women are exempt from
rabbinic-level positive time-bound commandments unless a specific reason is given for
obligation.3

How might this play out in practice? For example, women are usually exempt from the rabbinic
positive time-bound mitzva of reciting the full Hallel. Women are obligated to recite Hallel at
the seder, though. Why? For a special reason – that women were part of the miracle.

Legal Explanation

Why should women be exempt from positive-time bound mitzvot?

The Talmud provides a technical, legalistic explanation for this principle.

.‫קידושין לה‬

24
‫” הוקשה כל התורה‬.‫ אמר קרא “והיה לך לאות על ידך ולזכרון בין עיניך למען תהיה תורת ה’ בפיך‬:‫רב אחא בר יעקב‬
.‫ אף כל מ”ע שהזמן גרמא – נשים פטורות‬,‫ מה תפילין מ”ע שהזמן גרמא ונשים פטורות‬.‫כולה לתפילין‬

Kiddushin 35a

Rav Acha bar Yaakov: The verse states, “and it [tefillin] will be for you for a sign upon your
hand and for a remembrance between your eyes in order that God’s Torah will be in your
mouth” (Shemot 13:9). The entire Torah is made analogous to tefillin. Just as tefillin is a
positive time-bound commandment and women are exempt, so too women are exempt from all
positive time-bound commandments.

The mitzva of tefillin (technically, two mitzvot: one for the head and one for the hand) is positive,
because it entails specific action, and time-bound, because it is prohibited to lay tefillin on Shabbat
or Yom Tov.4 Furthermore, since Shemot 13:9 compares tefillin to the entire Torah, the mitzva
of tefillin is a paradigmatic positive time-bound commandment, from which we can learn about
that entire class of mitzvot. For this reason, women’s exemption from laying tefillin establishes
that women are exempt from positive time-bound commandments in general.

Is women’s exemption from positive time-bound mitzvot an absolute rule?

The mishna phrases women’s exemption from positive time-bound mitzvot as a clear rule. Yet the
Talmud questions its authority, noting exceptions to the rule and acknowledging that rules of this
sort apply only some of the time.

.‫קידושין לד‬

,‫ פריה ורביה‬,‫ תלמוד תורה‬:‫ ותו והרי‬.‫ ונשים חייבות‬,‫ דמצות עשה שהזמן גרמא‬-‫ הקהל‬,‫ שמחה‬,‫ מצה‬:‫וכללא הוא? הרי‬
‫ ואפילו במקום‬,‫ אין למדין מן הכללות‬:‫ אמר רבי יוחנן‬.‫ ונשים פטורות‬,‫ דלאו מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא הוא‬-‫ופדיון הבן‬
.‫שנאמר בו חוץ‬

Kiddushin 34a
And is it a rule? Behold: matza, rejoicing [on a festival], Hakhel [assembly at the end of the
sabbatical year]—which are positive time-bound commandments, and women are obligated.
And further, behold: learning Torah, [the command to] be fruitful and multiply, and redeeming
the first born—which are not positive time-bound commandments, and women are
exempt. Rabbi Yochanan said: We do not learn [definitively] from rules, even in a place where
exceptions are stated.

25
In other words, this rule is by no means absolute. In practice, the Talmud employs various means
to determine a woman’s obligation in a given mitzva, sometimes citing the general exemption from
positive time-bound mitzvot, while often turning to midrash halacha or oral tradition
instead.5 Rambam makes this point:

‫ ז‬:‫פירוש המשניות לרמב”ם קידושין א‬

‫ אבל מצות עשה שהנשים חייבות‬,‫ ואמרו כל רוצה לומר על הרוב‬,‫כבר ידעת שכלל הוא אצלינו אין למדים מן הכללות‬
‫ומה שאינן חייבות בכל הקפן אין להן כלל אלא נמסרים על פה והם דברים מקובלים‬

Rambam, Commentary to the Mishna, Kiddushin 1:7

For we have a rule that we do not learn [Halacha] from rules, and they say “all” to indicate
“for the most part.” But positive mitzvot in which women are or are not obligated, in all of their
scope, do not follow a rule but are transmitted orally and these are received traditions.

