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Expect Us: Online Communities and Political Media and Protest Logics in the Digital Era: The
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David Karpf Chris Wells
China’s Digital
Nationalism
FLORIAN SCHNEIDER
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1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
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Paperback printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
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For Foteini.
The 1 to all my 0s.
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Contents
1. Introduction 1
Notes 237
Glossary of Technical Terms 249
References 253
Index 283
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Tables
2.1 Communities and Polities—Definitions 43
4.1 Chinese Nanjing Massacre Issue Websites 94
4.2 Chinese Diaoyu Island Issue Websites 99
5.1 Encyclopaedic Knowledge about the Nanjing Massacre 116
5.2 Online Encyclopaedia Introductions to the Nanjing Massacre 122
7.1 Encyclopaedia Hudong’s User Comments 179
7.2 Top-10 Weibo Users in 2012 185
Figures
1.1 Japanese Restaurant in Beijing Makes Nice 2
1.2 Media and Minds in Popular China Discourses 6
1.3 Shattered Vision of Capitalist Urbanism 13
2.1 Communities 35
3.1 Digital Bias 64
3.2 Searching for Tiananmen 69
3.3 How Different Search Engines in China Produce Results on Japan 72
3.4 Content Distribution and Own-Content Bias Across Five Chinese
Search Engines 73
3.5 National Weather for Contested Territories 76
4.1 What Constitutes a ‘Community Network’? 87
4.2 Central London’s Underground Network 90
4.3 Immediate Neighbourhood of the Nanjing Massacre Issue Pages 97
4.4 Extended Network of the Nanjing Massacre Issue Pages 98
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Acknowledgements
This book is the result of a three-year research project titled ‘Digital Nationalism
in China’, which lasted from 2013 to 2016, and which has involved a number
of institutions and people to whom I am deeply grateful for their advice, help,
and support. None of the persons or institutions mentioned here are, of course,
responsible for any shortcomings in the book, and any remaining errors are en-
tirely my own.
Institutionally, the project was financed by the Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research (NWO), with a generous VENI grant (project no. 275-63-
005). The project was hosted at the Leiden University Institute for Area Studies
(LIAS). I thank the former LIAS directors Maghiel van Crevel and Frank Pieke
for their support of the project. I am in perpetual awe of their dedication to
their colleagues and to academic research. Both Maghiel and Frank provided
invaluable advice in the run-up to the grant application, and they have been
supportive ever since. The financial officers Ine Goedegebuur and Alex van der
Meer accompanied the project and helped me manage the grant. During the
project, I had the pleasure of visiting China numerous times for fieldwork, with
the kind support of my colleagues Yana Zuo and Marc Blanchard at Shanghai
Jiaotong University, Huang Dianlin and Zhang Qing at the Communication
University of China in Beijing, and Lena Scheen at the New York University
Shanghai Campus. On these occasions, many scholars, journalists, media
workers, and administrators shared their thoughts with me during formal or in-
formal interviews. For reasons of anonymity, I cannot list their names here, but
I am truly grateful for their willingness to share their knowledge and views.
Before the start of this project, as I was developing the ideas for this study,
the team around Chris Goto-Jones’s research project ‘Beyond Utopia’ offered
me a place to prepare my research. Chris has been incredibly kind in his support
of my work, not only by including me in his VICI project as a post-doc but also
by continuously providing me with a sounding board for ideas. I have benefitted
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immensely from working with him and the project’s PhD graduates Carl Li,
Mari Nakamura, and Martin Roth.
At Leiden University, I have had the pleasure of working in a rich and en-
gaging academic environment that is home to many excellent East Asia scholars,
and our conversations over recent years have shaped this book in countless ways.
My thanks go to Lindsay Black, Remco Breuker, Javier Cha, Rogier Creemers,
Kasia Cwiertka, Koen de Ceuster, Alice de Jong, Ans de Rooij, Hilde De
Weerdt, Aya Ezawa, Ed Frettingham, Marc Gilbert, Han Namhee, Hwang Yih-
jye, Erik Herber, Anne-Sytske Keijser, Svetlana Kharchenkova, Nadia Kreeft,
Stefan Landsberger, Luo Ting, Ewa Machotka, Ethan Mark, Oliver Moore, Kiri
Paramore, Park Saeyoung, Fresco Sam-Sin, Ivo Smits, Daniela Stockmann, Rint
Sybesma, Teh Limin, Paul van Els, Paul Vierthaler, Bryce Wakefield, Wang Jue,
Wang Ying-Ting, Jeroen Wiedenhof, Guita Winkel, and Zhang Yinzhi. I also
want to thank my colleagues in Utrecht and Amsterdam for our conversations
about digital media and digital methods, especially Anne Helmond, Richard
Rogers, and Mirko Schäfer.
