Villanova University

Pakistan—From Hybrid-Democracy to Hybrid-Martial LawAuthor(s): Ayesha Siddiqa

Source: Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies , Vol. 42, No. 2 (Winter
2019), pp. 52-72
Published by: Villanova University

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.33428/jsoutasiamiddeas.42.2.0052

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Villanova University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 42, No.2, Winter 2019

Pakistan—From Hybrid-Democracy
to Hybrid-Martial Law
Ayesha Siddiqa*

Introduction
Pakistan held its eleventh general elections in July 2018 and the second
in a row in which the baton of government was passed from one civilian
government to the other without any interference from the military. The
smooth transition took place despite allegations of election rigging by the
army. However, can the peaceful shift be deemed as a sign of democracy
strengthened in the country? The argument is that electoral democracy
alone does not guarantee the consolidation of democracy. For civil-military
relations to improve in favor of the former depends on the relative power
of the political class and civil society to negotiate from a position of strength
with their armed forces. In Pakistan’s case, it will be argued that, the power
was reduced to a degree as the polity seems to be a case of a hybrid martial
law where all real power is vested in the army, and civilian government is
relegated to the position of a junior partner.
In the seventy-one years after independence from the British rule,
Pakistan’s armed forces have evolved into a political hegemony that now
exercises greater power than any other competing institution. It is not only
the key player in power politics but it is also a prominent economic and
societal player. An added feather in the military’s cap is the ability to hide
*Ayesha Siddiqa, earned her Ph.D. in War Studies from King's College, London. She is a
research associate with the Centre for International Studies & Diplomacy (CISD) at the
School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS), University of London. She is the author of “
Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99” (Palgrave Press, 2001), and”
Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy” (Pluto Press 2007 & updated edition
2016).. She is a Charles Wallace fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford; the inaugural
Pakistan fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars; a research fellow
at the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Advanced Studies of India (UPIASI); a Ford
Fellow at the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, and Senior Research Fellow at
Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico. She has taught at the University of
Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins University, Lahore University of Management Sciences
(LUMS) and Quaide Azam University, Islamabad. She is currently working on her book on
the exchange of religious narratives between the Middle East and South Asia.

52

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
the scope of its power behind the civil-military fusionist rule in which the
generals exercise strategic power, and the civilians, tactical control of the
state. However, using a civilian ruler creates the facade of Pakistan
appearing like a weak democracy rather than a military rule which it is in
reality. The standard analytical framework for civil-military relations tends
to treat military in direct power as the maximalist position (when in fact, as
it is apparent from Pakistan’s case, a political army can exercise maximum
power and use tactics that it would, while in direct control without legally
being in power. The military and its intelligence agencies are responsible
for extreme censorship of media and an increase in the number of missing
people. Such coercive acts are meant to change the national discourse
during the term of a political government which makes Pakistan look like
a hybrid-martial law regime this change requires a new categorization in
the civil-military relations literature.

From Intervention to Non-Interventionist Intervention

For some Pakistan observers, the holding of a third parliamentary election
in 2018 without military intervention indicates improvement in civil-military
relations.1 The military itself seems to encourage the impression that it has
contributed towards the strengthening of democracy.2 According to this
assessment based on a linear analysis of civil-military relations, the absence
of a coup is described as a marginal improvement in politics.
In the 21st century, Pakistan seems to have moved away from military’s
direct intervention as was witnessed in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999, to a
fusionist approach. While the possibility of a future coup cannot be entirely
ruled out due to unforeseen circumstances and conflict within a highly
politicized army. There are no systems at this juncture that suggest a
perspective shift to a military rule in the foreseeable future. Over the years,
the generals have consciously invested in a political system that allows
them strategic control of state and society without visible intervention. The
society’s praetorian nature hampers consolidation of democracy to a
degree that it becomes ‘the only game in town.’ Alfred Stepan defines this
condition as one in which even in the face of a crisis “the overwhelming

1
S. Akbar Zaidi, “The End of Democracy or a New Resurgence in Pakistan?” In Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol. 53, Issue no. 24, 16/06/2018. Pp. 18-20.
2
Pervez Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan. (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2002). P. 182.

53

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
majority of the people believe that any further political change must
emerge from within the parameters of democratic formula.”3
Theoretically, militaries intervene when political governments are weak
and fail to establish their legitimacy.4 The civil and military bureaucracies of
the newly formed Pakistan that were jointly responsible for the first martial
law in 1958 shared the above perception. In a partnership between the two
bureaucracies, the civil bureaucrats initially took a leading role. Pakistani-
American historian Ayesha Jalal disagrees with that view and argues that at
the time of partition of India, the state bureaucracies in Pakistan were as
weak as the political class but gained strength later due to military’s
alignment with the US.5 The army certainly gained confidence after
receiving the first critical military modernization at the end of the 1950s and
early 1960s. However, the fact remains that some officers had demonstrated
a will to play a political role even before the organization turned relatively
powerful. They were undoubtedly encouraged by the way in which they
were plucked from under their British command and utilized in the Kashmir
operation resulting in the first India-Pakistan war of 1948. The British
officers indeed had warned the new Pakistani leadership against doing so.6
The outcome of the first war and Pakistan government accepting the UN
ceasefire angered some officers including Maj. General Akbar, who later
planned the Rawalpindi conspiracy to overthrow the political government.7
On the other hand, Muhammad Ali Jinnah surrendered to the officiating
commander-in-chief of Pakistan’s Army, Lt. General Douglas Gracey’s
threat of ordering British officers in the army to stand down if he was forced
to respond to Indian Army moving into Kashmir to fight the incursion of
tribal forces from Pakistan’s frontier region.8
Military bureaucrats used to functioning in an institutional system, the
officer cadre was western in its outlook and modern as compared to the
political class. It comprised a mix of upper-class and the relatively small-

3
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. ( Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996
(Kindle Edition, Locations 375-377).
4
Amos Perlmutter, Political Roles and Military Rulers. (London: Frank Cass Ltd, 1981). P. 13.
5
Ayesha Jalal, Pakistan State of Martial Rule. (Lahore: Vanguard Books. Pakistan Edition,
1991). Pp. 63-64.
6
Interview with military historian Hamid Hussain (November 13, 2018).
7
Ibid.,
8
Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. (Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2014.