According to Rambam, the rule may be more of a rule of thumb than a source for Halacha. This
may explain why the Talmud does not undertake a deeper explanation for it beyond learning from
the tefillin paradigm. To the Talmud, when it applies, exemption from these mitzvot as a group
may simply be a decree of Divine will.

What other conceptual rationales have been suggested to explain the exemption?

Over the centuries, various rabbis have suggested conceptual rationales for women’s exemption.
When a matter is clear, one reason can suffice to explain it. Often, a wide range of proofs for a
matter suggests that we are unsure as to the absolute reason behind it.6 These explanations all have
significance, but none of them is fully authoritative.

Let’s review some of the more prominent explanations, keeping this in mind. Our working
assumption is that these sources reflect the deeply held beliefs of their authors, and are not just
apologetics.

Essentialist Explanation

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Germany, 19th century) suggests that women’s exemption derives
from both essential and practical gender differences:

26
Rav S. R. Hirsch, Commentary to Vayikra 23:43 (Judaica Press translation)

The Torah did not impose these mitzvot on women because it did not consider them necessary
to be demanded from women. All time-bound mitzvot are meant, by symbolic procedures, to
bring certain facts, principles, ideas and resolutions afresh to our minds from time to time to
fortify us to realize them to keep them. God’s Torah takes it for granted that our women have
greater fervor and more faithful enthusiasm for their God-serving calling [than men], and that
this calling runs less danger in their case than in that of men from the temptations which occur
in the course of business and professional life. Accordingly it does not find it necessary to give
women these repeated spurring reminders to remain true to their calling…

For Rav Hirsch, women’s “greater fervor and more faithful enthusiasm” for serving God,” together
with a more sheltered lifestyle than men’s, makes these particular mitzvot unnecessary for women.

At first glance, this argument sounds like an elevation of women’s spirituality above men.
However, Rav Hirsch is not advocating reverse gender bias. How do we know this? Elsewhere,
Rav Hirsch refers to men and women as spiritual equals:7

Rav S. R. Hirsch, 'The Jewish Woman,' Judaism Eternal

While fully appreciating the special and deeply implanted characteristics of the female sex, the
Sages also attribute to it complete spiritual and intellectual equality with the male.

What, then, is his claim? Women and men have complementary roles, and a woman needs less
external prodding, such as that provided by positive time-bound mitzvot, to fulfill her
role.8 Furthermore, men’s professional roles outside the home present risks that these
particular mitzvot help counteract, a process unnecessary for more domestically-oriented women.
Although significant, internal motivation is not the only measure of spirituality.

Are women more religiously enthusiastic than men? What about working women?

Between Husband and Wife

27
Another major school of thought, exemplified by Abudarham’s approach, associates women’s
exemption from these mitzvot even more closely with women’s traditional roles in the home.

‫ספר אבודרהם ברכת המצוות ומשפטיהם‬

‫ ואם היתה מחוייבת‬.‫והטעם שנפטרו הנשים מהמצות עשה שהזמן גרמא לפי שהאשה משועבדת לבעלה לעשות צרכיו‬
‫ ואם תעשה מצות הבורא ותניח‬,‫במצות עשה שהזמן גרמא אפשר שבשעת עשיית המצוה יצוה אותה הבעל לעשות מצותו‬
‫ לפיכך פטרה הבורא ממצותיו כדי להיות‬,‫ ואם תעשה מצותו ותניח מצות הבורא אוי לה מיוצרה‬,‫מצותו אוי לה מבעלה‬
.‫לה שלום עם בעלה‬

Sefer Abudarham, Blessings on Mitzvot and Their Laws

The reason that women were exempted from positive time-bound commandments is because the
woman is subservient to her husband to perform his needs. If she were obligated in positive
time-bound commandments, it is possible that at the time for performing the mitzva the husband
would command her to perform his command, and if she were to perform the command of the
Creator and set aside his [the husband’s] command, woe is to her from her husband. If she were
to perform his [the husband’s] command and set aside the mitzva of the Creator, woe is to her
from He who formed her. Therefore, the Creator exempted her from His commands in order
that she have peace with her husband.

