Republic of the Philippines it was taken from him by his older brother, Tan Ban Yong, the
SUPREME COURT private respondent herein.
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 106251 November 19, 1993
CHIAO LIONG TAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON MANUEL T.
MURO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 54 and TAN
BAN YONG, respondents.
Joaquin M. Arao for petitioner.
Macavinta & Sta. Ana Law Offices for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Petitioner seeks in this petition the reversal of the Court of Appeals'
decision dated May 15, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 29982 affirming the
unfavorable decision of the trial court 1 in his suit for replevin and
damages.
Petitioner Chiao Liong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor
vehicle, particularly described as Isuzu Elf van, 1976 Model with
Motor No. 44999-2 and Chassis No. 9646780 which he purchased in
March, 1987. As owner thereof, petitioner says he has been in
possession, enjoyment and utilization of the said motor vehicle until
Petitioner relies principally on the fact that the Isuzu Elf van is
registered in his name under Certificate of Registration No. 1501909.
He claims in his testimony before the trial court that the said vehicle
was purchased from Balintawak Isuzu Motor Center for a price of
over P100,000.00; that he sent his brother to pay for the van and
the receipt for payment was placed in his (petitioner's) name
because it was his money that was used to pay for the vehicle; that
he allowed his brother to use the van because the latter was working
for his company, the CLT Industries; and that his brother later
refused to return the van to him and appropriated the same for
himself.
On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT Industries is
a family business that was placed in petitioner's name because at
that time he was then leaving for the United States and petitioner is
the remaining Filipino in the family residing in the Philippines. When
the family business needed a vehicle in 1987 for use in the delivery
of machinery to its customers, he asked petitioner to look for a
vehicle and gave him the amount of P5,000.00 to be deposited as
down payment for an Isuzu Elf Van which would be available in
about a month. After a month, he himself paid the whole price out of
a loan of P140,000.00 which he obtained from his friend Tan Pit Sin.
Inasmuch as the receipt for the downpayment was placed in the
name of petitioner and since he was still on good terms with him,
private respondent allowed the registration of the vehicle in
petitioner's name. It was also their understanding that he would
keep the van for himself because CLT Industries was not in a
position to pay him. Hence, from the time of the purchase, he had
been in possession of the vehicle including the original registration
papers thereof, but allowing petitioner from time to time to use the
van for deliveries of machinery.
Tan Pit Sin who had known private respondent since 1968, not only
because they were classmates but also because of their business
dealings with each other, confirmed that private respondent
borrowed from him P140,000.00 in March, 1987 to buy an Isuzu Elf
van. In fact, he had borrowed said vehicle for a few times.
Gina Lu, an employee of the Balintawak Isuzu Motors, testified that
private respondent paid the balance of the purchase price of the
Isuzu Elf van in the amount of P133,000.00 but the receipt was
issued in the name of Chiao Liong Tan to make the records
consistent because it was the latter who made the deposit of
P5,000.00. Thereafter, the Isuzu Elf van was released to him.
After hearing, the trial court found for private respondent. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring defendant Tan Ban Yong to be the owner
of and entitled to the possession of the vehicle
described in par. 2 of the Complaint, and the
plaintiff is hereby ordered to deliver possession
thereof to the said defendant or in the alternative if
such delivery cannot be made, to the sum of
P138,000.00 as the value of the vehicle taking into
account the depreciation of the vehicle but offset by
the inflation rate; in either alternative, plaintiff is
also ordered to pay to said defendant consequential
damages of P20,000.00 for the latter having been
deprived of the possession and use of the vehicle
and to pay the costs. All amounts adjudged herein,
except costs, shall bear interest at the legal rate
from the date of this decision, until delivery of the
vehicle or the alternative payment of the value
thereof as well as payment of consequential
damages is paid; the interest applies to the value of
the vehicle if return thereof is delayed. No cost. 2
Finding no merit in the appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Undaunted by his successive
failures, petitioner comes to us and raised the following error
allegedly committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
1. . . . in finding the testimonies of private
respondent's witnesses credible;
2. . . . in disregarding the Certificate of Registration
of the subject motor vehicle as proof of ownership
by the petitioner-appellant. 3
Since the Court of Appeals merely affirmed the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses that testified before it,
petitioner is in effect questioning the factual findings of said court
and its appraisal of their testimony which this Court cannot review,
its jurisdiction being limited to questions of law. The considerable
weight given to the findings of the trial court is not without any
reason. It had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
which is usually not reflected in the transcript of records. The
profundity of the conclusions thus reached is just the result of such
observance. When the Court of Appeals affirmed said findings, it
goes to show that no misapprehension of facts was committed as
said Court has the power to scrutinize said factual findings under
existing rules of procedure.
In concluding that the testimonies of Tan Ban Yong, Tan Pit Sin and
Gina Lu cast doubt on the petitioner's ownership of the motor vehicle
in question, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals attached
significance to their respective interlocking accounts on how the
motor vehicle was acquired, complete with the financing source and
mode of repayment. Respondent Tan Ban Yong's declaration that he
borrowed P140,000.00 from Tan Pit Sin and paid the balance of the
purchase price of the motor vehicle himself to Gina Lu of the
Balintawak Isuzu Motors, is corroborated by the above-mentioned
persons themselves. Tan Pit Sin not only confirmed the loan but also
stated that the same was paid in three (3) months; P50,000.00 on
the first payment; another P50,000.00 on the second payment and
P40,000.00 on the last payment. 4 Gina Lu, who testified at the
instance of petitioner, declared that the downpayment of P5,000.00
was paid by petitioner and so the receipt for the same was issued in
his name but the balance of P133,000.00 was paid by private
respondent and to make the record consistent, she issued the
receipt in the name of petitioner again.
In contrast to the clear and categorical averments of private
respondent and the witnesses in this case negating petitioner's
ownership of the motor vehicle in question, petitioner's averments
before the trial court and this Court are not only disparate but
conflicting. In his testimony below, petitioner averred that he used
his own money to purchase the motor vehicle by paying the sum of
P100,000.00, 5 which testimony is negated by his admission on page
5 of his petition 6 before this Court that private respondent borrowed
money from Tan Pit Sin with which to purchase the subject motor
vehicle. Then, in his pleading before the court below, particularly in
his reply to the answer of private respondent, petitioner alleged that
the motor vehicle was intended for his exclusive use and not to
service the family business. 7 And yet , in his petition before this
Court, he claimed that the subject motor vehicle was purchased for
CLT Industries, which he solely owned and accordingly, registered in
the latter's name. 8 On top of these entangled averments, petitioner
did not have in his possession the Certificate of Registration of the
motor vehicle and the official receipt of payment for the same,
thereby lending credence to the claim of private respondent who has
possession thereof, that he owns the subject motor vehicle.
A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle in one's name indeed
creates a strong presumption of ownership. For all practical
purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually
the owner thereof unless proved otherwise. In other words, such
presumption is rebuttable by competent proof.
The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trust other than
those enumerated therein. 9 Thus, although no specific provision
could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it is undeniable that an
implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the
motor vehicle was placed in the name of the petitioner although the
price thereof was not paid by him but by private respondent. The
principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his
name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration is one
of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust, which derives its
strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially
between brothers, does not lose that character simply because of
what appears in a legal document.
Even under the Torrens System of land registration, this Court in
some instances did away with the irrevocability or indefeasibility of a
certificate of title to prevent injustice against the rightful owner of
the property. 10
It is true that the judgment 11 in a replevin suit must only resolve in
whom is the right of possession. Primarily, the action of replevin is
possessory in character and determined nothing more than the right
of possession. However, when the title to the property is distinctly
put in issue by the defendant's plea and by reason of the policy to
settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the
possession of the property in controversy, the question of ownership
may be resolved in the same proceeding.
Procedure-wise, the Court observes that the action by petitioner as
plaintiff in the trial court was only one for Replevin and Damages.
Since replevin is only a provisional remedy where the replevin replevied property or secure a judgment for the value of the
plaintiff claims immediate delivery of personal property pending the property in case the adjudged return thereof could not be had.
judgment of the trial court in a principal case, 12 the petitioner Appropriately, the trial court rendered an alternative judgment.
should have filed in the trial court as a main case an action to
recover possession of the Isuzu Elf van which was in the possession WHEREFORE, the questioned decision being in accordance with the
of the private respondent. Logically, the basis of petitioner's cause of law, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for lack of
action should have been his ownership of said van.In the State of merit.
California, from whose Code of Procedure 13 we copied our rule on
replevin, their old replevin rule which allowed the immediate delivery SO ORDERED.
of the chattel at the commencement of the action upon application
with bond by the replevin plaintiff had already been struck down as
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
early as July 1, 1971 in the case of Blair v. Pitchess. 14 As in fact, on
June 12, 1972 when the United States Supreme Court struck down
as unconstitutional the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes in Puno, J., took no part.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 15 most of the states, on their own, changed their
replevin statutes to include a mandatory preliminary hearing before
the writ could be issued, similar to our mandatory preliminary
hearing before the writ of preliminary injunction can be issued. 16

If that had been the case in this jurisdiction, then the trial judge
would have discovered right away at the preliminary hearing that
private respondent should have immediately staked his claim of
ownership and that would have created serious doubts about
petitioner's claim of ownership. Most likely, the writ would not have
been issued and the complaint would have been dismissed motu
proprio by the trial court upon the discovery that the petitioner did
not have a principal case therein. As it is, the complaint proceeded
its course to the detriment of private respondent.

Finally, although a "replevin" action is primarily one for the

possession of personality, yet it is sufficiently flexible to authorize a
settlement of all equities between the parties, arising from or
growing out of the main controversy. 17 Thus, in an action for
replevin where the defendant is adjudged entitled to possession, he
need not go to another forum to procure relief for the return of the
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000]
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of
ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA,
respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
. failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the
For review is the decision 1[1] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by
herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order
to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court
of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners’ (a) Motion
to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as
well as (b) petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a
Writ of replevin..2[2] Â h Y
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement
Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles,
described as follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded
with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet
of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75,
being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a
certain] Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with
one thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety
seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced
lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one
Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain]
Manuela Babalcon. …".3[3]
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles,
apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load
of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and
Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources)
Office in Catbalogan..4[4] Seizure receipts were issued but the
drivers refused to accept the receipts..5[5] Felipe Calub, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the
Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against
Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68
[78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.6[6] MisÓ sc
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by
Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting
DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave
coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however,
dismissed by the Public Prosecutor..7[7]
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number
FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-
CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd
Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again
loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47
board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal
complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and
several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section
68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order
277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code..8[8]
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and
Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But
note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished
the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action
may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible
for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was
Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut
timber be loaded on it..9[9]
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the
vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded
vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners
before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application
for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated
April 24, 1992..10[10] Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was
denied by the trial court.11[11]
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the
present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary
Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent
RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for
replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or
attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products seized
from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest
products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from
deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the
direct order of the Supreme Court..12[12] In a Resolution issued on
September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent
appellate court for appropriate disposition..13[13]
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack
of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant
to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said
conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such
authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized
representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally
obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose
is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws,
regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court.
The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such
regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines
in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in
the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D.
No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277..14[14]
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners
failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of
the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the
owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and
recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’ failure to
comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order
No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of
petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior
to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit.
Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the
appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in
custodia legis..15[15]
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners’
claim that private respondents’ complaint for replevin is a suit
against the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield
themselves under the principle of state immunity as the property
sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not yet been lawfully
adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according
to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability
nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It
reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or
beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit
against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally
seizing or withholding the possession of the property of
another..16[16]
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners
based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and
held in custody because they were contradicted by its own
findings..17[17] Their petition was found without merit.18[18] RtcÓ
spped
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.19[19]
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE
PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO.
705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES
NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA
LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE
FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN
CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE
DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D.
NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST
THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE
STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate
number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against
the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all
conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of
Section 78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting
Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. –
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forestland,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code…slxä mis
The Court shall further order the confiscation in
favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and
punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as
prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products
at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing
authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was
duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of
the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the
persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by
the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances
used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the
Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the
same Code. They read as follows: Scä
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the
Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases
of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules
and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and
all conveyances used either by land, water or air in
the commission of the offense and to dispose of the
same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations
or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A
forest officer or employee of the Bureau
[Department] or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest
 even without warrant any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of
the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also
seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government,
the tools and equipment used in committing the
offense... [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990,
implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and
Forfeiture. -- All conveyances used in the transport
of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally
whether or not covered with transport documents,
found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec.
68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in
favor of the government or disposed of in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. --
The Secretary or his duly authorized representative
such as the forest officers and/or natural resources
officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are
authorized to seize said conveyances subject to
policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized
military personnel and officials of other agencies
apprehending illegal logs and other forest products
and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR
field offices, and turn over said forest products and
conveyances for proper action and disposition. In
case where the apprehension is made by DENR field
officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the
nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may
be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient
and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being
transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to
or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the
involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and
89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Slxsä c
Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure
outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was
justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the
seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the
vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and
Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the
impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again,
when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded
for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report
the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the
owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went
to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles
and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of
the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a
confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be
effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the
seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles
were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process and considered in the custody of the law, and not
otherwise..20[20]
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-
1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to
be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property
were already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry
laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the government by
order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in
custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property
already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action
should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by
way of partial Sheriff’s Return, and wait for the judge’s instructions
on the proper procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot
be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff
Magumun, we elucidated further:
". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used
by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel
earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution.
Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the
sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution
of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure
and forfeiture proceedings could easily be
undermined by the simple devise of a writ of
replevin...".21[21] ScslxÓ
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession
of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a
suit against the State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued
without its consent..22[22] And a suit against a public officer for his
official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to
hold the State ultimately liable..23[23] However, the protection
afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to
activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without
willfulness, malice or corruption.24[24] In the present case, the acts
for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question
are clearly official in nature.25[25] In implementing and enforcing
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure
carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as
officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority.
There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit
against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the
State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office
of the Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners
concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to
recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible,
even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting
a claim, by a motion to dismiss..26[26] If not invoked at the proper
time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the
court could take cognizance of the case and try it.27[27] Mesmä

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued
in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of
the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take
possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143,
for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by
petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable
Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all
persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised
Forestry Code.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,

concur. CalrkyÓ
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116192 November 16, 1995
EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 32263 1 reversing the decision of
the regional trial court, as well as its resolution of June 29, 1994
denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are assailed in
this petition for review on certiorari.
This case originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages
filed by herein private respondent Generosa S. Cruz, as plaintiff,
against herein petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as defendant, in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil
Case No. 899, which complaint alleges these material facts:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 2-A of the subd. plan, Psd-
03-0345 being a portion of Lot 2, covered by TCT
No. T-147219, located at Bo. Mabuco, Hermosa,
Bataan, containing as area of 280 square meters,
xerox copy of the title is hereto attached as Annex
"A" hereof and for taxation purposes, the same is
declared in the name of the plaintiff, xerox copy of
the tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B"
of this complaint;
3. That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by
the family of Atty. Gonzalo Nuguid but the same is
being used and occupied by the defendant where a
house was constructed thereon;
4. That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of
her lot herein mentioned, it was found out by the
Geodetic Engineer that the defendant is encroaching
on her lot for about 71 square meters, copy of the
relocation sketch by said surveyor is hereto attached
as Annex "C" hereof;
5. That when the plaintiff talked to the defendant
that she would like to remove the old fence so that
she could construct a new fence which will cover the
true area of her property, the defendant vehemently
refused to let the plaintiff remov(e) the said fence
and menacingly alleged that if plaintiff remove(d)
the said fence to construct a new one, she would
take action against the plaintiff legally or otherwise;
6. For fear that plaintiff may be charged in court
should she insist on removing the fence encroaching
on her property, plaintiff now seeks judicial relief;
 7. That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the
Katarungang Pambarangay of Mabuco for
settlement, however, the efforts of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa turned futile, as evidenced by a
certification to file action issued by the Lupon
secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman, copy
of the certification to file action is hereto attached as
Annex "D" hereof;
8. Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid
court litigation because she is poor but nevertheless
she consulted the undersigned counsel and a
demand letter was sent to the defendant for
conference and/or settlement but the defendant
stood pat that she will not allow the removal of the
fence, thus depriving the plaintiff of the use and
possession of the said portion of her lot (71 square
meters) which is being occupied by the defendant
for several years, xerox copy of the demand letter is
hereto attached as Annex "E" of this complaint;
9. That by virtue of the willful refusal of the
defendant to allow the plaintiff to have the fence
dismantled and/or to be removed, the plaintiff is
deprived of the possession and she was forced to
hire the services of counsel for which she contracted
to pay the sum of P2,000.00 plus acceptance of
P1,000.00 until the termination of this case before
this Honorable Court. 2
xxx xxx xxx
On January 21, 1993, the trial court, on motion, issued an order
giving the defendant to file her answer to the complaint. 3 This was
opposed by the plaintiff therein on the ground that Section 15(e) of
the Rule on Summary Procedure does not allow the filing of motion
for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other papers.
4
Nonetheless, defendant filed on January 29, 1993 her "Answer with
Motion to Dismiss." 5 Plaintiff filed and ex-parte motion reiterating
her contention that the filing by defendant of her aforesaid answer
with motion was barred for reason that her preceding motion for
extension of time to file an answer is a prohibited pleading. 6 On
February 4, 1993, the trial court, finding merit in plaintiff's ex-parte
motion, ordered that defendant's answer be stricken from the
records for having been filed out of time. 7 The case was then
submitted for decision.
On February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision with the
following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering
the latter:
1. To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by
the defendant and allowing the plaintiff to remove
the old fence permanently and (to) make the
necessary enclosure of the area pertaining to the
herein plaintiff containing an area of 280 square
meters, more or less;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1,500.00 as attorney's fees. No
pronouncement as to damages;
3. To pay the cost(s) of this suit. 8 (Corrections in
parentheses supplied.)
Defendant filed a motion for the reconsideration of said judgment,
but the same was denied by the trial court for lack of merit in its
order dated March 2, 1993. 9
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch
5, in Civil Case No DH-121-93, defendant assailed the jurisdiction of
the court a quo. On June 21, 1993, said lower appellate court
rendered judgment, stating in part as follows:
A perusal of the records of the case and the
memorandum of appeal of the adversaries led this
court to the opinion that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the
instant appealed case based on (the) reason that
the said case should be one of question of
ownership or accion rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that
of forcible entry as the(re) was no allegation of prior
possession by the plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as
required by law and jurisprudence. Absence of
allegations and proof by the plaintiff in forcible entry
case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic)
cannot be said that defendant dispossesses her of
the same, thus, the legal remedy sought by the
plaintiff is not the proper one as it should have been
accion publiciana or accion rei(vin)dicatoria, as the
case may be, and the forum of which is the Regional
Trial Court.
This Court declines to venture into other issues
raised by the defendant/appellant considering that
the resolution on jurisdiction renders the same moot
and academic. 10 (Corrections in parentheses ours.)
Therein plaintiffs motion for reconsideration having been denied in
said lower court's order dated August 12, 1993, 11 she elevated the
case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on
certiorari, purportedly on pure questions of law. This Court, treating
the petition as a special civil action for certiorari, referred the case to
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and
disposition pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 12
On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in
CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 13 reversing the decision of the regional trial
court and reinstating that of the municipal circuit trial court, hence
the present petition.
The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of
origin had jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Well-settled is the
rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the
action, are determined by the averments in the complaint. 14
Accordingly, the issue in the instant case can only be properly
resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.
A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by
herein private respondent reveals that the action is neither one of
forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a
boundary dispute which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria
on the issue of ownership over the disputed 71 square meters
involved.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions
defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry,
one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful
detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entity, the possession is
illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has
the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession
was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession. 15
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's
entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may
be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible
entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which
must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand. 16
In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein
petitioner's alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same
was legal or illegal. It does not state how petitioner entered upon
the land and constructed the house and the fence thereon. It is also
silent on whether petitioner's possession became legal before private
respondent made a demand on her to remove the fence. The
complaint merely avers that the lot being occupied by petitioner is
owned by a third person, not a party to the case, and that said lot is
enclosed by a fence which private respondent claims is an
encroachment on the adjacent lot belonging to her.
Furthermore, it is also alleged and admitted in the complaint that the
said fence was already in existence on that lot at the time private
respondent bought her own lot and it was only after a relocation
survey was made that it was found out that petitioner is allegedly
encroaching on the lot of the former. Consequently, there is here no
contract, express or implied, between petitioner and private
respondent as would qualify it as a case of unlawful detainer.
Neither was it alleged that the possession of the disputed portion of
said lot was acquired by petitioner through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry.
Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner's
possession of the controverted portion was by mere tolerance since
that fact was never alleged in the former's basic complaint, and this
argument was raised in her later pleadings more as an afterthought.
Also, it would be absurd to argue that private respondent tolerated a
state of affairs of which she was not even then aware. Finally, to
categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer,
plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. 17
Indeed, and this was definitely not the situation that obtained in and
gave rise to the ejectment suit, to hold otherwise would espouse a
dangerous doctrine, for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the
land is an open challenge to the right of the lawful possessor, the
violation of which right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior
court provided for in the Rules. If a period of one year from the
forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy
ceases to be speedy and the aggrieved possessor is deemed to have
waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a
forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of
a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of
forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance
to prevent prescription from setting in — and summarily throw him
out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable, especially if we
bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year
time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action. 18
To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant
or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these On the foregoing premises and with these conclusions, it is
proceedings are summary in nature. 19 The complaint must show unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the petition at
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to bar.
parol testimony. 20
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the judgment
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 is hereby
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court
or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. DH-121-93 is
effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at REINSTATED, without pronouncement as to costs.
bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial SO ORDERED.
court. 21
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of
this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of Francisco, J., is on leave.
possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim
before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is
the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested
from another who had been in the physical or material possession of
the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action
for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof
was not obtained through the means or held under the
circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.

We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry

and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the
person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of a
controverted proprietary right, the law requires the parties to
preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to invoke the
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of
ownership. 22
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002]
TERESITA BONGATO, Petitioner, v. Spouses SEVERO A. MALVAR
and TRINIDAD MALVAR, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is summary in
nature. It is designed to recover physical possession in speedy
proceedings that are restrictive in nature, scope and time limits. The
one-year bar within which to bring the suit is prescribed to
complement its summary nature. Thus, after the one-year period has
lapsed, plaintiffs can no longer avail themselves of the summary
proceedings in the municipal trial court but must litigate, in the
normal course, in the regional trial court in an ordinary action to
recover possession, or to recover both ownership and possession.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the December 16, 1998 Decision[1 and the
September 1, 1999 Resolution[2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR SP No. 34204. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.[3
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The CA sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Butuan City (Branch 4), which had disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby affirms
the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2 penned
by the Honorable Santos Rod. Cedro and the Writ of Execution
issued on the 24th day of August 1993 upon order of the Honorable
Rosarito F. Dabalos (Record, p. 42, Folio II) can now be served on
the defendant.[4
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the Court of
Appeals as follows:
The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible
entry against petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that petitioner
Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-
16200 belonging to the said spouses and erected thereon a house of
light materials. The petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to
file an answer which the MTCC denied; it being proscribed under the
Rule on Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of
hearing. With a new counsel, Atty. Viador C. Viajar, petitioner filed
an answer which the MTCC disregarded, the same having been filed
beyond the ten-day reglementary period. Later, with still another
counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorneys Office,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss which the MTCC denied as being
contrary to the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to
vacate the land in question, and to pay rentals, attorneys fees, and
the costs of the suit. The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC
judge. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
On March 4, 1994, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
motion for reconsideration only insofar as to determine the location
of the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know
whether they are located on one and the same lot or a lot different
from that involved in the criminal case for Anti-Squatting. In the
same order, respondent Judge disallowed any extension and warned
that if the survey is not made, the court might consider the same
abandoned and the writ of execution would be issued.
The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed
by private respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato. The case
is still pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City.
On March 28, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for extension of the
March 29, 1994 deadline for the submission of the relocation survey
and to move the deadline to April 15, 1994, as the engineer
concerned, Engr. Lumarda, could not conduct his survey during the
Holy Week, he being a lay minister and parish council member.
On April 7, 1994, respondent Judge noted that no survey report was
submitted and ordered the record of the case returned to the court
of origin for disposal.[5 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the lot referred to in the present controversy was
different from that involved in the anti-squatting case.[6 It further
ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction,
and that it did not err in rejecting petitioners Motion to Dismiss. The
appellate court reasoned that the MTCC had passed upon the issue
of ownership of the property merely to determine possession -- an
action that did not oust the latter of its jurisdiction.[7
Unsatisfied with the CA Decision, petitioner lodged this Petition.[8
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this
Courts consideration:
I
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
not finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint
was filed beyond the one-year period from date of alleged entry;
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
ruling that the Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading.[9
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
MTCC Jurisdiction
Petitioner claims that the MTCC had no jurisdiction, because the
Complaint for forcible entry was filed only in 1992 or beyond the
one-year period provided under the Rules of Civil Procedure.[10 She
avers that in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting, Respondent
Severo Malvar alleged in his Sworn Statement that petitioner had
illegally entered his land sometime in the first week of January 1987.
[11
On the other hand, respondents contend that the subject of the anti-
squatting case is different from the parcel of land involved here.[12
Before tackling the issue directly, it is worthwhile to restate three
basic legal principles. First, in forcible entry, one employs force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical
possession of land or building.[13 Thus, the plaintiff must allege and
prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until
deprived thereof by the defendant.[14 This requirement implies that
the possession of the disputed land by the latter was unlawful from
the beginning.[15 The sole question for resolution hinges on the
physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property.
Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an
averment of ownership[16 by the defendant can outrightly prevent
the court from taking cognizance of the case.[17 Ejectment cases
proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff
needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue
deprivation thereof.[18
Second, as a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the
evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been
tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.[19
There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court
cannot refer to the record in another case to ascertain a fact not
shown in the record of the case before it,[20 yet, it has been held
that it may consult decisions in other proceedings, in order to look
for the law that is determinative of or applicable to the case under
review.[21 In some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice
of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the
matter in controversy.[22 These cases may be so closely interwoven,
or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.[23
Third, factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the
review of such findings is not a function that this Court normally
undertakes.[24 However, this Rule is not absolute; it admits of
exceptions, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower courts
inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which -- if
properly considered -- will justify a different conclusion; (5) when
there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they
are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are
contradicted by evidence on record.[25
Respondents in the present Petition filed three cases against
petitioner: (1) Criminal Case No. 4659 for violation of PD No. 772[26
(filed on October 2, 1991), in which petitioner was acquitted on the
ground of good faith; (2) Civil Case No. 5681 for forcible entry (filed
on July 10, 1992) which was resolved by the MTCC on October 26,
1992.[27 (3) Criminal Case No. 5734 for Violation of PD No. 1096[28
(filed on July 15, 1993), wherein petitioner was again acquitted.
We agree with respondents that Lot 10-A, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-16200[29 and registered under the
name of Severo Malvar, is different from Lot 1 which is covered by
TCT No. RT-15993[30 and registered under the name of Severo
Malvar also. However, we cannot ignore the Decision[31 dated April
30, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 4659 for violation of PD 772; or the
Decision[32 dated November 26, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 5734 for
violation of PD 1096. The property involved in these two criminal
cases and in the instant case for forcible entry is one and the same -
- petitioners house.
The allegation of petitioner that there is only one house involved in
these three cases has not been controverted by respondents. Neither
was there evidence presented to prove that, indeed, she had
constructed one house on Lot 1 and another on Lot 10-A. On the
contrary, she correctly points out that the house involved in these
three cases is found on one and the same location. Verily, in his
Sworn Statement[33 submitted in Criminal Case No. 4659,
Respondent Severo Malvar stated that petitioners house was located
in front of the Museum and just behind the City Hall. On the other
hand, in the Complaint[34 for forcible entry, the subject property
was said to be located along Doongan Road and right in front of the
Regional National Museum and not far behind the City Hall of Butuan
City. Lastly, the Decision[35 in Criminal Case No. 5734 stated that
the building inspector, Engineer Margarita Burias, had responded to
a verbal complaint involving a structure built near the Museum in
Upper Doongan, Butuan City.
Based on these factual antecedents, there is cogent basis for
petitioners contention that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction in this case.
First, respondents allege that the subject house was built by
petitioner on Lot 10-A covered by TCT No. 16200. This allegation is
belied by the sketch plan[36 dated June 16, 1994, submitted by
Engineer Regino A. Lomarda Jr. To recall, in an Order[37 dated
March 4, 1994, the RTC had required petitioner to submit a
relocation survey of Lot 10-A to determine the location of the house
and to ascertain if it was the same house involved in Criminal Case
No. 4659 for anti-squatting. However, because of the Holy Week,
petitioner failed to submit the relocation survey within the period
provided by the RTC. In the said sketch plan that was offered in
evidence as Exhibit 5 in the anti-squatting case, Engineer Lomarda
Jr. certified that the hut of Teresita Bongato is not within Lot 10-A as
shown in this plan as relocated by the undersigned based [o]n TCT
No. RT-1576 of Benjamin Eva, et al. and [o]n TCT No. RT-16200 of
Lot 10-A of Severo Malvar.
Second, according to the Decision in Criminal Case No. 4659,
petitioners house is actually located on Lot 1, the parcel of land
previously covered by TCT No. RT-15993 and subject of the anti-
squatting case. The RTC Judge in said case ruled:
The lot on which accuseds house is standing was formerly covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-15993 dated January 24, 1983
in the name of Severo Malvar, and superseded by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-24589 dated December 3, 1991 in the
name of Butuan Land Developers Group, Inc.[38
Third, petitioners house had actually been in existence prior to
February 1992, the alleged date of illegal entry. Thus, in Criminal
Case No. 5734 for violation of PD 1096, the RTC Judge opined as
follows:
Firstly, the prosecution has not proven that the accused had
constructed or for that matter was constructing the questioned
house in February of 1992, since it was never stated that when the
complaint was lodged with the City Engineers Office, that the house
occupied by the accused was under construction or under
renovation. The fact that Engr. Burias even admitted that she had no
knowledge of when the structure was built implicitly indicates that
the same was completely erected or constructed before Engr. Burias
visit, or even for that matter, before the complaint was filed.[39
That the house of petitioner had been constructed by her father and
that she had merely continued to reside therein was upheld by the
Decision, which we quote:
Suffice it to state, however, that We are convinced, given the
testimonial evidence offered that the house in question was not built
by the accused, but by her father, Jacinto Bongato sometime in
1935; that accused merely lived in the house as a member of Jacinto
Bongatos family until the death of her parents, whereupon, she
continued to reside in the said house and now claims to be its
owner.[40
Fourth, Respondent Severo Malvar admitted in Criminal Case No.
4659 that he had knowledge of petitioners house since January
1987. We quote from his testimony:
Q Earlier, Judge Malvar, you told this Honorable Court that you
discovered sometime in January 1987, the accused was occupying
your property consisting of 348 square meters. What did you do
upon discovering that the accused already occupied a portion of your
property without your knowledge?
A I want to demolish her house. I told her that I am the owner of
the land and she is looking for the hectare that was not sold by her
father to me.
Q And upon being informed by Teresita Bongato that they were
looking for the hectare lot which was not sold to you by her father,
what did you say to her?
A I told her to remove her house. Then after that, I was so busy
with the squatters along Satorre Street of the Malvar Village that
kept me so busy. It was only last year that we were able to attend to
this.[41
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process,
and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the
summary nature of such process.[42 Indeed, the one-year period
within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted
from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is
made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the
time the plaintiff learned about it.[43 After the lapse of the one-year
period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an
accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of
possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.[44
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of
action for forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed
when they filed the Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992.[45
Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land,
possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary action for
ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than
one (1) year.[46 Respondents should have presented their suit
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria,
not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry.[47
Their cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and
the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.[48
Second Issue:
Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner further argues that a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a prohibited pleading, but
is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.[49 We agree.
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.[50
The speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of
public policy,[51 and the Rule should equally apply with full force to
forcible entry cases, in which possession of the premises is already
illegal from the start.[52 For this reason, the Rule frowns upon
delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of
time. Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the trial court the
power to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a
defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.[53
However, as forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in nature
and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural technicalities
should be carefully avoided[54 and should not be allowed to override
substantial justice.[55
Pursuant to Section 36[56 of BP 129,[57 the Court on June 16, 1983,
promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases.[58
Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited
pleading. Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
however,[59 a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited
pleadings:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by
this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the
complaint or information except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with the
preceding section;
xxx
Further, a courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot
be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or
even express consent.[60 A party may assail the jurisdiction of the
court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal.[61 That the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has
been belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v. Natino:[62
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor,
do not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period
should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is
no provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It
must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATOs defense of lack of
jurisdiction may have even been raised in a motion to dismiss as an
exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a)
thereof, x x x.
In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue
of jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited
pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.[63 Because the
Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was applicable.
Finally, the MTCC should have taken into account petitioners
Answer,[64 in which she averred that she had been in constant
occupation on said land in question since birth on March 17, 1941 up
to the present, being an heir of the late Emiliana Eva-Bongato, who
inherited said property from her father Raymundo Eva with
considerable improvements thereon. It should have heard and
received the evidence adduced by the parties for the precise purpose
of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the
subject matter.[65 And after such hearing, it could have dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction.[66 In this way, the long, drawn out
proceedings that took place in this case could have been avoided.[67
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for forcible entry is
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 120652. February 11, 1998
EUGENIO DE LA CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
and CRISTINA MADLANGSAKAY VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The oft-debated issue of ownership based on acquisitive prescription
submits itself before the Court anew, involving a four hundred and
seven (407) square meter residential lot located at Barangay San
Jose, Bulacan, Bulacan. Petitioner Eugenio De La Cruz claims to be
the owner and actual possessor of the lot, having possessed and
occupied it openly, publicly, notoriously, adversely against the whole
world, and in the concept of an owner, for more than thirty years,1
at the commencement of this controversy on September 28, 1987.
Private respondent Cristina Madlangsakay Villanueva is a purchaser
of the same lot from the Ramos brothers, Rogelio and Augusto, Jr.,
who claim to be successors-in-interest of a previous possessor of the
same.
In October 1959, petitioner contracted a loan from the parents of
private respondent, Anastacio Sakay and Lourdes Manuel, in the
amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), mortgaging the
disputed land as security. Sometime in 1973, the land became the
subject of an application for registration under the Land Registration
Act (Act No. 496)2 by the Ramos brothers. They insisted that, under
said Act, they had a better claim than petitioner, being successors-
in-interest of a previous possessor of the land. Petitioner seasonably
opposed the application which, after trial, was denied on the ground
that the land, not having been reclassified for other purposes,
remained part of the forest reserve, hence, inalienable.3
Consequently, the opposition was dismissed. Shortly thereafter, the
brothers successfully pursued the reclassification of the land and
were granted ownership of the same. It was after this occurrence
that private respondent came to purchase the disputed land from the
Ramoses.
Oblivious of the Ramoses success in claiming the land, petitioner was
later surprised to learn that its ownership had been bestowed upon
them, and that it was subsequently sold to private respondent.
Petitioner, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 520-M-87, entitled Eugenio
De La Cruz versus Cristina Madlangsakay Villanueva, filed a
complaint on September 28, 1987 for reconveyance with damages
against private respondent, defendant therein. The complaint was
dismissed.
On appeal, plaintiff-appellant elucidated that an uncle of his had
given the land to his mother, after having purchased it from a Cecilio
Espiritu in 1930.4 He sought a reversal of the decision of the lower
court, praying for a reconveyance of the land in his favor. The
appealed decision was affirmed in toto by the appellate court. A
motion for reconsideration, for lack of merit, did not prosper.
The persistent petitioner, filing this petition for review, opined that
the questioned decision of the trial court was incompatible with the
ruling in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Miguel Marcelo, et al.,5
where this Court held that the primary right of a private individual
who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith, much prior to
its classification, must be recognized and should not be prejudiced
by after-events which could not have been anticipated.6 He relies on
the equitable principle of estoppel, alleging that, by virtue of the
contract of mortgage, private respondent and her parents thereby
tacitly acknowledged him as the true and lawful owner of the
mortgaged property. As such, they are estopped from claiming for
themselves the disputed land. He prays for the reconveyance of the
lot in his favor; moral damages in the amount of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00); exemplary damages of like amount; and attorneys
fees of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), plus one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00) per court appearance and the costs of the suit.7
This petition cannot be given due course.
The several decades when petitioner possessed and occupied the
land in question may not be considered in his favor after all. In an
action for reconveyance, what is sought is the transfer of the
property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another persons name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with
a better right. This (sic) is what reconveyance is all about.8
The crucial point for resolution is this: Is petitioner vested with a
better right over the residential lot to which he devoted an
abundance of time, effort and resources in fencing and cultivating
the same? It is sad that even the magnanimous compassion of this
Court cannot offer him any spark of consolation for his assiduous
preservation and enhancement of the property.
We answer in the negative.
Unfortunately for him, Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Miguel
Marcelo, et al.9 is inapplicable in the present case. In said case, the
disputed land was classified after the possession and cultivation in
good faith of the applicant. The Court stated that the primary right
of a private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good
faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and should
not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been
anticipated.10 Land Classification Project No. 3 was certified by the
Director of Lands on December 22, 1924, whereas the possession
thereof commenced as early as 1909.11 Petitioner therein was not
deprived of his possessory rights by the subsequent classification of
the land. Although the classification of lands is a government
prerogative which it may opt to exercise to the detriment of another,
still, private interests regarding the same are not prejudiced and the
possessor in good faith is respected in his right not be disturbed.
This was the auspicious situation of petitioner in the abovecited
case.
Here, petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it had been
declared by the Government as part of the forest zone. In fact, the
land remained part of the forest reserve until such time that it was
reclassified into alienable or disposable land at the behest of the
Ramoses. As succinctly stated by this Court in Director of Lands vs.
Court of Appeals,12 a positive act of the Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest, and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for other purposes. Until such lands
have been properly declared to be available for other purposes,
there is no disposable land to speak of.13 Absent the fact of
declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith
by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as
forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by
prescription.14
Clearly, the effort to apply Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Miguel
Marcelo, et al. in the case at bar is futile. No similarity of facts or
events exist which would merit its application to the case presented
by petitioner.
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by
petitioner, as it is an iron-clad dictum that prescription can never lie
against the Government. The lengthy occupation of the disputed
land by petitioner cannot be counted in his favor, as it remained part
of the patrimonial property of the State, which property, as stated
earlier, is inalienable and indisposable. Under Article 1113 of the Civil
Code:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription. (Italics supplied).
the mortgaged property and his concomitant capacity to alienate or
encumber the same,18 it must be considered that, in the first place,
petitioner did not possess such capacity to encumber the land at the
time for the stark reason that it had been classified as a forest land
and remained a part of the patrimonial property of the State.
Assuming, without admitting, that the mortgagees cannot
subsequently question the fact of ownership of petitioner after
having dealt with him in that capacity, still, petitioner was never
vested with the proprietary power to encumber the property. In fact,
even if the mortgagees continued to acknowledge petitioner as the
owner of the disputed land, in the eyes of the law, the latter can
never be presumed to be owner.

Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which iterate that forest WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, we are bound by the
lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and findings of the appellate court and are constrained to AFFIRM the
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private same in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
property.15 Possession of the residential lot by petitioner, whether
spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership. SO ORDERED.
This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim (d)ura lex, sed
lex.16 Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Francisco, and
Purisima, JJ., concur.
The fact that the disputed land was used for a dual private purpose,
namely, as a residential lot and as part of the ricemill business of
private respondents parents, is immaterial. As held in Heirs of Jose
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,17 the classification of forest
land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal nature or
status, and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like.

Recourse to the principle of estoppel must likewise fail. Petitioner

invokes this principle in light of the contract of mortgage between
him and the parents of private respondent. While it is true that the
mortgagees, having entered into a contract with petitioner as
mortgagor, are estopped from questioning the latters ownership of

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138971. June 6, 2001]
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), Petitioner,
vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, Regional Trial Court of Lapu-
Lapu City (Branch 54); and the Heirs of the Deceased Spouses JUAN
CUIZON and FLORENTINA RAPAYA, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An action for reconveyance of land, an equitable remedy recognized
under our land registration laws, is subject to the applicable rules on
prescription. Moreover, the right to pursue such reivindicatory action
may be defeated when the property sought to be recovered has
been conveyed to an innocent purchaser for value.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the June 8, 1999 Decision
[1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 47575. In the said
Decision, the CA sustained the January 12, 1998 [2 and the March
31, 1998 [3 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City
(Branch 54) in Civil Case No. 4534-L, which denied petitioners
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, [there being] no abuse of discretion committed by
respondent court, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Facts
The subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 4673 of the Opon
Cadastre situated in Lapu-Lapu City, covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. RO-2537 (May 19, 1982) and registered in the
names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon, Isidro Cuizon, Ursula
Cuizon, Benito Lozano, Isabel Lozano, Pelagia Lozano, Augusto
Lozano, Valeriano Ybaez, Jesus Ybaez, Numeriano Ybaez, Martino
Ybaez, Eutiquio Patalinghug, Celedonio Patalinghug, Santiago
Patalinghug and Silvino Patalinghug. The lot has an area of 11,345
square meters, more or less.
On May 15, 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon
executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in which they declared
themselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered owners of
the aforesaid lot. Consequently, they were issued TCT No. 12467 on
July 8, 1982.
Considering that the said lot was among the objects of expropriation
proceedings docketed as Civil Case No 510-L and pending before it,
Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City
rendered a partial Decision on August 11, 1982. In that Decision, the
RTC approved the Compromise Agreement entered into between the
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the new registered
owners of Lot No. 4673; namely, Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and
Felix Cuizon. In accordance with the approved Compromise
Agreement, EPZA would pay P68,070 as just compensation for the
expropriation of the subject property, which was to be used for an
export processing zone to be established in Lapu-Lapu City.
As a consequence of the RTC Decision, petitioner acquired title over
Lot No. 4673 and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 12788 issued by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City
on October 13, 1982.
On July 29, 1996, private respondents filed with the RTC of Lapu-
Lapu City a Complaint for Nullity of Documents, Redemption and
Damages against petitioner and Jorgea-Igot Soroo et al. Docketed as
Civil Case No. 4534-L, the Complaint alleged that herein private
respondents had been excluded from the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate. It likewise sought the nullification of several documents,
including TCT No. 12788 dated October 13, 1992, issued in the
name of herein petitioner.
On February 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint on the ground of prescription. This Motion was denied by
respondent judge in the Order dated January 12, 1998. A Motion for
Reconsideration thereof was likewise denied in the Order dated
March 31, 1998.
On April 30, 1998, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari. As earlier noted, the CA
dismissed the Petition.
Hence, this recourse. [4
The CA Ruling
In denying the Petition, the CA ratiocinated as follows:
Civil Case No. 4534-L although instituted in the guise of a complaint
for Nullity of Documents, Redemption and Damages is in effect an
action for reconveyance of the property to plaintiffs of a portion
which rightfully belong to them. It would be against good reason
and conscience not to hold that defendants, Francisca Frisca Booc,
heirs of deceased Jorg[e]a Igot-Soronio and heirs of Felix Cuizon
committed a breach of trust which enabled them to execute a Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition[,] Special Power of Attorney and Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of EPZA to the prejudice of the plaintiffs as
their co-heirs. Therefore, in an action like this case, the private
respondents may be ordered to make reconveyance of the property
to the person rightfully entitled to it.
It is undeniable that defendants defrauded plaintiffs by falsely
representing that they were the only heirs of deceased Juan Cuizon
and Florentina Rapaya, succeeded in having the original title
cancelled and enabling them to appropriate the land in favor of EPZA
and a new one issued in the name of the latter (EPZA). This way of
acquiring title create[s] what is called constructive trust in favor of
the defrauded party and grants the latter the right to vindicate
[itself] x x x regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, it has been held
that if a person obtain(s) a legal title to the property by fraud or
concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so called
trust in favor of the defrauded party. In fact, it has long been held
that a co-heir who through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a certificate
of title in his name to the prejudice of his co-heirs, is deemed to hold
the land in trust for the latter. The excluded heirs action is
imprescriptible.
And if the action involve(s) the declaration of the nullity or
inexistence of a void or inexistent contract which became the basis
for the fraudulent registration of the subject property, then the
action is imprescriptible. This finds codal support in Article 1410 of
the Civil Code, which declares that the action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe.
As to the constructive notice rule alleged by the petitioner, (the)
Supreme Court in the case of Juan vs. Zuniga, citing Sevilla vs.
Angeles, has this to say:
'While this ruling is correct as applied to ordinary actions
by recovery of real property which is covered by a torrens
 title upon the theory that its registration under our
registration system has the effect of constructive notice to
the whole world, the same cannot be applied x x x when
the purpose of the action is to compel a trustee to convey
the property registered in his name for the benefit of the
cestui que trust. In other words, the defense of
prescription cannot be set up in an action whose purpose
is to recover property held by a person for the benefit of
another.
The Issues
Petitioner interposes the following issues for the consideration of this
Court:
I person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that private
respondents claim against expropriated property had prescribed.
II
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that
reconveyance does not lie against the expropriated property.[5
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Prescription
Petitioner avers that private respondents claim against the subject
property has already prescribed, because the two-year period within
which an unduly excluded heir may seek a new settlement of the
estate had already lapsed by the time private respondents filed their
action with the trial court. Petitioner further argues that private
respondents received constructive notice in view of the registration
of the extrajudicial partition with the Registry of Deeds. According to
petitioner, the two-year period commenced from July 8, 1982, the
date of inscription of the extrajudicial settlement on OCT No. 2537.
The pertinent provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
are reproduced for easy reference, as follows:
Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. - If it shall appear at
any time within two (2) years after the settlement and
distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of
either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other
in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the
settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such
lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years,
it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate
which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been
unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the
court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that
purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful
participation and order how much and in what manner each
distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue
execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the
preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the
deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain
charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the
full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding
any transfers of real estate that may have been made. (Emphasis
supplied)
A perusal of the foregoing provision will show that persons unduly
deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement may assert their
claim only within the two-year period after the settlement and
distribution of the estate. This prescription period does not apply,
however, to those who had no part in or had no notice of the
settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is not meant to
be a statute of limitations. Moreover, by no reason or logic can one
contend that an extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parte
proceeding, would affect third persons who had no knowledge
thereof. [6 Be that as it may, it cannot be denied, either, that by its
registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be
known actually or constructively.
In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have been
constructively notified of the extrajudicial settlement by reason of its
registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject
lot. From the time of registration, private respondents had two (2)
years or until July 8, 1984, within which to file their objections or to
demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.
On the matter of constructive notice vis--vis prescription of an action
to contest an extrajudicial partition, a leading authority on land
registration elucidates as follows:
While it may be true that an extrajudicial partition is an ex
parte proceeding, yet after its registration under the Torrens
system and the annotation on the new certificate of title of the
contingent liability of the estate for a period of two years as
prescribed in Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, by
operation of law a constructive notice is deemed made to all
the world, so that upon the expiration of said period all third
persons should be barred [from going] after the particular
property, except where title thereto still remains in the names of
the alleged heirs who executed the partition tainted with fraud, or
their transferees who may not qualify as innocent purchasers for
value. If the liability of the registered property should extend
indefinitely beyond that period, then such constructive notice which
binds the whole world by virtue of registration would be meaningless
and illusory. x x x.[7 (Emphasis supplied)
The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the
title remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused
the partition of the subject property or in those of their transferees
who cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
In this regard, title to the property in the present case was no longer
in the name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of
an innocent purchaser for value the government. Moreover, the
government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the
acquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto was obtained
through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in proper
expropriation proceedings.
Even assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part of the other
heirs, private respondents may proceed only against the defrauding
heirs, not against petitioner which had no participation in or
knowledge of the alleged fraud. The fact that the co-heirs title to the
property was fraudulently secured cannot prejudice the rights of
petitioner which, absent any showing that it had knowledge or
participation in the irregularity, is considered a purchaser in good
faith and for value. [8
The remedy of an owner alleged to have been prejudiced or
fraudulently deprived of property that was subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the
person or persons who perpetrated the fraud. [9
 Second Issue: Limitations on Reconveyance
The law recognizes the right of a person, who, by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, is deprived of an
estate or an interest therein. [10 Although a review of the decree of
registration is no longer possible after the one-year period from its
entry expires, still available is an equitable remedy to compel the
reconveyance of property to those who may have been wrongfully
deprived of it. [11 This equitable remedy afforded by law is not
without limitations, however.
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four
years from the discovery of the fraud; such discovery is deemed to
have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Registration of real property is considered a constructive
notice to all persons and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted
therefrom. [12 Clearly then, private respondents action for
reconveyance based on fraud has already prescribed, considering
that title to said property had been issued way back on August 11,
1982, while the reivindicatory suit was instituted only on July 29,
1996.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or a
constructive trust would have already prescribed just the same,
because such action prescribes ten (10) years from the alleged
fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title
over the property. [13 The imprescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only
when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is in possession
of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to
quiet the property title, which does not prescribe. [14 Undisputedly,
private respondents are not in possession of the disputed property.
In fact, they do not even claim to be in possession of it, even if to do
so would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action.
Accordingly, the CA Decisions reliance on Juan v. Zuiga, [15 as
regards the imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust, is utterly misplaced in the light of the
foregoing rulings of the Court declaring a ten-year period of
prescription for such action. Moreover, the principle enunciated
therein has no application to the instant case, considering that the
supposed trustee herein has effectively repudiated the so-called trust
by directly performing an act of ownership; that is, by conveying the
property to the government through expropriation. An action to
compel, for the benefit of the cestui que trust, the conveyance of
property registered in the trustees name does not prescribe unless
the trustee repudiates the trust. [16 Thus, private respondents
cannot invoke the imprescriptibility of their action for reconveyance,
irrespective of their basis for it.
Finally, it must be remembered that reconveyance is a remedy of
those whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in the name of another. Such recourse, however, cannot be availed
of once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not
have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. [17
Indubitably, we find that the property has already been conveyed to
the government in appropriate expropriation proceedings, the
regularity or validity of which has not been questioned. Petitioner
should, therefore, enjoy the security afforded to innocent third
persons under our registration laws. Equally important, its title to the
property must be rightfully preserved.
Hence, private respondents action to recover the subject property
from the government cannot be maintained, not only because of the
prescription of the action, but on account of the protection given to
innocent purchasers for value granted under our land registration
laws. Indeed, the inevitable consequences of the Torrens system of
land registration must be upheld in order to give stability to it and
provide finality to land disputes.

This ruling notwithstanding, private respondents are not without

recourse. They may sue for damages their co-heirs who have
allegedly perpetrated fraud in Civil Case No. 4534-L pending before
the RTC. The right and the extent of damages to be awarded to
private respondents shall be determined by the trial court, subject to
the evidence duly established during the proceedings.

WHEREFORE , the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54) in Civil Case No.
4534-L, dated January 12, 1998 and March 31, 1998, are SET ASIDE
and the said Civil Case, as against petitioner, is DISMISSED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-

Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141853. February 7, 2001]
TERESITA V. IDOLOR, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, SPS. GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA
DE GUZMAN and HON. PRUDENCIO CASTILLO, JR., Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 220, Quezon City, Respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita
Idolor which seeks to set aside the decision [1 of the respondent
Court of Appeals which reversed the Order [2of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City [3granting Idolors prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and the resolution denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration. [4
On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, petitioner
Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo
De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-
judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage on or
before September 20, 1994. The object of said mortgage is a 200-
square meter property with improvements located at 66 Ilocos Sur
Street, Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City covered by TCT
No. 25659.
On September 21, 1996, private respondent Iluminada de Guzman,
wife of Gumersindo de Guzman, filed a complaint against petitioner
Idolor before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Ramon
Magsaysay, Quezon City, which resulted in a Kasunduang Pag-aayos
which agreement is quoted in full [5:
Kami, ang (mga) may sumbong at (mga) ipinagsusumbong sa
usaping binabanggit sa itaas, ay nagkakasundo sa pamamagitan nito
na ayusin ang aming alitan gaya ng sumusunod:
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor of legal age ay nakahiram ng halagang
P520,000.00 noong September 20, 1994.
Na ang nasabing halaga ay may nakasanlang titulo ng lupa (TCT No.
25659) under Registry receipt 3420 dated July 15, 1996.
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor ay humihingi ng 90 days palugit (grace
period) to settle the said amount.
Failure to settle the above account on or before December 21, 1996,
I agree to execute a deed of sale with the agreement to repurchase
without interest within one year.
Total amount of P1,233,288.23 inclusive of interest earned.
At nangangako kami na tutupad na tunay at matapat sa mga
katakdaan ng pag-aayos na inilahad sa itaas.
Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private
respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for execution before the
Office of the Barangay captain who subsequently issued a
certification to file action.
On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an
extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the
parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage dated March
21, 1994.
On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public
auction to respondent Gumersindo, as the highest bidder and
consequently, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.
On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against
private respondents, Deputy Sheriffs Marino Cachero and Rodolfo
Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City alleging among
others alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. In the
meantime, a temporary restraining order was issued by the trial
court.
On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining private respondents, the Deputy Sheriffs and the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the issuance of a final
deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property
in favor of the De Guzman spouses. The trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the de Guzman spouses.
Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari seeking annulment of the trial courts order
dated July 28, 1998 which granted the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the petition
and annulled the assailed writ of preliminary injunction. Teresita
Idolor filed her motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
resolution dated February 4, 2000.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita
V. Idolor. The issues raised by petitioner are: whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling (I) that petitioner has no
more proprietary right to the issuance of the writ of injunction, (2)
that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos did not ipso facto result in novation
of the real estate mortgage, (3) that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is
merely a promissory note of petitioner to private respondent
spouses; and (4) that the questioned writ of preliminary injunction
was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The core issue in this petition is whether or not the respondent Court
erred in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in enjoining the private and public respondents from
causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of
ownership of the subject parcel of land in favor of private
Respondents.
Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of
land was not yet lost since her right to redeem the subject land for a
period of one year had neither lapsed nor run as the sheriffs
certificate of sale was null and void; that petitioner and the general
public have not been validly notified of the auction sale conducted by
respondent sheriffs; that the newspaper utilized in the publication of
the notice of sale was not a newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive
rights and interests. [6 Before an injunction can be issued, it is
essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a
right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act
against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such
right. [7 Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to
the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect
contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence
of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected
through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed
or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends
to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for
denying the injunction. [8 The controlling reason for the existence of
the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and
advisedly adjudicated. [9 It is to be resorted to only when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation. [10
In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that
petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the
foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of
injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a
public auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23, 1997
and the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year
from the registration of the sheriffs sale to redeem the property but
she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus
spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and
possession of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her
complaint for annulment of sheriffs sale against private respondents
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the
property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had
already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing
of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that
the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and
no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she
shows no equity. [11 The possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. [12
Petitioners allegation regarding the invalidity of the sheriffs sale
dwells on the merits of the case; We cannot rule on the same
considering that the matter should be resolved during the trial on
the merits.
Petitioner next contends that the execution of the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos dated September 21, 1996 between her and spouses de
Guzman before the Office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa showed the
express and unequivocal intention of the parties to novate or modify
the real estate mortgage; that a comparison of the real estate
mortgage dated March 21, 1994 and the Kasunduang Pag-aayos
dated September 21, 1996 revealed the irreconciliable incompatibility
between them, i.e., that under the first agreement, the amount due
was five hundred twenty thousand (P520,000) pesos only payable by
petitioner within six (6) months, after which it shall earn interest at
the legal rate per annum and non-payment of which within the
stipulated period, private respondents have the right to extra-
judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage while under the second
agreement, the amount due was one million two hundred thirty
three thousand two hundred eighty eight and 23/100
(P1,233,288.23) inclusive of interest, payable within 90 days and in
case of non payment of the same on or before December 21, 1996,
petitioner should execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase
within one year without interest; that the second agreement
Kasunduang Pag-aayos was a valid new contract as it was duly
executed by the parties and it changed the principal conditions of
petitioners original obligations. Petitioner insists that the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos was not a mere promissory note contrary to respondent
courts conclusion since it was entered by the parties before the
Lupon Tagapamayapa which has the effect of a final judgment. [13
We are not persuaded.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or
change of the obligation by a subsequent one which terminates it,
either by changing its objects or principal conditions, or by
substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating
a third person to the rights of the creditor. [14 Under the law,
novation is never presumed. The parties to a contract must
expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor
of a new one. [15 Accordingly, it was held that no novation of a
contract had occurred when the new agreement entered into
between the parties was intended to give life to the old one. [16
A review of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos which is quoted earlier does
not support petitioners contention that it novated the real estate
mortgage since the will to novate did not appear by express
agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts were
incompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly recognized in
the Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old obligation
where she acknowledged her long overdue account since September
20, 1994 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and asked for
a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before
December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will execute
a deed of sale with a right to repurchase without interest within one
year in favor of private respondents. Where the parties to the new
obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity
of the old one, where, in other words, the parties expressly negated
the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no novation. [17 We
find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent courts
pronouncement as follows:
In the present case, there exists no such express abrogation of the
original undertaking. The agreement adverted to (Annex 2 of
Comment, p.75 Rollo) executed by the parties on September 21,
1996 merely gave life to the March 21, 1994 mortgage contract
which was then more than two years overdue. Respondent
acknowledged therein her total indebtedness in the sum of
P1,233,288.23 including the interests due on the unpaid mortgage
loan which amount she promised to liquidate within ninety (90) days
or until December 21, 1996, failing which she also agreed to execute
in favor of the mortgagee a deed of sale of the mortgaged property
for the same amount without interest. Evidently, it was executed to
facilitate easy compliance by respondent mortgagor with her
mortgage obligation. It (the September 21, 1996 agreement) is not
incompatible and can stand together with the mortgage contract of
March 21, 1994.
A compromise agreement clarifying the total sum owned by a buyer
with the view that he would find it easier to comply with his
obligations under the Contract to Sell does not novate said Contract
to Sell (Rillo v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 461 [1997]).
Respondent correctly argues that the compromise agreement has
the force and effect of a final judgment. That precisely is the reason
why petitioner resorted to the foreclosure of the mortgage on March
27, 1997, after her failure to comply with her obligation which
expired on December 21, 1996.
Reliance by private respondent upon Section 417 of the New Local
Government Code of 1991, which requires the lapse of six (6)
months before the amicable settlement may be enforced, is
misplaced. The instant case deals with extra judicial foreclosure
governed by ACT No. 3135 as amended.
Notably, the provision in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos regarding the
execution of a deed of sale with right to repurchase within one year
would have the same effect as the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage wherein petitioner was given one year from the
registration of the sheriffs sale in the Registry of property to redeem
the property, i.e., failure to exercise the right of redemption would
entitle the purchaser to possession of the property. It is not proper
to consider an obligation novated by unimportant modifications
which do not alter its essence. [18 It bears stress that the period to
pay the total amount of petitioners indebtedness inclusive of interest
amounted to P1,233,288.23 expired on December 21, 1996 and
petitioner failed to execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase
on the said date up to the time private respondents filed their
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The
failure of petitioner to comply with her undertaking in the kasunduan
to settle her obligation effectively delayed private respondents right
to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage which right
accrued as far back as 1994. Thus, petitioner has not shown that she
is entitled to the equitable relief of injunction.

WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The decision of the

respondent Court of Appeals dated September 28, 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-

Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 106043 March 4, 1996
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS
ASSOCIATION INC. (COCLAI), Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro
City, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY (NHA), respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
This is a petition to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated February 28, 1991, in C.A. G.R. SP No. 23080, which reversed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 25, dated November 17, 1988.
The antecedent facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
The land subject of the dispute is Lot No. 1982 of
Cad. 237 consisting of about 12.82 hectares located
at Cagayan de Oro City. Said parcel of land was
formerly a timberland identified as Block No. F, L.C.
Project No. 8 of the Bureau of Forestry. On
September 4, 1956, the Bureau of Forestry released
the said land as alienable and disposable public land.
Subsequently, on January 29, 1964, the Bureau of
Lands issued Survey Authority No. 16-64 granting
authority to the COCLAI to survey the land in
question for purposes of subdivision into residential
lots. By virtue of said authority, the COCLAI engaged
the services of a geodetic engineer to prepare the
subdivision survey which was submitted to the
Bureau of Lands. On March 31, 1964, the Bureau of
Lands, after conducting an ocular survey, required
the COCLAI, in behalf of its members, to file a
miscellaneous Sales Application over the land in
question which the latter did on August 13, 1970.
The said sales application was however held in
abeyance by the Bureau of Lands pending the final
outcome of the civil case filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and the City of Cagayan de Oro against
Benedicta Macabebe Salcedo, et al. for the
annulment of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-257
covering the land in question then pending before
the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-41115.
In said case, the COCLAI was a party-intervenor.
Meanwhile, on August 22, 1979, the NHA filed an
expropriation proceeding before the former Court of
First Instance of Misamis Oriental at Cagayan de Oro
City docketed as Civil Case No. 6806 to acquire
Cadastral Lot No. 1982, including the land involved
in this case, located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro
City with an area of 224,554 square meters which
was then covered by OCT No. 0-257. In said case,
the COCLAI intervened claiming that instead of
being paid the amount of P300,000.00, they prefer
to acquire residential lots in any housing area of
NHA. Upon learning of the pending suit before the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-41115) involving the
annulment of the title over the same land, the NHA
sought the suspension of the expropriation
proceedings.
On September 11, 1982, the Supreme Court finally
resolved G.R. No. L-41115 annulling OCT No. 0-257
and declaring the land covered thereby as public
land.
On October 8, 1982, the Solicitor General furnished
the Bureau of Lands, Manila, with a copy of the
Supreme Court decision prompting the Director of
the Bureau of Lands to order the District Land
Officer in Cagayan de Oro City to take appropriate
action for inventory of each and every portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 1982. In response thereto, the
Regional Land Director of Region 10 informed the
Director of Lands that the members of COCLAI were
occupying portions of the said lot by virtue of the
Survey Authority issued on March 19, 1964 and the
COCLAI's subdivision survey had already been
submitted to the Central Office for verification and
approval but was held in abeyance.
On May 10, 1983, the President of the Philippines
issued Proclamation No. 2292 reserving the entire
area of Cadastral Lot No. 1982 for the Slum
Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Project to be
implemented by the NHA. Under the said
proclamation, the NHA was granted the authority "to
develop, administer and dispose of lot No. 1982
located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, in
accordance with the guidelines of the Slum
Improvement and Resettlement Program and the
approved development plan of the area".
On May 19, 1983, the Bureau of Lands, through its
Regional Director, issued an order rejecting the
subdivision survey previously submitted by the
COCLAI.
Sometime in November, 1986, the NHA, through its
agents, Virgilio Dacalos and Engr. Vicente
Generalao, the area manager and project engineer,
respectively with the help of the policemen and
claiming authority under P.D. 1472, demolished the
structures erected by the COCLAI members. This
action prompted the COCLAI to file a forcible entry
and damages case against the NHA employees and
police officers with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City docketed as
Civil Case No. 11204.
After due hearing, the MTCC on November 17, 1988
rendered judgment ordering the defendants in Civil
Case No. 11204 to restore the COCLAI members to
their respective actual possession of the portions of
Lot No. 1982 but the court dismissed plaintiffs claim
for damages. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court in
Cagayan de Oro City affirmed the decision of the
lower court. Thereafter, the prevailing party, the
COCLAI members, moved for the issuance of a writ
of execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990.
While Civil Case No. 11204 was pending before the
courts, the President of the Philippines issued on
July 1, 1988 Special Patent No. 3551 covering the
entire area of Cadastral Lot No. 1982, and by virtue
thereof, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro
City issued on January 3, 1990 an Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3324 in the name of NHA.
Thus, on July 24, 1990, a day after the COCLAI
moved for the execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 11204, the NHA filed a complaint for
"Quieting of Title with Application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" against the COCLAI and its
president, Pablo Solomon, as well as the City Sheriff,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-337. Said
case was assigned to Branch 25 of the Regional Trial
Court in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by Hon.
Noli T. Catli. In its complaint, plaintiff NHA alleged:
4) That defendant landless
association laid claim of a portion of
Lot No. 1982 aforestated alleging
that they are entitled to possession
thereof and, in fact, filed a
complaint for Forcible Entry against
certain Virgilio Decalos, Vicente
Generalao, and four (4) others,
plaintiff herein not being made a
party thereto, which case is
docketed as Civil Case No. 11204
assigned to Branch 3 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City;
5) That on November 18, 1988
defendant landless association
obtained a favorable decision from
MTCC Branch 3;
6) that pursuant to the ruling of the
Supreme Court in City of Bacolod et
al. vs. Hen. Enriquez et al., G.R. No.
L-9773, May 29, 1957 the said
decision could not be enforced
against plaintiff herein as it was not
a party to the said case;
7) That the claim of defendant
landless association for possession
of a portion of said Lot No. 1982,
subject-matter hereof, is predicated
or anchored upon the fact that said
lot was declared a public land;
8) That on January 3, 1990,
however, plaintiff National Housing
Authority became the absolute
owner of said Lot No. 1982, now the
site of the Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Project, by virtue of
Special Patent No. 3551 issued by
Her Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, for which Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3324 was
issued in its name; . . .
9) That the claim of defendant
landless association has created a
cloud on plaintiffs title to Lot No.
1982 aforementioned, which claim is
apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective
and unenforceable and prejudicial to
plaintiffs title, the land, subject-
matter hereof, having ceased to be
a public land;
10) That defendants Solomon, et al.
threatened or are about to enforce
the decision in said Civil Case No.
11204 in violation of plaintiff's rights
respecting the subject of the action,
and tending to render the judgment
herein ineffectual, unless restrained
or enjoined by this Honorable Court;
11) That the plaintiff is entitled to
the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission of the
act herein complained of;
12) That the commission of the act
herein complained of during the
litigation would probably work
injustice to the plaintiff;
13) That the plaintiff is willing and
ready to file a bond executed to the
defendants in an amount to be fixed
by this Honorable Court, to the
effect that the plaintiff will pay to
said defendants all damages which
they may sustain by reason of the
injunction if the Court should finally
decide that the plaintiff was not
entitled thereto.
Acting on the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, the
Regional Trial Court issued an Order on July 24,
1990 stating thus:
. . . let a RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to
Defendants Pablo Salomon and Cagayan de Oro
Landless Association, Inc. and the City Sheriff or
Deputy Sheriff of MTCC, Branch 3, or anybody
acting in their behalf or acting as their agent or
representative. And until further orders from this
court, they are enjoined to refrain or desist from
enforcing the decision of Civil Case No. 11204 until
this court resolves this complaint.
Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint stating, among others, as a ground
therefor that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment in another case. (Apparently, the NHA has
filed an action for "Injunction with Damages" against
COCLAI and its President before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro City docketed as
civil Case No. 89-399 to prevent the MTCC from
executing its decision in Civil Case No. 11204, but
this was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court in its
Order dated July 19, 1990 on the ground that the
decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204, had
been upheld by the Supreme Court when it denied
 NHA's petition for certiorari. The RTC, Branch 17,
further stated that ". . . (I)f plaintiff believes that it
is the owner of the property subject of that civil case
(No. 11204), then it should ventilate its claim in
some other case but not in a simple case of
injunction.)"
On August 10, 1990, the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 90-337 issued an Order denying the
motion to dismiss as well as plaintiff NHA's prayer
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to
restrain the enforcement of the decision in Civil Case
No. 11204. The motion for reconsideration filed by
plaintiff NHA was likewise denied by the Regional
Trial Court in its Order dated August 17, 1990. 1
Aggrieved by the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the NHA
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
lower court. The decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
GRANTED the questioned Orders of respondent
judge are hereby declared null and void and
respondent judge is ordered to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction to respect the possession of
the petitioner over the land subject of the
dispute . . . 2
Hence, this petition.
The issues raised by petitioner are: whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling (a) that the National Housing Authority (NHA)
is entitled to the injunction prayed for; and (b) that NHA has a better
right to the possession of Lot No. 1982, as a necessary consequence
of ownership.
As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or
maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to
prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be
heard. 3 As such, injunction is accepted as the "strong arm of equity
or a transcendent remedy" to be used cautiously, as it affects the
respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the
part of the court of its extreme necessity. 4 Its issuance rests entirely
within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and
is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. 5
Moreover, it may only be resorted to by a litigant for the
preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. 6
Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following
requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; and 2) the act against which the
injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. 7 Hence, it
should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled
thereto. 8
In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals was justified in ruling that
NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction. The reason is that, while
Civil Case No. 11204 for forcible entry was pending on appeal before
the Regional Trial Court, Special Patent No. 3551 was issued by then
President Corazon Aquino which covered the lot subject of the
dispute and by virtue thereof, an Original Certificate of Title in the
name of NHA was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de
Oro City on January 3, 1990. So, when petitioner moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990, a
certificate of title had already been issued to NHA. In view of this
intervening development, NHA filed a complaint for quieting of title
before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, it was
only proper for the Court of Appeals to direct the Regional Trial
Court, 9 where Civil Case No. 90-337 was pending, to grant the writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the decision
of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a material change
in the status of the parties with regard to the said land. Clearly, the
government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the impending
enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which directs
the said agency to restore the members of petitioner to their
respective possession on portions of Lot No. 1982.
Petitioner claims that Special Patent No. 3351 issued by then
President Corazon Aquino on July 1, 1988 and the corresponding
issuance by the Register of Deeds of Original Certificate of Title No.
P-3324 in the name of NHA had entrusted only the administration of
the disputed lot to the said agency but not the ownership thereof. It
also alleges that, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2290, issued on May
10, 1985, declaring the land situated at Barrio Macabalan, Cagayan
de Oro City, as Slum Improvement Settlement (SIR) area, it is illegal
for NHA to claim ownership over the said land. Furthermore,
petitioner also claims that "respondent Court overlooked the fact
that the issues on ownership and possession are sub-judice before
RTC, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City in Civil Case No. 90-337 . . . "
10
Hence, it concludes that the appellate court cannot pass upon
these issues as there is still no final judgment on said civil case.
Petitioner's contentions are bereft of merit.
The Original Certificate of Title (No. P-3324) issued to respondent
NHA serves as a concrete and conclusive evidence of an indefeasible
title to the property. Accordingly, once a decree of registration is
issued under the Torrens systems and the one year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration has lapsed, without said
decree being controverted by any adverse party, the title becomes
perfect and cannot later on be questioned. 11
Furthermore, in the case at bench, the original certificate of title was
issued by the Register of Deeds, under an administrative proceeding
pursuant to Special Patent No. 3551. Thus, it is as indefeasible as a
certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding as
the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within
the contemplation of the Public Land Law. 12 Moreover, the said
certificate of title was not controverted by petitioner in a proper
proceeding nor did it show that the issuance of the Original
Certificate of Title by the register of deeds to NHA was tainted with
bad faith or fraud. Hence, said certificate of title enjoys the
presumption of having been issued by the register of deeds in the
regular performance of its official duty. 13
Also OCT No. P-3324 issued in the name of respondent NHA, clearly
states:
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, the said parcel of land with
all the appurtenances thereunto of right of
belonging unto the NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY and to its successors-in-interest or
assigns forever, subject to private rights, if any
there be. 14
Clearly, the certificate of title vested not only ownership over the lot
but also the right of possession as a necessary consequence of the
right of ownership.
Respondent is not merely the administrator of the said lot. It cannot
be denied that Proclamation No. 2290 gave authority to the NHA to
dispose of Lot No. 1982. In the said Proclamation the President of
the Philippines granted to NHA the authority to "develop, administer
and dispose" of Lot No. 1982, located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro
City, "in accordance with the guidelines of the Slum Improvement
and Resettlement Program and the approved development plan of
the area."
On the other hand, petitioner's only basis for claiming the disputed
lot is lawful entry and possession for an extended period of time
and, as a matter of fact, there is a final judgment in its favor in the
case for forcible entry before the MTCC. As to this, settled is the rule
that, in an action for forcible entry, the only issue involved is mere
physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical
possession (possession de jure) nor ownership. 15 As the case filed
before the lower court is only one for forcible entry, it is indicative
that the legal title over the said property is not disputed by the
petitioner. There has been no assertion of ownership over the land,
only that of prior possession. At any rate, the judgment rendered in
the ejectment case is effective only with respect to possession and
"in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land." 16
Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a
preliminary injunction, transfer property in litigation from the
possession of one party to another, this rule admits of some
exceptions. For example, when there is a clear finding of ownership
and possession of the land or unless the subject property is covered
by a torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed
owner. 18 In the case at bench, the land subject of the suit is
covered by a torrens title under the name of NHA.
A writ of injunction should issue so as not to render moot and
academic any decision which the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 90-337 will render and in order to prevent any irreparable injury
which respondent may sustain by virtue of the enforcement of the
decision of the MTCC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 23080 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, petitioner has no legal leg to stand as regards ownership Padilla, Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
because its Miscellaneous Sales Application was not acted upon nor
favorably considered by the Bureau of lands. The Bureau, through its
Kapunan, J., took no part.
Regional Director, rejected the subdivision survey previously
submitted by COCLAI, in an Order, dated May 19, 1983.

In effect, petitioner's occupation of the land in question, after the

denial of its application for Miscellaneous Sales Patent, became
subsequently illegal. Petitioner's members have, as a consequence,
become squatters whose continuous possession of the Land may
now be considered to be in bad faith. This is unfortunate because
squatters acquire no legal right over the land they are occupying. 17

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16995 October 28, 1968
JULIO LUCERO, movant-appellee, vs. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL.,
oppositors-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the former Judge
Wenceslao L. Fernan presiding, dated September 21, 1959, now on
appeal before this Court, speaks to this effect: "Regarding the writ of
possession, once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a
writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past
has been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is no period
of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, and
inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered, it follows
that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered
owner."1 chanrobles virtual law library
Accordingly, it granted a writ of possession in favor of movant, now
appellee, Julio Lucero. There was an opposition on the part of
oppositors, all surnamed Loot, now appellants. The lower court failed
to see merit in the opposition interposed. It explained why: "The
opposition interposed by the oppositors to the effect that there are
defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion is
not under oath is trivial in its nature and consequently untenable."2
Accordingly, the writ of possession, as prayed for, was
issued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There was an urgent motion to quash the writ of possession filed by
the oppositors on September 25, 1959,3 followed by a motion for
reconsideration on October 10, 1959,4 which was denied in an order
of October 23, 1959.5 As set forth in such order of denial: "After
weighing the arguments adduced by the movant represented by
Atty. Gonzales and the oppositor represented by Atty. Loot, this
Court adheres to the previous ruling that inasmuch as no writ of
possession has been issued in this case, it is the ministerial duty of
this Court to issue one in compliance of the provisions of Act 496 as
amended." There was a second motion for reconsideration filed by
oppositors on November 3, 1959,6 which was denied in an order of
December 10, 1959.7 Not satisfied, there was still another motion for
reconsideration of the above order filed by oppositors on December
28, 1959,8 which similarly met the same fate, an order of denial
being issued on February 20, 1960.9 The appeal was taken direct to
us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The sore issue, therefore, is whether on the above facts, the order
granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law. The
answer must be in the affirmative. This appeal cannot
prosper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
No other view would be compatible with the pertinent provision of
the Land Registration Act,10 as uniformly interpreted by this Court.
As was noted in the order of September 21, 1959, there was a final
decree in a land registration case which arose from a decision
promulgated in 1938, the final decree being issued on October 29,
1941. It was not incorrect for the lower court to state, therefore,
that "the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if
nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered
owner."11 It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there
is "no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
possession, ..."12In Pasay Estate Co. v. Del Rosario,13 it has been
made clear that the purpose of the statutory provision empowering
the then Court of Land Registration, now the ordinary courts of first
instance, to enforce its orders, judgments or decrees in the same
way that the judiciary does is so that the winning party could be
placed in possession of the property covered by such decree.
Thereby, there would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the
further delay to which a successful litigant would be subjected if he
were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for the
purpose of securing the fruits of his victory." chanrobles virtual law
library
There was a restatement of the above principle in Demorar v.
Ibañez,14 the closest in period of time to the challenged order of the
lower court. Thus: "We have heretofore held that a writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land
registration proceedings ... The issuance of the decree of registration
is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end
the said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and
adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the
final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ
of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said
writ when asked for by the successful claimant." As a matter of fact,
in a 1948 decision,15 it was held by us that "the fact that the
petitioners have instituted, more than one year after the decree of
registration had been issued, an ordinary action with the Court of
First Instance attacking the validity of the decree on the ground of
fraud, is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession applied
for by the registered owners." chanrobles virtual law library
A few months after the issuance of such a challenged order of
September 21, 1959, Marcelo v. Mencias was decided,16 where this
Court went so far as to hold that "if the writ of possession issued in
a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of
the land to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition
must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but
a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition,
would be ineffective." chanrobles virtual law library
It is clear, therefore, to repeat, that on the facts as found, the
validity of the challenged order cannot be impugned. It is equally
clear that this being a direct appeal to us, no questions of fact may
be raised. As was held recently in Perez v. Araneta:17 "Nothing is
better settled than that where the correctness of the findings of fact
of the lower court are assailed, the Court of Appeals is the proper
forum. If resort be had directly to us, then appellant must be
deemed to have waived the opportunity otherwise his to inquire into
such findings and to limit himself to disputing the correctness of the
law applied." chanrobles virtual law library
The problem thus confronting oppositors-appellants in bringing the
matter direct to us was to show that the above two-page order on
the meager but sufficient facts as found, was vitiated by error or
errors in law. It was far from easy, therefore, considering as above
shown that on the authority of applicable decisions, the lower court
was left with no choice but to issue the writ of possession
sought.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Resolute and undaunted, oppositors did their best to accomplish a
task formidable in its complexity. It seemed they overdid it. They
assigned twenty-one errors a great many of them factual, and,
therefore, not for us to consider, and the remaining, except the last,
far from decisive in view of the rather settled state of the law
concerning the issuance of a writ of possession. Nor did the twenty-
first error assigned suffice to call for a reversal, as will be more fully
explained. That is why, as earlier stated, the appeal was doomed to
futility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It would not be amiss, though, to discuss even briefly one of them,
the fourteenth. Invoking three of our previous decisions,18 they
would impugn the issuance of the writ of possession on the ground
that they were not oppositors and defeated parties in the land
registration proceeding. They would ignore the fact, however, that in
the above decisions relied upon, the basis for the impropriety of
issuing a writ of possession was that the parties adversely affected
entered the property in question after the issuance of the decree.
There is nothing in the challenged order that such is the case here.
Thus, they would raise a factual issue - a matter not properly
cognizable by us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
issuance of a writ of possession. Whether or not the motion should
have been denied, in view of institution of said Civil Case No. 6267,
is a matter that does not affect said jurisdiction." chanrobles virtual
law library
WHEREFORE, the order of September 21, 1959, granting the writ of
possession in favor of movant-appellee, and the orders of October
23, 1959, December 10, 1959 and February 20, 1960, denying the
reconsideration thereof, are affirmed. With costs against oppositors-
appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A reminder may not be out of place. The apparent ease with which Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro,
oppositors-appellants could conjure up so many alleged errors, while Angeles and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
it may be a tribute to their ingenuity in making a two-page order Zaldivar, J., is on leave.
yield so many instances of the rankest violation of legal precepts,
hardly contributes to the persuasiveness of their brief. As a matter of
fact, the suspicion could be legitimately entertained that in thus
attempting to paint the highly unrealistic picture of a terse and brief
order being so sadly riddled with errors, oppositors- appellants were
trying in vain to bolster what inherently was a weak
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That is all that needs be said about this appeal except for the
disposition of the twenty-first error assigned, referring to the
existence of a pending case between the parties for reconveyance.19
There was no denial in the brief for movant-appellee that such a
case was then pending at the time the respective briefs were filed.
What is decided here cannot affect whatever final decision might
possibly have been rendered by this time in the aforesaid
reconveyance action. Nonetheless, the mere fact that such suit was
then pending did not oust the lower court of its jurisdiction to issue
the writ of possession. As stated by our present Chief Justice in
Agreda v. Rodriguez:20 "Besides, it is clear that respondent Judge
had jurisdiction to pass upon the motion of Santiago Agreda for the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25660 February 23, 1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, MAURO RENOBLAS, TELESFORO
BALONDIA, FELIX ABANDULA, FAUSTO GABAISEN, ISIDORO
ELIVERA, RAYMUNDO BONGATO, MARTIN ROLLON,
EUSTAQUIO MEDANA, DOROTEO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO
PAGAURA, MACARIO GEPALAGO, GREGORIO ITAOC,
ALEJANDRO RENOBLAS, SIMEON BARBARONA, GREGORIO
RENOBLAS, FRANCISCO ASOY, TEOFILA GUJELING, FABIAN
VILLAME, VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDRO BALORIA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC, FORTUNATO
ITAOC, FLORENTINA GEMENTIZA, RESTITUTA OMUSORA,
ZOILA OMUSORA, FELISA OMUSORA, ROBERTO HAGANAS,
FELISA HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS, VICTORIANO
HAGANAS, JULIA SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA, MARCELA
MATELA, DELFIN MATELA, PELAGIO MATELA, ROBERTA
MATELA, PROCOPIO CABANAS and SERAFINA CABANAS,
plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES, ROSARIO REYES, SALUD
OGILVE BELTRAN, AMALIA R. OGILVE, FLORA VDA. DE
COROMINAS, JESUSA REYES, LOURDES COROMINAS
MUNOZ, JUAN COROMINAS, LOURDES C. SAMSON
CEBALLOS, SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA, DOLORES V.
GARCES FALCON, JAIME GARCES, JOAQUIN REYES, and
PEDRO RE R. LUSPO, defendants- appellees.
G.R. No. L-32065 February 23,1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO
ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON,
GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO
GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA,
SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX
ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING,
TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA and
MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First
Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al.,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-33677 February 23, 1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO
ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON,
GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO
GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA,
SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX
ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING,
TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS NAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA
and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First
Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, The Provincial Sheriff, Province
of Bohol, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents.
Lord Marapao and Lorenzo A. Lopena for petitioners.
Roque R. Luspo for respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of
these three cases, considering that they involve the same parties
and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L-25660---this is an appeal from
the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol (now Regional Trial
Court) 1 dated May 12,1964 dismissing the cases of some of the
plaintiffs-appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965 denying the
motion for reconsideration and the motion to declare the
defendants- appellees in default; (2) G.R. No. L32065---this is a
petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of its prior order
dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt; (3) G.R.
No. L-33677--- this is a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated
June 2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of the
petitioners.
On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting these
cases, or supervening events have transpired which render these
cases moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the same.
On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filed an ex parte manifestation
that they are still very much interested in the just prosecution of
these cases.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
G.R. No. 25660
On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application
for registration of the parcels of land allegedly inherited by them
from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration Case No. 76, L.R.C. Record
No. N-4251. On July 26,1951, administratrix Bernardina Vda. de
Luspo filed an amended application for registration. After hearing,
the land was registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400
(pp. 84-85, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).
On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real properties
with damages and preliminary injunction, Civil Case No. 1533, (pp.
2-19, Record n Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) was filed by plaintiffs-
appellants before the Court of First Instance of Bohol. It was alleged
that they are the lawful owners of their respective parcels of land
including the improvements thereon either by purchase or
inheritance and have been in possession publicly, continuously,
peacefully and adversely under the concept of owners for more than
thirty (30) years tacked with the possession of their predecessors-in-
interest. However, those parcels of land were included in the parcels
of land applied for registration by the heirs of Juan Reyes, either by
mistake or fraud and with the intention of depriving them of their
rights of ownership and possession without their knowledge, not
until the last part of 1960 when the defendants-appellees, through
their agents, attempted to enter those parcels of land claiming that
they now belong to the heirs of Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the
defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22,
Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of cause of
action and (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying
defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss (pp. 29-30, Record on
Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to set aside such
order (pp. 31-32, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12, 1964,
the same court issued another order reversing itself partially (p. 56,
Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs
Alejandro Renoblas, Fausto Cabaisan, Fabian
Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc, Fortunato
Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin
Haganas, Victorians Haganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon
Matela, Roberto Matela, Procopio Cabañas and
Vicente Amosora are hereby dismissed on the
ground of res adjudicata with these plaintiffs paying
proportionately eighteenth forty one (18/41) of the
costs, but the petition to dismiss the case of the rest
of the plaintiffs is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
On May 28,1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were
dismissed filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 57- 58, Record on
Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants
whose cases were not dismissed filed a motion to declare the
defendants-appellees in default for failure to file their answer with
the time prescribed by law (pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7,
Rollo). On the other hand, defendants-appellees filed their
opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that the
complaint as regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be likewise
dismissed (pp. 75-80, Record on Appeal; p. 7 Rollo).
On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in connection
therewith (pp. 82-98, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) denying all
motions.
The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of
errors (p. 3, Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants; p. 9, Rollo), to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASES OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WHOSE
NAMES ARE ALREADY MENTIONED ABOVE ON THE
ALLEGED GROUND THAT THEIR CASES ARE
BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT OF RES
ADJUDICATA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WHOSE
CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TO DECLARE THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES IN DEFAULT FOR HAVING
FAILED TO FILE THEIR ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME
PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court dismissing
the appeal as regards the second issue because the order appealed
from was merely interlocutory, hence, not appealable (pp. 35-38,
Rollo).
On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas,
Simeon Barbarona, Fabian Villame, Macario Gepalago, Eustaquio
Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc, Francisco Asoy and Martin
Rollon filed a motion to withdraw their appeal on the ground that
they are now the absolute owners and possessors of their respective
parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 1533.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by
the defendants-appellees that they (plaintiffs-appellants) were
notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for
registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the trial
court. Likewise, they contend that res judicata is not applicable in an
action for reconveyance.
The allegations that no evidence was presented by the defendants-
appellees that plaintiffs-appellants were notified of the date of the
trial on the merits of the application for registration nor were they
given copies of the decision of the trial court are new issues. It is a
well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question
will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court
below and it is within the issues made by the parties in their
pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July 25, 1983, 123
SCRA 532). The other contention that res judicata is not applicable
in an action for reconveyance is not plausible. The principle of res
judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land
registration and cadastral proceedings (Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R.
No. L-35376, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vs. Inandan 75
Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303).
It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits,
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same
parties and their successors in interest litigating upon the same thing
and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be. In order,
therefore, that there may be res judicata, the following requisites
must be present: (a) The former judgment must be final; (b) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action (San
Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692,
Nov. 26,1986, 146 SCRA 24).
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that
parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than
once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them in law or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept. 28,1984,132 SCRA 302). The
doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom
and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is
to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation
by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and
fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium (Carandang
vs. Venturanza, G.R. No. L41940, Nov. 21,1984,133 SCRA 344). To
ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the door to
endless litigations by continuous determination of issues without end
(Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 80294- 95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515).
Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when
notified he does not want to participate and only after the property
has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding title has
been issued files an action for reconveyance, to give due course to
the action is to nullify registration proceedings and defeat the
purpose of the law.
In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a quo
meticulously discussed the presence of all the elements of res
judicata (pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54, Record on Appeal; p. 7; Rollo):
There is no question that in that Registration
Proceedings, LRC Record No. N-4251, Land
Registration Case No. N-76, the Court of First
Instance of the province of Bohol had jurisdiction of
the subject matter, that said court had rendered a
judgment on the merit that was terminated in the
Court of Appeals since December, 1958, and that
decision is now final with a decree of registration
over the parcels of land described in the application
issued to the applicants.
The subject matter (the parcels of land) now
claimed by the plaintiffs in this case at bar are the
same, or at least part of the parcels already
adjudicated registration in that registration case to
the persons, some of them are made defendants in
this case before us. The cause of action between the
two cases are the same, ownership of these parcels
of land, though the forms of action are different,
one is an ordinary Land Registration and the other is
reconveyance.
'It is settled that notwithstanding
the difference in the form of two
actions, the doctrine of res
adjudicata will apply where it
appears that the parties in effect
were litigating for the same thing. A
party can not, by varying the form
of action, escape the effects of res
adjudicata (Aguirre vs. Atienza, L-
10665, Aug. 30, 1958; Geronimo vs.
Nava No. L-1 21 1 1, Jan. 31, 1959;
Labarro vs. Labateria et al., 28 O.G.
4479).
'Well settled is the rule that a party
can not by varying the form of
action, or adopting a different
method of presenting his case,
escape the operation of the principle
that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated
between the same parties or their
privies. (Francisco vs. Blas, et al.,
No. L-5078; Cayco, et al., vs. Cruz,
et al., No. L-1 2663, Aug. 21, 1959).
'Accordingly, a final judgment in an
ordinary civil action, determining the
ownership of certain lands is res
adjudicata in a registration
proceeding where the parties and
property are the same as in the
former case (Paz vs. Inandan 75
Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuason, 22
Phil. 303).'
xxx xxx xxx
But are there identities of parties in this case before
us and the former registration proceedings? Identity
of parties means that the parties in the second case
must be the same parties in the first case, or at
least, must be successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the former
action or proceeding, or when the parties in the
subsequent case are heirs (Chua Tan vs. Del
Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Martinez vs. Franco, 51 Phil.
487-1 Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744; Valdez, et
a]. vs. Penida No. L- 3467, July 30, 1951).
xxx xxx xxx
Returning our attention to the case at bar, and with
in mind the principles of res adjudicata above-
quoted, we noticed that many of the plaintiffs were
not oppositors in the former registration case, but
many are children of the former oppositors. In such
a case we have to determine the case of every
plaintiff, if the former decision in the land
registration case is conclusive and binding upon him.
xxx xxx xxx
The defendants had proven that the adjoining
owners and claimants of the parcels of land object
of registration proceeding had been notified when
the land was surveyed. These persons notified
according to the surveyor's certificate, Exhibit "B"
were as follows: Cipriano Samoya, Fausto Baguisin,
Silveria Pahado, Enojario Laroda, Alejandro
Renoblas, Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame,
Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura,
Marcelina Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et al., Nicolas
Omosura, Simon Lagrimas, et al., Martin Quinalayo,
Gorgonio Baquinang, Demetrio Asolan, Catalino
Orellena, Heirs of Catalina Palves, Manuel Mondano,
Angel Mondano, Victoriano Balolo, Eugenio del
Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Felomino Ruiz, Apolonio
Horbeda, and Mun. of Calape.
The following persons were notified by the Chief of
the Land Registration Office of the initial hearing
(Exhibit "J") of the registration proceedings
enjoining them to appear on June 16,1952, at 8:30
a.m., before the Court of First Instance of Bohol to
show cause why the prayer of said application
should not be granted: the Solicitor General, the
Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and
the Director of Forestry, Manila; the Provincial
Governor, the Provincial Fiscal and the District
Engineer, Tagbilaran, Bohol; the Municipal Mayor,
Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio Azocan, Catalino
Orellena, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano,
Victoriano Bolalo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici
Bayson, Filomeno Ruiz, Apolonio Horboda, the Heirs
of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc,
Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina
Asilom, Gregorio Baguinang, Nicolas Omosura,
Simon Lagrimas and Martin Quinalayo, Calape,
Bohol; the heirs of Catalino Polvos, Fausto Baguisin,
Cipriano Samoya, Silveria Pohado, Enojario, Laroda,
Alejandro Renoblas and Leoncio Barbarona,
Antequera Bohol.
And after the application had been filed and
published in accordance with law the following
persons represented by Atty. Conrado D. Marapao
filed opposition to that registration proceeding:
Felipe Cubido, Simon Lagrimas, Simeon Villame,
Felix Lacorte, Victor Omosura, Germana Gahil,
Anastacio Orillosa, Enerio Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy,
Cipriano Sanoya, Pablo Dumadag, Andres
Reimbuncia, Roman Reimbuncia, Celedonio
Cabanas, Moises Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting, Gervasio
Sevilla, Pedro Omosura, Daniel Itaoc, Luis Omosura,
Bartolome Omusura, Nicasio Omosura, Calixto
Sevilla, Teodora Omosura, Jose Sabari, Silverio
Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy, Gertrudes Sevilla, Teodora
Sevilla, Magno Orillosa, Gervacia Sevilla, Marcos
Hagonas, Eleuterio Pandas, Pablo Omosura, Fabian
Villame, Teodoro Omosura, Magdalina Asilom,
Mauricio Matela, Marciano Ordada, Eusebio
Omosura, and Gregorio Repelle, (Exhibit "E"), Atty.
Juna V. Balmaseda in representation of the Bureau
of Lands, and Asst. Fiscal Norberto M. Gallardo in
representation of the Municipality of Calape.
Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio Renoblas are
children of plaintiff Alejandro Renoblas. Plaintiff
Telesforo Balanda is son-in-law of Alejandro, being
the husband of Juliana Renoblas, daughter of
Alejandro. Plaintiff Alejandro Renoblas was not one
of the oppositors in the registration proceedings, but
he was notified of the initial healing of that
registration case and by the surveyor that surveyed
the land object of registration (Exhibit J-Movant).
Therefore, the decision of the land registration
proceeding is binding upon him and his case is
dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata with
costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notifed by the surveyor
and that notice of the initial hearing. And though he
was not an oppositor, the former land registration
proceeding is binding on him. Therefore, this case is
dismissed in so far as Fausto Cabaisan is concerned
with costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc, Faustino
Ita-oc and Fortunate Ita-oc are children of Daniel
Ita-oc, one of the oppositors in the registration
proceedings. They claim parcel No. 10 described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint. Gregorio Ita-oc
testified that his land was inherited by said plaintiffs'
mother from her father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on
record (Exhibits J-3, J- 4, J-5). However (sic), shows
that the land is declared in the name of Daniel Ita-
oc, a former oppositor in the registration case.
Hence, these plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of
Daniel Ita-oc, and, therefore, are bound by the
decision in that registration case. Their case,
therefore, is dismissed, with costs.
"Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin
Haganas and Victoriano Haganas are children of
Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor in the
registration case. Marcos testified that his claim
before was only two hectares, while the claim of his
children is seven hectares, which come from his
wife, not from him. These plaintiffs claim two
parcels, one under Tax Declaration No. R-4452, and
Tax Declaration No. R-8456. It appears that Tax
Declaration No. R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in the name of
Marcos Haganas and the land described under Tax
Declaration No. R-8456 was bought by the spouses
Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla from Gertrudis
Sevilla in 1956 (Exhibit M-3), who was an oppositor
in the registration proceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs
Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas,
and Victoriano Haganas are successors-in-interest to
properties in which the decision in the registration
case is conclusive and binding to their predecessors-
in-interest. Hence, their case here is dismissed with
costs.
Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo Matela,
who was the oppositor in the registration
proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman Matela, Marcela
Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela are their
children. She has no son by the name of Pelagic.
Julia testified that the land now claimed by her
children came from her father Pio Sevilla. The land
that was claimed by Mauricio Matela as oppositor
was in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5099.
This is the same land now claimed by plaintiffs Julia
Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin
Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit 0-4). These
plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Mauricio
Matela, who is bound by the decision in that land
proceeding wherein he was the oppositor.
Therefore, the case of these plaintiffs are dismissed
with costs.
Plaintiff Procopia Cabanas was the wife of Andres
Reambonancia, oppositor in the land registration
proceedings. She claims parcel No. 20 described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint bearing Tax
Declaration No. R-8121. It appears that this land is
declared in the name of Andres Reambonancia
(Exhibit N-3) who, as oppositor in the land
registration case, is bound by the decision of that
case. Therefore, the case of plaintiff Procopia
Cabanas as successor-in-interest to Andres
Reambonancia, is hereby dismissed, with costs.
Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio
Amosora and Florencia Gahil both oppositors in the
former registration case. The land claimed by
plaintiff Vicente Amosora is described as parcel No.
24 of paragraph 2 of the complaint under Tax
Declaration No. R-6107, under the name of his
father Enerio Amosora. Since Enerio Amosora was
an oppositor in the former land registration of which
this land was a part, the decision of that land
registration case is conclusive and binding not only
to Enerio Amosora, but also to his successor-in-
interest, plaintiff Vicente Amosora, whose case
therefore, is dismissed with costs.
G.R. No. L-32065
Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3561 was issued in the name of Pedro R.
Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562 was issued in the
name of several persons (p. 36, Rollo).
A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of
possession dated January 6, 1961, and a second alias writ of
possession dated July 2, 1966 were issued by the trial court against
the petitioners. A sample of the guerilla-like, hide and seek tactics
employed by the petitioners was proved by the official report of the
deputy sheriff dated January 21 1960. Another evidence of
petitioners' refusal to sign and to vacate was a certification dated
July 22, 1966 and the Sheriffs return dated October 25, 1966.
On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano
Ogilve, who is one of the registered owners of the parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562, against the
petitioners for refusing to vacate the land occupied by them and for
refusing to sign the Sheriffs return.
On May 6, 1969, the court a quo issued a resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads (p. 47, Rollo):
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, make
it of record that Procopia Reambonansa voluntarily
left the land and dropped out from the case; the
charge of contempt against Alejandro Renoblas
(who died) is dismissed and each of the remaining
22 respondents are hereby found guilty of contempt
under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are hereby sentenced
each to pay a fine of One Hundred Pesos,
authorizing the Constabulary Detachment at or near
Candungao Calape Bohol to collect the same and to
transmit the money to the Clerk of this Court, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the
rate of one day for every P2.50 or fraction of a day,
the said Constabulary Detachment to effect the
commitment if any of them is unable to pay the fine.
The fingerprints of each of these 22 respondents
shall also be taken by the constabulary and filed
with the record of this case.
It is so ordered.
On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
the aforestated resolution whereas Ogilve filed an opposition
thereto.
On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied.
On March 18, 1970, another motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioners on the ground of pendency of the action for
reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1533 and their appeal in G.R. No. L-
25660. On May 14, 1970, the court a quo ordered the proper officers
to actually execute the resolution dated May 6, 1969.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I
THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT
OF POSSESSION WITHOUT ANY COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT FOR
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, NOR FOR RECOVERY OF
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE PARCELS OF LAND IN
QUESTION AGAINST THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A
WRIT OF POSSESSION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO
WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDING AND
WHO WERE NOT DEFEATED OPPOSITORS OF THE SAID
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor
defeated oppositors in the said land registration case, as their names
do not appear in the amended application for registration; that they
have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than thirty (30)
years which began long before the filing of the application for
registration; and that after the hearing of the registration case, they
continued in possession of the said land.
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the
applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carried
with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the
right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is,
therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the
generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice
rests (Romasanta et. al. vs. Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion et. al.
vs. CFI of Iloilo, et. al., 100 Phil. 554 [1956]). A writ of possession
may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in
a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land
registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree
(Demorar vs. Ibañez, et al., 97 Phil 72 [1955]).
The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of the
said land for more than thirty (30) years which began long before
the filing of the application for registration and continued in
possession after the hearing of the registration case, worked against
them. It was a virtual admission of their lack of defense. Thus, the
writs of possession were properly issued against them.
However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that
petitioners are guilty of contempt. Under Section 8 (d) of Rule 19,
Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession
of real property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff or
other officer to whom it must be directed to deliver the possession of
the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means
that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from the
premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning party. If
subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing party
enters or attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession of the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto, then and only then may the loser be charged with
and punished for contempt (Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et.
al., 85 Phil. 459). According to this section, it is exclusively
incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry out the mandates of
the judgment in question, and in fact, it was he himself, and he
alone, who was ordered by the trial judge who rendered that
judgment, to place the respondents in possession of the land. The
petitioners in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of
possession, and consequently, their refusal to effectuate the writ of
possession, is entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could
not hinder, and much less prevent, the delivery being made, had the
sheriff known how to comply with his duty. It was solely due to the
latter's fault, and not to the disobedience of the petitioners' that the
judgment was not duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could
even have availed himself of the public force, had it been necessary
to resort thereto (see United States v. Ramayrat 22 Phil. 183).
G.R. No. L-33677
On March 22,1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of
Demolition which was granted by the trial court on April 5, 1971 (pp.
42-43, Rollo) against those who were adjudged guilty of contempt.
On April 29, 1971, the petitioners filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration of said order. On June 2, 1971, the trial court issued
another order, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of preliminary
injunction Deputy Provincial Sheriff Pedro Aparece
must not only take P.C. soldiers with him but also
carpenters to effect the demolition, the carpenters
being at the expense of the Luspo.
 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted without
or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and
thus excluded the herein petitioners from the use and enjoyment of
their right to which they are entitled when he (respondent judge)
issued the order of demolition on April 5, 1971 and again on June 2,
1971 (p. 107, Rollo).
On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (p.
51, Rollo).
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The petitioners allege that the respondent-judge cannot issue a writ
of demolition pending the resolution of G.R. No. L-32065.
We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the
issuance of the writ of demolition. It is significant to note that the
subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 is the order dated
May 14, 1970 directing the execution of the prior order dated May 6,
1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt and not the writs of
possession themselves. Thus, the respondent Judge correctly issued
the writs of demolition. In Meralco vs. Mencias, 107 Phil 1071, We
held:
[I]f the writ of possession issued in a land
registration proceeding implies the delivery of
possession of the land to the successful litigant
therein (Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay
Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil. 391;
Manlapas vs. Llorente 48 Phil. 298), a writ of
demolition must, likewise, issue, especially
considering that the latter writ is but a complement
of the former which, without said writ of demolition,
would be ineffective.
xxx xxx xxx
[The issuance of the writ of demolition] is
reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner who
is being deprived of the possession of the lots in
question, by reason of the continued refusal of
respondent ...... to remove his house thereon and
restore possession of the promises to petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of the
Court of First Instance dated May 12, 1964 and August 25, 1965 are
AFFIRMED; the motion to withdraw the appeal of some of the
plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED;
2) In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution
of the Court of First Instance dated May 14, 1970 is SET ASIDE; and
3) In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order of
the Court of First Instance dated June 2, 1971 is AFFIRMED. The
temporary restraining order is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE,
respondents.
Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.
Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of
232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the
Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11,
1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally
registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by
the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of
attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to
develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential
subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained
Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of
the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but
the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the
development of the subject property which included the portions
occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against
petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging
that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's
Association; that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings
some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No.
27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a
permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was
allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag
secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be
affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived
private respondents of their property without due process of law by:
(1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing
their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit
bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of
force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3)
trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject
private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of
P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private
respondents' complaint for forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by
the Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. On July 24,1986, said court gave due course to their
petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and
the Regional Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in
actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly
ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence
an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was
denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26,
1986. 6
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied
due process to petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a
quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer and
whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible
entry case against petitioner. 7
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an
answer for due process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on
February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in
the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court
of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not
await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact
that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for
reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the
owners to develop the subject property, private respondents, as
actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely
a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate.
Title is not involved. 8
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner
entered the property, private respondents were already in
possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose
were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary,
private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the
fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve
to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on
the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not
responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a
forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be
the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have
rationalized petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying
the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-
help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such
justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only
be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which
is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost,
the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states,
"(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He
who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the
holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The

decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970
FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO
VILLADELREY, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Godofredo F. Trajano and Rafael A. Francisco for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip,
Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, convicting them of the crime of Grave
Coercion, with which they are charged, and sentencing each to four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of
P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, as well as one-third of the
costs.
As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the
present case is this:
The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of
Marcelino Guevarra who cultivated a parcel of land
known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in
sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu,
Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be
tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant.
Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia. and
administered by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of
the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the accused
herein. Even before the occurrence of the incident
presently involved, there had been a series of
misunderstandings and litigations involving the
complainant and her husband, on one hand, and the
men of Hacienda Palico on the other.
It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino
Guevarra filed an action with the Court of Agrarian
Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant of
Roxas y Cia. over lot No. 105-A of Hacienda Palico.
In a decision dated February 22, 1958, the Court of
Agrarian Relations declared it has no jurisdiction
over the case, inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant
on the said parcel of land. An appeal was taken by
Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was
dismissed in a resolution dated April 10, 1958.
On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action
against Marcelino Guevarra in the justice of the
 peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible
entry, praying therein that Guevarra be ejected from
the premises of Lot No. 105-A. After due hearing,
the said Court in a decision dated May 2, 1959
ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot and to pay
damages and accrued rentals. A writ of execution
was issued by Justice of the Peace Rodolfo A.
Castillo of Nasugbu, which was served on Guevarra
on June 6, 1959, and the return of which was made
by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R. Aquino of this Court
on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ recites
among other things that the possession of the land
was delivered to the Roxas y Cia. thru Felix Caisip,
the overseer, and Guevarra was given twenty days
from June 6, 1959 within which to leave the
premises.
The record before Us does not explain why said decision was
executed. According to the complainant, her husband's counsel had
appealed from said decision. The justice of the peace who rendered
it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had been an attempt
to appeal, which was not given due course because the
reglementary period therefor had expired; that a motion to
reconsider his order to this effect was denied by him; and that a
second motion for reconsideration was "still pending consideration,"
and it was October 19, 1959 when such testimony was given.
Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the Trial
Judge, added:
On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between
the complainant and Caisip regarding the cutting of
sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The following day June 16,
1959, the complainant allegedly again entered the
premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out
by Felix Caisip. Due to the aforementioned incidents,
Gloria Cabalag was charged in the justice of the
peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, with grave
coercion for the incident of June 15, 1959, docketed
in the said court as Criminal Case No. 968 (Exhibit
"3"); and with the crime of unjust vexation for the
incident of June 16, 1959, docketed in the said court
as Criminal Case No. 970. Both cases, however,
were filed only on June 25, 1959.
In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against
Gloria Cabalag, were filed eight (8) days after the incident involved
in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy that both cases were — on
motion of the prosecution, filed after a reinvestigation thereof —
provisionally dismissed, on November 8, 1960, by the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, upon the ground "that the evidence of record
... are insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt." The decision of said court, in the case at bar,
goes on to say:
It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude
of Gloria Cabalag to remain in the premises, Caisip
sought the help of the chief of police of Nasugbu
who advised him to see Deputy Sheriff Aquino about
the matter. The latter, however, informed Caisip
that he could not act on the request to eject Gloria
Cabalag and to stop her from what she was doing
without a proper court order. Caisip then consulted
Antonio Chuidian, the hacienda administrator, who,
in turn, went to the chief of police and requested for
the detail of policemen in sitio Bote-bote. The chief
of police, acting on said request, assigned the
accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey,
 police sergeant and police corporal, respectively, of
the Nasugbu Police Force, to sitio Bote-bote. 1
On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen
weeding the portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Appellant
Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused to do
so, alleging that she and her husband had the right to stay there and
that the crops thereon belong to them. She having stuck to this
attitude, even when he threatened to call the police, Caisip went to
his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local
police, who were some distance away, and brought them with him.
Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position, to stop
weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales
grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom
the trowel she was holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand
and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her northward —
towards a forested area, where there was a banana plantation — as
Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun.
Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!" 2her neighbors,
Librada Dulutan, followed, soon later, by Francisca Andino, came
and asked the policemen why they were dragging her. The
policemen having answered that they would take Gloria to town
which was on the west — Francisca Andino pleaded that Gloria be
released, saying that, if their purpose was as stated by them, she
(Gloria) would willingly go with them. By this time, Gloria had
already been dragged about eight meters and her dress, as well as
her blouse 3were torn. She then agreed to proceed westward to the
municipal building, and asked to be allowed to pass by her house,
within Lot 105-A, in order to breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the
request was turned down. As they passed, soon later, near the
house of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which she
was affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for
him, whereupon, he went down the house and accompanied them to
the municipal building. Upon arrival thereat, Rojales and Villadelrey
turned her over to the policeman on duty, and then departed. After
being interrogated by the chief of police, Gloria was, upon
representations made by Zoilo Rivera, released and allowed to go
home.
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is to
the effect that, upon being asked by the policemen to stop weeding
and leave the premises, Gloria, not only refused to do so, but, also,
insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to the defense, she was
arrested because of the crime of slander then committed by her.
Appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, moreover, testified that, as they
were heading towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria proceeded
to tear her clothes.
His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of the
prosecution and found that of the defense unworthy of credence.
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which fully concurred in
this view, are "final," and our authority to review on certiorari its
appealed decision is limited to questions purely of law. 4Appellants
maintain that the Court of Appeals has erred: (1) in not finding their
acts "justified under Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2) in
holding that the 20-day period of grace given to Marcelino Guevarra
and his wife, Gloria Cabalag, by the sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A, was
valid and lawful; (3) in finding that the elements of the crime of
grave coercion are present in the case at bar; and (4) in finding
appellants guilty as charged. This pretense is clearly untenable.
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or
 prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property.
upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable
to the case at bar, for, having been given 20 days
from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-
A, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959 — or
within said period — invade or usurp said lot. She
had merely remained in possession thereof, even
though the hacienda owner may have become its
co-possessor. Appellants did not "repel or prevent in
actual or threatened ... physical invasion or
usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a property of
which she and her husband were in possession even
before the action for forcible entry was filed against
them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the
Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said
property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed
the view that he could not oust them therefrom on
June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria
had committed a crime in the presence of the policemen, despite the
aforementioned 20-day period, which, appellants claim, the sheriff
had no authority to grant. This contention is manifestly untenable,
because: (1) said period was granted in the presence of the
hacienda owner's representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not
objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act
performed by the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby
allowed to remain, and had, in fact, remained, in possession of the
premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or his
representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the
ricefield was beneficial to its owner and to whomsoever the crops
belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not
constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her
husband had been sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment
against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties who
had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind
whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary
expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," 5 and the cost of
cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the
nature of necessary expenses. 6
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of
violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented the
complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," (weeding
and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something
against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot),
"whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the law into their
hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. 7
Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the
complaining witness, he should be acquitted of the charge. In this
connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge, correctly observed:
... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay
hands on the complainant, unlike the accused
Rojales and Villadelrey who were the ones who used
force against Gloria, and while the Court is also
inclined to discredit the claim of the complainant
that Felix Caisip drew a gun during the incident, it
sufficiently appears from the record that the
motivation and inducement for the coercion
perpetrated on the complainant came from the
accused Caisip. It was his undisguised and particular
purpose to prevent Gloria from entering the land
and working on the same. He was the one who first
approached Gloria with this objective in mind, and
 tried to prevent her from weeding the land. He had Dizon, J., is on leave.
tried to stop Gloria from doing the same act even
the day previous to the present incident. It was Makasiar and Villamor, JJ., took no part.
Caisip who fetched the policemen in order to
accomplish his purpose of preventing Gloria from
weeding the land and making her leave the
premises. The policemen obeyed his bidding, and
even when the said policemen were already over-
asserting their authority as peace officers, Caisip
simply stood by without attempting to stop their
abuses. He could be hardly said to have disapproved
an act which he himself induced and initiated. 8

