Underlying Reasons of Military Engagemen

Volume II, No.
December 2016
International Journal of Ethnic and Social Studies
International Centre for Ethnic Studies

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INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF
ETHNIC AND
SOCIAL
STUDIES
VOLUME II NUMBER 2 DECEMBER 2016
CONTENTS
1 Dreaming of Bridges: Arborescent Identity and Ethical imagination

in Artistic Performances of Peace
Syed Jamil Ahmed
31 Underlying Reasons of Military Engagement in Politics of Pakistan

and Bangladesh: A Reappraisal
Asifa Jahangir and Sadia Mahmood Falki
87 Adivasi Marginal Tea Plantation Workers of West Bengal: Emergent

Micro-Politics in the Face of Globalisation and the State’s Neo-
Liberal Policies
Lalit Premlal Tirkey
119 Film Review: A Humanistic Perspective of a Demonised Movement

My Daughter, the Terrorist, A Film by Beate Arnestad
Safiya Cader
Underlying Reasons of Military
Engagement in Politics of Pakistan and
Bangladesh: A Reappraisal
Asifa Jahangir and Sadia Mahmood Falki
Abstract
While democracy and participant political culture have been viewed as

integral parts of the modern polity, the issue of military engagement in politics
has been at the centre of debate for many years in comparative politics. Yet,
many South Asian nations encounter challenges of institutionalising the civil-
military relationship as in the case of the politics of Pakistan and Bangladesh,
which are characterised by the dominant role of armies in politics that hinder
the process of democratisation in these societies.
This study attempts to highlight the underlying causes of military

interventions in Pakistan and Bangladesh, wherein incompetent political elites
prepared the ground for the military of these States to appear the most eligible
to take over in the political arena. It explores how the role of the military in
politics has hampered the institutionalisation of the democratic process in both
countries. The article suggests that issues of identity in these States slowed
down the stabilisation process and that the political leadership has failed to
create a sustainable democracy. The inability of the political systems of
Pakistan and Bangladesh to manage multiple identities has provided sufficient
lacunae for the military to formulate state discourses derived from within
divisive religious paradigms. However, although the factors paving the way
for military intervention in both these States arise from within similar contexts
International Journal of Ethnic & Social Studies, Vol. II, No. 2, December 2016
© ICES
32 Jahangir & Falki
the orientation of politics by the military differs. The shaping of politics

requires the transformation of military ‘rule’ into military ‘role’, which marks a
civilianising of the military regimes restoring democracy; this paper explores
the manner in which military intervention in both Bangladesh and Pakistan
illustrates the control of politics as one part of the task.
Keywords: Pakistan, Bangladesh, role of military, civil-military relations,

democratisation, military professionalism, military rule and military role
Introduction
South Asia is characterised by population boom, immense socio-

economic disparities, weak political structures and fragile democratic
institutions. Besides mounting militarisation and radicalisation by
numerous paramilitary entities and non-state military groups, this
region is also known for having the largest and most significant
militaries of today (Cohen 2013: p. 351). Accordingly, the South Asian
region has a divergent experience of the role of military in politics that
is based on different models of civil-military relations. Moreover, it is
widely believed that armies in both Pakistan and Bangladesh play an
active role—directly or indirectly—and exercise strong influence over
the politics of their countries. Growing political military role in these
countries has shaken the democratisation process as well as electoral
procedure considerably. On the other hand, India and Sri Lanka are
representatives of the ascendancy of civilian rule in the turbulent
region of South Asia (Rizvi 1989: p. 50). In South Asia Military
involvement in politics is a strategy to overcome law and order
challenges under civilian supremacy, and the Indian emergency rule
from 1975-77 is one such case. This is a legal construct of military rule
under civilian order and does not depict a political exercise of power
by military. Moreover, India has military rule in certain states and
regions such as Kashmir (7.5 lakhs of military and paramilitary rule in
Indian occupied Kashmir) and in the North Eastern Seven Sisters states.
The military rule they apply in these states and regions is the Armed
Forces Special Powers Acts (AFSPA) (New World Encyclopaedia 2015).
Military Engagement in Politics of Pakistan and Bangladesh 33
Absence of elections and strong, stable countervailing civilian forces in

Pakistan and Bangladesh have paved the grounds for political
dominance of an organised military establishment to make coups a
frequent process. While India and Sri Lanka also have strong military
organisations, they are, however, relatively feebler than the
countervailing civilian forces in these countries (Misra 1984). Misra
explicates that the nature of military structure and organisation
generate a military mind-set, which some time prompt the military to
plunge into politics. Organisational control by the civilian elite is that
significant factor which distinguishes military organisation of Pakistan
and Bangladesh from India and Sri Lanka. In Pakistan and Bangladesh,
the organisational control of the civilian elite being weak led to the
military viewing themselves as the ‘Guardian’ of politics. In the case of
India and Sri Lanka, the military did not take ‘organisational
grievances’ into account whereas this served as an important factor in
stimulating intervention in Pakistan and Bangladesh.
There are various factors and dynamics to consider in the role of the
military in the politics of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the divergent
orientations of militaries of these countries manifest the grounds for
democratic politics. The role of the military in both states is linked with
their historical practices and appears to be the product of their
independence movements. Both states have inherited fragile political
systems, dysfunctional political institutions and cultures of low civilian
participation. This has produced highly centralised polities and given
birth to military dominance, and authoritarian and assertive trends in
politics even in the civilian tenures. The inability of political elites to
manage political crisis and problems within the political domain
produce a power vacuum where militaries of these states appear the
most eligible to take over politics. The military being an organised and
professional institution is structured on the rule of command and
control, while being less accommodative to ethnic, regional, secular
and group identities.
34 Jahangir & Falki
Though the role of military in politics in both countries has been

slightly different, several similarities are obvious. For instance, military
intervention, over different periods of time, is attributed to various
reasons: all-time low political culture, incompetency of political
leadership, military professionalism, poverty and low economic
growth, and national security dilemmas. Moreover, allegations of
mismanagement and poor governance have been presented as
legitimate justifications for the military to engage in politics for
replacing the civilian government(s) at opportune times.
1. Military Dominance in Politics of the Subcontinent During

British Rule
While military dominance in politics is considered to be colonial

baggage in South Asian countries, democracy is perceived to be the
cursed legacy of British rule, especially in the subcontinent regions
including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The subcontinent has
frequently faced military intervention in politics and disruptions of
democracy. The roots of direct or indirect political role of these
countries’ armies can be found in the British Indian Army. During the
almost 200-year of British rule in the subcontinent, the British
developed strong military structures leading to a martial race, 1 firstly
1 Martial race was a designation created by the army officials of British

India after the Indian Rebellion of 1857, where they classified each caste
into one of two categories: ‘martial’ and ‘non-martial’. The rationale was
that a ‘martial race’ was typically brave and well-built for fighting, while
the ‘non-martial races’ were those whom the British believed to be unfit
for battle because of their sedentary lifestyles. Historically, after the War
of Independence of 1857, fought by the Muslims and the Hindus
collectively against British imperial rule, the British reframed the
recruitment policy of Indian-based forces and made it into regional one.
This strategy ensured that recruitment based on ‘martial race strategy’
from south of the subcontinent were restricted. Indians from royalty,
noble castes and specific ethnic groups were part of the British Indian
by deploying British forces, and later Indian, for establishing their

economic hegemony and subsequent territorial control (Cohen 2013:
pp. 351-52).
After the 1857 War of Independence, the strategy of ‘martial race’, as

introduced by the British, infused military dominance in the politics of
the subcontinent (Gaylor 1993: p. 28). Following this policy, Indians,
mostly of Royal background (generally Sikhs and Hindus), were
recruited in the British Indian (National) Army (BINA). These Indian
recruits while receiving a range of political privileges from British
rulers in the late 1880s, were also involved in decision-making process
(Gaylor 1993: p. 28). Based on the marital race strategy, recruitment of
Muslims, mostly from low areas of Punjab and northern areas of
today’s Pakistan in BINA, was made in order to send troops outside
the subcontinent to different parts of the world for the protection of the
British Empire (Cohen 2013: p. 352). By the end of the 19th century,
new British rulers decided to continue the previous rulers’ policy of
not recruiting Bengali Muslims in the British army of the Indian
subcontinent (Ahmed 2004: p. 2).2
Further, at the dawn of 20th century, British law of apolitical military

practice was firstly breached by the British commander-in-chief of the
Indian Army, General Lord Kitchener who used his influential links in
Calcutta and Whitehall to overthrow the civilian Viceroy, Lord Curzon
army. The British recognised only some high ranking/noble groups and
classes as ‘martial races’ (Cohen 2013: p. 352). Unlike the Muslims, the
Sikhs and Hindus were bestowed with the commission ranks in British
Indian Army following British military men and received modern training
and political advantage from the British government in the subcontinent
compared.
2 As Great Britain firmly established its military ascendency in Bengal
through the East India Company, it started excluding the already
recruited Bengali Muslims from British Army. Later this practice was
totally abandoned.
36 Jahangir & Falki
(Colley 2003). The first area in which Lord Kitchener introduced the
ethos of military intervention was South Asian politics. During his
time the role of the military—in supporting British imperialism within
the subcontinent—acquired a greater role, and the BINA was sent
outside the subcontinent for different expeditions during the two
world wars. Later these martial races were incorporated into the
bureaucratic set-up and their political influence grew rapidly (Menezes
1999: p. 235).
2. Reasons for Military Involvement in the Politics of Pakistan

and Bangladesh
2.1. Political Imbalance and Apolitical Military Role
In post-independence Pakistan and Bangladesh, military dominance

(either direct or indirect) over politics was very evident. In united
Pakistan, the military either directly presumed power or indirectly
developed its dominance as a key political force affecting the political
institutions (Rizvi 1989: p. 50). This practice developed a strong link
between politics and the military. Pakistan and Bangladesh appear to be
similar in terms of factors nurturing military takeovers. Both states are the
outcome of historical institutionalism, where historical policy decisions of
institutions have a deeper impact in manifesting future policies of these
political systems. Colonial legacies under the British, and later
authoritarian practices in pre-1971 united Pakistan were severed as ‘path
dependency’ to set the political milieu, taking inspirations from the past
practices for espousing contemporary choices.3
At its inception, Pakistan, like India, adopted the Government of India