According to Abudarham (Spain, 14th century), the woman is subservient to her husband, so she
is not free to perform positive time-bound commandments. (We will address different perspectives
on the marital relationship in a forthcoming article.) Religious time constraints could create tension
between her obligations to her husband and to God, and so women are exempt in order to
promote shalom bayit, peace at home.

Do time-bound mitzvot really take up that much time?

A Twist

In a sicha (a public discourse) to the women and girls of Chabad, the Lubavitcher Rebbe adds an
interesting twist to this interpretation, which he attributes to Arizal:11

Rav Menachem M. Schneerson 'Address to Convention of N’shei Ubnos Chabad,' 25 Iyar

5744

28
Women are freed from performing mitzvos which are obligatory only at a specific time (e.g.,
tzitzis, which is obligatory only during the day). The AriZal writes concerning such mitzvos:
“When the male performs the mitzvah, it is unnecessary that the woman should also do them
separately, for she has already been included with him at the time when he does the mitzvah…
This is the meaning of our Sages’ statement, ‘One’s wife is as one’s body.’”…In other words,
when Torah frees a woman from certain mitzvos, it frees her only from doing them — so that
she can devote her time and energies to her unique mission. The state of wholeness and
perfection that is attained, and the reward that accrues, from these mitzvos, does pertain to
women also — through her husband performing them.

While Abudarham’s perspective seems to build on a hierarchical view of marriage, Rav

Schneerson embraces complementarity. If men and women work together in complementary ways
to build a Jewish home, then the woman’s exemption does more than facilitate the husband’s
mitzva performance; the husband’s performance of positive time-bound mitzvot represents his
wife.

According to these last explanations, why aren’t unmarried women obligated?

Torah Temima finds a talmudic basis for this question.12 The Talmud (see here) discusses
husband-wife concerns like Abudarham’s with regard to a married woman’s honoring her parents.
There, however, the mishna still obligates the woman fully in the mitzva of honoring her parents;
the Talmud releases married women from some elements of this obligation only when conflict
arises.

According to Abudarham’s approach, why doesn’t the Torah follow a similar model with time-
bound mitzvot? Why not obligate women in general, and exempt married women in situations that
cause conflict?

In line with his approach, Rav Schneerson suggests that a woman’s future husband performs
positive time-bound mitzvot on her behalf. However, this response does not address divorcees,
widows, and women who never marry.13

The answer might be that Halacha often takes a law generated by concern for a particular instance
(here, the married woman) and applies it to a broader class (here, women as a whole), an approach
known as lo pelug.14

Rav Yisrael Zeev Gustman (Lithuania and Israel, 20th century), however, writes that a woman
should not avail herself of the exemption more than necessary:

29
 254 ’‫ עמ‬,‫ קונטרסי שעורים מסכתא קדושין‬,‫רב ישראל גוסטמן‬

‫ונלענ”ד ]ונראה לעניות דעתי[ לחדש להלכה דגם במצות עשה שהזמן גרמא אין לנשים לבטלן בחנם אם לא מפני מצוה‬
…‫עוברת או משום טירחא יתירה‬

Rav Yisrael Gustman, Kuntresei Shiurim, Kiddushin, p.254

In my humble opinion, it seems warranted to rule that even in positive time-bound

commandments, it is not worthy for women to free themselves from these mitzvot if not for some
[other] mitzva [whose time is] passing or because of excessive effort…

Rav Gustman accepts the across-the-board exemption, but seeks to minimize its effects on women
who are at greater liberty. To Rav Gustman, women really should perform positive time-bound
commandments unless there are conflicts or other significant concerns.