In other words, there was community of purpose between the

policemen and Caisip, so that the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as
a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction. 9

In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of

abuse of superior strength 10 and disregard of the respect due the
offended party, by reason of her sex, 11 were present, insofar as the
three appellants herein are concerned. As regards appellants Rojales
and Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating circumstance of
having taken advantage of their positions as members of the local
police force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted out to
appellants herein, which is the minimum of the maximum prescribed
in said Art. 286, 12 and the fine imposed upon them, are in
accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with

costs against the defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and

Barredo, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 123713 April 1, 1998
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SR., represented by their
Administrator ELPIDIO VENCILAO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES SABAS and RUPERTA
GEPALAGO, and DOMICIANO GEPALAGO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Between two (2) sets of claimants of real property — those claiming
ownership by acquisitive prescription, and those asserting ownership
on the basis of a deed of sale recorded in the certificate of title of
the vendor as mortgagee and highest bidder in a foreclosure sale —
who has a better right?
On 12 February 1990 the heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., represented
by their Administrator Elpidio Vencilao, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of
possession and/or ownership, accounting and damages with prayer
for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction against the spouses Sabas and Ruperta Gepalago. 1 The
complaint was subsequently amended to include an action for
reconveyance and cancellation of title and to implead defendant
Domiciano Gepalago. 2
The heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr. alleged that they were the
absolute owners of a parcel of land situated in Cambansag, San
Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 3,625 square meters having inherited
the same from their father, Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., who during his
lifetime was in peaceful, open, notorious and uninterrupted
possession and enjoyment of the property in the concept of owner,
declared the property for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration
No. 37C6-344 and religiously paid the real estate taxes. He likewise
had the property consistently declared as his own in other
documents, e.g., those relevant to the 1987 Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). After his death, his heirs continued to
possess and enjoy the property.
The Gepalago spouses, on the other hand, denied all the material
allegations in the complaint and claimed that they were the
registered owners of a 5,970-square meter property located in
Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol, and covered by TCT No.
16042, previously a portion of a 1,401,570 square-meter land
originally owned by a certain Pedro Luspo. The entire parcel of land
was mortgaged by Pedro Luspo to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) as security for a loan. Since Luspo failed to pay the obligation
upon maturity the mortgage was foreclosed. Thereafter PNB, the
highest bidder in the foreclosure sale, conveyed the whole property
to fifty-six (56) vendees among whom were the spouses Sabas and
Ruperta Gepalago who acquired the 5,970 square-meter portion
thereof. Since then, they had been the owner and possessor of the
land until they donated the same in 1988 to their son Domiciano
Gepalago.
The trial court appointed a commissioner to survey the litigated
property and determine the areas claimed by both parties. The
commissioner reported that the area claimed by the Vencilaos was
included in the titled property of the Gepalagos. On the basis of the
commissioner's report and the other pieces of evidence presented by
the parties, the trial court found the following: (a) The property
claimed by the Gepalagos consisted of 5,970 square meters, while
that of the Vencilaos covered an area of 22,401.58 square meters as
indicated in the survey plan submitted by Engr. Jesus H. Sarmiento,
the court appointed commissioner; (b) Insofar as the survey plan
and report submitted by Engr. Sarmiento were concerned, these
indubitably established the fact that the Vencilaos owned the excess
area of 16,431.58 square meters which was clearly outside the area
claimed by the Gepalagos; (c) The lot in question had been titled to
defendant Sabas Gepalago and subsequently titled to his son,
defendant Domiciano Gepalago, under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 18621 by virtue of a deed of donation executed on 25 October
1988 by Sabas Gepalago in favor of Domiciano Gepalago; and, (d)
As stated in the commissioner's report, "If the titled lot of Domiciano
Gepalago is plotted in accordance with the technical description
appearing in the title, it will be relocated to more than 219
kilometers eastward away from its supposed actual location. This
amounts to its non-existence." 3
The trial court then ruled in favor of the Vencilaos holding that they
had been in possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the litigated
property for more than thirty (30) years and that the improvements
therein were introduced by them long before any title was ever
issued to the Gepalagos. The lower court added that there was
ample evidence showing that the Gepalagos knew when they bought
the property from PNB that the land had long been possessed and
enjoyed in the concept of owners by the Vencilaos. Thus, while
under ordinary circumstances a certificate of title is indefeasible, it is
not so when a person with prior knowledge of the ownership and
possession of the land by another obtains title to it.
The Gepalagos appealed the decision of the trial court. After due
consideration, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and
declared the Gepalagos owners of the disputed property —
Evidently, defendant-appellants spouses Gepalago were
purchasers in good faith and for value. They acquired their
share in the property from the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) which was the registered owner. Even assuming they
had knowledge of the plaintiff-appellee' possession of the
said property at the time of the purchase, it was PNB which
was the registered owner of the property. The title was
transferred to the bank after the foreclosure sale of the
property mortgaged by the previous registered owner, Pedro
Luspo. Thus where the certificate of title is in the name of
the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has
the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title.
The rule that all persons dealing with property covered by
Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond
what appears on the face of the title is well-settled.
Granting that plaintiff-appellees were possessors of the
property for a long time, they never raised objections to the
transactions affecting the land. There was no action made or
any protest recorded with the Register of Deeds.
Defendant-appellants' claim of ownership was evidenced by
certificates of title issued in their names. A Torrens
Certificate of Title is the best evidence of ownership of a
registered land. As against the allegations of plaintiff-
appellees, defendants-appellants are the ones entitled to the
property. Defendants-appellant' ownership of the property
was evidenced by a certificate of title while plaintiff-
appellees relied merely on tax declaration. Torrens title is
generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land
 referred to therein. Defendant-appellants acquired the land
in a foreclosure sale and there was no evidence to show that
plaintiff-appellees were defrauded when the property was
mortgaged and then sold . . . . 4
The motion for reconsideration by the Vencilaos having been denied
5
they filed the instant petition for review.
In awarding the disputed land to petitioners, the trial court
erroneously found that petitioners had been in possession and
enjoyment of the property for more than thirty (30) years. It should
be noted that the land in dispute is a registered land placed under
the operation of the Torrens system way back in 1959, or more than
thirty (30) years before petitioners instituted the present action in
the court a quo, and for which Original Certificate of Title No. 400
was issued. 6 The rule is well-settled that prescription does not run
against registered land. Thus, under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, it is specifically provided
that "no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession." A title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by
adverse, open and notorious possession. The certificate of title
issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is
binding and conclusive upon the whole world. 7 All persons must
take notice and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. 8
Neither can the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by
petitioners as evidence of ownership prevail over respondents'
certificate of title which, to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of
ownership. It should be stressed that tax declarations and receipts
do not by themselves conclusively prove title to the land. 9 They only
constitute positive and strong indication that the taxpayer concerned
has made a claim either to the title or to the possession of the
property for which taxes have been paid. 10 Stated differently, tax
declarations and tax receipts are only prima facie evidence of
ownership or possession.
But assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioners had indeed
acquired the land they were claiming by prescription, there likewise
exists a serious doubt on the precise identity of the disputed
property. What petitioners claimed in their complaint was a parcel of
land located in Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 3,625
square meters. 11 This clearly differs from the piece of land
registered in the name of the Gepalagos, which is Lot No. A-73 of
the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-60558, LRC Rec. No. H-4251, and
located in Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of
5,970 square meters. 12 Even the commissioner's report failed to
clarify the difference in the area and location of the property
claimed. In order that an action to recover ownership of real
property may prosper, the person who claims that he has a better
right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but also
satisfactorily prove the identity thereof. 13
As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the
vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to
rely on what appears on the face of the title. 14 He is under no
obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of
the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. By way of
exception, the vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if
there is anything in the certificate of title which indicates any cloud
or vice in the ownership of the property. 15 Otherwise, his mere
refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his
eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's
title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value if it
afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to
its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which
may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation. 16
Petitioners maintain that it is the exception, not the general rule,
which should be applied in this case. They argue that respondents
had knowledge of prior possession and enjoyment by petitioners
when they purchased the property. Thus, they were not innocent
purchasers for value and could not invoke the indefeasibility of their
title.
We do not agree. The exception contemplates a situation wherein
there exists a flaw in the title of the vendor and the vendee has
knowledge or at least ought to have known of such flaw at the time
he acquired the property, in which case, he is not considered as an
innocent purchaser for value. In the instant case, we discern nothing
from the records showing that the title of PNB, the vendor, was
flawed. Petitioners not only failed to substantiate their claim of
acquisitive prescription as basis of ownership but they also failed to
allege, and much less adduce, any evidence that there was a defect
in the title of PNB. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption
leans towards the validity of the vendor's title.
Therefore, inasmuch as there was no flaw in the title of PNB, private
respondents rightly believed that they could and did acquire likewise
a flawless title. Indeed, as a result of the deed of conveyance
between PNB and private respondents, there was transmission of
ownership and the latter stepped into the shoes of the former hence
entitled to all the defenses available to PNB, including those arising
from the acquisition of the property in good faith and for value.
Finally, another consideration that militates heavily against the
present petition is the unusual silence of petitioners while the
ownership of the disputed land transferred from one person to
another. There were at least three (3) transactions on record
involving the property: first, the contract of mortgage between
Luspo and PNB whereby the property was used as security for the
loan contracted by Luspo; second, the foreclosure of mortgage upon
the failure of Luspo to pay the loan and the subsequent sale of the
property at public auction; and, third, the sale of the property to
fifty-six (56) vendees, among whom were the Gepalago spouses.
Each of these transactions was registered and a corresponding
transfer certificate issued in favor of the new owner. Yet in all these,
petitioners never instituted any action contesting the same nor
registered any objection thereto; instead, they remained silent.
Thus, they are now estopped from denying the title of the present
owner. Having failed to assert their rights, if any, over the property
warrants the presumption that they have either abandoned them or
declined to assert them. Or, it could likewise be inferred therefrom
that petitioners themselves were not convinced in the validity of their
claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals of 31 July 1995 as well as its Resolution of 14 December
1995 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
 SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 142546 August 9, 2001
HEIRS OF ANASTACIO FABELA, namely; Teodula Fabela
Paguidopon, Ricardo Fabela, Irenita Fabela Zea(d), Carolina
Fabela Arazo Donglas, and Ampiloquio Fabela, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ROQUE NERI, namely:
Roque Neri, Jr. Filomeno, Sherlina, Emeterio, Antonio, Nelcar
and Claudia, all surnamed Neri, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioners, heirs of Anastacio Fabela, seek to annul the (1) decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals dated June 17, 19991 which
reversed and set aside the appealed judgment by default of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan De Oro
City2 in Civil Case No. 10459 declaring petitioners as the rightful
owners of subject lot 868 of the Pls. 293 of Balacanas, Nabacaan,
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, and (2) its resolution dated February
18,3 2000 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Sometime in December 1985, the heirs of Anastacio Fabela filed a
complaint for reconveyance and damages against the heirs of Roque
Neri, Sr., involving the subject lot 868, alleging among others, that
plaintiffs' late grandfather, Anastacio Fabela, left two parcels of land
in Nabacaan, Misamis Oriental which were later identified as lot 868
with an area of 48,121 sq. meters and lot 870 consisting of 15,658
sq. meters which originally formed part of their grandfather's big
tract of land; that earlier in 1924, the parcel of land became the
subject of litigation (Civil Case No. 2891) in the then Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental between Carmelino Neri as plaintiff and
Simeona Balhon and children heirs of Anastacio Fabela as
defendants and in connection therewith, the parties entered into an
agreement embodied in an "Escritura de transaccion", a notarized
document in a Visayan dialect, which provided that Carmelino Neri,
as vendee-a-retro had been entrusted with the possession of a
parcel of land for a period of fourteen (14) years from the date of
the instrument which was May 10, 1924 and upon the expiration of
said period, Carmelino Neri was to restore the possession of the
property to Simeona Balhon and her children-heirs of Anastacio
Fabela, without need of "redemption"; that sometime in 1977 or
1978, the Bureau of Lands conducted a cadastral survey on this land
when a road (Barrio Abacan road) was constructed across the land
dividing it into two separate lots which are now known as lot 868
and 870; that Roque Neri Sr. declared these two parcels of land in
his name with the Bureau of Lands and the Assessor's office; that
sometime in 1980, the Philippine Veterans Industrial Development
Corporation (PHIVIDEC), a government entity buying substantially all
real properties at Nabacaan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, negotiated
with Roque Neri Sr. for the purchase of lot 870, however, the heirs
of Anastacio Fabela, protested and consequently, Roque Neri Sr.
executed a waiver of rights over a portion of lot 870 stating that the
8,000 sq. meter portion of lot 870 was erroneously included in his
name, thus plaintiff heirs of Anastacio Fabela eventually received the
proceeds of the sale; that with respect to lot 868, which was the lot
in controversy, the late Roque Neri Sr. continued to ignore plaintiffs'
demand for the return of the said lot. Plaintiffs prayed for judgment
declaring (1) the plan of lot 868, Pls-293 and the tax declarations
issued subsequent to and by virtue of aforesaid plan as null and
void, (2) the heirs of Anastacio Fabela as the lawful owners of lot
868, and (3) the estate of Roque Neri Sr. liable for payment of
damages.
Upon motion of plaintiffs heirs of Anastacio Fabela, defendants
Sherlinda Neri Jamisolamin, Emeterio Neri and Antonio Neri, were
declared in default on April 14, 1986, Filomena Neri on September
26, 1986 while Nelchar and Claudia Neri on February 9, 1989, for
their failure to file answer despite receipt of summons and copy of
the complaint. On the other hand, defendant Roque B. Neri, Jr. had
filed his answer with Counterclaim, but was likewise declared in
default for failure to appear at pre-trial on August 12, 1988.
The case was submitted for decision on the basis of plaintiffs'
evidence since all the defendants were declared in default. After trial
and hearing ex-parte, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads:4
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
rendered in favor of the heirs of the late Anastacio Fabela
including those named in the Complaint as plaintiffs, as co-
owners of lot 868, Pls-293 subject of the complaint and as
indicated in the plan (Exhibit D), as such entitled to the full
enjoyment and possession thereof. All other prayers or
claims in the complaint are denied for lack of merit."
In finding that the property belonged to the heirs of Anastacio
Fabela, the trial court concluded that in the "Escritura de
Transaccion," Carmelino Neri was obliged to restore the subject
property in or about 1938 to the heirs of Anastacio Fabela; thus the
fulfillment of that prestation of Carmelino Neri was presumed under
Section 5, par (ii), Rule 131, Rules of Court which enumerates
among the disputable presumptions "that a trustee or other person
whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has
actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to
perfect the title of such person or his successor-in interest." It thus
found that the Fabela heirs have been in possession of lot 868 since
1938 up to the present and as such were entitled to the full
enjoyment and possession as owners thereof.
On July 24, 1989, defendants heirs of Roque Neri Sr. filed a motion
to set aside orders of default and judgment which the trial court
denied in an Order dated August 22, 1989, on the grounds that the
motion had been filed out of time (after judgment) and that even if
such motion would be treated as a motion to set aside
judgment/new trial under Section 1, Rule 37, Rules of Court,
defendants' negligence was not excusable, much less a mistake.5
Heirs of Roque Neri Sr. appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Considering, however, that the original records of the case from the
trial court had been lost or misplaced, the respondent court,
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals (RIRCA), set the case for preliminary conference on
December 17, 1998, which was reset to January 26, 1999, and the
parties were informed of the loss of the original records of the case.
Counsel for defendants-appellants heirs of Roque Neri Sr. manifested
her clients' willingness to submit the case for decision, even without
the original records and asked for thirty days to file memorandum, to
which manifestation counsel for plaintiffs-appellees heirs of Fabela
interposed no objection. The respondent court granted appellants'
prayer and gave plaintiffs-appellees twenty days to file their counter
memorandum and appellants ten (10) days to file reply
memorandum, after which the case was submitted for decision.6
On June 17, 1999, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its
assailed decision reversing the trial court's judgment by default and
dismissed the complaint. It sustained the trial court's declaration of
default against appellants heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. but found that the
judgment of default was contrary to the evidence or the law. It
concluded that petitioners had not successfully adduced the required
preponderance of evidence on their claim of absolute ownership over
lot 868, the court stated:7
"Art. 434 of the Civil Code states that "In an action to
recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claims. The possessor of the
property has the presumption of title in his favor. Hence,
any person who claims that he has a better right to the
property, as owner thereof, must prove (1) that he has a
better title than the defendant to the property, and (2) the
identity of the property. The identity of the land sought to
be recovered may be established through the survey plan of
the property. Ownership may be proved by any evidence
admissible in law, such as titles and certificates, long
possession and tax declarations or receipts.
Appellees claimed that Lots 868 and 870 are owned by their
grandfather Anastacio Fabela. The records of the Bureau of
Lands, as well as the survey plan presented in court,
however, indicate Roque Neri, Sr. as the registered claimant
of both lots. The original of the 'Escritura de Transaccion' on
which appellees relied heavily, was not presented in court.
Its probative value, however, remains doubtful since said
document does not really prove appellees' absolute
ownership of the subject property, nor was Lot 868 explicitly
referred to as the property being entrusted to the vendee-a-
retro (Carmelino Neri).
On the other hand, the waiver of rights executed in 1980 by
Roque Neri, Sr. appears to refer only to a portion of Lot 870
(the parcel of land sold to PHIVIDEC), and not to Lot 868.
The old tax declaration presented by appellees and which
supposedly covered the two (2) lots did not specify the lot
number, nor was there any evidence presented that the
original parcel of land actually consisted of eighteen (18)
hectares. Their allegation that both lots have already been
partitioned among the heirs of Anastacio Fabela was not
substantiated by any document or writing evidencing such
extra-judicial partition. The fourteen (14) years of the
agreed temporary possession of the land by the defendants-
appellants had lapsed a long time ago, and this was prior to
the 1971 public survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands. It
appears appellees did not exert diligent efforts to regain
possession or resume paying taxes on the land thereafter,
prior to the purchase of Lot 870 by PHIVIDEC. The fact that
appellees were the ones paid by PHIVIDEC for the portion of
Lot 870 does not automatically lead to the conclusion that
they also absolutely own Lot 868. Most significant yet, is
appellees' failure to adequately explain why they had not at
all registered their claim over the property with the Bureau
of Lands during and after the public survey in the
municipality.
Roque Neri, Sr., appellants' predecessor-in-interest,
meanwhile registered his claim or interest on the land and
declared it for taxation purposes. Appellees' claim of
possession was through the land's caretaker and
administrator, Delfin Sia, but at the same time admitting that
appellants similarly benefit from the fruits of the land.
Regarding tax declarations, it has been held that while tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual
possession, they are strong evidence of ownership. Thus,
where it was shown that plaintiff has never paid the land
tax, while the defendant has faithfully done so for many
years, there being no explanation offered, it was held that
such payment of taxes should be taken into consideration in
 favor of defendant. Being the exclusive possessors of the
subject property who have declared the same for tax
purposes through the years, defendants-appellants are
entitled to such favorable presumption of ownership which
so far had not been overturned by plaintiffs-appellees.
The foregoing considered, it is clear that plaintiffs had not
successfully proved by the required preponderance of
evidence their claim of absolute ownership of Lot 868. It is
an invariable rule laid down in numerous decisions, that a
person who claims the ownership of property is in duty
bound to clearly identify the land claimed, in accordance
with the titles on which he founds (sic) his right to
ownership, and he shall not be permitted to rely upon the
defects in defendant's title. Failure to prove his right of
ownership will bar an action to recover the property; his
right to recover must be founded on positive title or right,
and not merely on negative ones, such as the lack or
insufficiency of title on the part of the defendant. The
possessor has a presumption of title, and unless the plaintiff
proves he has a better right, he cannot recover the property
from the defendant."
Appellees' motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution
dated February 18, 2000.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the heirs of
Anastacio Fabela alleging that the respondent court (1) departed
from the stringent jurisprudence on default and appeals filed out of
time and (2) erred in the appreciation of the findings of fact of the
lower court.
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners fault the respondent court
for reversing the decision of the trial court despite its complete
agreement with the findings of the trial court that respondents were
properly declared in default. They contend that the reasons cited by
private respondents for their failure to file answer and to appear at
the pre-trial were not meritorious and that private respondents'
affidavit attached to the motion for reconsideration did not declare
how Roque Neri Sr. acquired lot 868.
We are not persuaded.
Section 1, Rule 188 of the old Rules of Court which is the law
applicable in the instant case provides:
"Judgment by default — If the defendant fails to answer
within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon
motion of the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the
defendant in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to
receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting
him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may
warrant. This provision applies where no answer is made to
a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint within
the period provided in this rule."
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained
that the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting
party, petitioners in this case, warrant the grant of the same.9 In this
sense, the law gives the defaulting parties some measure of
protection because plaintiffs, despite the default of defendants, are
still required to substantiate their allegations in the complaint. The
judgment of default against defendants who have not appeared or
filed their answers does not imply a waiver of all their rights, except
their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their
allegations.10 Otherwise, it would be meaningless to require
presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in
default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the
non-defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his
prayer.11 Since the trial court rendered a judgment of default against
private respondents, the latter took the appropriate remedy which is
an ordinary appeal under Section 2 Rule 41, par (3)12 , of the Rules
of Court providing in part as follow:
"A party who has been declared in default may likewise
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary
to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to
set aside the order of default had been presented by him in
accordance with Rule 38."
Thus, notwithstanding the respondent court's complete agreement
with the trial court's findings that all the respondents were properly
declared in default, it found that the judgment by default was
contrary to the evidence or the law and thus reversed the trial court
decision.
Anent the second error, petitioners claim that the respondent court
erred in concluding that petitioners' predecessor Roque Neri, Sr.
appeared as the registered claimant of lot 868 and 870 which was
contrary to the findings of the trial court that the "plan showing lot
868 (Exh. D-2) and lot 870 (Exh. D-1) although appearing to have
been approved by Jose F. Gatus, OIC, Regional Director, on July 17,
1986 does not on its face indicate for whom it had been approved";
that Neri Sr. failed to produce evidence of ownership on how he
acquired the subject Lot No. 868. They further claim that the
execution in their favor by Roque Neri Sr. of a waiver of right over
lot 870 where the former acknowledged the erroneous inclusion of
the lot in his name was a strong admission against interest on Neri's
part. They also contend that the respondent court erred in doubting
the probative value of the "Escritura de Transaccion" only for the
reason that the original was not presented in court.
These arguments essentially raise factual issues which normally are
not reviewable by this Court in a petition under Rule 45 which is
generally limited only to question of law.13 While certain exceptions
to this rule are recognized such as when the factual findings of the
respondent Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the
Regional Trial Court, the Court does not, in all cases of disagreement
of facts between these two courts, automatically delve into the
record to determine the facts for itself.14 Admittedly, there have
been instances when this Court made independent findings of fact
on the points that the trial court and the appellate court disagreed
but we did not do so as a matter of course. When the dispute
between the two courts are merely on probative value, we limit our
review of the evidence ascertaining if the findings of the Court of
Appeals are supported by the record. And, so long as the findings of
the said court are consistent with, or not palpably contrary to, the
evidence on record, we decline to make a review on the probative
value of the evidence.15 In the instant case, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the factual findings of the respondent court and its
conclusion that petitioners failed to establish their case by
preponderance of evidence.
The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to
maintain an action for recovery of ownership, the person who claims
that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his
ownership of the property claimed but also the identity thereof.16
The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land
claimed by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.17
In the instant case, petitioners based their claim of ownership on the
"1924 Escritura de Transaccion", the original copy of which was not
presented in the trial court, while the photocopy was also lost when
the original records were elevated to the respondent court. This was
the only piece of evidence that would establish petitioners'
ownership and the identity of subject lot 868. In ruling for
petitioners heirs of Anastacio Fabela as the absolute owners of lot Q: Now while it was still in the hands of Anastacio
868, the trial court found that in the Escritura, "it appears that the Fabela while he was still alive, do you know what was the
portion which is now identified as lot 868 had been entrusted to the total area of the mother lot?
possession of Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a retro, for a period of 14
years from the date of the instrument which was May 10, 1924 and A: Yes, it was estimated by our father and we
upon the expiration of which said Carmelino Neri was to restore the estimated it to be 18 hectares.
possession of the property to Simeona Balhon and her children heirs
of Anastacio Fabela, namely Petra Buenaventura, Julio and Pedro, all Q: Do you have evidence to prove that it was indeed
surnamed Fabela, without need of 'redemption'," and "that 18 hectares?
fulfillment of Neri's obligation was presumed to have taken place."
We note, however, that nowhere in the trial court's narration of facts
A: Yes, ma'am.
were the boundaries of the parcel of land indicated with particularity,
nor the parcel of land referring to as lot 868. What really defines a
piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description, but the Q: I am showing to you an old document but only a
boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its xerox copy thereof entitled escritura de transaccion
limits.18 notarized by Uldarico Akut in the year 1924, kindly take a
look and see where is the 18 hectares which you have just
mentioned?
Moreover, the testimony of petitioner heir Teodula Fabela
Paguidopon which was quoted in part in petitioners' own
memorandum19 did not also clearly establish the relation of the said A: This one.
"Escritura de Transaccion" to lot 868, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
"Q: Now, that bigger lot has the cadastral lot number
before? ATTY. LLEGO:

A: No because that was not yet surveyed. "x x x We will have this marked as our Exhibits A, A-
1 to A-3."
Q: Do you know who owns this lot?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Our grandfather Anastacio Fabela.
(TSN of 2/9/89 pages 16 to 18 (topmost)

COURT:
 Plaintiff is ordered to prepare the English translation
of that document.
xxx xxx xxx
(TSN of 2/9/89 page 18)
"ATTY. LLEGO: (continuing)
Q: You have pointed this portion as your basis for
saying that the area is 18 hectares. Now kindly read this
paragraph on the description of the land for purposes of
record. (witness is ready (sic)
Which, we pray that that portion being read into the record
by witness be marked as our Exhibit A-4.
COURT:
Mark it. (page 18 bottom to page 19 middle portion of the
page)."
Unfortunately, the description of the eighteen (18) hectare land
which should had been read and incorporated into the transcript for
purposes of record, was omitted in the quoted portion, to establish
the exact location, area and boundary of the 18 hectare lot in
relation to lot 868. The omission has created serious doubts as to
the specific identity of the lot which petitioners sought to recover.
Moreover, even in the petitioners' complaint filed before the trial
court, there was no allegation of the metes and bounds of the
subject lot, the complaint reads:
"3) a. That the grandfather of plaintiffs-the late Anastacio
Fabela, had left among others, the following property, to
wit:
a) Lot 870
Area: 15,658 sq. m.
Location: Nabacaan, Misamis Oriental
b) Lot 868
Area: 48,121 sq. m.
Location: Nabacaan, Misamis Oriental
b. That the above described parcels of land are adjacent to
each other as shown by a photocopy of the sketch plan from
the Bureau of Lands hereto enclosed and marked as Annex
"B";
c. That these two parcels since time immemorial used to be
one big parcel of land, until in 1977 or 1978, when a
government cadastral survey in Villanueva, Misamis Oriental,
was undertaken by the Bureau of Lands, wherein a road was
provided and made to appear across the big parcel of land,
causing it to be divided physically and for which the
government surveyors assigned two lots numbers for what
used to be one big parcel of land, thus the appearance of
Lot 870 and Lot 868; This once one big chunk of land never
had a cadastral number in the past;"
Notably, the total area of lots 868 and 870 would only be about
63,679 sq. meters or about six (6) hectares which fails to correspond
to the eighteen (18) hectare parcel of land allegedly owned by the
late Anastacio Fabela which was the subject of the "Escritura de
Transaccion" and testified to by Teodula Fabela Paguidopon.
Petitioners failed to identify the land with that degree of certainty
required to support their affirmative allegation of ownership.
Moreover, the respondent court found, and we agree, that the
waiver of rights executed in 1980 by Roque Neri Sr., in favor of
petitioners referred only to a portion of lot 870 and not to lot 868.
Thus such waiver which petitioners capitalized on as an admission
against Neri's interest did not in any way support petitioners' claim
of ownership of lot 868. Said waiver reads:20
"ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ADJUDICATION AND QUITCLAIM
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, Roque Neri, Sr., of legal age, widower, Filipino, with
residence and postal address at Villanueva, Misamis Oriental,
Philippines, do hereby ACKNOWLEDGE AND CONFIRM that
the certain portion of a parcel of land located at Balacanas,
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental under Lot No. 870 of Pls. 923 of
Villanueva Public Land. Subdivision containing a total area of
SIXTEEN THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (16,000 sq. m.)
which portion is more particularly described as follows:
North — Roque Neri, Sr.
East — Nabacaan Road
West — Tayum Creek
South — Lot 869
containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND SQUARE METERS
(8,000 sq. m.) is hereby adjudicated in favor of the Heirs of
Anastacio Fabela.
That the above described portion of a parcel of land actually
belongs and owned by said Heirs of Anastacio Fabela.
That the above described portion of land was erroneously
included in the land survey conducted by the Bureau of
Lands in my name.
That I hereby quitclaim and renounce whatever interest,
rights and participation I have over the described portion of
real property of which the Heirs of Anastacio Fabela were
the lawful owners.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 18th
day of August 1980 in Villanueva, Misamis Oriental,
Philippines.
SGD. ILLEGIBLE
T/ROQUE NERI, SR."
A simple reading of the instrument would readily show that only
8,000 sq. meters of the entire 16,000 sq. meters included in lot 870
was adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Anastacio Fabela as
belonging to them. In fact, petitioners in their memorandum
admitted that only 8,000 sq. meters was given to them and yet they
did not take any positive action to assert their ownership of the
entire lot 870. Petitioners have accordingly no sound basis to claim
lot 868 by virtue of such instrument. As the appellate court
succinctly stated, "the fact that appellees were the ones paid by
PHIVIDEC for the portion of lot 870 does not automatically lead to
the conclusion that they also absolutely own lot 868. Most
significantly, is appellees failure to adequately explain why they had
not at all registered their claim over the property with the Bureau of
Lands during and after the public survey in the municipality." Finally,
petitioners also failed to allege much less establish that they are in
possession of the subject lot.
On the other hand, the respondent court found, and this finding was
not refuted, that petitioners' own witness, Norberto Dumat-ol, a
representative of the Bureau of Lands, testified that when a
cadastral survey was conducted in 1971, the registered claimant of
lot 868 based on their official record was Roque Neri Sr. Petitioners'
allegation that Neri Sr., committed fraud in the registration in his
name of these two (2) parcels of lot was not substantiated. The
survey plan for lot 868 was approved for Roque Neri Sr. and he had
also declared lot 868 for taxation purposes which was admitted by
petitioners as their complaint prayed for the annulment of the plan
and tax declaration. Although a tax declaration is not considered as
conclusive proof of ownership the same is admissible in evidence to
show the nature of the possession of the claimant of the property for
which taxes have been paid. We accordingly find well-taken the
respondent court's conclusion as follows:
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his
case by preponderance of evidence.21 If he claims a right granted or
created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of his opponent.22 When the record does not show
that the land which is the subject matter of the action for recovery
of ownership has been exactly determined, such action cannot
prosper, inasmuch as the petitioners' ownership rights in the land
claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the
trial.23
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., is on leave.

"Thus, where it was shown that plaintiff has never paid the
land tax, while the defendant has faithfully done so for many
years, there being no explanation offered, it was held that
such payment of taxes should be taken into consideration in
favor of defendant. Being the exclusive possessors of the
subject property who have declared the same for tax
purposes through the years, defendants-appellants are
entitled to such favorable presumption of ownership which
so far had not been overturned by plaintiffs-appellees."
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 96644 June 17, 1994
HEIRS OF JUAN OCLARIT, namely: FRANCISCA VDA. DE
OCLARIT, SOFRONIO OCLARIT, BELACIO OCLARIT, RUFINO
OCLARIT, JUANA OCLARIT DE MACALOS, assisted by her
husband HILARIO MACALOS, FELISA OCLARIT DE LACRE,
assisted by her husband, COSME LACRE; HEIRS OF PAULA
OCLARIT DE OCANG, namely: PETRA OCANG and ALFREDO
OCANG, ANGELA OCLARIT DE OCANG, assisted by her
husband, CARLOS OCANG, EPIFANIA OCLARIT DE
ALMODOBAL, assisted by her husband, URBANO
ALMODOBAL, CRESENCIA OCLARIT DE IVARRETA, assisted
by her husband, LUCRESIO IVARRETA, NARCISA OCLARIT
DE CAGAS, assisted by her husband, JUAN CAGAS, and
JUSTO OCLARIT, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZACARIAS BALASABAS, respondents.
Lord M. Marapao for petitioners.
Urbano Lagumay for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
Petitioners seek the review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on September 28, 1990, affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch
2, Tagbilaran City, dismissing their complaint for quieting of title with
damages and declaring the defendant (private respondent herein)
the owner of the parcels of land subjects of controversy.
In 1953, the late Juan Oclarit, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest,
allegedly purchased from Martin Macalos a parcel of unregistered
land located in Antipolo, Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, with no
permanent landmarks or boundaries in consideration of the sum of
one hundred (P100.00) pesos. The deed of sale simply described the
property as bounded on the north and east by the property of
Herminigildo Baja, on the south by Mariano Gales and on the west
by a brook.
In 1956, Oclarit bought five more parcels of land located in Antipolo
and Ulbujan, also in Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, from Dalmacio Gales
in consideration of the sum of six hundred (P600.00) pesos. Parcel
IV thereof is described as follows:
A parcel of an irrigated rice and coconut lands,
bounded on the NORTH, by the land of Leon
Macalos; EAST, by the land of Mariano Gales;
SOUTH, by the land of Pablo Gales, and on the
WEST, by the land of Saturnino Gales; containing an
area of 9 ares and 28 centares, more or less,
without visible landmarks of the boundaries of the
same, covered by Tax Declaration No. R-19915 now
transferred and declared under the name of the
herein VENDEE, JUAN OCLARIT, with the total
assessed value of P30.00.
In 1975, the heirs of Oclarit filed an action for the quieting of title
and damages against respondent Balasabas before the then Court of
First Instance of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 3103. The
complaint alleged that in January 1969, private respondent entered
the properties subject of the action. Failing to work on the area
planted to palay, private respondent climbed the coconut trees,
replaced the "J.O." markings on the trees with "F.G.", representing
Felipa Gales, his mother, and caused to be recorded in the cadastral
survey of the land the name of Felipa Gales as claimant against Juan
Oclarit. The heirs of Oclarit considered the acts of private respondent
as having cast a cloud of doubt over their title to the property and
therefore deprived them of the enjoyment of the fruits of the
coconut trees. Petitioners further alleged that the late Juan Oclarit,
from the time of the acquisition of said properties, had exercised
dominion and ownership thereon openly, peacefully, adversely and
uninterruptedly. It was also claimed that the deceased planted
coconut trees and other crops on the property, enjoyed their
produce and paid the realty taxes on the land which was continued
by his heirs after his death.
In his answer, respondent Balasabas claims to have actually and
lawfully possessed the disputed parcels of land "since time
immemorial". According to respondent, the first parcel of land was
owned by his mother, Felipa Gales, by virtue of inheritance, and
declared in her name under Tax Declaration No. D-1120; while the
second parcel of land was acquired by him from his own mother as
evidenced by a deed of absolute sale executed on March 20, 1963
and which he declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. D-
1006. In addition, respondent likewise alleged possession of the
parcels of land openly, peacefully, adversely and continuously
without disturbance from any party until he was molested by the
heirs of Oclarit. It was contended that Oclarit himself surreptitiously
declared these lands for taxation purposes in his own name.
In the course of the proceedings, the trial court appointed Teotimo
Borja, Deputy Provincial Assessor of Bohol, as commissioner for the
purpose of determining whether the lands described in the complaint
and covered by Tax Declarations Nos. D-13935 and D-13926
overlapped with any of the lands described in the defendant’s
affirmative and special defenses and covered by Tax Declarations
Nos. D-1120 and D-1006. In 1978, the court-appointed
commissioner conducted a relocation survey and an ocular
inspection of the properties in controversy in the presence of the
heirs of Oclarit, their counsel, respondent Balasabas, a policeman,
and adjoining owners Procopio Oclarit, Galicana J. Pagaran, Maxima
Macula, Felipe Macula and some disinterested persons. In his report
dated May 25, 1979, the commissioner made the following findings
and observations:
When plaintiffs were asked the extent of their land
under the tax declaration No. D-13935, they pointed
to the undersigned that figure in Annex ‘A’ which is
embraced from corners 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14 back to 1 by a red ball pen broken
lines. The area of this is approximately 3,639 square
meters (.3639 ha.). The area of the tax declaration
No. D-13935 is .0928 ha. This Annex ‘A’, which is
made an integral part of this report has been traced
from the file of the Bureau of Lands Office in Jagna,
Bohol. The personnel in that office informed the
undersigned that no Lot numbers have as yet been
assigned and that the traverse is not yet computed
because it will be done by IBM. This land is partly
cocal (on the northeastern portion) and partly
riceland. There are thirty (30) coconut trees mostly
of which are 40 to 50 years old;
 Defendant Zacarias Balasabas pointed the extent of
his claim under the tax declaration No. D-1120 as
that area in the cadastral survey. In other words he
refer(red) to his claims as that figure in Annex ‘A’
embraced by corners 1, a, 2, 3, 4, b, c, d, e, 11, 12,
f, 13, 14 to 1 and shaded by pencil diagonal lines
and which is titled ‘HRS. OF JUAN OCLARIT VS.
FELIPA GALES’ in the cadastral survey. This contains
an area of 1,420 square meters (.1420 ha.), more or
less. The tax declaration No. D-1120 has an area of
.44010 ha.;
Plaintiffs and defendants both claimed the same
parcel of land on the western portion of Annex ‘A’
and which is titled ‘FRANCISCA MACALOS VS.
ZACARIAS BALASABAS’ in the cadastral survey as
that which is represented by their tax declaration
Nos. D-13926 and D-1006, respectively. This parcel
which is embraced by corners A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H,
I, J, K to A contains an area of 3,098 square meters
(.3098 ha.), more or less. The tax declaration No. D-
13926 in the name of Juan Oclarit contains an area
of .0204 ha. and the tax declaration No. D-1006 of
defendant has an area of .8147 ha. There are
approximately 200 coconut trees many of which are
still non-bearing. The contour of this lot is generally
hilly. (Rollo, p. 39)
In its decision, the lower court made the following findings: the heirs
of Oclarit and Balasabas are laying claim over the same parcels of
land; Dalmacio Gales, who sold to Oclarit the parcel of land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 13935, was an uncle of Balasabas’ mother,
Felipa Gales; Martin Macalos, the vendor of the land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 13926, was the cousin of Balasabas’ grandmother,
Guillerma Gales; the area being claimed by the heirs of Oclarit is, per
commissioner’s report, approximately 3,639 square meters (.3639
ha.) while Tax Declaration No. 13935 shows that it is only 928
square meters (.0928 ha.) and the area of the second parcel per
commissioner’s report is approximately 3,098 square meters (.3098
ha.) while that reflected in Tax Declaration No. 13926 is only 204
square meters (.0204 ha.).
From these findings, the lower court expressed its surprise as to the
size of the area being claimed by the heirs of Oclarit according to the
commissioner’s report in comparison with the areas shown in Tax
Declarations Nos. 13935 and 13926. While recognizing that areas
stated in tax declarations are not "approximately exact," the lower
court nonetheless considered the discrepancies between the actual
areas being claimed and those shown in the tax declarations as "too
obvious to be taken with excuse." Moreover, it doubted the
credibility of petitioners for their failure to explain why the adjoining
owners named in their claim are different from the adjoining owners
found by the commissioner. Furthermore, if petitioners were indeed
the real owners of the two parcels of land, they would have taken
steps for the correction of the smaller areas stated in the tax
declarations. Concluding that petitioners were claiming much bigger
parcels than what their evidence can support under justifiable
circumstances, the trial court thus disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding a preponderance of evidence
in favor of the defendant, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1 Dismissing the complaint;
2 Declaring the defendant as the owner of the lots
covered by Tax Declarations Nos. D-1120 and D-
1006 with area of .4010 hectare and .8147 hectare,
 respectively and ordering the plaintiffs to recognize
such ownership by the defendant; and
3 Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant
attorney’s fee of P500.00 and litigation expenses of
P400.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, respondent court ruled that petitioners failed to prove
either legal or equitable title to the two parcels of land which are
necessary in an action for quieting of title. Petitioners’ claim of
ownership was based principally on tax declarations which, however,
are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s
declaration that private respondent is the owner of the two parcels
of land and such ownership should be recognized by petitioners. It
considered such conclusion of the lower court as "bereft of any
convincing evidence" because tax receipts, tax declarations and
survey plans are not conclusive and indisputable bases of ownership.
Accordingly, it disposed of the appeal in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
of the Court a quo dismissing the plaintiffs’
complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. The portions thereof
declaring the defendant as the owner of the lots
covered by Tax Declarations Nos. D-1120 and D-
1006, respectively, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay
the defendant attorney’s fee of P=500.00, litigation
expenses of P=400.00 and costs of the proceedings
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 40)
Their motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied,
the heirs of Oclarit instituted the instant petition. Private respondent
did not appeal the above disposition.
The petition is moored primarily on the following contentions: (a) the
filing of Civil Case No. 3103 was the only legal remedy available to
petitioners against the "malicious and unwarranted actuations" of
private respondent; (b) Oclarit’s undisturbed claim of ownership of
the two parcels of land which he acquired in 1953 and 1956, had
spanned more than ten years until private respondent disturbed it in
1969; (c) the two parcels of land mentioned by private respondent in
his answer are "foreign and alien" to the two parcels which Oclarit
bought from Dalmacio Gales and Martin Macalos and because these
vendors had been in possession of the property "from time
immemorial", the "waters of prescription have set in"; (d) the Court
of Appeals failed to appreciate the real worth of Exhibits "N" to "P"
otherwise it would have noted that petitioners’ "clear ownership over
said two (2) parcels of land in litigation as the description found
therein jibed materially" with the averments in the complaint, and
(e) the lower court, in a decision in another case, cited (Ramos v.
Court of Appeals 112 SCRA 543) holding that tax receipts are strong
evidence of possession as no one in his right mind would pay realty
taxes year after year for property not in his actual possession.
From the above submissions, it is at once apparent that petitioners
assail the factual findings of both courts below. However, there is no
basis for considering this case as an exception to the general rule
that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on and
are not reviewable by this Court (Oporto v. Court of Appeals, 208
SCRA 878 [1992]). A careful review of the decisions below do not
show that both courts overlooked essential facts which, if
considered, would have changed the outcome of the case. Moreover,
the matter of giving credence to evidence presented is best
addressed by the trial judge who is in a better position than the
appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the
testimonies of witnesses who have appeared before him (Sapu-an v.
Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 701 [1992]). In civil cases, the lower
court must lean towards a party who successfully presents
preponderance of evidence in his favor.
It is thus too late in the day for petitioners to claim that the parcels
of land which Oclarit had bought are "alien" or different from the
parcels which private respondent had allegedly acquired from his
mother both by inheritance and by purchase. This is clearly a factual
issue which is beyond the ambit of this Court’s jurisdiction.
It was precisely for the purpose of pointing out with particularity the
parcels of land involved that the lower court appointed a
commissioner whose findings may be adopted in toto by the trial
court (See: Apurillo v. Garciano, 28 SCRA 1054). Had the petitioners
been in possession of solid evidence that the parcels of land they are
claiming are "alien" or "foreign" to those declared by private
respondent as his, they should have questioned the commissioner’s
report which was based on the relocation survey and ocular
inspection which were conducted in their presence. Moreover,
petitioners’ claim that their property is different from those of private
respondent’s is indeed antithetical to their filing of the complaint for
quieting of title — there would not have been any basis for claiming
that private respondent cast a cloud of doubt to their title over their
two parcels of land.
More, the deed of sale wherein Martin Macalos conveyed to Oclarit a
parcel of land did not even indicate with particularity the area of the
land covered thereby. This explains why they indiscriminately
pointed at boundaries which are even beyond what could have been
bought by Oclarit. Although it is true that what defines a piece of
land is not the area mentioned in its description but the boundaries
therein laid down (Vda. de Tan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 213
SCRA 95 [1992]), in controversial cases as in this case where there
appears to be an overlapping of boundaries, the actual size of the
property gains importance. Thus, the lower court correctly stressed
that it would have done petitioners some good had they correctly
specified even in their tax declarations the areas of the land they
were claiming. It is well settled that anyone who claims that he has
a better right to the property, must prove both ownership and
identity of the said property (Beo v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 574
[1991], citing Flores v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 717
[1989]). An area delimited by boundaries properly identifies a parcel
of land.
With regard to tax declarations as bases for claim of ownership,
petitioners capitalize on what was obviously an obiter in (Ramos v.
Court of Appeals) (supra) that no one in his right mind would be
continuously paying taxes for property that is not in his actual
possession. On the contrary, any person who claims ownership by
virtue of tax declarations must also prove he is in actual possession
of the property. Thus, proof that the property involved had been
declared for taxation purposes from 1908 to 1945, did not constitute
proof of possession, nor is it proof of ownership in the absence of
the claimant’s actual possession of said property (De Luna v. Court
of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]).
In the same vein, tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property (Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650 [1991];
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 214
[1992]).
As earlier stated, private respondent did not appeal from the adverse
decision of the appellate court. Yet, respondent ventures to implore
this Court to nullify and reverse the decretal portion of the decision
subject of this petition and to declare him the owner of the lots
covered by his Tax Declarations Nos. D-1120 and D-1006. This
cannot be legally done.

Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the

correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him. An appellee
may only make counter statement of errors to sustain the judgment
on other grounds but not to adduce arguments which would
otherwise modify or reverse the same, for in such case, an appeal
must have been seasonably filed (Itogon-Suyoc Mines v. NLRC, 117
SCRA 523 [1982] and cases cited therein). There being no appeal
taken by private respondent from the adverse judgment of
respondent court, the decision has become final as against him and
can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. That
respondent may have been in possession of the disputed properties
since 1965 is of no moment. This Court is not a cadastral court
before which respondent can seek confirmation of title.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109215 July 11, 2000
DOMINICA CUTANDA, SEBASTIAN CUTANDA, JUANARIO
CUTANDA, SOTERO CUTANDA, CRISPIN CUTANDA,
FLORENCIO CUTANDA, TRINIDAD CUTANDA, NICANOR
CUTANDA, GABINA CUTANDA FLORES, and CLAUDIO
CUTANDA, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA, namely, GERVACIO
CUTANDA, SOPRONIO C. CUTANDA, JORGE CUTANDA, and
CRISPIN G. AVENIDO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 31, 1992 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 24546, insofar as it
reverses the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Branch 1,
Tagbilaran City declaring the petitioners as the true and lawful
owners of the subject lands.
The background of this case is as follows:
On August 4, 1988, private respondents brought an action for
recovery of possession, accounting and damages against petitioners
in the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. They alleged1 that in
the 1900's, their grandfather, Roberto Cutanda, owned two parcels
of land in Bohol. One had an area of 31.0929 hectares and was
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1246,2 while the other was 7.0925
hectares and was covered by Tax Declaration No. 1247.3 Both tax
declarations were in Roberto Cutanda's name. Upon Roberto
Cutanda's death, these lands were inherited by his children, namely:
Doque, Diego, Pedro, Andres, and Anastacia, all surnamed Cutanda.
Except for Doque who stayed in Bohol and administered the lands,
all of Roberto Cutanda's children established residence in Leyte. In
1987, they returned to Bohol to personally work the inherited lands.
Their plan, however, was frustrated as petitioners, who were
occupying the lands, refused to leave. Private respondent thus
prayed that each be declared owner of 1/5 of the subject real
properties and that petitioners be ordered to return to them said
properties.
In due time, petitioners filed their answers. One was prepared by the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office, while the other one, which was the
one actually considered during the trial, was prepared by the Bureau
of Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Contending that private respondents had no cause of action,
petitioners denied that private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Roberto Cutanda, was the original owner of the lands in question.
Instead, they claimed that the owner was their uncle and
predecessor-in-interest, Anastacio Cutanda. It was alleged that
Anastacio Cutanda died without children and that the real properties
in question were inherited by his brothers and sisters whose children
are the present petitioners. Claiming a better right to possess the
subject properties, petitioners alleged that while they occupied the
shares which their parents inherited from Anastacio Cutanda, some
of them also worked as tenants cultivating the lands of their co-
petitioners. They filed a counterclaim in which they sought the
recovery of damages from private respondents.4
On September 28, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision5
declaring petitioners to have acquired the ownership of the subject
properties through prescription and dismissing private respondents'
complaint. The court ordered private respondents to vacate the
properties and remove whatever improvements they may have
made, to restore petitioners in possession of the lands, and to cease
from laying further adverse claims over the lands. As basis for its
ruling, the trial court made the following findings:
In the assessment of the evidence of the parties the court
finds the evidence of the defendants preponderant and had
established their case against plaintiffs, among the most
outstanding facts are as follows:
1. Even plaintiffs document (Exhibit "C") visayan
written testament/statement of Quirico Becauan
dated February 25, 1935, it admitted that before
1935 Anastacio Cutanda had been in the possession
of the land in question;
2. Gervacio Cutanda admitted that the defendants
thru their predecessor-in-interest Anastacio Cutanda
had squatted on the land since 1933 and since then
because his father Roberto Cutanda, the alleged
original owner of the land had transferred residence
in Leyte, the land was with the defendants.
Although, he came back in 1949, he and Sofronio
only claimed back the land in 1987;
3. That, it is beyond doubt that the defendants have
long been in possession and cultivation of the land
as owners whose possession if tacked with
Anastacio Cutanda since 1933 up to the present has
been for more than 54 years;
4. That, Tax Declaration No. 10434 of Anastacio
Cutanda from whom the defendants have inherited
the land is dated as far back as 1933 and
continuously until the present when different tax
declarations were issued in the names of the
defendants;
5. That, .defendants' continuous possession,
occupation and cultivation of the land is not
rebutted, refuted by convincing, sufficient evidence
by the plaintiffs whose claim, is highly nebulous and
unsatisfactory:
6. That, even assuming the plaintiffs have the right
over the land in question, the fact that they have
slept [on] their right since 1933 up to 1987 by failing
to institute an action to recover its ownership and
possession, plaintiffs are clearly guilty of laches;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That, Anastacio Cutanda's right over the land and
succeeded by defendants since 1933 has beyond
any cloud of doubt been sufficiently established.6
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 31,
1992, the appellate court rendered a decision7 which, while affirming
the dismissal of the case against petitioners, nonetheless declared
that there was no sufficient evidence that they were the owners of
the properties. It stated:
However, this Court finds that the trial court has exceeded
its jurisdiction in declaring defendants-appellees to be the
 true and lawful owners of the land in question there being
no sufficient evidence on record that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
for the period required by law as to acquire ownership
thereof by prescription.8
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the appellate court's
decision. On February 26, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied their
motions for lack of merit. No further action was taken by private
respondents so that the decision of the appellate court affirming the
dismissal of their action for recovery of possession, accounting and
damages became final. On the other hand, petitioners brought the
instant petition for review, insofar as the Court of Appeals ruled that
no sufficient evidence existed in the records to establish their
ownership of the lands.
The sole issue for resolution in this petition is thus whether
petitioners presented sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of
the lands in question. Petitioners contend that: (1) the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals should not be binding upon this Court as
they are in direct contradiction to that of the trial court;9 (2) the
decision of the Court of Appeals does not cite any reason for
reversing the trial court's findings of fact;10 (3) while agricultural
tenancy relations exist between them and the owners of the land,
they were also owners of the shares inherited by their parents from
Anastacio Cutanda;11 and (4) as found by the trial court, petitioners
and their predecessors have been in possession of the lands since
1933 and have consequently acquired the same through acquisitive
prescription.12
The petition is meritorious.
First. While both the Court of Appeals and the trial court held that
private respondents' action for recovery of possession (accion
publiciana) was already barred, it appears that they relied upon
different grounds. For the trial court, the ground was extinctive
prescription. Paragraph no. 7 of its findings plainly states that —
7. Consequent to laches, plaintiffs' right to the land having
allowed the defendants to possess, cultivate and claim as
owners since 1933 up to 1987, their rights if any are lost by
extinctive prescription and, therefore, defendants have
acquired the rights over the parcels of land by acquisitive
prescription.13
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held private respondents'
action to be barred by laches, thus:
The failure of plaintiff-appellants and their predecessors-in-
interest to assert their claim over the disputed properties
from the time that Anastacio Cutanda allegedly usurped said
lands in 1933 until the instant action was filed in 1988 — a
period of 55 years — constitutes laches and bars this action
to recover possession of said properties.14
In Maneclang v. Baun,15 this Court distinguished prescription from
laches as follows:
. . . While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay,
laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a
matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of
permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being
founded on some change in the condition of the property or
the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is
 not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at
law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not.
Based on this distinction, we hold that prescription, not laches, is the
proper ground for holding private respondent's action to be barred.
Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that by prescription, one
acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time,
in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. In the
same way, rights and actions are lost by prescription. There are thus
two kinds of prescription: (1) the acquisition of a right by the lapse
of time, or acquisitive prescription; and (2) the loss of a right of
action by the lapse of time, or extinctive prescription.
Private respondents' action was an accion publiciana to recover the
right of possession and to be declared owners of the subject lands.
Their complaint squarely put in issue the ownership of the lands in
dispute. It may thus be properly treated as an accion reivindicatoria.
As found by the Court of Appeals and by the trial court, however,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Anastacio Cutanda, acquired
possession of said lands in 1933. On the other hand, private
respondents did not assert ownership over the lands until 1988 — 55
years later, when they filed their present complaint for recovery of
possession. It is settled that the remedies of accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria must be availed of within 10 years from
dispossession. Under Art. 555(4) of the Civil Code, the real right of
possession is lost after the lapse of 10 years.16 In Cruz v. Court of
Appeals,17 in which an action for recovery of possession and
ownership of lands was brought only after 26 years had elapsed, this
Court ruled:
And secondly, whether We consider the complaint of private
respondents to recover possession of the property in
question as accion publiciana or acccion reivindicatoria, the
same has prescribed after the lapse of ten years. After
private respondents had abandoned for 26 years the
property which is unregistered land, the law as well as
justice and equity will not allow them "to lie in wait and
spring as in an ambush" to dislodge and dispossess
petitioners who during said period made and constructed
residences, buildings and other valuable improvements
thereon, and enjoying the fruits therefrom.
Hence, insofar as petitioners are concerned, private respondents'
cause of action was barred, not by laches, but by extinctive
prescription, regardless of whether their complaint is considered as
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria. As regards the
private respondents who did not appeal from the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, this question is now final.
Second. As already stated, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's ruling that petitioners had acquired the lands by prescription
on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that
petitioners had been in open, continuous and adverse possession of
the lands. There is, however, nothing in the evidence to support this
finding of the appellate court. To the contrary, the evidence in the
record, both documentary and testimonial, shows: (1) that their
common ancestor was the late Doque Cutanda, son of Eustaquio
Cutanda and Rufina Atup;18 (2) that Doque Cutanda had several
children, namely, Anastacio, Saturnino, Esperidion, Pedro, Honorio,
German, Fortunata, Eustaquia, and Ponciana;19 (3) that, in his
lifetime, Doque Cutanda acquired a parcel of agricultural land
consisting of 31.0929 hectares, which was declared under Tax
Declaration No. 698320 in the name of his eldest child, Anastacio; (4)
that Anastacio, who had no children, remained in possession of said
land from 1933 until 1968 when he executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate which adjudicated and partitioned said parcel of
land among his brothers and sisters;21 (5) that after 1968,
Anastacio's brothers and sisters worked on the land, as shown by
several tax declarations22 and subsequently, their children and
successors, herein petitioners, remained in actual and peaceful
possession of said land until 1988 when private respondents filed
their action to recover possession of the land; (6) that during such
time, petitioners Dominica, Sebastian, Sotero, Januario and Nicanor
were cultivating the share of their father while working as
agricultural tenants on the shares of their uncles Honorio and
German Cutanda;23 and (7) that petitioners Gabina, Crispin and
Claudio Cutanda are the children and heirs of Honorio Cutanda
working on their father's share while petitioners Florencio and
Trinidad Cutanda are the children and heirs of German and
Esperidion Cutanda, respectively.24
The foregoing sufficiently establish that Anastacio Cutanda was in
possession of the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6983, which
has an area of 31.0929 hectares, from 1933 up to 1968, or a period
of 35 years. Such possession appears to be adverse, continuous and
in the concept of an owner because Anastacio Cutanda cultivated the
land, thereby, performing an act of ownership over it. It is to be
noted that Anastacio's possession began under the former Civil
Code. This fact brings this case squarely under the ruling in Cruz v.
Court of Appeals,25 in which adverse possession of a parcel of
unregistered land started in 1938 while the complaint for recovery of
possession was filed only in 1964, after 26 years. The trial court
dismissed the complaint and declared the adverse possessors as
owners of the land. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
trial court. On appeal, this Court in turn reversed the appellate court.
We held that —
This contention of the petitioners is impressed with truth and
merit as the same is borne out by the records and the
transcript thereof which We have previously discussed. We,
therefore, find that the ruling of the respondent court dating
petitioner's adverse possession to the year 1953 is contrary
to the admission of the private respondents thru counsel,
and since petitioners' possession of the property in question
commenced way back in 1938 which was at the time of the
old Civil Code was still in force the prescriptive period is
governed under Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides that
"Prescription already running before the effectivity of this
Code (August 30, 1950), shall be governed by laws
previously in force." Section 41 of the C.C.P. states:
SECTION 41. Title to land by prescription. — Ten
years of actual adverse possession by any person
claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or
interest in land, uninterruptedly, continuously for ten
years by occupancy, descent, grants or otherwise, in
whatever way such occupancy may have
commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual
possessor of such land a full complete title, saving to
the persons under disabilities the rights, secured by
the next section.26
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, ten years of actual
adverse possession was required, regardless of how such occupancy
may have commenced or continued, before possession ripened into
full and complete title over the land. Applying this to the present
case, by 1943, ten years.after his possession of the subject parcel of
land had begun, Anastacio Cutanda became owner of the land in
question through acquisitive prescription.
Third. The Court of Appeals limited its review of the evidence to the
issue of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners, however, submitted
evidence to prove that they were heirs of Anastacio Cutanda's
brothers and sisters, even as some of them were also working as
tenants for their co-petitioners. Particularly compelling is the 1968
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Real Estate executed by
Anastacio Cutanda which pertinently states that:
WHEREAS, ANASTACIO CUTANDA, single, 90 years of age,
with no common-law wife, illegitimate children or otherwise,
through his own will desires to adjudicate and partition his
three (3) parcels of land to his brothers and sisters or legal
heirs, declared under Tax Dec. Nos. R-2485; R-2486; and R-
6983 situated at Camambugan, Ubay, Bohol and
Saguisinhan, Trinidad, Bohol, respectively, which are
described and bounded as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Tax Declaration No. 6983, situated at Saguisinhan, Trinidad,
Bohol, with an area of 31.0929 hectares more or less:
Bounded on the North by Justo Ogayon & creek; or East, by
Saguinsihan Creek; on South, by Pablo Ebaoc, Graciano
Ebaoc, Diosdado Ebaoc, Gaviro Mumar; and on West by
Pablo Ebaoc, Mateo Nuera, Dominga Nuera; with
improvements of 15 groups of bamboos.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the brothers, sisters and heirs of said Anastacio
Cutanda, through his will and voluntary deed, mutually
agree to accept this extrajudicial partition made by said
Anastacio Cutanda for the benefit of said brothers, sisters,
and heirs of same.
As Anastacio Cutanda had acquired ownership of said parcel of land
through the lapse of the period required by law, he could validly
adjudicate and partition it among his brothers and sisters who were
his only heirs. Petitioners, in turn, as children of Anastacio's brothers
and sisters, acquired ownership of the subject land not through
prescription but through hereditary succession.
But while we find sufficient evidence of ownership with respect to
that parcel with an area of 31.0929 hectares covered by Tax
Declaration No. 6983, we find no similar evidence to support the
finding of the trial court that Anastacio Cutanda was also the owner
of the other parcel of land consisting of seven hectares. Petitioner
Florencio Cutanda himself admitted that he and the other petitioners
were only claiming the 31-hectare land. His testimony is as follows:
Q: And Mr. Witness you will assure us here that this tax
declaration No. R-6983 is the only parcel of land owned by
either Doque Cutanda or Anastacio Cutanda situated in
Trinidad, Cambangay Norte?
A: That is correct.
Q: You will not change your answer?
A: I will not.
Q: So that Mr. Witness considering that this case now
involves two parcels of land, one with an area of 31 hectares
and the other with an area of 7 hectares, you are only
claiming the 31 hectares covered by Tax Decl. No. R-6983,
am I correct?
A: Only the 31 hectares.
Q: You and your co-defendants are not claiming the 7
hectares?
 A: This 7 hectares was already owned and claimed by
Honorio Cutanda.

Q: You mean to tell us that Honorio Cutanda has a previous

tax declaration covering this 7 hectares?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: But you are not in the possession of that tax declaration?

A: No, sir.27

Moreover, the alleged tax declaration in Honorio Cutanda's name

covering the seven-hectare land was never presented in evidence.
For these reasons, with respect to the said seven-hectare land, the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that there is no sufficient evidence as
to its ownership must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and

another one is rendered declaring petitioners to be true and lawful
owners of that parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6983 of
the Tax Assessor's Office of Saguisinhan, Trinidad, Bohol, with an
area of 31.0929 hectares. The complaint filed by respondents is
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.