Act of 1935 as the Interim Constitution of 1947 to run the functions of
3 Historical institutionalism is an approach of social science that provides a

historical orientation of the ways in which institutions in a political system
are structured and political behaviour and the outcomes are shaped.
an independent state. It provided a parliamentary system and federal

form of government system. Some revisions made in the Act were
considered de rigueur to meet the basic requirements and address the
prevalent issues of an infant sovereign state (Rizvi n.d.). According to
the Act, the Governor-General could enjoy special discretionary
powers over the Prime Minister, and the federal government could
exercise many overruling powers over provincial units. The struggle
for a separate state in Bangladesh had also been characterised by a
demand for the constitutional rights and grants; after 1971, democratic
leadership was committed to putting into practice principles of true
parliamentary democracy. These circumstances moved Pakistan and
Bangladesh further towards political turbulence, thereby inviting
military interference in the politics of these countries to establish order
(See Appendix A).
In India, the possibilities for military dominance in civilian matters

ended permanently by the timely amendments in the 1935 Indian Act,
and the efforts initiating constitutional development. In this regard,
Davis observes that since the start of independence Indians retained a
few British legacies such as an ‘apolitical military role’ discipline,
organisation and professionalism (Colley 2003). Thus the army is
subordinate to the civilian structure. All these contributing factors and
well-timed developments have created a political balance in India’s
democratic system. However, this has not been the practice in
Pakistan’s political system in the early years. Davis elucidated that
Nehru made some crucial political reforms in order to consolidate the
democratic system. For instance under the Nehru doctrine, the Defence
Ministry was to be headed by civilian politicians and staff (Khilnani
1999: p. 81). In the same way, Rizvi (1989: p. 50), a senior analyst of
Pakistan, believes that the ‘model of civilian dominance’ in India has
been devised due to the successful exercise of functional democracy
through electoral politics at regular intervals. Changes in the
governmental system and political elitism through constitutional
38 Jahangir & Falki
means have bequeathed legitimacy of power to the civilian democratic

government in India. Challenges are tackled and resolved politically,
and this renders the Indian political system immune from the political
shocks and breakdown that political systems of Bangladesh and
Pakistan usually encounter. Supremacy of civilian leadership in the
Indian parliamentary system over the military is an outcome of
managing the rules of the game on a consensus-based approach (Rizvi
1989: p. 50).
2.2. Lack of Politically-motivated National leadership and the

Foremost Martial Law
Charismatic political leadership is a significant feature in the South

Asian countries. In India, Nehru used his charisma to strengthen
democratic practices. He served as the main architect of the modern
political institutions and had no preference for a personalised system
of support and polity. In the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh,
charismatic leadership was either non-existent in the arena of politics
or the leadership lost their charisma due to severe conflict over
ideology, unfavourable policies and an authoritarian brand of civilian
rule. Political institutionalisation was not fully achieved due to a
personalised system of politics.
Although a dynamic leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding

father of Islamic Republic of Pakistan did not have sufficient time to
establish viable and functional institutions of participatory orientation
in Pakistan. Ali Jinnah’s untimely death in 1948 left less room for
Pakistan to tackle the bulk of issues, due to a lack of potential leaders
who could share Ali Jinnah’s charisma and vision or his ability to
resolve the problems with great wisdom. The decline of charisma of
Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman4 in Bangladesh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 5 in
4 Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman was known as ‘Mujib’.

5 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is known as Z.A. Bhutto.
Pakistan are apt examples of charismatic politics in history that grew

ineffective and resulted, ultimately and tragically, in the replacement
of these leaders. Mujib attempted to prevent loss of charisma by
seizing more power and deploying authoritarian approaches to
politics, measures that later revealed the authoritarian nature of a
civilian polity which later provoked indignation (Rizvi 1989: p. 62) (See
Appendix A, Table 3).
Moreover, the political leadership of both Pakistan and Bangladesh

proved to be inept in maintaining national stability and carrying out
the task of state-building. In the united Pakistan, the demise of
Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 and assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan
in 1951 created a serious leadership vacuum. Meanwhile, the earliest
main martial law was imposed in Pakistan by the provincial governor
of Punjab, Mian Momtaz Daultana in response to the situation of
deteriorating law and order in Punjab where a new tide of protests had
erupted after the declaration of the Ahmadia community as non-
Muslim (Ziring 1971: pp. 48-49). Consequently, the role of the military
in politics amplified owing to the escalating chaos in the country
(Ziring 1971: p. 49). A similar leadership vacuum developed in
Bangladesh after the assassination of Mujib-ur-Rahman and his family
members on 15 August 1975 (Islam 2011: p. 3; Maniruzzaman 1992: pp.
206-10).
Charismatic, patriotic and politically-committed national leadership

disappeared in the early years of independence. Thus, civilian
governments could not complete their full tenure in Pakistan or
Bangladesh. In Pakistan, loyalty to Ali Jinnah’s notion of ‘civilian
government officers as a servant of populace’ disappeared, and the
civilian government ruled the country as if it were their personal
property. A similar political system developed in Bangladesh. If any
government achieved the given constitutional period, the successful
completion of governance was ironically attributed to military
40 Jahangir & Falki
intervention (Kukreja 1991: p. 56). Conversely, in India, the longevity

of Nehru’s political career and his commitment to Gandhi’s ideas of
‘army subordination to the civilian structure’ kept the Indian army
within its sphere (Khilnani 1999: p. 81).
2.3. Military Coups and Constitutional Dilemmas
Since 1947, Pakistan has undergone four military coups (see Appendix
A, Table 1). During these four coups, there was direct military rule.
Apart from the military coups, three constitutions were put forward in
1956, 1962 and 1973. The military coups created constitutional
dilemmas leading to irregular elections and amendments for apolitical
military role were made in the 1973 constitution between 2008 and
2012 (see Appendix A, Table 2). Parliamentary democracy in Pakistan
was resumed in 2002. Although the general elections of 2002 were
conducted under military rule, the elections of 2008 and 2013 restored
the dismantled democratisation process in Pakistan. Nevertheless,
analysts such as Junejo (2010) suggest that political unrest, a shocking
economy and weak democracy can make undemocratic forces strong
(Rashiduzzaman 1997: p. 256). Some analysts argue that a political
system provides stability as political parties seriously consider the
challenges faced by the country and make earnest attempts for better
elections, prospective civilian rule and a balanced civil-military
relationship (Baloch and Gaho 2013). Bangladesh has similarly
experienced two military d’états (1975-81 and 1982-90) and two minor
coups (1975 and 2007-08) (See Appendix A, Table 3). The Awami
League (AL) led by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman took charge of the
country’s nascent democratic order according to the Provisional
Constitution Order of 1972. Being a part of the political elites in united
Pakistan, Mujib was alerted about the suspected military interference
in politics. To counter prospects of a military coup in Bangladesh, he
established a loyal force called, the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National
Vanguards or National Defence Force)—a group within the military,
which was used as a ‘personal army’ to safeguard Mujib’s regime with

special privileges accorded to them (Codron 2007). Political observers,
such as Khondker (1998: p. 307), argued that some groups within the
military were annoyed by Mujib’s discriminatory policies. It is
commonly believed that a plot to assassinate Mujib was planned by
junior military officers with the aim of toppling his government;
however the army as a whole denied its involvement in Mujib’s
assassination.6 Later, the AL leaders established a parliamentary
democracy, which was nominated from the Jatiya Sangsad (legislature),
with actual powers vested in the cabinet, and which was collectively
liable to the legislature for its actions and policies.7
2.4. Political Parties, Viable Political Institutions and Election-

Engineering
Given that a practice takes time to become a norm or convention,

political parties and viable institutions play a crucial role for
disseminating the democratic values in the country. In emerging
democracies like Pakistan and Bangladesh, political parties could not
have propagated norms of democratisation in their societies. This was
due to incompetence, corruption, and the inability to sustain
democratic principles within its party structure, for most political
parties have a dynastical orientation and the quest of vested interests.
Post-independence political parties, which had played a proactive role
in independence, suffered political victimisation and fragmentation
through both internal and external forces. External factors such as the
military of these countries, with the help of newly-formed political
6 It was reported by the analysts like Liton (2015) asserted, “the army as an
institution was not involved in the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-ur-
Rahman and the overthrow of his government on 15 August 1975”.
7 Jatiya Sangsad comprises directly-elected representatives of the people of
Bangladesh as an outcome of national elections held after five years; a
cabinet is directly responsible to the Sangsad for its actions and policies.
42 Jahangir & Falki
parties, led by military men or alliance-making with small groups of

political parties, weakened the hold of the Muslim League in
Pakistan’s political system and the AL in Bangladesh. This occurred
during the military regimes of General Ayub Khan, General Zia-ul-
Haq and General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan, as well as in
Bangladesh during the eras of General Zia-ur-Rahman and Lieutenant
General Hussain Muhammad Ershad. These military rulers not only
acquired constitutional legitimacy, but also pursued their corporate
military interests (Dawood 2014: pp. 283-93). They sought to prolong
their rule through lawful means while strengthening political
institutions.
Although political parties had opportunities of governing the state,

they failed to implement constitutional changes for fair elections. A
viable, independent institution of election commission, as in India, is
still to be established in the political systems of Bangladesh and
Pakistan (Kukreja 1995: p. 531). Electoral politics is a valuable means of
fostering trends of renewing the popular mandate after a fixed period
of time. In modern democracies, elections are viewed as the only way
to ensure political participation of the masses and bring social change.
In India, it is evident from the facts that continuity of electoral politics
amplified the stakes of different communities by extending their
bargaining power; this created a sense of ownership and belonging
towards Indian political system. This is the major factor in India that
restricted the military from exceeding its capacity beyond the power of
the Indian parliament; hence its ‘role’ was never extended to ‘rule’
(Rizvi 1989: p. 55).
The inefficiency of the political elite in Pakistan and Bangladesh, who

justified their rule through ballot, empowered the bullet. In Pakistan,
unlike in Bangladesh, the failure to manage the political drift provided
the opportunity to use force as a bargaining chip with the military.
Being an organised and structured institution, the military in Pakistan
is perceived as the most adept contestant in the arena of politics. In

both Bangladesh and Pakistan, the regional political elites often looked
to the military to facilitate their power especially when they were
unable to manifest their strength at electoral polls.
2.5. The Intermittent Collapse of Political Order: Entrenchment of