Protected Role

Writing in the mid-1970’s, Rav Moshe Feinstein builds on the shalom bayit logic. Rav Moshe
moves the focus from husband to children. He sees child-rearing as a key constraint on women
that leads to exemption from these mitzvot.15

‫מט‬:‫אגרות משה אורח חיים ד‬

‫…סתם נשים בעולם אינם עשירות ועליהן מוטל גידול הילדים והילדות שהיא מלאכה היותר חשובה להשי”ת ]להשם‬
,‫יתברך[ ולהתורה… שגם טבע הנשים מסוגל יותר לגידול הילדים שמצד זה הקל עליהן שלא לחייבן בלמוד התורה‬
‫ שלכן אף אם ישתנה סדור החיים בעולם גם לכל הנשים ולעשירות בכל‬,[‫ובמ”ע שהזמ”ג ]ובמצוות עשה שהזמן גרמא‬
…‫הזמנים ואף כשאפשר למסור הגידול לאיזה אינשי ונשי כבמדינתנו לא נשתנה דין התורה ואף לא דין דרבנן‬

Iggerot Moshe, OC 4:49

30
The average women in the world are not rich and are responsible for raising the boys and girls,
which is the most important labor to God and to the Torah… For the nature of women is also
more suited for child-rearing; therefore, [God] was lenient with them so as not to obligate them
in learning Torah and in positive time-bound commandments. Therefore, even if the order of
life in the world should change for all women, and for the wealthy in all eras, and even when it
is possible to give over the child-rearing to some men and women as in our country, the law of
the Torah has not changed and neither has rabbinic law.

Rav Moshe writes that a woman raising children fulfills a Divine mission, “the most important
labor to God.” According to Rav Moshe, the physical makeup of women attests to this; women are
built to bear children.16 Halacha serves to protect that mission by avoiding piling too many other
responsibilities on a woman’s shoulders. Even in a world like ours, in which “it is possible to give
over the child-rearing” to others, the natural order does not change and Halacha does not change.

A woman may be in a position to choose to focus her energies on other matters, and Halacha
permits that. But the Torah’s basic legislation does not shift to reflect individual life choices.
Elsewhere within this responsum, Rav Moshe notes that Halacha supports individual women who
are genuinely motivated to observe more mitzvot.17 He does not think that means Halacha can or
should change in general.

In an article on women and Judaism, Rabbi Saul Berman takes a similar approach to Rav
Moshe’s:18

Rabbi Saul Berman, 'The Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism,' pp. 16-17

While not demanding adherence to one particular role, it is nevertheless clear that since for
most of our history, our continuation as a people depended upon the voluntary selection by
women of the role of wife-mother-homemaker, the law would and did encourage the exercise of
that choice…. Exemption would be a tool used by the Torah to achieve a particular social goal,
namely to assure that no legal obligation would interfere with the selection by Jewish women of
a role which was centered almost exclusively in the home. However, it is vital to emphasize that
even with these exemptions, the wife-mother-homemaker role is not the mandated, or
exclusively proper role, though it is clearly the preferred and therefore protected role.

What does Rav Berman add to our discussion? While agreeing that the exemption facilitates a
woman’s “preferred and therefore protected role” in the home, Rav Berman emphasizes the
individual woman’s right to choose to what extent her life is centered on domestic activity, as
opposed to more public activity.

31
Rabbanit Malke Bina, Founder and head of Matan, takes this line of thought a step further, leaving
the purpose of protecting a woman’s time to her own choosing:19

Rabbanit Malke Bina, 'Symposium on Women and Jewish Education,' p. 15

I have always believed that women are released from positive time-bound mitzvot in order that
they have more flexibility and more choices.

32
Do we have to

take sides

33
 in this discussion?