54

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
sized rural and urban middle class. According to military historian Hamid
Hussain, socially the military came from several backgrounds:
- Scions of tribal and princely families that were encouraged to join the
military under the Imperial Cadet Corps scheme introduced by the
Viceroy Lord Curzon like Maj. General Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan
Pataudi and Lt. General Sahabzada Yaqub Ali Khan;
- Young men of middle-class families that did not necessarily belong to
military families and joined through open competition such as
general Yahya Khan;
- Educated men from the rural middle class but representing military
tradition like Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Lt. General Azam Khan and
Maj. General Iftikhar Khan;
- Men, who served several years in ranks before becoming officers.
They were relatively less educated and older but came from a
military tradition. Initially groomed at Kitchener College, Nowgong
before entering the military academy at Dehra Dun where they were
refined to become officers such as Generals Musa Khan and Tikka
Khan,
- Men that belonged to communities with no army tradition like Maj.
Gen. O. A. Mitha (Memom business community), Maj. General
Ishfakul Majid (Assamese Muslim), and Maj. General Shahid Hamid
(from Lucknow).

The institutional ethos not only set these men apart from the grizzly reality
of chaotic state politics, but it also infested the officer cadre with a sense of
their own cultural and social superiority versus the political class. The
assassination of the first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 added to
the confusion between the western wing of the country which was histor-
ically ingrained in a military tradition and was dominantly Muslim versus
the eastern side that was culturally rich and communally more diverse. The
significant number of Hindus in the east part could not be ignored. Though
the population of East Pakistan was more significant than in the western
wing, the leadership was reluctant to give Bengalis a larger role in state
rule. From 1947-58, Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers and eight cabinets.9
These conditions coincided with indigenization of the officer cadre that
was rapidly promoted to replace British officers vacating senior positions.
These officers were part of a generation trained by the British at the

9
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan. (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publication, 2003 – 2nd Pakistan Edition). P. 80.

55

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
military academy Sandhurst, UK. Naturally, their socialization acquainted
them with political standards that were hard to find in a newly de-colonized
state. These men formed the most modern and organized segment of the
society that was in sharp contrast with the less-organized political class the
country inherited. The majority of politicians were from the landed elite or
a limited business class (it was the military that helped create an entrepre-
neurial class during the 1960s).10 The upshot is that in an environment
ridden with problems of nation building the political class was far too weak
to discipline the armed forces whose echelons created its values to judge
the legitimacy of politicians. It seems that for the army’s top brass the one
way to curb nationalist and leftist tendencies amongst the officer cadre that
had become visible during Rawalpindi Conspiracy was to elevate the
organization into a power player. The first non-British commander-in-chief,
General Ayub Khan would not allow interference of civilian politicians in
military matters.11 Soon after in 1958, his civilian partner-in-crime for the
first coup, Iskander Mirza declared martial law. Governor-General Ghulam
Mohammad’s successor, Iskandar Mirza, who was also a former
bureaucrat, equally relied on the Army. A close friend of Ayub Khan’s,
Mirza increasingly involved the military in the functioning of the state.12
Mirza twice gave Ayub Khan an extension as commander-in-chief, first in
1954 and later in 1958.13
Historians tend to view the later martial law by General Muhammad
Yahya Khan as the second one. However, 1958-72 may be viewed as a
period of continuous military rule—an army government morphing into the
control of an army president followed by another coup.14 General Ayub
Khan abrogated the first Constitution of 1956 but then became the
president after making another constitution in 1962 and being elected
through indirect elections the same year. Although the bulk of the army
remained tied to its organizational work, Ayub Khan owed his success to
political intervention by the army that he headed until March 1966.
Afterward, he conferred upon himself the title of field marshal and selected
his favorite, General Yahya Khan as the C-in-C. As American political

10
Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. (London: Pluto Press,
Second Edition, 2016). P. 87.
11
Hamida Khuhro, Mohammad Ayub Khuhro A Life of Courage in Politics. (Lahore, 1998). Pp.
439-440.
12
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan. (Lahore, 2003). P. 80.
13
Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism. (New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2005). P. 35.
14
Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. (London,
2016). P. 67.

56

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
scientist Edward Feit has argued, if a military officer maintains his
connections with his institution while in power, it should be deemed as the
continuation of military rule.15 In this respect, Yahya Khan's coup of 1969
was a counter-coup that took place primarily to protect the army from
gaining a poor image. The government celebrated the decade of
development (1958-68) under Ayub Khan with much publicity. However,
for the general public, it was a reminder of failures of a military-led
government. Besides curbs on media and civil society, unrest was brewing
in the eastern wing over alleged inequitable distribution of national wealth.
There were allegations of an unfair concentration of wealth in the hands of
a few.16 The subsequent unrest benefitted the popular movement of Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto and resulted in the birth of his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).
The politician from Sindh had been Ayub Khan’s foreign minister until
Ayub Khan ousted him mainly on pressure from the United States. Besides
economic issues, Bhutto built his political movement around Khan’s peace
agreement with India at the end of the controversial 1965 war. In the face
of Ayub Khan’s depleting popularity, Yahya Khan tried to salvage the
military’s by imposing martial law. This counter-coup formula was used
later during the 2000s as well but in a different style.
The two martial laws taught the civilians and the military some lessons.
The political government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto inherited a Pakistan which
comprised only the western wing. The eastern wing Bangladesh broke
away after the 1971 war with India. Bhutto attempted to discipline the
demoralized armed forces through a strategic restructuring: the C-in-Cs of
the three services were re-designated as chiefs of staff that reported to the
supreme commander, the prime minister. Moreover, the three services of
the armed forces were brought under the centralized control of the
Ministry of Defence. Their headquarters were brought together at a central
location in the twin cities of Islamabad/Rawalpindi.17 Moreover, the new
constitution of 1973 declared coup a treasonable offense punishable by
death. Hence, the next coup-maker, General Ziaul Haq suspended the
constitution rather than abrogate it.
After 1977 the army displayed its superior capacity at realpolitik, manipu-
lating circumstances to its advantage. Starting with General Ziaul Haq’s

