The Plurality of Moral Standards

Royal Institute of Philosophy
The Plurality of Moral Standards

Author(s): H. J. N. Horsburgh
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 111 (Oct., 1954), pp. 332-346
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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THE PLURALITY OF MORAL STANDARDS
H. J. N. HORSBURGH, B.A.
I. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, approaching the ethical field as a theologian

rather than as a philosopher, has maintained that the Christian ethic
is not single and indivisible, but that, on the contrary, it consists of
what one might call an absolute ethic ('the law of love') and a kind of
interim ethic in which the notion of justice is prominent. Without
commenting on Niebuhr's work I wish to put forward a view which,
although more general than his, is perhaps not without a superficial
resemblance to it. I wish to maintain that the moral judgments of
most agents reveal the working of three distinct moral standards; and
I hope that in the course of my defence of this view it will become
clear that a recognition of this plurality is likely to be of assistance in
the clarification of a variety of ethical problems. (For brevity's sake
what have I to say in this article is exclusively concerned with our
interior moral life and our reactions to the judgments which other
moral agents may pass on our conduct, not at all with the judgments
that we pass on the conduct of other moral agents.) First, there seems
to be a standard below which we cannot fall without the loss of some
self-respect. While we adhere to this standard we should be reluctant
to regard our actions as blameworthy; but, on the other hand, we
should be prepared to admit that they are morally inferior to the
actions of some other moral agents in similar situations. This self-
respect standard is one which, generally speaking, we seek to main-
tain. Nevertheless, it is not to be regarded as simply the whole system
of a man's expectations with regard to his own conduct. It is obvious
that one's self-respect standard is closely related to how one expects
oneself to act, for one cannot maintain a standard without giving rise
to expectations through habitual conformity with it. But one's self-
respect standard is not simply that standard which one expects one-
self to reach; it may lie morally below or above the standard of
expectation. This is largely due to the fact that one's self-respect
standard (owing to a sudden insight) may at any time come to include
the performance of actions (or the implementation of policies) which
it did not previously require; and therefore, it may be partly a stan-
dard to be attained. There is a constant tendency, however, for it to
find a level appropriate to the maintenance of one's self-respect, and
this must be a standard which one ordinarily maintains. Hence, it is
not misleading to speak of one's self-respect standard as a standard
which one seeks to maintain, even although, from time to time, it
becomes in part a standard which one sets oneself to attain. (If, for
any reason, it comes to be widely separated from the standard which
one actually achieves, and it is not adjusted in a downward direction,
332
serious mental troubles are bound to develop

complete loss of one's self-respect. This is th
Secondly, there seems to be a higher sta
but more or less infrequently attain, a stan
that dissatisfaction with ourselves which issues in a desire to make
moral progress. I shall refer to this standard as our aspirational
standard. Thirdly, there seems to be a standard of moral perfection by
means of which we rank all other standards. Its distinctness from the
standard we seek to attain may be seen from the fact that we do not
ordinarily aspire to be heroes or saints and would admit that actions
which conform with the standard we seek to attain are morally
inferior to the actions which the finest men would perform in similar
circumstances. In spite of the unfortunate associations of the word
'inspiration', I propose to call this our inspirational standard. On my
view, then, there are three standards ordinarily at work in the indi-
vidual moral agent, namely, a self-respect standard, an aspirational
standard, and an inspirational standard.
With a view to clarifying my position I must now say something
about the notion of a moral standard and some of the ways in which
it differs from the notion of a moral rule. Three differences are worth
stressing: First, the concept of a moral standard is wider than that
of a moral rule. A standard may consist of a set of moral rules. Thus,
A's self-respect standard may require that he conform with the moral
rules, x, y and z. Secondly, the concept of a moral standard suggests
a scale of standards, standards being high or low according to their
place on this scale; the concept of a moral rule does not suggest such a
scale, although, of course, possible moral rules may be ranked one
above another from the standpoint of some established ethic. One
standard may be higher than another for any of the following reasons.
It may consist of stricter moral rules. It may insist upon a stricter
observance of the same moral rules. This may be illustrated with
reference to promise-keeping. Promises are made against a back-
ground of purposes and conditions which may be weighed with a
myriad degrees of justness by the moral agents concerned. This is
recognized in the distinction which we make between the fulfilment of
the spirit and the fulfilment of the letter of a promise. The former is
vaguer, and, as will become clearer when I enlarge below on the
function of moral rules, the movement from the lower to the higher
form of the fulfilment of a promise is one which tends to take us
beyond the province of moral rules. One standard may recommend
higher degrees of certain virtuous dispositions. Finally, one standard
may recommend a closer conformity than another with a certain ideal.
Thirdly, a moral standard (as I have already implied) may be con-
cerned with dispositions, policies, etc., as well as with actions, whereas
the typical moral rule, in my view, is concerned exclusively with
333
PHILOSOPHY
actions. Moral rules are meant to enforce; an