While I was preparing and later working on this project, Russ Glenn and Taru
Salmenkari took over my teaching duties, and I am in their debt for all the hard
work and dedication they showed during what must have frequently seemed like
a thankless task: to pick up someone else’s teaching obligations on short notice
and supervise such a large number of undergraduate and graduate projects. Our
students have benefitted enormously from their excellent teaching, and I have
profited time and time again from their input and feedback on this project.
Also at Leiden University, Jacqueline Hicks did a tremendous job organizing
the Digital Asia Conference of 2016, and it was a pleasure working with her
and Bart Barendregt during that event. Jacky and Bart have also been invaluable
members of our editorial team for the journal Asiascape: Digital Asia, and I thank
everyone involved in helping launch that journal and creating such a lively com-
munity of scholars interested in digital communication and Asia. Our exchanges
of ideas and our work on journal-related issues have provided me with an impor-
tant and fruitful context for my own work. In addition to Bart and Jacky, I thank
Azman Azwan Azmawati, Ian Condry, Jens Damm, Fu King-wa, Chris Goto-
Jones, David Herold, Dal Yong Jin, Thomas Looser, Nissim Otmazgin, Martin
Roth, Barbara Schulte, Martin Slama, Ross Tapsell, Takayuki Tatsumi, Kyong
Yoon, and Elaine Yuan for all their excellent work. Hugo Dobson, Christopher
Hughes, Jeroen de Kloet, Thomas Lamarre, Mark McLelland, Jack Linchuan
Qiu, Éric Sautedé, Yang Guobin, and Zhang Xiaoling have been tremendously
helpful as our advisory board, and I thank them for their unwavering support. It
has been wonderful being part of this community while working on this book.
In recent years, I had the pleasure of attending a series of academic events
to present parts of this book, and many of my fellow participants provided
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invaluable constructive feedback and advice. This included colleagues at the an-
nual China Internet Research Conference (CIRC), which I joined in 2013 at the
Oxford Internet Institute, in 2014 at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and
in 2016 at Shanghai’s Fudan University. I especially thank David Herold for in-
viting me to teach workshops at the 12th CIRC in Hong Kong. At various CIRC
events, I have been particularly grateful for thoughtful comments from and in-
spiring conversations with David Herold, Ang Peng Hwa, Séverine Arsène,
Gilian Bolsover, Gabriele de Seta, William Dutton, Margaret Hillenbrand,
Fang Kecheng, Fu King-wa, Hu Yong, Jiang Min, Randy Kluver, Liao Han-teng,
Silvia Lindtner, Tom McDonald, Gianluigi Negro, Jack Qiu, Clément Renaud,
Maria Repnikova, Marcella Szablewicz, Cara Wallis, Yang Guobin, Peter Yu,
Elaine Yuan, Zhang Weiyu, and Zhou Baohua. In addition, Yang Guobin was
kind enough to let me join the 2015 conference on Social Media and Public
Engagement in Hangzhou, and Randy Kluver included me in his panel at the
International Communication Association’s annual meeting in Fukuoka in
2016, for which I am deeply grateful.
Also in Hangzhou, I am indebted to Shi Xu for including me in the
International Conference on Multicultural Discourse in 2013, at a time when
I was in the middle of preparing the research project, and Cao Qing, Lutgard
Lams, and Johann Unger provided feedback on the pilot study that would later
become the foundation of this project. At the London School of Economics
(LSE), I would like to thank the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and
Nationalism (ASEN) for inviting me to their annual meeting in 2014. ASEN is
a wonderful community of scholars working at the cutting-edge of nationalism
studies, and I have very much enjoyed the many enlightening exchanges that
take place at the LSE. Incidentally, the LSE’s William A. Callahan later caught a
translation error of mine, just as the book was about to go to press, and I thank
him for his keen eye and his last-minute assistance.
In the same year as the ASEN meeting, the American Political Science
Association (APSA) included me in its annual meeting, and I thank Brock
Tessman for hosting our panel on East Asian territorial conflicts. In late 2014, at
Lund University, Marina Svensson invited me to join one of her Digital China
workshops, and my thanks go to her and her colleagues Gladys Chicharro,
Christian Göbel, Annika Pissin, Jesper Schlaeger, Barbara Schulte, and Wang
Ning for making this such a successful event.
In 2015, Karl Gustafsson and Linus Hagström invited me to Stockholm to
present my work at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and I thank
them and their colleagues for the opportunity to share my thoughts with
them, and especially Astrid Nordin and Joakim Edvardsson Reimar for their
helpful feedback. At Cambridge University and Oxford University, my sincere
gratitude goes to Barak Kushner and Rana Mitter for inviting me to join their
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Note on Conventions
In this book, Asian names follow the local convention of placing the last name
first and the given name second, for example, ‘Mao Zedong’. I have only made
exceptions where another rendition is more commonly accepted, for example,
‘Jackie Chan’.
For Chinese names and phrases, I have used the Pinyin transliteration that is
prevalent in mainland China. Where I have used Chinese characters, I have gen-
erally provided the simplified version commonly used on the mainland, unless
the discussion warranted mention of the traditional script, for instance in online
posts that mix both writing systems.
All English translations from Chinese sources are my own, unless noted
otherwise.
A short note on references: throughout, I have quoted and referenced a
number of e-books, specifically texts in Amazon’s Kindle format. In such cases,
I have used Kindle’s page location in place of the hard copies’ page number to
indicate where a quote, factoid, or argument is located. I have also spelled out
all given names in the list of references rather than using initials as convention
frequently dictates. This is to make it less cumbersome for readers to identify
authors with Asian names, especially considering how the relatively low number
of common Chinese surnames can lead to many authors sharing the same last
name and initial.
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Abbreviations
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1
Introduction
In the sweltering heat of the 2012 summer, passions are running high in
China. After Japanese right-wing activists land on contested islands in
the East China Sea, known as the Diaoyu Islands in China, the Chinese
internet erupts with angry posts. ‘It feels like when your wife is raped
yet you can only stand at a distance cursing the culprit, “dare you do it
again?” ’, concludes one user on the popular Chinese messaging service
QQ. The online anger quickly spills into the streets as protesters march
through major Chinese cities. Some carry picket signs reading ‘resist
the devils’ (kangji guizi 抗击鬼子), others burn Japanese flags. The
situation escalates further when the Japanese government decides to
purchase the islands from their private owner in a bid to outmanoeuvre
a nationalist politician at home. The resulting riots across China see
Japanese factories and stores set on fire. Japanese restaurants are flying
Chinese national flags to discourage vandalism.
On 15 September 2012, a particularly gruesome scene plays itself out
in the central-Chinese city of Xi’an: second-hand car dealer Li Jianli is
driving his family to a homewares market when he encounters a crowd
of protesters smashing and overturning Japanese cars. The mob encircles
his vehicle and trashes it with clubs and bricks. When the 51-year-old
Mr. Li attempts to protect his car, a rioter smashes his skull in with a
bicycle lock. His wife drags him from a pool of blood to a nearby taxi,
which rushes Li to a hospital. Emergency brain surgery saves him, but he
and his family are scared for life. Mr. Li’s offense: he was driving a Nissan.
Four years after the attack, Li and his wife are trending again on social
media, following a video report of him and his continuing health problems.
In the report, his wife draws her own conclusions from the event: ‘Perhaps
Japan is all to blame for this, for stealing our Diaoyu Islands. If they
wouldn’t have done that, there would have been no protests’.1
1
2
Events like the 2012 riots in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) highlight
how important popular nationalism is in contemporary Chinese society. They
also highlight how strongly this nationalism remains tied to anti-Japanese
sentiments, and how those sentiments, in turn, inform political discussions and
actions (Figure 1.1). Importantly, the events illustrate that present-day nation-
alism is a different animal than the nationalism of earlier centuries. Nationalism
itself is, of course, not a new phenomenon. From 17th-century Europe, the insti-
tution of the nation state has spread to all corners of the world.2 Today, the United
Nations recognizes nearly 200 autonomous nation states. This success story has
been made possible by the innovative idea that human beings should be viewed
as members of nations—of territorially bound, politically sovereign ethnic
communities that share self-proclaimed cultural and historical ties. The nation
has become so ubiquitous that it seems nearly impossible to imagine human
identity without recourse to a person’s nationhood. Indeed, most nationals
are passionate about belonging to ‘their’ nation. It matters to be American or
Australian, Chinese or Japanese, Dutch or South African. Sometimes, it matters
in seemingly banal ways, for instance during international sporting events or
when a border guard requests a traveller’s passport. In other instances, such
Figure 1.1 Japanese Restaurant in Beijing Makes Nice. With kind permission from an
anonymous photographer, 30 September 2012.
3
I n t rodu ct ion 3
as during the events outlined earlier, it matters in ways that have broad and, at
times, grave consequences.
If we are to understand the social and political complexities of the 21st century,
we need to ask: what happens to nationalism when it goes digital? Nationalism
today is shared through digital information and communication technologies
(ICTs). It is adopted, filtered, transformed, enhanced, and accelerated through
digital networks. Moreover, nationalism in digital spheres interacts in compli-
cated ways with nationalism ‘on the ground’, challenging simple dichotomies of
online versus offline politics. All of these dynamics are on display in the rich cul-
tural and political environment that is digital China.
An example of this complicated relationship is the role the Japanese adult film
actress and pop idol Sola Aoi played during the 2012 territorial dispute. Her so-
cial media calls for peace between the Chinese and Japanese people brought the
patriotic sentiments of many Chinese fans in conflict with their love for Japanese
pornography (see Coates 2014). As the ensuing debates over who should be
permitted to speak on issues of national self and other suggest, and as the online
anger and rioting of 2012 also demonstrate more generally, ‘relations between
Japan and China continue to be overshadowed by the history of war between
them’ (Austin & Harris 2001: 48). Routinely resurfacing issues show how deep
historical conflicts run: Japanese history textbooks, political rituals, and claims
to disputed territories have repeatedly outraged Chinese internet users.5 While
nationalist voices also target other perceived enemies of China, the ‘fiercest
comments and suggestions are reserved for Japan’ (Breslin & Shen 2010: 8).
For the Chinese government, anti-Japanese sentiments are a mixed blessing.
On the one hand, they help construct a sense of national unity, and the lead-
ership has consequently fostered the idea of a malicious Japan through school
curricula (Wang 2012: ch.4), museum exhibits (Denton 2014), and a wide
range of media products such as books, TV programmes, computer games,
maps, and paraphernalia (Callahan 2010; Nie 2013). Through propaganda
strategies old and new (Brady 2008: 125–149), the CCP reminds its citizens
to ‘never forget’ the atrocities of the Second Sino-Japanese War (Mitter 2003),
and to view modern Chinese history through the lens of national humiliation
(Cohen 2002; Wang 2012). As Carrico and Gries argue (2016: 430), the fre-
quently racist anti-Japanese views of contemporary Chinese nationalists ‘cannot
be understood apart from their socialization in the PRC into a view of Japan as
a fascist state perpetually frozen in time in 1945’. Indeed, Japan as an antagonist
has become deeply engrained in the CCP’s attempt to legitimate its rule over
China. On the other hand, as He (2007b: 2) points out, ‘the visceral nation-
alist sentiment’ that these ‘pernicious mythos in the national collective memory’
often lead to also endanger political and economic cooperation, and in extreme
cases they have the potential to harm the political legitimacy of the CCP. In
heated current affairs debates, Chinese internet users at times bypass official in-
formation policies and shape the meaning of patriotism in ways that do not nec-
essarily serve the leadership.6
Japanese planes in China’s skies:
One of the most devastating earthquakes in human history strikes
the Chinese province of Sichuan on 12 May 2008. Over 70,000
people are killed or missing, hundreds of thousands more are injured.
Neighbouring Japan is quick to offer aid to the disaster-stricken region,
which China’s leaders gladly accept. Japan issues 500 million Yen in
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