Notes

1. Joshua Berman, “Balancing the Bima: The Diaspora Struggle of the Orthodox Feminist,” Midstream (August/September 1990).
2. Halichot Beitah (Petach Ha-Bayit 7, p. 38) cites authorities who argue that Tosafot (Berachot 20b s.v. bitfilla)
understand Rashi ad loc. as maintaining that women are obligated in rabbinic-level time-bound commandments. This is possible,
but by no means clear.
3. Halichot Beitah, Petach Ha-Bayit 7, p. 38. Authorities debate whether women are exempt from other types of positive time-
bound mitzvot, for example mitzvot which can be performed by means of a messenger, mitzvot upon the community,
or mitzvot linked to a negative mitzva.
4. Shulchan Aruch O.C. 31:1.
5. The discussion in Sukka 28b about a woman’s exemption from sleeping in the sukka is a perfect case in point, considering all
three types of proof.
6.

‫תלמוד ירושלמי מסכת ברכות פרק ב ה”ג‬

‫ כל מילא דלא מחוורא מסמכין לה מן אתרין סגי‬:‫דמר רבי יוחנן‬

Talmud Yerushalmi Berachot 2:3

For Rabbi Yochanan said: Any matter that is not clear, they find support for it from many places.
7. Rav S. R. Hirsch, Judaism Eternal, Volume 2, (Surrey: Soncino, 1976), 95.
8. See Yisrael Kashkin, “Rereading Rav Hirsch on Mitzvos and Gender,” Hakirah 18, Winter 2014, pp. 217-233. Available here:
http://www.hakirah.org/Vol18Kashkin.pdf
9. Sylvia Barack Fishman and Daniel Parmer, Matrilineal ASCENT/ Patrilineal DESCENT. (Waltham: Brandeis University, 2008)
Available here.
10. Ibid, p. 69.
11. Available here.
12. Torah Temima Shemot 13, note 42.
13. Rav Menachem M. Schneerson, “Address to Convention of Nshei Ubnos Chabad, 25th Day of Iyar, 5744 (1984).”
14. Another possible direction for a response would be to argue for a distinction between the nature of kibbud av va’em and of
positive time-bound commandments.
15. Rav Schneerson’s sicha does also emphasize child-rearing and shares arguments with the positions we present here. We
presented it in the last section because of its unique view of husband and wife and time-bound mitzvot.
16. See also Berachot 31b.
17.

‫שו”ת אגרות משה אורח חיים חלק ד סימן מט‬

‫איברא דאיכא רשות לכל אשה לקיים אף המצות שלא חייבתן תורה ויש להם מצוה ושכר על קיום מצות אלו‬

Responsa Iggerot Moshe OC 4:49

Indeed, every woman is permitted to fulfill even the mitzvot in which the Torah did not obligate them, and they have a
mitzva and reward for fulfilling these mitzvot.
18. Rav Saul Berman, “The Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism,” Tradition 14:2 (Fall 1973): pp. 5-28. Available here.
19. Rabbanit Malke Bina, “Symposium on Women and Jewish Education,” Tradition 28:3 (Spring 1994): p. 15.

34
 The Gendered Rhetoric of Sukkah Observance

Marjorie Lehman writes:12

12
The Jewish Quarterly Review , Summer, 2006, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 309-335

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
 A Woman’s Place Is in the Sukkah

Allisson Kaplan Sommer writes:13

Nobody intentionally set out to make Sukkot and Simchat Torah feminist holidays. Yet, slowly
but surely, these two Jewish festivals have evolved into a time of year when the envelope is pushed
when it comes to women’s participation, even in Orthodox communities in which egalitarian
practice isn’t easily accepted. Over the past four years, the changes picked up speed in Israel and
the Diaspora as the awareness of the phenomenon of “exclusion of women” has heightened,
inspiring many to push back against it at this time of year. On Sukkot, more and more women are
buying and using Sukkot objects like the lulav and etrog, and helping to build and spending time
in the Sukkah. On Simchat Torah reading from and celebratory dancing with the Torah on the
holiday that celebrates the sacred scroll, and reading from it has become something that even
women in very traditional communities are not willing to forgo.