scriptive power has repressive intensity. Mo
of this order.
This account of moral rules leads me, of course, into a number of
difficulties and controversies. In particular it immediately sets me in
opposition to the views of Mr. W. J. Rees, persuasively set down in
his article, "The General Nature of a Moral Duty" (Philosophy,
January I953). As it is likely to help me to make clear my own con-
ception of moral rules, which has a decided bearing upon the subject
of this article, I shall attempt a brief answer to Mr. Rees. It seems to
me that while the rule-form can be used to prescribe anything, English
idiom not restricting its use in any hard and fast way, typically moral
rules prescribe (or proscribe) certain specific actions. Thus, "One
ought to keep one's promises", and one "Ought to return what one
borrows", are typical moral rules. That moral rules should prescribe
specific actions in this way follows from the primary function of rules
in the normal life which I take to be the maintenance of a minimum
standard of conduct. Moral rules, in their own sphere, seem to have a
role similar to that of teacher's rules in a classroom. The teacher's
rules are framed in such a way as to create the essential foundation of
effective work, this foundation being the maintenance of a minimum
standard of conduct in the class. Similarly, the primary function of
moral rules is to ensure the maintenance of a minimum standard
of conduct. (This implies a fundamentally teleological interpretation
of moral rules. I have no intention of dealing with that aspect of the
matter, however.) And clearly, this is most effectively secured by the
framing of rules which concentrate attention on particular sorts of
actions, for in this way it can be made most obvious when the rules
are being observed and when they are being broken-and unless this
is clear the minimum standard of conduct cannot be effectively
enforced. I now propose to reply to the three arguments which Mr. Rees
urges in favour of his own different view, namely, that moral rules
recommend certain dispositions. (i) He tells us that "some rules
can be stated without the use of any active verb at all, but simply
with the use of the verb 'to be'. " Thus, one might say, "A man ought
to be honest". I quite agree that this is an idiomatic expression.
Nevertheless, it does not seem the kind of rule to which one is likely to
appeal because it lacks the clarity in use which an effective rule
requires. Indeed, the sense of "A man ought to be honest" is much
more naturally conveyed by such expressions as "honesty is good"
and "It's good that a man should be honest." These expressions would
not be used a propos of some definite occurrence or situation of which
one had become sharply aware, the ordinary occasions on which one
appeals to a moral rule-and neither would the expression, "A man
ought to be honest". All three expressions belong to the wider and less
334
precise worlds of aspiration and general m

