China, US, Russia & Afghanistan: A Current Scenario

A new phase of regional cooperation is in bloom following US President Joe Biden’s decision to
withdraw all US troops from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, revitalizing efforts to develop
consensus around common security challenges. Officials from Islamabad, Beijing, Moscow, and
Tehran are meeting or plan to meet with the leadership of the Taliban and Afghan government, in
addition to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s consultations with Afghan and Pakistani
leaders and the March conferences in Moscow and Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
There can be no sustained solution to the Afghan war without a national consensus on a political
roadmap for the country. Still, these regional efforts are a parallel and crucial phase of the political
peace process because the conflict in Afghanistan is multidimensional. Each country in the region
has specific interests that influence its engagement in Afghanistan’s future, and the relations of
regional powers demonstrate the realpolitik at play.
In particular, Russia, China, and Iran have much to gain (or lose) from Afghanistan’s peace
process. In recent years, they have been directly involved in Afghan politics: both formally,
through state-to-state diplomatic relationships, and informally, through support to various political
factions. Russia and Iran have become more proactive regional players in Afghan affairs since the
start of the Afghan peace process in 2018. Additionally, China’s partnerships with these countries
will further define the Afghanistan that emerges after the US military withdrawal.

In the context of great-power politics, Russia has consistently expanded its influence in Central
Asia. The US troop withdrawal has further motivated Russia to expand its military presence in the
region. Moscow’s engagement in the Afghan peace process and its involvement in regional
platforms—particularly through the Troika-plus grouping of the United States, Russia, China, and
Pakistan—has more to do with the threats it faces from Afghanistan’s insecurity, religious
extremism, drug production, and drug trafficking. At this point, the primary concern of Russia and
Central Asian countries is their own security; they want to be sure that Afghanistan’s post-US
withdrawal insurgency or political instability will not cross their borders. Russia will likely find
ways to work with the Taliban, which many expect to hold power (either formally or informally)
in the new Afghanistan.
The US withdrawal and potential power vacuum that results in the region will allow Russia to
establish a geopolitical foothold in Afghanistan. For this purpose, it has already started building
relationships with Afghan political factions. Russia still sees itself as a regional hegemon and
views the US departure as an opportunity to revitalize its role and expand its power by building
alliances in the region, particularly with China.
Beijing’s major interest of securing economic gains can be achieved by using Afghanistan’s
position as a regional connector in either the Belt and Road Initiative or China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor. In addition, since 2007 China has been seeking ways to extract Afghanistan’s vast
mineral wealth, which requires security and transportation infrastructure. None of this is possible
without a stable Afghanistan, so China is still assessing the political landscape in Afghanistan and
what it can gain from a peace deal.
Following the rule of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” both Beijing and Moscow are eager
to undermine Washington. China and Russia are now more aligned than they’ve
been since the mid-1950s. With a commitment to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, these
countries will expand their political outreach to the region through bilateral and trilateral
agreements, well aware that, historically, romances among global powers do not last for long. For

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now, both Beijing and Moscow will maintain a presence in Afghanistan to prevent the potential
threats that instability in the country could pose to their security.
Though neither country wants an Islamic Emirate nearby, they may still agree to such a system if
it serves their interests. That requires maintaining a relationship with the Taliban.

Like Russia, Iran, one of the most influential regional actors in Afghanistan, has always seen
Afghanistan as a threat to its security but also as an opportunity to expand trade and accessibility
to Afghan and Central Asian markets. Iran never wanted a long-term US presence in
Afghanistan and has targeted the United States with both soft and hard power. Iran opposed the
Bilateral Security Agreement negotiated between Afghanistan and the United States, while also
supporting anti-US insurgents. Tehran has substantial security interests in Afghanistan and has
fought Islamic State Khorasan Province there by sending its Fatemiyoun Brigade, which has
recruited Afghan Shia fighters in the past. Iran will strive to maintain its access to the Afghan
market, promote Shia ideology there, and address transnational threats such as militancy, drug
trafficking, and insurgency. It tends to work quietly in the country, using soft power to spread its
influence.
Despite their shared views about US troops, Russia doesn’t want a powerful Iran countering its
own regional influence. Another concern for Russia is US-Iran rapprochement, which could
undermine and marginalize Russia’s influence.
With the US troop withdrawal, Iran will have more direct influence in Afghanistan and will aim
to protect its interests by building alliances with regional powers, particularly China and Russia.
A deal signed between Iran and China promising $400 billion in Chinese investment is the second
Chinese partnership in the region after China’s collaboration with Russia. Though the China-Iran
relationship is growing, Beijing will be careful to not allow that partnership to risk its relationships
with oil-rich Gulf Arab states.
Though deals between the regional powers might not have a direct impact on Afghanistan in the
near future, in the long term they will influence Afghan power dynamics, especially considering
that the China-Iran agreement includes deepening military cooperation through intelligence-
sharing. In addition, these deals, if sustained, will strengthen cooperation between China and Iran,
which, in principle, oppose US dominance in the region.

China does not tend to perceive Afghanistan through the prism of opportunities; it is almost
entirely about managing threats. The US presence was understood as a geopolitical threat, much
like the Soviet military presence in the 1980s, but Beijing had grown to see it as the lesser of two
evils. Pushing back Islamic militancy in China’s backyard and killing militants on China’s hit-list
ranked above nebulous fears about how the United States might use bases there for strategic
‘containment’ purposes. Beijing certainly hoped that the US would withdraw from the region –
but only after a peace deal had been brokered. China is now anxious on multiple counts. Its
perennial concern, going back to the Taliban’s last time in power, is the potential for Afghanistan
to become a safe haven for militant groups targeting China. Chinese economic and political
interests in the wider region have grown considerably since then, though, and Beijing is also
worried about the spillover effects in neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan.

The Chinese government has long sought to reach agreements with the Taliban, largely focused
on the question of their ties with Uyghur groups. The recent meeting between Mullah Baradar and
Wang Yi in Tianjin was unusually well-publicised, but the two sides have been interacting with

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each other for a couple of decades. Nonetheless, although Beijing is pragmatic about the power
realities in Afghanistan, it has always been uncomfortable with the Taliban’s ideological agenda.
China wants to see them hemmed in by compromises with other political forces in the country, not
resurgent after a military victory. The Chinese government fears the inspirational effect of their
success in Afghanistan for militancy across the region, including the Pakistani Taliban.
China does not tend to perceive Afghanistan through the prism of opportunities; it is almost
entirely about managing threats

Beijing is also concerned about the risks of entanglement in Afghanistan, which is seen as a
strategic trap that has diminished the other great powers that have involved themselves too deeply.
There are endless references to the “graveyard of empires” in Chinese analysis. So, while they see
the necessity of taking on a more active political role to deal with the fallout of what is now
underway, there is considerable wariness about being sucked in.

China certainly has substantial commercial and economic interests in the wider region, but they
are minimal in Afghanistan itself. Its major investments there, the Aynak copper mine and the
Amu Darya energy projects, have been in stasis for many years. There have been numerous
discussions about Afghanistan’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative, including
connections to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, but Beijing’s view has been that, in
Afghanistan, stability has to precede serious new economic commitments. Beijing has also chosen
not to build any cross-border infrastructure through the Wakhan Corridor, despite Afghan
government requests, effectively leaving a physical buffer with its neighbour. If there is a
permissive security and political environment in the country, then China would certainly take on
a significant investment role – but it will be extremely cautious. Right now, it is very worried about
recent attacks on Chinese nationals working on projects in Pakistan, not thinking about hair-
raisingly risky new ventures in Afghanistan.

The direct connections to Xinjiang are minimal. Virtually every attack in China itself has been
entirely indigenous, not tied to international terror networks. The border is locked down and there
are no plausible concerns about literal spillover from neighbouring Badakhshan. Any potential
cross-border issues have tended to be focused on Central Asia and Pakistan, which is one of the
main reasons we have seen a Chinese security presence by the Tajik border with Afghanistan. In
the longer narrative, Chinese concerns about the East Turkestan Islamic Movement have tended
to be vastly out of synch with the threat posed by any of the Uyghurs caught up in the militant
networks in the region.

The picture has shifted in recent years, though. The civil war in Syria saw the Turkestan Islamic
Party emerge as a more capable actor than any of its predecessor entities, and it has a presence in
Afghanistan too. China has been concerned about the return of more battle-hardened fighters from
northern Syria. Since the late 2000s, for reasons partly related to Xinjiang and partly related to
Pakistan, China has also been targeted by various other militant and terrorist groups that had
previously given it a pass. The Taliban – whatever commitments it makes to the Chinese
government and however willing it is to turn a blind eye to the situation in Xinjiang – has
engendered an environment in which many of these groups are likely to flourish. Even if it is
implausible to expect attacks on the Chinese mainland, it is already clear that threats to soft
Chinese targets in the region have grown.

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Evidently, for Europeans, the situation in Afghanistan brings back the spectre of large-scale
refugee flows and everything that may follow from that politically. Afghans are already showing
up in Turkey in greater numbers as they flee the violence and the potential consequences of a
Taliban takeover of urban areas. Unsurprisingly, a number of European states would rather have
seen a more graduated, conditions-based US withdrawal rather than the current scenario.
Afghanistan is a rare issue where China’s interests and not just European but US interests too have
been relatively well aligned. Beijing wants to see a stable political settlement there and, at different
points, has played a helpful role on the reconciliation talks. China’s closest partner in the region,
Pakistan, has been the Taliban’s chief host and backer, which gives them an additional avenue of
influence, even if it’s not one they’ve always been willing or able to use effectively. In the coming
period, though, Beijing will be tightly focused on securing their bilateral interests in Afghanistan
and channelling their diplomatic energies in the region to deal with the fallout from current events.
There will certainly be opportunities for European exchanges with China on Afghanistan. And the
two sides are not pulling in different directions. But I wouldn’t expect Beijing to attach such a high
priority to any active cooperation with Europe at present, given the nature of the issues at stake.

The China-Iran bilateral agreement and China-Russia comprehensive partnership create the
conditions for a triangular partnership among all three countries, which could determine the
security architecture of the region. China, Russia, and Iran likely would never invade Afghanistan,
but they will use it as a battlefield for their strategic competition with the United States.
Additionally, knowing that Afghanistan will face long-term instability, these countries fear that
the US withdrawal will destabilize the region and present them with transnational threats.
In such a context, a continued US partnership with Afghanistan through development and
diplomacy, intelligence-sharing, and other forms of cooperation would prevent Afghanistan from
becoming a harbor for terrorists and allow Washington to maintain a base in the region to counter
its regional rivals. To maintain regional order, multilateral diplomacy should proceed with US
engagement—not abandonment—of the region.
In addition, the peace process should include Iran, Russia, and China so that they can negotiate
their interests with Afghan political factions and offer their resources to advance Afghanistan’s
peace and stability. This will ultimately serve the economic and security interests of everyone.