National Security State
From the outset, intermittent collapse of political structures, which

embedded the concept of ‘National Security State’, created constitutional
dilemmas. However, the nature of challenges to political order differed
in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Compared to Delhi, in united Pakistan,
Karachi and Dhaka lagged in building basic civilian administrative
infrastructures. The earliest politicians were insecure and faced greater
socio-economic pressures. Hence, rather than nurturing broad-based
political institutions, they moved towards committing to consolidating
territorial solidarity and unity of ethnically-divided units of the state. As
Kamtekar’s points out, “[i]t is an over simplification with some truth to
say that while in India independence involved restructuring a state, in
Pakistan it involved building a state. Delhi existed; Islamabad had to
be built” (Colley 2003: pp. 2-5).
As Pakistan had to fight its first war with India over the Kashmir
dispute in 1948, its first parliamentary government sought to manage its
internal administrative problems in order to ensure the territorial
integrity of the state (Khan 2009: pp. 54-55). The early governments of
Pakistan focused on strengthening state defence rather than
democratising the political system. This led to a reinforcement of a
dysfunctional authoritarian political system and poor administrative
management. Consequently, an alliance between bureaucracy and
military elites was forged for the pursuit of their vested interests
contributing later on to the definition of Pakistan as a ‘National Security
State’ Siddiqa (2011), a prominent civilian military analyst of Pakistan,
44 Jahangir & Falki
expounds that the alliance between military leadership and bureaucratic

elite led to a change of state discourse, underscoring its authoritarian
character. Force and coercion were viewed as immediate remedies to
resolve all problems of national stability. This gave weight to the
perception of the military as an organised and institutionalised power
bank that dispersed all challenges and demands on linguistic and ethnic
bases. Moreover, insecure eastern borders of Pakistan and emerging
international compulsions at the onset of cold war in South Asia,
amplified the military’s role in politics, which directly or indirectly
received support from the superpowers of cold war. Internal and external
factors manifested the pattern of civil military relations and favoured a
strong, structured and institutionalised military that had the capacity to
enforce agendas and make decisions regarding national stability.
In Bangladesh, similarly, the military’s role was predominant: from

1972 to 1975, the defence budget was 13 per cent of the total national
expenditure (Codron 2007). Under Zia-ur Rahman’s era, the defence
budget escalated rapidly—an increase of almost 186 per cent from 1972
to 1981. During 1975-76, the allocation for defence budget was 32 per
cent of the total revenue budget, which continued in the following
years (Codron 2007). Even though Bangladesh did not face great
external challenges as compared to Pakistan it was forced to confront
their internal problems on the account of the military coup which
toppled Mujib-ur-Rahman’s civil government structure in Bangladesh
in August 1975. On the other hand, in India, during the Nehru’s period
(1947-64) the military budget was quite tight and Nehru laid down the
basis of an Indian welfare state.
In the case of Pakistan, national security dilemma has also become a

reason for the overwhelming influence of the military in politics. 8 Since
8 This was communicated during a personal conversation related to ‘Civil-

military relationship in Pakistan and National Security Issues’ with A. Z.
the early years of independence, Pakistan’s security and territorial

integrity have been at stake due to many external and internal threats,
which persuaded the military to intervene in political affairs of the
state. The civilian government(s) are not in the position to remove
existential threats to the country’s security due to its geostrategic
position in South Asian region. Therefore, a military role is visible in
the country’s administrative field. Conversely, Bangladesh has not
faced terror risks to the country’s security and its geostrategic location
has not been as challenging as Pakistan’s. National security dilemmas
manifest the different responses to military coups in these two
societies, where in Pakistan, military rule faces minimal resistance and
the military is viewed as a ‘National Saviour’.
2.6. Military Professionalism
Huntington pointed out that the reasons for military intervention in

the politics of developing countries is to do with the professionalism
within its structure and organisation. He attributed military
professionalism to “social responsibility, expertise and corporate
authenticity to men who follow it” (Huntington 1957: pp. 3-7). These
dynamics induce the military to interfere in the state affairs of civilian
governments and to ensure the military have the upper-hand over
civilian institutions. While political institutions lack professionalism,
the military uses its professionalism in politics to generate influence
and material benefits. In fact, civilian governments, too, benefit from
this military trait: according to Abrahamson under this professionalism,
the military organises and equips political institutions so that civilian
administrative structures can flourish and mutual understanding can
evolve between military and civilian government (1972).
Since independence, the Indian army found itself in a similar

advantageous place of, what Huntington and Abrahamson describe as,
Hilali (Head of the Political Science Department at University of

Peshawar, Peshawar-Pakistan) 30 July 2015.
46 Jahangir & Falki
professionalism. However, having enjoyed the privilege of higher rank

under British rule, they had no urge to engage in ruling politics in
India. Differences of orientation of behaviour of the military do occur
in India. Yet the civilian government strengthened its own footing and
adopted an approach of mutual understanding and cooperation with
the military. Thus both institutions could grow simultaneously in their
own spheres and together strengthen democracy in the country for a
balanced civil-military relationship. Civilian governments endeavoured
to discharge its responsibilities, and contained the military within its
domain wherein it uses its professionalism within its organisational
boundaries rather than meddling in the matters of state. Eventually,
viable political institutions emerged in India and democratic
professional practices of politicians obstructed military intervention
into politics.
Conversely, Pakistan’s army was comprised of ill-equipped old units

of regiments and some of the Indian Muslim officers. Hence, the
professionalised nature of organisation in Pakistani military had been
resulted by following experiences of Britain and America, and later
developed Pakistan’s own style of professionalism, which led to the
popular belief in Pakistan that the military, being the professional
institution, was the fitting actor in political decision-making. Due to
the over-ambitious approach of the military elite, in conjunction with
persisting political unrest, the civil-military relationship could not be
fostered. Therefore, undemocratic practices among political parties
and, the ‘intermittent political culture’9 paved the way for military
interference in politics (Rizvi 1989: p. 50).
As in Pakistan, a similar culture of military professionalism in politics

is visible in the Bangladesh army. Some observers such as Wolf (2013)
argue that successful completion of civilian governments’ tenures
9 The intermittent political culture is an outcome of irregular patterns of

elections.
(1991-2007) ‘apparently’ indicates the continuing control of military on

the country’s politics. On the other hand, many such as Chowdhury
(2014b) believe that the military is set to purge the politics of all the
corrupt leaders from the stage of Bangladeshi politics due to their
mishandling of state affairs. This would maintain a strong military
standing in its society (Chowdhury 2014a: pp. 75-79) and safeguard the
country from political chaos and recurring uprisings (Wolf 2013: pp. 5-
6). It has also been argued that incompetent politicians create rifts
within the military between the junior and senior officers (Independent
Bangladesh 2008).
2.7. Organisational and Structural Challenges
The structure and composition of the Bangladesh Army was

predominantly different to the Pakistan army due to two main
significant features: explicit politicisation and factionalisation as a
result of civil war. These factors not only impeded professionalism but
also hindered the process of institutionalising civil-military relations.
This led to the exposure of structural instability and configurational
issues of the army—an outcome of the War of Liberation of 1971. In the
early years, the liberation force, Raksi Bahini, emerged as an
‘organisation within organisation’ for purging the anti-government
enterprises of Mujib-ur-Rahman (Jahan 2001: pp. 30-33). Such kind of
factionalisation does not exist in the Pakistan army. Codron believes
that military elites in Bangladesh tried to enhance professionalism but
civilian power between 1991 and 2007 brought partisan differences
into the army. Codron explains that democratisation essentially does
not accompany advancement of professionalism in the armed forces
(2007). Bangladesh inherited both British and Pakistan legacies.
Nevertheless, the military of Bangladesh did not emerge from the
British colonial culture as it was one of the outcomes of the 1971 War of
Liberation. Participants of this war were heterogeneous in terms of
culture and race: they were civilian, students, militia, rebellious officers
48 Jahangir & Falki
and peasants. These groups were divided into different political factions
holding their own political agendas influenced by the nationalists and
Marxist paradigms. Moreover, the leadership was disputed because
many of these groups did not regard Mujib-ur-Rahman as a legitimate
and skilled leader, capable of leading a nascent state. Moreover, given
the diverse groups, the Bangladeshi Army was not only divided, it was
also alienated ideologically. The conflict mainly stemmed from the fact
that nationalist forces and the army in Bangladesh were not able to
develop a common vision of what state ought to be.
With regard to Pakistan, it is important to note that the Independence

Movement of 1947 was commanded by the liberal and modern
leadership, which stood by democratic principles and legislative
struggle for attaining the rights of the Muslims. The army never
appeared as a significant player during the British rule; it was only
seen as an instrument to achieve Empire’s goals (Codron 2007).
Religion as an integrative force, to unite Muslims in subcontinent’s
politics, successfully materialised despite the cultural and regional
disparities among the Muslim communities. This policy was continued
by the military to achieve the desirable level of internal cohesion.
Pakistan’s military had an advantage in terms of internal cohesion
compared to other armies of South Asia and helped impart
professionalism in the army. However, the Pakistan military has an
extraordinary representation of Punjabis and Pashtuns, which created
the quandary of ethnic imbalance. Hence, the military, when in power,
has been less accommodative to the ethnic and provincial demands.
However, adherence to Islamic ideology within military has been a
significant factor throughout the years and served as a valid
justification to rule.
Unlike the Pakistan military, the Bangladesh military faced grave

issues of factions and politicisation. In 1971—the post-war period—the
lack of control over the army’s entry into politics, and its exit from the
political system, produced several problems, divisions and inequalities

within the army as an institution. It developed a conflict of interests
and prestige among the repatriated Bengali soldiers, officers from
Pakistan and freedom fighters of the War of Liberation of 1971; the
latter received favours, privileges and, more importantly, promotions
in the army ranks. Factions and politicisation augmented within the
Bangladeshi army as a result of Mujib’s policy of rehabilitating and
enabling the freedom fighters and guerrillas by recruiting them in the
army and bringing them in as a streamlining of the army system. 10 This
so-called policy of accommodation put army’s professionalism and
strength at stake and produced insecurity among the officially
recruited officers.
2.8. Ideology and Role of Military in Politics
Nationalism, generally, translates to resolute political philosophy.