15
Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). P. 6.
16
Wayne Wilcox, "Pakistan: A Decade of Ayub." In Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No.2, A survey
of Asia in 1968 part II, February 1969. Pp. 90-91
17
Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement, and Military Buildup, 1979-99 In Search
of a Policy. (Palgrave Press, 2001). Pp. 37-40.

57

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
trick at escaping the treason charge, it was under his command that the
army introduced the first version of the fusionist civil-military political
model. The army chief-president got himself selected through a
referendum to become the president for five years. The question presented
to the people equated an affirmative for Islam as automatically supporting
Zia’s continuation as president. Furthermore, the dictator handpicked the
prime minister elected in a party-less election in 1985. The next military
government in 2002 repeated this process. But referring to the third martial
law, General Ziaul Haq had learned his lesson from the earlier military
governments—he did not surrender his position as the army chief and
continued with it until his death in August 1988 in a mysterious air crash.
He manipulated his handpicked prime minister and the elected parliament
to pass the 8th amendment to the 1973 Constitution whereby the president
instead of the prime minister became the supreme commander of the
armed forces with additional powers to sack the latter. He did not intend to
abandon power while introducing his version of ‘guided democracy’ that
was tried in other military authoritarian states like Turkey and Indonesia.
Though the army also dabbled with the idea of instituting a Turkish style
National Security Council under Ziaul Haq, there was not passionate
support for the concept. The politicians saw the NSC (National Security
Council) as military’s bid to formalize an equal status in decision-making.
On the other hand, the military that was in charge through its chief did
not care about investing in the concept of institutional equality. The NSC
as an institution has worked in fits and starts. More importantly, a military
president did not intend to leave power but had worked on a method
through which an army government could get a civilian cover.
General Ziaul Haq’s death along with that of military’s primary intelligence
agency, the ISI and numerous other senior army officers in an air crash in
1988 brought the same kind of a shock to the armed forces as losing the 1971
war with India. Civilian politicians returned to power in the space created by
this event. However, the 8th amendment to the 1973 Constitution
overpowered civilian rule. The article 58(2)(b) gave extraordinary power to
the president to sack a government. This constitutional provision worked as
a security valve used twice during the 1990s to pack off the government
when the army chief considered them as a problem. Benazir Bhutto, who was
elected for the first time in 1988, was removed through a conspiracy in which
politicians from different parties were bribed to bring a no-confidence

58

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
motion against the prime minister in which the head of the ISI was
involved.18 The army intelligence also put together a coalition of conservative
and right-wing parties called the Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI) whose head,
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif got elected in 1990.
From 1988 to 1997 can be deemed as a period of experimentation in
which the military leadership tried different methods of fusionist rule. The
ultimate objective was to have better coordination between the military
and civilian governments. The latter was expected to be in greater sync
with the military. Such a level of coordination could not be achieved
because the political leadership assumed governance as a concept of
complete control of the state and continuously battled to overtake the army
in the race of power politics. For instance, Benazir Bhutto replaced the chief
of ISI, Lt. General Hameed Gul, who was a hawk and had lots of influence
in the service due to his role in the Afghan war, with her handpicked man,
Maj. General (retd) Shamsur Rahman Kallu. She also wanted to extend
Admiral Iftikhar Sirohey as the Chairman Joint Chief of Staffs Committee
( JCSC), a move which was turned down by President Ishaq Khan.19
Frustrated in the face of article 58 (2)(b) that had transferred powers to
make changes in the military from the prime minister to president, Bhutto
tried to steer an independent course in foreign policy by trying to improve
relations with India that irked the generals.
It seems that Bhutto’s confrontations with the military set the course for the
future government of Nawaz Sharif, who despite being favored by the Army
GHQ (General Headquarters) could not complete his term. Elected in 1990,
Sharif got into conflict with President Ishaq Khan, who had the confidence
of the army. Nawaz Sharif imposed taxes on military business for the first
time since its formation. From a business family in Punjab, Sharif had
financial and political resources to make inroads into the army. Sharif was
different from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto or his daughter Benazir Bhutto. He was
from Punjab and had risen from the middle class, which means he shared his
conservatism and ideology with the military elite. His ethnicity put him in an
advantageous position and gave him the confidence that he demonstrated in
reprimanding the then army chief, General Jahangir Karamat for giving a
speech at the Naval War College, Lahore asking for the formulation of a
National Security Council. Due to his soft demeanor, General Karamat was
known in army circles as being effeminate, resigned his position. Then,

Jon Boone, “Former ISI chief says army money used to influence 1990 Pakistan”. The
18

Guardian, March 09, 2012 18:44 GMT.