points out that "in a large number of cas
active verbs in order to state our duties,
easily stated with the use of the verb 'to b
man ought to speak the truth", means the
be truthful". One might reply to this by a
affirmed and simply reversing the argumen
"A man ought to be truthful" means the
speak the truth"-a preferable view if on
expressions. But I deny that they are equiv
a far wider connotation than 'speaking
aware of some of the sorts of actions whic
some of its uses) not all of them; and it is
which makes it so valuable an expression w
level of self-respect standards of morality
levels to which we aspire. Thus, those who
exhortation have often spoken of 'truthful
word and deed', etc. In these expressions 't
same as 'speaking the truth'. (iii) Finally, h
rules are stated with the use of determinab
which there exist no corresponding occurre
gives is "Persons ought to honour their par
ber with regard to this alleged moral rule th
be appealed to in all seriousness today th
(b) its currency arises out of its inclusion i
the Israelitish community filial duties wer
if one fulfilled them all one was honour
social context, therefore, 'to honour one's p
tional verb but simply a shorthand device b
duties could be referred to collectively. Suc
today because, in a modern community, fil
definiteness to be effectively prescribed in
would be more natural to say either, e.g
support one's destitute parents", or, e.g., "I
honour his parents". Thus, the old rule
conditions, either to be rendered more
dispositional), or, alternatively, to give
forcible recommendation. In my view, t
maintains that moral rules recommend d
failing to attend to the inappropriate
'recommend' when used in connection with moral rules, he is
failing to take account of the primary function of rules in the
moral life.
I shall now conclude these preliminary remarks with a brief state-
ment-to be amplified and defended in what follows-of the relations
335
PHILOSOPHY
between the three moral standards I hav

think it is necessary to distinguish two
morality: an obligational aspect and an asp
aspect. The former demands one standard an
sharply contrasting aspects are the products
Secondly, few aspire without being inspir
seems to admit of no moral improvement
accepted and approved, is able to inspire us. B
which we are inspired (at least when it is rea
whose biographies play an important and ne
life) is too exacting to fall within the moral c
In the short run, at least, we do not aspire to be
to set ourselves such a target is to suffer such
a serious risk of acting less well than we migh
fore require a standard intermediate betwee
processes of moral deterioration and that w
moral effort. Human nature, then, I mean t
us to develop the plurality of standards on w
2. In this section I propose to give a brief st
for distinguishing self-respect and aspirat
shall first produce reasons for supposing
likely to be of value and then endeavour to
the respective moral functions of these stan
It should first be noted that we tend to resist the condemnation of
our actions, either by ourselves or by other people, when they are not
such as to reduce our self-respect even if there is a sense in which we
are prepared to say that we ought to have acted differently. Clearly,
this is a diluted sense of "I ought to have acted otherwise"; for, if it
were not, we should condemn ourselves. What it means, I think,
is that while we have maintained the standard which self-respect
requires, and therefore need feel no shame, we have not achieved that
higher standard of conduct to which we aspire. 'Ought', then, reaches
beyond the strictly imperative level, at which failure is punished by
condemnation and is accompanied by loss of self-respect, to a level
at which it signifies aspiration and where failure is simply accompanied
by regret and possibly a sense of discouragement. "I ought to have
acted otherwise", as used on such an occasion, is equivalent to, "It
would have been better if I had acted otherwise". When 'ought' is
used in connection with moral rules a corresponding translation would
be far from acceptable.
Our manner of using the term 'obliged' should next be noted.
It is not idiomatic to speak of being obliged to do something if one
only thinks one ought to do it in some diluted sense of 'thinks one
ought .. .' which does not entail actual performances of the action in
question; the word 'oblige' is largely restricted to use in connection
336
with moral rules which are so unreservedly

invariably conform with them. Thus, if I
you because I'm obliged to stay with the ch
am not open to persuasion; on the other ha
to stay with the children", or still more, "
the children", you know that I might be p
favour of inclination. In brief, while these a
to aspirational moral standards (or purel
form 'I am obliged to .. .' is largely reserved
one's self-respect standard. These differenc
equal clarity below the purely linguistic
speak of as 'honouring' or 'dishonouring'
and routine-in brief, with such fully ac
parents, children, etc. They have to do with
of morality, that part of our ethic which ha
operation of habit and in response to the s
self-respect. When we conform with this m
praise ourselves nor expect praise from oth
we fail to conform with it we do expect to
the shame of lost self-respect. At the aspira
all this is changed; blame does not attach
rewarded with praise or followed by a mea
What, then, of the respective functions o
The function of the lower standard is best
sidering the occasions on which we experie
respect. These occasions are of two sorts, n
we break a hitherto inviolate, or almost in
on which we are suddenly presented with a
ishness. The shame on occasions of the form
short of our self-respect standard, and on o
to a new awareness of the lowness of our
awareness by means of which it is raised to
such circumstances has great value as a me
towards moral depravity or as providing
raise us quickly from a moral slough into w
ally sunk. But the value of such jolts to th
to zero or even becomes a serious liabilit
occurrence; for, in that case, either our mo
menaced or we suffer serious psychologica
intensity of our feelings of guilt and shame
respect standard, then, is to protect us f
provide a means of quickly recovering f
insidious processes of moral decay. It punis
of shock therapy which usually cures bu
much for the weakened constitution of the moral invalid.
D 337
PHILOSOPHY
The aspirational standard, with its accent

blame, has quite a different function. It is
and cure our moral diseases; its function is
latent athleticism so that we are encour
moral health. We do not deal severely with
reach this standard; and, on those occasion
we experience a measure of gratification. It
tool of moral progress, just as the self-resp
tool of moral stability; for, just as feelings
the best instrument for maintaining our sta
of carefully controlled moral satisfactio
advancing them.
3. I shall now give a short statement of m
that the vast majority of moral agents requ
in addition to that which is associated with the maintenance of self-
respect. First, both as a goad, at once inspiring us with holy discontent
and providing a direction in which to advance, and as a means of
ranking other moral standards, which will be estimated according to
the degree to which they approximate to it, we require a standard of
moral perfection. This standard is admittedly vague, much vaguer
than our aspirational standard; but from time to time it acquires
additional definiteness through its partial realization in the lives of the
most heroic and saintly of men and women. These paragons kindle
our moral imaginations, quickening our awareness of the somewhat
nebulous standard of perfection implicit in our moral comparisons;
and, at the same time, by stirring us to admiration, inspire us with
a desire to achieve at least a measure of their nobility. But this
inspirational moral standard, partially achieved by the finest men and
women, lies far beyond the compass of most moral agents; to seek to
conform with it is either impossible or is to invite failures so complete
as to give rise to an enervating sense of discouragement, which is
likely to debase our actual moral achievement. For most of us, there-
fore, to aim at conformity with the highest standard we can conceive
is to act less well than we would do if we were to lower the standard
that we set ourselves. (Some of us, for example, might love our neigh-
bours more if we protested less about our love for humanity.) It
follows that, in addition to an inspirational standard, we require a
somewhat less exalted aspirational standard.
But at least two objections to this account of the matter immedi-
ately suggest themselves. First, it might be said that it is our inspira-
tional standard which recommends those actions we think right. It is
therefore with this standard that we should conform; for it is our duty
to do what we think right. Secondly, 'ought' implies 'can'; therefore
since we ought to conform with our inspirational standard we are
quite capable of conforming with it. It follows that it is incorrect to
338
speak of this standard (considered now a

not as something which we set ourselves) a
compass.
To help me answer these objections and thereby to establish the
moral admissibility of the view I am putting forward with regard to
the relations between these two standards I propose to consider two
non-moral forms of achievement which, in my view, are sufficiently
analogous to be of service to me. Consider such a physical skill as high
jumping. Woodworth points out in his book, "Psychology: A study of
Mental Life", that our best jumps are made when the bar is neither
too high or too low-when, in fact, it is at that height which we can
just hope to clear if we put forth the very greatest effort we can. If the
bar is too low we are not stimulated to exert ourselves; if, on the other
hand, it is too high either we do not seriously attempt to clear it or
our previous failures bring us to such a pitch of discouragement that
we jump less well than we might have done. Next consider an intel-
lectual skill, e.g., learning a language. Jesperson claims in his book,
"The Growth and Structure of the English Language", that in the
initial stages of learning a language women are apt to make more
rapid progress than men, the reason being that they are less intent
upon speaking grammatically. Of course, if they were indifferent to
questions of grammar they would make hardly any progress; on the
other hand, if they were to aim at absolute correctness they would be
discouraged and also slowed, making less progress than they ordin-
arily do. There is, therefore, for each person, at any given time, an
optimum standard of grammatical accuracy, namely, that standard
which is so adjusted that it calls forth his very best work. Needless to
say, this is a vague standard: the teacher can counsel the pupil to be
more careful about his grammar; he cannot say exactly how careful he
should be. Nevertheless, there are clear differences between different
students' standards and between the standards which the same
student is aiming at at different times. Moral standards are also
the vagueness I have just noted, therefore, only adds to the va
this analogy.
It is now necessary to consider the notion of empirical possib
in its bearings upon the notion of action. In high jumping the
results of which one is capable are shown by what one act
achieves. Of the best of these results I say, "I can't jump any h
than that at present". Yet, although I am prepared to say
should hesitate to say, "It's quite imposible for me to jum
higher than that at present"; and this hesitation may seem stran
view of the fact that the 'can't' of the former sentence would no
be interpreted as the 'can't' of empirical impossibility, i.e. as id
with the 'quite impossible' of the latter sentence. In the cas
intellectual skill, such as learning a language, my reluctance to
339
PHILOSOPHY
late "I can't do any better" into "It's quite

any better" would be still more noticeabl
arises: how are we to account for these reluctances ? The answer is that
they are due to the ambiguity of the notion of empirical possibility.
One of its meanings is tightly attached to what has actually occurred;
its other meanings are much more loosely tied to actual occurrences.
Thus, one might not be prepared to say that one could do x unless one
had actually done x and had no reason to suppose that one's capacity
for doing x had declined since one had done it. On the other hand, if
one tries again to do x after an unbroken record of past failures one is
clearly assuming that, in another sense, it is empirically possible to do
x. At different times, then, 'empirically possible', as applied to actions,
means each of the following: (i) that something has been done and
that there is no reasonable ground for supposing that one will fail to
do it if one tries again; (ii) that one has reason to believe that in the
future something will be done although it has never yet been done;
and (iii) that one has some reason to hope, if not to believe, that in
the future something will be done although it has never yet been done.
The 'can't' of "I can't jump any higher than that at present" means
"that's the highest I've jumped" and "there's no reason to believe I'd
do better if I tried again now"; 'impossible', used in such a context,
means, in addition to the above, "there's no hope whatsoever of my
improving at present on what I've already done". The notion of em-
pirical possibility is therefore elastic in meaning stretching all the way
from what could be done again to the utter limit of what might be
done; i.e., it ranges from the extreme of repeatable achievements to
the extreme of estimated potentialities, these latter sometimes being
the potentialities of a certain period, and sometimes those of any
period, in an agent's life. "There's no hope whatsoever of my doing
better now" gives ground for the use of the word 'impossible' instead
of the word 'can't', for, in such a case, the agent perceives that some-
thing surpasses the outermost limit of his potentialities during the
relevant period. (Estimated potentialities are, of course, less directly
tied to actual occurrences, being based upon, e.g., correlations
between certain levels of eventual achievement and certain physical
or mental characteristics, i.e., upon what improvements have occurred
in similar cases.) Our greater reluctance to substitute 'quite impossible'
for 'can't' in connection with intellectual skills is due to the greater
difficulty of estimating intellectual potentialities. As agents are some-
times mistaken with regard to both their physical and intellectual
potentialities, hoping, e.g., to do x when there is not the faintest
legitimate ground for hoping to do it, it is important to distinguish
between two points: (a) that one cannot (empirically) set oneself a
standard which one believes to be empirically impossible for one to
reach; and (b) that one can set oneself a standard which is so high
340
that one is empirically certain not to reach

seriously attempt to jump ten feet (without a p
it to be impossible. On the other hand, athletes
ground for hoping for success have sometimes
four minutes. Such athletes were certain to fall short of the standard
they set themselves; and some may have prematurely abandoned
the effort to improve on the standard they actually achieved owing
to the frustration of their efforts.
How much of what I have been saying is applicable to our moral
judgments? Are we prepared to use the expressions 'can't' and 'quite
impossible' in connection with moral standards, e.g., in connection
with a proposed moral rule, meaning not that circumstances are such
that on this occasion conformity is physically impossible but that we
are morally incapable of conformity with the proposed moral rule at
least during a certain period? It seems immediately clear that we are
at least prepared to use the expression 'can't' in this way. Thus, if A
said to B, "One ought to turn the other cheek to an aggressor", B
might well reply, "But I just couldn't do that". Are we sometimes
also prepared to use the expression 'quite impossible' in such a con-
nection? I think it must be admitted that we should be extremely
reluctant to do so for at least three reasons. First, there is a general
reluctance to accept 'can'ts' and 'impossibles' as legitimate replies to
imperatives of any kind, moral or otherwise; for admissions of this
sort cut at the defences of bullying in which most of us wish to indulge,
and also make for increased administrative difficulties. Thus, one
could hardly expect lawyers and magistrates to be quick to recognize
the genuineness of kleptomania or to admit that homosexuals simply
"cannot help themselves". Secondly, it is far harder to estimate an
agent's moral than to estimate his intellectual potentialities during
a certain period. The phenomena of religious conversion, to mention
no others, tend to make us wary. Finally, the moral potentialities
of an agent in the longest run are inestimable, for while there are
physical and intellectual peaks from which one declines with age,
one can continue to make moral progress till the day that one
dies. However, I think that sometimes we are prepared to say that it
is quite impossible for us to conform with a certain standard during a
restricted period. When we are prepared to say this our aspirational
and inspirational standards must part company. But for all the
reasons I have just enumerated it often happens that moral agents fail
to recognize that a standard is beyond them. Of many such agents it
is true to say that if they were to lower their aspirational standards it
would reduce the discouragement which is threatening their actual
moral achievements. My reply, then, to any criticism based on the
principle that 'ought' implies 'can' is simply to point out that agents
are often incapable of acting in the ways that it is alleged they ought
34I
PHILOSOPHY
to act; and from this it can only be conclu

judged by the wrong standards. The vast maj
quite incapable of acting in conformity with
know; it is therefore mistaken to suppose th
with this standard.
In answer to the first of the two objections I am examining I wish
to make two further points, however. First, if they are thought of as
having the same kind of claim on the moral agent the two principles
which might be phrased in some such way as "be ye perfect" and "Do
your best" come into irreconcilable conflict. If the moral agent is ever
to attain perfection he must do his best; but if, on the other hand, he
is ever to do his best, he must aim directly, not at moral perfection,
but at the realization of a succession of much less exalted standards of
behaviour. He must do, not what he thinks is absolutely right (in the
sense of the finest thing which a moral agent might do) but what is
right for him, this being conformity with a standard which, ideally,
changes so as to approximate ever more closely to what is absolutely
right. Secondly, there is a diluted sense of 'thinks he ought . . .' in
which one does always think that one ought to conform with one's
inspirational standard. One thinks that one ought to conform with it,
not in the sense which implies actual conformity, or even the intention
to conform, but in the sense which implies a morally grounded wish to
conform. One aspires to conform with a certain standard precisely
because it lies along the road which leads eventually to conformity
with one's inspirational standard. Insufficient account is taken by
moralists of the differences between immediate, short-term and long-
term moral objectives, with the result that the whole strategy of the
moral life, which would require attention to be directed towards
the plurality of the agent's moral standards, is one of the most
neglected topics of ethics.
4. I now wish to give two specimen illustrations of the value of this
scheme in the province of psychology of morals, which I am assuming
to fall somewhere within the sphere of ethics.
First, it seems to help us to understand most of the certainties and
uncertainties of the moral life. Whether intentionally or otherwise,
Prichard, Ross and their closest philosophical associates sometimes
give the impression that, in their view, the moral life is largely cut and
dried, the major thickets being those of temptation rather than un-
certainty as to what, in general, one ought to do. Such a view-
whether or not it is illustrated by the school of moralists to which I
have referred-seems to be decidedly one-sided. Nevertheless, it does
draw attention to an aspect of the moral life which is sometimes
ignored. Thus, while we are often in doubt, not only as to what we
should do in some particular situation, but also as to what one ought
to do in situations of a certain kind, we are usually clear both about
342
what we ought not to do in certain kinds of s