This change has spurred a spirit of innovation. Want to buy Simchat Torah flags that show pictures
of adult women dancing and celebrating with the Torah together with their families? Since 2012,
the Israeli Masorti movement has been producing and marketing thousands of such flags and
selling them with great success, offering an alternative to the traditional flags produced by Israeli
manufacturers limited to images of men and young children for fear of offending ultra-Orthodox
sensibilities. Feel the need to symbolically welcome the legacies of great learned women into your
sukkah as guests in addition to the usual array of the male bearded rabbis? Thanks to the Jewish

13
https://forward.com/life/321607/a-womans-place-is-in-the-sukkah/

48
Orthodox Feminist Alliance, there are now posters of learned women to hang up in the Sukkah
alongside the men, after a Kickstarter program last year proved that there was enough demand to
sustain their manufacture as well.

Historically, notes feminist scholar and former JOFA executive director Dr. Elana Sztokman,
Simchat Torah, together with Purim were the two holidays that the early women’s tefilla
movement in the 1990’s latched onto because these were considered exceptional times of the year,
and it was easier to convince women that it would be acceptable to read from the Megilla and the
Torah. Simchat Torah became the most influential of the two, she says, because “I think that
reading from the Torah has been the most impassioned area of empowerment for Orthodox
women.”

Sztokman’s major step on her personal feminist journey took place the first time she read from the
Torah on Simchat Torah. “It was an entry drug, those Torah readings … My father was a Torah
reader and a chazan, so for me, reading from the Torah was the pinnacle of participation. Once
you learn to read Torah, you never look at the text the same way again … Reading from the Torah
gives you a real connection. It altered everything for me - it changed my relationship to being
Jewish - you are standing at the center, you own the tradition and the heritage. You can’t go back.”

Rabba Melanie Landau, a graduate of Yeshiva Maharat believes that one reason women are
introducing change on these holidays is that both Sukkot and Simchat Torah are “democratizing”
festivals - where the doors are open to all. It is a time “ where you find a dynamic of freedom and
exceptionality” and “any opportunity that opens things up is a powerful opportunity for change.”

In addition, she says, the fun factor plays a major role. Following the serious and somber
contemplation of Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur - the hands-on pleasures of Sukkot and the
exhilarating celebration of the Torah on Simchat Torah, are about pure unfettered joy. And
everyone - male and female - wants to be part of that.

Also, Sztokman asserts that ironically, change often happens when sexism and strict gender roles
are so obvious they force women to pay attention to them - and that is the first step to change.

“On Simchat Torah, when you go to a synagogue and you see men being wildly active and involved
with the Torah, dancing with the Torah and enjoying it - and you look at the women sitting around
gossiping and utterly disconnected from what is happening, the contrast is too huge to ignore. That
spurs change.”

Indeed, as Sukkot approaches, Internet forums for Orthodox women buzz as participants compare
notes as to which synagogues welcome women dancing and reading on Simchat Torah, and which
ones forbid it, and many attend a different synagogue than they normally do on Shabbat in order
to participate in festivities.

On one, a woman posted that she was disgusted that after women in her community put pressure
on the rabbi on the synagogue, he agreed to “allow” them to handle a Torah, but only if they were
married and fully covered their heads - and were dressed in non-cleavage-revealing shirts with
long sleeves and long skirts, while no such detailed requirements were in place for men to dance

49
with the Torah. Other women said she should consider herself lucky - they reported that, after
being told by their synagogue that they could not dance with a Torah because some members were
“uncomfortable” with the concept - they had decided to dance independently with a Torah they
had acquired themselves in a park.

Beyond the Orthodox community - in secular Israel - the burgeoning spirit of egalitarian
participation in these holidays isn’t merely symbolic, but very real and public. For three years, in
the Tel Aviv Port, where a giant sukkah has been erected by the Beit Tefilah Israeli community.
Beit Tefilah is internationally renowned for their popular Shabbat singing services at the Tel Aviv
Port. The massive Sukkah they create seats 500 people, and it is very different than the typical
public municipal sukkahs that usually stand in city centers in Israel which have a traditional
Orthodox orientation and are often sponsored by organizations like Chabad.

Inside the Tel Aviv port sukkah, daily egalitarian musical holiday prayer services with full
participation by both genders is held, along with other activities - stories and arts and crafts for
children, Israeli dance, yoga, lectures and films, and a one day conference of Jewish learning
bringing together all of the Jewish renewal organizations in Israel. At the port, both men and
women fully participate in the Sukkah rituals, as they do in the Simchat Torah celebrations that
follow dancing with and around the Torah in what is known as “hakafot.”

“I noticed when we first started doing the hakafot in the port, that the Torah kept moving from
male to male, even though we had no mechitza, no barrier between men and women - even secular
people had this paradigm in the back of their minds - that it should be men holding it,” says Rani
Jaeger chairman and co-founder of Beit Tefilah Israeli. “So last year I started grabbing the Torah
and giving it to women. I made a point of giving it to older, even elderly women who I knew had
probably never touched a Torah - and they loved it and never let it go.”

Jaeger points out that because the massive sukkah at the port is a “kosher” sukkah, meeting the
physical requirements for observant Jews, over the course of the holiday it draws all kinds of
visitors and Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox in the area use it for eating and praying, despite the fact
that it was not built by Orthodox Jews. “This offers an opportunity for interesting dialogue that
rarely happens. I mean, how often do you get ultra-Orthodox in a Reform synagogue, right? While
they aren’t joining in our service, they do their own thing, they definitely watching and learning -
they open our prayer books and ask questions.”

He believes Sukkot it is the appropriate time for such interaction, “The spirit of Sukkot is all about
welcoming, opening up. Sukkot is a happy moment in Judaism and one that calls for a breaking of
barriers between people. Sukkot is a holiday that lends itself to change and innovation. You can
also see it on Purim, but in a different way. Purim is a holiday when you are breaking everything
down just for the sake of doing it - you are turning everything upside down just for fun. But on
Simchat Torah, you are expanding the borders of practice and you do it for the sake of something
that is more meaningful. You expand them for Torah.”

50
Judith Raskin writes:14

According to halakhah, women are responsible for obeying all of Judaism’s negative
commandments and for observing most of the positive ones, including the Sabbath and the Jewish
year’s festivals and holy days. In some instances, however, male and female obligations on these
days differ, and female exemption from certain positive precepts cannot be explained solely on the
grounds of domestic duties.

These exclusions must be seen as conforming to a larger agenda in rabbinic legislation to restrict
female participation in public communal activities as much as possible. Yet it is also important to
notice the ways in which Talmudic legislation specifically includes women in time-bound religious
obligations connected with festival observance.

According to the halakhah, women are exempt from the two central mitzvot of the eight-day
autumn harvest festival of Sukkot because these commandments are considered time-bound.

These commandments comprise dwelling in the sukkah and waving the four agricultural species
that make up the lulav (palm, myrtle [hadas] and willow [aravah]) and etrog (citron) during
festival worship (Orah Hayyim 640:1 and 658:9).

However, women may choose to fulfill both precepts (Halikhot Betah 22:5, 9). The Kizzur Shulhan
Arukh, in fact, assumes that women will be present in the sukkah to hear the kiddush (135:6) and
counsels a man to “make a sukkah fit for the habitation of himself and his wife, just as he lives the
entire year, if possible” (Kizzur Shulhan Arukh 135:8).

It also advises that marital intimacy may take place in the sukkah (135:2) and rules that women
are permitted to repeat the benediction “To sit in the sukkah,” even though they are exempt from
the obligation to do so (135:15).

Women, like men, must not work during hol ha-moed, the intermediate days of Sukkot
and Pesah (Orah Hayyim 530).

14
https://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/festivals-and-holy-days

51
 Absentees Landscapes and the Eternal Sukkah at Rum 46, Aarhus15

Queen of the Sukkah

KAREN MILLER JACKSON WRITES:16

15

Absentees Landscapes & Eternal Sukkah Documents in the frame of “Room for Improved Futures” curated by Agnieszka
Wołodźko and Grete Aagaard. Presentation of video materials, prints, documents and a “Sukkah Lamp”. for more info on the
projects: http://sala-manca.net/?p=1211 http://sala-manca.net/?cat=274
16
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/queen-of-the-sukkah/

52
There are many faces of Orthodox Feminism in Israel. One might highlight the plight of agunot,
another women’s leadership in the beit midrash or in shul and still others increasing women’s
participation in mitzvot. What unites these faces is their desire to participate, to be considered and
to be a real member of the community. Every woman and every act has significance.

Take the mitzvah of “sitting in the sukkah.” Women are halachically exempt from sitting in the
sukkah, but are permitted to fulfill it voluntarily. The Talmud, in Masechet Sukkah, teaches that
women have been sitting in the sukkah as far back as tannaitic times. The famous wealthy queen
Helene, a convert, is known to have had a grand sukkah frequented by the rabbis.

Queen Helene’s sukkah is mentioned as proof by Rebbe Yehuda that a sukkah can be more that
20 cubits high. His opinion is not accepted, but the mention of Helene’s sukkah leaves me with
some valuable lessons about women’s participation in mitzvot.

There is irony in the fact that Queen Helene may have been considered exempt from the mitzvah
and yet because she took it upon herself to build a sukkah she was eternalized by the Talmud. She
was considered “einah metzuve ve’oseh,” she took on a mitzvah voluntarily even if her reward was
not as great as one who is commanded. Moreover, her sukkah was frequented by the rabbis, who
did not comment on the sukkah’s validity, implying that they considered it halachically valid.
Helene Hamalka is an ancient role model for women and mitzvot. She took on this voluntary
mitzvah and this act contributed to the halachic decision process. She may have been exempt, but
by taking on the mitzvah of sukkah she made her fulfillment count.

The most famous case of women taking on a voluntary mitzvah is the mitzvah of Shofar. Like
Sukkah, women are exempt from the mitzvah of Shofar, according to the Talmud. But as women
as a group have historically made the commitment to fulfill this mitzvah, the communal
expectation and rabbinic opinion has shifted. Some halachic authorities write that women have
obligated themselves in the mitzvah of Shofar.

53
There is a similar process happening today in two other areas. Over the past few years, more and
more women have taken on the mitzvah of reciting kaddish. Given that most women don’t attend
weekday minyan regularly, it takes tremendous commitment, perseverance and courage for a
woman to raise her voice and recite kaddish, sometimes in front of hundreds of community
members. But as the number of women reciting kaddish goes up so does the general community’s
tolerance and respect for the women saying it. Each woman who says kaddish contributes to the
positive perception and acceptance of women saying kaddish and inspires others to take on this
mitzvah as well.

This is also true for religious girls and army service. As the numbers of girls choosing to go to the
army grows, so does the dati leumi community’s attitude change positively. Five years ago there
were much louder rabbinic voices discouraging girls to choose this path. Today, there is significant
rabbinic support and encouragement for girls who choose the army. The girls themselves changed
the view of army service in the religious community.

Helene Hamalka is an ancient role model for taking on voluntary mitzvot and infusing them with
value. Today, there are many inspiring men and women advocating for agunot and victims of
abuse, leading women’s batei midrash, fighting for equality in girls’ education, guiding religious
women in the army, and much more. These special faces will be gathering in Jerusalem on October
18 for the Kolech conference, will you add your face to their inspiring work and activism?

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