19
Shaikh Aziz, “A Leaf from History: (Im) balance of power.” Dawn, October 02, 2016.

59

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Pervez Nawaz was selected by Nawaz Sharif as army chief with the idea that
being from the Urdu-speaking migrant community he did not have enough
backing in the Punjab dominated army and would remain loyal to the prime
minister. The act itself boosted Sharif's confidence.
Meanwhile, he also developed an understanding with his political
opponent Benazir Bhutto to revoke the aforementioned controversial
article of the constitution. A more confident Nawaz Sharif then tried to
soften the historical animosity with India by inviting India's then Prime
Minister Atul Bihari Vajpai to Lahore where the two leaders signed the
Lahore Declaration providing a roadmap for improving bilateral relations.
This particular act was not well received by the army whose top four
generals planned a secret military mission resulting in the Kargil Crisis
between India and Pakistan in 1999. The bad blood created between the
prime minister and the army chief finally resulted in a military takeover on
October 12, 1999. Though the army chief, General Pervez Musharraf
justified his action by the need to remove a corrupt government and
eradicate corruption from the country, other commanders were sure that
the problem lay elsewhere. According to the then naval chief, Admiral
(retd) Fasih Bokhari, after Kargil, both men were looking for an
opportunity to remove the other.20 Prime Minister Sharif had certainly
misunderstood the power of the military and the strength of organizational
corporatism that kicked in when he forcibly tried to remove Musharraf as
well. His decision to replace Musharraf with the then head of the ISI, Lt.
General Ziauddin Butt and plan to arrest the former by not allowing the
flight that was bringing him back from Sri Lanka to Karachi backfired.
Sadly, Sharif never learned from the experience that appointing a junior
general or a man of average professional capacity never got him an
obedient military bureaucrat. His choices of Musharraf and later army
chiefs, Generals Raheel Sharif and Qamar Bajwa indicate that the hawkish
institutional legacy always kicks in to bolster even an average general.
Sharif’s calculations, who got the chance during his career as thrice-elected
prime minister to appoint an army chief three times (1998, 2013 and 2016),
always backfired because an army trained in considering itself superior to
civilians21 would ensure that its top man would not succumb to any external
pressure by civilian leaders. A general reputed to be of average military
acumen is under higher pressure to appear hawkish as far as his organi-
zation's core values—considering India as a threat and establishing army’s

20
Interview with Admiral Fasih Bokhari (Islamabad: September 10, 2001)
21
Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. (Massachusetts, 2014).

60

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
primacy over political governments—is concerned. Sharif’s first handpicked
army chief Pervez Musharraf imposed military rule in 1999; his second
General Raheel Sharif orchestrated a campaign in his favor presenting
himself as a savior of Pakistan, and the third General Qamar Bajwa
manipulated the judiciary to bring Sharif's tenure to an end before the
natural completion of the term.
Referring to the Musharraf era, when the army seems to have begun re-
defining the fusionist model of civil-military government in which the
former would respect the army’s control over strategic decision-making
and not engage in negotiating power with the GHQ. From 1999–2018 can
be considered as the first phase of experimentation in which, unlike the
1990s, the parliament was allowed to complete its term but not the prime
minister and the cabinet. Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali, who was
elected in 2002 as the prime minister could not finish his term. Musharraf
replaced him with his handpicked former Citibank banker, Shaukat Aziz.
This pattern continued after 2007 when the prime minister elected in 2008
Yusuf Raza Gillani was sacked in 2012 and replaced with Raja Pervez
Ashraf. Similarly, Shahid Khakan Abbasi replaced Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif, who could not complete his term. Nevertheless, there was a
difference how various prime ministers were replaced. Jamali resigned in
2004 amidst rumors that he had lost the confidence of the military.22 On the
other hand, Gillani and Sharif were forced out through the help of the
superior judiciary.
During this phase, the judiciary played the role which the office of the
president expanded from 1985 until the removal of article 58(2)(b). Stanley
Kochanek's work on significant interest groups in Pakistan identifies the
legal community as a substantial player supporting the military throughout
the country’s history. Numerous judges in the past legalized military
takeovers.23 Despite the impression generated after 2007 that the judiciary
had grown independent of the military under Chief Justice, Iftikhar
Chaudhry, a human rights activist and a prominent lawyer. The (late) Asma
Jahangir challenged this perception. Her opinion leaned toward
cooperation between the lawyer’s movement and segments of the
military.24 The larger point is not just about an inter-institutional conspiracy

22
Salman Masood and Amy Waldman, “Pakistan Premier Resigns, Replaced by General’s
Ally.” In New York Times, June 27, 2004.
23
Stanley Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development Business and Politics in Pakistan
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
24
Interview with Asma Jahangir (Islamabad: August 12, 2016).

61

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
but also of a political environment in which key players were not willing to
resolve political conflict “according to the established norms” and
understand “that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective
and costly.”25 Under the garb of eradicating corruption, the judiciary
opened itself up to covert interference from the military that weakened the
institution but also strengthened the hands of the armed forces. According
to one of the judges of the Islamabad High Court, Justice Shaukat Siddiqui,
the ISI interfered with court proceedings regarding cases about the former
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his daughter.26
In the absence of article 58(2)(b) the army seems to have conspired with
the higher judiciary to keep political governments on a tight leash. The
Supreme Court of Pakistan sacked Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani under
the pretext of the latter not writing a letter to the Swiss courts regarding a
pending corruption case against President Asif Ali Zardari. While the
political government argued that the president enjoyed immunity and the
suit was time-barred, the judiciary did not consider the counter-argument.
Later, the highest court fired Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a case that the
court was not ready to entertain earlier. Pakistan's senior journalist
Muhammad Ziauddin is of the view that the claim was considered only after
there was friction between the military and the government over ‘Dawn
leaks’.27 There was heightened civil-military tension at the end of Sharif's
third term in government. The prime minister started his term on an
assumption with the military by insisting on improving ties with India. He
also tried to develop personal relations with India’s Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, who was taken to Sharif’s private house in Lahore during
a visit to Pakistan in 2013. Consequently, there was increased propaganda
against the prime minister over corruption allegations with substantial parts
of the media joining hands with the judiciary and the military. The civil-
military conflict did not end here but resulted in a vast anti-Sharif
propaganda campaign to influence the 2018 election outcome. Such tactics
aimed at one party is known as pre-poll rigging or according to the
European Union election observer’s report, competitors not getting a level
playing field.28 The Supreme Court seems to have singled out the leadership

25
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. ( Johns Hopkins University Press,
1996 (Kindle Edition, Locations 375-377).
26
Malik Asad, “IHC judge sacked for accusing ISI of interference." In Dawn, October 12, 2018.
27
M. Ziauddin, “The devil is in the details.” The Express Tribune, July 05, 2018.
28
“EU monitors team says Pakistan election not a level playing field.” Reuters, July 27,
2018, 12:53 PM.

62

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
of one party, the PML-N with clear benefits for Imran Khan’s Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party. Though Khan could not manage a clear
mandate, there were reports of elected members being coerced to join his
party that would allow him to form the government in at least three out of
four provinces of the country.29 The decisions against Nawaz Sharif are
controversial and do not represent the birth of a new system of governance
and a society free of corruption as Khan promised in his election campaign.
In fact, the seven years jail sentence and PKR (Pakistani Rupee) three billion
fine given to Nawaz Sharif on December 24, 2018, suggest the blending of
the new political leadership, the judiciary, and the military. Not surprisingly,
a retired General Ghulam Mustafa quickly tweeted: “advance happy
birthday Quaid-e-Azam. Please accept our humble present Nawaz Sharif
disqualified for life, jailed for 7 Years and fined $25 million.”30 This exhila-
ration could be temporary depending on when Sharif was needed again by
the military. For senior Pakistani journalist Muhammad Ziauddin, the
military whitewashed judicial decisions in the past once it wanted to use
certain politicians to its advantage.31
But this shift from Nawaz Sharif to Imran Khan may not take Pakistan
through a replay of the 1990s, though it may look like a repeat of those
events. The change is significant in three distinct ways. First, it may be a
tactical move to bring in a new actor. Some critics point towards ISI's alleged
help to Imran Khan in building his party, planning and executing the sit-in
in Islamabad that brought the Sharif government to a standstill. The idea was
to force Prime Minister Sharif to resign. While the sit-in did not achieve its
objective, the government could not fully function and was eventually
brought to its knees with the state’s anti-corruption agency, the National
Accountability Bureau (NAB) and higher judiciary going after Sharif.
Second, the military is a catalyst of the strategic social change that took
place during the last couple of decades. By the turn of the 21st century,
Pakistan became more urbanized. The influence of agriculture in the
economy had decreased.32 Though these calculations were later proven
wrong,33 there was indeed a rise in unplanned urbanization. Musharraf’s
ten years in power produced a more educated middle class as compared to
the old and less educated one—trader-merchants, religious clerics, etc.—that
29
Mahreen Zahra-Malik, “Arrests and intimidation fuel fears of ‘dirty’ election in
Pakistan.” The Guardian, July 21, 2018. 18:41 BST.
30
https://twitter.com/_GhulamMustafa_/status/1077143861896642560
31
Interview with Muhammad Ziauddin (Islamabad: December 24, 2018).
32
S. Akbar Zaidi, "Economic myths and our elite." Dawn, September 03, 2012.
33
S. Akbar Zaidi, "Rethinking urban and rural." Dawn, August 29, 2017.

63

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
supported Nawaz Sharif. The new middle class benefitted from
Musharraf’s expansion of the media, the NGO sector, and some other
fields. More important, it saw an eye-to-eye with the military which had
viewed itself as the most substantial element of the country’s middle class
on the need to replace the seemingly less modern, feudal and archaic ruling
elite. From General Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq to General Musharraf, the
political army has struggled to replace the older members of the ruling elite
with newer stakeholders. The new middle class is modern yet conservative
in political values. It shares the desire to change the leadership with the
military. It participated in the electoral process for the first time in 2013 to
oust the older ruling class that it, along with the military, considered as
corrupt and responsible for Pakistan’s persistent failure at the national and
global level. This cluster grouped around Imran Khan, who, however,
failed to get a clear majority in the Parliament in 2013 and 2018 which
makes this middle class suspicious of democracy and electoral system.
Their shared narrative is that Pakistani voters cannot vote against corrupt
leadership because they are bribed during elections and are uneducated.34
Despite being a simplistic explanation about the voting pattern in the
country, the new middle class saw the 2018 change as a watershed moment
in the country’s history. In the eyes of the information minister, Chaudhry
Fawad Hussain PTI’s government represents the revolution of the middle
classes.35 They see Imran Khan as an ideal leader who had no prior
experience of governance and thus viewed as having a clean slate. A
strange mix of cultural-liberal and conservative, this class was also known
for its sensitivity to nationalism’s narrative created by the military. This
nationalism offered pride, especially after being labeled a failed or terrorist
state after 9/11, the ability to be moderately liberal but the acceptance of
religious identity at the same time. In addition, this middle class was intrin-
sically authoritarian and opposed to democracy especially if it didn't
deliver them their choice of leader. The change in the form of Imran Khan
was different because the armed forces found a partner in this middle class
that was modern and educated like it considers itself to be.
Third, the post-2018 political government seems to present what the
military would consider as a perfect fusionist model—it would not interfere
with any strategic decisions taken by the generals. The judiciary as an
institution has collapsed. After giving a landmark decision in July 2009 in

34
Saadat Ali Khan, “Elections in an uneducated Pakistan.” The Express Tribune, April 17, 2013.
35
Excerpt from Chaudhry Fawad Hussain’s lecture at IISS (London: 11. 2018).

64

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:2 1976 12:34:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
the case of Musharraf’s second emergency that was also meant to deter the
possibility of a future coup,36 The post-2013 judiciary seems to have
collapsed in the face of military pressure. The Supreme Court made itself
questionable in the eyes of people by focusing primarily on cases dealing
with the PML-N. Moreover, using the court’s power of suo moto, the higher
judiciary weakened democracy37 and its institutions far more than a military
coup. The weakening of judiciary and its use as a tool to weaken the
politicians and eliminate any source of threat for the military. With a pliant
political government installed after the 2018 elections that seem to have
helped the military to inflict repressive means of controlling dissent,
dominating the media, and restraining peaceful political movement, the
political environment is similar to the martial law than a civilian rule. The
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) even stopped two parliamentarians
from traveling without orders. Later the cabinet gave orders which were
eventually withdrawn by the prime minister,38 the confusion indicates the
government is Janus-faced, a military regime with a civilian façade.
The change witnessed in civil-military relations during the decade of the
2010s is not merely about the Army GHQ bringing new politicians of its
choice to power. It is also about military’s opposition to organic
movements that question the Army’s role in the control and the war on
terror. The military’s attitude towards the Pushtun Tahafuz Movement
(PTM) is extremely antagonistic despite the movement being peaceful and
demanding constitutional rights. The young leadership has turned into a
symbol of peaceful resistance on behalf of hundreds and thousands of
disappeared people, and those who believe that the state’s support to
militants has cost people’s peaceful living. In response, the military
launched a propaganda war against the movement labeling it as part of a
fifth generation warfare39 according to the army chief, Pakistan was encoun-
tering.40 The allegations unfold a larger plan to tame the civil society and
make it surrender to a military-defined national security paradigm.

36
Frank James, “Pakistan's Supreme Court: Musharraf Broke Constitution." NPR, July 31,
2009, 12:47 PM ET.
37
Adnan Rasool, “Pakistan’s activist Supreme Court endangers a fragile democracy." The
Conversation, March 28, 2018.11: 41 AM BST.
38
https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/pakistan/pm-imran-orders-to-remove-mohsin-dawar-
ali-wazirs-names-from-ecl/
39
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/ptm-a-practical-manifestation-of-5th-generation-war-
fare-against-pakistan.587074/
40
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “‘Hybrid war imposed on the country to internally weaken it, says
Bajwa.” Dawn, April 15, 2018.

65

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Building Military Power
The military does not control dissent for altruistic reasons, but to safeguard
its echelons multiple interests. It is not as Aqil Shah argued, power for the
sake of power and because officers have a trained bias for their power and
inferiority of civilians.41 Shah’s perspective is closer to the traditional work
carried out by Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz or Manfred Halpern
who have reviewed the political power of the militaries—from the argument
regarding organizational strength to their sociological modernity—generals
turn into arbiters of politics. However, most of this work does not consider
real interests as driving the military’s desire for power.

Economic Dimension of the Military’s Political Power

Though Pakistan’s military projects its commercial ventures as a contri-
bution to national development, it always was, and remains, an expression
of the organization's power and autonomy. The military not only takes a
significant chunk of the Central Government Expenditure (CGE),42 it also
digs into the broader economy as well. The four military foundations set up
for welfare purposes are used to run hundreds of businesses. Besides, there
are thousands of acres of agricultural land distributed to the armed forces.
The military operates in all three major segments of the economy—
agriculture, manufacturing, and service industry. The estimated worth of
this business empire runs into billions of dollars.43
Despite that the military would like to couch its business ventures in
development terms, the fact is, as mentioned earlier, such activities are
always linked with the organization’s power. For instance, the first welfare
foundation, Fauji Foundation was created in 1954 from Pakistan's share
from the British of the war veteran’s fund. By that year, the first army chief
General Ayub Khan was appointed as defense minister which means he
effectively had all decision-making power. Khan and several generals used
welfare as an excuse to acquire hundreds of acres of agricultural land
personally. The land acquisition and distribution were justified by a British
tradition of distributing land reclaimed from making irrigation canals in

41
Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. (Massachusetts, 2014).
42
Although the defense budget is reportedly 21 percent of the CGE (2018-2019), this does
not include military pensions, monies extracted from civilian heads of account, off-budget
financing, etc.
43
“Pakistani army's '$20bn' business.” Al-Jazeera, February 17, 2008.
44
Imran Ali, Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1947. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

66

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
different parts of the Indian Subcontinent.44 During the 1960s, sons of some
senior generals including Ayub Khan used the dominant position of their
fathers to make it in the corporate sector.
This tide of the military intruding in the economy slowed down consid-
erably during the 1970s, which is the only time Pakistan experienced a
robust political government accompanied by industrial expansion and a
policy of nationalization of the private sector. However, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto’s most prominent flaw that led to his eventual failure was contin-
uously using the military for his political support as he had done at the time
of the exchange of power from General Yahya Khan. After General Ziaul
Haq’s coup in July 1977, the military was back in business not only of
politics but also of extending its influence through building into the
economy. By the middle of the early 1980s, there were three more
foundations—Army Welfare Trust (1971 – Army ), Shaheen Foundation
(1977 – Pakistan Air Force), and Bahria Foundation (1981 – Pakistan
Navy)—that joined hand with the only tri-service Fauji Foundation to
embark upon an ambitious plan of industrialization. It was also during the
decade of the 80s that the army established other organizations controlled
from the GHQ like the Frontier Works Organization – FWO (an
engineering company for building dams, roads, etc), National Logistics Cell
– NLC (a cargo transport company), and Special Communications
Organization – SCO (for telecommunication network). During this period,
hundreds and thousands of acres of agricultural land were distributed
amongst military personnel in addition to establishing urban housing
schemes for the officer cadre. This pattern continued during the period of
unstable political governments during the 1990s. Like the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt under Muhammad Morsi’s failure to see the
connection between military business and political power,45 Pakistan’s
political elite did not think of these ventures beyond sweeteners. Similar to
Egypt, the political leadership failed to view military business as one of the
methods for the military to penetrate the ruling elite to form covert
partnerships based on economic interests.
A further boost came after the fourth martial law in 1999. The one
common pattern between the military in politics and the economy is that
in both cases the armed forces gradually built on their experience to
expand their presence in the two areas. The commonality is also because
the military’s economic expansion is about its political influence. Some of

45
Zeinab Abul-magd, Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt.
(Columbia University Press, 2018).

67

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
the biggest housing schemes in large urban centers belong to the military.
The army also has made rules whereby every service chief gets a plot of
land in the city of his choice at the time of retirement. To provide relaxation
from taxation and other state dues, the piece of land is declared as a
housing scheme. Because real estate is one of the booming sectors in the
country and military echelons have stakes in the business, Musharraf
shifted control of the Military Land & Cantonment (MLC), a civilian
department, under military control.46 In addition to real estate, the armed
forces have started business ventures in other sector which are considered
money making. Therefore, during the 2000s, the armed forces got into oil
and gas, education, construction of commercial plazas, aviation, banking,
insurance, and trading as an expression of its political influence, these
ventures were kept above accountability through legal maneuvering. The
foundations were registered either under laws used for private companies
to escape public sector accountability, hence, secrecy. In 2004, the head of
the Fauji Foundation, Lt. General (retired) Syed Muhammad Amjad
snubbed the elected parliament that had summoned him regarding the sale
of his company's sugar mill allegedly on a lower price.47
As the military grew in power, it found new means to monopolize both
political power and economic resources. Military business started to create
monopolies after 2013. Consequently, in late December 2018, there were
clashes at the Torkhum border (with Afghanistan) between the police and
local transporters as the latter protested against monopolization of cargo
business by the Army’s NLC.48 Similarly, the FWO used its army
connections to obtain the contract for collecting toll on the Islamabad-
Lahore and Islamabad-Kashmir highways constructed with official
resources and then increased the fee without the prior consent of the
National Highway Authority.49 The controlled media suppressed this
information. Despite uninterrupted civilian rule, it became more difficult
for the political leadership to watch over the military business. Companies
that were subject to public sector auditing as they were part of the military
organization and, hence, responsible to the Ministry of Defense (MOD)
found new ways to keep their ventures away from accountability. The

46
“Serving general appointed on civilian post.” The News, July 24, 2013.
47
Farhatullah Babur, “When foundations are shaken,” The News, 23 May 2005.
48
https://twitter.com/sshinwari99/status/1057252191902281734?s=12, See also,
https://twitter.com/mashalpti/status/1060429256482791424?s=12, and
https://twitter.com/shahids97337034/status/1054312486520926208?s=12.
49
Sehrish Wasif, “Islamabad-Lahore motorway: NHA, FWO trade blame for toll tax
increase.” The Express Tribune, September 25, 2016.

68

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
military brought in its men to escape accountability in key sectors. For
instance, senior retired army officers were responsible for the management
of the MOD were brought under military control through the appointment
of serving or retired military officers. The fact that a senior retired Lt.
General was made secretary of defense meant that he facilitated the
decision to exempt FWO from public sector audit. Legal means were also
found to facilitate the decision such as the formation of private companies
under the rubric of FWO which could then be exempt from accountability.
The FWO now has several subsidiary private companies that carry out
major projects.50

Internationalizing Military Business

After 2007/2008, Pakistan’s military expanded its business empire outside
the country through international partnerships and opening ventures
internationally. After 1988, successive political governments were unable to
tame the military business giant. For instance, the finance minister in the
second Sharif government, Ishaq Dar failed to convince the army’s
leadership to merge its ventures. This advice was given to avoid waste and
losses. In the 1990s, the Army’s AWT was given a bailout of Rs 15 billion
after incurring losses.51 Though the military did not adhere to the advice
then, some adjustments were made later such as Fauji Foundation buying
shares of Askari Bank (PVT) Ltd that was AWT’s venture. Despite the fact,
that Askari Bank held most military accounts, it started to become less
profitable due to bad investments. The narrative of the military’s
competence is used to hide reduced efficiency of these organizations. Thus
in December 2011, Askari Bank was sold at, what is suggested by insiders,
as a throwaway price to Fauji Foundation. The shares were divided between
the Fauji Foundation (7%) and its associated companies; Fauji Fertilizer
Company Ltd (43%) and Fauji Foundation bin Qasim Ltd – FFBL (21%).
The Askari Bank was another venture that expanded abroad through
establishing its branches in Bahrain and China and undertaking foreign
investment PKR 3.386 billion mostly in the Middle East.52 In 2008, FFBL
launched a joint venture in Morocco with a state-run company called OCP.

50
https://www.fwo.com.pk/extensions/business-units/dew-medo. See also, https://www.
fwo.com.pk/extensions/business-units/lafco, https://www.fwo.com.pk/extensions/business-
units/score, https://www.fwo.com.pk/extensions/business-units/ibex-telecom, https://www.
fwo.com.pk/extensions/business-units/ibex-construction, & https://www.fwo.com.pk/ exten-
sions/business-units/lsmim
51
Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. (London, 2016). P. 259.
52
Askari Bank Lt, Annual Statement, 2017-2018.