However, in South Asia, it is strongly interlinked with religious
discourses. This enables illegitimate rulers to justify their version of
rules to a larger portion of the population. The militaries of Pakistan
and Bangladesh both used religion in their political discourse.
Pakistan, in particular, did not have any significant opposition as, in
terms of religion, the population is homogenous. This enabled the
military to successfully assert their ‘role’ and ‘rule’ in defining
ideological considerations. Unlike Bangladesh, the concept of national
security was closely associated with ideological orientations where
apathy to religious ideology was regarded as a repudiation of national
interests. Therefore, state discourse was accompanied by the ‘National
Security Paradigm’ formulated by the military (Rafique 1993: p. 108).
10 The Bangladesh army was mainly split between two hostile groups—the
freedom fighters and repatriates. The freedom fighters were guerrilla
fighters of war advocating radical philosophy while repatriates were
regular army men influenced by British army traditions of united Pakistan
and who did not favour a political role for army. For further details, see
Baxter 1997.
50 Jahangir & Falki
Although for Bengalis, the bases of identity in 1947 were uniformity of

religion, post-independence, language became an identity-maker
instead of religion. However, Muslim political elites migrating from
India preferred religion as their political slogan to attract the masses
because they did not have constituencies in Pakistan (Codron 2007).
The military of Pakistan, predominantly composed of Punjabi-Pashtun
majority, and heavily influenced by its colonial heritage of evaluating
Bengalis on the bio-cultural theory of Martial Race, raised serious
concerns for Bengali nationalists (Cohen 2013: p. 352). The concept of
Bengali nationalism was invoked as an outcome of various political
events which occurred in a post-1947 setting. Bengali nationalism later
became the part of the four key principles of liberation movement and
was included in the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh under Article 9
(Hossain & Khan 2006: p. 325). The military intervention of 1975 was a
major outcome of several attempted coups and counter-coups that
brought a significant change in Bengali nationalism reintroduced by
Bangladeshi nationalism (Hossain & Khan 2006: p. 326).
The idea of Bangladeshi nationalism was promoted in 1976 under the

military rule of Major General Zia-ur-Rahman, who was considerably
interested in civilianising his rule through developing an ideological
paradigm different from the ethnic-linguistic bases of nationalism
(Anisuzzaman 2000: pp. 45-63). The military’s depiction of nationalism
in Bangladesh derived its inspiration more from religion rather than
Bengali culture and heritage. For the promotion of Bangladeshi
nationalism and obtaining political legitimacy, Zia-ur-Rahman
established the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Claiming an
ideology on the basis of religion was a secure option for the military.
Producing less resentment from people, reliance on religious identity
was seen as a solution to the legitimacy crisis of military role (Milam
2009: p. 334). When Zia-ur-Rahman became president of Bangladesh in
1977, it was evident that he amended the constitution for the sake of
replacing secularism with “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah”;
Bengali identity and citizenship was modified to ‘Bangladeshi’ (Riaz

1994: p. 303). Support to right wing religious political parties was
provided by lifting the ban on them imposed during Mujib-ur-
Rahman’s government. The policy of declaring a religious-political
approach was continued in Major General Ershad’s era (1982-90). It
was elevated further by the policy of raising Islam to the level of state
religion because Ershad needed to further justify his rule (Milam 2009:
p. 19). It drew a clear line of distinction between the people of
Bangladesh and ethnic Bengalis of India, efforts that were a series of
policies intended by civilian and military governments for promotion
as the essence of national identity (Riaz 1994: p. 303).
Seen from this perspective, Pakistan bears similarities to the

Bangladeshi military. General Zia-ul-Haq also made support to his
regime obligatory by adding a question in the Referendum where the
answer ‘yes’ and ‘no’ was conditional to adherence to Islam (Kamran
2008: pp. 114-15). Religious political parties of Pakistan also became
successful in forging an informal alliance with the military that
diminished the military regimes’ dependence on political elites. This
aided Zia-ul-Haq’s regime to hold a party-less election in 1985 in order
to devise ‘selective competition’ by filtering political elites (Zahid 2011:
p. 16). As Talbot explicates, Zia-ul-Haq envisioned a comparatively
enlarged role of military in the politics of Pakistan as he viewed the
tasks of the army not merely linked to domestic stability and territorial
integrity. The army was also guarantor of Pakistan to extend it as an
ideological state (1998: p. 255).
General Pervez Musharraf in 2002 followed the footprints of Zia-ul-

Haq with a military/civilian hybrid system. He developed an alliance
with Islamist political parties, an approach contradictory to his
projected idea of ‘Enlighten Moderation’ (Zia 2009: pp. 225-26). For the
first time in the history of Pakistani politics, an alliance led by religious
political parties acquired a striking share of power. It was accomplished
52 Jahangir & Falki
due to a policy of ‘selective competition’ commanded by the military.

However, the adverse consequences of a Mullah-Military alliance
looming in Pakistani politics tarnished Pakistan’s image at an
international level. Siddiqa (2011) explains that in the initial years a
religious paradigm was even central for civilian leadership in Pakistan
since it was viewed as an effective strategy to bring all communities
together to resolve the issues of national integration. Later, under
military regimes, religious identity was also used to pronounce state
discourse and the military acted as guardian of this ideology. This led
to suppression of all regional, ethnic and linguistic demands for power
sharing which were contradictory to military dominances of power in
Pakistan. This practice of pronouncing religion as a core ideology of
the state branded the ethnic and provincial demands as inappropriate
and disloyal.
2.9. Constitutional Role of Military
The Indian constitution of 1950 laid a foundation for a successful

functional democracy and for strengthening the political process and
political institutions. Although 59 amendments are incorporated into
the Indian constitution, they neither affected the nature of the
constitution nor have the civilian leadership used these constitutional
changes to serve their vested interests. This has kept the primary
feature of the constitution intact (Rizvi 1989: p. 52). Today political
problems and conflicts over power sharing exist, yet resolution
strategies are always devised politically and crises are diffused by
managing them politically too.
Pakistan’s constitution of 1973 defined the role of the military as

defence against external aggression, threat of war, and subject to law,
they act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so. The oath laid
down principles for soldiers and officers of armed forces and
prohibited any association in active politics.11 The constitution also

declares that “any attempt to abrogate or connive to abrogate and
sabotage the constitution by use of force and show of force or by any
other act [to be] high treason”.12 It is evident that these constitutional
provisions failed to restrain military intervention. However, the
military did not distinguish between internal and external threats and
its role was extended to internal threats through pleas of the civilian
governments to manage a crisis.13 Several attempts had been made by
military elites to legitimise their role in politics by formulating a
decision-making power besides the ultimate authority like the
National Security Council (NSC).14 In 2004, the effort was made to
11 See The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Article 245 and
Third Schedule.
12 See The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Article 245 and
Third Schedule.
13 The transfer of power in Pakistan in 1958 (assumption of power by Field
Marshal Ayub Khan), 1969 (Ayub Khan to General Yahya Khan), 1971
(Yahya Khan to Z.A. Bhutto), and 1977 (Z.A.Bhutto to General Zia-ul-Haq)
were not in accordance with any constitutional formula and involved the
military. The civilianisation of military rule in 1962 and 1985 was carried
out under martial law, which ensured the continuation of coup-making
army commanders as the heads of state after the end of martial law.
14 The NSC was established in 1969 under the military government of Yahya
Khan but remained merely an organisation confined to paper. The NSC
was abandoned by the civilian government of Z. A. Bhutto who
established the ‘Defence Committee of the Cabinet’ (DCC) in 1976. In 1977,
General Zia-ul-Haq tried to restore the NSC. Nevertheless, the idea was
strongly opposed by the political parties and had to be dropped. The NSC
was finally dissolved in 1993 under Benazir Bhutto’s tenure as Prime
Minister. The Chief of Army Staff, Jehangir Karamat, in 1998, argued
during a speech at the Navy War College in Lahore that there was a need
to create an NSC, in order to institutionalise the military’s role in the
decision-making process. However, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did
not approve of this statement and Karamat was forced to resign. It was
eventually under Pervez Musharraf that the NSC was approved by
54 Jahangir & Falki
incorporate the constitutional role of military under the military/

hybrid system and the NSC was established. It was put to an end by
the elected civilian government of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in
2008, which came into power after the general elections of 18 February
2008. The notion of NSC was also floated in Bangladesh in 2008, but it
was neither appreciated by Bangladeshi society nor was it approved by
the civilian governments.
2.10. Issues of Parliamentary Democracy
The problems and challenges of parliamentary democracy in

Bangladesh and Pakistan remained similar to each other with a few
exceptions. Due to incompetence and ineptness of political leadership,
constitutional and legitimacy issues remained unresolved or ill-
resolved. The ingredients of a functional democracy—viable political
institutions, legitimisation of a political system based on regular intervals
of electoral politics, effective channels of political participation—were
missing altogether.
Unlike Pakistan and Bangladesh, political leadership in India was

trained, equipped and politically mature. This political training was
initiated during the rule of Muslim dynasties in the subcontinent
where Hindus, as a community, were eager to play their role and
provide services to run the affairs of Muslim Sultanate. Later, the
establishment of All India National Congress in 1885 under the British
Empire paved the way for encouraging a participatory culture through
political dynamics. Political interaction with the British gradually
parliament in 2004 and thereby became a part of Pakistan’s constitution.

With the end of Musharraf’s era and the PPP’s victory in the 2008
elections, the DCC once again replaced the NSC at the centre of the
security and foreign policy decision-making mechanism.
See ‘Performance of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet: Civil-Military

Relations’, (March 2012), PILDAT Citizen Monitoring Report.
helped Congress to transform itself to a level of a dynamic political

party rather than a mere channel of communication for the British or a
short lived political movement. Expression of political mandates and
consensus by electoral politics built the notion that even one dominant
national political party cannot rule and control all the states of
federation. This not only motivated diversity in democratic traditions
in India, but pluralistic and accommodative approaches were also
practiced as effectual means to confine the military to their barracks.
The political elite, in general, and Congress as a national political
party, in particular, manifested their strength through political
participation and promoting a culture of diversity. These both diffused
the identity crisis and moved it higher to a manageable level.
In contrast to the Congress in India, the Muslim League (ML) of United

Pakistan and Awami League (AL) of Bangladesh, in terms of their political
approaches, failed to upgrade themselves from a mass movement to a
political party. Both confronted the problem of delivering their role as the
national political party. Lack of organisational uniformity, absence of
rules and discipline and a plan of action based on consensus-oriented
ideology badly injured their structure and hindered recovery and
moving forward from the trauma of partition. The decline of the ML in
Pakistan, as a national political party, was not a direct outcome of the
1947 partition; however, its minimum inclination towards democratic
practices put a question-mark on its credibility in the post-partition
climate. Despite all of its shortcomings, the ML never resorted to
extreme violence and hostility against the state, not even against the
British Empire during colonial rule. The AL of Bangladesh was terribly
shaken, in terms of its growth by the War of Liberation of 1971. A lack
of organisation and discipline made the AL, in part, an alliance of
fragmented factions that had materialised and worked as semi-
independent groups to pursue their political goals.
A parliamentary form of government was one of the key goals of

political leadership of the Independence Movement of 1947. In
56 Jahangir & Falki
Pakistan, the parliamentary form of government was adopted in the

constitution of 1956 and 1973. The life of the parliamentary-based
political system under the 1956 constitution was short-lived and
hampered by a military intervention of General Ayub Khan in 1958.
Later, Ayub installed a one-man show in the 1962 constitution, which
empowered the President in a way that crushed the prospects of
parliamentary democracy. A system of limited and controlled
democracy was initiated by the military regime to ensure their
transition from de facto to civilianised military government (Khan 2009:
pp. 153-58). The constitution of 1973 reinforced the parliamentary spirit
by adopting bicameral legislature. The principle of representation was
further enhanced by placing more powers in the hands of the Prime
Minister as the representative ruler who was ultimately accountable to
parliament. Although adherence to parliamentary democracy existed,
it was limited only to theory, not practice. The political environment
and culture were not conducive to operationalising the hitherto
theoretical democracy by establishing viable political institutions.
Constant political shocks, breakdowns, and a lack of vision to view
elections as a significant instrument of indicating and incorporating
change, made it difficult for a political system to respond. Though the
constitution of 1973 was different in many aspects from previous
constitutional schemes, it, however, addressed old issues of religion
and regionalism. The Islamic nature of the constitution legalised the
use of religion in politics of Pakistan (Milam 2009: p. 31).
According to many political observers, 1972-77 was an appropriate era

to alter the pattern of military interference in politics and to
consolidate the democratic structures in Pakistan.15 Z.A. Bhutto’s era
existed as the only example where civilian supremacy was visibly
functional. It was due to the fact that the military’s affirmation to stay
15 For further details see Rizvi 2000: pp. 142-43. See also Talbot 1998: p. 245
and Milam 2009: pp. 38-39. A clear insight of the power Bhutto held over
the military is well described in Wolpert 1993: pp. 171-72.
as a legitimate player in politics was largely shattered by the traumatic

loss of the 1971 war. However, Bhutto’s authoritarian solutions to
political problems, which provided enough space to opposition parties
to form a strong alliance—the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) for
agitation in 1977 (Rizvi 1989: p. 55) (See Appendix A, Table 2) meant
that Bhutto’s charisma and his alluring political slogan of ‘roti, kaapra
aur makkan’ (bread, clothing and shelter) were insufficient to allow him
to continue the second term of parliamentary politics. The harrowing
loss of East Pakistan diluted the prestige and influence of the military
in Pakistan. However, the failure of Bhutto’s regime to institutionalise
democratic norms and his inefficient management of demands from
regional entities, by pleading with the military to rescue him when in
political conflict, paved way for another military rule (Rizvi 1989: p.
31). In comparison with Pakistan, a period of military rule and tenure
of civilian governments in Bangladesh appeared far better. The periods
of military rule in Bangladesh did not persist for too long in the
manner it was sustained for a longer period under Ayub, Zia-ul-Haq
and Musharraf regimes in Pakistan.
2.11. Role and Rule: Military in Power
Patterns of civil-military relations brought about a model of military

dominance in Pakistan. This was enabled due to dysfunctional political
institutions. The lack of a pluralistic culture in support of defining national
interests created a political vacuum for military to dominate the decision-
making in Pakistan. Rizvi elucidates that “in most of the years in Pakistan,
military has interchanged between the Role and Rule, which helped
military to emerge as the most powerful actor” (Rizvi 1989: p. 50). It ruled
the country directly by either abolishing or keeping the constitution in
abeyance. It also ruled through military coups, and by civilianising martial
law regime and adopting a ‘selective competition’ of political elites to
justify their claim of restoring democracy. However, the military always
sought continuation in the policies of previous military regime. Most of
58 Jahangir & Falki
the time, constitutional arrangements, amendments and alterations under

martial regimes in Pakistan changed the constitutional discourse mainly to
obtain legitimacy for military rulers to stay in power. Transformation of
military ‘rule’ to ‘role’ was made feasible and achieved through
commanding constitutional changes under civilianised facades. This led
to formation of a political system in Pakistan with powerful individuals as
presidents at the cost of weak parliament.
As a part of the national security apparatus, the military in Pakistan

became the recipient of an asymmetrical portion of resources, and
access to these resources made the military an organised, well-
equipped and modified institution having the capacity to overshadow
civilian institutions. As a result of constant political shocks and break
down of political systems, Pakistan advanced into a praetorian state
where military dominance over politics was reinforced as a norm
rather than an exception. The military was historically transformed
from an institution of state, into the authority that delineated the
nature of the state (Rizvi 1989: p. 31). This is apparent in the mind-set
of military elites who believed that state interests were best protected
by them, and they have the right to control politics either directly or
indirectly with this civilianised face. Under ‘military/civilian hybrid’ 16
governments in Pakistan, several military men were inducted into
policy-making bodies, which inevitably paved the way to view the
interests of military and state as synonymous. This led to a confusion
of identity where the military has come to infer that it is identical with
state (Milam 2009: p.24).
16 In Pakistan, this notion was especially strengthened under Zia-ul-Haq and

Musharraf when the military/civilian hybrid system (the civilised version
of military government) was established under these semi-military rules.
Active and retired military personnel were embedded into political and
economic institutions of the state which severed, primarily, the interests of
military, and this led to justification of it being in the interests of the state.
See Chapter 4 “From military to semi military rule in Pakistan’ in Milam
(2009). Also see Siddiqi (2004).
Learning from the Pakistani experience of military coups and

interventions in politics, Mujib-ur-Rahman initiated policies that
undermined the power of the military in Bangladesh. Moreover, the
role of Bangladeshi officers during the Liberation War, and the
induction of some guerrilla groups as a regular part of the military,
forged the violent, hostile behaviour of the military as an organisation.
The military also claimed its role and due share in the politics and
resources of the country. Military coups were planned due to the
feeling of deprivation because of the benefits accrued to the regular
officers in the Liberation War. As political groups and elites were the
recipients of material and power resources, the military were side-
lined altogether. The first military rule in Bangladesh lasted until 1979
and this was a different experience to that of Pakistan. Despite Zia-ur-
Rahman being a military man, his efforts seemed to disassociate the
military from politics. This was because his rule was endangered by a
hostile army that was divided sharply into factions. The failure of the
government to meet the demands of these factions generated attempts
to topple one government after another. The War of Liberation
induced deep-rooted violence and aggression within the army, which
not only impeded political development in Bangladesh, but also
affected the strength of the military as an organised and professional
institution. In Bangladesh, the decade of 1980s significantly changed
the military perceptions of staying in politics. As part of their efforts to
civilianise military regimes, Zia-ur-Rahman and later General Ershad
introduced policies for inducting a sense of professionalism and
discipline in Bangladesh military.
The Political culture of Bangladesh was similar to a ‘Zero Sum Game’,

demonstrating that political elites neither resolved their political
conflicts nor developed a culture of reconciliation. In spite of being a
homogeneous society, a consensus-based approach for working and
the growth of a functional democracy is still missing. The politics in
Bangladesh is not particularly characterised by compromises over
60 Jahangir & Falki
power-sharing between the different political forces. The political

leadership of Bangladesh had shared the belief that once they were in
power, they had absolute authority to define and design the ‘national
interest’ (Rizvi 1989: p. 8).17 Moreover, the political elites in Bangladesh
were largely involved in controlling the economic resources and
advantages for their vested interests which led to the endorsement of
the culture of nepotism and corruption as established norms. Milam
points out that ‘redistributive politics’ was the only politics in
Bangladesh (2009: p. 8).
The ‘role and rule’ of the military in Pakistan is also a well-recognised

norm. It has developed from a largely accepted belief that the military
is a national saviour in times of political and national crisis. Weak
political institutions with a less supportive culture for democracy led
to many in Pakistan believing that military intervention was an
appropriate option to deal with real or imagined threats to the
existence of state. The mistrust and insecurity existing between India
and Pakistan encouraged Pakistan’s reservations over the perceived
hegemonic intentions of India. Pakistan’s security dilemma and the
role of India led to the shaping of a general belief among many in the
country that the military alone have the capacity to guarantee national
security and sovereignty. Milam (2009) believes that it was a ‘necessary
corollary’, which justified each period of military rule in Pakistan. It
reflects an unquestioned assumption by military elites arising from a
lack of trust in incompetent civilian leaders in the context of the
national security of state (Rizvi 1989: p. 8).
Conclusion
Military intervention in politics has become a key phenomenon of the

political systems of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The military either
17 This is largely the perception of political elites in Bangladesh throughout

its history.
overlooked the democratisation process or was reluctant to support it

due to their stakes in politics. The military in both countries
discouraged and eroded democracy by extending their ‘rule’ into
‘role’. The military in these countries is regarded as the ‘third party’
and an absolute choice in the event of the incompetence of civilian
leaders. The causes of military intervention in the politics of Pakistan
and Bangladesh did remain similar but there are significant differences
in the military orientation of politics, as well as the responses from
societies of these countries to military claims over political power. The
dissimilarity emerges because the growth and nature of the military as
an institution have remained significantly different in the two
countries. In Pakistan, the character of the military evolved as
guardian of the state, acting as the most eligible player in defining and
designing the state discourse, and requiring the subordination of all
other stakeholders to the military orientation of national interests and
politics. The absence of viable political institutions and resolution of
problems within the political domain provided sufficient opportunities
to the bureaucracy and military elites to control the reins of politics.
This turned Pakistan into a national security state with an
authoritarian political system irrespective of a civilian rule or a
military setup of politics.
Military coups in Pakistan differ from Bangladesh in that they are

always successful in taking charge of politics while facing no
significant challenges from civilian institutions which are largely
dysfunctional. The military in Pakistan is regarded as the appropriate
actor to protect and accomplish national interests and therefore, was
assigned an additional power of formulating the state discourse. It is a
matter of fact that since 2006, political leadership has been making
several efforts of reconciliation by announcing Charter of Democracy
in 2006 and adopting 18th amendment in the 1973 Constitution during
April 2010. Moreover, continuity of second tenure of civilian
government in the post-Pervez Musharraf’s era is also considered a
62 Jahangir & Falki
part of these reconciliatory efforts. In current scenario, military in

Pakistan has been evading its ‘rule’; however, its ‘role’ is still
overwhelmingly influential for outlining the national-interest-based
policies including politics, economy and security. Moreover, military
intervention is also obvious for resolving political and federal conflicts.
In Bangladesh, however, military rule faced a great deal of resentment.

Due to the problem of politicisation and factions, the military itself
remained in a quandary over its role in politics. Analysis shows that in
Pakistan while the military ruled, military-rulers were less likely to
discourage the military role in politics; in Bangladesh; however,
military-rulers not only restrained military involvement in the
country’s politics but also assisted caretaker set-up and elected
governments to administer the state affairs in a better manner. In
Bangladesh, whatever factors paved the way for the military’s opting
back in politics after 17 years in 2007, it clearly pronounced the
military’s preference of keeping the politics in civilian domain by
turning over the government to civilian technocrats (Milam 2009: p. 7).
Moreover, the civilian governments in Bangladesh on several occasions
called for the assistance from the military to deal with the vicious cycle
of internal and external challenges but, due to its changed mind-set on
the issue of its involvement in politics, the military stayed in the
barracks after accomplishing the domestic peace-keeping task.
Due to this, since the 1990s, electoral democracy has been stronger in
Bangladesh than in Pakistan. General elections have been held every
five years in Bangladesh since 1991 unlike in Pakistan where this is not
the case. Although regular intervals of electoral politics persisted in
Bangladesh it did not diminish the political culture characterising the
‘zero sum game’ of the last three decades. Apart from the homogenous
character of Bangladeshi society and its resentment towards military
intervention, there is still a lack of consensus and accommodative
politics among political leadership of Bangladesh for a functional
democracy. Likewise, in Pakistan, there is power politics between

civilian governments, elites of bureaucracy and military. The failure of
politicians in disseminating democratic values and their mal-
governance created a strong link between the military and bureaucracy
(Rabbani 2011: pp. 124-39). This culture paved the way for the military
to intervene in the affairs of civilian government.
Every military regime in Pakistan, except Yahya’s military rule,

brought its own set of principles into politics leading to the
implementation of different constitutional schemes and arrangements
to settle the role of the military in politics in a legitimate way. On the
other hand, Bangladesh does not have a diverse experience of
constitutional changes though the military rulers modified the
constitution of 1972 in order to facilitate their presence. Since 2002, in
terms of the development of a viable political culture and political
reconciliations among political elites, Pakistan’s records appear far
better than that of Bangladesh. After the 2013 election, Pakistan Tehrik
Insaaf (PTI) under the leadership of Imran Khan emerged as third
significant political force which led to somewhat altered the traditional
role of the two political parties in Pakistan. Moreover, civilian political
leadership in Pakistan, with few exceptions, is primarily cautious to
invite another episode of military takeover. After Musharraf’s
resignation in August 2008, the military seems less interested in direct
intervention in politics. However, its indirect role strongly persisted
and is evident in the careful examination of civilian policies and
complete control on defence and foreign policy.
Thus the trend of dynastic politics in Pakistan and Bangladesh needs to

be transformed. Political parties as the dynamic of political process are
unable to advance democracy in both countries. The selection of
leaders based on inherited politics is still preferred instead of election.
Political parties in these countries are not effective in devising and
promoting a democratic culture as they do not exercise democratic
64 Jahangir & Falki
practices within their own ranks. However, political parties themselves

have to take solid measures to eradicate undemocratic patterns within
politics. The political elites of both countries must understand that
electoral democracy alone cannot substitute for strong political and
civil institutions. It is pertinent to note that the most needed ingredient
of democratic politics is a viable, functional and stable system of civil
institutions. Therefore, Pakistan and Bangladesh have to pursue
constitutional measures for promoting the patterns of apolitical military
norms in order to strengthen democratisation within their societies.
Today, the apolitical military role in India is considered one of the major
factors behind India’s largest democracy of the world (Khilnani 1999: p.
81). Analysts contend that in the current Indian democratic and
parliamentary system, the military has no significant role but is only
confined to its own sphere. As Strachan writes, “Parliamentary
sovereignty over the army is assumed to be the norm” (1997: p. 5).
A balanced civil-military relationship in Pakistan and Bangladesh can

be fostered through continuation of democratic practices and electoral
politics at regular intervals. The civilian governments and military
have to perform their constitutional obligations within their domain,
and not exceed their limits. This needs a participatory culture and
pluralistic approach. Adherence to a constitutional framework and
timely reforms can enhance the ability of political systems to sustain
and survive from the political shocks and breakdowns. The political
elites of both countries must learn from their turbulent history that
their exercise of power can only be assured through managing and
resolving the political conflicts within the political domain. The
political leadership has to cultivate enduring democratic norms and
advance accommodation of regional, ethnic and political demands of
the various groups of the nation. It is important to remember that the
political elites’ failure to respond to the political crises always gave
birth to a power vacuum. In such situations the military being the
most organised and institutionalised actor emerges as the only saviour
to rescue the political system. The process of democratisation would

evolve in Pakistan and Bangladesh by increasing citizens’ stakes. As
stated by former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan
(2000);
No one is born a good citizen, no nation is born a democracy. Rather,

both are processes that evolve over a lifetime…. Democracy is a
habit that we need to cultivate consciously in ourselves. That is how
we build enduring societies.
Asifa Jahangir PhD Scholar, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the
Punjab, New Campus, Lahore, Pakistan.
Sadia Mahmood Falki Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science/

International Relations, Lahore College for Women University, Jail Road
Campus, Lahore Pakistan.
66 Jahangir & Falki
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Appendix A
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Table 1: Direct and Indirect Military Rule in Pakistan
No. of Year Martial law Steps to Restore Democracy
Coups administrator
1 1958- General Ayub • Annuls 1956 Parliamentary Constitution introduced by Muhammad Chaudhary Ali.
68 Khan • Implements 1962 constitution providing Presidential form of government.
• Introduces a concept of guided or controlled democracy assuming Pakistan is unable to
practice democratic rights. ‘Basic Democracies’ (BD) system sustained from 1962 to 1969
strengthens elitism in military and bureaucracy while seeking to acquire legitimacy of power
through constitutional means (Ziring 1971: p. 121).
1962 This indirect democracy under BD system serves as ‘electoral college’ for presidential election.
2 1969- General Yahya • 1970 First ever General Elections: Causes political turmoil between East and West Pakistan.
71 Khan Elections indicate highly divergent trends of politics in both wings as Pakistan People’s Party
(PPP) under Bhutto win West Pakistan, and Awami League (AL) under Mujib are victorious
in East Pakistan.
• Political crisis erupts over issues of representation, power sharing and provincial autonomy.
Attempts made to resolve ethnic and provincial issues through authoritarian means of
military government that amplifies crisis due to foreign involvement.
• Military elite underestimates strength of movement of provincial rights that turns into a
disastrous movement of Bengali nationalism within days. Military government of Yahya
Khan is reluctant to hand over political power to respective leaders especially Mujib. This
situation leads to break away of Eastern wing from federation of Pakistan and a new country
of Bangladesh comes into being.
1. 3 1977- General Zia- • Military coup ousts Z. A. Bhutto who is hanged; death sentence pronounced by judicial
88 ul-Haq decision on charges of murder by political opponent Ahmed Qasuri.
• Chief martial law administrator postpones elections scheduled for October 1977; initiates
72
Coups administrator
policy for scrutiny of political leaders as per The Disqualification Tribunal.
• Promises elections in 90 days; takes about 91 months to hold elections. Regime sustained for 11
years.
• Military coup legalised as court decision on petition of Nusrat Bhutto (Z. A. Bhutto’s wife)

gives martial law government warrant to maintain power as desired. Decision based on
‘Doctrine of Necessity’.
• September 1978 President Fazal EIahi Chaudhry’s term ends; Zia-ul-Haq takes charge in uniform
as President of Pakistan on 16 September and remains Chief of Army Staff until death.
• March 1981 Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) provides maximum power to executive and
deliberative body – Majlis-e-Shoora (Federal Council).1 Includes Ulema (clergy), Islamic
scholars and technocrats.
• 1984 Provisions enabling President to dismiss Prime Minister and government without
consulting National Assembly (NA) or Senate added to 1973 Constitution – clause 58(2b) of
8th Amendment.
• Religion officially legitimises military rule and justifies extension of Zia-ul-Haq’s rule.
• December 1985 Referendum question asked is shrewdly connected to process of Islamisation of
country through selection of Zia-ul-Haq. Turnout of 95 per cent at referendum makes him
constitutionally elected president of Pakistan for next five years.
• Military ruled directly under Zia-ul-Haq for eight years.
• 1985 Non-party-elections for the NA and Provisional Assemblies (PA) to lower prospects of
opposition to authoritarian politics.
• Consequence of elections – military/civilian Hybrid Government takes charge for additional
three years.
1 The parliament of Pakistan that was officially termed the Majlis-e-Shoora was the bicameral federal and supreme legislative body of
country, and comprises Senate as upper house and National Assembly as lower house.
73
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68 Jahangir & Falki
Coups administrator
• 1988 Disagreements lead to Prime Minister (PM) Muhammad Khan Junejo and military/
civilian hybrid government being dismissed by Zia-ul-Haq.
• Military under Zia-ul-Haq’s regime penetrated deep into political and state institutions.
• 1988 Military rule ends as a result of mysterious plane crash in which Zia-ul-Haq, military
leadership and American Ambassador die.
4 1999- General • 12 October 1999 PM Nawaz Sharif ousted as result of a military coup.
2009 Pervez • 14 October 1999 ‘Emergency Proclamation’ announced. This puts the 1973 Constitution in
Musharraf ‘abeyance’, and suspends the NA, Senate and PAs.
• 1999 - 2002 Military exercises direct rule
• February 2000 Six out of 13 Supreme Court judges repudiate taking oath of allegiance to military
regime as they perceive it to be violation of oath taken earlier to uphold 1973 Constitution.
• May 2000 Supreme Court validates military coup as legitimate under ‘Doctrine of Necessity’.
However, Court provides three year deadline to restore parliamentary rule that despite being
in ‘abeyance’ the 1973 Constitution is still supreme law of land, and Musharraf not authorised
to amend ‘salient feature’ of constitution.2
• June 2001 Musharraf names himself as replacing President Mohammad Rafiq Tarar by issuing
Chief Executive Orders.
• 30 April 2002 Presidential referendum, though controversial, is held as part of efforts to
civilianise Musharraf’s rule. A political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) (Quaid-i-
Azam3 Group), is established by forming a faction of PML Nawaz Sharif Group as PML (N), to
provide political support to Musharraf.
2 These salient features included Federalism, judicial independence and parliamentary form of government.
3 Quaid-i-Azam was the title given to Muhammad Ali Jinnah by the Muslims of subcontinent during the Independence Movement. This
political party is abbreviated as PML-Q.
74
Coups administrator
• June 2002 A hybrid presidential/parliamentary system is established (Christine, 2009: p. 76).
• August 2002 Musharraf promulgates ‘Legal Framework Order’ (LFO) restoring powers of
President to dismiss the NA, PM and Provincial Assemblies (PA) without consultation of any
elected or legislative body.
• Powers further concentrated in the President by reinventing 58(2b) as 17th amendment in the
1973 Constitution.
• An informal political collaboration commences with Islamist political parties known as MMA
(Mutaheda Majlis Amal), an Islamic-based alliance.
• 2004 National Security Council (NSC) established under LFO for consolidating role of military
in policy-making process by making amendment in the constitution of 1973. This provides
powers to President, and not elected Parliament, over policy.
• April 2004 Parliament approves the creation of NSC which institutionalises military control on
politics, governance and policy-making.
• End of 2004 The military/Islamist political alliance breaks down.
• Support for US led ‘War against Terrorism’ provides strength to Musharraf’s regime, which
helps regime to stay in power for longer period of time.
• 3 November 2007 Musharraf suspends constitution by imposing an emergency and firing Chief
Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry of the Supreme Court.
• November 2007 Musharraf remains President and Chief of Army Staff simultaneously till
retirement from army in 2007.
• February 2008 As a result of general elections, the civilian government of PPP comes into
power.
• August 2008 PPP and PML (N) agree to force Musharraf to step down, and to initiate
impeachment process against him for suspending the constitution. Strong political opposition
and circumstances caused by judicial movement force Musharraf to resign as president.
75
Table 2: Political History of Pakistan: Civil Government Rule and Military Direct/Indirect Rule
76
68 Jahangir & Falki
Nature of the Rule Timeframe of different events and steps taken by leaders
August 1947 - October 1958
• Process of constitution making begins by adopting the Indian Government Act 1935 as interim constitution.
• 12 March 1949 Objective Resolution (OR) passed by first constituent assembly that determines ideological
foundation of upcoming constitutional framework. Consensus built on Islamic orientation of law-
Civilian political making. As per OR, supreme power of state was Almighty Allah (God), and politicians and
governments administration would use powers Allah delegated. This was placed as preamble in all three constitutions
of 1956, 1962 and 1973 later becoming permanent part of 1973 constitution.
• Dismissal of two constituent assemblies, under the premierships of Muhammad Ali Bogra and Chaudhry
Mohammad Ali, create constitutional dilemma in the country.
23 March 1956 Second Constituent Assembly under leadership of Muhammad Ali formulates first
constitution of Pakistan, which becomes operational. During his period, units of West wing incorporated
as ‘One Unit’. 1956 Constitution approved unanimously by Constituent Assembly.
• 1956 Constitution is Islamic, parliamentary and federal in nature. The country is declared a republic.
According to the constitution, the Parliament would consist of a single House i.e. the NA.
27 October 1958 First President of Pakistan annuls this constitution.
• Constitutional development is sabotaged due to failure of the political system and political roulette
between civilian governments and bureaucratic-military elites.
Governor-Generals Prime Ministers President

• 1st – Quaid-i-Azam • 1st – Liaquat Ali Khan
(August 1947- September 1948) (August 1947 - October 1951)
• 2nd – Khawaja Nazimuddin
(September 1948 - October 1951)
• 3rd – Malik Ghulam • 2nd – Khawaja Nazimuddin
76
Muhammad4 (October 1951 - April 1953)
(October 1951- August 1955) • 3rd – Muhammad Ali Bogra
(April 1953 - August 1955)
• 4th – Major General Iskander • 4th – Chaudhry Muhammad Ali • 1st – Major General Iskander
Mirza (August 1955 - September 1956) Mirza

(August 1955 - October 1956) • 5th – Hussain Shaheed (November 1956 - October
Suhrawardy 1958)5
(September 1956 - October 1957)
• 6th – I.I. Chundigar
(October - December 1957)
• 7th – Malik Feroz Khan
(December 1957 - October 1958)
December 1971- August 1977 (Journey from Civil Martial Law to Civilian Government)
• Civilian Martial Law (Z.A. Bhutto)
- Bhutto assumes power as Chief Civil Martial Law Administrator as he achieves an ‘electoral success’
(in 1970 general election) from western wing. Military is demoralised and Fall of Dhaka puts army
back in Barracks. After crisis of East Pakistan, civilian authority required to settle aftershocks of
Civilian political
violent political turmoil. As Bhutto had served different offices during regimes of Ayub and Yahya,
governments
he is the best option to restore morale of armed forces and rule the country. He diplomatically
manages to take back 90,000 POWs (prisons of war) and seizes land from India. He boosts the morale
of army forces after 1971 East Pakistan crisis (Khan 2009: p. 241).
4 M. Ghulam Muhammad dismisses Khawaja Nazimuddin using his discretionary powers. Bureaucracy supports him in this dismissal and
appoints Muhammad Ali Bogra as third PM of Pakistan in 1953, before the finalisation of the first constitution of the country in 1954,
Ghulam Muhammad dissolves constituent assembly as Bogra tries to minimise discretionary powers of Governor-General. Ghulam is
forced to leave the office owing to his failing health in 1955.
5 He forms his own political party named ‘Republican Party’ when he resumes the office of presidency. With the help of military and
bureaucracy during his tenure (1956-58), he forces all PMs to resign.
77
78
68 Jahangir & Falki
- 19 December 1971 General Gul Hasan and General Rahim Khan force Yahya Khan to resign.
20 December 1971 Bhutto resumes office of Presidency. Later, General Gul is replaced by General
Tikka Khan (Khan 2009: p. 251).
- Bhutto has the support of army circles and the US as he visits President Nixon in December 1971.
- 20 December 1971 to 21 April 1972 During his civilian martial law, Bhutto serves as the President and
Chief Civil Martial Administer, and establishes his own political party i.e. PPP.
- 14 April 1972 Bhutto elected as civilian President of National Assembly unanimously as he received
vote of confidence.
• Democratic Period (14 April 1972 - 14 August 1977)
- 21 April 1972 Martial law ends. Bhutto adopts the Interim Constitution, which provides unicameral
legislature, presidential form of government at Central level and parliamentary form of government
to the provincial level.
- No new elections are held. The life of NA (elected in 1970) is extended until 1977.
- 14 August 1973 – 1973 Constitution is unanimously adopted and provides federal and parliamentary
form of government with bicameral legislature. Policy of nationalisation of industries, private
educational institutions and land reforms are introduced.
- Democratic period is characterised by assertive and authoritarian trends employed by civilian
government. Interventions by central government are made at various times in provincial matters in
the name of an appalling law and order situation. New elections are announced in March 1977.
However, before elections, nine opposition parties form anti-government Pakistan National Alliance
(PNA) against PPP. Despite collaboration of opposition parties, PPP wins the elections with a
majority of the seats, but allegations of election rigging by PPP prove disastrous for democratic era.
- 26 April 1977 A political debacle, as per ‘Emergency Law’ of the 1973 Constitution, partial Martial
Law in Lahore, Karachi, and Hyderabad imposed (Khan 2009: p. 312).
- 3 July 1977 National and provisional assemblies are dissolved.
Direct military • October 1958 - June 1962 (General Ayub Khan)
rule March 1969 - December1971 (General Yahya Khan)
July 1977 - December 1985 (General Zia-ul-Haq)
78
October 1999 - November 2002 (General Pervez Musharraf) (See Table 1)
Selective use of • June 1962 - March 1969 General Ayub introduces Basic Democrats – 40,000 elected representatives for selection
democracy by of president. Through the system he extends his stay by constitutional means.
the military • March 1985 - August 1988 General Zia-ul-Haq announces non-party elections in February 1985. Independent
candidate, Muhammad Khan Junejo, wins. He later joins PML and becomes PM of Pakistan.

(post–military
rule) • May 1988 President Zia-ul-Haq dismisses Junejo and dissolves assemblies by making eighth amendment in
the constitution. He holds the powers of 58(2)(b). He postpones elections of 1990.
• 17 August 1988 Zia-ul-Haq dies in an air crash. Benazir Bhutto (B. Bhutto) is back in the country and efforts
are made to restore democracy.
Military ‘s • December 1988 - October 1999
influence from - The second democratic era is characterised by dismissal of civilian governments and politics of traditional
the side-lines on rivalry of two mainstream parties. Four civilian governments are terminated by presidents using
policy-making presidential powers devised by 58(2b), on charges of misconduct, poor governance, corruption and
nepotism.
under civilian
- The military remains influential through ‘power Troika’ consisting of president, PM and (most influential
governments
and mediator) the army chief.
- December 1988 - September 1990 B. Bhutto’s first term of office
- October 1990 - October 1993 Nawaz Sharif’s first term [Pakistan’s Muslim League – Nawaz Group (PML-N)]
- Power politics at play between PPP and PML-N. Whenever the civilian government attempts to reduce the
president’s power through constitutional amendments, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan uses his
discretionary powers according to Article 58(2b) for dissolving the assemblies. The drift between PML-N
and the president widens on the issue of appointing the chief of the armed forces.
- October 1993 - September 1996 B. Bhutto’s second term. Her government mishandles judges’ appointments in
Supreme courts, and tries to implement separating the Judiciary from Executive. The difference between
President Asif Leghari and B. Bhutto’s government on issue of judges prompts Leghari to dissolve
assemblies using his powers under Article 58(2b) in the 1973 constitution.
- 3 February 1997 - October 1999 Nawaz Sharif’s second term as a result of February 1997 elections. PML-N
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68 Jahangir & Falki
gets 2/3rd majority again, and seeks to amend Constitution for removing Article 58 (2)(b), but fails to do so.
General Musharraf is preferred as chief of armed forces, due to his Mohajar identity, to avoid prospects of
military intervention.
Military’s direct • October 1999 - August 2008
involvement in - Chief of Martial Law Administrator – P. Musharraf confronts Judiciary on issue of Nawaz Sharif’s trial
power regarding the hijacking Musharraf’s aeroplane while he was returning from Sri Lanka. Under doctrine of
management necessity, Supreme Court upholds martial law of 1999 until 2002.
- 30 April 2002 Civilian President Musharraf removes President Tarar and resumes office of presidency as he
after the end of
receives highest percentage of votes in referendum held. Introduces LFO of 2002, in which he tries to
military rule;
civilianise his system through local government and hybrid systems.
constitutional
- 2002 - 2007 Holds elections in 2002 and forms a military-backed government of PML-Q (Quiad-i-Azam
and legal role for Group) till 2007. Three leaders of PLM-Q resume the office of premiership:
the military o November 2002 - June 2004 First PM – Zafarullah Khan Jamali
o June - August 2004 Second PM – Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain
o August 2004 - November 2007 Third PM – Shaukat Aziz.
The National Security Council Act 2004 is formulated.
- Musharraf is successful in obtaining a constitutional cover under 17th amendment, a modified version of
the famous 58(2b) which once again centralised power in the president. Musharraf has serious conflict with
the Judiciary over his legitimacy and this leads to the imposition of Emergency rule.
- 3 November 2007 Dismissal of several judges of High Court. Announces the date for general elections.
- 27 December 2007 During election campaign, leader of PPP B. Bhutto is assassinated in a bomb blast.
- Musharraf, uniform, signs a covert pact of National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) with PPP to get a wide
acknowledgement of his rule parties other than Islamist and Muslim League-Q. The NRO is intended to
bring an end to the cases against politicians on political bases and initiation of restoration of democracy
(The Express Tribune 2014).
Restoration of • February 2008 - 2015 onwards
democracy 2008- - An agreement entitled ‘Charter of Democracy’ (CoD) (Meesaq-e-Jamhuriat) is signed between PPP and
PML-N for the restoration of democracy in the country (Mufti 2014).
80
15 (onwards) - Assassination of B. Bhutto provides sufficient political electoral sympathies and PPP come into power
after elections of February 2008 (they complete their constitutional tenure in 2012).
• March 2008 - June 2012
- First PM – Yousaf Raza Gillani (forced to resign due to Judicial Activism to implement Rule of Law)
- 18 August 2008 Musharraf resigns as President; Asif Ali Zardari, the co-chairperson of PPP, becomes

President and hands over Presidential powers 58(2b) to Parliament.
- June 2012 - March 2013 Second PM – Raja Pervaiz Ashraf
- 11 May 2013 General Elections result in successful transfer of power from one democratic civilian
government to the other. PML-N receive a majority and form a government at Centre and Punjab;
coalition governments formed in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa and Baluchistan.
• 2013 onwards Nawaz Sharif takes oath as PM for the third time as per CoD.
- Pakistan faces a great challenge to the country’s security due to terrorism.
In 2013, the top leadership of civilian government (Nawaz Sharif) and military decided to reconstitute
the DCC as ‘the Cabinet Committee on National Security’ (CCNS) for focusing on national security
related policies. This committee is chaired by PM. Cabinet Ministers of different state departments such
as Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance are included in it along with the Chairman Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee and Chiefs of Staff of Pakistan army, air and navy. Its objective is to “focus on the
national security agenda with the aim to formulate a national security policy that will become the
guiding framework for its subsidiary policies – defence policy, foreign policy, internal security policy,
and other policies affecting national security” (Dawn 2013).
- 16 December 2014 Terrorist attack at Army Public School Peshawar and brutal killing of students puts
civilian leadership and military elite on the same page.
- Prospects of a balanced civil-military relationship emerge after the 21st Constitutional Amendment Act
of 2015 in the 1973 Constitution.
- 5 May 2015 Statement by PML-N during inauguration of Quaid-e-Azam solar power park in Mianwali
(The Nation 2015). ‘Peace is being revived as a result of consensus decision of the political and military
leadership’. Civilian government and military are in agreement for strengthening the democratic
institutionalisation in Pakistan.
81
Table 3: Political History of Bangladesh: Civil Government Rule and Military Direct/Indirect Rule
82
68 Jahangir & Falki
Nature of the Rule Timeframe and steps taken by Different Leaders
• January 1971 - August 1975
Civilian military - 1971 Z. A. Bhutto releases Mujib-ur-Rahman.
government - 16 December 1971 Pakistan recognises Bangladesh as an independent State after the surrender of Pakistan’s
military in East Pakistan (Khan 2009: pp. 243-53).
- 10 January 1972 Rahman returns to Dhaka via London and India, and resumes office of presidency after
independence.
- 12 January 1972 Rahman decides to step down from the presidency to become PM in order to run the country
democratically. Justice Abu Sayeed Choudhury takes over as President.
- The War of liberation introduces violence and aggression into political culture of Bangladesh causing
deterioration of law and order. The presences of the Indian Army in the country as well as socio-economic
disparities are major challenges for Rahman. Political crisis and turmoil are present after independence.
Political uncertainty leads Rahman to authoritarian practises. A one party system is imposed by barring the
media and all political parties other than AL (Khondker 1998: pp. 307-08).
- A culture of nepotism and political rewards commences as Royal Freedom Fighters and members of Jatio
Rakhti Bahani are accommodated in politics as well as in military. The army occasionally assists civil
government in different fields of administration. Civilian leadership proves less efficient in rescuing the State
from crisis and their failure is exposed.
- 16 December 1972 Within the year a new constitution of the country is incorporated under which Rahman’s
government works.
- March 1973 First parliamentary general elections with a one party system is held.
25 January 1975 Rahman comes into power as President once again with a large mandate. The 1972
Constitution is amended to replace the parliamentary system with a presidential one.
- August 1975 Rahman is assassinated by junior military officers. This brings civilian rule in Bangladesh to an
end. A coalition government of military and civilians is formulated.
Direct military • Minor Military Coups
rule - 3 November 1975 A military coup puts an end to the coalition government (Khondker 1998: pp. 307-08). Minor
military coups are attempted by various factions of army from August-November 1975. This does not foster
82
normal civilian relationships. Politicians saw the military in Bangladesh as a conspirator.
- Post-1971 Raksi Bahini was used as a substitute of the army in eliminating and crushing anti-government
forces.
- December 1974 A State of Emergency is announced and all constitutional rights are suspended. Activities of all
political parties are banned.
• First Major Military Coup November 1975 - May 1981

Successful coup attempted by General Zia-ur-Rahman; Zia-ur-Rahman annuls the parliamentary form of
government.
- April 1977 - June 1978 Zia-ur-Rahman removes A. S. M. Sayem from presidency and with the help of a six-
party alliance resumes power as President.
- 1979 Zia-ur-Rahman launches a new political party – the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), and wins the
elections.
He restricts all forms of political meetings and activities outside offices of political parties. His polices to
civilianise rule are similar to that of Ayub Khan in Pakistan. A culture of violence leads to another
assassination in the politics of Bangladesh.
- 30 May 1981 Zia-ur-Rahman is assassinated. After his demise, the political command of his party – BNP – is
handed over to his wife Khalida Zia.
- Justice Abdus Sattar resumes power as President but is unable to remain in power due to political and
economic challenges in the country.
• Second Major Military Coup April 1982 - December 1990
- 24 April 1982 Lieutenant-General Huseyn Mohammad Ershad topples Abdus Sattar government by a bloodless
military coup.
- Amendments in the constitution of 1972 are incorporated to give a legitimate role to the army in decision-
making of the state and administration. General Ershad, like his counterpart (Zia-ul-Haq) in Pakistan,
politicises Islam and uses it to justify civilianise military rule.
- 27 November 1990 The army proclaims a state of emergency due to a protest staged by political parties. General
Ershad is forced to resign in 1990 and a caretaker government is managed under the headship of Justice
Shahabuddin Ahmad.
83
84
68 Jahangir & Falki
• February 1979 - May 1981 The political party BNP of General Zia-ur-Haq wins 1979 elections; a civilian president,
Selective use of General Ershad governs the country and follows the civilisation model of General Ayub Khan.
democracy by the • August 1986-December 1990
military (post- 1983 Army Chief of Staff, General Ershad, supports the political party Jana Dal (JD) and runs government affairs.
military rule) August 1986 Ershad leaves his army office and renames the JD as Jatiya Party. He tried to legitimise his power
through constitutional means.
• October 1986 and March 1988 Presidential elections ensure that Ershad is the authoritative ruler of the country. He
rules for almost eight and half years with an iron fist. As a civil president, General Ershad politicises Islam and
strengthens the bureaucracy-military bond as General Zia-ul-Haq did in Pakistan.
Military allows • Regular elections are held with limited military support of the caretaker governments so that democracy can thrive
civilian in the country.
governments to - 1990-96 BNP government (led by Khaleda Zia)
govern but its - 1996-2001 AL government (led by Sheikh Hasina)
involvement in - 2001- 06 BNP government
policy-making
affairs continues
• 2006 - 2008
Direct military October 2006 The political crises begin with a caretaker government [CTG] assuming power at the end of October.
control Under the constitution, the CTG manages the government during the interim 90-day period and parliamentary
elections. Political conflict escalates over the appointment of a chief adviser, a role which is transferred to the
President Dr Iajuddin Ahmed due to the failure of major parties to agree on a candidate from among five selected
candidates. The interim period is marked by violent protests, initiated by the AL where 40 people killed and
hundreds injured in the first month.
• 2007 General elections are postponed due to political chaos and uprisings in the country.
11 January 2007 Army Chief Lt. General Moeen U. Ahmed with the bureaucratic military elite staged a military
coup (The Daily Star 2009). Resumed control of the country so that political stability could be developed before the
next general elections (Chu 2014).
84
Restoration of • January 2007 to December 2008 Bangladesh army fully supports the caretaker government.
democracy 2009 Elections are held successfully.
• 2009 - 2013 AL forms government.
• 5 January 2015 Because of the delay of the 2013 elections, the polling for the 10th Jatiyo Sangshad is conducted. AL
win a majority of the seats as a result of General Elections and form the central government (Barry 2014); BNP
boycott the elections and Roshwan Ershad (wife of General Ershad) currently leads (to date) the opposition in the
house.

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Volume II, No.

International Journal of Ethnic and Social Studies

International Centre for Ethnic Studies

The International Journal of Ethnic and Social Studies (IJESS) is published

All communŝĐĂƟons concerning the IJESS should be addressed to:

InternaƟŽnal Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES)

1 Dreaming of Bridges: Arborescent Identity and Ethical imagination

31 Underlying Reasons of Military Engagement in Politics of Pakistan

87 Adivasi Marginal Tea Plantation Workers of West Bengal: Emergent

119 Film Review: A Humanistic Perspective of a Demonised Movement

Asifa Jahangir and Sadia Mahmood Falki

While democracy and participant political culture have been viewed as

This study attempts to highlight the underlying causes of military

the orientation of politics by the military differs. The shaping of politics

Keywords: Pakistan, Bangladesh, role of military, civil-military relations,

South Asia is characterised by population boom, immense socio-

Absence of elections and strong, stable countervailing civilian forces in

Though the role of military in politics in both countries has been

1. Military Dominance in Politics of the Subcontinent During

While military dominance in politics is considered to be colonial

1 Martial race was a designation created by the army officials of British

by deploying British forces, and later Indian, for establishing their

After the 1857 War of Independence, the strategy of ‘martial race’, as

Further, at the dawn of 20th century, British law of apolitical military

2. Reasons for Military Involvement in the Politics of Pakistan

2.1. Political Imbalance and Apolitical Military Role

In post-independence Pakistan and Bangladesh, military dominance

At its inception, Pakistan, like India, adopted the Government of India

3 Historical institutionalism is an approach of social science that provides a

an independent state. It provided a parliamentary system and federal

In India, the possibilities for military dominance in civilian matters

means have bequeathed legitimacy of power to the civilian democratic

2.2. Lack of Politically-motivated National leadership and the

Charismatic political leadership is a significant feature in the South

Although a dynamic leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding

4 Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman was known as ‘Mujib’.

Pakistan are apt examples of charismatic politics in history that grew

Moreover, the political leadership of both Pakistan and Bangladesh

Charismatic, patriotic and politically-committed national leadership

intervention (Kukreja 1991: p. 56). Conversely, in India, the longevity

2.3. Military Coups and Constitutional Dilemmas

which was used as a ‘personal army’ to safeguard Mujib’s regime with

2.4. Political Parties, Viable Political Institutions and Election-

Given that a practice takes time to become a norm or convention,

parties, led by military men or alliance-making with small groups of

Although political parties had opportunities of governing the state,

The inefficiency of the political elite in Pakistan and Bangladesh, who

is perceived as the most adept contestant in the arena of politics. In

2.5. The Intermittent Collapse of Political Order: Entrenchment of

From the outset, intermittent collapse of political structures, which

expounds that the alliance between military leadership and bureaucratic

In Bangladesh, similarly, the military’s role was predominant: from

In the case of Pakistan, national security dilemma has also become a

8 This was communicated during a personal conversation related to ‘Civil-

the early years of independence, Pakistan’s security and territorial

2.6. Military Professionalism

Huntington pointed out that the reasons for military intervention in

Since independence, the Indian army found itself in a similar

Hilali (Head of the Political Science Department at University of

professionalism. However, having enjoyed the privilege of higher rank

Conversely, Pakistan’s army was comprised of ill-equipped old units

As in Pakistan, a similar culture of military professionalism in politics

9 The intermittent political culture is an outcome of irregular patterns of