the minimum that one should do in those kinds of situations. For
example one knows that if one borrows a book, as a general rule,
one ought not to burn it, and that, again as a general rule,one ought to
return it. But a book may be returned in many different ways-not
only by hand and by post, etc., but for example, with or without
thanks, in a manner likely to give pleasure or some degree of pain. In
brief, the bare fulfilment of our basic rules is only the beginning
of morality although it may also be almost the end of certainty. Again,
one may sometimes feel confidence with regard to what the finest
moral agents would do in situations of a certain kind. Such certainties
as exist in the moral life seem, therefore, to be adequatelyexplained by
reference to our self-respect and inspirational moral standards. The
formersometimes gives rise tocertaintybecause it deals mainlyin hard
and fast rules of the sort I have already attempted to describe. With-
out a large measure of certainty it could not discharge its harsh re-
pressive function. The latter also gives rise, in some circumstances,
to certainty, because no inspirational standard can operate without
a core of certainty, a nucleus of qualities and actions which are
accepted with unreserved approval.
Other schools of moralists have tended to stress the uncertainty of
the moral life. Thus, the existentialists have particularly stressed the
uncertainty which arises out of what has been called 'the encounter
with nothingness', that is to say, the uncertainty which emanates
from a sense of the arbitrariness of all moral standards. This is the
profoundest and most terrifying species of moral uncertainty. It
occurs whenever moral agents think of their own inspirational stan-
dard as only one of a number between which they have to choose, the
choice being necessarily groundless. This suggests that the uncertainty
arises when doubt, or sheer disbelief, assails us with regard to the
objectivity or universally binding character of what has hitherto
served as our inspirational moral standard. But it may be questioned
whether such doubt can be more than Cartesian-artificially stimu-
lated with a view to silhouetting an intellectual difficulty-while the
standard is serving its function of inspiration. For while an inspira-
tional standard actually inspires us it is experienced as that which
chooses us rather than as that which we choose, and therefore, the
atmosphere of moral lottery cannot be generated. This kind of uncer-
tainty, then, occurs when one's inspirational moral standard is not dis-
charging its primary function. (The really serious problem, however,
is to understand why 'the encounter with nothingness' is so common
in our own time.) A less terrifying but still more common form of un-
certainty is rarely discussed. This is uncertainty with regard to what
moral standard to set oneself. Consider, for example, the moral pro-
blem represented by a quarrel. Suppose that A, owing to a misunder-
343
PHILOSOPHY
standing has quarrelled bitterly with B.

reconciled with A? Or should he simply avo
better? The examination of such a case requ
of distinctions. First, there is the most d
complete reconciliation. Secondly, there is th
results which anyone in B's position mig
nearest approach to the ideal solution havin
of A. And thirdly, there is the best result w
compass of B. All moral agents, however go
tainty owing to the difficulty of determ
desirable result in any given situation is po
merely to the physical situation, but to the
moral agents involved: they have to recogn
goodness is something against which some m
complete immunity, and therefore, that the
the desired response from some other mora
failed to win Judas's regard sufficiently to
the vast majority of moral agents have to r
probable shortcomings of others, but also wi
to be reconciled with A and entertains a mea
him. What is questionable is whether it is s
act with good humour towards A if the latte
starts to insult him. When B attempts to b
setting himself (among other things) to reac
ness which a reconciliation with A requir
beyond him; that is, he may be quite inca
with A owing to his own moral limitations.
standard may be disastrous for any of seve
because the consequences may discourage
efforts to reach a higher standard of friend
sequences may tend to worsen his dispos
tempered or less agreeable than he was be
moral philosophy lurk near the surface o
but I must ignore them if I am to avoid l
illustration should serve to show that one's
dard represents one's current moral polic
deavours to follow over a period, implementi
all the relevant situations. Uncertainties of
commonplace of moral experience-are very
with reference to the difficulties of fixing
The scheme I am putting forward also hel
to classify the various crises of the moral li
scheme it is difficult to see how this could be done. First, there are
those moral crises which involve a fundamental reorientation or
conversion. In such cases one moral ideal replaces another in the wa
344
in which Nietzsche intended his vision of supe

of that ideal of meekness and humility embod
sonality of Christ. Buber's "I and Thou"
Nietzsche's "Thus Spake Zarathustra", has b
moral conversions of this kind. Such conversion
as the replacement of one inspirational moral
They justify the use of the term 'inspirationa
occur when men are overwhelmed by the at
which is presented to them. Secondly, there
involve a quickening of moral effort. In such
standard does not replace another: what happe
tional moral standard is made clearer and more attractive to us with
the result that we are stirred from moral slumber. Usually this expan-
sion of moral energy takes the form, or is accompanied by, the raising
of one's aspirational moral standard. But in extreme cases of moral
sloth this is not possible, for, in such cases, one's aspirational standard
has gradually fallen until, eventually reaching the limiting level of
one's self-respect standard, it has ceased to exist. The end of such
sloth is signalized by the resurrection of one's aspirational moral
standard. Crises of both these sorts are inspirational in psychological
tone: and this distinguishes them from those crises which affect the
moral agent's self-respect standard. Crises of the former sorts are
occasions of joy however deeply disturbed the moral agent may be;
crises which affect the moral agent's self-respect standard are pri-
marily times of suffering. He is made aware of the miserable laxity
of that standard, or of the reprehensible nature of some variety of
action which hitherto he has permitted himself; and awarenesses of
these kinds are so painful that to be salutary they must needs be
rare. The vast majority of moral crises would seem to be either
'encounters with nothing' or of one of the sorts I have just dis-
tinguished.
5. I now wish to make a final suggestion by way of conclusion. It
would be generally conceded that one of the peculiarities of ethics as
a study is that no school of moralists is ever entirely wrong. Any
adequate ethical view must therefore be eclectric at least in the sense
of having room within it for the different sets of truths which all these
warring groups of thinkers have culled from reflection on their ex-
periences as moral agents and on the uses to which we put our ethical
terms. This makes it necessary to explain how so many, apparently
contradictory views, can all have something to recommend them. I
wish to suggest that part (although only part) of this chaos in ethical
theory is due to the fact that different schools have tended to concen-
trate on different moral standards, and that much might be done to
reconcile apparently irreconcilable schools by relating what they have
to say to one or more of the three standards I have attempted to
345
PHILOSOPHY
distinguish. Such a task would be formidabl

outside the scope for this article. However, I
a few connections between these standards
ethical thought. Deontologists have tende
I have termed the self-respect standard. H
of their writings. Idealists, on the other
their attentions upon what I have called the
tional standards. Hence they have much
ideal', about moral progress and developm
(which is much more intensely felt as a pro
the higher moral standards). The utilitar
indifferent to subtle differences between mo
looked all the phenomena attributable to
these moral standards, and have concentr
character (indisputable in my view) of all m
As for the existentialists-always difficult t
-they have tended perhaps to pay most atte
moral life, and thereby to explore (among o
relations subsisting between our actions a
and also between these standards themselves.
University of Edinburgh.
346

The Plurality of Moral Standards

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Royal Institute of Philosophy

The Plurality of Moral Standards

I. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, approaching the ethical field as a theologian

serious mental troubles are bound to develop

actions. Moral rules are meant to enforce; an

precise worlds of aspiration and general m

between the three moral standards I hav

with moral rules which are so unreservedly

The aspirational standard, with its accent

speak of this standard (considered now a

late "I can't do any better" into "It's quite

that one is empirically certain not to reach

to act; and from this it can only be conclu

what we ought not to do in certain kinds of s

standing has quarrelled bitterly with B.

in which Nietzsche intended his vision of supe

distinguish. Such a task would be formidabl

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