69

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The project named Pakistan Maroc Phosphore (PMP) was established at
the cost of US $ 250 million with an equal investment of US$ 125 million
divided between the two companies. A plant was set up in Morocco to
produce 375,000 metric tons of phosphoric acid for Fauji Foundation
companies with the remaining to be sold in the open market, the profit of
which would be divided between Fauji Consortium and OCP. The plant
was a strategic venture as it fulfills needs of FFBL’s only DAP manufac-
turing unit in Karachi and gives it an advantage over other competitors in
the country. The Fauji Consortium comprises the Fauji Foundation, Fauji
Fertilizer Corporation, and Fauji Foundation bin Qasim Limited. FFBL
being the largest partner in the consortium conducts the operations in
Morocco with a share of 25 percent followed by Fauji Foundation’s 12.5
percent and FFCL 12.5 percent.53
In 2014, the FWO also launched an international venture in Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates. The company, FWO Civil Contracting LLC was
established as a subsidiary of the FWO, and registered in the UAE under
the category of ‘Special Category Construction Company.54 The military
made use of its good terms with the ruler of Abu Dhabi to get numerous
construction contracts.55 The FWO has also positioned itself in the mining
industry where it could benefit from a prospective venture with China that
has come to Pakistan in a big way. Military companies are likely to be some
of the beneficiaries of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
agreement signed in 2013. It is perceived by the military and the larger
strategic community in the country as a ‘game-changer.’56 Though CPEC is
talked about in financial and military-strategic terms, the bilateral
partnership has the potential of anchoring China’s culture of clamp down
on dissent in Pakistan. There is a visible hardening of attitude in Pakistan
regarding alternative views especially after 2013. Justified on the bases of
enhancing security, the two critical laws, Cyber Crime, and Pakistan
Electronic Crime Acts, 2016 were often used to punish political dissent.57
The generals would certainly not want a replay of harsh targeting of
military's economic interests by the public as had happened in 2007. The

53
Interview with project secretary FFBL (Rawalpindi: October 03, 2018).
54
https://www.fwo.com.pk/fwo-overseas/about-us
55
https://www.fwo.com.pk/fwo-overseas/projects
56
Sajjad Haider, “CPEC: The Game Changer for Pakistan.” In The Nation, July 31, 2018.
57
Interview with Taha Siddiqui (on phone: December 18, 2018 14:45). There was a case of
an attempted abduction of the journalist that Siddiqui escapade and later sought refuge in
France. See, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-asia-42640242/pakistani-journalist-
taha-siddiqui-recounts-abduction-attempt

70

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lawyer’s protest then had targeted wealth accumulation by generals and the
military’s business empire.58 While indiscriminate use of force is an option,
the generals would instead quash protest and dissent before it begins.
It is noteworthy that while the business expansion is carried out without
civilian oversight, there was an increase in the anti-corruption rhetoric
aimed primarily at the political class, especially the old parties that the
military wants to discard. There is an effort to create a supra-image of the
armed forces as saviors of the state against external and internal threats.
Pakistan's army has emerged stronger than its Turkish counterpart that was
ousted politically during the failed coup attempt in 2016. On the contrary,
the new leadership created by the military intended to highlight the
importance of the country’s religious identity and supremacy of the armed
forces as the vital institution. Here is a formula of power that is difficult to
counter unless there is a serious movement to combat the trend or any
external development that could weaken the military substantially.

Conclusion
Does the continuation of the electoral process guarantee consolidation of
democracy and shift in civil-military relations? Pakistan’s case indicates
that the civil-military relations will remain skewed in favor of the latter
unless there is a strong effort at liberalization of the state and society. What
Pakistan has today at the end of the third un-interrupted election is a
controlled form of democracy that trains people in the process of giving
votes but also accepts the military as a permanent guardian.
The post-2018 period is one of the lowest for civil liberties in Pakistan. In
people's imagination, General Ziaul Haq’s martial law was the worst period
in the country's history. However, the decade of the 2010s is challenging as
the military has embarked upon an exercise of subtle and managed
coercion. There are hundreds of cases of missing people in different parts
of the country that are hidden carefully through the management of media
and politics. There is even an effort to subvert organic political movements
through the massive use of propaganda. The military is keen to generate a
new national discourse in which the army’s position is considered
synonymous to the state. Anyone questioning the army or its generals, or
even politicians like Imran Khan selected by the GHQ to lead the country,
is perceived as an act of challenging the armed forces, hence, an act of
treason. While the military has allowed governments to complete their

Jane Perlez and David Rhode, “Pakistan Attempt to Crush Protest by Lawyers.” In the
58

New York Times, November 06, 2007.

71

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
term, there are new forms of instability used such as overthrowing the
prime minister and cabinets of all governments since 2008. Such weakness
is due to the problematic over-centralized structures of the political parties
that, like rest of South Asia, revolve around their leaders. The leaders
represent the party at all times without any internal debate on the efficacy
of leadership. On the other hand, in an environment where the society is
made conscious of a hefty price of dissent allowing a Parliament to
complete its term means very little. Silence is the hallmark of the media,
academia, and activism.
Despite the repressive tools used to curb the voice of the PTM, the
movement represents a formula for Pakistan’s society to change the highly
negative civil-military balance. Not that the PTM has the strength to
overturn the power of the armed forces, but if it wants to shift the balance,
the only option remains the power of the civil society. Changes in civil-
military relations are something that may happen in the future depending
on the development of mass movement and a parallel weakening of the
unity of command of the armed forces.

72

This content downloaded from

119.160.66.185 on Sat, 05 Jun 2021 07:51:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms