The Crescent and the Sword: Islam, the Military, and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan,

1977-1985
Author(s): Mumtaz Ahmad
Source: Middle East Journal , Summer, 1996, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 372-386
Published by: Middle East Institute

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328957

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Middle East Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Middle East Journal

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Crescent and the Sword: Islam, the
Military, and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan,
1977-1985

Mumtaz Ahmad

The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that military regimes are
inherently unstable because they lack the essential political skills of persuasive
communication, bargaining, mass appeal, and the development of new political
strategies for survival and legitimacy. It is argued here that the military regime of
General Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, through its skillful use of the normative symbols of
Islam and nationalism was able to achieve a considerable degree of political
stability and legitimacy, and efectively meet political, sectarian and ethnic
challenges.

here is a commonly held assumption in the literature on the military and politics that
the military is usually politically untrained and naive and is, therefore, unable to undertake
long-term political management.' It is believed that military officers lack charisma,

Mumtaz Ahmad is professor of political science at Hampton University, Hampton Virginia. The author wishes
to gratefully acknowledge research grants from the American Institute of Pakistan Studies (1991) and from the
United States Institute of Peace (1992)forfield work in Pakistan. Needless to say, both AIPS and USIP are not
responsible for the views and opinions expressed in the essay. The author is also indebted to Professors
Muhammad Umar Memon and Bary Lerner for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See Henry Bienen, "The Background to Contemporary Study of Militaries and Modernization," in
Henry Bienen, ed. The Military and Modernization (Chicago: Alsine Atherton Press, 1971); Claude E. Welch,
ed., Soldiers and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Beragt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization
and Political Power (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1972); Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics:
Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977); and Constantine P.
Danopoulos, "Military Professionalism and Regime Legitimacy in Greece, 1967-1974," Political Science
Quarterly 98, no. 3 (Fall, 1983).

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 50, NO. 3, SUMMER 1996

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN * 373

persuasive skills, and political sophistication. The absence of these qualities in the military
and its presumed inability to engage in the complex tasks of political engineering are then
linked with the "unique general outlook, orientations, and system of values closely
connected to military professionalism."2 It is maintained that the professional qualities of
the armed forces may serve them well in their primary function of war, but may become
a hindrance in the political arena, which requires an "infinitely greater degree of patience
and deliberation"3 than the strict command-obey norm of military behavior. Morris
Janowitz also attributes the lack of political sophistication in the military to its peculiar
organizational characteristics, command structure, and, more importantly, to its pattern of
socialization and training.4 These variables, Janowitz argues, put severe limitations on the
ability of the military to produce the "leadership skills in bargaining and political
communication that are required for [sustaining] political leadership"5 and for developing
"new political devices." Similarly, it is believed that the military cannot appreciate the
subtleties and nuances of complex political situations and is thus more likely to resort to
coercive, disciplinary measures in order to regulate the socio-economic and political
conflicts in society. This may be especially true in developing societies, where political
conflicts are intense and new political forces, unleashed by the processes of socio-
economic change, are agitating for an enhanced role in the political system. The problem
of accommodating malcontents and integrating, or at least containing, divergent socio-
political forces becomes particularly acute for the military which is not trained in the art
of compromise, bargaining, verbal skills, mass appeal, and give-and-take.6 It is on the
basis of these assumptions that military regimes are believed to be "inherently unstable."7
The purpose of this study is to test these popular assumptions and hypotheses with
reference to the political performance of the military regime of General Muhammad
Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan, which ruled the country from 1977 to 1985, under martial law, and
then transformed itself into a military-dominated civilian regime with the holding of
non-party elections in January 1985. Pakistan constitutes a very appropriate case study to
test the validity of the above hypotheses because its low level political institutionalization,
relative economic backwardness, and embryonic stage of state formation and nation
building is typical of many developing countries. Also, the military in Pakistan is a highly
professional organization with its own sophisticated training institutions at both line and
staff levels, and with a strong espr-it de corps going back to the British Indian Army.
Zia-ul-Haq's military regime also constitutes a particularly instructive case study since it
came to power as the successor of the popularly-elected Prime Minister Zulfikar 'Ali
Bhutto, who took pride in being a master politician.

2. Danopoulos, "Military Professionalism and Regime Legitimacy," p. 505.

3. Ibid.
4. Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 161-66.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 116-19.
7. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, pp. 137-38.

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
374 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

THE MILITARY AND ISLAMIZATION

The most relevant period with which to begin this study is early 1977. In March,
Prime Minister Bhutto held general elections in the midst of a highly charged political
atmosphere marked by intense ideological differences between him and his opponents.
Bhutto had come to power as a result of the support of the lower and lower-middle classes
in the Punjab and the Sind.8 Once he assumed power, however, he turned to the landed
aristocracy for support and alienated himself from both the big as well as the petty
bourgeoisie.9 His regime was essentially characterized by a highly personalized, corpo-
ratist, and authoritarian style. As inflammatory as his policies were, his rhetoric and style
were even more so, and provoked resentment among a number of groups. This resentment
was best articulated by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) -a coalition of Islamic
revivalist, conservative, and centrist parties-at the time of the March 1977 elections. The
post-election conflict between the PNA and Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), over
the alleged rigging of the elections, led to a nationwide protest movement. The violent
processions, demonstrations, and barricade fighting between PNA supporters and security
forces, and the increasingly uncontrollable lawlessness eventually resulted in a successful
coup d'etat by the military, under the leadership of General Zia-ul-Haq, and the
imposition of martial law for the third time in Pakistan.
At the time of his coming to power in July 1977, Zia-ul-Haq said that the reason for
the martial law regime was to restore law and order, and hold free and fair general
elections within ninety days. Later, however, he postponed the elections in order to 'weed
out' the corrupt political elements from society and "lay down the foundations of the
Islamic system," the two objectives which, according to him, enjoyed the support of the
entire nation.'0
An orthodox Sunni Muslim, Zia-ul-Haq was fully convinced that it was the desire for
an Islamic system that had moved the people to oppose the Bhutto regime. "I He, therefore,
worked closely with the Islamic groups in the PNA, especially the Jama'at-i-Islami
(Islamic Party) and the Jam'iyat-i-'Ulama-i-Islam (Party of the 'Ulama of Islam), and
introduced a series of Islamic reforms in Pakistan's legal, educational, and economic
systems.'2 Zia-ul-Haq's announcement of these Islamic reforms was hailed by the Islami
revivalists and conservatives; they saw the invocation of Islam by the military regime not

8. The best analysis so far of Bhutto's rise and fall, and an extremely perceptive critique of his
socio-economic policies is found in Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto (New York: St Martin's Press,
1982); see also Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: the Nature and Direction of Change (New York:
Praeger, 1982).
9. Mumtaz Ahmad, "Class, Religion, and Power: Some Aspects of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," a
paper presented at a conference on Islamic revival, University of Chicago, 28-31 May 1980.
10. Dawn (Karachi), 30 September 1977.
11. Daily Muslim (Islamabad), 14 October 1980; see also, President Zia-ul-Haq's interview with M.J.
Akbar in Sunday (New Delhi), 13-19 June 1982, p. 17.
12. For details of these reforms see, Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Revival in Pakistan," in C.K. Pullapilly,
ed., Islam in the Contemporary World (Notredame: Crossroads Press, 1981).

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN * 375

only as a genuine revival of Islamic shari'a (Islamic law), but also as a recognition of their
special sphere of influence in matters of public policy.13

THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

The major source of political strife in Pakistan, during 1977-85, remained the
demand for the restoration of democracy. It was not only the PPP and other leftist and
regionalist parties which demanded the end of martial law and the holding of elections, but
the centrist and religious groups as well. The postponement of elections, first scheduled
for October 1977 and then for November 1979, aroused considerable dismay and
resentment. This was particularly so among members of the PPP, which had been singled
out as a major target of the various martial law regulations, and of the government's
accountability drive, intended to weed out the Bhutto loyalists from the political scene.
Even after the completion of the accountability process and the holding of local
government elections, the government did not announce any definite schedule for hol
national elections and restoring civilian rule. Zia-ul-Haq maintained that the successful
completion of the Islamization process was much more important than the holding of
elections.14 Given the fact that the religious and the centrist political groups remained
solidly behind Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization drive, and shared the regime's hatred of Bhutto
and his political legacy, no popular opposition movement could be organized at the
national level to lift martial law. The military took full advantage of the divisions within
the ranks of both the opposition and the pro-government political parties, and thus
forestalled any move toward the formation of a united front against the regime. The PPP
tried to break its isolation by launching the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
(MRD) -a loose coalition of nine opposition parties, the majority of which consisted of
politically insignificant leftist groups. It suffered a severe political setback when it was
linked to the hijacking of a Pakistani civilian airplane to Kabul and other terrorist activities
in the Punjab and the Sind.'5
In August 1983, Zia-ul-Haq set up a new constitutional framework which provided
for fundamental changes in the 1973 Constitution, and called for elections on a non-party
basis, by March 1985.16 This announcement ignited a violent protest movement in the
Sind province, which was led primarily by a coalition of radical and regionalist elements
within the PPP. By the end of August, prominent Sindhi landlord families had also joined
this movement and created a serious threat to the government. The anti-government
protestors attacked the district jail in Dadu and freed about 200 inmates, who were later
linked to assaults on government officials and raids on banks, post offices, police stations,
and other public properties.

13. See, Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore), 11 February 1979, and Zindagi: (Lahore), 18-25 January 1975.
14. Jasarat (Karachi), 17 January 1981.
15. 8 Days (London), 5 December 1981, p. 21, and 9 January 1982, p. 27.
16. Constitutional Framework: President Zia-ul-Haq's Address to Majlis-e-Shoora on August 12, 1983,
(Washington, DC: Information Division, Embassy of Pakistan, 1983). See also Craig Baxter, ed., Zia's Pakistan:
Politics and Stability in a Front Line State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985).

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
376 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

The martial law authorities in the Sind cordoned off the area of rebellion, and thus the
anti-martial law agitation remained mainly confined to two districts in the Sind, Dadu and
Tharparker. To the pleasant surprise of the authorities, the strategy worked and the
agitation did not spill over into other parts of the country. The rebellion could have posed
a serious threat to the stability of the regime had it spread to the Punjab, the 'home'
province of the military and the most politically sensitive and influential region in the
country. But Indira Gandhi's totally unexpected expression of support for the Sindhi
protesters alienated both the traditionally anti-Indian Punjabis, and the Urdu-speaking
refugees, in the urban Sind, from the anti-military Sindhi agitation. As a result, they
disassociated themselves from the MRD movement, which then collapsed. The province,
however, remained calm, and the regime intact. The Indian prime minister's statement
also provided the government with an opportunity to accuse the MRD of pursuing "the
politics of sabotage and subversion at the suggestion of [its] foreign masters."'17
Equally crucial to the collapse of the anti-martial law movement, however, was the
military's ability to solicit support from the major religious political parties. These parties
enjoyed a considerable following in the North West Frontier Providence (N.W.F.P.), the
Punjab and the urban Sind; hence, no movement could succeed without their active
participation. Although these parties shared the MRD's demand for the lifting of martial
law and the holding of general elections, they also shared Zia-ul-Haq's fear that elections
could result in the political rehabilitation of secular and socialist elements under the
leadership of the Ppp.'8 Furthermore, their commitment to democracy was ideologically
not strong enough to make them support a mass movement committed to forcing the
military government out of power, especially a government with Islamic credentials.
Given the ideological predilections of the centrist and religious parties, it was not difficult
for the military to separate these parties from the MRD-sponsored agitation in the Sind by
promising them more Islamic reforms and offering their leaders important positions in the
newly created Islamic institutions.
In order to preempt any potential move toward a grand alliance between the MRD
and the former constituents of the PNA, Zia-ul-Haq took another initiative: he invited the
latter to join him in a series of talks, and offered to reconsider his August 1983
constitutional formula in light of their "constructive criticism and suggestions," his
euphemism for docile oppposition. The marathon talks between the military and the
religious and centrist political leaders continued for about three months, i.e., the duration
of the anti-government agitation in the Sind. Once the agitation subsided, and the need to
keep up the appearance of a political dialogue disappeared, the government abruptly
terminated the talks and declared that further political discussions would only be held at
the floor of the Zia-ul-Haq nominated Majlis-i-Shura (Federal Advisory Council).

17. President Zia-ul-Haq's speech in the 8th session of the Federal Advisory Council, reported in
Nawa-i-Waqt, 23 October 1983.
18. See a statement by Maulana 'Abdallah Darkhwasti, the chief of Jam'iyat-i-'Ulama-i-Islam,
published in Mashriq (Karachi), 26 April 1983, in which he said that his party would not support MRD because
it was dominated by 'communist and anti-Islamic elements.'

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN * 377

The military also took advantage of divisions among the three major leftist
opposition groups. The 'ideological left,' consisting of less than 200 card-carrying
members of the banned Pakistan Communist Party (PCP) and some trade union leaders,
refused to join hands with the PPP, a party dominated by the traditional political forces of
the landed aristocracy from the Punjab and the Sind. This faction of the left had been
critical of the reformist approach of Bhutto during the PPP reign, and thus had suffered as
much as the rightist parties at his hands.'9 The 'ideological left' also saw long-term
ideological and revolutionary benefits in exacerbating the political situation. The majority
of the 'regionalist left,' consisting of Sindhi nationalists, not only participated in the
anti-martial law movement, but, in fact, suffered the brunt of the regime's retaliatory
measures. The Baluch faction of the 'regionalist' left remained divided as many of its
leaders were co-opted by the military. In public, however, they reasoned that the time was
not ripe for an anti-government movement. Finally, the 'democratic left,' consisting
primarily of a section of the Western-educated middle class, and non-institutional
intellectuals in the lower middle class-writers, journalists, artists-was still recovering
from the loss of credibility due to its past association with and support for the Bhutto
regime.
It was precisely for these reasons-the distrust of the PPP, the legacy of the Bhutto
regime, the skillful manipulation of the religious political parties, the fear of foreign
intervention, and the sowing of the seeds of discord by the military intelligence agencies
within the opposition groups-that the MRD movement against military rule failed to
make any political impact. By the end of 1983, the movement fizzled out, leaving the
regime intact and even stronger.

SUNNI - SHI'ITE SECTARIAN CONFLICT

In Pakistan, as in some other Muslim societies, Islamic resurgence has also been
paralleled by a resurgence of sectarian controversies and conflicts. This development may
have been caused, generally speaking, by a reawakening of religious consciousness in a
manner which strengthened the sectarian identities of the people and made them even
more conscious of their distinct doctrinal positions. The more proximate reasons for the
sectarian conflict in Pakistan, that between Shi'ites and Sunnis, appear to have been
related to two factors: the government's Islamization drive, and the spill-over effects of the
Iran-Iraq war.
With the revival of various Islamic laws by Zia-ul-Haq, the old juristic, doctrinal and
theological differences among Muslim sects and schools of law resurfaced with consid-
erable intensity. The most serious conflict arose over the question of which interpretation
of Islamic law ought to be legislated into public policy. The Shi'ite religious leaders
protested the introduction of the compulsory collection of zakat (alms tax) and 'ushr (tithe
levied for public assistance) and the enforcement of Islamic penal laws, maintaining that

19. Aijaz Ahmed, "Democracy and Dictatorship," in Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, eds., Pakistan:
The Roots of Dictatorship (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 90-97, 141.

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
378 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

these laws were based on Sunni jurisprudence and were in conflict with their own
Ja'fariyah fiqh (jurisprudence).20
In order to force the government to amend those laws they found unacceptable,
thousands of Shi'ite militants besieged the federal government establishments, in 1979, in
Islamabad and took some government officials as hostages.2' To avoid bloodshed and
prevent religious discontent from turning into a full scale political rebellion, the military
government accepted the demands of the militants, and announced that no law would be
enforced in the future without the consent of the Shi'ite 'ulama. Once the immediate threat
to law and order was removed, the military authorities embarked on a long-term plan to
split the Shi'ite leadership, and lure some of its respected members to lucrative positions
in state-controlled Islamic institutions, such as the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), the
Federal Zakat Council, and the Majlis-i-Shura. This move helped the government combat
the Shi'ite militancy in subsequent sectarian controversies and conflicts.
The success in obtaining their demands encouraged the Shi'ite militants to stage
another showdown with the government, in February 1983, in Karachi. The alleged cause
of the conflict this time, was a plot of land in a Sunni majority neighborhood of north
Karachi, on which the Shi'ites wanted to build their Imam bargah (a Shi'ite mosque).22
The Shi'ites, believing that the government would withdraw its permission to build the
mosque as a result of Sunni pressure, decided to take what they described as 'direct
action.'23 Thousands of Shi'ite youths, led by the militant Imamiya Students Federation
(ISF), a pro-Iranian group, staged a sit-in on one of the main highways of Karachi,
bringing traffic to a virtual halt, and paralyzing the city for two days.24
While the Shi'ite protesters were blocking the highway, they were visited by the
Iranian consul-general in Karachi, who extended his support and expressed his solidarity
with their demands.25 The government, apprehensive that the Shi'ite agitation might
develop into a mass political movement, again acceded to their demands. The Sunni
religious leaders, however, strongly resented the concessions made to the Shi'ites and
launched a counter-movement.26 The entire months of February and March 1983 saw
continuous Shi'ite-Sunni riots with considerable loss of life and property on both sides.27

20. See the statement of Mufti Ja'afar Husayn Mujtahid, the Shi'ite member of the Islamic Advisory
Council who resigned from his post to protest the introduction of these laws, in weekly Millat (Islamabad), 26
September, 1979.
21. Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Revival in Pakistan."
22. Viewpoint (Lahore), 24 February 1983, p. 7.
23. See the statement of the President of the Imamiya Council of Pakistan, in Jasarat, 2 February 1983.
24. Jasarat, 8 February 1983.
25. Jasarat, 9 February 1983. It also reported that a week before the Shi'ite sit-in in Karachi, a powerful
Iranian delegation headed by the militant Jalal al-Din Farsi, an opponent of Bani Sadr in the first Iranian
presidential elections, had visited Pakistan. While in Karachi, he had a series of meetings with local Shi'ite
leaders, including militant Shi'ite youth leaders. In an interview before leaving Karachi, Farsi explained that his
mission in Pakistan was to "show... [the Pakistani people] on the spot how Islamic revolution works" and "to
transfer to them our experience in making revolution and to exploit interior and exterior policies to that end."
See South (London), April 1983; and Economist (London), 26 March 1983.
26. Nawa-i-Waqt, 11 February 1983.
27. Economist, 26 March 1983, p. 40.

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN * 379

The government imposed a curfew in sensitive areas of the city and called in paramilitary
forces to aid civilian police.28
Throughout this period of sectarian riots, the armed forces personnel deployed in the
city scrupulously avoided the use of violence against either side. In fact, they appeared,
at times, to be no more than mere passive spectators, careful not to take sides with either
the Sunnis or the Shi'ites. Some critics of the regime later accused the military of actively
encouraging the Karachi sectarian strife as a cathartic measure and as a means of sowing
disunity among its potential opponents in a politically sensitive region.29 There is little
evidence, however, to suggest that the government authorities actually engineered the
riots; on the contrary, the evidence suggests that the riots were a spontaneous eruption of
pent-up hostilities.
The government, however, was well aware that it stood to gain politically from the
riots: when attacked by the Shi'ites, the government expected the Sunni majority to rally
around Zia-ul-Haq in a show of Sunni solidarity. The sectarian split also ensured that the
Sunni and Shi'ite religious groups would not unite in the future in any mass political
movement directed against the government. Sectarianism thus became a device for
keeping the opposition divided. Furthermore, in the conflict between the Shi'ites and the
Sunnis over the correct interpretation of traditional Islamic law, the military government
assumed the role of mediator, which helped establish the authenticity of its Islamic
credentials in the eyes of both parties. Sectarianism also evoked Sunni feelings of
solidarity with the regime while fostering Shi'ite dependency on the state in the wake of
the Sunni counter-attacks, which were often violent. Hence, the government emerged from
the sectarian riots even stronger than before.

ETHNIC AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS

One major unresolved area of conflict in Pakistan is the problem of ethnic and
regional sub-nationalism in the smaller provinces. Although Pakistan is now a more
cohesive state than it was before the separation of East Pakistan, certain critical problems
still remain unresolved and tend to complicate the processes of nation-building in the
country.30 One of the most serious problems is that of the resentment felt by the smaller
provinces-Baluchistan, the N.W.F.P. and the Sind-toward the Punjab. This resentment
stems from three basic structural constraints on national integration: the demographic
composition of the provinces, the existence of regional economic disparities, and the
ethnic origins of the military.
The Punjab happens to be the largest and most populous province of the federation;
the other three provinces together constitute less than forty percent of the total population.

28. International Herald Tribune (Paris), 26-27 March 1983, p. 5.

29. See the editorial comments in the New Trend, September 1983; and Javed Ansari, "Pakistan
Revisited," Arabia. The Islamic World Review (London), June 1983.
30. We have left out the events associated with the rise of Muhajir ethnicity and the Muhajir Qawmi
Movement (MQM) in the urban Sind as they fall outside the time-frame of this study. For a perceptive analysis
of Pakistan's regional problems, see Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements in Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute
of Policy Studies, 1991).

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
380 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Consequently, Punjabis dominate all branches and levels of the federal government.
Economic disparities also exist between the Punjab and the other provinces, with sections
of Baluchistan the N.W.F.P. and the rural Sind receiving a relatively smaller share of the
national economic resources. Finally, the major political force in the country is the
military, whose officers and jawans (rank and file) come mainly from the Punjab.
Naturally, therefore, any military takeover of the civilian government and suspension of
the democratic political process (which has happened three times since independence) is
perceived by the smaller provinces as an imposition of Punjabi rule.
The most serious challenge to the authority of the military regime, during 1977-85,
came principally from the rural Sind. There a coalition of Sindhi nationalists, traditional
landlord families, and radical elements within the PPP all formed a united front and
paralyzed the normal functioning of governmental authority in at least two districts, for
about two months in 1983. The coalition combined two political groups with distinct
approaches toward the problems of the Sind. There were the 'autonomists,' namely,
Sindhi landlords and PPP elements, who stood for greater regional autonomy for the Sind,
and for a greater share of national economic resources, governmental jobs, and
educational and business opportunities. They also demanded an end to what they
perceived as domination over the provincial administration by Punjabis and refugees from
India, and the generous distribution of prized agricultural land to Punjabi settlers and
retired military officers.31
Besides these autonomists who demanded the resolution of their ethnic-regional
grievances within the federation of Pakistan, there were the 'separatists' known as Jiye
Sind (Long Live Sind), ultra-nationalist Sindhi youths who championed the right of
self-determination for the Sind. They believed that, given the structures of power relations
in the country, the Sind could not expect a fair distribution of economic resources and
political power in a united Pakistan. Relatively small, but very effectively organized, this
group was able to win converts from the autonomists on the campuses, especially after the
execution of Bhutto, in April 1979. Jiye Sind was the most violent group in the PPP-led
anti-martial law movement in the Sind, in August-September 1983.
In Baluchistan, the situation in the eighties remained relatively calm. There is no
doubt, however, that an irredentist political movement existed which aimed at creating an
independent state of Baluchistan (incorporating parts of Afghanistan, and Iranian and
Pakistani Baluchistan). The adherents of the Baluch nationalist movement, during martial
law, consisted of Baluch tribal chiefs who opposed the inroads of modernization into their
tribal-based social and political structures, and highly-motivated Marxists of the Baluch
Students Organization (BSO) who saw in independent Baluchistan a great opportunity to
experiment with their progressive socialist ideas. This uneasy alliance between tribal
chiefs and modern-educated youth came about primarily as a reaction to Bhutto's policies
in Baluchistan. Bhutto's decision to dismiss the elected government of Ataullah Mengal
and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo in Baluchistan, in 1973-1974, forced these tribal leaders to join

31. For a sensitive analysis of the socio-economic and sub-nationalist forces at work in the Sind
province, see Tahir Amin, Jiye Sind Tahrik, mimeograph (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1979).

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN * 381

ranks with radical and separatist elements in the Baluch nationalist movement, in order to
organize an armed struggle against the central government. The alliance was further
strengthened when Bhutto, with the help of Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran, ordered the
intensification of the military action against his Baluch opponents. According to one
estimate, the little-known war which ensued in Baluchistan resulted in 3,300 Pakistani
military casualties and 5,300 Baluch guerrilla casualties, during a total of 178 major
engagements and 107 minor ones.32
The armed conflict in Baluchistan came to an end only with the change in regime in
1977. Immediately upon assuming power, Zia-ul-Haq withdrew the armed forces to their
barracks, declared a general amnesty for those involved in the armed rebellion, offered
substantial financial aid for the rehabilitation of those who had fled their homes, and
released all political prisoners unconditionally. Zia-ul-Haq blamed the 1974 military
action in Baluchistan on the intransigence of Bhutto and the adventurism of then Army
Chief of Staff, General Tika Khan, now a PPP leader. He assured the Baluch leaders that
he and other senior generals were opposed to the military action against the Baluch
dissidents, and had advised Bhutto to seek a political settlement.
Although many of the underlying problems which gave rise to the Baluch nationalist,
separatist movement still remained unresolved-particularly the problem of the restora-
tion of democratic rights and political autonomy-the military regime nevertheless
adopted a series of measures to diffuse the situation and soften the hostility of the Baluch
regional elite to the central political authority. These measures included: allocation of
increased development funds for Baluchistan; provision of lucrative business opportuni-
ties to Baluch tribal leaders (in order to turn their attention away from politics to business);
co-optation of certain influential segments of the regional elite into the newly-created
politico-administrative institutions; extension of personal favors to leaders of the 1973-
1976 armed rebellion; and large-scale distribution of jobs in the civil service and public
sector to educated Baluch youth. These measures were largely responsible for the relative
calm in Baluchistan since 1977.

THE REGIME'S RESPONSE

Amitai Etzioni's analytical classification of power and compliance relations in

complex organizations is based on three categories: normative, remunerative or calcula-
tive, and coercive.33 According to Etzioni, normative compliance relations operate in
voluntary organizations such as the church, calculative compliance relations are found in
business organizations, and coercive compliance relations are the hallmark of military
organizations. Contrary to Etizioni's formulation, the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq
effectively employed normative resources (rather than coercive or even remunerative

32. Selig Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," Foreign Policy, no. 32 (Fall 1978), p. 139.
33. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press,
1975), pp. 4-6.

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
382 U MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

ones) to obtain compliance, and to meet the challenges it faced in political, sectarian and
ethno-regional arenas.
The major thrust of the military regime's response to the forces challenging its
authority and power was normative. It was in this realm that the ideological resources of
Islamic symbols and institutional structures were utilized to the maximum. It was also the
normative appeal of Islam that became the major legitimizing force of the regime. The
stated goals and objectives of the government were defined in terms of Islamic revivalist
ideals and practices on the one hand, and the ideological commitment to the Pakistani
state, on the other.34
The government sought the support of the Pakistani people by propagating an
ideology which integrally linked Islam and the destiny of Pakistan to the continuity of the
military regime itself. The original formulation of Pakistan's ideology, as articulated by
Islamic parties, emphasized the essential relationship between Islam and the nation, i.e.,
Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam, and it could only exist in the name of
Islam. Zia-ul-Haq added another element to this formulation by maintaining that the
existing political establishment (the military) was equally vital for the preservation of
Islam and Pakistan. Thus Islam, Pakistan, and the military regime became united in an
indivisible trinity.35
This new formulation of Pakistan's ideology postulated that Islam was not only the
ideological basis of the state, but was also fundamental to the nation's very existence.
Therefore, if the state were to be organized on the basis of any other ideology or political
system, it would not only lose its identity, but would disintegrate and perish, as would
Pakistan as an independent nation. Furthermore, according to this formulation, the
promotion of any ideology other than Islam-be it secularism, socialism, communism, or
even Western liberal democracy-would not only be considered religiously objectionable,
but also treason against the state.
When a state establishes and legitimizes itself as a theocracy and presents a particular
version of religion as official dogma, any deviation from the official interpretation, even
if it is within the framework of the same ideology, is likely to be treated as treason. In the
context of a theocratic state, religious dissent and political rebellion become indistinguish-
able. In Pakistan, when a pro-government politician from Karachi was assassinated by his
political opponents in 1982, Zia-ul-Haq declared that the assassins were the "enemies of
Islam" and should be treated as such. It is in this context that one should read his
statement:

Pakistan and Islam are the names of one and the same thing and any idea or action contrary
to this would mean hitting at the very roots of the ideology, solidarity and integrity of
Pakistan.36

34. See General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Interviews to Foreign Media, Vol. 1, (Islamabad: Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), pp. 18-21; 69-70; 117-24; 200-205.
35. Ibid., pp. 118-21.
36. Dawn, 27 October 1982.

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN * 383

The crux of the regime's normative response to the challenge of the political
opposition that was demanding democratization, was that since the opposition movement
against the military government was identified with ideologically leftist and secular ideas,
it was ipso facto deprived of any legitimacy to claim power in an Islamic state. Zia-ul-Haq
and his colleagues quite frequently emphasized the "binding relationship" between the
ideological basis of the state and the ideological orientation of the government. In 1980,
addressing the local councilors of the Multan district, Zia-ul-Haq declared: "Pakistan was
achieved in the name of Islam, and Islam alone could provide the basis to run the
government of the country and sustain its integrity... The present government would
provide opportunity to others to serve the country after it had achieved its objectives...
[but] no un-Islamic government would be allowed to succeed the present regime."37 The
use of Islam thus created a situation in which religious interests became indistinguishable
from purely political interests and the regime's need for legitimacy. The road to salvation
became the road to power as well.
Islam was not only used to legitimize the regime and delegitimize the secular
political forces, it was also used to seek political and moral support from the religious
political parties and to create a broad constituency of support among the religiously
oriented, traditional lower middle classes of the Punjab, the urban Sind, and the N.W.F.P.
It was this strata which participated in the officially sponsored religious festivals and
rituals, in the newly created religious institutional network of zakat, 'ushr, and the
islah-i-mu'ashra (reformation of society) committees, and in government-organized
religious gatherings such as the milad-un-nabi (celebrations of the birth of the Prophet),
and the qirat (recitations) and na'at (poetry in praise of the Prophet Muhammad)
competitions.38 Zia-ul-Haq, both through his policies and rhetoric, seems to have
responded positively to the religious sensibilities and economic interests of this strata,
support of which he regarded as critical to the stability of his regime. His promise to
protect the sanctity of chador (the veil) and chardivari (the four walls of a house), symbols
of a woman's honor and of private property mirrored in the priority structure of middle
and lower middle class values.
The normative response of the military to the challenges emanating from sectarian
and ethno-regional sources was also articulated in idioms of Islamic values and principle
Besides accommodating Shi'ite demands and, at the same time, assuring the Sunni
hierarchy of its superordinate position in the religious establishment, the government
invoked the Islamic injunctions of ittihad (unity) and harmony between Islamic sects.
Shi'ite-Sunni unity councils were established in various cities, and prominent 'ulama from
both sides were encouraged by the state to include a message of peaceful co-existence in
their sermons. Islamic dignitaries and 'ulama from Saudi Arabia and Iran were also
employed for extra legitimacy, albeit with delicate balancing, to placate the warring
domestic religious factions.

37. Muslim, 10 June 1980.

38. Dawn, 1 January 1980 and Muslim, 2 February 1980.

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
384 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

The state-controlled Islamic discourse also proved useful and effective in meeting the
challenge posed by the ethno-regional forces. The regime's response was articulated in
terms of both the original Pakistani ideology and Islamic brotherhood: Pakistan had come
into being as a result of the re-awakening of Islamic consciousness among all Muslims of
the Indian subcontinent, and not as a result of the struggle launched separately by different
ethno-linguistic groups now constituting Pakistan. This historical legacy of a common
struggle under the banner of Islam ought to obliterate divisive elements such as ethnic,
linguistic and regional loyalties. Moreover, it was argued, all parochial and particularistic
demands and interests were antithetical to Islamic universalism and were thus devoid of
any legitimacy in an Islamic state. Echoing Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq once
said: "One God, One Prophet, One Book, one country, one system-no dissension!"
At the normative level, the second element of the military regime's strategy was to
use nationalist symbolism in order to meet the challenge of the opposition forces.
Although Islam remained the primary normative base of the regime's legitimacy,
Pakistani nationalism also came to be emphasized, not as an alternative to Islam, but as
a pillar supporting the primary normative base. Emphasis on the use of Urdu in schools
and government communications; introduction of a compulsory national dress code for all
government employees; and the celebration of national events such as Pakistan Day,
Independence Day, Defense Day, and the birth and death anniversaries of the poet and
philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad 'Ali Jinna, the founder of Pakistan, were
some of the symbolic state gestures intended to highlight the strong nationalist commit-
ment of the military rulers. Since the military is usually identified as a pillar of national
honor and prestige, and itself constitutes a vivid symbol of nationalism,39 Zia-ul-Haq's use
of nationalist symbols, to legitimize the military regime and strengthen the moral bonds
between the rulers and the ruled, appeared to be more natural and genuine than his use of
traditional religious symbols which are not usually identified with the military.
The third element of the strategy, at the normative level of response, was related to
the external situation on Pakistan's borders, especially the Soviet occupation of Afghan-
istan and its geo-political consequences for Pakistan's security. In the face of such grave
danger from the north, and the continued hostile posture of India, Zia-ul-Haq argued that
the nation's need for unity and political stability dictated the postponement of general
elections and the imposition of restrictions on the activities of political parties. He argued
that elections might result in political upheaval and the breakdown of administrative and
political institutions, which the country might not be able to survive at that time.40
There is no doubt that many people in Pakistan in the early eighties, believed that
external forces, i.e., the Soviet Union and/or India, would take advantage of the domestic
political turmoil and act in a manner that would threaten the security of the state. The
Jama'at-i-Islami, for example, publicly stated that while it did not approve of the continuation
of martial law, it would not participate in a movement which aimed at the violent overthrow

39. Ernest W. Lefever, Spear and Sceptre: Army, Police and Parliament in Tropical Africa (Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1970), p. 21.
40. 8 Days, 5 December 1981.

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PAKISTAN * 385

of the military regime because of the external threats facing the country.41 The regime also
successfully used the Afghanistan situation to rally the Pakistanis around their flag and gain
acceptance in the wake of continued agitation by the opposition parties for the withdrawal of
martial law and the transfer of power to elected representatives.

CONCLUSIONS

Military regimes become dependent on civilian bureaucracies for political manage-

ment when they lack experience in politics, as was the case of Ayub Khan's military
regime (1958-1969). By the time Zia-ul-Haq and his colleagues came to power, a
tradition of military intervention in the politico-administrative affairs of the country had
been established, and hence the new government found little difficulty in the complex task
of political conflict management. Zia-ul-Haq had learned from the experience of his
predecessors, such as Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Ayub Khan's legacy was the
consolidation of an authoritarian rule under a military leadership, through a complex of
martial law regulations that controlled the behavior of political parties, trade unions,
students associations, and the press. That of Yahya Khan was the development of
mechanisms that allowed the regulation of political conflict in subordinate political arenas.
What was distinctive, however, about Zia-ul-Haq's management of political, sectarian,
and ethno-regional conflicts was that, in order to legitimize his regime, and establish a
broad rapport with the masses, he mobilized the normative symbols of Islam and Pakistani
nationalism more effectively than any other regime in the history of Pakistan.
As the literature on the military and politics has amply demonstrated, within the
broader category of military regimes there are important variations in terms of both the
political structure of the regime and its relationship to society. On the one hand, there are
military regimes with a single party mobilization structure in which the military and the
politico-ideological party join together for purposes of socio-political control and mass
mobilization. The relationship between power and ideology in such regimes is function-
ally necessary for their legitimacy and survival. These regimes tend to suppress rival
political groups, subdue autonomous institutions of the civil society, abolish intermediary
structures, and seek to build their own organizational mechanisms in order to politicize the
entire society in favor of the regime goals. There are thus elements of both authoritari-
anism and populism in these regimes. Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's Egypt, Hafiz al-Asad's Syria,
and Saddam Husayn's Iraq are some of the prominent examples of such regimes.
In other cases, the military rules essentially as a corporate interest group and is not
concerned with populist attempts at mass mobilization and politicization of society. The
regime undertakes limited goals of modernization and economic development in congru-
ence with its own oligarchic interests and the interests of those socio-economic groups
which constitute its main support base. The most critical problem faced by this type of
regime is the lack of a normative basis of legitimacy. Sheer self-interest and greed cannot

41. See the statement of A. Ghafoor Ahmad, the vice-president of Jama'at-i-Islami, in The Pakistan
Times Overseas Weekly, 4 December 1983.

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
386 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

sustain a regime for long. Hence, this type of regime is usually highly unstable and
unabashedly repressive. El-Salvador of the late 1960s is a good example of this
phenomenon.
The corporatist type of military regime may, however, identify itself with some
popular ideology and seek a relatively stable basis of legitimacy in order to perpetuate
itself in power. In such a case, the corporate interests of the military are articulated in a
manner that becomes indistinguishable from the normative demands of a national
ideology. Zia-ul-Haq's Pakistan during 1977-88, with its emphasis on Islamic ideology,
is a primary example of such a regime.
In the minds and perceptions of the military officers in Pakistan, domestic and
external threats were interrelated, and the armed forces' involvement in one reinforced
their capacity to succeed in the other. The geo-strategic considerations and the imperative
of territorial integrity thus became intertwined with the ideological identity of Pakistan:
the normative symbols of Islam had to be emphasized, and the traditional religious
institutional structures had to be strengthened in order to assert Pakistan's distinct Islamic
identity as opposed to the secular ideology of India; secularly-based political parties had
to be denied participation in the political process because they were antithetical to the very
idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state; regionalist and ethno-national movements and
demands had to be suppressed because they were part of some external power's desire to
weaken the state; and 'communist subversion' had to be countered in order to keep the
Islamic ideology of the country intact. It is obvious that all these threats, domestic and
external, helped the military justify a larger allocation of national resources to its own
institution, and strenghthened and legitimized its claim to power in the political arena.
Zia-ul-Haq's invocation of Islam, and his use of other normative measures for the
management of political, sectarian and ethno-regional conflicts, and for the maintenance
of political legitimacy between 1977-85, represent a classic example of the way in which
Pakistan's military used normative rather than coercive means to contain domestic and
regional conflicts and maintain its hold on power.

This content downloaded from

39.40.19.162 on Thu, 24 Sep 2020 17:18:51 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms