Klaus Brummer, Valerie M. Hudson - Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America (2015, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.)

Foreign Policy Analysis
Beyond North America

Foreign Policy
Analysis
Beyond
North America
edited by
Klaus Brummer
Valerie M. Hudson
b o u l d e r
l o n d o n
Published in the United States of America in 2015 by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301
www.rienner.com
and in the United Kingdom by

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU
© 2015 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved
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is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-1-62637-197-2 (hc : alk. paper)
British Cataloguing in Publication Data

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Printed and bound in the United States of America
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5 4 3 2 1
Contents
1 Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America 1

Valerie M. Hudson
2 Foreign Policy Analysis in China 15

Huiyun Feng
3 Japan Through the Lens of Foreign Policy Analysis 37

Yukiko Miyagi
4 Foreign Policy Analysis in India 57

Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi
5 Foreign Policy Analysis and the Arab World 77

Raymond Hinnebusch
6 Foreign Policy Processes in African States 101

Korwa G. Adar
7 Latin American Foreign Policy Analysis 121

Rita Giacalone
8 North American and European Foreign Policy Analysis 139

Amelia Hadfield and Valerie M. Hudson
9 Implications for Mainstream FPA Theory 169

Klaus Brummer
Bibliography 187
The Contributors 229
Index 231
About the Book 242
v
1
Beyond North America
Valerie M. Hudson
Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is now a mature subfield of inter-

national relations (IR), arguably having been in existence for well over
fifty years. Over the past ten years, it has moved from the margins of IR,
possessing now such markers of maturity as its own Web of Science–
ranked journal, Foreign Policy Analysis; at least a half dozen textbooks;
increasing inclusion in both the undergraduate and graduate curricula of
departments of political science and international relations; dedicated
monograph series by high-profile academic publishers; and status as
one of the two largest sections of IR’s professional organization, the
International Studies Association (ISA). There are now academic job
ads that specifically seek scholars working in foreign policy analysis.
We write this volume at a time when FPA is arguably experiencing a
true renaissance.
As I have explicated in my own survey of the field, Foreign Policy
Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Hudson 2013: 3), foreign
policy analysis is that subfield of international relations that takes as its
theoretical focus those human beings who make and implement the for-
eign policy of a collective, usually, but not always, a nation-state. Those
decisionmakers stand at the point of intersection between forces exter-
nal to and internal to the nation-state that bears on the choice at hand.
One hallmark of FPA scholarship is that the subfield views the
explanation of foreign policy decisionmaking as of necessity being mul-
tifactorial and multilevel. Explanatory variables from all levels of analy-
sis, from the most micro to the most macro, are of interest to the analyst
to the extent that they affect decisionmaking. As a result, insights from
1
2 Valerie M. Hudson
many intellectual disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, organiza-

tional behavior, anthropology, and economics, are useful for the foreign
policy analyst in efforts to explain foreign policy decisionmaking, mak-
ing multi/interdisciplinarity a second hallmark of FPA. Thus, of all sub-
fields of IR, FPA is the most radically integrative theoretical enterprise,
which is its third hallmark, for it integrates a variety of information
across levels of analysis and spanning numerous disciplines of human
knowledge.
Our focus on human decisionmakers leads FPA toward an emphasis
on agent-oriented theory, this being a fourth hallmark of FPA. States are
not agents, because they are abstractions and thus have no agency. Only
human beings can be true agents. Going further, FPA theory is also pro-
foundly actor specific in its orientation (to use a term coined by Alexan-
der George [1993]), unwilling to “black box” the human decisionmak-
ers under study. The humans involved in the Cuban missile crisis, for
example, were not interchangeable generic rational utility maximizers
and were not equivalent to the states that they served. Not just general
and abstract information, but specific and concrete information about
the decisionmakers in all three countries involved (the Soviet Union, the
United States, and Cuba) would be necessary to explain that crisis.
Actor specificity, then, is FPA’s fifth hallmark. The perspective of FPA
is that the source of all international politics and all change in interna-
tional politics is specific human beings using their agency and acting
individually or in groups.
The primary levels of analysis used by FPA scholars range from
examination of cognitive and personal characteristics of leaders, small
group dynamics, organizational process, bureaucratic politics, domestic
political contestation, national culture, and economic considerations, to
broader regional and international systemic forces. The explanandum,
foreign policy, can be examined from a variety of perspectives as well,
with possible emphases on choice, process, outcome, or implementation.
It is also true that FPA has, as part of its historical legacy, generally
placed a premium on comparison as a means of theory development.
While FPA abounds in single case studies, comparative case studies and
even statistical analyses of compiled foreign policy events or content-
analyzed texts are also common in FPA literature. Last but not least,
there has frequently been a normative element to FPA studies where
particular decisions are analyzed with an eye to what went wrong (or,
less frequently, right) in that case.
Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America 3
A North American Enterprise?
Despite its avowedly global purview, foreign policy analysis is still pre-
dominantly seen as a North American enterprise by many non–North
Americans. This view has perhaps been most eloquently and consis-
tently expressed by FPA scholars from developing countries. There have
been a few volumes—though limited in number—that focus specifically
on FPA in contexts of the Global South. Each opens with a lament over
the “US-ness” of the field of FPA, which manifests itself in two ways:
(1) the proliferation of studies of US foreign policy decisionmaking in
FPA in contrast to those of other nations, particularly those of the
Global South; and (2) the nature of the theories, assumptions, and meth-
ods used in FPA. Indeed, one cannot help but wonder if the paucity of
volumes about FPA in the context of the Global South is not, in some
sense, an outgrowth of the ethnocentric nature of the subfield. Is it pos-
sible that ethnocentrism has actually stymied the theoretical and empir-
ical progression of an entire academic field of study?
To begin the exploration of this question, I note that there are sev-
eral works that might also be considered (including some written by
Southern scholars and some written by US scholars about Southern for-
eign policy, e.g., Clapham 1977; Korany and Dessouki 1984; Hey 1995;
East 1973; Van Klaveren 1984; Moon 1983; Richardson and Kegley
1980; Ismael and Ismael 1986; Ferris and Lincoln 1981; Brecher 1972).
But the two volumes that I examine here are How Foreign Policy Deci-
sions Are Made in the Third World: A Comparative Analysis (Korany
1986a) and The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Con-
ceptual Frameworks (Braveboy-Wagner 2003a).
In the mid-1980s, when FPA was a little over two decades old and
most definitely US centric, Bahgat Korany created a working group at the
International Political Science Association (IPSA), the purpose of which
was to gather non-US FPA scholars to discuss the application of FPA the-
ory and techniques to what was then known as the third world. His edited
volume How Foreign Policy Decisions Are Made in the Third World: A
Comparative Analysis (1986a) was the outcome of those discussions.
Korany’s opening chapter in that volume “Foreign Policy Decision-
Making Theory and the Third World: Payoffs and Pitfalls” is, in his
words, a review of “the barren state of Third World foreign policy stud-
ies” and a demonstration of “the limited help that established foreign
policy theory can offer” (1986b: 39). Indeed, Korany states that “some
4 Valerie M. Hudson
authors think there is nothing worthwhile in the literature to build upon”

(1986b: 41).
One of the authors that he cites in this regard is Tim Shaw, a long-
time analyst of the foreign policies of African states. Korany quotes
Shaw as commenting in 1983 on “the inappropriateness, bordering at
times on the irrelevance, of the subfield . . . symptomatic of the defi-
ciencies and mistakenness of much (most) of the field as defined by the
prevailing paradigm” (Korany 1986b: 41). For example, notes Korany,
the bureaucratic politics framework as adumbrated by Graham Allison
and Morton Halperin is of little use in analyzing the nonindustrialized
countries of that time period: “The model is . . . culture-bound. In other
words, this model of discrete decisions leading to disjointed incremen-
talism is inspired only by, and mainly applicable to, the US decision
making process” (Korany 1986b: 56).
Korany also figuratively shakes his head over the assumption by
North American FPA scholars that governmental archives and accurate
news reports will naturally be available to the foreign policy analyst. He
provides the example of how the Western press reported that sixty coun-
tries attended the Non-Aligned Summit in Algeria in 1973 when in fact
seventy-five did so, and it was also reported that Saudi Arabia did not
attend even though the Saudi delegation was headed by King Faisal
himself (Korany 1986b: 41). Korany further notes that the then ascen-
dant psychological-perceptual model in FPA encountered several data
issues when repurposed for the examination of third world countries,
not the least of which was flagrant lying as a common practice among
leaders in those countries, making content analysis fruitless. Further-
more, there were such deep data requirements for the model that an ana-
lyst would have to “live several days and nights with the head of state,
his family, his secretary, and perhaps other members of the immediate
entourage” (1986b: 57). Indeed, Korany concludes that FPA scholars in
the third world often came to the conclusion that they would simply be
“unable to collect the needed data” (1986b: 57).
Korany suggests that the data issues mask a more profound set of
concerns: “The problems, then, are related not only to accessibility of
data; they go much deeper to the epistemological level” (1986b: 41). In
his view, “To counter the serious deficiencies plaguing the established
model, analysts of Third World foreign policy decisionmaking must turn
to other schools of social analysis for inspiration” (1986b: 59). The
remainder of his volume is dedicated to a discussion of what Korany
terms the “state-societal” and the “global-systemic” levels of analysis,
which he feels are underestimated in the North American FPA paradigm.
Fast-forward almost twenty years after Korany’s volume, at a time

when FPA was over forty years in age, and we find a eerily similar set
of complaints in Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner’s edited volume The For-
eign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks
(2003a). In her introduction to the volume, Braveboy-Wagner notes that
FPA “has arguably had an inherent bias toward the study of ‘developed
Western states.’” Rather than this bias being ameliorated over time,
Braveboy-Wagner asserts that “scholars are less likely than before to
consider third world countries as having theoretical relevance to the for-
eign policy . . . enterprise” (2003b: 1; emphasis added). FPA as a field
of study has progressed according to Braveboy-Wagner and her coau-
thor of the chapter “Assessing Current Conceptual and Empirical
Approaches”: “But in contemplating this rich body of research, one is
struck by how little work has been done on the global south states. The-
oretically oriented, as opposed to descriptive, decision making research
remains heavily focused on the behavior of the global north developed
countries, in particular the United States . . . studies focusing on or
incorporating decision making in the global south are few” (Braveboy-
Wagner and Snarr 2003: 19–20). However, Braveboy-Wagner is fairly
optimistic that this situation can be rectified compared to other scholars
represented in her volume such as Siba Grovogui, who contributed a
chapter entitled “Postcoloniality in Global South Foreign Policy: A Per-
spective”:
Either by benign neglect or sheer intellectual hubris, the vast majority of

Western theorists have forsaken the idea of an alternative conceptualiza-
tion of foreign policy that might differ in both substance and ethos from
that which emerged from modern Europe. This neglect may be explained
by the fact that theorists have predicated the study of international rela-
tions and foreign policy on ontological foundations that uncritically as-
sume that postcolonial states will inevitably converge with Western states
in their formulation of “interest,” “value,” and “power.” Thus the prevail-
ing models of foreign policy are derived from extrapolations on selective
Western experiences and posited as immutable traditions. This being the
case, the fields of foreign policy studies, and international relations gen-
erally, depend upon a combined historiography, hermeneutic, and ethnog-
raphy that precludes the possibility of non-Western political imaginaries
as a basis for any coherent set of values and norms that may be general-
ized. (Grovogui 2003: 31)
What Grovogui is asserting is that FPA, like all theoretical approaches

originating in a hegemonic state, seeks to reproduce that hegemony: “It
can be reasonably argued that foreign policy studies, as a field of inquiry,
6 Valerie M. Hudson
purposefully justifies parochial institutions of politics, law, economics,

and morality as inherent and legitimate” (2003: 38). In particular, the
idea that there are “universal categories” applicable across Northern and
Southern nation-states is critiqued. Grovogui issues a plea that “analysts
seek to understand . . . the foreign policies of the global south on its own
terms, that is, in light of a historiography and hermeneutics that may be
unique to it” (2003: 47). For example, Grovogui notes that “the study of
foreign policy has construed international politics in such a manner as to
exclude the cultural, economic, spiritual, and social instantiations of for-
eign policy from its purview” (2003: 47), and he calls for “new forms of
knowledge and a reconfiguration of the objects of the field of foreign
policy” which he hopes will incorporate more “appropriate methodolo-
gies, historiographies, and ethics” (2003: 48).
Randolph Persaud of American University, a third contributor to
Braveboy-Wagner’s volume, echoes the theme that “there is too much
of an unproblematic acceptance of the models developed for, and out of,
the experiences of the Western states” (Persaud 2003: 49). More specif-
ically, Persaud is skeptical of the idea of “classes” of nation-states that
would have similar characteristics and be under the influence of similar
forces (such as was postulated by James Rosenau [1966] in his article
“Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” which articulated the
concept of a “genotype” of nations). This positivism, with its search for
law-like generalizations, may be, he believes, an ideological commit-
ment tied to FPA’s North American roots. Paul Adogambe of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Whitewater, a fourth contributor, agrees and goes
further in suggesting with reference to those who study African foreign
policy:
As a result of their educational and intellectual backgrounds, most

African scholars have tended to borrow from Western social science the-
ories and concepts to help formulate theoretical paradigms and models
that are adaptable to the African context, even though these concepts and
theories are recognized as culture-bound and rooted in Western social
values. These modified models and approaches sometimes pose serious
methodological problems, partly because they were developed to explain
international relations in the industrialized world, and partly because the
data needed to make them applicable to the African environment are sim-
ply not available. (Adogambe 2003: 80–81)
It is important to note that these views of the US-ness of FPA are not
confined to those from the Global South. For example, in a recent essay,
the eminent UK scholar A. J. R. Groom asserts that the US view of FPA
is overly narrow: “It was essentially an American agenda with disturb-
ing elements of parochialism that ignored emerging global problems. In

short, it was a research agenda fitted for a particular actor, not for FPA
or more generally” (2007: 210). In this critique, US visions of the cor-
pus of FPA scholarship focus almost exclusively on North American
scholars or those writing in North American journals. Groom feels that
“foreign policy [study] was originally conceived in terms of changing
the world and responding to a changing world to make it better, what-
ever that might mean,” with an emphasis on the study of diplomacy
(2007: 214).
Groom is particularly dismayed at the continued state-centric focus
of US FPA: “In the evolution of foreign policy studies, now more
grandly known as FPA, over the last century or so, we find that it has
become a more limited tranche of a much more complicated world”
(2007: 214). Consider also this statement by three British scholars,
Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, in their edited textbook
Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (2008a: 4): “To treat FPA as the
only approach to the study of foreign policy would limit our discus-
sions. . . . [R]educing the study of foreign policy to be only FPA-related
is inaccurate, since many more theories are involved than those covered
by FPA.” What is implied is that these limitations have been imposed by
the particular North American character of FPA.
Are these views of the profoundly ethnocentric character of FPA on
target? One way of addressing this question is to examine the author-
ship of articles published in the flagship journal of FPA, Foreign Policy
Analysis, sponsored by the ISA. Approximately 60 percent of the arti-
cles in the 2012 volume do not have an author or coauthor from a non-
US institution. But this figure must be placed in context: the inaugural
year of that journal found 82 percent of the articles authored by scholars
at US institutions (affiliation was used since it is difficult to say what
country each scholar was born in). There has been a profound shift in
this subfield that we feel has not been recognized for what it is: the
de−North Americanization of this field of inquiry. Some of the best and
most innovative work in foreign policy analysis is now being penned by
scholars located in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and other areas.
And yet the perception that FPA is still largely a North American
scholarly enterprise persists. We attribute this primarily to two phenom-
ena. The first is that, when graduate students are introduced to FPA,
they are usually exposed to the “classic works” in the field, which are
virtually all North American in origin. The second is that much of the
literature produced outside of North America is not easily available to
FPA scholars throughout the world. For example, the best work in Chi-
8 Valerie M. Hudson
nese FPA may not be available in any form to FPA scholars in the Mid-
dle East, the West, or other areas of the world. However, North Ameri-
can work may be more readily available to non–North American schol-
ars through the preeminent journal outlets and publishers in the field,
their preeminence clearly colored by the hegemony of the United States
in the world system for over half a century.
This volume aims to lower some of these challenging obstacles by
providing an overview of current FPA work from areas outside of North
America. As Margaret G. Hermann notes,
To date, models of foreign policy decision-making have had a distinctly

US flavor. As a result, the models have not fared as well when extended
to non-US settings, particularly to nondemocratic, transitional, and less
developed polities. Indeed, the “US bias” in the decisionmaking litera-
ture has made it difficult to generalize to other countries and has given
researchers blind spots regarding how decisions are made in government
and cultures not like the American. (2001: 49)
Let us examine Hermann’s observation before turning to a road map of

this volume: we need to step back and ask ourselves how to discern and
mitigate ethnocentrism in an academic discipline of study.
Ethnocentrism’s Effects on FPA Scholarship
In what ways may the spatiotemporal origins of a body of social science

scholarship limit its applicability outside of those scope conditions?
While I am a North American, from my own standpoint as a female
scholar I have had the occasion to ponder this question. As a female
social scientist, I have observed that the production of knowledge by
those who occupy a particularist and privileged standpoint does indeed
affect theorizing and knowledge production in several ways. The ques-
tions we ask, the assumptions and concepts we use, the methods we deem
most rigorous, the stance we take toward that which we study, the moti-
vations behind knowledge-seeking, and perhaps even the very nature of
our reasoning bear the mark of that hegemonic “ethnicity,” if you will.
For example, from a position of power and privilege, one’s own cir-
cumstances are the obvious norm from which all others who are differ-
ent depart. At the same time, one is able to classify and categorize those
different others because one is the norm, the standpoint from which all
difference is calculated. Difference may also take on the connotation of
“inferior,” such that we consider nations unlike the United States to be
in a subordinate position—not only in the material world, but also in the

theoretical work of our discipline. Thus, we might be tempted to believe
that any new theoretical breakthroughs in FPA would originate through
an analysis of the United States, and not other countries. We might also
believe that certain levels of analysis, such as bureaucratic politics, are
not worth analyzing in countries that are not like the United States such
as Saudi Arabia.
Likewise, certain phenomena may become invisible to us because
of our standpoint. That dictatorships might experience robust domestic
political contestation was not originally understood in the early days of
foreign policy decisionmaking theorizing, for example. Similarly, the
refusal of the United States to accede to many multilateral treaties, such
as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), due to sovereignty concerns may mask the
importance of a new intermestic level of analysis to US FPA scholars.
The dominance of the United States in entities such as the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may occlude from the view of US
scholars that other areas are developing institutions that may have
agency that is not identical to the largest partner in the institution. In
related fashion, the US emphasis on military force may blind us to the
fact that some of the most important foreign policy behaviors taking
place in the world are nonmilitary in nature. This, in fact, may be an
explanation for the relative lack of integration between the subfields of
FPA and international political economy (IPE) in the United States.
There may also be seen a strong tendency to impose a voice of interpre-
tation rather than emancipate the subject’s voice. How Peruvians, for
example, find meaning in their foreign policy may seem of little rele-
vance to a US scholar studying Peru’s foreign policy.
There also may be methodological strictures emanating from the
North American origins of FPA. An obvious example would be the gen-
eration of events data, which relies, in the first place, on predominantly
Western media sources and Western chronologies. But there may be
more subtle constraints at work. For example, while I was teaching a
class on political psychology many years ago, one of my students, per-
forming just such a word count content analysis, announced that
François Mitterand was extremely lacking in self-confidence! Knowing
just a little about Mitterand, I pronounced that impossible. On looking
at the coded text, it became apparent that Mitterand always used the
“royal we.” That is, he referred to himself in the plural to denote that he
was representing the nation, as did the French kings of old. Thus, Mit-
terand would say, for instance, “This is our plan; this is what we believe
10 Valerie M. Hudson
would work best,” even though he was referring to himself. When we

adjusted for this cultural tradition, the recoding showed Mitterand to be
possessed of abundant self-confidence.
Even the foundational notion that comparison across nations will
yield generalizable knowledge may be more easily justifiable when
one’s position is hegemonic and central. Superficial instrumental use of
“types” of nations to fit a comparative case study design in FPA is too
common a practice, for example. Filling in the required cases for such a
design by asking the question, What small, economically underdevel-
oped, closed society could I find to fill this position in my design?
betrays an ethnocentric view of other entities as fairly easily inter-
changeable because only a limited set of dimensions is actually impor-
tant to note. In sum, we can trace the effects of a privileged standpoint
on both theorizing and empirical work in FPA.
Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America
As a result, we assert that FPA’s promise as a theoretical enterprise can

be realized only as it is made capable of moving beyond the confines of
its North American origins. Seen in this light, surveying the work of
non–North American FPA scholars, as the contributors to this volume
do, alerts us to what might be some of the most important new work
being done in the field today.
The volume presents literature reviews of FPA work by non–North
American scholars (some of whom are expatriates living in the United
States). Since most of the work of non–North American scholars is pub-
lished in languages or in fora to which North American scholars might
not have ready access, these essays are a treasure trove of analysis that
circumvents the problem of North Americans defining non–North
American foreign policy.
Huiyun Feng takes us first to FPA scholarship in China. Feng
argues that FPA is still in its embryonic stage within the Chinese com-
munity of international relations scholars; for example, she asserts that
the first FPA article concerning China was written in 1998, and Chinese
scholars have concentrated on introducing FPA to a community of
scholars unfamiliar with this subfield of work. The first academic con-
ference on FPA was held in Beijing only in 2010. Nevertheless, Feng
notes there is a small body of FPA work extant, written by scholars such
as Zhang Qingmin, Wang Mingming, Zhang Lili, and Feng Yujun. One
of the most interesting problems faced by FPA scholars in China is that
it is much easier—politically—to study the foreign policies of nations

other than China, given the political sensitivities of the ruling regime.
Yukiko Miyagi then discusses FPA work in Japan, noting that there
is a considerable literature in this tradition already. A debate that has
gripped this scholarly community has been over whether Japan’s for-
eign policy is realist or not. Is Japan a different type of state than the
types envisioned by Western scholars in the realist tradition—could it
be a trading state (shoninkokka)? Could Japan’s unique norm set illus-
trate the degree to which unique ideational elements are crucial to
understanding Japanese foreign policy? In addition to these interesting
discussions, Miyagi highlights the many fine case studies focused on
bureaucratic politics and domestic political contestation conducted and
reported on by Japanese scholars about their nation.
Next, Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi note the relative
absence of FPA-style scholarship among the international studies com-
munity of scholars in India. They argue that IR theorizing in general is
woefully underdeveloped, but that the almost complete lack of FPA
work is in part due to the thirty-year time period required for declassifi-
cation of government documents. As a result they say, “No Indian
scholar has written major books or articles using social psychology or
the vast literature on bureaucratic politics.” On the other hand, expatri-
ate scholars, such as Ganguly himself, have penned FPA works on
Indian foreign policy (see, for example, Ganguly 2010). Furthermore,
Ganguly and Pardesi argue that there are some indigenous foreign pol-
icy conceptualizations that have significantly influenced Indian foreign
policy, including Panchsheel (the five principles of peaceful coexis-
tence), which must be taken into account in any FPA account of that
nation.
Raymond Hinnebusch then surveys the FPA literature of the Arab
world, which is more highly developed than that in other regions or
nations surveyed such as India. In part this is due to the pioneering
work of Bahgat Korany and Adeed Dawisha over the past several
decades, and in part this is due to the pressing need of the United States
to understand the foreign policy of Middle Eastern nations with which it
often finds itself at odds. Israel, of course, is also a Middle Eastern
power, and its foreign policy decisionmaking has been extensively
investigated by scholars, most notably Michael Brecher (1972). Ques-
tions of national or transnational identity (such as pan-Arabism or pan-
Islamism) are themes with which the foreign policy literature of this
region is becoming ever more concerned, especially in the wake of the
Arab uprisings of 2011–2012.
12 Valerie M. Hudson
After that, Korwa G. Adar reviews the FPA literature in sub-Saharan

Africa. Adar discusses how the growing importance of entities such as
the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC)
has been a theoretically crucial development in that region. Foreign pol-
icy is becoming more and more a product of these regional intergovern-
mental institutions. At the same time, opposition parties are also becom-
ing stronger institutions across the region, and this limits the ability of
African leaders to make foreign policy by fiat. The state-centric
approach of North American FPA may be less well suited to understand-
ing African foreign policy. Indeed, Adar opines, “The non–North Amer-
ican circumstances of foreign policy making are thus crucibles for a new
round of FPA theory-building, and the African case could play an impor-
tant role in that exercise.”
Rita Giacalone then brings us back to the Western Hemisphere by
examining FPA scholarship in Latin America. Dependency theory
shaped Latin American theorizing about Latin American foreign policy
decisionmaking since the 1970s. Over the succeeding decades, Latin
American scholars began carving out a “peripheral realist” and “periph-
eral idealist” position, again with a focus on the degree of autonomy
wielded by Latin American nations in the construction of their foreign
policy. However, in the 1990s and 2000s, constructivism became a real
force in the analysis of Latin American foreign policy decisionmaking,
with an emphasis on national identity formation and civil society’s role
in this. It is clear to Giacalone that “these ideas do not necessarily come
from the United States or produce the same results than in mainstream
FPA.”
Finally, Amelia Hadfield, a European FPA scholar, and Valerie Hud-
son, a North American FPA scholar, examine whether there is a cross-
Atlantic divide concerning FPA. Indeed, they assert that North Ameri-
can FPA may be distinguished along a variety of dimensions from
European analysis of foreign policy (AFP), including explanatory
objectives, theoretical proclivities, methodological tendencies, forms of
theoretical ethnocentrism, and differing forms of community building.
European FPA scholars are much more engaged, for example, with IR
theory more broadly construed than are their North American counter-
parts, for example. The rise of the European Union (EU), much like
regional intergovernmental organizations in sub-Saharan Africa, has
created a clear need to move beyond the state-centric paradigm in Euro-
pean AFP. Importantly, European scholars are skeptical of the covering
law type of explanation preferred by North American scholars, and
favor explanations that explore the historical contingency surrounding

foreign policy decisionmaking.
Conclusion
In conclusion, then, we hope that this volume will find its way onto the
shelves of both North American and non–North American FPA scholars.
We believe it will prove invaluable, not only in providing a survey of
literature by scholars whose work may be largely inaccessible other-
wise, but also by serving as a starting point to identify and mitigate
those elements of North American FPA theory and methodology that
remain too tightly linked to that standpoint and perspective. It is to be
hoped that such reflections will occasion the desire to question what we
have always done in FPA because, in this way, FPA theory can move
beyond its current limits to a new more encompassing, more appropri-
ate, and more useful wave of theorizing foreign policy and foreign pol-
icy decisionmaking. In doing so, we do not deprecate FPA’s roots, but
rather honor them.
2
in China
Huiyun Feng
The rise of China and the increasing importance of US-China

relations have drawn the world’s attention to the foreign relations of
China, particularly how the Chinese view foreign relations and what
approaches Chinese scholars and decisionmakers are adopting to ana-
lyze foreign relations. Are the Chinese mainly applying Western
approaches, or are there any unique Chinese approaches to foreign pol-
icy analysis (FPA)? These are significant questions with important
implications for states that interact with China. By presenting some
major characteristics of Chinese scholars’ approaches to FPA and laying
out some theoretical differences between foreign policy decisionmaking
in China and in the United States, I intend this chapter to enrich our
understanding of FPA in China as well as reveal the contributions and
problems of a Chinese approach.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss how Chinese
scholars conduct FPA through historical, theoretical, and issue-specific
perspectives. I suggest that Chinese scholars are at the early learning
stage in the study of FPA. Next, I examine the empirical focal point of
Chinese studies of foreign policy. I suggest that the study of Chinese
foreign policy (as versus the foreign policy of other nations) is a rela-
tively new field in China’s FPA academy due to the liberalization of
academy and the rise of China after the Cold War. Then, I discuss the
unique contributions and problems of China’s FPA scholarship. I sug-
gest that recent research on China’s ancient history and philosophy
reveals the great potential of Chinese FPA to contribute to the subfield
of FPA in particular and to international relations (IR) in general. How-
15
16 Huiyun Feng
ever, many limitations exist in Chinese FPA studies with regard to theo-
retical innovation and methodological sophistication. I conclude with
some suggestions about how to advance China’s FPA community as
well as the mutual scholarly dialogue between China and the outside
world.
Chinese Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy
“Foreign policy analysis” (外交政策分析) is an alien or unfamiliar term in

Chinese academic discourses. In Chinese, scholars traditionally use the
term “study of foreign policy” (外交政策研究) to refer to academic research
on foreign policy. In addition, the distinction between IR and the study of
foreign policy (FPA in China) is not clear. In other words, unlike in the
United States where FPA has become a subfield of IR, the FPA scholars in
China have not clearly constructed a subfield of FPA within Chinese IR.
Chinese FPA is at an early learning stage. The first academic article
that carried FPA in its title, “The Theoretical Development and Limita-
tions of Foreign Policy Analysis,” was published in 1998. Ironically, the
author is not a Chinese scholar, but a Korean professor (Li Kuitai 1998).
From 2000 to 2012, the total number of academic journal articles whose
titles include the term foreign policy analysis is only twenty-seven.1
Most of them simply introduce different FPA theories, mainly from the
United States, to the Chinese academy rather than conduct concrete
research (e.g., Shen Peng 2009; Li Zhiyong 2011). If we divide knowl-
edge dissemination into three stages of introduction, application, and
innovation, then China’s FPA is clearly at the early introduction stage of
development as a subfield of IR. However, if we evaluate Chinese FPA
from a broad FPA perspective that includes all research that focuses on
foreign policy, then there is more to say on the state of the art in Chi-
nese FPA. China’s study of foreign policy is normally divided into three
aspects: history, theory, and current events (Sun 2000: 3).
China’s Study of Diplomatic History

China’s IR and FPA have a close relationship with the studies of inter-
national relations history and diplomatic history. Some well-known IR
and FPA scholars in China, such as Shi Yinhong at Renmin University,
Yang Kuisong at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Shen
Zhihua at East China Normal University, were originally trained as his-
torians. As I discuss later in this chapter, detailed descriptions and his-
Foreign Policy Analysis in China 17
torical narratives continue to be the major research methods in the Chi-

nese IR and FPA field. China’s first academic association related to IR,
the Chinese Research Association of History of International Relations,
was established in 1980. In 2000, this IR history-focused association
was renamed the China National Association for International Studies in
order to reflect the diverse theoretical and methodological development
of IR in China.2
As some scholars point out, there are two types of historical studies
of IR and diplomacy in China. One is the study of the official diplo-
matic history and the other is called the “new archive” or “new Cold
War history” school (Wang Dong and Jia 2010). While the first official
diplomatic history school is dominated by Chinese scholars who are
affiliated with governmental research institutions, such as China’s Cen-
tral Party School and the Department of International Politics at major
research universities, scholars from the new archive or new Cold War
history school are mainly from the history departments of research uni-
versities. The official diplomatic history scholars normally use official
materials and historical archives to explain and endorse what the Chi-
nese government portrays as “diplomatic history” such as the split of
China-Soviet relations during the Cold War and the origins of the
Korean War (e.g., Zhang Baijia 2002; Zhang Baijia and Niu 2002).
Since this type of research is under the direct supervision of the Chinese
government, the ideological purpose is normally clear and dominant.
In contrast, the new archive or new Cold War history school is more
academic and unofficial in orientation, although scholars in this school
also work in major Chinese (state) universities. Especially after the
Cold War, many Chinese scholars began to rely on newly declassified
archives from Russia and Eastern European countries to reexamine
China’s diplomacy and international relations in the Cold War. In recent
years, the Chinese government also has gradually started to declassify
its own diplomatic archives for the 1950s and 1960s. Although China’s
declassification process is relatively slow and limited, it provides an
invaluable resource for this new archive school in the study of China’s
Cold War history. Chinese scholars, such as Shen Zhihua, Yang
Kuisong, and Niu Jun, are also actively engaging with international
scholars with similar interests. Collaborative works between Chinese
scholars and the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Cold War International His-
tory Project on the Korean War, Sino-Soviet Relations, and Cold War in
Asia are well known.3
The major contributions of this new archive school in the study of
China’s diplomatic history and international relations history are twofold.
18 Huiyun Feng
First, it breaks the ideological and governmental constraints on the under-

standing of Cold War history. Based on newly declassified archives from
China and other countries, these scholars provide fresh perspectives,
which differ from the official interpretations, on China’s diplomacy and
international relations during the Cold War. For example, Shen Zhihua
(2004) suggests that the Korean War would have ended early in 1951 if
Mao Tse-tung had not miscalculated the situation and had instead
accepted peace talk proposals initiated by the United Nations. This view
clearly challenges China’s official history of the Korean War, which puts
all blame on the United States and South Korea.
Second, most scholars in this school are trained as historians rather
than in IR, and their writings on China’s diplomatic history during the
Cold War offer many detailed historical materials for IR scholars to use
in conducting case studies as well as in theory testing. Unfortunately,
the intellectual divide between IR scholars and historians is clear in that
some prominent Chinese scholars complain that the lack of historical
knowledge is one of the weakest elements of IR scholarship in China
(Niu 2010).
The Theoretical Approaches to FPA in China

Chinese scholars employ many grand IR theories in the study of foreign
policy. In the 1980s, Marxism was the dominant theoretical approach
(Qin 2008). Since the 1980s, other Western IR theories, such as realism,
liberalism, and constructivism, have been introduced into the Chinese
academia, and the dominant position of Marxism has started to erode.
Although it is debatable about which school of thought is dominant, it is
clear that more and more Chinese scholars have begun to de-ideologize
and employ non-Marxist IR theories in explaining and understanding
interstate relations and foreign policy (Wang Dong and Jia 2010: 53).
Indeed, Qin Yaqing points out that the three dominant IR theoretical
approaches in the past thirty years are “realism, liberalism, and con-
structivism,” among which liberalism carries more weight than the other
two (Qin 2008: 18). Sun Xuefeng (2003) suggests that realism is still
the dominant school of thought in Chinese IR. Some scholars, however,
emphasize that the 2008 financial crisis vindicates the long-standing
value of Marxism in IR (Su 2009: 50).
According to a keyword search in the China Academic Journals
Full-text Database, the total number of academic journal articles pub-
lished between 1994 and 2012 (as of June) is 14,896 with a subject
tagged as “international relations.” When searching for “international
relations” together with “realism” the total number of articles is 868,

with “liberalism” 330, with “constructivism” 495, and with “Marxism”
443. It seems that realist IR publications are more prominent than other
schools. However, after more detailed reading, we can find that many
scholars actually criticize rather than endorse or apply realism in their
publications (e.g., Qin 2005a). For example, in his article “The Western
Neorealism and the Critiques of Constructivism,” Liu Yongtao (1998:
26) criticizes neorealism and suggests that constructivism can “broaden
the theoretical perspectives of IR.” This phenomenon is similar to the
United States where realism is a classic foil for other schools to advance
their theoretical agendas. It is clear that the Chinese IR field has moved
in a diverse and pluralist direction.
In recent years, many midrange and micro-level FPA theories, such
as decisionmaking, cognitive, and psychological theories, have also
been introduced to China’s study of foreign policy. However, the appli-
cations of these micro-level approaches of FPA are limited due to gen-
eral weakness in social science methodological training in China, which
I discuss below.
Marxism. Because China is the largest socialist-communist country in

the world, Marxism remains the dominant ideology in the country, at
least officially. Although Marxism is not a theory of IR or FPA per se,
many Marxist concepts, such as the class-based analysis and historical
materialism, have implications for international relations (Ni and Xu
1997; Wang 2006a). Consequently, Marxism has become an important
theoretical approach for Chinese scholars to analyze and examine inter-
national relations and foreign policy. For example, Li Bin (2003)
employs Immanuel Wallenstein’s “world systems theory” to analyze US
motivations in the Iraq War in 2003 and suggests that US victory can
facilitate its control of capital in the world system. More generally,
Wang Cungang (2009) advocates following Robert Cox’s “critical the-
ory” approach to further develop the Marxist theory of IR in China.
In the study of foreign policy, Chinese scholars do not just employ
social class−based Marxism in examining interstate relations. Rather,
Chinese scholars localize Marxism by incorporating Chinese leaders’
political thoughts to form a Chinese school of Marxism in the study of
foreign policy. For example, many Marxist IR or foreign policy scholars
examine Mao Tse-tung’s political thoughts and international strategies.
Mao’s famous “three-world” theory is seen as a Chinese application of
Marxism in the study of foreign policy decisionmaking and international
relations (Liu Dexi 2000). In addition, Deng Xiaoping’s “opening-up”
20 Huiyun Feng
foreign policy, Jiang Zemin’s great power diplomacy, and Hu Jintao’s

“harmonious world” strategy are all identified by Marxist scholars as
Chinese characteristics of Marxism in the study of foreign policy (Chen
Junsheng 1998; Pan and Li 2011). In other words, China’s Marxist schol-
ars creatively integrate Marxism with Chinese leaders’ political thoughts
to explain and endorse China’s official foreign policies. It should be
noted that, although their publications sometimes appear in Chinese
mainstream IR and foreign policy journals, the influence of Marxism in
Chinese IR and FPA is limited (Guo 2004). The leading Marxist IR jour-
nal in China is Current World and Socialism.
Realism. The Western IR theory of realism rooted in Aristotle and

Thucydides was introduced to China in the 1980s after the Cultural Rev-
olution.4 As one of the dominant IR theories and foreign policy
approaches in the West, realism gradually gained popularity in China
after the Cold War when the ideological antagonism between the West
and the East ceased. Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1948)
and Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) were trans-
lated into Chinese in the 1980s. In addition, in the late 1990s Ni Shixiong
(2001) and Wang Yizhou (1998), two leading IR scholars in China,
published popular IR textbooks that systematically introduced major
Western IR theories (Su 2009: 50). Some Chinese scholars applied dif-
ferent realist theories to examine China’s national security and interna-
tional relations. For example, in Chinese National Interests Analysis,
Yan Xuetong (1997) employed major concepts of realism, such as
power politics and alliance politics, to explore the conceptualization and
quantitative measurement of China’s national interests. Considering the
ideological and Marxist influences in China’s political discourse soon
after the Cold War, Yan’s realism-based analysis of national interests
was a pathbreaking effort in Chinese IR.
Qin Yaqing wrote Hegemonic System and International Conflict
(1999), in which he applied Waltz’s neorealism to suggest a “hegemonic
sustaining” theory in explaining US foreign policy toward international
conflicts after World War II. It has become another classic realist work
in Chinese IR. It is worth noting that both Yan and Qin received their
doctoral degrees in political science in the United States, from the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley and the University of Missouri respec-
tively. Western-trained Chinese scholars have become a leading intellec-
tual group in introducing and spreading Western IR thought in China.
Some young Chinese scholars also actively engaged in the realist
debate after the Cold War. Like their counterparts in the United States,
Chinese scholars are interested in searching for the answers to the ques-
tion of why the balance-of-power mechanism did not work in the unipo-
lar system. Wei Zhongyou (2003, 2005) suggests that the “collective
action” problem among other states is the major reason for the failure of
balancing against the hegemon after the Cold War. More interestingly,
Wei’s case studies not only address the current US-dominated unipolar
world, but also include a historical case in the Warring States period of
intense conflicts among contending regional factions from Chinese
ancient history dated from 475 to 221 BCE. Wang Xuedong (2005), on
the other hand, introduces a “national reputation” argument by suggest-
ing that a country like the United States with a good international repu-
tation is less likely to be balanced against by other states. Liu Feng
(2006), based on Waltz’s balance-of-power argument, suggests that the
structural change in the system from multipolarity to unipolarity
increases the difficulty for balancing due to the huge power disparity
between the hegemon and other states. Sun Xuefeng and Yang Yuan
(2009) highlight the role of “legitimization” for a rising power in deal-
ing with counterbalancing from the system. Although what Chinese
scholars have suggested is similar to the existing explanations in the
West, the incorporation of Chinese cases enriches and strengthens these
existing arguments.
There are two reasons for the popularity of realism in Chinese IR
and FPA. First, the end of the Cold War and eroding ideological con-
flict encouraged Chinese scholars to search for new theoretical per-
spectives in understanding war and peace in world politics. Realism
emphasizes economic power and military capabilities, thus it shares a
similar philosophical root of materialism with Marxism. Therefore,
realism is more easily understood and accepted by Chinese scholars.
Second, Chinese policymakers are living in the “high church of power
politics” that emphasizes material power and interests in world politics
(Christensen 1996a). This top-down, interest-driven mentality also
encourages Chinese IR scholars to examine world politics through var-
ious realist perspectives.
However, the dominant status of realism in Chinese IR and FPA has
been seriously challenged by other schools of thought, especially liber-
alism and constructivism since the mid-2000s (Yang Yuan 2008). One
of the reasons is rooted in the relatively peaceful international relations
after the Cold War, particularly in the Asia Pacific. When Chinese lead-
ers claim that peace and development are the major themes of the time,
Chinese scholars also start to search for the IR and FPA theories that
can explain peace and development in world politics.
22 Huiyun Feng
Liberalism. As a twin brother of realism, liberalism also entered the

Chinese IR field at about the same time. Like their Western counter-
parts, Chinese IR scholars also compare liberalism with realism in the
study of international relations. In the 1990s, liberalism became a com-
peting IR approach to realism in the mainstream Chinese IR and the
study of foreign policy. Wang Yizhou published An Analysis on Con-
temporary International Politics (1995), which systematically intro-
duced different types of liberal IR theories to China (Qin 2008: 19). As
shown below, Chinese scholars have used different models of liberal-
ism, especially economic liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism, to
explain economic cooperation and the rapid development of regionalism
in Europe and the Asia Pacific.
The popularity of liberalism in China is driven by two forces. One is
China’s gradual integration into the international community and the
deepening economic interdependence between China and the world. The
second driving force is the increasing role of globalization in transform-
ing world politics (Chen Yugang 2003). Chinese liberal scholars are
attracted by the widespread international institutions in IR and are inter-
ested in examining how international institutions affect China’s status in
world politics and its interactions with other states. Some notable liberal
works include Su Changhe’s Global Public Problems and International
Cooperation: An Institutional Analysis (2000) and Men Honghua’s Wing
of Hegemony: US Institutional Strategy (2005). Su uses institutional lib-
eralism to explain how institutions can facilitate international coopera-
tion despite the self-interested nature of states in the international sys-
tem. Men integrates institutionalism and realism to suggest that US
hegemony is built on its institutional strategy (i.e., using various institu-
tions to exercise and maintain its hegemony in the international system).
One notable phenomenon in the Chinese liberal school is its collec-
tive and systematic criticisms of democratic peace theory. Although
democratic peace theory is not lacking for criticism in the West, many
Western IR scholars try to refine the thesis by incorporating different
institutional and ideational conditions. In other words, while democratic
peace theory does not lose all of its value in the eyes of Western schol-
ars despite its problems, in China the academic consensus is that demo-
cratic peace theory is theoretically misleading and politically dangerous.
Many Chinese scholars not only criticize the theoretical weaknesses of
democratic peace theory, such as the problematic definition of democ-
racy, but also link it to US interventionist foreign policy in the 1990s
such as the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (e.g., Ni and Guo 1997; Yang
Guangbin 1999).
In the Chinese Academic Journals Full-text Database, there are

forty-one journal articles on democratic peace theory if we search for
“democratic peace” in the subject of “international relations.” Not a sin-
gle piece has a positive evaluation of democratic peace theory (e.g., Li
Shaojun 1995; Pang 1995; Ni and Guo 1997; Zhang Jianxiong 1997).
Given China’s one-party political system, it seems understandable that
there would be generally negative feedback on democratic peace theory
in China. On the other hand, the unanimous criticism also reflects some
latent constraints on public discourse and academic freedom in China’s
communist system.
Constructivism. Since the late 1990s, Chinese scholars have begun to

engage constructivism, especially Alexander Wendt’s social construc-
tivism. As a new IR perspective in the West, constructivism received an
unprecedented and surprising welcome in China (Rao 2005; Xue and
Xiao 2006; Qin 2008; Hou 2012). In 2000, Qin Yaqing translated
Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (Wendt 1999) into Chi-
nese, and soon Wendt’s social constructivism was widely cited and dis-
cussed in China’s IR field. In 2001, Yuan Zhengqing translated Martha
Finnemore’s National Interests in International Society (Finnemore
1996). In addition, many Chinese scholars are trying to advance con-
structivism by criticizing realism and liberalism (Liu Yongtao 1998). It
is not an exaggeration to say that a constructivist turn of IR has indeed
taken place in China in the 2000s. Some Chinese scholars suggest that
constructivism has been established as another school of thought in Chi-
nese IR since 2000 (Yang Guang 2003; Qin 2008).
In the study of foreign policy, Chinese scholars employ the ideas of
norms, identity, and culture of social constructivism in explaining the
foreign policy orientations of major powers. For example, Fang Chang-
ping (2002) conducted a comparative case study on the constructions of
national interests of North Korea versus South Korea, thereby using
social constructivism to examine the social constructions of national
interests. Liu Yongtao (2002) explores how norms and identity played
an important role in US policy toward China after World War II. Qin
Yaqing (2003) relies on strategic culture and identity to suggest that
China’s national identity is experiencing a significant transition from a
revolutionary state to a status quo one. Qin Yaqing and Wang Yan
(2004) further suggest that an East Asian community has been built on
the common ideas and identity among East Asian countries.
The rise of constructivism in China has three origins. First, the dis-
tinctive ontological and philosophical roots of constructivism are attract-
24 Huiyun Feng
ing the attention of Chinese scholars. As a competing theoretical

approach, constructivism opens a new ideational world for Chinese
scholars who have lived for a long time in the materialist world driven
by Marxist ideology. As Yuan Zhenqing (2004) points out, construc-
tivism makes Chinese scholars question the constructive process of
national interests, which used to be assumed unchangeable in the materi-
alist world. How identity and norms shape a country’s interest and in
turn affect the country’s foreign policy has become an important research
agenda for Chinese scholars.
Second, constructivism provides an alternative way to interpret and
analyze the rise of China. When China’s rise became a reality instead of
a speculation circa 2000, Chinese scholars started to think about how to
examine its implications on regional security and the world. While real-
ists paint a dark picture and liberal economic interdependence is also
questionable, constructivism offers a bright future for the rise of China.
According to constructivism, China’s rise is a process of identity trans-
formation and socialization between China and the international com-
munity. Therefore, it may not cause inevitable conflicts with other
nations as realists suggest (see Yuan 2004; Qin and Wendt 2005). To a
certain extent, constructivism provides a theoretical remedy for Chinese
scholars to overcome the realist-predicted symptoms of China’s rise.
Last, but not least, constructivism fits the Chinese traditional cul-
ture well. Although the dominant ideology in China has been Marxism
since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chinese
traditional culture is rooted in Confucianism. Unlike materialism-based
Marxism, Confucianism emphasizes order, norms, culture, and morality
in the society. Although Confucianism focuses mainly on building
domestic society instead of international relations, its influence on state
behavior is also profound. To a certain extent, Confucianism shares
common ideational roots with social constructivism, which also empha-
sizes how moral and cultural forces can shape people’s decisions and
states’ behavior (Rao 2005).
Bureaucratic, Cognitive, and Psychological Approaches

Differing from the paradigmatic approaches above, Chinese scholars also
started to use the micro-level approaches, such as the bureaucratic and
cognitive ones, in studying foreign policy. As mentioned above, in the
West and especially in the United States, the FPA approach mainly refers
to this micro-level or narrowly defined approach that focuses on national
institutions and individual leaders in making foreign policy decisions;
however, it is a new theoretical perspective for Chinese scholars. On

May 28, 2010, the China and the World Research Center of Peking Uni-
versity and the Editorial Office of the Foreign Affairs Review at China’s
Foreign Affairs University cohosted the conference “Foreign Policy
Analysis: Unexplored Land” (Niu et al. 2010). It was the first attempt by
the Chinese academia to build FPA as a subfield of IR.
In the 1990s, the academic interest in this micro-level approach was
overshadowed by the paradigmatic debate among the three major IR the-
ories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism). Since 2000, some Chi-
nese scholars have started to systematically introduce the bureaucratic
and cognitive approach of foreign policy analysis in academic journals
and books. Zhang Qingmin published a series of articles (2001, 2003a,
2003b, 2004, 2006a) to introduce different theoretical approaches of FPA
in leading IR journals in China. For example, he characterized three
major approaches in FPA as a decisionmaking mechanism and process
(including bureaucratic politics and small group dynamics), comparative
foreign policy, and political psychology (Zhang Qingmin 2001). Wang
Mingming at China’s Academy of Social Sciences wrote a textbook on
foreign policy analysis (2008) in which he lays out three different theo-
ries in FPA: rational choice, bureaucratic approach, and cognitive analy-
sis. Despite their different classifications, both of these authors review
the history of FPA from the comparative foreign policy to the actor-spe-
cific approach and introduce the latest theories and methods in FPA.
Chinese scholars also employ different FPA approaches in empirical
analyses. For example, Feng Yujun (2002) uses the bureaucratic politics
model to examine Russia’s foreign policy decisionmaking mechanisms
and processes after the Cold War. Zhang Qingmin (2006b) compares
rational choice and bureaucratic politics models of foreign policy deci-
sionmaking in examining the United States’ arms sales history and pol-
icy toward Taiwan. Zhang Lili (2007) integrates theoretical approaches
and China’s foreign policy practices after the Cold War in Foreign Policy
Decision Making, in which he systematically examines how China made
decisions in the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet split, and the Somali crisis.
It is worth mentioning the efforts of Yin Jiwu of the Beijing Foreign
Studies University to introduce political psychology into the Chinese
academic field. He has organized a major project translating political
psychology literature into Chinese and has developed a Chinese diction-
ary of political psychology. This contribution is significant in systemat-
ically standardizing the field. In 2011, Yin edited a special issue on
“political psychology and IR research” in the Foreign Affairs Review
(Yin et al. 2011), which focused on the role of emotion in international
26 Huiyun Feng
relations. From the same school of political psychology, Lin Minwang

(2010) employs prospect theory to examine why Mao decided to send
troops across the Yalu River during the Korean War. Besides the cogni-
tive, bureaucratic, and psychological approaches, some Chinese schol-
ars also explore how social actors, such as public opinion, media, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) influence foreign policy deci-
sions. For example, Hao Yufan and Lin Sheng edited a book entitled
China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making (2001), in which the contribu-
tors systematically examine what role social factors play in China’s for-
eign policy decisions.
The Area Studies Approach

The area studies approach has a long history in the study of foreign pol-
icy in China. Even before the import of Western IR theory and models,
Chinese area studies scholars relied on their rich regional knowledge to
examine both domestic politics and international relations of a specific
country. Many think tanks in Beijing divide their research units accord-
ing to geographical areas. For example, the Chinese Academy of Social
Science, the largest governmental think tank in China, has area-based
institutes such as the Asia Pacific Studies Institute, the American Stud-
ies Institute, and the European Studies Institute (Men 2002).
This area studies approach in the study of foreign policy is not
explicitly theory oriented. Instead, many Chinese area studies scholars
examine the influence of both domestic and international factors on a
particular country’s foreign policy. For example, Liu Jiangyong (2009)
edited a book entitled Japan’s Contemporary Foreign Relations, in
which the contributors explore Japan’s foreign relations with major
powers, such as the United States, China, Russia, and some European
countries, from an area studies perspective. There is no single theoreti-
cal framework in the book, but all the contributors are specialists who
have conducted research on Japan for many years. The book provides
firsthand information on how Japan makes bilateral foreign policies
toward other states and on some key foreign policy issues such as
Japan’s environmental and energy policies.
There are some similarities between diplomatic historical studies
and the area studies approach. Neither uses IR theory or foreign policy
theory explicitly, although scholars formulate their arguments with
some implicit theoretical perspectives. The difference between these
two lies in their empirical focus. Diplomatic historical scholars work
mainly on the history part of foreign relations and diplomacy. Although
some area studies scholars also use history to analogize present events
and predict future policy orientations, their research emphasizes current
issues rather than history. One obvious limitation of the area studies
approach is rooted in its narrow research scope. Normally, an area spe-
cialist writes on only one particular country’s foreign relations (Men
2002: 100). However, this can also be seen as an advantage because of
the rich local knowledge that area specialists can offer.
Empirical Focal Points of China’s Studies of Foreign Policy
It is normally the case that scholars from a particular country are good
at the study of that country’s foreign policy. For example, more scholars
in the United States are conducting research on US foreign policy than
scholars in other countries. It makes perfect sense because US scholars
have richer local knowledge and easier access to information than
scholars from other countries in the study of US foreign policy. It is also
the area in which US foreign policy scholars can contribute most to the
field of FPA from theoretical and empirical perspectives.
However, this is not the case in China. Due to the one-party politi-
cal system and the constraints on academic freedom, more Chinese for-
eign policy scholars focus on other nations’ foreign policies than on
China’s own foreign policy. Searching in the Chinese Academic Jour-
nals Full-text Database, we can find that there are a total of 10,176 aca-
demic articles under the subject of “foreign policy.” If we further search
for “China’s foreign policy,” there are only 406 articles in the database.
In terms of the quantities of articles, there are 19 articles from 1940 to
1990, 75 articles from 1991 to 1999, and the rest have been published
after 2000. The increasing trend appears to indicate that the inclusion of
Chinese foreign policy as a research topic is becoming more acceptable;
however, it may also simply reflect an increase in the total number of
articles on all topics.
There are two main reasons for this unbalanced, or surprising, dis-
tribution in the study of China’s foreign policy in China. First, China’s
foreign policy was an academic taboo during the Cold War. Because of
the ideological antagonism and the tight constraints of the party system,
Chinese scholars were not encouraged to conduct research on China’s
foreign policy. On the one hand, Chinese scholars had no incentive to
study China’s foreign policy because, if their views departed from the
party line, it might have hurt their careers. On the other hand, the gov-
ernment did not need such research, especially in open publications,
28 Huiyun Feng
because all the policies were set by the government. So instead, the
government encouraged scholars to conduct research on other countries’
foreign policies toward China. In the nineteen articles from 1940 to
1990, most are endorsements or elaborations of China’s foreign policy
instead of analyses or research on China’s foreign policy.
After the Cold War the influence of ideology started to erode in
Chinese academia. Consequently, Chinese scholars began to touch on
the study of China’s foreign policy, although the scope and intensity of
the research on China’s foreign policy were still constrained. However,
since 2000 China’s scholars have begun to ask tough questions on top-
ics such as the problems and weaknesses of China’s foreign policy. For
example, Wang Yizhou (2007, 2010, 2011) examines some problems
and inefficiencies of China’s diplomacy over the past thirty years such
as the weak public diplomacy regarding the harmonious world concept,
the lack of sensitivity and innovation to the outside world, and the lack
of foreign policy crisis mechanisms. These frank and candid sugges-
tions on and evaluations of China’s foreign policy would have been
impossible to publish during the Cold War and even into the 1990s.
There are two major reasons for the rise of the study of China’s for-
eign policy in the 2000s. First, the rise of China encouraged Chinese
scholars to explore the country’s foreign policy options. During the
Cold War, China could only respond to the great-power politics of the
international system. Although it played an important role in shaping
the political landscape between the two superpowers, China’s foreign
policy was simply set by the international system and strong leaders in
China. After the Cold War, and especially in the 2000s, China began to
face a more complicated international environment in which its ability
to play a substantial role in world affairs significantly increased. This,
in turn, encouraged Chinese scholars to search for creative foreign pol-
icy strategies for China.
To a certain extent, China has changed its role from a marginalized
actor to one that helps shape the international system. How to alleviate
suspicions from the outside world and how to maintain its ascent trajec-
tory have become compelling questions for Chinese scholars. For exam-
ple, one popular topic in China’s IR community is the “peaceful rise”
strategies. The Chinese Academic Journals Full-text Database shows that
there are 712 articles with “peaceful rise” in their titles from 2005 to
2012. Most of them examine what China should do, and how to do it, in
order to overcome diplomatic difficulties on the path to its peaceful rise.
In addition, the relatively freer academic environment in Chinese
society after the Cold War also offers more incentives for Chinese
scholars to explore China’s decisionmaking process and suggest new
directions in foreign policy (e.g., Li Kaisheng 2011). For example,

Wang Cungang (2012) systematically examines China’s “three circles”
of foreign policy decisionmaking—including the central bureaucracy;
local governments and interest groups; and think tanks, the media, and
the public—and suggests that Chinese leaders need to consolidate and
coordinate the interests of these three circles to make more effective
foreign policies. Sun Xuefeng (2011) examines China’s strategic dilem-
mas and possible strategies for its rise through both theoretical exami-
nations and empirical testing. He introduces a “legitimization” theory
for a rising power to avoid counterbalancing in the system and system-
atically explores China’s strategies in coordinating the Olympic Games,
promoting East Asian cooperation, and dealing with the Darfur contro-
versy. Gong Li and his colleagues (Gong, Men, and Sun 2009) examine
China’s foreign policy decisionmaking mechanisms from Mao to Hu
Jintao and suggest that the country’s decisionmaking process has moved
in a pluralistic direction.
Zhang Lili (2009) compares the differences of decisionmaking
mechanisms between China and the United States and suggests that
China should learn from the latter on how to handle information flows,
relations between think tanks and the government, and efficient mecha-
nisms in decisionmaking. Xu Jin (2011) examines China’s soft power in
world politics and argues that China should reconsider its long-time
“non-alignment” foreign policy. Wang Yizhou (2011) encourages the
Chinese government to adopt a “creative involvement” in diplomacy
instead of insisting on the principle of “non-interference into internal
affairs” in world politics.
Besides China’s foreign policy, the most important research focal
points in the Chinese FPA community are the foreign policies of great
powers, such as the United States, Russia, and Japan. The reason is
straightforward, as these great powers are politically important for
China. In addition, issue-based studies, such as energy diplomacy, pub-
lic diplomacy, and environmental foreign policy, have attracted many IR
and FPA scholars’ attention in recent years (Wang Dong and Jia 2010).
As mentioned above, many think tanks in China have geographically
designed research departments for the studies of great powers such as
the Institute for American Studies in the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS). In order to cope with the issue-based studies in IR
and FPA, these think tanks also have so-called comprehensive research
units such as the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the CASS.
In these think tanks, scholars mainly conduct policy-oriented research
on great powers’ foreign policy and diplomacy and provide policy consul-
tations for the government. The policy research normally pays little atten-
30 Huiyun Feng
tion to IR or foreign policy theories (Wang Dong and Jia 2010). Scholars
affiliated with universities are more likely to produce academic books and
journal articles that focus on theory and method, but not on policy rele-
vance. How to bridge the intellectual gap between the academy and the
policy community is an enduring challenge for the Chinese IR and FPA
research scholars (Wang Jisi 2009).
The Unique Contributions of Chinese FPA
As mentioned earlier, the study of foreign policy in China is at the early

learning stage if we use the FPA standard of the United States to evalu-
ate the state of the art for the discipline. Since the 2000s, Chinese schol-
ars have only gradually been exposed to different micro-level FPA
approaches such as the bureaucratic politics, small group dynamics, and
cognitive and psychological approaches. More time is needed for the
mature development of China’s FPA as a subfield of IR, but the founda-
tions are there.
Nevertheless, there are three potential contributions from the Chi-
nese study of foreign policy to the field of FPA. First, Chinese scholars
have started to explore traditional Chinese political thought on interna-
tional relations and foreign policy. Since 2008, Yan Xuetong and his
colleagues at Tsinghua University have published a series of research
articles on China’s pre-Qin international political and foreign policy
thought in the Quarterly Journal of International Politics (in Chinese)
and the Chinese Journal of International Politics, the only peer-
reviewed Chinese IR journal published in English by Oxford University
Press (e.g., Li Bin 2009; Yan 2008, 2011). The pre-Qin era (from 770 to
221 BCE), also called the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States
period, is one of the most chaotic times in China’s ancient history.
Yan and his colleagues not only focus on the famous Confucianism
but also successfully compare and contrast the differences and similari-
ties of other Chinese systems of political thought, such as Daoism,
Mohism, and legalism, on international politics and foreign policy.
More importantly, Yan links the traditional Chinese philosophies with
current international relations and highlights the importance of morality
and leadership in guiding foreign policy and shaping international poli-
tics in the twenty-first century. In 2011, Princeton University Press pub-
lished Yan’s essay collection, entitled Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern
Chinese Power (2011). There is no denying that Yan and his colleagues
have paved a new theoretical and intellectual path to reform current IR

theory, which is based on Western philosophy and history.
Besides Yan and his Tshinghua team, Zhao Tingyang (2005) from
CASS introduced the tian xia (all under the heaven, 天下) international
system theory based on China’s ancient political philosophy. Zhao sug-
gests a new harmonious international order transcending interstate rela-
tions, which are the major foundations of the Western IR theory. Qin
Yaqing (2005b, 2010), based on his critical evaluation of Wendt’s
structure-based constructivism, introduces a Chinese guan xi (network
connection, 关系)–rooted version of constructivism by highlighting the
process of social construction among states instead of focusing merely
on the structure of social identity and norms. Western scholars have
highly evaluated these non-Western philosophical contributions to the
IR theory−building enterprise (Callahan 2008; Carlson 2011). There
may yet be a long way to go for Chinese scholars to present pathbreak-
ing contributions to IR and FPA; however, they have moved in interest-
ing directions with these approaches.
Second, China’s long history of interstate relations provides a rich
case study pool from which to test various IR and FPA theories. China
has 5,000 years of history, and many historical records are well pre-
served. Several scholars have started to use Chinese historical cases to
test Western IR theory. Victoria Hui (2005) examines the success and
failure of balance-of-power theory by comparing China’s pre-Qin his-
tory and European history.5 Zhang Feng (2009) examines the conceptu-
alization of the tribute system and its implications for relations between
China and its neighboring states. Zhou Fangyin (2011) also focuses on
the tribute system and uses a game theoretic model to explore when
China’s tributary diplomacy succeeded and when it failed in Chinese
history. It is worth noting that testing IR and foreign policy theory by
comparing ancient history with contemporary international relations is
not the sole innovation of Chinese scholars. Many Western IR scholars
have done a wonderful job in paving this new path of research (see
Wohlforth et al. 2007). However, Chinese scholars have the advantage
in accessing China’s ancient history records and contributing more case-
and theory-testing research in this regard.
Finally, Chinese scholars can offer unique cultural and local per-
spectives on China’s foreign policy decisionmaking. It is true that Chi-
nese scholars’ research on foreign policy is constrained by China’s
political culture and one-party system. China’s foreign policy decision-
making is confidential and, to a certain degree, mysterious in nature.
32 Huiyun Feng
Ironically, foreign scholars face fewer constraints in writing about

China’s foreign policy than do their Chinese counterparts. However, due
to the leadership transition from the revolutionary generation to the
reform generation, and with increasing diversity and pluralism in
China’s foreign policy decisionmaking, the political constraints on the
studies of China’s foreign policy have begun to relax. As mentioned
above, some Chinese scholars have conducted research on China’s for-
eign policy decisionmaking process by looking at the relationship
between the party, the leadership, and the bureaucracy (Wang Cungang
2012). In addition, some Chinese scholars have started to explore the
influence of societal factors in shaping China’s foreign policy (Hao and
Lin 2001; Bai 2011). Given their cultural background and local knowl-
edge about Chinese political settings, Chinese scholars have the great
potential to offer some distinctive contributions to the study of China’s
foreign policy in FPA.
The Problems in Chinese FPA
Despite the great potential of China’s FPA, there are four pitfalls and
problems. First, Chinese scholars pay too much attention to introducing
different FPA theories rather than applying them. As a result, too little
empirical research is being conducted in Chinese FPA. While it is nec-
essary to introduce different IR and FPA theories to the Chinese IR
community, often Chinese academic publications are simply replica-
tions of Western IR debates with many works only translating the exist-
ing IR and FPA literature and debates without engaging in and provid-
ing new perspectives and analysis. This may lead to two consequences
to the Chinese IR field. On the one hand, too many translations are not
necessarily conducive to theoretical innovation by Chinese scholars
themselves; on the other hand, some Chinese scholars seem to enjoy
these theory discussions without conducting any empirical testing and
verification (Li Wei 2007). It is much easier to criticize a theory than
create a new one. It is time for Chinese scholars to move forward from
this learning and translation stage to the application and innovation
stage. Many Chinese FPA scholars have made a similar call to the field
to conduct more empirical testing rather than staying in the “theory
trap” (Men 2005; Li Wei 2007; Qin 2008; Su 2009).
Second, the Chinese IR and FPA communities lack the academic
culture of critical exchanges and debates over their own concrete empir-
ical and policy research. This may be influenced by China’s political
culture, which emphasizes modesty instead of accuracy but allows crit-

icism of outsiders. However, internal public debates and academic
exchanges are vital to the healthy development of any academic field. In
the United States, there are several academic and policy debates on real-
ism versus liberalism, rationalism versus constructivism, and US grand
strategy after the Cold War. However, there are not many similar public
debates and exchanges in IR and FPA in China (Wang Yizhou 2006a,
2006b). Two exceptions may be the policy debates on the nature of the
post–Cold War international system and the peaceful rise policy (Pills-
bury 2000; Glaser and Medeiros 2007). As Wang Yizhou (2006a: 12)
points out, the major problems for China’s IR field are rooted in the
serious lack of the scientific tradition in theory exploration and the
intellectual environment for academic criticism and self-criticism.
Third, weak training in methods hinders China’s IR and FPA scholar-
ship development. In the 2000s, some Chinese scholars, such as Yan
Xuetong, actively advocated the scientific research method of hypothe-
sis testing in Chinese IR. Although there are some disagreements on
whether IR and FPA can be analyzed scientifically or through a more
humanistic interpretive approach associated with historians, more and
more Chinese scholars have accepted the scientific methods of IR and
FPA research. However, due to limited training in methods, especially
in quantitative and formal modeling skills, Chinese scholars are not as
capable of performing sophisticated theory building and testing (Wang
Yizhou 2006a; Yang Yuan 2012). In terms of research methods, the
qualitative case study method is more popular than the quantitative and
formal ones. This is not to suggest that Chinese scholars prefer qualita-
tive methods to others. Instead, it reflects only that Chinese scholars’
training in quantitative methods is relatively limited (Yang Yuan 2012).
It is worth noting that some Chinese universities have started to offer
some methods training summer courses for young faculty and students
either through collaboration with US universities or by themselves.6
Although these training programs are less advanced than similar sum-
mer programs in the United States or Europe, it shows the awareness of
China’s IR community regarding the importance of research methods,
especially the quantitative and formal modeling skills.
Finally, Chinese scholars are relatively weak in internationalizing
their scholarship. One leading Chinese academic journal conducted a
field survey and found that China-based scholars have a limited publica-
tion rate in the world’s top IR and foreign policy journals (Editorial
Board 2006). There may be two reasons for this. First, due to the lan-
guage barrier, many Chinese scholars are not able to publish their arti-
34 Huiyun Feng
cles in top IR journals in English. Second, it is not rewarding to publish

in internationally recognized journals for career purposes. It seems that
the second reason has been weakened in recent years since many Chi-
nese universities even offer cash awards to Chinese scholars who publish
in top international IR journals. It is worth noting that the establishment
of the Chinese Journal of International Politics as an English-language
journal has gradually changed the lack of internationalization of Chinese
scholarship in the field. Some Chinese scholars, such as Tang Shiping,
Yan Xuetong, and Wu Xinbo, have already published high-quality arti-
cles in some top IR journals. However, more work needs to be done in
order to internationalize the Chinese IR and FPA scholarship.
Conclusion
China’s FPA is at the formative stage. Chinese scholars have been

exposed to the latest FPA approaches, such as cognitive and psycholog-
ical theories, in studying foreign policy processes and outcomes. How-
ever, they often lack some of the required methodological skills to apply
these theories to empirical research, and they need more time to digest
these methods and theories.
The paradigmatic approaches, such as realism, liberalism, and con-
structivism, are much more popular than the micro-level approaches,
such as cognitivism, in studying foreign policy in China. Some Chinese
scholars focus on historical studies of international relations. One
notable group in this context is the new archive school of Cold War his-
tory. In addition, the area studies approach remains popular in China,
especially in the policy and think tank communities.
In terms of empirical focus, Chinese scholars are more interested in
major great powers’ foreign policies toward China. Due to political con-
straints and a self-censored scholarship tradition, China’s own foreign
policy ironically has not been the major research area of Chinese schol-
ars for a long time. However, this has gradually changed since the
2000s. Chinese scholars normally employ historical and qualitative case
studies in their studies of foreign policy.
The rise of China is one of the defining phenomena in international
relations in the twenty-first century. The quality of China’s IR and for-
eign policy scholarship does not yet match the country’s economic and
political power in the international system. If we see academic knowl-
edge and ideas as one form of soft power, it is clear that the soft power
of China’s IR and foreign policy in the field of international studies is
still weak. Although some Chinese scholars actively advocate the estab-
lishment of a Chinese school of IR, there has been limited progress so

far (Qin 2005b). There may be two reasons for this.
First, the creation of a Chinese IR school may be politically com-
pelling, but academically misleading. In other words, no scholarship can
be created by political fiat. Instead, it is a long-term process of accumu-
lation, refinement, and innovation of knowledge. Second, Chinese
scholars may need to prepare for a long march to achieve this goal, even
though it is feasible. Besides engaging in theoretical debates and
improving methods training, the Chinese IR and FPA community also
needs to internationalize their scholarship by publishing in internation-
ally recognized outlets. In conclusion, China’s rich historical cases and
sophisticated political thoughts are invaluable for foreign scholars to
test and modify existing theories and invent new ones in FPA. If diver-
sity is a virtue for scholarship, the internationalization of Chinese schol-
arship research is definitely a value-added endeavor for the future
development of FPA.
Notes
1. The search was conducted in June 2012 through the Chinese Academic
Journals Full-text Database, hosted by the China Knowledge Resource Inte-
grated Database, www.cnki.net.
2. For the history of the China National Association for International Stud-
ies, see its website at www.cnais.org.
3. For example, the Department of History at East China Normal Univer-
sity has become a partner of the Wilson Center’s Cold War International His-
tory Project. See www.wilsoncenter.org.
4. China’s ancient political philosophy embodies some thoughts similar to
Western realism as seen from Xun Zi and Han Fei Zi’s philosophy. Han Fei Zi
was the most successful in implementing his philosophy in the ruling system of
the Qin dynasty; however, his realist legalism did not help the Qin dynasty to
rule. After Qin and starting from the Han dynasty, Confucianism became the
dominating philosophy. In terms of interstate relations, Confucianism played a
dominant role in guiding interstate relations in China’s ancient history. Some
Western scholars, however, continue to consider China’s ancient realist
thoughts as “cultural realism” (Johnston 1998).
5. Victoria Hui is based in the United States.
6. For example, since 2002 the Institute of International Studies at
Tsinghua University has held an annual methods training summer camp for
graduate students and junior faculty. Since 2010, the School of Public Econom-
ics and Administration at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics has
collaborated with Duke University and the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Summer Program in Quantitative Meth-
ods of Social Research to hold a summer methods training camp in Shanghai.
3
Japan Through the Lens of
Yukiko Miyagi
There is a considerable literature on foreign policy analysis (FPA)

of Japan and a lively trans-Pacific debate over Japanese foreign policy.
Many Western scholars in the realist tradition have seen Japan’s foreign
policy as suboptimal or abnormal, with perennial debates over whether
Japan is becoming a more “normal” power or not (M. Green 2001; Lind
2004; C. W. Hughes 2004). Others, both Western and Japanese scholars,
have seen Japan’s nonmilitarist (Hook 1996) or mercantile (Hegin-
botham and Samuels 1998) foreign policy as superior to realist ways,
albeit under threat from a resurgent realism.
Many Japanese scholars have joined these debates by publishing in
the Western FPA community, and have tended to see Japan’s policy as
eminently realistic without being realist (Kawasaki 2001; Soeya 1998).
Japanese scholars writing in Japanese and sometimes English have pro-
vided meticulous accounts of Japan’s distinctive policy process that
explain the special features of its foreign policy (Yoshizaki 1999;
Watanabe 1976, 1977; Shinoda 1999; Ogawa 1999; Kimura 1977;
Inoguchi 1993). And there are some cases of productive collaborative
scholarship between Japanese and Western scholars (Muramatsu and
Krauss 1984; Katzenstein and Okawara 1998).
I begin this chapter with a review of the major debates among
observers of Japan’s foreign policy, which have been centered around
how to understand its seeming anomalous nonmilitarist tendency. I fol-
low this with an overview of the alternative models that have been used
to understand the Japanese foreign policy making process. I then look at
case studies of Japan’s foreign policy making in order to highlight find-
ings regarding the special features of the country’s foreign policy
process.
37
38 Yukiko Miyagi
Japanese Approaches to the Study of

Foreign Policy: Debates over Foreign Policy
The literature on Japan’s foreign policy characterizes Japan as a great

power, albeit of a nontraditional kind. From the point of view of the
Western realist tradition, Japan appears to be an anomaly. Its economic
and technological capability provides Japan every potential to be a great
power able to take responsibility for its own security, yet it suffers from
an unbalanced strategic profile as an economic giant lacking compara-
ble military capabilities and reliant on the United States for its security.
Japan’s foreign policy continued, at least until the 1990s, to be passive,
low risk, reactive, and seemingly devoid of ambition to act as a great
power (Blaker 1993; Curtis 1993). From a realist point of view, Japan’s
reliance on the United States was a function of its World War II military
defeat but, as Japan recovered, it would have been expected to acquire
military capabilities to counter regional threats and wield diplomatic
stature commensurate with its global interests.
Japan did steadily build up its military capabilities, but at a slower
pace than would be rational from a self-help point of view. These capa-
bilities remained purely defensive, were deployable only in home terri-
tory and waters, and gave little power projection capability. They were
undertaken purely within the context of the US alliance and at US urg-
ing, not as an instrument of an independent policy nor accompanied by
any attempt by Japan to assert itself in relation to the United States or
any other power. Notably, in eschewing an easily achievable nuclear
deterrent, Japan remained dependent on the US nuclear umbrella. In the
1980s and 1990s, when trade conflicts with the United States escalated
and it threatened Japan with trade sanctions and hinted that the security
alliance depended on Japanese trade concessions, many neorealists
expected that this, combined with Japan’s accumulation of economic
power, would lead Japan to challenge the United States and turn to self-
help for its security (Berger 1998: 352; Soeya 1998: 227–228).
Yet despite episodes of tension, Japan sought instead to strengthen
the alliance with the United States. After the end of the Cold War,
Japan’s behavior seemed especially abnormal in that Japanese policy-
makers perceived increased security threats from North Korean nuclear
capabilities and China’s rising power. To be sure, beginning with the
Gulf War of the 1990s Japan started to assume a greater military role
within the context of the US alliance, began to be involved in United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, and started to react to interna-
tional crises in a more proactive way. Japan undertook some heretofore
Japan Through the Lens of Foreign Policy Analysis 39
eschewed military deployments, climaxing in the dispatch of the Self-

Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq, a combat zone, yet paradoxically on the
condition that its troops not engage in combat. Japan still “self-
restrained” its power potential (Rynhold 2002; M. Green 2001; C. W.
Hughes 2004; Lind 2004). A neoclassical realist might attribute this
putative failure to respond effectively to the international environment
to dysfunctional political institutions (van Wolferen 1993; Calder 1997).
A liberal interpretation, however, sees Japan not as an anomaly but
as a new kind of actor, a trading state. Indeed, Japan appears to be the
vanguard trading state. When he decided to ally with the United States
by signing the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, Japanese prime min-
chant nation (shōnin kokka) well before the concept became fashion-
ister Yoshida Shigeru (2012) advanced the notion that Japan was a mer-
able. As a trading state, Japan is said to seek wealth, not military might,
as the means to status. Japan is deeply embedded through its trading and
investment practices in the complex interdependence of the interna-
tional capitalist economy; as such, it relies on multilateralism, including
the UN system, for security. Japan is not without ambitions. Indeed, in
the 1980s its spectacular economic success seemed to provide the basis
for great-power status and the country started to claim a global leader-
ship role–achieving, for instance, inclusion in the Group of Eight (G8).
It did so not on military grounds, but rather as a nonmilitary “new” kind
of economic superpower (Garby and Bullock 1994).
If neorealists appear at a loss to understand Japan, others have seen
its policy as eminently realistic. Japan’s “mercantile realism” is, for
them, a rational adaptation to the movement of the international system
from an era of geopolitical to geoeconomic competition (Heginbotham
and Samuels 1998). For Tsuyoshi Kawasaki (2001), Japan’s reluctance
to further increase its military capabilities is a rational calculation that
its capabilities were, together with the US alliance, sufficient to deter an
attack and that a further buildup would exacerbate the security dilemma
in East Asia and divert resources from economic competition. At the
foreign policy level, the explanation for this rational adaptation would
point to the weight of the economy and finance ministries, the power of
business, and the relative weakness of the military and defense estab-
lishment in the Japanese policy process.
Finally, Japan is a favorite case of constructivists because its distinc-
tive national norms seem responsible for its deviation from realist behav-
ior. The antimilitarist norms generated by the World War II experience of
the cost of militarism have strongly pervaded Japanese political culture
and have been institutionalized in legal hurdles to Japan’s military role,
40 Yukiko Miyagi
notably those enshrined in its “peace constitution” (Katzenstein and

Okawara 1998; Berger 1998; R. W. Barnett 1984). This political culture,
passed along generations through socialization, endures long after the
shaping experience of defeat in war and despite major changes in Japan’s
material position, including the growth of its own economic and military
power.
Yet Japan’s norms are far from static (Hook 1996). As a result of
US pressures, combined with perceptions of increased threats in Japan’s
neighborhood, a realist worldview has, some argue, become influential
among pivotal elites. For them, Japan’s profile as a trading state is no
longer seen as an advantage since military capabilities are deemed
essential to play a proper role in world politics (Tanaka 2000; Furukawa
2005: 5). However, Japanese elites have faced such ingrained resistance
to remilitarization in Japanese political society that they have had to use
foreign crises as opportunities to gradually break down public opposi-
tion to an enhanced Japanese military role in world politics. The clash
between the realist worldview of a dominant faction of Japan’s elite and
public antimilitarism is revealed in the Japanese government’s unprece-
dented 2003 dispatch of the SDF to Iraq in support of the US-led inva-
sion of that country, but as mentioned above confined to noncombat-
related roles (Miyagi 2009).
To understand Japan’s policy, it is therefore indispensable to exam-
ine the foreign policy process where the perceptions of Japan’s ruling
elite, legal and constitutional restraints, and the broad public acceptance
of nonmilitarist norms set the parameters for contests over how to
respond to the external environment (periodic crises, US pressures,
threats in East Asia). While realists would see Japan’s foreign policy as
paralyzed in its response to an anarchic international system by an obso-
lete culture left over from the postwar era, many Japanese believe
restraints on foreign policy makers by Japan’s postmodern culture to be
a healthy phenomenon.
The Literature on the

Japanese Foreign Policy Making Process
Each of these main theoretical approaches of FPA has captured a key

aspect of Japan’s policy, identifying coexisting aspects of its environment
and the sometimes conflicting, sometimes converging, pressures on poli-
cymakers. To understand exactly how these pressures are represented,
interpreted, contested, and resolved to produce decisions at any given time,
we must open the black box of foreign policy decisionmaking.
Indeed, FPA allows us to make a considerable advance on these

debates in its recognition that there is no fixed national interest or one
way of responding to external situations. Hence, to understand out-
comes we need to identify elite goals and perceptions of the external sit-
uation, trace the contests over differing conceptions of Japan’s interests
and norms in the policy process, and assess the balance of power among
those seeking to influence outcomes.
Analysis of Japan’s foreign policy process must depart from the
copious literature available in the field of Japanese comparative politics
1995; Curtis 1993; Fukushima 1999; Gaikō Seisaku Kettei Yōin Kenkyū
and foreign policy making (Drifte 1990; Matsuoka 1992; Yasutomo
kai 1999). Writers such as Hugo J. Dobson (1998) and Michael Minor
(1985) have identified several “models” of Japanese policymaking
prevalent in the literature. These are distinguished by factors such as the
extent of centralization and the level of cohesion or consensus thought to
prevail, with each having likely consequences for Japan’s foreign policy.
I have altered and adapted their classifications to produce four models,
with the relevant literature in each tradition identified: elite consensus,
elite fragmentation, centralization within elites, and pluralism.
Elite Consensus
The main strand of literature on Japanese policymaking, the “Japan, Inc.
model,” stresses the domination of a cohesive Japanese political elite,
governing by intraelite consensus. This model corresponds to studies
based on elite theory in domestic politics that see policy largely reflect-
ing the views and opinions of elites (M. Ito, Tanaka, and Mabuchi 2005:
28). The most influential policymaking circle in Japan is thought to be
made up of an iron triangle consisting of the senior bureaucracy, the rul-
ing political party (or parties), and the business community (Hosoya and
Watanuki 1977; Kusano 2001; Misawa 1977).
Elite Fragmentation
The second model also sees decisionmaking as elite centered but per-
ceives the elite as fragmented and policymaking as paralyzed or inco-
herent, a view compatible with the North American “bureaucratic poli-
tics model” (Allison 1969) which argues that foreign policy was the
product of a conflict of competing interests. As Karel van Wolferen
(1986−1987: 289) puts it, there is “a complex of overlapping hierarchies
. . . with no supreme institution with ultimate policy-making jurisdic-
tion.” Kent Calder (1997) states that, owing to the fragmented character
42 Yukiko Miyagi
of state authority in Japan, decisive action is difficult to achieve. In this

tradition, conflicts have been documented between various ministries
such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (later
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, METI) and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) over foreign aid and export promotion
(Campbell 1984: 297–299). Other important work focuses on the roles
and interests of elite actors such as the bureaucracy (Shinkichi Eto
1976; Fukui 1970; Hayakawa et al. 2004; Muramatsu 2005a, 2005b;
Ryuen 2003; Sebata 1992; Watanabe 1976); the prime minister (Hayao
1993; Shinoda 2004); senior ruling party members (Shinoda 1999;
Nakajima 1999; K. Nakano 2000); and the ruling party factions and pol-
icy “tribes” (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987). This perspective alerts us to the
fact that Japan is not a unitary actor in the pursuit of self-evident
national interests, but rather that there are differences within the policy-
making circle over issues such as the value of the US alliance, the desir-
ability of an active military role, and how to deal with China.
Centralization Within Elites

According to Minoru Nakano (1997: 80), a gradual process of central-
ization of the policy process has taken place over time. In the 1970s,
pluralistic policymaking within the ruling party was replaced by oli-
garchic policymaking by a few dominant party factions, and further by
hegemonic policymaking by one dominant faction in the beginning of
the 1990s. Under the Junichiro Koizumi government (2001–2006), this
went even further, with decisionmaking being centralized in the prime
minister’s hands and imposed against opposition from a wide scope of
actors without much effort to reach consensus, even among the elements
of the iron triangle. This model therefore differs from the first model
discussed above in that, rather than governing through broad intraelite
consensus, the top elite tends to impose its views, and it differs from the
second model in that this centralization has reduced the impact of fac-
tionalism. This third model must be seen less as an alternative to the
first two models, and more as necessitated by the evolution of Japanese
foreign policy making at the turn of the century.
Works on this new policymaking pattern include Michio Mura-
matsu’s (2005a, 2005b) analysis of the balance of influence between the
bureaucracy and the political leadership in the recent period; Tomohito
Shinoda’s (2004) study of the political leadership’s top-down policy-
making in the cases of the US-led coalition’s military attacks on the Tal-
iban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, which focused
of the role of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku Kanbō) in response to inter-

on the Prime Minister’s Office; and Teijiro Furukawa’s (2005) analysis
national crisis. Toshiyuki Takahashi (2003) documents the eclipse of

factional influence in the Koizumi administration. It is also important to
acknowledge that this top-down policymaking by the highest levels of
political leadership currently only dominates during crisis situations.
Conversely, on “routine” issues a bureaucracy-led bottom-up policy
process (Fukui 1970; Minor 1985; Nakamura 2004), in which decisions
are made by the ministry that has jurisdiction for an issue with little
interest from other actors and little need for consensus building, pre-
vails. The first model, then, is still applicable in many decisionmaking
instances.
Pluralism
The more “pluralist” model of Japanese politics stresses the ability of
wider forces opposing top elites to constrain or divert their policies.
Especially assuming divisions within the top policymakers, and within
the iron triangle, the pluralist model sees greater influence by opposi-
tion parties, the press, and public opinion in the policy process than the
first three models mentioned above. Relevant studies of the political
parties in the ruling coalition and in the opposition are those by Susumu
(2005) on the Kōmei Party and its behavior during its coalition with the
Suito (1991) on the opposition parties in the Gulf War; Sadao Hirano
Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyū Minshu tō, LDP); and Kazuyoshi Abe
(1991) on the business community.
Some of these actors hold norms that are at odds with top elites and,
to the extent that they enter the political process, may constrain policy-
makers. But the contestation by such actors in policymaking is uneven
and, when their interests are not directly involved or normative issues
are not at stake such as in more routine cases, they do not become
involved and decisionmaking remains centralized in the hands of the
bureaucracy with jurisdiction over an issue. Moreover, studies have
documented policymakers’ attempts to manage and even reshape public
opinion (Schoppa 1993; Hanai 1998: 95–97). For example, MOFA offi-
cials routinely highlight the threat from North Korea to justify Japan’s
security reliance on the United States (Ishiba 2005). They also justify
involvement in unpopular US ventures, such as the invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, by quoting word for word US officials’ demands
for Japanese cooperation in these ventures in return for US protection
from North Korea.
44 Yukiko Miyagi
Case Studies of Japan’s Foreign Policy Making
The structure of Japanese policymaking can be divided into the domi-

nant policymaking actors within the inner policymaking circle whose
perceptions and preferences are the main factor in policymaking; the
intermediate policymaking circle in the bureaucracy or ruling party
leadership that has influence over the dominant policymakers; and the
outer ring of the policy process, which includes the opposition parties,
the press, and interest groups that may have access to decisionmakers
but have limited influence and may act as either buffers or transmission
belts between the inner policymaking circle and the public.
Depending on the nature of the issue, the actors participating in pol-
icymaking and the balance of influence among them varies. In the top-
down pattern, operative in crises, decisionmaking is centralized in the
hands of the top political and bureaucratic elite; the bottom-up policy
process takes place within the bureaucracy and is ratified at the top. The
dynamics of Japan’s foreign policy process can usefully be revealed by
case studies of pivotal crisis decisions and of routine policymaking. In
this section, both kinds of policymaking are discussed.
Crisis Decisionmaking Under Prime Minister Koizumi

An analysis of the drive of the Japanese prime minister at the time,
Koizumi, to participate in the 2003 US-led Iraq War, and specifically
the highly controversial and precedent-breaking decision to send the
SDF to an overseas combat zone (and without a supportive UN resolu-
tion), exposes tendencies that had been developing for some time to
enhance the foreign policy power of the prime minister and which have
become the subject of considerable analytical interest by scholars
(Kitaoka 1991; Marukusu 2004) and revelations by insiders (Ishiba and
Ushio 2004). These tendencies climaxed under the Koizumi administra-
tion and have since receded somewhat in the absence of a similar polit-
ically dominant personality as prime minister. Nevertheless, a snapshot
of this episode provides exceptional insight into the conflicting actors
and tendencies in the policy process.
Since the central administrative reforms of January 2001, a top-
down policymaking process dominated by the highest political leader-
ship has become operative in Japan, particularly in an international cri-
sis (Shinoda 2004). This reform was enacted to enable a swift response
to such crises as a result of the lessons drawn from the Gulf War of
1990−1991 in which the time-consuming process of consensus building
among the inner policymaking circle resulted in heavy US criticism of

Japan’s seemingly reluctant and tardy response.
In the top-down policymaking pattern, the prime minister and the
Cabinet Office dominate policymaking to a great extent, at the expense
of the intermediate level and even some of the top elite, in a historically
unprecedented manner. The inner circle that formerly was involved in
branches, including the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Naikaku Hōsei

key decisions included senior figures from the relevant bureaucratic
kyoku, CLB), the MOFA, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the METI,
the Japan Defense Agency (JDA; the Ministry of Defense [MOD] since
2007), the ruling LDP, the heads of the other ruling coalition parties,
and senior representatives of the business community. But contrary to
the consensual policymaking that traditionally required consultation
with all these members of the iron triangle, the dominant actors have
been able to bypass and subordinate these actors.
However, realizing the preferences of the dominant actors requires
strong political leadership. Under the Koizumi administration, the prime
minister and the Cabinet Office were, in concert, able to take full advan-
tage of the administrative reform for crisis policymaking owing to
Koizumi’s proactive leadership,1 his exceptionally high personal popu-
larity among the public, and the decline of factional power within the
LDP. Nevertheless, the ability of the prime minister and the Cabinet
Office to prevail depended ultimately on their ability to contain chal-
lenges from within the inner policymaking circle and from the interme-
diate level and the public.
Dominance of the prime minister and the Cabinet Office over the
LDP leadership. During the Koizumi administration, the prime minister
was able to fully exercise his authority over the ruling LDP’s leadership
(hence, over the cabinet) for several reasons. With the introduction of
smaller electoral districts under the reforms of 1994 that ended the tra-
ditional practice of multiple LDP members competing against each
other in large electoral districts, traditional party factions were weak-
ened, which facilitated the emergence of a stronger prime minister so
long as he enjoyed strong public support. In fact, the strong public sup-
port enjoyed by Koizumi led to a significant erosion of the power of the
party’s factions that used to influence policy through informal channels,
conducting behind-the-scenes policy coordination (nemawashi) in order
to realize their preferred policy prior to formal policymaking. With
Koizumi’s public popularity as his power base in the ruling party, rather
than the support of the party’s factions, the prime minister dominated
46 Yukiko Miyagi
the party and ended factional influence over policy. As a result, policy-
making under the Koizumi administration was free from interfactional
consensus building and the consequent need to make concessions to
various powerful party factions in the Diet (A. Ito 2003).
The prime minister’s strong public support also resulted in his tight
control over the members of his cabinet and over the Cabinet Office.
How far things had changed is evident by a comparison to the 1980s
when a proposal by the military activist prime minister, Yasuhiro Naka-
sone, to send a minesweeper to the Gulf in response to US demands
haru Gotōda, who threatened to use his veto at the cabinet approval
faced strong opposition from the director of the Cabinet Office, Masa-
stage (Okamoto 2004: 197). Thus, in those days, the prime minister’s
policy could be challenged by an influential member of the cabinet due
to the fact that the prime minister’s position was based on factional
alliance making, and the director of the Cabinet Office, representing a
faction different from that of the prime minister, had leverage. In con-
trast, because the appointment of cabinet members under Koizumi was
independent of factional balancing, the cabinet members had no lever-
age over the policy favored by the prime minister. Rather, if they failed
to follow his preferences he could freely dismiss them, being uncon-
strained by obligations to LDP factions (Tanaka 2000: 4).
Also eclipsed by the prime minister’s personal power was the influ-
ence of policy tribes (zoku), which acted as pressure groups represent-
ing interests concerned with a particular policy issue, and which, having
gained specialized knowledge and personal connections with bureau-
crats and interest groups, could act as policy brokers. In the field of
security issues, the Defense Tribe (Kokubō zoku) had come into being
especially to represent the voice of the uniformed officers, with its
members often recruited from former directors of the Japanese Defense
Agency that was the predecessor of the current Ministry of Defense.
The Defense Tribe had increased its influence since the late 1980s in
parallel with the growing number of politicians and bureaucrats at
higher levels who wanted to promote the expansion of Japanese military
capability (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987: 119–120, 209). The influence they,
like other policy tribes, could exercise was, however, limited by the new
top-down policymaking style of the Koizumi administration.
With the diminution of informal channels, the LDP’s formal policy-
Affairs Research Council (Seimu chōsa kai, PARC), divided into policy
making and coordination institutions also lost influence. The Policy
fields such as the Foreign Affairs Committee (Gaikō bukai) and the
National Defense Committee (Kokubō bukai), coordinated among min-
istries, adjusted proposed legislation, and even put forward new propos-
als together with high-ranking bureaucrats. However, PARC lost these
functions along with the disappearance of the power of the policy tribes,
which constituted the committees’ active members. Likewise, the
(Sōmu kai), which gives approval to bills, also lost much of its authority
party’s highest decisionmaking institution, the General Affairs Council
with the decline of the influence held by faction leaders who make up
the council’s membership. The top-down policymaking by the Cabinet
Office under the Koizumi administration bypassed the custom of policy
consultation between bureaucratic officials and the LDP’s policy tribe
leaders in PARC and factional leaders in the General Affairs Council.
On the other hand, to the extent that there was informal exercise of
influence within the LDP, it was through personal ties to the prime min-
ister by some party leaders who had privileged opportunities to discuss
policy with him. Considering the fact that all of his closest aides were
strong military activists (Miyagi 2011: 124), it is likely that their views
merely encouraged and reinforced the prime minister’s policy.
The Koizumi administration was centered on the ruling LDP, but
Conservative New Party (Hoshu Shin tō)—until it dissolved in Novem-

was supported by a ruling coalition with smaller parties; namely, the
ber 2003—and the Kōmei Party. The coalition was needed in order to
secure an absolute majority in the upper House of Councillors, which
the LDP lacked at the time. The two smaller parties were therefore rep-
resented in the Koizumi cabinet. The prime minister and the Cabinet
Office were able to co-opt the coalition party leadership, using as lever-
age the overwhelmingly dominant size of the LDP in the stronger lower
house of parliament compared to the small representation of coalition
partners. The coalition partners, on the other hand, were ready to com-
promise their own policies in order to survive in the Japanese party sys-
tem, which appeared to be slowly heading toward a two-party system
shu tō, DPJ) as a result of the 1994 electoral reform. As a consequence,

dominated by the LDP and the Democratic Party of Japan (Nihon Min-
Koizumi was able to obtain their support to secure formal legislative

approval of government policy in the Diet. The policy of the Koizumi
coalition government turned out to be no different than that of a pure
LDP government (Eto and Kazunori 2003).
Control of the prime minister and the Cabinet Office over the
bureaucratic branches. The reform of January 2001 also established
the dominance of the prime minister and the leaders in the Cabinet
Office over the bureaucracy, particularly the director of the Cabinet
48 Yukiko Miyagi
Office as number two after the prime minister (Furukawa 2005: 5).
First, this changed the pattern of policymaking in times of crisis, by
allowing the members of the Cabinet Office to give policy direction to
the bureaucratic branches and utilize the latter’s policymaking expertise
and knowledge through special policymaking task forces that co-opted
top officials. Secondly, the reform enabled the director and deputy
director of the Cabinet Office to exercise authority over high-ranking
bureaucratic appointments. This meant that, when the prime minister or
the director of the Cabinet Office had a specific policy preference
counter to the interests of a bureaucratic branch, the former could over-
ride the latter.
Another key agency, the CLB, a suprabureaucratic institution empow-
ered with the authority of judging the legality of the government’s policy
(especially the constitutionality of security policy), might have been a
major check on the ambitions of the Koizumi administration. However, it
had accommodated the incremental remilitarization of successive govern-
ments in both the Cold War and post–Cold War periods by stretching the
interpretation of the constitution, albeit still putting down some conditions
to maintain “logical” adherence to legal norms (Miyagi 2011: 94). The
Koizumi administration’s policy preference for a greater level of stretch in
the constitutional interpretation was accepted by the CLB in the decision-
making over SDF participation in the war in Afghanistan in 2001.
Throughout the half-century dominance of the LDP in Japanese pol-
itics, the bureaucracy had built channels with LDP leaders to enable the
smooth passage of its own policy preferences. However, since the influ-
ence of the LDP factional and policy tribal leaders had declined under
Koizumi, the interbureaucratic struggle over the differences in policy
details was no longer played out through the policy tribes and factional
leaders, but through the leaders in the Cabinet Office and the Prime
Minister’s Office such as the director and deputy director of the Cabinet
Office and the prime minister’s policy secretary (Akasaka 2003: 224,
2004). Hence, bureaucrats could not bypass the prime minister. Rather,
they had to persuade him and his close aides of their policy preferences.
Since the implementation of these administrative reforms, the posi-
tion of the MOFA in policymaking during times of international crisis
has been reinforced vis-à-vis other branches of the bureaucracy because
it assumed a role in the joint policymaking in foreign and security pol-
icy matters with the Cabinet Office (Furukawa 2005: 11). Often enjoy-
ing the backing of the prime minister or the Cabinet Office and claiming
special expertise in foreign policy matters, the MOFA’s top officials had
ample room to retain influence and advance their preferred policies
against those of other ministries such as the MOF and the METI.
In contrast, the JDA and the SDF were at a relative disadvantage

since civilian control of the Japanese military mandated by the constitu-
tion had been ensured by locating the JDA at a position lower than min-
isterial rank and under the direct command of the prime minister. The
JDA was also under the influence of the other bureaucratic branches
since its officials were appointed by transfer from other ministries such
as the MOF, the MOFA, the METI, and the police (Inoguchi 1991: 56–
57; Hook et al. 2001: 48–49). In order to overcome this disadvantage,
the JDA sought an upgrade of the agency to ministerial status, which it
achieved in 2007.
Both civilian officials and uniformed officers in the JDA and the
SDF have thus slowly overcome much of the organizations’ original
structural disadvantage within the government. This has resulted from
the gradual de facto legitimization and expansion of the military’s role
through increasingly developed ties of MOD officials and uniformed
officers with US forces in Japan, their newly built international ties
through overseas postings, and the specialized knowledge they possess
of high-technology military equipment. Their influence is especially
important regarding issues of military budget allocation and military
planning (Sebata 1992: 92, 106, 339–340; Ishiba and Sakamoto 2004).
However, on an issue carrying high political stakes for the political
leadership, their wishes can be ignored and they remain at a disadvan-
tage and under the influence of the prime minister, the Cabinet Office,
and the MOFA.
Marginalization of the business community by the prime minister

and the Cabinet Office. The dominance of the prime minister in the
LDP also led to the decline of the influence of the business community
(zaikai) in the top-down policymaking process. Along with the domi-
nant ruling party and the bureaucracy, the business community has tra-
ditionally been an influential actor in Japanese policymaking. Among
the community, the most powerful group has been the highly organized
and most foreign policy−oriented business association, the Keidanren,
which is led by the chief executives of leading Japanese companies and
is the primary funding body for the LDP. At the height of the factional
politics era, the Keidanren effectively influenced the policy of the
LDP’s factional leaders by altering the balance of its financial support
among the factions. Since the mid-1990s, business leaders have also
become increasingly involved in security policymaking through “study
groups,” where business leaders invite speakers to discuss various poli-
cies of concern to them and, on the basis of their findings, put forth pol-
icy proposals to government. In the case of the 1990−1991 Gulf War,
50 Yukiko Miyagi
the business community played an active role in pushing the govern-

ment to cooperate with the United States and appealing to the public
through the media, resulting in the government’s decision to impose a
special tax increase for that purpose (Shikata 1999: 206; Yoshizaki
1999: 330).
Perceiving the dominance of the prime minister within the LDP, the
leaders of the business community have sought to strengthen ties with
the prime minister at the expense of their traditional ties with LDP lead-
ers and the bureaucracy. However, as a prime minister with strong pub-
lic support weakened the LDP factions, the business community lost the
leverage it derived from the use of funding to balance between the LDP
factions. As a consequence, although access to the prime minister was
established, the position of the business community was weakened
under the Koizumi administration, and the best it could do was lobby
him or ministries such as the MOFA and the METI (Hamada 2004).
This meant that the decisionmaking of the prime minister was free of
the business leverage seen prior to the Koizumi administration.
Marginalization of the challenge from the opposition parties. For

three intertwined reasons, in matters of security policymaking, the inner
policymaking circle under the Koizumi administration faced less chal-
lenge from the opposition parties compared to its predecessors. With
regard to the role of the opposition in the political system, the electoral
reform of 1994, which introduced a dual system of first-past-the-post
single-member constituencies and proportional representation, resulted
in a slow move toward a two-party system. One consequence was the
emergence of a relatively large opposition party, the DPJ. However, the
DPJ’s challenge to LDP rule was pragmatic and not based on a cohesive
and distinctive policy program. In fact, the party was deeply divided
over security policy, with some members in strong support of sending
the SDF overseas at times in international military operations.2
The electoral reforms of 1994 also led to the downsizing of parties
other than the LDP and the DPJ. The opposition parties representing the
the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshu tō, SDP) and the Japan
antimilitarist national norms and skeptical of the US alliance, such as
Communist Party (Nihon Kyōsan tō, JCP), had dwindled by 2003 to

only 40 and 24 Diet seats respectively out of 722 total seats in both
houses. Furthermore, the opposition was fragmented in its policy pref-
erences, particularly over security issues (Miyagi 2011: 113–114). This
meant that the opposition had no influence on legislation and little capa-
bility to check the ruling parties in the Diet or to mobilize public sup-
port to challenge the government. It can be argued that the dominance

of the LDP was a reflection of the public’s preferences, which voted for
the prime minister and his party, even though the outcome was a decline
in accountability for foreign policy to the public.
Finally, the fact that the ruling coalition parties had an absolute
majority of seats in both houses of the Diet meant that government leg-
islation could be passed without having to reach a compromise with the
opposition. In the past, in order to ensure the smooth passage of legisla-
tion, the LDP needed to gain the approval of the main opposition party,
the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), by giving concessions behind the scenes
before the formal vote in the Diet. This was necessary because the
opposition held a crucial number of Diet seats, albeit barely sufficient to
block the ruling party’s legislation. With a diminished opposition in the
Diet regarding the expansion of SDF activities overseas, the Koizumi
administration was able to marginalize party influence.
The absence of a challenge to the inner policymaking circle from

interest groups and independent experts. Interest groups and
experts in international affairs have access to, and therefore potentially
greater influence on, policymaking than the general public. However,
the inner policymaking circle under the Koizumi administration did not
face any effective input of alternative views from them. Cross-party
leagues (giin renmei) of Diet members have been formed by those with
an interest in strengthening bilateral relations with a counterpart in the
Middle East such as leagues for Japan-Iraq friendship. However, they
have lacked influence on policymaking since they have been largely
motivated by the expectation of the material benefits they could acquire
from acting as a broker between Japan and a particular Middle Eastern
state on behalf of Japanese business. This means that, when Japanese
business is not at stake, the members have little interest in taking action.
In the case of the Iraq War, their interests, including that of the Japan-
Iraq Parliamentary Friendship League, had declined with the prospect of
a regime change in the country, in contrast to the period following the
UN Oil-for-Food Programme when the league was active in support of
reviving ties with Iraq.3
Second, the input of independent views into policymaking by field
experts has been generally absent due to the dominance of official
experts in the bureaucracy, which has been reinforced by the political
power of the prime minister. In the field of Middle East−Japanese rela-
tions, there have been two main streams of experts. One is the dominant
group both within and around the Japanese policymaking circle, often
52 Yukiko Miyagi
comprised of politicians and business leaders with particular interests in

oil resources and business in the Middle East, that has built links with
the Japanese government. The other group, often made up of academics
and researchers, has more interest in the area itself as well as more sym-
pathetic views of it. The most influential circle from the second group
was able to influence government policy at the time of the oil crisis in
1973 and thereafter.4
Under the Koizumi cabinet and in contrast to the past, especially in
the period following the 1973 oil crisis when the prime minister and his
Cabinet Office welcomed views critical of government policy, only
experts favoring government policy had been invited for consultation by
the secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office. It is also the case that the
think tanks in the field of Middle East studies have been closely affili-
ated with the government’s bureaucratic branches; they work within the
government’s framework that presets tasks and confines discussion to
means, not ends. Those chosen to take part are those known to share the
government’s policy line and who are ready to use their special knowl-
edge to support it rather than providing critical or alternative views on
it.5 Generally, Middle East experts are at a disadvantage because they
lack the prestige of experts specializing in relations with the United
States that generally support the US point of view.
The manipulation of public opinion. The public has played a signif-

icant indirect role in influencing policymaking when the issue relates to
a national norm such as Japan’s nonmilitaristic stance. Political leaders
have felt pressure to adhere to national norms since public support for
the government has been contingent on perceptions that they do not vio-
late these norms. These leaders monitor opinion polls and take the
results into account in policymaking so as not to risk a loss of public
support (Cabinet Office 2012).
In general, however, the public has been susceptible to manipula-
tion by policymakers. The media have a major impact in shaping the
public view, hence affecting the durability or the dilution of normative
constraints. To be sure, the major Japanese media are not overly biased
as they are divided into those that are pro-government and those critical
of the government. Nevertheless, both can limit the information and
views to which the public is exposed, thereby giving policymakers an
advantage over their opponents. Since the major media depend on per-
sonal relationships and mutual confidence with policymakers as infor-
mation sources, they refrain from releasing information that would work
against the interest of their government patrons. They also often tend to
reflect the tone used by the information sources in their reports. In addi-
tion, the fact that the Japanese public’s primary concern is domestic
issues—and the Koizumi administration enjoyed support for its domes-
tic policy—meant that policymakers enjoyed a great deal of freedom for
realizing their intended foreign policy without facing serious criticism
or accountability (Nikkei Net 2007). Nevertheless, despite manipulation
by policymakers, as long as the public adheres to national norms, this
can be a source of some constraint on policymakers’ options.
Bottom-Up Policymaking:
Routine Policymaking in Middle East Cases
The bureaucracy’s supremacy in policymaking has survived the recent
strengthening of the political leadership when it comes to more routine
cases. The political leadership normally does not intervene in policy-
making matters unless the issue is extremely significant and carries
political stakes for top politicians. The bureaucratic branch in charge of
foreign affairs (i.e., the MOFA) has therefore dominated policymaking
on most foreign policy issues. As a result of the superior knowledge and
expertise it possesses and on which politicians depend, its recommenda-
tions tend to enjoy de facto automatic approval from political leaders.
In most cases, final decisions are made at the level of the MOFA’s
deputy foreign minister, the top bureaucrat of the ministry, or lower
officials such as councillors and bureau directors. The options from
which they choose are themselves the outcome of a bottom-up policy-
making pattern (ringisei) within the bureaucracy (Yakushiji 2003: 197),
and, hence, a product of routine work. When national norms are not sig-
nificantly at stake, policymaking is relatively free from scrutiny by the
Diet and the media. However, when economic interests are involved,
other actors seek to influence the policy process.
When Japanese Middle East policymaking involving an oil state, such
as Iran, takes place in the bottom-up pattern under the jurisdiction of the
bureaucracy, the outcome is likely to be a reflection of the balance of
influence between the more pro-US branch, the MOFA, and the more
nationalist and economic-oriented branch, the METI. Since the experience
of the 1973 oil crisis, the METI has an agenda of overcoming Japanese
vulnerability to the oil producers, avoiding a disruption of the oil flow,
and maintaining stable prices. This agenda, however, is less salient for the
MOFA than are relations with the United States (Hook et al. 2001: 83).
The influence of the business community in bottom-up policymak-
ing has also survived the strengthening of the political leadership in top-
54 Yukiko Miyagi
down policymaking and has been channeled through the METI. The
interest of Japan’s oil industry in maintaining a close relationship with
Middle Eastern oil states is self-evident. General trading companies, the
most influential sector among the Japanese business community, also
have a great interest in economic relations with Middle Eastern oil
states because about 80 percent of their business transactions deal with
raw materials including oil (Enayat 1994: 264) and the purchasing
power of the oil-rich states provides a market for Japanese exports.
These large companies have a long history of ties with the government
and greater influence on policymaking compared to the rest of the busi-
ness community. They enjoy good relations with the METI officials
through policy consultation and with the leaders of foreign countries
through the exchange of delegations (Calder 1997: 2). The policy pref-
erences of the business community vary, and the view of the oil industry
does not always agree with that of the more influential general trading
companies that dominate the Keidanren.
In dealings with Middle Eastern states in which oil interests are not
involved, policymaking is almost wholly conducted within the MOFA.
This means that the policy outcome reflects its intraministerial balance
of influence between the sections involved in policymaking. The domi-
nance within the MOFA of the sections, notably the North American
Affairs Bureau (Hokubei kyok, NAAB), that are closely affiliated with
their US counterparts means that the ministry is prone to support US
policy. This is most directly reflected in the bottom-up policymaking in
the case of non-oil-producing states (Miyagi 2011: 161–170).
The MOFA’s internal hierarchical structure has been established
over time based on the supremacy of the bureaus that deal with the
United States, giving its culture of pro-US policymaking considerable
durability. The top ranks of the MOFA have been typically appointed
from those who have served in diplomatic posts regarding the United
the Security Treaty Division (Jōyaku ka), and former ambassadors to

States such as chiefs of the North American Division I (Hokubei Ikka),
the United States. The pro-US policy trend within the ministry has been
reinforced by the establishment of the supervisory Foreign Policy
Bureau (Gaikō Seisaku kyoku) during the period following the Gulf
War, whose bureau director is typically appointed as a promotion from
the director of the North American Affairs Bureau.6 Such a posting and
promotion system has institutionalized the dominance of the Foreign
Policy Bureau and the NAAB over the Middle Eastern and African
Affairs Bureau (Chūtō Afurika kyoku, MEAB).
Since the MEAB is expected to be more sympathetic to Middle
Eastern states, its policy adherence to the general pro-US policy posi-
tion of the MOFA as a whole has been ensured by the practice of

appointing its directors from officials recruited outside the bureau, par-
ticularly from more influential bureaus such as the UN Policy Division
of the Foreign Policy Bureau and the Economy Bureau (Keizai kyoku).
In addition, the fact that officials’ adherence to the pro-US line has been
crucial for their future promotion has ensured the director’s general sub-
servience (Amaki 2003: 14–15, 21, 68, 186). On a daily basis, policy
coordination between the NAAB and the MEAB has often seen vigor-
ous policy disagreements in which the participants reflect Japan’s stake
in the respective regions for which they are responsible. For instance,
the George W. Bush administration’s hostile policy toward Syria in the
first half of the 2000s provoked disagreements over the Japanese
approach toward Syria (Miyagi 2011: 160). However, the custom is that
the MEAB usually yields to the influence of the pro-US sections of the
ministry.
Conclusion
Japan’s foreign policy is in many ways quite distinctive, pursuing, for a

long time, foreign policy widely described as nonmilitarist, mercantilist,
reactive, and risk-averse. Analysts have been divided between those
who see this stance as rational and those who consider it an anomaly
that is bound to change over time into a more conventional realist
approach appropriate to the country’s status as an economic great
power. In good part, this is due to a special foreign policy process that
institutionalized restraints on traditional great-power behavior and also
was reflective of a wider political culture of military restraint. But addi-
tionally, bureaucratic politics explanations have pointed to a process of
policymaking by consensus and the fragmentation of elites. On the
other hand, scholars of Japan’s foreign and security policy have agreed
that Japan has, to some extent, been moving toward a more conven-
tional realist and proactive foreign policy stance. In this respect, the
Koizumi period was seen as a watershed. FPA analysis was able to iden-
tify alterations in the policy process, as summarized in the present case
study, as essential explanations for these alterations in Japan’s foreign
policy, demonstrating in particular how the policy process shaped
Japan’s responses to external systemic pressures and opportunities.
The dialogues and debates between Japanese and non-Japanese stu-
dents of Japan over the country’s anomalies thus have been fruitful in
enriching our understanding of the importance of domestic politics and
the policy process in accounting for a greater variation in the foreign
56 Yukiko Miyagi
policies of states, even great powers, than conventional realist thinking

might have led us to expect. Japanese scholars have absorbed the cate-
gories, concepts, and theoretical approaches of FPA imported from North
America to explain Japan’s distinctiveness, even while contesting claims
of its abnormality. On the other hand, some of the special features of the
Japanese case—concepts such as the trading state, iron triangle, and non-
militarist foreign policy—have been exported to wider scholarly dis-
course on foreign policy.
Notes
1. The administrative reform of January 2001 was enacted to enable a swift

Japanese response in times of international crisis and legitimize a top-down
policymaking process dominated by the highest political leadership (Shinoda
2. See Asahi Shinbun, “Ryōtōshu ga Kihon Gōi: yatō saihen mezasu Min-
2004: 5).
shu bunretsu ka” [Both Party Leaders Reach a Basic Agreement: Will the DPJ
Shinbun, “Minshu Daihyō Sen: Okada shi sedai kōtai uri, Kan shi takai
Split by the Opposition Party’s Reconfiguration?], November 30, 2002; Asahi
chimeido kyōchō” [The DPJ’s Leadership Election: Mr. Okada Appeals to a
ber 10, 2002; Asahi Shinbun, “Jiyū to Gōryū Hidane nimo: tō un’ei tsuzuku
New Generation, Mr. Kan Emphasizes His Wide Name Recognition], Decem-
tsunawatari” [Merging with the Liberal Party Might Trigger Conflict: Party
Management Still on the Tight Rope], January 31, 2003.
3. Middle East expert at the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan
External Trade Organization, interviewed by the author, Tokyo, October 22,
2003.
4. Tokyo Shinbun reporter, interviewed by the author, Tokyo, November 24,
2004.
5. Middle East expert at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, interviewed
by the author, Tokyo, September 9, 2006.
6. For reports of postings of high-ranking bureaucrats, see Bungei Shunjū’s
Kasumigaseki Konfidensharu [Kasumigaseki Confidential] in various volumes.
4
in India
Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi
This chapter covers the major theoretical and empirical issues

pertaining to foreign policy analysis (FPA) in India. We argue that the
study of FPA as a subfield of the academic discipline of international
relations (IR) is largely absent in India. This is not to suggest that the
study of foreign policy is absent in India. However, the emergence of
FPA as an approach to the study of foreign policy in US academia since
the end of World War II has no counterpart in India. Consequently, we
begin this chapter with an analysis of the state of the academic disci-
pline of international studies (IS)—the Indian counterpart to US IR—to
explain the paucity of work on FPA in India. We show that, in sharp
contrast to works on psychological processes and on decisionmaking in
FPA, the study of foreign policy in India is dominated by structural
determinants or by nontheoretical idiographic and narrative accounts
that focus on individual leaders. With few exceptions, the bulk of the
FPA-type scholarship emanating from India-based Indian scholars has
been quintessentially devoid of theoretical substance.1
While Indian scholars have largely shied away from theoretically
informed FPA, they have introduced local or indigenous concepts in the
study of foreign policy. In particular, these include the concepts of non-
alignment and Panchsheel.2 However, mainstream US academia has
tended to either ignore these concepts altogether or dismiss them as
variants of well-known concepts without critically examining and intel-
lectually engaging with them. That said, back in India many of these
concepts, such as nonalignment, became ideologically cloaked national-
ist mantras and lost their intellectual appeal. Furthermore, the academic
engagement with these concepts was bereft of serious collaborative
57
58 Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi
work in political theory and international thought rooted in Indian tradi-

tions. With few exceptions, IS scholarship in India has neither been sup-
ported by a serious engagement with the political and international
thought of prominent twentieth-century political and intellectual leaders
like Jawaharlal Nehru (the first prime minister of independent India) nor
Akbar (1542–1605 CE) or the Mauryan emperor Aśoka (304–232

with that of India’s key precolonial figures such as the Mughal emperor
BCE). As a result, intellectual work on these Indian foreign policy con-

cepts has remained quite limited in its scope.
In this chapter, we proffer some explanations for the relative
absence of theoretical (or theoretically informed) Indian FPA scholar-
ship as well as the limited influence of Indian concepts of foreign policy
both within and outside India. We discuss the distinctive and anomalous
features of the literature on foreign policy from India. We also provide
a limited survey of some of this literature; the survey is merely illustra-
tive as opposed to being exhaustive and is included to support the argu-
ment of this chapter. Finally, we discuss the major substantive foreign
policy issues under scrutiny in India. We show that security issues and
India’s relationship with its neighbors and major powers have domi-
nated the foreign policy literature in India. Indian IS and consequently
academic studies of foreign policy have largely ignored issues related to
international organizations, international political economy, global gov-
ernance, and international law, although this may change as India’s
clout in the international system increases along with its economic
development.
In the next section of this chapter, we discuss the origin and evolu-
tion of the academic discipline of IS in India and focus on how it relates
to FPA in US academia. More specifically, we concentrate on the resist-
ance toward theoretical work in India. We conclude the discussion with
a brief overview of FPA scholarship related to India by scholars not
based in India to demonstrate its divergence from the work of India-
based scholars. In the subsequent section, we provide an outline of the
specific Indian concepts that have been developed in the study of for-
eign policy as well as their limited impact on scholarship. Finally, we
close the chapter with some suggestions on future courses of research
and inquiry.
Indian Approaches to International Studies
The academic discipline of IS—the Indian equivalent of US IR—suffers

from an “identity crisis” because of its conflation with area studies
Foreign Policy Analysis in India 59
(Alagappa 2009: 14). This has had an adverse impact on scholarship in

India because “discipline-oriented IR studies are thought to be the same
as idiographic foreign area studies” (Behera 2009: 134). In other words,
area studies is assumed to be the same as IS and IR despite significant
differences between the two disciplines (especially in US academia).
While there is a long-running debate in the United States on the useful-
ness of area studies for cumulative knowledge generation, it is widely
believed that area studies is largely atheoretical while IR (or the social
sciences) aim for lawlike regularities and causal explanations.3 There-
fore, the superficial similarity between US academia, where IR is a sub-
discipline of political science, and India, where IS housed within
departments of political science, is misleading. Consequently, “political
scientists masquerade as area specialists in India” (Sahni 2009: 54).
The Absence of Theory in Indian IS at Its Inception

By and large, Indian IS scholars have ignored theory and eschewed
scholarship that aims for lawlike regularities. While there are multiple
reasons for this trend, three in particular stand out. First, as argued by
Kanti P. Bajpai, the influence of the “formative moment” of the field of
IS in India was highly influential. Beginning its modern statehood as a
postcolonial state after independence in 1947, India, where the higher
education system was largely patterned along British lines, was deeply
suspicious of IR theory as it had been developed in the West. Theory
was equated with “Western intellectual constructs that would subvert
independent thinking” (Bajpai 2009: 123–124).4 As such, India viewed
Western IR theory as a “neo-colonial trap . . . carrying the biases of that
[Western] geopolitical location” (Sridharan 2005: 4819).
The second reason behind the neglect of theory in India had to with
Nehru’s near-total dominance of India’s foreign policy after independ-
ence. Not only did Nehru serve as India’s minister of external affairs
after independence in 1947 (in addition to being the country’s prime
minister) until his death in 1964, but India’s two other top leaders—
Mahatma Gandhi (the preeminent leader of the Indian nationalist move-
ment) and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (Nehru’s deputy prime minister and
a leader with foreign policy views very different from his)—died soon
after independence.5 Given Nehru’s control of the foreign policy appa-
ratus, “the rest of the power structure and academic circles in India did
not see the need to bestir themselves to engage in creating a broad sub-
structure of intellectual and political study and thinking on external
relations” (Dixit 1997: 56). This had the pernicious effect not only of a
neglect in the study of IS in India, but it also marginalized Indian IS
scholars who turned toward morally justifying and operationalizing

Nehru’s policies—above all, the strategy of nonalignment which is dis-
cussed below (Sridharan 2005: 4819).
The third reason for the neglect of theory in IS scholarship in India
has to do with the fact that IS scholarship has had a “predominantly
practical orientation with an emphasis on understanding and interpret-
ing the external world to develop suitable policy responses” (Alagappa
2011: 196). So even though India had some early advantages in the
pursuit of IS scholarship (at least in Asia) for using the English lan-
guage and having a British-patterned higher education system, and
because it was one of the first Asian states to establish dedicated insti-
tutions for the study of foreign affairs, Indian scholars did not create a
theoretically informed body of scholarship.6 It was widely felt that the-
oretical work was the domain of armchair thinkers who were divorced
from the real world, and that a nascent state like India that had enor-
mous nation- and state-building challenges in addition to acute real and
perceived security threats needed research that could inform policy
(Sahni 2009: 55–58).
In addition, the colonial legacy has also affected the state of IS
scholarship in India. During the British colonial period not only was
India linked to the wider world in support of Britain’s imperial interests,
but the British also excluded Indians from positions in the colonial deci-
sionmaking apparatus involved with making (foreign) policy choices
about India’s relations with the outside world.7 Consequently, few Indian
colonial nationalist elites had any exposure to questions of foreign and
security policy formulation. Since few Indians had any political and
strategic knowledge of the world beyond the subcontinent,8 the task for
the IS institutes of higher learning in India was to collect information to
understand the world in order to help New Delhi form suitable policies,
a process that naturally gravitated toward a multidisciplinary area studies
approach. Such knowledge, which was generated to aid policy, tended to
be atheoretical as members of the diplomatic corps—the practitioners of
foreign policy for whom it was generated—were uninterested and even
hostile toward theory (Paul 2009: 135–137).9
As a result, with few exceptions, Indian IS tended to ignore the
developments in US IR soon after independence at a time when IR was
becoming a social science in the United States. While the history and
historiography of IR, which began as an academic discipline in the
interwar years and transformed into a social science after World War II,
is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Schmidt 2002), India chose “not
to engage with the Anglo-American (or any other) IR community” in
the 1950s (Bajpai 2009: 110). Therefore, Indian scholars did not notice
the emergence of FPA-style work in US IR in the 1950s. According to

Valerie M. Hudson (2008: 12), FPA-style work that “seeks to explain
foreign policy, or, alternatively foreign policy behavior, with reference
to the theoretical ground of human decision makers, acting singly and in
groups” emerged as a subfield of US IR in the 1950s and 1960s (see
also Hudson 2007). However, such FPA scholarship had little appeal in
India because the consumers of this knowledge—the diplomatic
corps—were uninterested in the “process” approach to foreign policy
making that analyzed the modes of decisionmaking (because they
thought that they were closer to the decisionmaking process than the
scholars studying it) or in the “policy” approach to foreign policy mak-
ing that sought to answer why a particular choice was made (because
arguably they had a better understanding of the trade-offs between var-
ious policy choices).10
Therefore, FPA as it developed in US academia had no interested
constituencies in India. In India, where the IR community had an
“umbilical relationship” (Behera 2008: 24) with the state apparatus on
whose patronage it depended, academics chose not to pursue FPA-style
scholarship in its early years. It is somewhat ironic that two Western
scholars—Michael Brecher and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger—became the
primary source of FPA analysis concerning India (Brecher 1969;
Vertzberger 1984). The lack of interest in FPA-style analysis was also a
result of the fact that few Indians went to Great Britain or the United
States to study political science in the 1950s and 1960s.11
Furthermore, given the limited opportunities in Indian academia in
IS in government-linked or government-funded institutions, the study of
foreign policy was not leavened with a substantial dose of talent. Faced
with inadequate domestic resources, lacking professional prestige,
unable to establish significant contacts with scholars in Anglo-America
(the United States and Great Britain), and prevented from obtaining for-
eign training because of limited external funding, most analysts of for-
eign policy became at best astute commentators on current affairs.
Inevitably, these scholars reproduced successive generations of academ-
ics whose training in social science was quite deficient and inadequate.
We now turn to a discussion of how the discipline of IS has evolved in
India up to the present day.
The Evolution of the Discipline of IS in India

Despite having an early start in creating dedicated institutes of higher
education in IS, India did not build on this advantage to establish a
broad-based institutional structure. While firm data is not available,
India has merely a dozen universities offering undergraduate, master’s,

and doctoral programs in IS (although courses or seminars in IS are
offered in many more schools).12 This is a woefully small number given
that India has more than 370 central and state universities (Y. Sharma
2011) and that since its independence India has harbored an ambition to
play the role of a major power. Clearly, India is underinvesting in the
creation of intellectual capital to generate useful knowledge about world
affairs.
Adding to the problem of a small number of schools specializing in
IS in India is the fact that most of these schools are suffering from the
same “crisis” that is affecting higher education in India in general and
the social sciences in particular (Abraham 2004). This crisis affects the
whole gamut of professional development in IS from issues related to
learning, teaching, publishing, and career advancement. To begin with,
the libraries at many Indian universities are not stocked with even the
most basic IS texts and teaching materials. For example, neither Ken-
neth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (a basic text in any
advanced course in IR in the United States) nor Kautilya’s Arthashastra
(ancient India’s foremost strategic affairs manual) are available in any
of the state universities in India (Mattoo 2009: 39). Similarly, many uni-
versities across India have poor Internet connectivity and lack access to
online databases like JSTOR and Project MUSE. Given that subscrip-
tions of IR journals published in Great Britain and the United States
tend to be expensive for university libraries, much less other libraries in
India, the lack of access to journals via these online databases has fur-
ther isolated the Indian academic community.
As a result, it is not surprising that IS courses at Indian universities
have not kept up with recent theoretical developments in the field and
that teaching curricula are outdated. Not only have Indian universities
been largely cut off from the theoretical developments in US IR, but
they also have not kept up with advances in research methodology. In
fact, courses on methodology in IS are not compulsory even at the grad-
uate level (D. Sharma 2009: 76–78). Furthermore, quantitative and sta-
tistical techniques are almost absent from the curricula of Indian univer-
sities (Sahni 2009: 64). Given that IS scholarship in India is dominated
by area studies, it would be reasonable to expect Indian universities to
have well-established foreign language training programs. However, the
state of affairs points toward a bleak picture. For example, the School of
International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi—the
country’s largest IS school13—has “no student or scholar who can read
or write or speak Pashto or Baluchi, and this is not an isolated example”
(Mattoo 2009: 40). The neglect of these Pakistani (and Afghani) lan-
guages in India means that area studies scholarship on India’s subconti-
nental neighbor and rival tends to be subpar.14 Furthermore, the limited
research funding available to Indian students and scholars means that
“few Indian scholars have the luxury of being able to even visit the
region they are studying or spend time learning the language” (Mattoo
2009: 43).
The unavailability of academic books and articles, the neglect of
research methodology, and poor language skills means that IS scholar-
ship in India is not organized along what is termed “research programs”
in US academia nor is it driven by theoretical or empirical puzzles. For
example, as Rajesh M. Basrur notes, though it has become a cliché to
talk of India as the world’s largest democracy, Indian scholars have not
analyzed the “relationship between the patterns of India’s democratic
evolution and its external policies” (2009: 104). As a result, IS and area
scholarship in India “is neither theory-driven nor method-driven, nor
even problem/issue-driven,” instead it is “event-driven” (Sahni 2009:
64). In other words, IS scholarship is current affairs oriented and tends
to be driven by the topic of the day. Consequently, it is not surprising
that “think-tankers, journalists, and quasi-academics have been in the
forefront of new IRS [international relations studies] scholarship in
India” (Alagappa 2011: 209; see also Mohan 2009), and that many
important debates on Indian foreign policy issues take place in newspa-
pers and in the columns of current affairs magazines.
Not surprisingly, the quality of IS journals in India is quite poor. To
begin with, India “lacks the academic culture of peer review” (Behera
2008: 9). According to the registrar of Indian newspapers, only 40 of
the nearly 500 IS-related journals are published regularly “and less than
ten of them have any review process to maintain the quality of the pub-
lications” (Mattoo 2009: 39). International Studies, South Asia Survey,
and Strategic Analysis are perhaps the most well-known peer-reviewed
Indian IS journals. International Studies is the journal of the School of
International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University and, among the
three journals, it tends to publish the highest number of theoretically
informed articles (Basrur 2009: 100). However, most of the articles
published in this journal are from the faculty of the School of Interna-
tional Studies, where the journal is hosted (D. Sharma 2009: 81).
South Asian Survey is a journal of the Indian Council for South
Asian Cooperation and, as implied in the title of the journal and name
of its parent organization, its aim is to provide a regional perspective on
the politics, economics, and international relations of South Asia. As
such, the journal is not dedicated solely to the study of IS. Moreover,
the majority of the contributors to South Asian Survey are policymakers,
civil servants, diplomats, and journalists (as opposed to academics who
also publish in this journal). Therefore, theoretical concerns do not fea-
ture prominently in the journal (if at all). Finally, Strategic Analysis is a
journal of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, a New
Delhi−based think tank linked with the Indian Ministry of Defence.
Consequently, policy relevance as opposed to theoretical advancement
is the core concern of this journal.
Given the nature of academic publishing in India and also as a
result of training and funding issues, theoretically informed research is
not an important concern for Indian scholars. Notably, only eighteen
scholars from Indian universities published in ten important Western
journals between 1998 and 2008 (Mattoo 2009: 39). However, only
three of these ten journals—International Security, International
Organization, and World Politics—pay attention to theoretical issues.
The remainder of the journals have an area studies focus or are pub-
lished by think tanks.15 And even in the three theoretically driven jour-
nals, issues related to FPA are not the main concern.16
The Absence of FPA-Style Analysis in India

Given the current state of affairs of IS scholarship, Indian scholars have
tended either to debate topical foreign policy issues or to attempt to
explain (and rationalize) Indian foreign policy decisions to India and the
wider world. Finally, FPA-style research is also absent in India as a
result of the country’s peculiar political culture. Thanks to a colonial
legacy that privileged government secrecy when it came to matters per-
taining to questions of foreign policy and national security, access to the
private papers of key leaders, critical decision makers, and senior
bureaucrats continue to remain extremely limited six decades after inde-
pendence. Notionally, India adopted a “thirty-year rule” for the declas-
sification of important documents. In practice, this rule is mainly
flouted or applied selectively.17 Worse still, some scholars who were
reliably uncritical in their approach to India’s diplomatic record or well
connected to those in positions of power and authority were granted
selective access to government documents. However, there was always
a danger that scholars critical of the decisions or the decisionmakers
would be denied access to the documents in the future. This led to a cer-
tain degree of self-disciplining that was disadvantageous for theoreti-
cally informed FPA-style scholarship.
Area Studies and Diplomatic History in Indian IS

In their analysis of Indian foreign policy, Indian scholars tend to focus
on a chronological and narrative style with an eye toward making their
work policy relevant. Area studies and diplomatic histories have been
the preferred modes of knowledge generation. In addition to this, Indian
IS also tends to concentrate on a subgenre of area studies known as
“relational studies” (Bajpai 2009: 113) that focuses specifically on
India’s relationship with another country. Such works, some of which
can be theoretically informed in the broad sense, do not strive to search
for causal mechanisms in their explanations.
There are few books by Indian scholars that center on the sources
and determinants of the country’s foreign policy. An early and important
example is The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Insti-
tutions, Sources, and Personalities by Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya
(1970) from Jadavpur University. Bandyopadhyaya’s book, though
uneven in quality, provides the most comprehensive discussion of
sources and determinants of foreign policy decisionmaking in India. Its
strength is its serious treatment of the institutional apparatus of foreign
policy making in India. While multiple editions of the book have been
published in India over the decades, to our knowledge no other India-
based scholar has tried to study this issue in its entirety. Furthermore,
while the institutional setup of Indian foreign policy making is clearly
spelled out by Bandyopadhyaya, it remains unclear how the different
organizations (and bureaucrats) interact with one another because the
book lacks detailed case studies.
One of the most notable books focusing on the role of individual
leaders in foreign policy making is Surjit Mansingh’s (1984) important
study of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi titled India’s Search for Power:
Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966−1982. Mansingh, a former Indian
Foreign Service officer, cogently shows how the various features of
India’s domestic politics constrained Indira Gandhi’s conduct of foreign
policy. Though lacking any theoretical orientation, the book neverthe-
less provides a detailed account of the key developments that took place
in Indian foreign policy under Indira Gandhi. Unfortunately, the bulk of
the remainder of Indian scholarship on the sources and determinants of
foreign policy decisions in India is highly idiographic since no compet-
ing hypotheses are tested to make a theoretical contribution nor are psy-
chological processes analyzed because of a paucity of primary source
material.
In terms of substantive issues in Indian foreign policy, the nuclear
question has been a topic of much interest. One of the earliest and most
thoughtful and policy-oriented contributions on this subject remains

Sisir Gupta’s chapter “The Indian Dilemma” in A World of Nuclear
Powers? edited by Alistair Buchan (Gupta 1966). Gupta, a political ana-
lyst associated with the Congress Party in India, also served as a diplo-
mat and a political commentator. In “The Indian Dilemma,” he cogently
argues that in the absence of a nuclear guarantee from the great powers
and because of a perceived threat from the People’s Republic of China,
India’s decisionmakers at some point will feel compelled to acquire
nuclear weapons. Ironically, an Indian political commentator and lawyer
of long-standing, A. G. Noorani, in an insightful article “India’s Quest
for a Nuclear Guarantee” in Asian Survey (1967) carefully delineates
the maladroit strategy that India embarked on in its attempt to acquire a
nuclear guarantee from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. India wanted a nuclear guarantee but was also intent on
maintaining its nonaligned status, and thereby faced a fundamental con-
tradiction.
The Indian quest for nuclear weapons stemmed not only from the
potential nuclear threat from China, but also from a fundamental hostil-
ity toward the inequitable global order that allowed some states to pos-
sess nuclear weapons while denying them to others. In an early article
based on an elite sample survey, noted Indian social psychologist Ashis
Nandy (1974) shows how this sense of injustice was an important deter-
minant in India’s quest for nuclear weapons. While this is certainly a
useful contribution to the FPA-style literature in India, it remains a
stand-alone example since Nandy is not widely read by the Indian IS
community (because he comes from another discipline). Nandy is best
known for his critique of the West’s Enlightenment Project. However,
that corpus of research and writing falls outside the mainstream of IS
scholarship in India (as well as IR scholarship in the United States).
In the 1970s, International Security published two significant essays
on India’s nuclear weapons program. The first, “The Indian Nuclear
Explosion,” was written by India’s permanent representative to the
United Nations, Rikhi Jaipal (1977). Though informative, the essay was
little more than a deft and articulate defense of India’s first nuclear test.
The second, “India’s Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy,”
written by a political scientist and former member of the elite Indian
Administrative Service, Onkar Marwah (1977), had a broader intellec-
tual ambit. Marwah’s essay was an equally adroit defense of India’s
nuclear and space programs. Marwah explicitly sought to argue that,
contrary to popular belief, neither of the two programs had placed a sig-
nificant burden on India’s economy and thereby had not entailed dra-
matic opportunity costs. In more recent times, Bharat Karnad’s Nuclear

Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy
(2005) has received considerable attention. However, Karnad makes a
series of polemical and dubious historical and political claims, and his
work is not representative of careful scholarship.
Diplomatic history is another (limited) area where Indian scholars
with access to government archives have done some important work. An
early and important example is A Diplomatic History of Modern India
by US diplomatic historian Charles H. Heimsath and his Indian counter-
part Surjit Mansingh (1971). Covering India’s first twenty-five years as
an independent state, the book remains important because it constitutes
the standard reference work on that period of postindependence diplo-
matic history. Until archival material is made available to scholars and
researchers, this work will continue to inform academics about the early
choices in India’s foreign policy. In War and Peace in Modern India: A
Strategic History of the Nehru Years, Srinath Raghavan (2010) makes
some useful contributions to diplomatic and military history of the
Nehru years. However, Raghavan’s book is based on his doctoral disser-
tation at the University of London and, strictly speaking, is not a work
of an India-based scholar (though at the time of this writing, Raghavan
is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, a New Delhi−based
think tank). While undoubtedly useful, the works of these diplomatic
historians do not constitute FPA-style scholarship for reasons already
noted.
The Absence of FPA-Style Scholarship in India

While the examples from area studies and diplomatic history noted
above are representative of the bulk of Indian IS scholarship, there is a
small body of theoretically informed IS scholarship that only tangen-
tially deals with issues related to FPA. However, it should be noted that
the realist tradition “dominates” the analysis of foreign policy in India
(Behera 2009: 134). Despite the fact that under Nehru’s leadership India
had sought to create an ideational global order, liberalism has not been
important in the foreign policy analyses of Indian scholars. Further-
more, somewhat ironically, Indian scholarship has “hardly grappled
with the whole range of realist thought” (Bajpai 2009: 125). According
to Varun Sahni, “India’s external security policy has always operated in
the context of structural constraints” (2008: 211). Moreover, “the agent-
structure relationship veers dangerously close to the neorealist position”
in the analysis of Indian foreign policy (Sahni 2008: 230).
This is somewhat puzzling because Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam

(2007), the doyen of Indian strategic thinkers, argues that despite “very
contentious debates and even violent disagreements. . . . Indian foreign
policy was always a leadership function.” Subrahmanyam posits that the
most important foreign policy decisions, such as the strategy of non-
alignment (as opposed to nonalignment as an ideology), the Indian
nuclear program, partnership with the former Soviet Union, and India’s
economic liberalization, have all been the “initiatives” of Indian leaders.
Similarly, Raja Mohan (2009: 160) contends that, even in recent years,
“a small group of individuals have had extraordinary influence in
reshaping the national debate on India’s new foreign policy.”
In spite of this, Indian scholars have not analyzed the foreign policy
decisionmaking process in India through the study of individual choices
or group dynamics. To our knowledge, no Indian scholar has written a
major book or article using social psychology or the vast literature on
bureaucratic politics. A significant reason behind the absence of such
scholarship on the decisionmaking process is the fact that India lacks
the culture of declassifying government documents for scholarly
scrutiny. It therefore is not surprising that Indian scholars have tended
to favor the systemic in terms of the level of analysis and, consequently,
structure over agency in explaining Indian foreign policy dynamics.
That said, some Indian scholars have indeed performed useful theo-
retical work. However, their scholarship tends to be more IR centric
even as it speaks to some FPA issues. For example, Rajesh Basrur’s
(2008) work on the enduring India-Pakistan rivalry is a useful contribu-
tion to the literature. Basrur carefully defines what constitutes a “cold
war” and suggests that they are sustained through an amalgam of
ideational and material factors. His work is significant because he pro-
vides an explicit and innovative theoretical framework to reexamine an
otherwise well-trodden empirical ground. However, this is a theoretical
contribution to the wider IR and IS literature as opposed to being an
example of a work on FPA.
A number of Indian scholars are devoting increased attention to
matters pertaining to theoretical issues in IS (Bajpai and Mallavarapu
2005a, 2005b). However, literature on security studies dominates the
study of IS in India. FPA is not recognized as a distinct subfield of IS.
In fact, IS scholars in India have shied away from the study of interna-
tional political economy and have largely left that subfield of IS to
economists. Furthermore, though India wants to play a larger role in
global institutions and aspires to obtain a permanent seat in the United
Nations Security Council, critical intellectual engagement with interna-
tional institutions has remained outside the purview of Indian scholars.

The same is true for the study of international law. While there has been
some growing interest in studying nontraditional security issues in
India, this subfield has also remained atheoretical. The state continues
to remain the prime focus of analysis in Indian IS and issues of war and
peace dominate this literature.
Indeed, Navnita Chadha Behera (2009: 134–135) has identified
only three phases in the IS research agenda since Indian independence,
and none of these pay any attention to the process of decisionmaking in
the country. In the first phase that was largely coterminus with Nehru’s
term as the prime minister of India, Indian IS focused on the conception
of India as a soft or a hard power in Asia and beyond. Beginning in the
1960s and 1970s, the second phase analyzed the maintenance and
preservation of India’s preeminence in South Asia. In the third phase,
which began after India’s May 1998 nuclear tests that followed nearly a
decade of rapid economic growth, Indian IS has become concerned with
issues of international order and India’s place in what is believed to be
an emerging multipolar world. As such, Indian scholars have not really
worked on issues related to FPA.
FPA-Style Scholarship on India

by Scholars in Western Academia
It should be noted at the outset that this discussion of FPA-style schol-
arship on India by scholars in Western academia, several of whom are
of Indian origin, is not meant to be exhaustive. Our aim is merely to
demonstrate that, unlike India-based IS scholars, scholars in Western
academia have tried to explain the decisionmaking process behind
India’s most important foreign policy choices and have worked at all
levels of analysis. Many of these scholars were trained in North Amer-
ica and they provide strong causal arguments because their analyses are
oftentimes based on testing competing hypotheses or on comparative
research. However, because of different pedagogy and for reasons high-
lighted above, India-based IS scholars have not followed a similar
approach.
One of the few theoretically sophisticated and empirically rich stud-
ies of India’s quest for great-power status is Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V.
Paul’s India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status
(2003). The book examines the question of India’s attempts to enter the
global order as a major power, and the hurdles that it has faced along
that pathway. The book begins at the systemic level of analysis, but the
authors also examine state-level and decisionmaking variables. Nayar

and Paul’s analysis of Nehru’s worldview and India’s grand strategy
under his leadership is especially useful. In addition to this work,
Stephen P. Cohen has also written an important book on India’s rise,
India: Emerging Power (2001). Cohen’s work is at once historical, ana-
lytical, and hortatory. He argues quite cogently that India undertook
some drastic changes in the 1990s in response to international events,
and that these choices have placed the country on the path of economic
growth and military prowess. Cohen’s analysis of the major components
of Indian strategic thought and the worldview of India’s strategic elite is
one of the major strengths of this book.
Sumit Ganguly’s edited volume India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect
and Prospect (2010) is a recent example that explains the past and the
present state of India’s relationships with all of the major states and
with India’s neighbors in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia as well
as with Iran and Israel. This volume includes essays on the foreign pol-
icy dimensions of India’s economic and energy policies, which provide
a detailed analysis of personal, national, and systemic factors in
explaining India’s foreign policy decisions.
On substantive foreign policy issues, Rollie Lal’s comparative study
Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United
States and the World (2006) provides an important insight into the more
contemporary foreign policy decisionmaking process as well as the per-
ceptions of the elites of both India and China about the outside world,
especially the United States. Another work of diplomatic history dealing
with postindependence India’s relations with Southeast Asia is notewor-
thy: D. R. SarDesai’s Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam, 1947–1964 (1968) constitutes a carefully researched, well-
documented, and cogently argued diplomatic history of India’s foreign
policy toward some critical states in Southeast Asia in the early Cold
War years. SarDesai’s work is especially impressive because he was one
of the rare researchers who had substantial access to internal Indian
diplomatic correspondence.
Sumit Ganguly’s Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since
1947 (2001) is a comprehensive and theoretically supple analysis of the
four India-Pakistan wars since their independence in 1947. Ganguly’s
analysis is rooted in both the structural factors and the precipitating or
opportunistic causes of the India-Pakistan wars, and he tests his expla-
nation against rival hypotheses. Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty’s
Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear
Weapons (2003) seeks to test three competing hypotheses about the

effects of nuclear weapons on crisis stability in South Asia. To that end,
they examine the role of conventional military balance, US engagement,
and the effects of nuclear weapons in preventing these crises from esca-
lating into a full-scale war. After a careful analysis of available evi-
dence, the authors conclude that mutual possession of nuclear weapons
prevented escalation to full-scale war. Finally, in their article “The
2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy,” Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig (2005) explain the
difficulties of a successful implementation of a strategy of coercive
diplomacy when both adversaries possess nuclear weapons.
On the Sino-Indian conflict, the work of Stephen A. Hoffmann,
India and the China Crisis (1990) is especially useful. He carefully and
dispassionately traces Indian decisionmaking that led up to the 1962
Sino-Indian War. Hoffmann, one of the few academics who had access
to memoirs and private papers and who interviewed many of the princi-
pals involved in the conflict, manages to construct an accurate account
of the key choices leading up to the conflict. In his book Misperceptions
in Foreign Policy Making: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959−1962, Yaa-
cov Y. I. Vertzberger (1984) examines the process through which gov-
ernment leaders perceive events and use the available information in
making foreign policy choices. Vertzberger carefully analyzes the role
that Nehru personally played in the events leading to the Sino-Indian
War as well as the role played by other Indian entities such as the army,
intelligence apparatus, various ministries, and parliament. This sample
set of works shows that there is a substantial body of literature on FPA-
style scholarship on India, albeit most of it constitutes the work of
scholars not based in India.
Indian Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy
While Indian IS scholars have avoided theoretical work in general and

FPA-style research in particular, they have worked on at least two
important local concepts in the study of foreign policy—nonalignment
and Panchseel. Both of these concepts are important because they repre-
sent “the basic unit[s] of thinking” (Sartori 1984: 74) in India in matters
related to external affairs. The concept of nonalignment is an original
intellectual contribution of Nehru. Nehru wanted India, which was
emerging after close to two centuries of colonial rule, to chart its own
course in international affairs. Through his strategy of nonalignment,

Nehru sought to keep India “away from the power politics of groups
aligned one against the other” (Jones 1946a: 15). Given that India
became independent at the moment when the Cold War between the
United States and the former Soviet Union was beginning, Nehru
believed India should pursue an independent foreign policy compatible
with its own interests.
Nonalignment was neither a policy of isolation nor a policy of neu-
tralism. Nehru wanted India to “pull her full weight in world affairs,”
and to be actively engaged with the world partly because he “want[ed]
to” and partly because external relations could not be ignored in the
world that independent India was born into (Jones 1946b). And while
India certainly wanted to avoid fighting wars Nehru asserted that, if the
choice came to it, India would “join the side” that was “to our [India’s]
interest” (New York Times 1947). Ultimately, India chose to adopt a for-
eign policy that sought to undermine the role of power politics and
instead create an ideational world order (Rana 1976).
Consequently, Nehru and other Asian leaders, including Zhou Enlai
of China, U Nu of Burma (Myanmar), and Sukarno of Indonesia, came
up with the concept of Panchsheel, or the Five Principles. Panchsheel is
a Sanskrit term from the Buddhist poem and the great Indonesian clas-
sic Sutasoma (Chandra 2007). With these Five Principles—mutual
respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggres-
sion; noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and
mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence—Nehru sought to create his
ideational international order (Ranganathan 2007). These Five Princi-
ples were included in the preamble to an agreement on Tibet signed
between India and China in 1954. India looked at these Five Principles
not only as a way of defending its own sovereignty and territorial
integrity against foreign aggression, but also as a means to guarantee
the security of the postcolonial states in Asia and Africa.18 In their
attempt to institutionalize a normative order around the Five Principles,
India and other countries formed the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 to
create more political solidarity (Fidler and Ganguly 2010).
However, neither of these concepts was rigorously developed upon
by the academic communities in India or in the Anglo-American world.
As a consequence of the US-Pakistan alliance that emerged after 1954,
nonalignment became an article of faith of the Indian political and intel-
lectual establishment as it acquired a thinly veiled anti-Americanism. At
other times, it became part of the domestic ideological discourse that
meant that India would not take sides in the US-Soviet rivalry. This
interpretation of nonalignment, which meant that India would not side

with either superpower over any issue whatsoever, was very different
from the strategy that Nehru espoused that sought to evaluate India’s
interests first. After the formation of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship
Treaty that was at least an alignment if not an alliance, even nonalign-
ment as a strategy was challenged (Donaldson 1974). Similarly, India’s
multiple wars with Pakistan and China as well as India’s interference in
the domestic affairs of its smaller neighbors on the subcontinent were
an affront to the sentiments of Panchsheel.
While the political developments in India and its neighborhood
were a major challenge to these two Indian concepts of statecraft, they
did not receive any significant attention from US academia. The then
extant Cold War strongly influenced the intellectual environment in the
United States, and in 1956 US secretary of state John Foster Dulles
famously dismissed nonalignment as “immoral” (New York Times
1956). Consequently, without intellectually engaging with the concept
of nonalignment, most US scholars simply dismissed it as a “variant” of
neutrality (which, as explained above, is an erroneous interpretation of
this strategy).19 On the other hand, the concept of Panchsheel did not
receive any attention from US scholars whatsoever (Behera 2008: 17).
Arlene B. Tickner (2003a: 300) correctly notes that IR “reinforces ana-
lytic categories and research programmes that are systemically defined
by academic communities within the core [the United States], . . . that
determine what can be said, how it is said, and whether or not what is
said constitutes a pertinent or important contribution to knowledge.”
But within India, with few exceptions like A. P. Rana (1976), non-
alignment became an ideology with which to justify or explain India’s
foreign policy decisions while Panchsheel became a doctrine to which
regular lip service was to be paid. Consequently, both these concepts
ceased to be serious constructs that were theoretically developed. At
least one important reason for this neglect is the underdevelopment of
political theory and international thought in India that looks at Indian
thinkers and draws inspiration from Indian history. This is an important
point because in the West, political theory and international thought had
a formative influence on the discipline of IR.20 However, Indian IS has
not seriously engaged even with the international political thought of
Nehru (Chacko 2011). Similarly, no member of the Indian IS commu-
nity has published a book-length treatment of the strategic thought of
the ancient Indian thinker Kautilya. Finally, the international thought of
and the Mauryan emperor Aśoka—has been largely ignored by Indian

India’s most celebrated historical rulers—the Mughal emperor Akbar
IS scholars, though there are signs of a change in this regard. While not
strictly a work of political theory, Jayashree Vivekanandan’s (2011)
study of the grand strategy of Akbar is a notable exception that exca-
vates India’s precolonial past to search for indigenous traditions of
statecraft. Given their intellectual dependence on Western political the-
ory and international thought for the most of it, Indian scholars have not
theoretically developed concepts like nonalignment, which is based on
Nehru’s political thought, or Panchsheel, which is rooted in Indian (and
Asian) Buddhist philosophy.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we argued that the FPA subfield of US IR has no coun-

terpart in Indian IS. Analyses of foreign policy in India are largely dom-
inated by area studies scholarship (or relational studies) and diplomatic
history. When Indian foreign policy is analyzed using a theoretical
approach, Indian scholars have preferred a realist approach to explain
external relations. Indeed, structural and systemic factors are predomi-
nant in their analyses. Having said that, psychological processes and
decisionmaking models that focus on individual leaders or groups are
absent from Indian IS scholarship.
The nature of FPA-style scholarship demands the availability of
declassified government documents that shed light on foreign policy
decisionmaking processes. Both the availability and access to those doc-
uments is lacking. Given its present state, Indian IS also needs to
address issues of pedagogy and professional development that we high-
lighted in this chapter. At the same time, it is imperative for the Indian
IS community to engage with their counterparts in Anglo-America to
understand the importance of theoretical and methodological rigor (Paul
2009). The future of FPA-style scholarship in India will be bleak unless
these issues can be addressed.
On the other hand, it is possible that the Indian IS community will
engage with India’s colonial and precolonial past to develop indigenous
concepts and traditions of statecraft (Alagappa 2011). For example, a
prominent group of Indian IS scholars is trying to revive the concept of
nonalignment in the context of India’s rise as a major Asian power
(Khilnani et al. 2012). Whether or not these local traditions of statecraft
will impact the Anglo-American academic communities, they are bound
to have a major impact on the behavior and conduct of India’s foreign
policy.
Notes
1. It should be noted at the outset that this chapter is concerned with the
state of FPA scholarship in India. Although they are briefly discussed, the
works of ethnic Indian scholars in the diaspora in the United States (and else-
where) are not analyzed here. Furthermore, this chapter is not about the state of
IR scholarship in India. Instead, the focus is specifically on the state of FPA
scholarship, which is a subset of IR scholarship.
2. These concepts are subsequently explained in this chapter.
3. On the area studies debate, see Hanson (2009) and Bates (1997). On IR
as a social science, see Wight (2002). On causation, see Gerring (2005).
4. Bajpai further argues that theory is not necessarily value neutral.
5. Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated in 1948 while Patel died in 1950.
6. Under Nehru’s guidance, the Indian Council of World Affairs was estab-
lished in 1943 and the Indian School of International Studies was created in
1955. On India’s early advantages in IS in Asia, see Bajpai (2009: 110–111).
7. For a general statement about such a relationship between the colonies
and the metropole, see Anderson (1991).
8. In fact, even in the early years after independence, India learned about
the political developments in other parts of Asia through Western (primarily
British) media, journals, and books as opposed to gaining firsthand knowledge
of the countries concerned. Arguably, this is true to some degree even today.
9. Nehru was perhaps a rare exception in this regard since he did care
about broad patterns in world history (Kopf 1991). Notably, Nehru’s strategy of
nonalignment was based on his understanding of Indian history and conse-
quently of India’s place in Asian and world affairs (Keenleyside 1980).
10. On the “process” and “policy” approaches to FPA, see Carlsnaes (2008).
11. This was also due to the fact that, in a developing country like India,
professions such as law, medicine, and engineering (all of which had more
immediate applications and prospects for gainful employment) drew away the
most intellectually supple.
12. According to Behera (2008: 1), there are no more than “half a dozen”
such schools in India. D. Sharma (2009), on the other hand, mentions that there
are barely “over a dozen” such schools.
13. The Indian School of International Studies became the School of Inter-
national Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1970.
14. In fact, this lack of adequate language skills is even reflected in the
Indian intelligence agencies that do not have enough people who can read,
write, and even speak Urdu (which is also one of India’s official languages).
See Joshi (2008).
15. These journals include Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, Foreign Affairs, Inter-
national Affairs, Review of International Affairs, Security Dialogue, and Survival.
16. However, there are some books that deal with foreign policy research
and these are subsequently discussed in this chapter.
17. For example, the 1963 inquiry by the Indian army regarding India’s mil-
itary debacle against China in 1962—the Henderson-Brooks Report—has still
not been declassified.
18. This was also true for many other Asian states. See Kim, Fidler, and
Ganguly (2009).
19. For an early but influential example, see Armstrong (1956).

20. For an overview of the development of IR in the West along with polit-
ical thought, see Knutsen (1997) and Boucher (1998).
5
and the Arab World
Raymond Hinnebusch
While writings on the foreign policies of Arab states are by no

means scarce, the literature that explicitly uses the analytical tools of
foreign policy analysis (FPA) is more limited. As an early volume on
the issue observes, foreign policy–relevant work on the region was pri-
marily description, diplomatic history, current events commentary, or
work on the Arab-Israeli conflict; it was seldom informed by FPA the-
ory and was mainly concerned with the role of leaders and personalities
(Korany and Dessouki 1984). This was seen partly as a reflection of the
underdevelopment of FPA applied to the Global South. Since then, how-
ever, much has changed.
I begin this chapter with an overview of the key comparative works
on the FPA of the Arab states and identify the main debates over the
special features of the Arab world.1 Next, I survey a selection of defini-
tive, innovative, and representative works by regional scholars or schol-
ars of the region, organized by level of analysis and approach. Finally, I
summarize and integrate these findings into a framework of analysis
and indicate a future research agenda for the FPA of the Arab world
arising out of the uprisings that began in 2011.
Approaches to the Study of Arab States’ Foreign Policy
The Development of FPA in the Arab World

A body of work has been developed by indigenous scholars who have
been trained in FPA, through study either in the West or in Arab univer-
77
78 Raymond Hinnebusch
sities under Western-educated professors. Some of the most innovative

work is to be found in unpublished doctoral dissertations by Arab stu-
dents. This literature is growing as is work by non-Arab scholars of the
Arab world who have accumulated expertise and often undertaken field-
work in the region, and who address the distinctive characteristics of
FPA in the Arab world. These categories overlap in the case of Arab
scholars located at Western universities, an artifact of the limited schol-
arly life in a number of Arab states that leads many of the best to emi-
grate while they remain intimately in touch with the region. Among
those who stay in the region, Egyptian scholars are perhaps the most
prolific because the government is a major regional foreign policy actor
and hence a consumer of foreign policy analysis, and also because
Egypt’s universities are some of the most developed.
Most works applying FPA to the region are single-country case stud-
ies. Only a handful of works have made a systematic effort at regionwide
comparison. The 1984 volume The Foreign Policies of Arab States
edited by Bahgat Korany and Ali Hillal Dessouki was a path-breaking
attempt to systematically compare the foreign policies of all the major
Arab states using a common FPA framework in a project that brought
together both Arab and Western scholars. Its aim was to go beyond what
the authors took to be the predominant tendencies in existing literature,
either a realist-informed structuralism or a leader-centered psychological
approach. Although this is consistent with James Rosenau’s (1966)
assessment that these two factors (external pressures and leadership)
dominated in the third world owing to the weakness of institutions and
civil society, such approaches ignore many important factors. Korany
and Dessouki devised a framework of analysis that combined environ-
mental and decisionmaking variables, which each case study was
expected to survey. It included the external geopolitical environment,
state capabilities (including population, wealth, and military power), and
political structure characterized by both authoritarianism and factional-
ism. At the level of decisionmaking, leaders were seen to legitimize
themselves according to a foreign policy role (i.e., defense of shared
Arab core interests) with, however, a gap between role conception and
performance. This seminal book has gone through three editions (Korany
and Dessouki 1984, 1991, 2008). Its Arabic edition (Korany and
Dessouki 1994) is widely used as a text in Arab universities.
A second volume on regional diplomacy, Diplomacy in the Middle
East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers
edited by Leon Carl Brown (2001), expanded the country cases to non-
Arab regional states and great powers active in the Middle East. How-
Foreign Policy Analysis and the Arab World 79
ever, its theme—the historical tendency of regional states to seek to

draw in external patrons—was not systematically applied to the case
studies that varied considerably in focus and approach. Another volume,
The Many Faces of National Security in the Middle East edited by Bah-
gat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen (1993), albeit focused on secu-
rity rather than foreign policies, made advances in breaking down the
inside-outside dichotomy.
The fourth volume, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States,
edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (2002),
applied a common FPA framework in a systematic way to a selection of
regional actors, including the main non-Arab states of Iran, Turkey, and
Israel. In attempting to engage more explicitly with theoretical litera-
ture, the editors identified three environmental levels in which foreign
policy makers had to operate: the global (where dependency theory car-
ried weight); the regional (where a normative struggle between sover-
eignty and identity paralleled a material balance of power); and the
domestic level (where state formation shaped durable foreign policy
tangents). Roles, which expressed states’ traditions of balancing
between the often rival demands of the three levels, were interpreted
and applied via the decisionmaking process in specific situations. The
volume ended with a conclusion that identified certain patterns of for-
eign policy outcomes typical of the region. A second edition of this vol-
ume was published in 2014 (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami 2014).
Arab Foreign Policy Making

in the Context of Disciplinary Debates
Foreign policy analysis in the region cannot be separated from wider inter-
national relations (IR) debates originating in North America, particularly
those bearing on the “environmental” level of analysis, the features of the
systemic level to which decisionmakers react. First, many studies see the
Middle East as a realist world, a zone of war, where high threat levels and
the possibility of war remain imminent. This arguably accurately describes
the interstate environment in which neighboring states are seen as potential
threats, albeit also potential allies. In such studies, the decisionmaker is
seen as a rational actor balancing against threats (Walt 1987).
Second, the exceptional external penetration and the dependence of
many regional states on core patrons give credence to Marxist structural-
ist accounts. Many indigenous scholars are naturally persuaded by vari-
ants of dependency theory, the only approach that looks at IR from the
point of view of the Global South, and also by the kindred world systems
theory to which an indigenous scholar, Samir Amin (1974), was a main

contributor. The policy process was highly penetrated by external actors
and national decisionmakers were seen as rational clients whose interests
overlapped with those of the core; hence, their choices were responsive
to it rather than domestic opinion (Brown 1984; Alnasrawi 1991).
A third feature of the region, the exceptional power of trans- or
suprastate identities, Arabism and Islam, has inspired debates over how
much these affect foreign policy behavior, with notably Michael Barnett
(1998) and Stephen Walt (1987) arguing for the utility respectively of
constructivism and realism. Another seminal text that addresses this
debate, Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East by Shibley Tel-
hami and Barnett (2002), includes a mixture of indigenous and Western
scholars, who also are divided on the relative importance of identity and
of material interests and threats in foreign policy making. Several
Egyptian scholars, such as Korany and Dessouki (1984) and Mohamed
Hassanein Heikal (1978) promoted the idea of an “Arab system” based
on shared Arab identity, which was assumed to shape special common
interests among the Arab states. As long as pan-Arabism retained its
power, the “national interest” that state leaders were expected to pro-
mote was as much an all-Arab interest as that of their individual Arab
states, inducing into foreign policy making a potential tension between
“raison d’état and raison de la nation,” as Bahgat Korany (1987,
quoted in Korany 1988: 176) famously puts it. This, it is important to
note, distinguishes the Arab states from the non-Arab states of the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA)—namely, Turkey, Israel, and Iran—
where the nation and state enjoy the close congruence typical of the
Western nation-state prototype. A debate has periodically been reopened
over whether pan-Arabism is now defunct as a factor driving or con-
straining Arab state foreign policies (Ajami 1978; Sayigh 1991); or has
merely taken new forms more compatible with acceptance of sovereign
statehood in the Arab world (Sirriyeh 2000); or is located now at the
transstate popular level rather than in state role conceptions (Valbjorn
and Bank 2007). Identity is generally either seen to constitute the roles
that decisionmakers play or, in shaping public opinion, to constrain their
pursuit of state or regime interests.
Levels of Analysis
Foreign policy analysis–relevant literature can be identified at various

levels of analysis, the systemic or environmental level (both global and
regional) and the domestic level, itself admitting of disaggregation into

individual leadership; foreign policy role; bureaucratic intraelite politics;
state-society relations; and domestic political economy. In this section, I
provide a survey of representative work, with the focus on scholars from
the region where available and secondarily on outside scholars of the
region, and concentrating on three states that have been the focus of
much of the research (i.e., Egypt, Syria, and Jordan).
Elites and Decisionmaking

Many studies are, unsurprisingly, elite centered. Michael Brecher’s
(1972) study of Israeli foreign policy is widely recognized as a break-
through in FPA that has been replicated in other cases in the Middle
East region. Its strengths included its systematic outline of the environ-
mental determinants, but especially its emphasis on the images and per-
ceptions of decisionmakers. Brecher’s analysis of Israeli elites’ attitudi-
nal prism and of their decisionmaking process shows how much a shift
in the power balance within the leadership can make for very different
responses to the same environmental conditions, notably the replace-
ment of the dovish prime minister Moshe Sharett by the hawkish David
Ben-Gurion.
Adeed Dawisha, one of the most prolific and influential writers on
foreign policy making in the Arab world, deployed Brecher’s approach
in several Arab cases. His definitive work on Egyptian foreign policy
under Gamal Abdel Nasser (Dawisha 1976) was in the leadership-cen-
tered tradition, seeing Nasser’s anti-imperialist foreign policy as a func-
tion of his perceptions, values, and personality interacting with the
country’s environment. In two further works, Dawisha examined the
decisionmaking process leading to two interventions, that of Egypt in
Yemen and of Syria in Lebanon. His work on the Yemen intervention
(Dawisha 1977) examines the “operational environment”; presents a
qualitative and quantitative analysis of Nasser’s perceptions of it; looks
at the decisionmaking process; and examines three key decisions that
led to the intervention, ending with an assessment of its feedback
effects and policy consequences.
Dawisha’s studies on Syria’s 1976 intervention in Lebanon follow a
similar pattern (Dawisha 1978). After looking at the “setting” (i.e., the
struggle over Lebanon during its civil war), the focus shifts to the Syr-
ian political structure: while acknowledging the concentration of power
in the Hafez al-Assad presidency, Dawisha still judges Syria to be
exceptional in the MENA region in that the presidency shared power
with a strong political party, indicative of a certain importance accorded

to institutions in this case. The decision on intervention is said to have
resulted from a week’s stormy meetings in the Syrian party leadership
bodies. He then charts perceptions of the leadership and traces the
sequence of decisions. His study is based on interviews at the leadership
level as well as analysis of speeches and other discourse.
Several other studies of decisionmaking in MENA crises stress the
impact of images and, particularly, misperceptions in the policy process.
The common tendency to exaggerate the threat from the enemy is com-
patible with the realist security dilemma in which each side, fearing the
other, does things that increase the other’s fear. Laura James’s (2006)
study of Egypt in the 1956 Suez War and 1967 Arab-Israeli War shows
the opposite misperception; namely, Nasser’s underestimation of the
aggressiveness or power of the enemy. In the Suez War, even though
Nasser saw British imperialism as Egypt’s main enemy, he believed the
international bipolar environment would prevent the British and French
from resorting to force, especially since Egypt had shown itself to be
reasonable in international negotiations over the canal, and he could not
imagine British prime minister Anthony Eden collaborating with Israel,
which would ruin British interests in the Arab world. Thus, the Israeli
attack and the British-French ultimatum took Egypt by surprise; many
of Nasser’s colleagues, in panic, advised surrender but Nasser insisted
on resistance, continuing to believe that he could manipulate rivalries
among world powers. In fact, although Nasser did miscalculate his
rivals’ decisions, his perceptions of the balance of power proved realis-
tic since the aggressors were forced by the superpowers to withdraw
from Egypt.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War has widely been explained in rationalist
terms as a crisis of brinkmanship by Nasser that got out of hand (Stein
1991; Mor 1991; Popp 2006). Richard B. Parker (1993: 78–98), stress-
ing misperceptions, shows that Nasser expected a rerun of 1956, believ-
ing the United States would restrain Israel or at least that his forces
could absorb an Israeli attack long enough for an international interven-
tion to end the crisis and give him a political victory. James (2006)
believes that, in Nasser’s authoritarian regime, politicized intelligence
on Israel caused him to underestimate its capabilities.
Squarely in the tradition of leadership-level psychological studies is
the work by Shaheen Ayubi (1994) on Nasser’s and Anwar Sadat’s deci-
sionmaking. The foreign policy process, in his view, is uninstitutional-
ized in MENA, where patrimonial traditions or charismatic leadership
substitute for institutions; as such, the decisionmaking models appropri-
ate in the West are not applicable. In an uninstitutionalized setting, Gra-

ham T. Allison’s (1971) organizational model stressing the way standard
operating procedures shape policy is seen as inapplicable; not only are
there few formal or institutional constraints on the leader, but his legit-
imacy comes to be dependent on heroic personal performance in foreign
policy that leads to risk taking. He agrees with the argument of Boutros
Boutros-Ghali (1963: 320) that Egyptian foreign policy formulation
under Nasser was strictly the prerogative of the president and that the
extent to which he was guided by other elites, including the foreign
minister, was a matter of his personal choice. The foreign policy
bureaucracy, for Ayubi, was neither as rational-legal or weighty as in the
West, and the leader dominated and marginalized the foreign minister
who was normally a trusted client. The bureaucratic politics model
where the outcome depends on bargaining between leaders of rival
institutional branches (Allison 1971) was also thought inapplicable
since such leaders lacked strong institutional bases, seldom having
emerged from them, and did not represent them in the policy process.
Ayubi (1994) therefore argues that the rational actor model is more
useful for understanding the foreign policy of the MENA states since it
concentrates on the role of the leader’s perceptions and operational
code, but his work also underlines how the overconcentration of power
in the hands of a single decisionmaker risks that decisions will be
overly affected by the leader’s psychological complexes. Ayubi employs
Erik Erikson’s (1950) argument that the way the psychological prob-
lems of childhood and adolescence are overcome tends to shape a
leader’s personality. Thus, Nasser’s rebellion against his father was
channeled into nationalist agitation against imperialism. In power,
Nasser was sensitive to perceived slights to his dignity and that of
Egypt from the great powers. He would not give in under threat and,
when challenged, would go on the offensive even against a superior
power rather than accept defeat. He was ready to take large risks to win,
especially since his personal legitimacy was so bound up with foreign
policy performance.
In spite of such leader-centered analyses, there is some tradition of
linkage between factional, if not necessarily bureaucratic, politics and
foreign policy, with intraregime factionalism seen to produce subopti-
mal outcomes. In the run-up to the 1967 war, factional politics in Egypt,
notably mistrust between President Nasser and Field Marshall Abdel
Hakim Amer interfered with intelligence and defense planning, con-
tributing to a disastrous defeat for Egypt (R. B. Parker 1993). Syria’s
1970 intervention in Jordan is attributed to a struggle for power between
the radical Jadid faction that controlled the Baath party and the moder-
ate al-Assad faction in charge of the army, and Syria’s underperfor-
mance in this episode can be attributed partly to its disunity (Bar-
Simon-Tov 1983).
Toward Neoclassical Realism

Realist-inspired approaches have long been used to explain the Middle
East. Famously, Walt (1987) makes the argument that neither identity
nor dependency could override balancing against threat as the main
imperative of foreign policy in the region. Shibley Telhami’s (1990)
pathbreaking analysis of Egypt’s foreign policy under Sadat accepts
realist assumptions about the external power balance, but explains
Egypt’s particular response to this balance by bringing in other levels of
analysis, as would later be done systematically by neoclassical realism.
The systemic level, he argues, shaped only general long-run tendencies.
Theories at lower levels of analysis were needed to explain more spe-
cific behavior, but levels could be combined only if the theories at each
level were compatible: realism at the system level and the rational actor
at the leadership level were thought compatible.
Telhami (1990) dismissed certain popular explanations of why,
under Sadat, Egypt abandoned its Soviet patron and reached a separate
peace with Israel at the expense of its Arab leadership. Focusing on
Sadat’s personal values is unconvincing, Telhami argues, since Sadat had
a history of anti-Western attitudes; neither was Egypt constrained by
economic woes since these could have been addressed by reliance on aid
from the Arab oil producers that Sadat’s separate peace sacrificed.
Rather, in line with realism, Egypt’s search for a peace settlement under
US auspices was a response to a shift in the balance of power, globally
and regionally. A main regional dynamic has always been the alignment
of regional states with global great powers in their struggles with each
other—to make up for regional power imbalances against them. While
Nasser exploited nonalignment and bipolarity for a while, Egypt’s loss of
the 1967 war to Israel and the relative shift in global power away from
the Soviet Union led Egypt to realign. Knowing that the United States
had the cards to force Israel to make concessions to Egypt, Sadat sought
US patronage. The United States, he thought, would deter Israel and give
Egypt resources to reassert regional leadership if Egypt could show itself
to be a better surrogate for US interests in the Middle East than Israel.
This was not a quirk of Sadat’s personality: not only was the per-
ception of a shift in the power balance that Egypt faced accurate, but it
was also shared by the Egyptian elite in general. Where many of his
lieutenants parted with Sadat was in regard to his particular tactical
choice to rely wholly on appeasement of the United States; thus, he
overruled and dismissed other elites who were critical or independent-
minded on this issue. In fact, the total break with the Soviet Union
deprived Egypt of any military option, unnecessarily reducing its bar-
gaining leverage in negotiations with Israel. He also made too many
concessions in advance, and a propensity toward wishful thinking made
him believe that his personal rapport with US leaders would deliver an
acceptable deal. According to Telhami (1990), the overcentralization of
the Egyptian political system, and hence Sadat’s lack of accountability
to the wider elite and the public, made it difficult to correct his mis-
takes. Thus, while the realist power balance shaped the situation, the
specific terms of the peace settlement—whether it would be a compre-
hensive one acceptable in the Arab world or a separate one expending
Egypt’s Arab legitimacy—were shaped by Sadat’s suboptimal bargain-
ing strategies, themselves a product of the foreign policy process in
Egypt.
Identity and Foreign Policy Roles

Another genre of work, inspired by constructivism or by the earlier tra-
dition of foreign policy role analysis, examined the place of identity and
role in foreign policy making. Murhaf Jouejati’s (1997) comparison of
Syria’s and Egypt’s divergent approaches to a peace settlement with
Israel took a constructivist approach, inspired by Barnett’s (1998) idea
that the rival regional norms or institutions, Arabism and sovereignty,
constrained or empowered decisionmakers. The state’s role was seen as
the linkage between structure (regional norms and institutions) and
agent (state decisionmakers); such roles become routinized and become
part of the expectation of legitimate behavior into which leaders are
socialized or else leaders are constrained by the public’s embracing of
state roles. Both Sadat’s Egypt and al-Assad’s Syria were embedded in
these rival institutions. However, sovereignty was more compatible with
Egypt’s long history with an identity separate from Arabism while Syria
had no comparable history of statehood that could substitute for Ara-
bism. Embracing sovereignty enabled Sadat to pursue a separate peace
with Israel. On the other hand, Arabism precluded al-Assad from doing
the same (i.e., abandoning the Palestinians) since his regime’s legiti-
macy rested on being seen to defend the wider Arab national interest.
Jouejati saw Syria’s policy as emerging from a compromise between the
ruling Baath Party, which guarded Arabist norms, and the president’s
greater pragmatism owing to his need to deal with external realities and
constraints. Not the personalities of the two leaders but identity or role dif-
ferences—that is, Egypt’s state-centrism versus Syria’s Arab-centrism—
biased the policy process in contrary ways.
The above-mentioned volume edited by Telhami and Barnett (2002)
systematically addresses the debate over the relative weight of identity
in foreign policy making. In the constructivist view, perceptions of
interest and threat from the international system were interpreted via the
lens of identity, which was socially constructed. These identities did not
just constrain the pursuit of material interests, but might also constitute
(Arab) conceptions of those interests. Once this happens, identity
affects foreign policy (both as a legitimizing device and as a frame that
conditions the likely and possible). Yet because especially in the Middle
East there are multiple identities and also because the same identities
can be interpreted in different ways, as Arabism has been, there can be
no one-to-one relation between identity and policy. Rival elites are
likely to contest which identity to prioritize, and the struggles over for-
eign policy choices are framed in terms of identity differences. Marc
Lynch (2002) looks at how the transstate public space of the Arab world
was an arena for conflicting interpretations of the proper foreign policy
role of an Arab state, and how this contest was an integral part of the
policy process in the individual states embedded in this Arab public
sphere.
The case studies in Telhami and Barnett’s (2002) volume manifest
different interpretations of the relations between identity, interest, and
foreign policy. In Jordan, the state’s “rational” interest in survival,
which required appeasement of Israel and Western patrons, directly con-
flicted with the Arab public identity of the populace that acted largely as
a constraint, was occasionally bowed to (in periods of liberalization),
and was often overridden if it became too threatening to the regime
(requiring royal dictatorship). But additionally, Lynch (2002) shows
how the Jordanian regime’s policy choices, notably peace with Israel,
were paralleled by attempted reconstructions of Jordan’s identity (i.e.,
efforts to construct a legitimizing “Jordan-first” identity compatible
with a separate Israeli peace deal). In the Syrian case, Yahya Sadowski
(2002) argues that despite an official Arab identity, a separate Syrian
identity had been unintentionally “constructed” since the al-Assad
regime discredited Baathist Arabism by seeming to put Syrian over
Arab interests as Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
and Iraq engaged in bitter conflicts. Indeed, al-Assad played realpolitik,
not identity politics, sacrificing Arab interests to Syrian state interests,

an interpretation contrary to that of Jouejati (1997) noted above.
Ibrahim Karawan’s (2002) interpretation of Egypt saw the state as hav-
ing a decisive role in constructing identities comparable with what it
thought to be its interests, a view compatible with Jouejati’s assessment
of Egypt.
Finally, Russell E. Lucas (2000), who has pioneered work on the
effect of public opinion in foreign policy making in the Arab world,
observes that although constructivism saw debates over identity as
influencing foreign policy, it did not identify the mechanisms that link
the two. He proposes that a strong linkage was most likely if an iden-
tity-related issue became publicly salient and there was a public consen-
sus and some scope for mobilization around it, while elites were
divided. Applied to the conflict inside Jordan in the 1950s over the
Baghdad Pact, he notes that King Hussein I had wanted to sign the pact,
but the strongly opposed public was mobilized by Radio Cairo to riot
and demonstrate against it. With the impossibility of imprisoning all
those opposed, the cabinet divided, and the king not yet having consol-
idated royal authority, Hussein briefly bowed to the opposition—until a
royal coup later demolished the opposition and restored Jordan’s pro-
Western tangent.
Domestic Politics,
State-Society Relations, and Foreign Policy
There is a venerable tradition in IR that links domestic politics to inter-
national conflict and war. Do domestic conflict and regime instability or
legitimacy deficits increase international conflict, including war, in
MENA? Statistical analyses of internal and external conflict have failed
to establish a consensus on such a link, but case studies frequently have
asserted one. In the case of Syria many Israeli analysts, in particular,
have linked its supposed belligerency to the need of a minority Alawite
elite to prove its Arab nationalist credentials to the Sunni majority by
challenging Israel and eschewing a resolution of the conflict (Kedar
2005). Fred Lawson (1996) argues that when Syria faced severe internal
opposition, especially when paralleled by economic crisis, its foreign
policy became more aggressive, with militancy in foreign policy often
calculated to acquire economic resources needed to co-opt the opposi-
tion. Most scholars agree that the efforts of the narrow-based radical
Baath regime in the period from 1963 to 1970 to acquire domestic
nationalist legitimacy by sponsoring Palestinian raids into Israel and
engaging in reckless anti-Israeli rhetoric led Syria in 1967 into a war

that it did not want (Hinnebusch 1991; Seale 1988). On the other hand,
for many analysts, the Syrian-Israeli conflict was a reality with its own
dynamics that was independent of Syria’s domestic politics. Thus,
Avner Yaniv (1986) sees a deliberate Syrian decision to match Israeli
assertiveness, notably in the demilitarized zone and over water diver-
sion, as setting off an escalation that led to war in 1967.
A parallel tradition used domestic politics explanations to explain
alliance building. In a widely influential article, Steven David (1991)
proposed to adapt realism to the fragmented and domestically uncon-
solidated states in the third world and used some MENA cases to illus-
trate his argument. In such states, he argued, domestic threats to
regimes were much more salient than external threats; hence, foreign
policy was driven by the need to deal with the former, not the latter.
Such states, he argued, “omni-balanced” (bandwagoned) with more dis-
tant external patrons in order to get the resources to repress or co-opt
opposition at home. Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg
(1997) further adapted David’s view to the special features of MENA;
namely, the vulnerability of states to penetration by rival states using
transstate identity to stir up domestic opposition, what they call inter-
related threats—threats from domestic opposition fostered by rival
regional powers. These may be dealt with by bandwagoning with
(appeasing) domestic opinion, King Hussein’s strategy in the 1990 Gulf
War. F. Gregory Gause III (2003−2004) also sees domestic opposition
as the main threat against which Gulf Arab regimes balanced. These
approaches acknowledge the importance of discourse wars over identity,
but see states responding to these threats by forms of realist balancing.
Omnibalancing has also been applied to the cases of Saudi Arabia
(Reinhold 2001) and Oman (O’Reilly 1998).
Malik Mufti (1996) tackles a variation of alliance building—the
unionist initiatives typical of the period from 1950 to 1980 in the Arab
world—seeking to understand what drove them and why they ceased
after 1980. He shows that they cannot, as realists think, be explained as
balancing against external threats. Rather they are a function of regimes
seeking legitimacy and support, mostly at home. While this might fit
with David’s (1991) omnibalancing scenario in which foreign policy is
used to contain internal threats (from opposition), David’s approach
cannot explain why such unionism ceased after 1980. Constructivists
such as Barnett (1998) would attribute this to a shift in the region’s nor-
mative balance from pan-Arabism to state sovereignty, but what caused
this shift?
By way of resolving these riddles, Mufti (1996) distinguishes expan-

sionist unionism from defensive unionism and posits state consolidation
as the independent variable determining the kind of unionism pursued.
Domestically consolidated states, such as Nasser’s Egypt, used expan-
sionist unionism to build spheres of influence and assert regional leader-
ship by mobilizing domestic opposition in mostly unconsolidated rival
states. In cases of defensive unionism, unconsolidated states aimed to
appease domestic opinion and get support from (by appeasing) expansive
unionist regimes. The reason that unionism stopped after 1980 is that
most states had become too consolidated to be vulnerable to penetration
by offensive unionist regimes. Both the omnibalancing and the identity
change explanations fail to appreciate that the level of state consolidation
varies and that, to the extent it increases, states shift the normative bal-
ance toward sovereignty and have less of a need to omnibalance.
If Mufti (1996) charted the impact on foreign policy of variations in
Arab state consolidation over time, Basil Salloukh (2000) identified
variations among states in the same time period, comparing Syria and
Jordan. His work fits with neoclassical realism, which accepted that
states’ foreign policies are driven by external security threats, but
whether they effectively respond depends on whether domestic institu-
tions can effectively harness society for the power struggle. Salloukh
compares state-society relations, specifically whether society was effec-
tively controlled by the regime in Syria and in Jordan. What Ayubi
(1994) and Dawisha (1976) take for granted (i.e., power concentration
at the top of autonomous regimes), Salloukh problematizes: if society
was incorporated into the regime via modern corporatist institutions
(Syria), decisionmakers enjoyed the autonomy from domestic con-
straints to respond effectively to the external environment; if regimes
relied on traditional tribal forces (Jordan), domestic factors deprived the
regime of this capability. Realist Arabism was the outcome in Syria
where the regime could put realist strategies in the service of Arabist
goals.
In another article on Jordan, Salloukh (1996) argues that the leader-
centric literature that focused on King Hussein exaggerated the impor-
tance of his personality and prowess for outcomes. At the same time,
realism’s view of foreign policy as balancing against external threats
neglected that, for fragmented states such as Jordan, the main threat was
within and therefore foreign policy was chiefly deployed to ensure
regime survival at home. Because the Jordanian regime was chiefly
built on neopatrimonial clientelist support from tribes, divide and rule
(e.g., between the Palestinians and East Bankers), and selective coer-
cion, it lacked the ability to penetrate and harness society for external
foreign policy ambition, as in al-Assad’s Syria. As a state dependent for
survival on external resources, the king normally omnibalanced with his
Western patrons (Great Britain and the United States) and Israel at cru-
cial periods to get the coercive backing to repress domestic opposition.
However, at other times, because Jordan was so vulnerable to transstate
identity appeals (Arab nationalism), when domestic opinion was
aroused by a crisis such as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War or the Gulf War,
the king often bandwagoned with public demands or the regional states
(Egypt) that promoted them. While Jordan thus was more acted on than
actor in the regional power struggle, Salloukh acknowledges the deft-
ness of the Jordanian regime in deploying its foreign policy to survive
external threats.
Political Economy Approaches

Political economy approaches vary considerably, from rather mainstream
versions of the rentier state thesis to Marxist class analysis. The former
is inspired by one of the MENA region’s main features, the dependence
of regional economies on rent either from hydrocarbons or strategic rent
(foreign aid), which has been seen to shape foreign policies in various
ways. Michael Barnett and Jack Levy (1991) argue that alliance deci-
sions cannot be explained simply by external threats, but also by the
domestic political economy. Specifically, third world states that lack
domestic resources for self-defense, either because taxation or conscrip-
tion might require unwanted domestic accountability or because they
cannot divert to defense patronage resources needed to service the ruling
coalition or appease the public, may prefer to acquire resources or pro-
tection through external alliances, even at the cost of dependency on for-
eign powers. Egypt’s loss of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War made it particu-
larly dependent on external alliances to get the protection and resources
to contain both the external threat from Israel and the internal threat from
domestic opposition. Nasser deepened his dependence on the Soviet
Union while Sadat’s realignment from a Soviet to US alliance was also
driven by these needs.
Laurie Brand’s (1995) notion of “budget security,” using the case of
Jordan, argues that foreign policy and specifically alliance making is
put in the service of acquiring the financial resources to sustain the
regime and reproduce the ruling coalition. Indeed, Jordan, from its very
formation under the British, lacked the economic viability to sustain the
ruling monarchy and could not do so without subsidies. Hence, acquir-
ing budget resources, rather than responding to the balance of power or

external military threats, was the most basic survival imperative for the
regime. As Harknett and VanDenBerg (1997) point out, when there are
external threats, they are less military than threats to domestic legiti-
macy and stability, as Gause (2003−2004) also found in the Gulf. Curtis
Ryan (2009) agrees with Brand (1995) that accessing the resources
needed to maintain ruling coalitions (the security forces, bureaucracy,
and commercial bourgeoisie) was a more basic determinant of foreign
policy than external threats, but Ryan concedes that the most immediate
need—revenues for the treasury, security protection from external
threat, or appeasement of domestic opinion—varied over time. Simi-
larly, some, such as Lawson (1996), argue that the Syrian Baathist
regime used its foreign policy militancy to acquire economic rent,
notably aid from the Gulf states, that served the purposes of regime con-
solidation (i.e., to keep the army happy with arms purchases and as
patronage to co-opt clients).
Abbas Alnasrawi (1991) saw rentierism as also fostering depend-
ency in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy was a function of its
dependency on the United States for security from within and without,
resulting in a deal to serve the West by keeping oil prices moderate and
to recycle petrodollars to the West. The resulting deep investment of the
Saudis in US banks and bonds and the proliferation of Western arms and
construction contracts led, domestically, to a much deeper US penetra-
tion of the country, with Saudi princes, compradors, traders, and arms
dealers invested in and profiting from the Western connection. This
locked Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy into a pro-Western tangent, even if
the hostility of regional and often domestic opinion toward the West
required an occasional tactical criticism of specific Western policies or
parallel patronage of Wahhabist fundamentalist movements regionally
that sometimes antagonized the West. However, exactly how such bal-
ancing was calculated required opening the opaque black box of the
Saudi’s interfamilial policy process, where rival princes were often seen
to advocate somewhat different strategies with, for instance, the Sudairi
Seven seen to be more pro-Western and Prince (later King) Abdullah
more responsive to Arab opinion (Nonneman 2005).
Rent not only consolidated dependency in foreign policy but, under
other conditions, also generated assertive policies leading to war and
conflict. Radical republics that possessed rent, such as Libya and Iraq,
used it to pursue arms buildups and nationalist foreign policies that led
to war with Iran in the latter case and confrontation with the West in
both cases. In addition, rent shortfalls in Iraq exacerbated by Iran-Iraq
War debt to the Gulf oil states plus “over-pumping” of oil by Gulf
monarchies that drove down the price of Iraqi oil exports were seen, for
instance, by Kiren Aziz Chaudhry (1991) as factors in Saddam Hus-
sein’s decision to invade Kuwait. This raises the question of what
explains why rent can lead to either dependency on the West or chal-
lenges to it. Evidently, one needs to go deeper and look at the character
of the ruling coalition.
James Allinson’s (2011) work on Jordan does just that. He agrees
with Brand (1995) that Jordan’s inability to do without external subsi-
dies explained its foreign policy. However, the particular alliances cho-
sen to access resources were not self-evident. Indeed, in a pivotal
episode in the mid-1950s, it was a major issue of internal contestation
whether Jordan should keep its alignment with the West or realign with
the Cairo-led Arab nationalist camp (and change the source of its subsi-
dies). This choice, he argues, could not be understood simply in terms
of rational calculations by the leadership in response to an external
threat since Jordan was deeply divided about whether that threat was
from Israel and the West or from Egypt. Neither could it be seen as
decided by identity since similarly the country was divided between
those prioritizing Jordanian sovereignty and those identifying with Arab
nationalism. Rather, the outcome was shaped by a struggle between
these rival social forces over control of the state. The Jordanian regime
had been constructed around the incorporation of the tribes into the
army through the British subsidy. In the 1950s, the rising middle class
and the dispossessed masses challenged the conservative bloc of tribal
shaikhs, clan notables, and rich merchants invested in the British align-
ment. The struggle was played out in parallel battles inside the army, in
the streets via protests, and at the ballot box. Ultimately, the king was
able to repress the opposition and sustain the Western alignment with
the support of tribal military units co-opted via the British subsidy and
reinforced by Western intervention. This struggle put Jordan on a for-
eign policy tangent that would prove highly durable.
A long line of Egyptian Marxist writers, such as Samir Amin (1978),
have similarly explained the foreign policy of Arab countries by linking it
to domestic political economy. A more recent work by Yasser Elwy
(2009) continues in this tradition, looking specifically at Egypt. Foreign
policy issues, he argues, have shaped the domestic regime, the balance
among social forces, and Egypt’s modernization strategy while, in turn,
foreign policy choices have been used by elites to build domestic coali-
tions and serve political economy strategies. Thus, Nasserism reflected
the rise of the nationalist petit bourgeoisie radicalized by the Palestine
War and the struggle for independence from the British. Its class interest
dictated a reformist middle course between the oligarchy and the working
class, which it attempted to promote through an autonomous authoritarian
corporatist state. The Nasserist elite wanted reform from above instead of
revolution from below and sought autonomy of both left and right, pro-
moting a corporatist conception of the state in which all social forces
would be disciplined by a national interest defined from above and said to
be needed for domestic solidarity against the outside imperialism.
At the foreign policy level, Nasser initially wanted to similarly pur-
sue a middle nonaligned course in the Cold War and had started with the
idea that national independence required Egypt’s foreign policy role to
pursue leadership in several spheres (Arab, African, and Islamic)—an
objective product of its position—and to hold to neutrality in the Cold
War. It was conflicts with the West at Suez and over the financing of the
Aswan High Dam that pushed the country toward a Soviet alliance
which was, in turn, reflected in a domestic lurch toward an “Arab
socialist” development strategy that depended on Soviet aid to sustain
investment without slashing the populist welfare needed for regime
legitimacy (Elwy 2009). However, the 1967 defeat by Israel created a
contradiction between reliance on the Soviet Union and the postwar
economic crisis that had reempowered Egyptians (and Gulf Arabs) who
controlled capital. Sadat restructured the ruling coalition, abandoning
socialism and relying on the new bourgeoisie, paralleled in foreign pol-
icy by a diplomatic opening to the West and the Gulf monarchies. Peace
with Israel and an anti-Soviet turn were needed to get US patronage and
investment and Arab oil money. When this rent boom exhausted itself
Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, opted to join the United States
against Iraq in the Gulf War, winning a new rent windfall that rein-
forced the crony capitalist class that had emerged around Mubarak’s son
Gamal (Elwy 2009).
A Framework of Analysis and

Future Agenda for FPA of the Arab States
How might this literature be summarized or synthesized to provide a

framework incorporating and linking the key variables that would need
to be considered in a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policies of
any given Arab state? Such a synthesis would usefully highlight how far
FPA frameworks imported from North American scholarship on non-
Arab states need to be adapted to MENA’s unique features. Anoushira-
van Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch (2012) attempt this in their

contribution on foreign policy to the volume edited by Louise Fawcett,
International Relations of the Middle East. In this section, I summarize
this argument and indicate new research questions that have been raised
particularly by the Arab uprisings.
The MENA Environment

The environment in which regimes have to operate determines the chal-
lenges that they face. In MENA, this is much more complex than simple
realism assumes since it is constituted of several distinct levels. In a
region that is highly penetrated, as dependency and political economy
theorists show, the global environment is chiefly a source of constraint
on autonomy, but it is also a source of resources needed to confront
regional and domestic threats. Some regimes sacrifice their autonomy,
becoming clients overdependent for economic benefits or protection on
a core patron state, and must in return give political support to their
patrons. A few states are rebels against the global system and, for them,
it is a source of threat. Hence, all states seek to evade or manipulate the
core-periphery system, in what Mohammed Ayoob (2002) calls “subal-
tern realism.” Their ability to do so was much higher under bipolarity,
when the core was split than under post–Cold War unipolarity.
The effect of the Arab uprisings on core-periphery relations is
ambiguous; there initially appeared to be new opportunities for the
Western powers to exploit the cleavages of Arab societies to reassert
their influence (as in Libya). And even where pro-Western leaders were
overthrown (as in Egypt), foreign policy remained constrained by the
dependencies on the West created under the old regime (Hanieh 2012).
Yet as the Syrian case suggests, when great powers are divided (Russia
and China versus the West) regimes enjoy greater freedom of maneuver.
In the Arab Gulf, the “Asianization of the Gulf” (Davidson 2010) may
lead to more independent foreign policies, among the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) monarchies, but at present they remain highly depend-
ent on the United States for their security (against the putative Iranian
threat).
The regional environment in MENA has a dual character; that is, a
state system that is embedded in suprastate communities (pan-Arabism,
Islam). Within the interstate system, states’ ambitions and vulnerabili-
ties are shaped, as realists like Walt (1987) show, by their power posi-
tion: states with greater resources and power capabilities (wealth, popu-
lation, size) are more likely to have activist foreign policies, including
ambitions for regional hegemony, while weak states are more likely to
concentrate on maintaining their sovereignty. However, uniquely in
MENA, the regional interstate environment is cut across by transstate
movements and discourses over identity, which are either sources of
domestic legitimacy (from regimes being seen to champion or defend
suprastate norms based in identity) or a threat when manipulated by
states against their rivals (e.g., when Nasser’s Egypt mobilized pan-
Arabism against rival regimes in the 1950s). The regional environment
is thus an arena for playing out pan-Arab leadership ambitions and also
for balancing against these ambitions by weaker states (M. Barnett
1998; Korany and Dessouki 1991; Lynch 2002). The power of transstate
identity to penetrate and constrain, or be manipulated by foreign policy
makers, has varied over time and place, partly according to levels of
state formation.
In reinvigorating the pan-Arab “public space” and initially bringing
to power similar Islamist governments in several states, the Arab upris-
ings had the potential to reempower Arabism and Islam as more power-
ful factors in foreign policy decisionmaking. However, the backlash by
the remnants of state establishments against Islamist parties, notably in
Egypt, and the increasing construction of a Sunni-Shi’a cleavage in
regional identity suggest that, rather than empowering revisionist
regional regimes against Western penetration, the effect of the Arab
uprisings may be to shape regional alignments along sectarian lines.
State Formation and Foreign Policy Determination

If the structural environment of the state determines the kind of chal-
lenge, state formation, specifically variations in a state’s level of consol-
idation and the social composition of the ruling coalition, have a great
effect in determining the kind of response. The level of state formation
determines the main threats that foreign policy is used to manage. When
the consolidation of states in the regional system is low, as in David’s
(1991) scenario, the main threats are within the state and foreign policy
is used to counter domestic opposition via omnibalancing, either to get
resources from a patron or to generate legitimacy by bandwagoning with
transstate nationalist opinion. When state formation is high enough that
internal threats are manageable, the domestic environment becomes a
source of support and resources and, if military capabilities also advance,
the main threat starts to be from neighbors; in these conditions, foreign
policy deals with external threats and ambitions, as realists expect. High
levels of state formation depend on institution building and the inclusion
of social forces in these institutions as well as enough coincidence of

identity and state boundaries to legitimize regimes. While few Middle
East states enjoy such conditions, one cannot assume, as David (1991)
does, that the main threats are always from within, this being an empiri-
cal question and a matter of degree. In fact, levels of state formation
have varied enough to matter for foreign policy, both over time, as Mufti
(1996) shows, and among states, as Salloukh (2000) shows. In turn, the
social composition of the ruling coalition, as Allinson (2011) and Elwy
(2009) argue, determines the orientation or direction of foreign policy,
with the main historic distinction in MENA being the one between status
quo and revisionist states.
The Arab uprisings have arguably reduced the autonomy of regimes
where leaders were overthrown (Egypt, Tunisia) or where state forma-
tion was reversed by societal fragmentation and regime debilitation
(Libya, Syria, Yemen). States may therefore be less capable, for some
time, of engaging in an active foreign policy. If, in the long run, democ-
ratization brings about a wider inclusion of social forces, regimes may
turn out to be better able to mobilize their societies behind whatever
foreign policies they decide on. However, four years into the Arab
uprisings, democratization was little in evidence and weakened regimes
were again deploying their foreign policies chiefly as a means to deal
with internal and “inter-related” threats.
The Intrastate Level: Foreign Policy Analysis

and the Black Box of Decisionmaking
While the environment and state formation may determine the chal-
lenges to regimes and bias their responses, much variance remains
unaccounted for since, in any given situation, there are always choices
as to how to respond to environmental pressures. This is especially so in
the Middle East, where pressures from the different levels of the envi-
ronment often pull in contradictory directions. To understand choices,
we must open the black box of domestic decisionmaking.
Foreign policy role. A state’s foreign policy role, crucial in accounts by

Korany and Dessouki (1984, 1991, 2008), Jouejati (1997), and particu-
larly constructivists such as Barnett (1998), is chiefly derived from iden-
tity, which shapes how decisionmakers interpret interests and threats. It
defines orientations toward neighbors (friend or enemy), great powers
(threat or patron), and the state system (revisionist or status quo). In the
Arab world, roles are constructed by elites in interaction with other states
and also with their publics in an Arab public sphere, as Lynch (1998,
2002) shows. And these roles tended historically to vary, as M. Barnett
(1998) argues, between the promotion of Arabism and sovereignty. Once
a role is established, it sets standards of legitimacy and performance that,
to a degree, constrains elites or into which they are socialized and may
therefore impart a certain consistency to foreign policy despite big
changes in a state’s leadership and environment. Role does not, however,
predetermine decisions since they have to be applied in unique situa-
tions, allowing for differences over their interpretation. Conflicts over
role are decided in the foreign policy process in which interested actors
try to influence the choices of the top leader(s).
Role change is most likely in the wake of regime change, and among
the most important possible consequences of the Arab uprisings are the
potentials for role change in Egypt and Syria. Egypt’s new elites could
be expected to reassert the regional leadership role that Mubarak had
sacrificed (Elgindy 2012). In turn, if a post–al-Assad leadership in Syria
abandons the country’s traditional role as the “beating heart of Arabism,”
Syria’s Arab nationalist foreign policy will look very different, but
whether it will be more Western or more Islamic oriented depends on the
current “struggle for Syria.”
Power concentration and decisionmaking. The main debate at the

level of actual decisionmaking is concerned with how the features of the
policy process bias foreign policy decisions. In the Arab Middle East and
North Africa a limited number of elite actors is normally involved in pol-
icymaking. Input from outside of the governing establishment has been
typically limited. Yet as was seen in the case of Jordan (Allinson 2011;
Harknett and VanDenBerg 1997), it can have an indirect impact on for-
eign policy if leaders must defend legitimacy under attack by rivals or if
the mass public is aroused by a crisis such as conflict with the West or
Israel. In normal times, when the public is divided, for example, by class
or ethnicity, elites enjoy more autonomy to act as they please.
The role of the public in foreign policy making seemed likely to be
enhanced to the extent democratization proceeded in the post–Arab
uprising republics, albeit still constrained by state establishments and
inherited external dependencies. Here Egypt, a main test case, where the
unpopularity of Mubarak’s close relations with Israel and the United
States helped to delegitimize him, suggests elites can still manipulate
and deflect public opinion to pursue their preferred policies. In Egypt,
after Mubarak, rival politicians all played the anti-Israeli and anti-US
card to win popular support, but the intimate links of the military to the
United States and the country’s dependence on external aid, not to men-
tion the military superiority of Israel, represented powerful counter-
forces that greatly diluted the impact of public opinion (Mabrouk 2011).
Within the Arab policymaking establishment, the military and intel-
ligence services have dominated at the expense of the diplomats, bias-
ing policy toward coercive options and prioritizing “national security”
issues over others (Hinnebusch 2002: 17). Since the beginnings of eco-
nomic infitah (opening) in the 1970s, the influence of economic and
business elites has steadily grown, although conveyed less through
institutional interest groups than via individual clientelist connections to
decisionmakers. Moreover, as political economy approaches argue, the
kind of economic elite that dominates matters: where a “national bour-
geoisie” is ascendant, its demands for protection from foreign competi-
tion may reinforce a nationalist foreign policy; by contrast, satisfying
trading bourgeoisies is likely to require a pro-Western policy designed
to entice foreign investment (Elwy 2009).
Where elites conflict the power distribution among them, which is
defined by the state’s governing institutions, decides outcomes. A number
of studies have addressed the issue of what difference this distribution
within the decision group makes for the rationality of decisions; for
example, whether they over- or underreact to threats, innovate, or are war
prone, as the literature on the role of leaders surveyed above suggests.
Institutions shaping a proper balance between the decisionmakers’ auton-
omy of, and accountability to, society make for more effective foreign
policies since excessive autonomy risks the pursuit of risky or idiosyn-
cratic policies, as Ayubi (1994) argues, while insufficient autonomy and
or factional politics leads to suboptimal outcomes as, for instance, R. B.
Parker (1993) observes. In regimes where power is personalized and con-
centrated, with low levels of institutionalization, the leader’s personality,
values, perceptions—and misperceptions—can make an enormous differ-
ence, as Dawisha (1976) stresses. In the Arab authoritarian republics, con-
solidated presidents had great power to act and were capable of initiating
bold or risky policies; leadership miscalculations also had enormous con-
sequences for the region, including Nasser’s brinkmanship on the eve of
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Stein 1991) and Saddam’s failure to anticipate
the reaction to his invasion of Kuwait (for a discussion of Saddam’s per-
ceptions and calculations, see Stein 1992 and Gause 2002). The diplo-
matic skills and bargaining strategies of leaders also matter; thus, Telhami
(1990) argues that Sadat’s failure to play his hand effectively in the Camp
David negotiations produced a suboptimal outcome. In Arab monarchies,
the extended ruling families constitute an informal consultative group
with which the monarch was expected to consult; as such, royal decision-
making tends to be based on consensus (the lowest common denomina-
tor) and, hence, to be more cautious and status quo.
This framework has aimed to systematically identify the factors that
analysts of the Arab world have shown to matter in foreign policy mak-
ing, but their relative weight, which is disputed among analysts—
notably between realists stressing the dominance of the states system
and their rivals arguing for the importance of domestic politics—varies
by country and over time and, thus, is a matter for empirical research.
The foreign policy consequences of the Arab uprisings provide a pivotal
case through which the framework’s utility can be tested.
Conclusion
This survey of FPA in and of the Arab states demonstrates that the tradi-
tions developed in North America have been successfully imported,
with the same categories and issues typically addressed. They have also
been adapted to the MENA region where, for example, the role of
dependency, identity, and personalized leadership appears more salient
than elsewhere. Arab scholars of foreign policy have chosen from the
repertoire of North American approaches and have internalized many of
the methods and approaches most appropriate for understanding their
countries, albeit particularly via qualitative rather than quantitative
analyses. Equally, non-Arab scholars of the Arab world have high-
lighted the specifics of Arab foreign policy in their contributions to
Western debates on foreign policy outside North America. Altogether,
this cross-fertilization has been quite productive for advancing our
understanding of a complex and often misunderstood region.
Note
1. Although non-Arab scholars of the Middle East (notably Turkish, Israeli,

and Iranian scholars) have produced a prolific foreign policy literature, such
work is, with a few noted exceptions, outside the scope of this chapter.
6
Foreign Policy Processes
in African States
Korwa G. Adar
An analysis that provides a coherent, contextual, and systematic

approach to the foreign policy analysis (FPA) of Africa (a continent com-
prising over fifty sovereign states) is, to say the least, a daunting task and
one requiring a venturesome approach into a complex terrain clouded
with secrecy and interlocking economic-political, sociocultural, and reli-
gious centrifugal and centripetal factors. Since decolonization, these
complexities have only been compounded (McGowan and Gottwald
1975; Aluko 1977; Korany 1986a; Anda 2000).
African states acquired their international legal personalities as sov-
ereign states following decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s. Their
foreign policies were influenced not only by their weak and new status
in the international system, but also by internal, continental, and exter-
nal factors (Adar and Ajulu 2002; Adar and Schraeder 2007; Khadiagala
2001). In order to consolidate power and authority over the new states,
the practice of presidential dominance became the common behavioral
pattern. Specifically, centralization of power within the presidency, or
what has been called the “big man” syndrome, dominated leadership
styles of African presidents for the most part between the 1960s and the
1990s (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Chan 1992; Anda 2000). Foreign
policy became the domain of African presidents. As Michael Anda
(2000: 45) observes, “Weak states have fewer bureaucratic influences
on foreign policy making. In these states, individuals and personality
characteristics such as the self-confidence, perceptions and the political
culture of the leaders most strongly correlate with external policies.”
One of the key factors that influenced the foreign policy behavior of
African states since the 1960s was the bipolarity of the international
101
102 Korwa G. Adar
system, which was characterized by the East-West competition between

the United States and the Soviet Union (Clapham 1996; Clough 1992;
Ojo, Orwa, and Utete 1985; Zartman 1987). Similarly, scholars argue
that African states’ foreign policy behavior was, and still is, determined
by their status in the global political economy (Anglin and Shaw 1979;
Shaw and Okolo 1994; McGowan and Gottwald 1975).
However, those debates are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Instead, I examine foreign policy decisionmaking by states within the
regional system of sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter is divided in two
parts. In the first section, I examine the internal contexts of African
states’ foreign policy decisionmaking. I focus on domestic actors and
their impact on foreign policy decisionmaking. In the subsequent sec-
tion, which represents the core of this chapter, I introduce the external
dimensions of African states’ foreign policy decisionmaking. Specifi-
cally, I look at regionally based intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs), including the African Union (AU), the Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), in relation to their impact on African states’
foreign policy decisionmaking. More specifically, it is my contention
that FPA theory building is enhanced by a fuller examination of the
impact of decisions made by regional IGOs in relation to member states
and vice versa, and that this is made plain in the African case.
The chapter proceeds from the premise that the internal contexts of
states are capable of influencing the foreign policy decisionmaking
processes of regional organizations such as the AU, ECOWAS, and
SADC (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Adebajo and Landsberg 2005; Clark
2002; Mortimer 1996). Similarly, those regional actors are capable of
penetrating the foreign policy decisionmaking processes of their mem-
ber states (Tavares 2011). I take cognizance of the fact that the choice of
actors used as examples at both the internal and external level is not
comprehensive. The examples are used mainly for purposes of explor-
ing some of the underlying theoretical linkages. I also acknowledge the
limitations inherent in the generalizations that a scholar may encounter
when dealing with foreign policy–related issues carried out by actors.
Focusing on actors, or what Valerie M. Hudson calls “actor-specific”
theoretical disposition, that is, theory that mediates “between grand
principles and the complexity of reality” (2005: 6), is useful in isolating
the interplay between the internal and external contexts. Hence, I ask:
by whom (actors) is African states’ foreign policy made at the internal
(domestic) and external (regional) levels?
Foreign Policy Processes in African States 103
Approaches to the Study of

African States’ Foreign Policy: The Internal Dimension
The internal or domestic politics even in small states has implications

on foreign policy decisionmaking (Banjo 2009; Clapham 1977; T.
Hughes 2005; Korany 1983, 1986a; Robertson and East 2005). These
internal dynamics, whether they are in the form of the desire to maintain
economic or political power, have useful explanatory value in relation
to African states’ foreign policy decisionmaking (Hammerstad 2005).
The resurgence of a multiplicity of actors in the continent in the late
1980s, and their increasing involvement in the domain of foreign policy
decisionmaking of African states, is a new phenomenon that requires
conceptual and theoretical assessment (Adar and Ajulu 2002; Adar and
Schraeder 2007). As Terhembe N. Ambe-Uva and Kasali M. Adeg-
boyega (2007: 45) argue, “Sub-Saharan Africa countries have to con-
stantly reorient their foreign policies to reflect or accommodate domes-
tic and external vicissitudes.”
The actors operating within the domestic sphere, whose roles have
been empowered by constitutional structures and who are gaining direct
and indirect impact on African states’ foreign policy making, include,
among others, “the government, the political parties, the pressure
groups and the civil service, the political and bureaucratic elites, public
opinion parliaments and the press” as well as civil society organizations
in general (Ambe-Uva and Adegboyega 2007: 45). This perspective is
shared by Peter Schraeder who argues that a “variety of governmental
and nongovernmental actors . . . contributes to the formulation and
implementation of African foreign policy,” particularly in the post−Cold
War era (Schraeder 2004: 245; see also Chenwi 2011).
For decades national parliaments played constructive roles, albeit
with limitations, in checking the excesses of presidential dominance in
African states’ foreign policy decisionmaking (Salih 2005). In Kenya,
for example, the parliament was instrumental in questioning the deci-
sion by the executive to unilaterally sever diplomatic relations with
Norway in 1990. What is significant to emphasize is that, apart from
exercising its legislative responsibilities which culminated in the
restoration of the diplomatic relations with Norway, the parliament’s
impact on Kenya’s foreign policy decisionmaking happened at the time
when the country was still functioning under the de jure one-party state
system (Oloo 1995: 144; see also Barkan and Matiangi 2009; Mwagiru
2004, 2010).1 Overall, the influence of parliaments over the decades on
104 Korwa G. Adar
African states’ foreign policy decisionmaking cannot be underestimated

(Ahmed 2009; Barkan 2009: Hakes and Helgerson 1973; Jeffrey 1975;
Le Vine 1979; Nweke 1986).
What is more, it is important to mention two units within African
parliaments whose roles in the foreign policy decisionmaking process
cannot be ignored; namely, the backbench and the opposition political
party or parties. Even in emerging democracies, backbenchers and
opposition parties play important roles in questioning the decisions of a
government (Shultz 1970). True, these arguments are not unique since
they are akin to North American approaches in FPA. The point is that
North American approaches to FPA must be adapted by African scholars
to the idiosyncrasies of African foreign policy decisionmaking (Adar
2007; Akokpari 1999; Anda 2000; Barkan 2009; Clark 2002; Schraeder
2001).
As a result of criticizing the decisions and policies of governments, a
number of backbenchers have been detained over the years in several
African countries; for example, in Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi,
Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Detention of parliamentarians and pro-democracy
and human rights activists (including this author; see Adar 1999) criti-
cal of governments in Africa was common during the period of one-
party state rule, particularly between the 1960s and the 1990s (Adar
1998; Joseph 1999; Monga 1996; Olukoshi 1998; Sachikonye 1991). In
such cases, foreign policy decisionmaking became the domain of the
sovereign head of state, undermining the constitutional roles of other
internal actors.
In turn, opposition political parties also played noteworthy roles in
foreign policy decisionmaking (Bjereld and Demker 2000; Hagan 1993)
in a number of African countries during the drive for multipartism in the
1990s; for example, in Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, and Tanzania
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997). However, in the African context, the
role of the opposition political parties remains contentious. Some schol-
ars (Clapham 1996; Clark 2002; Khadiagala 2001; Venter 2001) argue
that, as in the past, the post-1990s democratization trends have not
enhanced their role in foreign policy decisionmaking because of the
continued control of the state by the African presidents.2 Countries such
as Cameroon, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mada-
gascar, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe serve as examples.
This pessimistic view, I argue, is not representative of the whole
continent and does not capture the diversity of actors involved in for-
eign policy decisionmaking and the ramifications thereof in Africa. On
this line of thinking, Schraeder observes in relation to West Africa that
“personal role progressively declines as Francophone West Africa

democratizes” and “that personal rule-oriented explanations constituted
at best exaggerations of more complex and dynamic foreign policy
processes” (Schraeder 2001: 50). And in Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, and
South Africa, for example, democratization is gradually taking root with
implications for foreign policy decisionmaking and, thus, also the field
of FPA (Adar 2007, 2008; Adebajo and Mustapha 2008; Kent and
Malan 2003; Selinyane 2006).
Indeed, in a continent with over fifty sovereign states, this uneven-
ness in relation to democratization of foreign policy decisionmaking is
bound to emerge. The key point to reiterate is that democratization is
slowly taking root in the continent. As Schraeder (2001: 49) argues,
“Democratization has strengthened power centers that can challenge tra-
ditional arenas of foreign policy.” Constitutional reform, respect for
human rights, and adherence to the rule of law remain some of the key
rallying points for the opposition political parties and other civil society
organizations (Adar 1999, 2008). This “coalition for change” (Barkan
and Matiangi 2009) particularly by legislators, has played key roles in
foreign policy decisionmaking in a number of African countries such as
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania. I discuss only a few
of these actors to illustrate the emerging transformation of African states’
foreign policy decisionmaking. The impact of these emerging actors goes
beyond the realist conception of the nation-state as a monolithic entity
that acts rationally in pursuit of national interest. Studies that focus on
the multiplicity of actors and their impact on foreign policy decision-
making in Africa broaden our understanding of FPA in general.
In Kenya, for example, it was as a result of the pressure in the
1990s for constitutional change by the press and the Citizens Coalition
for Constitutional Change (4Cs), which is a conglomeration of NGOs,
opposition political parties, and churches (Adar 1998; Mutunga 1999),
that a new constitution was eventually promulgated in August 2010. The
internal pressure by the 4Cs, among others, together with the involve-
ment of the international community forced the leadership of President
Daniel arap Moi to allow multiparty democracy in Kenya in 1991.
The impact of public opinion and the media on African states’ for-
eign policy decisionmaking also provide interesting clues in the study
of FPA (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Geldenhuys 2012).
In Nigeria, for example, the decision by President Olusegun Obasanjo
to provide asylum to former Liberian president Charles Taylor in 2003
led to widespread condemnation by the media and Nigerians in general.
It was due to internal pressure through the media and public opinion in
106 Korwa G. Adar
conjunction with pressure from the international community that

Obasanjo eventually agreed to hand over Taylor to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague for trial (Ojione 2008).
Approaches to the Study of

African States’ Foreign Policy: The External Dimension
In this section, I focus on the external dimensions of African states’ for-

eign policy decisionmaking. I draw attention to the impact of continen-
tal and regional actors on African states’ foreign policy decisionmaking.
Specifically, my inquiry focuses on the interplay between internal
(states) and external (regional organizations) stimuli in foreign policy
decisionmaking processes. As Chris Ojukwu (2011) observes, the
process of foreign policy decisionmaking is indeed influenced by inter-
nal and external factors. Mark DeHaven also considers this interrela-
tionship. He argues that “the underlying theoretical concern is to exam-
ine the way in which internal and external stimuli interact to produce
the climate within which policy makers must formulate their foreign
policies” (DeHaven 1991: 88; see also Diehl and Lepgold 2003; Gra-
ham and Felicio 2006).
My analysis in this section is informed by the view that, at the exter-
nal level, African states’ foreign policy decisionmaking can be under-
stood by examining the behavior exhibited by continental and regional
organizations. These continental bodies, such as the AU, ECOWAS, and
SADC, offer useful explanatory values in relation to what is referred to
in the FPA literature as “actor-oriented” or “actor-specific” foreign pol-
icy decisionmaking (Hudson 2005, 2007). However, the focus of the
analysis is not on the actors per se, but on the extent to which they
impact on African states’ foreign policy decisionmaking. In other words,
are the actions of the organizations broadening the scope of African
states’ foreign policy decisionmaking? I argue that these regional and
subregional bodies are increasingly contributing toward more inclusive
and participatory processes in African states’ foreign policy decision-
making unlike during the Cold War era.
The African Union and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking

The reconstruction and reorganization of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) into the African Union in 2002 has given the continental
body more institutional responsibilities in Africa. Unlike the OAU,
which was constrained by its charter particularly in the area of conflict

resolution, Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU provides for: “(h)
the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a deci-
sion of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely; war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; . . . and (j) the right of
Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to
restore peace and security” (African Union 2000). This is a paradigm
shift that has conferred on the AU continentally driven foreign policy
objectives that deviate from the noninterference that characterized the
OAU’s uti possidetis principle. These new objectives have legitimized
the AU’s right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states.
Alpha Oumar Konare, former chairperson of the AU Commission
(2003–2008), calls the latter “ingerence courtoise” (courteous interfer-
ence) (quoted in Mwanasali 2008: 42).3
Since the AU’s inception, the continent has been witnessing greater
involvement by the organization in foreign policy decisionmaking, par-
ticularly in the areas of conflict, peacekeeping, and security. The AU’s
Peace and Security Council (PSC) serves “as standing decision-making
organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and a
collective security and early-warning arrangement to conflict and crisis
situations in Africa” (African Union 2002: Article 3).4 Hence, it is no
longer sufficient to examine only the behavior of states in African FPA
studies; it is important to account for the interaction between state and
regional IGO decisionmaking (Ngoma 2005; Obi 2009).
Article 9 of the PSC is even more explicit on the question of deci-
sionmaking process, providing, among other things, that the PSC “shall
use its discretion to effect entry, whether through the collective inter-
vention of the Council itself or through its Chairperson and/or the Com-
mission, the Panel of the Wise, and/or in collaboration with Regional
Mechanisms” (African Union 2002: Article 9; emphasis added). How-
ever, it should be emphasized that it is the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government (AHSG), the supreme organ of the AU, which ulti-
mately authorizes the right of intervention.
As far as the cases examined in this subsection are concerned, it
was the PSC that initially deliberated on the issues and made its recom-
mendations to the AHSG for authorization. The explicit provision
inscribed in the Constitutive Act, which empowers the AU to employ its
foreign policy decisionmaking mechanisms by engaging in collective
security arrangements with regional mechanisms in Africa, is a new and
interesting development. More specifically, the AU is, by extension,
empowering the African subregional organizations to play proactive for-
108 Korwa G. Adar
eign policy decisionmaking roles by intervening in member states to

stop gross human rights violations such as those perpetrated by, for
example, Idi Amin of Uganda and Jean-Bédel Bokassa of Central
African Republic in the 1970s as well as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda
which took place during the time of the OAU (Kioko 2003). The
African Union has, for example, intervened in Burundi (2003), Darfur
(2005), and Somalia (2007) (Kabau 2012).
The AU’s concerns about crimes against humanity focus largely on
the people of Africa, broadening the scope for continental foreign policy
decisionmaking. Its failures and challenges notwithstanding, the AU and
its institutions, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APPRM),
the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the African
Court on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), the Pan-African Parlia-
ment (PAP), and the PSC, and their impact on African foreign policy
decisionmaking cannot be underestimated (see Akokpari et al. 2008).
New foreign policy actors are arising within the African context.
Highlighting a shift away from indifference and state-driven foreign
policy prescriptions reminiscent of the OAU period to more inclusive
and participatory practices driven by an emerging democratic institu-
tion, the Constitutive Act has empowered the AU with the requisite for-
eign policy decisionmaking authority, particularly concerning conflict
situations in Africa (Khan 2007: 8). Over the past decade, the AU has
invoked its constitutional mandate by involving itself in foreign policy
decisionmaking initiatives in, among others, Togo (2005), Mauritania
(2005), Madagascar (2009), Guinea-Bissau (2012), and Mali (2012).
These countries were affected by military coups d’état, in violation of
Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act. Contrary to the time of the OAU,
when coups d’état were common and no action was taken against the
military leaders, the practice is now deemed impermissible and incon-
sistent with the prescriptions of the Constitutive Act (P. D. Williams
2007).
These developments, I argue, are broadening the scope and institu-
tionalizing the AU’s foreign policy decisionmaking. As Paul D.
Williams (2007) observes, the Constitutive Act, the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), and other AU instru-
ments are laying the foundation for continental constitutionalism
amenable for African states’ foreign policy decisionmaking, albeit with
challenges. One of the key challenges is centered on state sovereignty,
particularly in relation to the right of intervention inscribed in the Con-
stitutive Act.
The Rome Statute, along with the international legal regime and
moral and normative principles that it is establishing in the international
system, has rekindled the debate on the issue of African state sover-
eignty (Hansen 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Schabas 2011). A number of
African countries are using the AU (an interesting internal-cum-external
stimulus) to drive their foreign policy agenda, arguing that the ICC,
which is based on the Rome Statute, is not only infringing on their sov-
ereignty, but that it is biased against Africa. By July 2012, of the fifteen
cases that have thus far been brought before the ICC, seven are from
African states; namely, Kenya, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Uganda, Central African Republic, Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire.5
There are two competing viewpoints advocated by the AU’s member
states with respect to the organization’s foreign policy making process
vis-à-vis the ICC (see Gichuki 2012; Minde 2012). Some member states,
led by Botswana, the Central African Republic, Malawi, Namibia, Nige-
ria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, are against impunity,
advocating for adherence to the ICC’s global legal mandate conferred on
it by the Rome Statute (Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties
2011). These countries, or what I call “global legal regime advocates,”
have on various occasion, for example, made it explicitly clear to
Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir that he will be arrested if he were to
travel to their respective countries because of his indictment by the ICC.
For these global legal regime advocates, the ICC legal regime established
by the Rome Statute is jus cogens, based on the principle of pacta sunt
servanda, because a number of the African states not only participated in
the drafting of the Rome Statute but also have ratified it (Adar 2010). The
election of Skosazana Dlamini-Zuma of South Africa by the AU in July
2012 to replace the Gabonese Jean Ping as chairperson of the AU Com-
mission might bring a paradigm shift that will embrace the ICC mandate.
On the other hand, there are African states, the majority of which
have ratified the Rome Statute, that are advocating for an African-dri-
ven legal regime akin to the ICC to deal with similar crimes as provided
for under Article 5 of the Rome Statute; that is, “the crime of genocide;
crimes against humanity; war crimes; and the crime of aggression”
(Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties 2011: 8). Most of the
African countries that fall under this category not only are threatening
to pull out of the ICC, but are also hiding behind an “African solutions
to African problems” conception (Maloka 2001). As Elise Keppler
(2011) observes, the decision by al-Bashir to travel to Chad and Kenya
in 2010 was against the spirit of the Rome Statute. Because of cases
110 Korwa G. Adar
against four Kenyan officials pending before the ICC, Kenya has been
in the forefront against cooperation with the court.6 Even though the
views of the advocates for the African version of the ICC seem to have
carried the day, Christopher Hoste and Andrew Anderson (2010: 3)
argue that “the complex nature of internal African decisionmaking
processes . . . lack . . . unity,” particularly in multilateral engagements.
I argue that adherence to the global legal regime is the only viable
option to prevent impunity, broaden democracy (in its holistic sense),
and lay the foundation for development in Africa. If those developments
come to pass, the state may well become less important to African FPA
than these emerging regional actors.
Where the AU seems to have succeeded fairly well in its pursuit of
coherent foreign policy decisionmaking is in the areas of peace and
security in relation to its member states. Specifically, the AU’s proactive
involvement in the internal conflicts in member states reinforces and
institutionalizes its foreign policy decisionmaking, which provides use-
ful insights for FPA. In this regard, the AU is clearly operationalizing
responsibilities enshrined in the Constitutive Act and the principles of
the Responsibility to Protect (Powell 2005; International Development
Research Centre 2001).
The AU has on many occasions invoked its foreign policy decision-
making responsibilities to intervene in conflict situations such as in
Burundi (2003), the Darfur region of Sudan (2004), Togo (2005), Mau-
ritania (2005), Madagascar (2009), Guinea-Bissau (2012), and Mali
(2012) (see Olonisakin 2004; Appia-Mensah 2005; Powell 2005).7 The
PSC is the main organ responsible for peace, security, and foreign pol-
icy decisionmaking and it recommends specific options to the AHSG
for deliberation and action on existing and emerging conflict and crisis
situations in the continent. For instance, the PSC recommended to the
AHSG the deployment of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the
African Mission in Somalia (AMISON). This emerging role by the AU
is gradually broadening foreign policy decisionmaking in Africa and
provides useful insights into the general theoretical corpus of FPA.
The Southern African Development Community

and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking
The transformation of the Southern African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Commu-
nity in 1992, and the accession to the treaty by South Africa following
its democratic dispensation in 1994, strengthened the organization’s
regional, continental, and global mandate in the sociocultural and

economic-political realms.8 In this subsection I do not deal with all
these issue areas, but focus on the SADC’s foreign policy decisionmak-
ing, as also analyzed by a number of other scholars (Bischoff 2001,
2002; Khadiagala 2001; Oosthuizen 2006). Specifically, the approaches
that address the SADC’s foreign policy decisionmaking are in many
respects similar to analyses of the foreign policy decisionmaking of the
European Union (EU) (Cardwell 2009; Keukeleire 2003; Keukeleire
and MacNaughtan 2008; K. E. Smith 2008; White 1999, 2001; see also
Chapter 8 by Amelia Hadfield and Valerie M. Hudson in this volume).
In a departure from the concerns of the destabilization period
caused by the apartheid regimes, Article 4 of the SADC treaty provides
for “sovereign equality of all member states; solidarity, peace and secu-
rity; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance, and
mutual benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes” (SADC 1992; see
also SADC 1996, 2004, 2008). However, the SADC’s involvement, for
example, in Democratic Republic of Congo (1998), Lesotho (1998),
Madagascar (2009), and Zimbabwe (2008–present) to deal with peace
and security issues has not been without intra-SADC controversies. The
Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS), also known as the
SADC troika, and the Council of Ministers are responsible for dis-
cussing and making recommendations to the Summit for authorization
on matters relating to security and foreign policy. The OPDS comprises
three heads of state or government. The three heads of state include the
chairperson, the incoming chairperson, and the outgoing chairperson.
The institutional structures, roles, and responsibilities of the OPDS are
stipulated in the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation
(OPDSC) protocol, adopted by the SADC member states in 1996.
The intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo by the OPDS
troika Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in 1998, with Zimbabwean pres-
ident Robert Mugabe at the helm of the OPDS, initially received support
by South Africa’s president Nelson Mandela who was the chairperson of
the SADC. However, the intervention was neither carried out through the
SADC’s foreign policy decisionmaking structure (i.e., the Summit) nor
authorized by the United Nations Security Council and the OAU. South
Africa under the Mandela presidency shifted its view on the Democratic
Republic of Congo, supporting a diplomatic approach to the crisis and
questioning the right of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to militarily
intervene through the OPDS without the express mandate of the Summit.
The SADC’s involvement in these two situations (the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Lesotho in 1998) has been used by FPA scholars
112 Korwa G. Adar
in an attempt to examine the organization’s foreign policy decisionmak-

ing initiatives (Hammerstad 2005; Nathan 2006; Likoti 2007; Schoeman
and Muller 2009; Tavares 2011). The scholars identify the intra-SADC
differences, particularly between the OPDS and the Summit, as the
main stumbling block to the realization of coherent foreign policy deci-
sionmaking. The challenges and controversies notwithstanding, Laurent
Kabila’s presidency in the Democratic Republic of Congo was salvaged
by the intervening forces of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (Breyten-
bach 2000; Essuman-Johnson 2009; Francis 2009; Kieh and Mukenge
2002).
Paradoxically, it was the turn of the Mugabe-led OPDS to register
their disappointment because of the invasion of Lesotho by South Africa
and Botswana in 1998, which was conducted without adhering to the
SADC’s treaty prescriptions and foreign policy decisionmaking struc-
tures, particularly the requisite express acquiescence and authorization
by the Summit (Barber 2005; Lambrechts 1999; Likoti 2007; Makoa
1999; Santho 2000; Soderbaum and Hettne 2010). Specifically, even
though the OPDS was still in fiere, particularly with respect to the issue
pertaining to the right of intervention, the two countries should have
observed the SADC treaty provision on foreign policy decisionmaking
(Nathan 2002). These competing viewpoints are addressed in Article
10(a) of the revised SADC treaty (SADC 2008). As I have explained,
the authority to implement decisions in relation to critical situations
such as military intervention in member states rests with the Summit
and not the OPDS (SADC 2001; see also van Schalkwyk (2005).
The conflict situations in Madagascar and Zimbabwe continue to
raise concerns for the SADC’s security and foreign policy establish-
ment. My analysis in this subsection focuses on the SADC’s foreign
policy decisionmaking in relation to these two cases (Cawthra 2010).
Marc Ravalomanana’s dominance and centralization of power since tak-
ing over the presidency in Madagascar in 2002 laid the foundation for
discontent, culminating in a popular uprising and his eventual removal
by the military in 2009. The Military Council for National Defense
(MCND) then installed Andry Rajoelina as the interim president of
Madagascar (du Pisani 2011). Rajoelina established a High Transitional
Authority which, together with the MCND, continues to govern the
country even at the time of this writing.
This unconstitutional change of government led to the suspension
of Madagascar by the AU as well as by the SADC during its extraordi-
nary summit meeting in March 2009. The SADC requested Rajoelina to
respect and adhere to the principles enshrined in the SADC treaty and
its protocols and to pave the way for the unconditional reinstatement of
the elected president, Ravalomanana (du Pisani 2011). The OPDS, with
the approval by the Summit, appointed the former president of Mozam-
bique, Joaquim Chissano, to drive the peace process in Madagascar.
The case of Zimbabwe, a country that has been under the control of
President Mugabe since 1980, remains a significant challenge for the
SADC (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003; Cawthra, du Pisani, and Omari 2007). The
first major political test for the Zimbabwe African National Union–
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) under Mugabe was the defeat of the party in
the 2000 referendum on the new constitution by the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai. However, it was
during the disputed elections of 2008 that the crisis in the country and
in the SADC region deepened. The SADC has remained divided over
the issue, with Botswana openly condemning the Mugabe leadership
(du Pisani 2011). In most cases Mugabe has received the, albeit
implicit, support of some members of the SADC, irrespective of the
internal political problems. This is mainly because of what has been
called “liberation solidarity”; that is, the prominent role Mugabe played
during the liberation struggle in southern Africa (Cawthra 2010; also
Hamill and Hoffman 2009).9
The OPDS, as the organ responsible for security and foreign policy
decisionmaking, has since the 2008 presidential election debacle played
an active role in the peace process in Zimbabwe. Under the leadership of
the SADC’s appointed president, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, a unity
government was brokered (based on the Kenyan model), with Mugabe
(ZANU-PF) and Tsvangirai (MDC) as president and prime minister
respectively (Adar 2008). What is important to stress is that even
Mugabe himself recognizes the SADC’s multilateral diplomacy and for-
eign policy role in Zimbabwe’s peace process. For example, he requested
the SADC during its summit meeting in June 2012 to allow his country
to hold elections as scheduled in 2012, with the SADC consistently
exhibiting reluctance to acquiesce to Mugabe’s request. Overall, I argue
that inchoate as they may be, the SADC’s security and foreign policy
decisionmaking initiatives are gradually laying the foundation for an
emerging intraregional normative consensus.
The Economic Community of West African States

and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking
The Economic Community of West African States is one of the regional
organizations in Africa that has, since its inception in 1975, been proac-
114 Korwa G. Adar
tively involved in crisis situations in the region.10 The region is one of

the most volatile and conflict prone in the continent. In this subsection,
I focus on foreign policy decisionmaking by ECOWAS. I use specific
examples to examine the nexus between internal crisis and ECOWAS
foreign policy decisionmaking. Of the eight organs of ECOWAS, the
Authority of Heads of State and Government (hereafter the Authority),
the Council of Ministers, and the Community Parliament are the institu-
tions responsible for foreign policy decisionmaking. As in the case of
the other African regional organizations, the final decision on critical
issues rests with the Authority, making it the primus inter pares in rela-
tion to the other organs.
ECOWAS has a long history of intervening militarily in its mem-
ber states since the 1990s. Yet the FPA literature that deals with the
foreign policy decisionmaking of ECOWAS is scanty (Abass 2000;
Adebajo 2002; Ademola 1995; Adibe 2002; Babarinde 1999; Francis
2006; Vogt 1992). I therefore attempt to underpin the organization’s
foreign policy decisionmaking by using a few examples where it has
played a role.
The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG), which was established by ECOWAS to deal with
the situations in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), provided a
testing ground for the legitimacy of its foreign policy decisionmaking
instruments (Magyar and Conteh-Morgan 1998). The involvement of
ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone since then has encouraged the
West African regional body’s direct involvement in, among others,
Guinea-Bissau (2005–2010), Côte d’Ivoire (2003), Liberia (2003), Togo
(2005), and Guinea (2005–2010) (Adebajo 2002; Adibe 2002; Bundu
2001; Kabia 2008; Tavares 2011; Yabi 2010). As David Francis (2009:
101) argues, “The conflict management interventions in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire are a demonstrable track
record of the development of common foreign and security policy.”
The role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution has evolved over time,
culminating for the first time into peacekeeping and peace enforcement
in Liberia. Its peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in this
country vis-à-vis the belligerent parties provide useful insights in
ECOWAS foreign policy decisionmaking (Adibe 1997; Bundu 2001;
Nwachuku 1999; Tavares 2011). The difficulties encountered by
ECOWAS between the anglophone and francophone member states
notwithstanding, the Authority transformed the peacekeeping contingent
into peace enforcement (Draman and Carment 2003; Francis 2009). The
ECOWAS dual-pronged approach to the crisis in Liberia (i.e., peace

enforcement and multilateral diplomacy) finally enabled the Authority
to bring the belligerent parties to the negotiating table. Of significance
in this process was the conclusion of the 1995 Abuja Accord (Nigeria),
which was revised in 1996. The Abuja Accords (1995, 1996) were pre-
ceded by the Yamoussoukro (1991) and Cotonou (1993) Agreements,
which paved the way for the 1997 elections won by Charles Taylor.
Under Taylor’s presidency (1997–2003), Liberia remained volatile, with
the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia troops and United Nations Mission in
Liberia deployed in the country following the negotiated exit of Taylor
(Yabi 2010; Sherman 2009).
The cases of Guinea (2005–2010) and Guinea-Bissau (2005–2010)
(Yabi 2010; Sherman 2009), which took place in the same period, also
provide valuable examples on how ECOWAS as a foreign policy actor
is enlarging normative consensus externally in the region and internally
within the member states. The evolution and development of the crises
in the two ECOWAS member states are not covered in detail in this sub-
section. Rather, my purpose is to put into proper context the foreign pol-
icy decisionmaking of ECOWAS using Guinea and Guinea-Bissau as
case studies (Yabi 2010; Tavares 2011).
The coups, countercoups, contested presidential and parliamentary
elections, as well as the assassinations of among others President Joao
Bernardo Vieira and army chief of staff, Tagme Na Waie, have caused
instability in Guinea-Bissau and the region and have undermined the
mediation efforts by ECOWAS (Yabi 2010). The responsibilities of
ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau have shifted from intervention reminiscent
of the ECOMOG version of the 1990s to multilateral diplomacy driven
largely by its foreign policy decisionmaking instruments and bolstered
by the emerging regional normative consensus (Yabi 2010).
The crisis in Guinea provides another interesting example in which
ECOWAS displayed its multilateral diplomacy and foreign policy initia-
tives. After independence, Guinea was dominated by two presidents,
Ahmed Sekou Toure (1958–1984) and Lansana Conte (1984–2008). The
death of President Conte in 2008 plunged the country into a political
crisis, with a military junta, the National Council for Democracy and
Development, taking over the reins of power under President Dadis
Camara and Prime Minister Kabine Komara (Yabi 2010: 43). As in
other crisis situations involving its member states, ECOWAS expressed
its reservations about the unconstitutional ascendency to power. More
specifically, the ECOWAS Authority, during its summit meeting in
116 Korwa G. Adar
2009, “rejected any idea of a military transition in Guinea and decided

to suspend this member state in the meetings and all decisionmaking
bodies of the Community, in accordance with the provisions of the 2001
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance” (Yabi 2010: 44). The
emphasis by the ECOWAS Authority on nonrecognition of the unconsti-
tutional ascendancy to power by leaders in the region is significant
because it draws a redline on actions that derail its regional normative
consensus.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to shed light on the internal and exter-
nal contexts of African foreign policy decisionmaking. I argued that
states have the capacity to penetrate the foreign policy decisionmaking
processes of regional and subregional organizations such as the AU,
ECOWAS, and SADC. By the same token, those organizations have
gained increasing influence on the African states’ foreign policy deci-
sionmaking. In a sense, we must redefine FPA in the African context to
include how regional IGOs have become the face of an emerging conti-
nental foreign policy making. North American FPA remains largely
state-centric, but that approach is not ideally suited for the African con-
text in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, the study of this new type
of actor and its emergence could be the means by which progress
beyond North American FPA theory may take place. The non–North
American circumstances of foreign policy making are thus crucibles for
a new round of FPA theory building, and the African case could play an
important role in that exercise.
In the European context, scholars argue that FPA must go beyond
state-centric approaches, particularly when theorizing on the foreign
policy decisionmaking of the EU (e.g., White 1999, 2001; Keukeleire
and MacNaughtan 2008). Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaugh-
tan, for example, draw our attention to what they call structural foreign
policy. Structural foreign policy means:
A foreign policy which, conducted over a long-term, seeks to influence

or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental
structures. These structures characterize not only states, and interstate re-
lations, but also societies, the position of individuals, relations between
states and societies, and the international system as a whole. (Keukeleire
and MacNaughtan 2008: 25–26)
In this regard, foreign policy decisionmaking of the EU (and, by exten-

sion, of African IGOs) is shaped not only by its institutional structures,
but also by among other things norms, principles, and rules of the game.
In the African context, I have used a few examples at the state
(internal) level as well as regional and subregional (external) levels in
this chapter to provide useful insights on foreign policy decisionmak-
ing. For a better understanding of the latter, particularly in the
post−Cold War era, one needs to go beyond state-centric approaches
and appreciate the complexities inherent in the impact of a multiplicity
of actors (state and nonstate) on African states’ foreign policy decision-
making. Apart from the actors, incorporation of the rules of the game at
the regional and subregional levels also provides insights into the for-
eign policy decisionmaking of African states. In other words, are the
normative principles established at the regional (the Constitutive Act of
the AU) and subregional (the subregional treaties) levels relevant in
understanding the extent to which foreign policy decisionmaking, and
thus FPA, is being enlarged? The concern by African states on the
potential impact of the Rome Statute’s legal regime on their national
and interstate relations is one of the cases in point.
As we have witnessed on the continent since the 1990s, the post−
Cold War era has ushered in opportunities for the resurgence of a multi-
plicity of actors, broadening the scope of African national, subregional,
and regional foreign policy decisionmaking processes. It also calls into
question the state-centric approaches of the traditional North American
FPA. As I have argued, the proactive involvement of, among others, the
AU, ECOWAS, and SADC in crisis situations in Africa is a paradigm
shift that has positive implications for national, subregional, and regional
foreign policy decisionmaking processes as well as the field of FPA in
general. For example, Zimbabwe has on a number of occasions requested
the SADC to allow it to conduct its elections, such as in 2012. However,
the SADC remains committed to comprehensive constitutional dispensa-
tion in Zimbabwe prior to elections. This national-cum-subregional rela-
tionship in the area of foreign policy decisionmaking is a new develop-
ment for Africa and an important one for FPA theory building.
The literature on this subject is scanty, particularly in the area of
foreign policy decisionmaking. Unlike other regional organizations,
such as the EU, foreign policy decisionmaking of the African regional
organizations is largely underresearched. As I have explained, the few
studies that have attempted to deal with this subject approach it from
the perspective of the role of regional or subregional actors in foreign
118 Korwa G. Adar
policy in general without specifically focusing on foreign policy deci-

sionmaking processes. It is in this area where attempts should be made
by scholars to fill the lacuna using case studies, with each case requir-
ing detailed assessment not only in relation to individual leaders but
also to the decisionmaking processes that unfold in regional organiza-
tions. At the same time, we must examine cases where national foreign
policy penetrated that of regional IGOs. For example, was the decision
to involve ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s made so
quickly because the military leadership in Nigeria was acting as the
driving force behind the ECOWAS involvement in the two countries?
At the time of this publication, the situation in Mali remains in
abeyance, with the UN attempting to broker an agreement with the
Tuaregs who call themselves the Azawad National Liberation Move-
ment and who occupy most of the northern part of the country. The
French military degraded the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic group known as
Mouvement pour L’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de L’Ouest (MUJAO,
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa)—which had provided
assistance to the rebellion from 2012 to 2013—killing one of its top
leaders in 2014. ECOWAS is yet to take decisive and tangible action to
reclaim the territorial integrity of its member state, Mali. Both the
actorness and presence of ECOWAS remain ambivalent (on these con-
cepts, see Filtenborg, Gänzle, and Johansson 2002), probably because
most of the member states are governed by democratically elected lead-
ers, as opposed to the 1990s. Those challenges notwithstanding, the
presence and actorness of ECOWAS need to be broadened within its
member states and the region as a whole.
Foreign policy decisionmaking of regional organizations is not static.
It changes with time and circumstances, which may have an impact on
how foreign policy decisions are made. As I have discussed, the involve-
ment of the SADC in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho in
the 1990s triggered some intra-SADC controversies. Furthermore, even
with the transformation of the SADC’s foreign policy decisionmaking
structures, the situation in Zimbabwe remains a divisive case.
One of the main challenges for FPA scholars is to shed light on some
of the deficiencies that I have identified in this chapter. The newly emerg-
ing foreign policy actors at the national (e.g., opposition political parties,
the church, NGOs), subregional (e.g., ECOWAS, SADC), and regional
(e.g., AU) levels in Africa hopefully would serve as a catalyst for theory
progression in FPA. Specifically, studies should focus on the impact of
the regional actors on the national, subregional, and regional foreign pol-
icy decisionmaking. What is important to reiterate is that these cases,

originating in the African context, could be a powerful theory-building
tool for the broader field of FPA.
Notes
1. Kenya became a de jure one-party state in 1982 following the amend-

ment of the constitution, which in Section 2A provided that “there shall be in
Kenya only one political party, the Kenya African National Union.”
2. These observations may vary from country to country in Africa. In
Kenya, for example, the country is experimenting with a coalition government
following the 2007 electoral debacle.
3. Article III of the OAU Charter deals, among other things, with respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in member states,
which reinforced the principle of uti possidetis (i.e., the respect for the bound-
aries as acquired at the time of independence).
4. The PSC is comprised of fifteen members, ten and five of whom are
elected for two and three years respectively.
5. Prior to the end of his term in 2012, the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno
Ocampo, had opened preliminary investigations in Guinea and Nigeria.
6. The four Kenyans whose cases are pending in the ICC at the Hague
include Uhuru Muigai Kenya, deputy prime minister and presidential candidate;
William Samoei Ruto, a presidential candidate; Francis Kirimi Muthaura; and
Joshua Arap Sang.
7. The more recent cases, particularly in 2012, are added mainly to demon-
strate the AU’s increasing involvement in Africa’s conflict situations.
8. SADC members include: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Sey-
chelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
9. As one of the key doyens of liberation movements in the SADC region,
Mugabe has been supported by countries such as Angola, Namibia, Mozam-
bique, and South Africa.
10. The sixteen ECOWAS member states include: Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
7
Latin American
Rita Giacalone
Latin American foreign policy analysis (FPA) has grown to differ

from mainstream North American FPA through a creative appropriation
of US and European theoretical approaches (Vidigal 2003), synthesized
with concepts developed within Latin America during the debate about
the region’s insertion in the international sphere. Though the past
decade has shown some disappointment about the quality of Latin
American FPA (Merke 2005), the field is wider and more complex now
than when theory-driven studies first appeared in the 1970s.
In this review of the publications of Latin American FPA authors
from the 1970s to the 2000s, I have two objectives: first, to identify the
concepts that appeared along the empirical and theoretical debates in
the region; and, second, to observe how mainstream theories have been
incorporated by Latin American authors. Accordingly, the first section
summarizes the main concepts in the autonomy debate while the second
links Latin American FPA with external influences through the lens of
different levels of analysis.
Approaches to the Study of Latin American

Foreign Policy: The Autonomy Debate
Though no longer a central debate, the long-running discussion on the

possibility of exercising an autonomous foreign policy provides a good
vantage point to review the principal homegrown concepts in Latin
American FPA. Most theoretical FPA studies in Latin America were
121
122 Rita Giacalone
published from the 1970s onward, after dependency theory claimed that
an autonomous foreign policy of dependent nations was impossible
unless by confrontation with the hegemon.1 The systemic division of
nations in center, periphery, and semi-periphery reduced peripheral
states to a dependent position in which sovereignty and economic devel-
opment required the reorganization of their relations with the center
through revolution (“confrontation autonomy”) or their adoption of a
dependent association. Previously, the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) had proposed an alternative that
emphasized economic development through regional import-substitu-
tion industrialization promoted by the state (Bresser-Pereira 2006).
In Latin America, dependency theory assumed the shape of a histor-
ical-structural approach born through the writings of Fernando Cardoso
and Enzo Faletto (1969), who rejected the exclusive logic of capitalist
accumulation—that is, the external systemic root of dependency—in
favor of an interpretation in which domestic interclass relations were
more important (Machado 1992). In this line, Helio Jaguaribe (1979)
considers that to alter the dependent situation, the national bourgeoisie
should maintain good relations with the hegemon (the United States)
while supporting their own development projects (“national depend-
ency”). Jaguaribe establishes a four-step international scale for auton-
omy—international supremacy; regional supremacy; autonomy; depend-
ency; and, for nations with control over a strategic resource, such as oil
in Venezuela, a fifth step was possible, namely sector autonomy. He
claimed that dependent nations could move to autonomy at the regional
and sector level by combining a set of static and dynamic elements.
Juan Carlos Puig (1975, 1980) articulated and developed the con-
cept of “heterodox autonomy.” The main difference from Jaguaribe’s
(1979) formulation is that, while the latter is concerned with the
national bourgeoisie, Puig discusses the possibilities and limitations of
the dependent state. “Heterodox autonomy” means that a dependent
state could accept the strategic leadership of a center nation and also
diverge from it concerning its internal model of development, nonstrate-
gic international linkages, and national interest (Corigliano 2009a).
Both authors wanted to show that, despite dependency, developing
nations could work within the interstices of the international space in
order to assume independent positions (Tickner 2007). At the same time
in Mexico, Jorge Dominguez (1978) developed the concept of “non
orthodox dependency,” based on the need to diversify dependency from
one to many centers (Gil Villegas 1989). All of these authors consider
autonomy possible, but differ on how to achieve it. They are state-
centric in their focus and see autonomy as a state attribute.
Latin American Foreign Policy Analysis 123
The 1970s witnessed autonomy-inspired foreign policy decisions.

This includes Brazil’s entry to the Non-Aligned Movement when the
military regime, whose development model had been compromised by
oil boom prices, adopted the concept of autonomy based on import-sub-
stituting industrialization. However, in Argentina, the arrival of the mil-
itary to power in 1976 cut short the dependency-autonomy debate
(Simonoff 2003).2 Thereafter, national characteristics affected the dis-
course. Since the external debt crisis of 1982, more attention has been
devoted to economic issues, internal factors, and instrumental questions
(Simonoff 2003: 6). Interdependence moved Latin American academics
toward theoretical convergence; for instance, by incorporating transna-
tional actors such as multinational companies (Tickner 2003b). In the
second half of the 1980s the return of democracy to Argentina and the
return of academics schooled abroad relaunched the dependency debate
in that country (Corigliano 2009b).
During the 1980s, dependency theory was criticized by Mario
Rapoport (1984) and Carlos Escudé (1983), who questioned the notion
of the state as a rational actor, explored the influence of individuals, and
discovered gray areas in interbureaucratic relations (Corigliano 2009b).
Escudé (1989) also developed the concept of “peripheral realism,”
which argued that economic development is more important than auton-
omy for dependent nations. Therefore, symbolic gestures of autonomy
should be abandoned if they run against that objective. The main for-
eign policy objective is not to enhance state power through autonomy,
but through social welfare by providing options of economic develop-
ment. Confrontation with the hegemon is not the goal if cooperation
helps to achieve development. Dependent, vulnerable, and strategically
undervalued states should formulate foreign policy on the basis of two
objectives: politically, by cooperating with big powers in areas in which
there is no danger to the national interest in order to reduce costs and
risks in the medium- and long-term perspective; and economically, to
limit confrontation in order to achieve development. Escudé (2005: 109)
highlights the “problematic” influence of external theories on FPA,
claiming that in Latin America Anglo-Saxon realism and German
geopolitics had combined with dependency to provide an eclectic
framework of analysis in which territory, military equilibrium, the state,
and autonomy explained foreign policy.
During the 1960s and 1970s, realism and dependency theory stressed
the dominant position of the United States in Latin America and made
confrontation and dependent association the alternatives. Jaguaribe
(1979), Puig (1980), and Dominguez (1978) considered autonomy as
being desirable. Escudé (1995), on the other hand, saw autonomy as a risk
124 Rita Giacalone
to economic development and social welfare (Tickner 2007; Simonoff

2010a). He justified his view with the argument that power is quite differ-
ent when looked at from the perspective of noncenter nations.
The debate on “peripheral realism” dominated the late 1980s and
the 1990s, and became politicized when the Argentine government
employed its arguments to justify rapprochement with the United States
during the Carlos Menem administration (1989–1999). Criticism of
peripheral realism focused on its determinism, which prevented the
autonomy of a dependent state, utilitarian character, and lack of moral
components (Russell and Tokatlian 2001; Souto Zabaleta 2004). Though
unsympathetic toward peripheral realism, Arlene Tickner (quoted in
Escudé 2008: 6) highlights its merits: “Beginning in the 1990s, aca-
demic production in the region on the topic of autonomy was nonexist-
ent. Carlos Escudé’s . . . formulation of peripheral realism constitutes
the only exhaustive conceptual endeavor in recent Latin American IR.”
The debate generated a wave of studies aimed at providing alterna-
tives. “Peripheral neoidealism” (Russell 1990a) argues that the foreign
policy of a dependent nation cannot be limited to economic matters and
should not support actions of center nations if they run against national
interests or violate international law. Trade and the attraction of foreign
investment should not compromise higher values (freedom, justice, pro-
tection of the environment, peace). Material interest is a rather limited
concept to serve as the basis of foreign policy so international princi-
ples, such as the defense of weak states against powerful ones, should
be incorporated (Russell 1991). José María Vázquez Ocampo (1989)
developed the notion of “realist autonomy,” exemplified by Argentine
president Juan D. Perón’s “third position”; that is, a kind of neutral
alternative position during the Cold War, and attempts at relative auton-
omy from the United States in regional matters.
Peripheral realism was well received in Mexico, as that nation, like
Argentina, was also experiencing a major shift in its foreign policy
toward the United States (Anzelini 2009: 103). Previously, Mario Ojeda
(1976: 93) had developed “relative sovereignty” to explain Mexican for-
eign policy during the Cold War: the United States accepted the Mexi-
can need to disagree in matters that are important to Mexico while the
latter supported the United States in fundamental aspects of its foreign
policy. This implied a realist assumption of Mexico’s dependent posi-
tion. However, Ojeda (1976: 99) also links autonomy with political sta-
bility or legitimacy, as an autonomous foreign policy vis-à-vis the
United States helped to defuse the notion of subordination to the North
in domestic politics. Olga Pellicer (1972) considers the Mexican posi-
tion toward the Cuban revolution an effort to maintain its autonomy and
identity as a historical revolutionary regime. Guadalupe González

(1983) and Dominguez (1989) link autonomy with the enhanced eco-
nomic weight of oil during the 1970s that made Mexico more important
to the United States.
In the 1990s, Mexico kept its view of the international system and
its own identity but changed its foreign economic policy toward the
United States, moving from economic liberalization to political democ-
ratization after the end of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
supremacy (Anzelini 2008). Foreign policy change followed from
regime change and meant a closer association with the United States
(Loaeza 2009). During the 2000s, Lorenzo Meyer (2008: 783) considers
that Mexico’s dependent position had worsened due to internal changes;
namely, the disappearance of authoritarian political system, which con-
centrated foreign policy making without allowing dissent, and the emer-
gence of a new development model.
In Argentina, the debate continued and generated the concept of
“relational autonomy” (Russell and Tokatlian 2001)3 to explain the
reorientation of Argentine foreign policy after the financial debacle of
Argentina (December 2001) and the September 11, 2001, events in the
United States from alignment with Washington, DC, to an increased
affinity with Brazil (Corigliano 2009b). For Roberto Russell and Juan
Gabriel Tokatlian (2001), dependency and autonomy are ideal types, but
relational autonomy depends on the state capacities, capabilities, and
power resources as well as the external situation. For them, the ideas of
Puig (1980) and Jaguaribe (1979) are anachronistic (Simonoff 2003: 9).
Instead, their concept of relational autonomy emphasizes the capacity
and disposition of states to make decisions of their own will or together
with similar states to gain control over transnational processes. Nations
act in different sectors, so autonomy is sector specific—depending on
attributes such as energy resources, geopolitical position, and economic
power—and not monolithic. Moreover, nations act in different power
circles and can exercise a higher level of autonomy in regional matters.4
Russell and Tokatlian (2004) later added that confrontation, alignment,
or power balancing were no longer options for foreign policies toward
the United States. A diversified and cooperative policy by several gov-
ernments—such as the one that in 2005 managed to thwart the US-led
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project (Anzelini 2009: 102–
104)—granted validity to the notion that autonomy is sector specific
and can be exercised at the regional level.5
In Argentina after the December 2001 default, Escudé (2005),
inspired by the critical theory of Robert W. Cox and Antonio Gramsci
(Corigliano 2009b), claimed that the main actor of foreign policy is not
126 Rita Giacalone
the state but a condominium of state and society. He links foreign policy
and political culture in Argentina with the existence of “subterranean
institutions” that occupy spaces belonging to the state (Escudé 2005:
14). From this perspective, “parasitic state” foreign policy becomes
another dimension of domestic politics (Escudé 2005: 9). As a result,
the government changes external strategies to maintain internal equilib-
rium and prevent its fall (Corigliano 2009b). Escudé’s work represents
a reorientation of Latin American FPA from almost sole focus on center-
periphery relations to a more nuanced view of the two-level game in
Latin American state foreign policy.
However, this move by Escudé (1989, 2005) was the exception, and
not the rule in Latin American FPA. In the 2000s, in Colombia the
autonomy-dependency debate6 was restarted by internal developments,
especially the escalation of guerrilla and drug trafficking activities that
determined Colombia’s closeness to the United States. Tickner (2007)
labels the latter “intervention by invitation.” For Tickner, aligning with
the United States to get material benefits is based on the assumption
that alignment guarantees a positive and lasting economic compromise
between the United States and the dependent state, but this may change
following a unilateral decision.
Before that, Colombian and Venezuelan academics (the Grupo Acadé-
mico Binacional) had promoted the development of “concerted autonomy”
through cooperation and regional integration (Grupo Académico Bina-
cional 1999). They had introduced the idea of joint strategies for treating
issues related to the United States through cooperative mechanisms (Rus-
sell and Tokatlian 2003: 104; Colacrai 2006: 388). Autonomy was seen as
a necessary condition of Latin American foreign policies. Its aim though
was not to confront the United States, but to generate “the capacity and
disposition of states to take independent decisions together with other part-
ners, in order to manage processes produced within and beyond their fron-
tiers” (Colacrai 2006: 388). Leonardo Carvajal (1993: 23–40, 168–169)
links regional integration between Colombia and Venezuela to the pragma-
tism of their foreign policies, as seen in the Colombian decision to de-
emphasize historical frontier problems with its neighboring state to con-
struct economic and political cooperation. Priority was granted to what
was possible, without implying the end of long-term objectives such as
autonomy and development.
In this sense, regional integration became an instrument to reach
autonomy and, in the 1990s and the 2000s, attracted a large number of
studies through which the evolution of Latin American FPA can be
explored. Autonomy through regional integration had been a subtheme
of the debate since its origins, but now that theme came to the forefront
of academic discussion. The ECLAC proposal of expanding import-sub-
stituted industrialization to the regional level in order to achieve eco-
nomic development was echoed by Jaguaribe (1979), who considered
that regional integration granted a minimum collective viability to
dependent nations. The case of Brazil illustrates the origin and evolu-
tion of the regional integration debate and its links with the autonomy
question.
Graziene Carneiro de Souza (2011) distinguishes two groups of
Brazilian authors interested in regional integration: the first group con-
sider Brazilian foreign policy in South America based on its interest in
regional stability and counterbalancing the United States (Oliveira and
Onuki 2000; Lima and Hirst 2006; M. G. Saraiva 2007) or see it as an
offshoot of its global projection because it fosters its image as a repre-
sentative of other developing nations in relations with the North
(Flemes 2004). But some Brazilian authors consider the intentions and
other cognitive aspects of decisionmakers in FPA. They focus either on
relations between state and society, with the state at the center of a
competition among interest groups (Bandeira 1995), or on the exis-
tence of paradigms shared by the governing elite (Cervo 1998, 2001;
Bernal-Meza 2006a: 71). The former favor the two-level approach
coming from the United States, and the latter ideational factors gener-
ated in Europe.7
The second group credits regionalism with contributing to the
development of a Brazilian long-time perspective derived from its geo-
graphical location, historical experience, language and culture, develop-
ment level, and social stratification, which influences strategic objec-
tives of its foreign policy. The perception that Brazil is “condemned” to
play an enhanced international role, shared by the military and civilian
elites, explains why, even under the military regime, foreign policy fol-
lowed similar paths (Lafer 2002: 122–123, 127). For all these groups,
autonomy is obtained by associating Brazil with its neighbors. The only
difference relates to the reasons for doing so.
“Deep forces,” or a collective identity responsible for Brazil’s for-
eign policy, appeared in the work of Amado Cervo and Clodoaldo
Bueno (1992), whose História da Política Exterior do Brasil combined
dependency with ideas and values. Cervo and Bueno recognized the
causal importance of both external and internal events and added
national objectives to the explanatory variables of foreign policy. The
decisionmaking process became a key factor, arguably reducing the
focus on system variables as the ultimate explanation for Brazilian for-
128 Rita Giacalone
eign policy. Agents counterbalanced structure, which highlighted the

centrality of political will.8
Amado Luiz Cervo (2006) reacted against the predominance of
Marxism in Brazilian historical analysis (J. F. S. Saraiva 2003: 23) with
the notion that foreign policy is the result of a matrix made up by val-
ues, behaviors, and interests. The concept of ‘deep forces’ is taken from
the French historian Pierre Renouvin (1969), whose methodological
influence Cervo and Bueno (1992) acknowledge.9 Also, in the 1990s in
Brazil, Cervo (2003: 19–21) saw the emergence of a “logistic state” that
had acquired autonomy within an interdependent international sphere. A
logistic state assumes that the developmental stage is over and attempts
to build material power instruments to take advantage of Brazilian com-
petitive advantages. In contraposition to this notion, Cervo (2003, 2008)
developed his ideas about nonmaterial forces (Bernal-Meza 2006b).
For Cervo (2008: 20–23), in developing nations more abstract theo-
ries should be replaced by more actor-specific conscious and historical
social constructions when the former no longer provide general expla-
nations. Such constructions, applied in foreign policy, become para-
digms, a sum of ideology and politics on the one hand, and national
interest and economic relations on the other. They combine an idea of
the nation’s place in the world, a perception of national interests, and a
political elaboration. Paradigms have cognitive effects because they
grant human behavior a purposeful intelligibility, implying actions and
perceptions of national interest, economic relations, and external forces
(Cervo 2003). This formulation is not unlike the development of
“national role conception” in North American FPA (Holsti 1970).
Simultaneously, another group of authors introduced beliefs and
cognitive elements in the tradition of North American FPA (Lima 1994;
Herz 1994) and moved to social constructivism. For Miriam Gomes
Saraiva (2009: 81–82), cognitive elements and normative principles
shaped the Brazilian foreign policy bureaucracy in the twentieth century
and established the lines of international behavior for different govern-
ments. Autonomy is the amount of maneuvering space that a nation has
in international relations. Thus, external behavior is predicated on real-
ism. At the same time, drawing on historical institutionalism, it is also
explained by the presence of a structured diplomatic corps (Itamaraty),
which had almost exclusive power over foreign policy formulation until
the mid-1990s (M. G. Saraiva 2010). Since then, foreign policy has
attracted the interest of other groups, and Itamaraty lost its exclusive
position in defining Brazil’s national interests (Lima 2000).
This favored the adoption of FPA approaches incorporating state

and nonstate actors as well as actor-centered theoretical influences.
However, after 2003, when autonomists became the main foreign policy
making group in Brazil, this trend was partially reversed, and there was
renewed emphasis on state-state interaction as a source of foreign pol-
icy behavior. Brazilian autonomists10 now support an active Brazilian
projection in international relations by means of “soft-revisionism” (i.e.,
a reform of international institutions to use them as an international
platform), and “soft power” (i.e., developing links with nations with
similar traits and building regional leadership to be recognized as a
global power) (M. G. Saraiva 2010). Regional integration means Brazil-
ian access to foreign markets and the increment of its worldwide nego-
tiating position (M. G. Saraiva 2010), implying a traditional multilater-
alism based on state attributes as opposed to multilateralism based on
the promotion and defense of individual rights (G. González 2006).
In a similar vein, authors who support present Venezuelan foreign
policy explain it through a combination of Marxism, confrontation
autonomy, and collective ideas, in which geopolitics, realism, and sys-
temic views remain important. Geopolitical elements reappear under the
guise of a reading of dependency as a political rather than economic
problem (Equipo de Investigación 2007: 69; F. González 2001) and are
reinforced by the emergence of radical geopolitics in the United States
and critical geopolitics in France (“Entrevista” 2008). The mainstream
postmodernist debate found little echo in Latin America during the
1990s (Tomassini 1991; Nasi 1998; Petrash and Ramos 1998). But in
the 2000s, the Marxist line of critical theory—considered an off-shoot
of dependency theory (Cornago Prieto 2005)—led to a reevaluation of
confrontation autonomy and saw regional integration as a political
instrument to reshape world geopolitics (Cardozo and Romero 2002).
In summary, in the 1970s the autonomy debate started when auton-
omists confronted the determinism of dependency theory, but accepted
the dependent position of Latin America. In the 1980s, the debate
waned. By the end of the decade, Escudé’s peripheral realism (Escudé
1989) considered economic development more important than auton-
omy. The debate was later relaunched and other concepts appeared as
well. Until this point, the concepts took into account systemic factors
affecting developing nations in general. Since Escudé, national foreign
policy experiences became the basis of more actor-specific concepts and
analysis in Latin American scholarship. Accordingly, the key notions
became more varied and were based on national experiences: peripheral
130 Rita Giacalone
realism (Escudé 1989), concerted autonomy (Colombian and Venezue-

lan authors in Grupo Académico Binacional 1999), the parasitic state
(Escudé 2005), the logistic state (Cervo 2003), and autonomy through
“deep forces” or “collective identity” (Cervo 2008; Lafer 2002).
In Latin America FPA, the debate over autonomy has often taken
center stage. But as the debate evolved, there has been a movement
from seeing autonomy as a characteristic of the state to seeing it as the
result of a process influenced by state and nonstate actors (Tokatlian
1998). During the past decade, the autonomy debate is now present in
only the regional integration debate, presenting two lines of theoretical
reflection: a group closer to theoretical influences coming from the
United States, and another linked to theoretical influences coming from
continental Western Europe. Though the former seems to favor the two-
level game and the latter ideational forces, the landscape is mixed
because systemic-oriented concepts have persisted in Marxist critical
theory and the reborn confrontation autonomy. Latin American FPA,
therefore, has taken on unique characteristics that differentiate it sub-
stantially from mainstream North American FPA.
External Theoretical Influences in Latin American FPA
In this section, I assess the importance of mainstream theoretical,

mostly US, influences in Latin American FPA through the identification
of the predominant levels of analysis currently used. I follow Valerie M.
Hudson’s (2005) classification: the individual decisionmaker; group
decisionmaking; culture and national identity; domestic politics and
opposition; and national or state attributes and the international system.
The autonomy debate has already shown that most Latin American
FPA centers on the state and the international system as the fundamental
levels of analysis. State attributes are assumed to influence foreign pol-
icy and the place of the nation in the international arena and, hence, the
foreign policy decisions that are being made. Even approaches that
emphasize ideational factors take into account the state and the interna-
tional system.
In the 2000s, some authors who emphasize ideological and nonma-
terial elements kept the state at the center of FPA. Henio Hoyo Prohuber
(2009) has studied the influence of nationalism, based on a tradition of
realism, romanticism, and messianism. He found its influence expressed
in the common interests, objectives, and ideas that the state pursues in
its international relations. Nationalism is affected by external and inter-
nal events, but its maximum aspiration is to develop a sovereign, strong,

and powerful state. At the same time, romanticism grants validity to the
state because the latter acts in the name of the nation (an entity based on
identity, language, etc.). Messianism considers “the people” a superior
moral actor and the leader as the indispensable guide for people to
recover its “right” place in history and fulfill its “national destiny,” all
through state actions (Hoyo Prohuber 2009: 386, 390, 391). Carlos
Luna Ramírez (2011) applies critical theory (especially its notion that
FPA can be built by means of communication and discourse) to the
emergence of social diplomacy in Venezuela, but recognizes the central
state objective of constructing a new geopolitical oil map.
Luis Valdivia Santa María (2001) relates critical theory to Mexico’s
foreign policy, through a revision of Gramscian elements (e.g., hege-
mony, US influence). Guadalupe González (2005) analyzes patterns of
continuity and change in Mexican diplomatic strategies toward Latin
America from 1945 to 2005, looking at the impact of systemic variables.
By comparing two historical moments—during the Cold War and after
its demise—González sees continuity in regional policy, but also that the
realist systemic approach has no explanatory leverage in his case study.
Meanwhile, Jorge Dominguez (2008) considers that a wider incorpora-
tion of Mexico into the world system has made diversified external fac-
tors weigh more in its foreign policy than simple geographical proximity
to the United States. Thus, we see that even authors who retain a state-
centric focus have begun to look beyond systemic variables for their
explanations of Latin American foreign policy.
In addition to such studies, in the 2000s the black box of Latin
American foreign policy is beginning to be opened much wider than
historically has been the case in the past century. A variety of subna-
tional levels of analysis are beginning to be pursued. At the individual
level, analyses of the presidential discourse in Venezuela have become
one of the most used approaches in the past decade (Zúquete 2008;
Giacalone 2008). Regarding methodologies employed, most authors
engage in content analysis and textual analysis (i.e., the explicit and
implicit ideas in discourse) with less exploration of its origins and links
to foreign policy. In this sense, Federico Merke (2010) considers that
constructivist discourse analysis in Latin America tends to reify identi-
ties without explaining how they are constructed. In any case, discourse
analysis has gained importance in Latin American FPA due to the
increased importance of ideas, identity paradigms, and perceptions of
actors as explanatory factors of foreign policy (Morandé and Durán
Sepúlveda 1993; Flores 2005).
132 Rita Giacalone
At the level of the individual decisionmaker, Francisco Corigliano

(2008) analyzes the foreign policy of Argentina’s Néstor and Cristina
Kirchner. He employs Tickner’s (2002a) notion that Latin American for-
eign policy makers make decisions based on a combination of depen-
dency theory, classic realism, and interdependency. Corigliano finds
peripheral variants of realism and idealism and concludes that, though
“hybrids”11 influence decisionmakers, their behavior is adjusted to
changing international situations. In the tradition of the relationship
among identity, discourse, and foreign policy, Leandro Sánchez (2011)
reviews the international speeches of Néstor Kirchner.
At the level of group decisionmaking, the first studies appeared at
the end of the 1980s, linked to collective efforts such as the Ford Foun-
dation–funded Follow-Up Program of Latin American Foreign Policies
(PROSPEL) in Chile. In this context, Roberto Russell (1990a) edited a
book with national case studies by Mónica Hirst and María Lima (1990)
on Brazil, Amparo Casar and Guadalupe González (1990) on México,
Manfred Wilhelmy (1990) on Chile, and himself (Russell 1990b) on
Argentina. Also, the dominant FPA influences in Argentina during that
decade centered on bureaucratic politics and decisionmaking processes
(Colacrai 1992). Contemporary Venezuelan contributions were by Elsa
Cardozo (1992) and Carlos A. Romero (1992).
Alba Gámez Vázquez (2000–2001) combines the rational choice
model and bureaucratic politics in Mexico to apply Allison’s (1971)
model to the study of the Salinas de Gortari administration (1989–
1994). Though bureaucratic politics implies negotiations among indi-
viduals or groups holding different positions (with the consequence that
foreign policy is not necessarily rational because bureaucratic actors
defend their interests), consensus among those in charge of decision-
making and their isolation from political pressures meant that the result
was rational.
In another analysis of the decisionmaking process, Rafael Velázquez
and Roberto Domínguez (2007) explore Waltz’s approach, combining the
systemic, state, and individual level. They conclude that decisions were
made at the individual level. In the same line, Susana Chacón (2001)
emphasizes the predominance of bureaucratic actors and their ideas in
Mexican foreign policy decisionmaking. Alexandra de Mello e Silva
(1995) examines the perceptions of Brazilian decisionmakers from the
end of the nineteenth century to the 1960s, employing a psychological
approach based on the individual.
Luis Fernández and Jorge Schiavon (2010) use institutional neolib-
eralism and constructivism to analyze how trade openness affected the
coordination of foreign trade negotiations in Brazil and Mexico. Differ-

ent liberalization processes explain why in Mexico actors other than the
Foreign Affairs Ministry became empowered while in Brazil decision-
making remained tied to the Itamaraty until the 1990s. In Mexico, new
actors used public opinion to increase their influence in foreign policy
formulation, so public opinion became an important factor.
Martha Ardila (2009) also incorporates nongovernmental actors,
such as the academic community, to the Colombian foreign policy deci-
sionmaking structure in the case of migration. Tickner (2003b) points to
the tenuous development of a professionalized Colombian foreign pol-
icy making body, a fact that concentrates decisionmaking in the presi-
dent and a small group of associates. She studies the creation of the
Ministry of Trade and the Presidential Advisory for International
Affairs, which further removed trade diplomacy and relations with the
United States from the Foreign Affairs Ministry. New issues, previously
ignored in FPA (e.g., environment and human rights) have helped to
develop different types of diplomacy (cultural, scientific) tied to the
demands of new actors (Pinheiro and Milani 2011).
Juan Claudio Epsteyn (2009) sees Brazilian foreign policy as being
determined by a process of negotiation among groups. In this process,
two factors interact: the political and institutional structure of the state
that regulates interactions with social actors; and the conceptual frame-
works of decisionmakers, based on previous interactions. The framework
of the Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva administration (2003–2010) was
based on the autonomy concept of the 1970s and inspired the internal
restructuring of Itamaraty. Leticia Pinheiro (2009) also deals with the
impact of new actors on decisionmakers. In Brazil, Itamaraty gained and
retained autonomy in foreign policy formulation because of its profes-
sionalization but later, on the need to manage specialized information,
gave relevance to other ministries and generated a more horizontal
decentralized process. Antonio Ramalho de Rocha (2002−2003) com-
bines the world vision of the individuals in charge of decisionmaking
with the role of bureaucracy in order to study the international projection
of Lula as a world leader.
In another study of how the Brazilian private sector increased its
participation in foreign policy, Alessandra de Lima Neves (2008)
applies Robert Putnam’s (1988) two-level game to trade negotiations
since the 1990s. For the 1990s she links private sector participation to
the complex nature of the trade matters discussed, which surpassed the
capacity of the foreign policy bureaucracy; and for the 2000s she links
it to the commodities export boom that enhanced the interest of business
134 Rita Giacalone
because of how much was at stake. Helton R. Presto Santana (2001)

uses the same approach to conclude that, in the FTAA negotiations, the
government employed the participation of the private sector to exter-
nally project a convergence of interest facade that never existed.
The reappraisal of cultural elements (deep forces and national iden-
tity) has led Miryam Colacrai and María A. Lorenzini (2005) to under-
stand foreign policy as an arena in which diverse political discourses
confront each other. While some authors incorporate notions coming
from European influences, another group incorporates US approaches.
Differences between the two may be linked to authors schooled in the
European or US FPA traditions, and to the respective weight of history
and sociology versus political science in their formation (Valdivia Santa
María 2001: 5).12 Guillermo Osorno (1995: 442–443) recognizes that
the almost simultaneous proposal of similar FPA approaches by US and
European authors has obscured the origin of external theoretical influ-
ences in Latin America.13
For Leonardo Carvajal (2009: 201), the increasing number of actors
in Colombian foreign policy makes it necessary to study it at the micro
level. He considers constructivism the most useful approach to do this.
If the international system is the consequence of previous processes,
and power in the international scene is a socially constructed institution,
both can be deconstructed. Individuals and states behave according to
the meanings they ascribe to facts and phenomena and develop diverse
identities according to the roles they play.
Drawing on constructivist assumptions, Tickner (2002b) reflects on
the role of the Colombian identity in the country’s relations with the
United States. She argues that Colombia is not a monolithic actor, but a
set of institutions and individuals with different identities. The Foreign
Affairs Ministry, the Foreign Trade Ministry, and the Defense Ministry,
plus the army and the police, hold different visions of Colombia, all of
which have repercussions on the country’s relations with the United
States. In the same line, Alexandra Guáqueta (2001) affirms that, if
Colombia cannot upset its asymmetry with the United States, it can
modify its foreign policy practices and construct a new identity.
Carlos Luna Ramírez (2009: 29) considers that the appeal of social
constructivism rests in its notion that nations do not have a static set of
interests but that interests vary, together with their identities and percep-
tions. He applies this to the transformation of Venezuelan foreign policy
since 2001, when the objectives of forming an anti–US axis and pro-
moting radical movements were incorporated. Other constructivist stud-
ies are those of Daniel Mora Brito (2003−2004) on Venezuela, Fabían
Bosoer (2006) on Argentina, Christían Ovando Santana (2009) on Chile,

and Gustavo Adolfo Puyo Tamayo (2009) on Colombia. Even Cervo
(2008: 22–23) has incorporated social constructivism and considers
ideational factors as objects that influence foreign policy (see also
Colacrai 2006).
Regarding domestic politics and opposition, some authors have ana-
lyzed international decentralized cooperation activities at the subna-
tional level (Velázquez and Schiavon 2009). They consider such actions
as being inspired by changes in both the international system and
domestic settings (democratization, decentralization, and structural
reform). In frontier studies, Ana Marleny Bustamante (2006, on
Venezuela) also incorporates the analysis of subnational actors. And in
2004, a special issue of Integración y Comercio included a good repre-
sentation of this level of analysis in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina
(Vigevani 2004; Dalla Via 2004; Serna de la Garza 2004).
Parliamentary participation in foreign policy formulation has been
studied by Rosario Green (1997), Fernando Solana (2000), Guadalupe
González (2006), and Rafael Velázquez (2008; also Velázquez and
Marín 2010) in Mexico. In Brazil, Janina Onuki and her collaborators
explore the distribution of preferences on foreign policy issues among
Argentina and Chilean deputies through the analysis of roll call votes
(Onuki, Ribeiro, and Oliveira 2009). Their conclusions highlight the
importance of ideology. However, this type of study, involving statisti-
cal analysis, is not common in Latin America.
At the level of public opinion, the most important studies are the
collective annual comparative surveys of social attitudes toward exter-
nal affairs in Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, the results
of which have been published in Mexico from 2004 to 2011 (G.
González et al. 2011). These link foreign policy issues with the individ-
ual political culture of nations. Amaury de Souza (2009) surveyed mem-
bers of the foreign affairs community in Brazil to check their percep-
tions of their own degree of participation or relations with Itamaraty.
In summary, Latin American FPA has moved from the state and the
international system as the predominant levels of analysis in the 1970s
to incorporate group decisionmaking as well as culture and identity in
the 1990s and 2000s. In general, this follows the evolution of main-
stream FPA, albeit with a certain sluggishness. This finding supports
Merke’s claim (2005) that, in the periphery, theories are more conserva-
tive than at the center and thus take longer to change. This way, the
state and the international system continue to retain a larger role in
Latin American than in mainstream FPA.
136 Rita Giacalone
Conclusion
The autonomy debate in Latin America started with the interplay of

realism and dependency theory. These approaches emphasized the role
of the state, saw external influences as determining factors, and paid
attention to material factors (Velázquez 2007: 65–67). When the exter-
nal debt crisis ended the appeal of autonomy, internal interests, already
present in the writings of Jaguaribe (1979) and Puig (1980), and
transnational actors became more important explanatory variables. Dur-
ing the 1990s, pragmatic and sector-specific approaches coexisted with
the debate on peripheral realism. Since Escudé’s (1989) work, there has
been more interest in national experiences than in broader generaliza-
tions, a trend that is consistent with the enlarged influence of construc-
tivism and deep forces.
Today, most Latin American FPA studies concentrate on the particular
and not the general aspects of state behavior in the international arena.
This represents an evolution from realism/dependency (international sys-
temic views) to constructivism/deep forces (national or cultural identity).
Accordingly, authors have incorporated domestic group pressures,
bureaucratic politics, parliaments, and public opinion at the micro level,
and perceptions, ideas, and identity at the macro level. Few studies com-
bine both lines of analysis, though there are attempts along those lines
(e.g., Ovando Santana 2009). Quantitative studies, formal modeling,
game theory, and political psychology are poorly represented approaches,
probably signaling deficiencies in Latin American IR programs. Compar-
ative studies are seen as a promising field in order to eliminate the
dichotomy between systemic-oriented general studies and national case
studies based on decisionmaking, perceptions, and so forth.14
Sandra Olaya (2007: 317–318) considers that the first autonomy
debate was anchored in structure and constrained by material forces. If
ideas did play a role, this was causal but did not contribute to the devel-
opment of national identities or interests. A comparison of Juan Gabriel
Tokatlian and Leonardo Carvajal (1995) and Russell and Tokatlian
(2003) illustrates their different roles. In the former, the state is the unit
of analysis and ideas increase its negotiating power. In the latter, the
authors look at Argentine visions about Brazil and why they change,
employing intertextual analysis. Both studies imply a redefinition of
autonomy from realism (what states have) to constructivism (what
states are in collective terms) (Olaya 2007: 303–309).
In conclusion, though the issues themselves (autonomy and regional
integration) differ from debates in mainstream FPA, the theoretical
approaches applied in Latin American FPA have followed a path along

the lines of US and European FPA—from systemic approaches (1970s)
to agent-oriented approaches (2000s). Thus, there is an association
between external theoretical influences and homegrown concepts, of
which peripheral realism is probably the most important due to its
implications and the number of concepts that have appeared in order to
contradict it. Latin American FPA has its own dynamism, affected by
internal and external events and national conditions, but it is not
immune to ideas coming from abroad. However, these ideas do not nec-
essarily come from the United States or produce the same results of
those in mainstream FPA.
Notes
1. For a review of Latin American FPA trends, see Giacalone (2012).

2. Puig went into exile in Venezuela where he published Doctrinas Interna-
cionales y Autonomía Latinoamericana (Puig 1980), which includes a typology
of the foreign policies of dependent nations.
3. Pardo and Tokatlian (1988) previously developed “relative autonomy”;
that is, the capacity of a dependent nation to maximize its negotiating power by
combining power attributes in external and internal areas, the willingness to
exert that capacity, and a conscious recognition of the risks involved. Those
ideas represent the roots of “relational autonomy.”
4. For Russell and Tokatlian (2001) regional integration is an effort to gain
autonomy, while for Puig (1980) regional integration does not enhance auton-
omy per se because it is instrumental to the objectives of the integrated states.
5. Russell and Tokatlian (2009) have identified five models of Latin Amer-
ican foreign policies vis-à-vis the United States after the end of the Cold War,
constructed on the basis of permanent factors (size and place of a state); contin-
uous factors (relative power, natural resources, international identity, degree of
diversification of international relations and of concentration between them and
the United States); and contingent factors (strategic importance or orientation).
Their models, which combine geopolitics, realism, relational autonomy, and
constructivism, are predicated on the notion that one of the main objectives of
Latin American foreign policies is to achieve autonomy.
6. During the 1990s, even authors who previously supported an autonomous
Colombian foreign policy (e.g., Drekonja 1993) favored pragmatism in relations
with the United States.
7. Lessa (2005) credits the existence of diverse Brazilian FPA interpreta-
tions to theoretical influences coming from research centers associated, respec-
tively, with history (at the University of Brasilia) and political science (at the
Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro). Thus, disciplinary orientation is an
important factor in the adoption of external theoretical influences.
8. Though Cervo and Bueno’s (1992) is a new type of study in comparison
to traditional diplomatic history, Norma Breda dos Santos (2005: 25–26) finds
138 Rita Giacalone
that the state is still largely considered a unitary actor in Latin American studies
of foreign policy.
9. Cervo’s formation in France during the 1960s is considered as being cru-
cial for the influence of Renouvin’s (1969) ideas on his work. However, Vidigal
(2003) considers that Etchepareborda (1978) was the first to employ “deep
forces” in Latin American FPA. For Rapoport (1990), Puig’s “deep trends”
(Puig 1980) were equal to Renouvin’s deep forces.
10. Gullo (2011) considers that two Brazilian autonomists, Jaguaribe (2001)
and Guimaraes (2005), have promoted elements of the Marxist-inspired line of
critical theory in Latin America.
11. Tickner (2002, 2003b) uses the term “hybrid” to refer to the fusion of
Latin American and external theoretical concepts in IR.
12. Cid Capetillo (2008: 48) attributes the predominance of Marxist and
neo-Marxist approaches in Mexico to European influence.
13. Examples are Putnam (1988) and Moravcsik (1993) in the United States
and Merle (1981, 1986) in France.
14. Vidigal (2003: 157) credits Raúl Bernal-Meza with an attempt to reacti-
vate PROSPEL-like comparative studies.
8
North American and European
Amelia Hadfield and Valerie M. Hudson
Several years ago, we collaborated concerning a textbook on

foreign policy analysis (FPA) that contained chapters by both North
American authors and European authors (S. Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne
2008b, 2012a). It soon became apparent to Valerie Hudson, as a North
American, and Amelia Hadfield, based in Europe, that there was a sig-
nificant trans-Atlantic difference between these authors as to how the
overall field of FPA was conceptualized relative to its international rela-
tions (IR) roots, defined in its own terms, and subsequently practiced as
a form of analysis. The differences were not superficial. Indeed, they
mirrored several of the issues facing the larger field of IR theory.
This volume seems an ideal place to set out some of the existing
tensions between North American and non–North American schools of
FPA, the latter here taken generally (though not exclusively) to incorpo-
rate the range of approaches found across Europe. Clearly, there are
major differences within the European canon, in which certain national
typologies appear to distinguish for example a Scandinavian approach
from a British perspective, or a German one from Russian offerings.
Each state and its corresponding higher educational institutes, think
tanks, and ministries have produced an analytical heritage, some quite
distinct indeed. However, the salient point is that the variations between
European theorists of foreign policy—whether they are exploring the
foreign policies of European Union (EU) member states or of the EU
itself—are not nearly as stark as the differences in terms of ontology,
epistemology, and methodology between them and the North American
school of FPA. This difference is not only interesting, but—given its
longevity—underexplored, and the point of this chapter.
139
140 Amelia Hadfield and Valerie M. Hudson
Our intention in this chapter is therefore not to minimize the differ-

ences within either the North American school or the emergent European
canon of foreign policy analysis, but—in taking their internal variations
into account—to explore rather more deeply the overt and persistent
transatlantic differences between the two broad churches. Accordingly,
we understand FPA to refer to the predominantly North American school
of thought, which since the 1950s has operated as a subset of IR theory,
incorporating public policy analysis, decisionmaking, psychology, and
midrange theorizing. The non–North American variants that we discuss
here are European in their conceptual heritage and, in this chapter, are
accordingly referred to as analysis of foreign policy (AFP).
“Analysis of foreign policy” is designed to be an indicative
umbrella term, meaning that it encompasses the wide range of European
approaches and attitudes to the analysis of foreign policy. It indicates,
first, some of the traits shared within this body of analysis, including a
sustained use of historical, social, and ideational approaches opera-
tionalized via qualitative approaches. More broadly, AFP indicates the
characteristics, which as a group, set it largely apart from the North
American school of thought designated as FPA. These include a procliv-
ity to draw less extensively on FPA precepts and methods, and to make
greater use of IR theory and methodology. Both trends are seen in the
two key approaches that now comprise contemporary EU AFP: country-
specific investigations of European states, and theorizing on the foreign
policy of the EU itself. The former encompasses investigations of states
constructing their foreign policy as EU member states (e.g., Jokela
2010; Baun and Marek 2012), and (more unusually) their foreign policy
as it exists “independently” of the collective foreign policy making
machinery of the EU, comprising national interests or separate strate-
gies (e.g., Manners and Whitman 2001a; Maclean and Szarka 2008).
The latter analyses focus, inter alia, on the institutional competences
accrued over time around a given foreign policy area, the manner of
decisionmaking by which policies take shape, and the nature of bargain-
ing over a given policy area (e.g. interest-driven, socialization) under-
taken by individuals, agencies, institutions, and states, first within the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and after the 2009 Treaty
of Lisbon, within the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)
(e.g., Thomas 2011; Kurowska and Breuer 2011). Both of these
approaches to EU theorizing draw on a variety of hybrid theoretical
approaches that eclipse the standard levels and units of analysis used in
FPA.
North American and European Foreign Policy Analysis 141
In keeping with the overall thesis of this edited volume, we provide

in this chapter a comparative overview of the differing conceptualiza-
tions of FPA that currently appear to exist between North American–
oriented FPA and a non–North American inspired (here European) AFP
school of thought and practice. Given the extraordinarily numerous
investigative modes that now comprise both North American and non–
North American foreign policy analysis, the chapter is necessarily an
abbreviated overview of the most predominant differences between the
two sides, and the most striking tensions that have arisen in conse-
quence. This is itself something of a stepwise process. The first step is
identifying a given trend in either camp (i.e., identifying a form of prac-
tice that seems to typify the modes and methods of a given school of
thought). The second step is explaining in broad terms why the trend of
one school appears not to exist (or to exist differently) in the other
camp. The third, more reflective step is to ask what ramifications these
differences might have for the broader field of study.
This chapter therefore plays several roles within the present vol-
ume. First, it acts as something of a microcosm for the overall thesis of
the text; namely, that the emergent canon of non–North American FPA
(in this case, AFP) has extended the discipline geographically, concep-
tually, and empirically. We explore both the North American “roots” and
the European “shoots” that have emerged in the past three decades or
more to revivify the analysis of foreign policy. Second, we provide a
comparative synopsis of the clear transatlantic differences in the ration-
ale and the practice of FPA. This is undertaken through a fivefold
review of the transatlantic variations as found in explanatory objectives,
theoretical proclivities, methodological tendencies, forms of theoretical
ethnocentrism, and differing forms of community building. Third, and
by extension, we explore the impact (if any) that European AFP
approaches have had on their North American counterparts.
Clearly, images of a US mainstream and a European periphery have
given way to two (and possibly more) distinct schools, but can this separa-
tion be said to exist evenly across the entire investigative terrain of FPA?
Are there some areas or approaches in which a united viewpoint still
obtains? And is that unity based on FPA understandings, AFP understand-
ings, or a hybrid of the two? The latter point is interesting, suggesting as it
does the possibility not only of disciplinary hybridity in terms of FPA’s cur-
rent state of the art, but genuine bridge building that heralds both interdis-
ciplinary crossovers that could benefit IR and more practical interfaces and
outputs between North American and non–North American FPA scholars.
Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy:

Transatlantic Comparisons
A brief reminder of the terrain of North American–based FPA, followed

by a short overview of the range of approaches currently on offer within
non–North American schools, is a helpful and necessary start. In order
to clarify the distinction between the two schools of foreign policy
analysis, we refer to the North American perspective as “FPA,” and the
European (including British) perspective as “AFP.” The reasons for this
distinction are twofold:
• First, to use the labels of FPA and AFP as discrete categories

describing the ontological, epistemological, and methodological
differences between North American and European approaches;
• Second, to suggest that, while they exist as analytically separate
categories of exploration, they need not be reified. Indeed, as we
argue below, there are areas of overlap, as well as serious (if unex-
plored) potential for bridge building between the two, and they
should therefore ultimately be regarded (particularly by those out-
side the IR family) as subsumed under the same umbrella of ana-
lyzing foreign policy.
The North American heritage of FPA began in the 1950s, but was not
firmly attached to any particular discipline, and this itself may explain
both its subsequent vibrancy and its diversity. Instead, a number of key
texts drawn from across the range of the postwar social sciences pro-
vided the anchor to the ensuing three FPA paradigms:
• The decisionmaking of foreign policy, as an individual and group-

based dynamic (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954), and as a struc-
tured institutional process defined as bureaucratic and organiza-
tional politics (Allison 1971; Allison and Halperin 1972);
• The psychological dimension of foreign policy decisionmaking
(Boulding 1966; Sprout and Sprout 1956; George 1979; Brecher
1972; Janis 1982); and
• The comparative foreign policy theories examining the generaliz-
able qualities between genotypes of states (Rosenau 1974).
This foundation enabled theorists to test both rational actor and psycho-
logical motives, to examine individual decisionmakers and the vary-
ingly structured if generic composition of state units, and to compare
between state units. FPA attempted, albeit uneasily, to connect via

midrange theories the generalizable attributes of state behavior with the
particularist qualities entailed in decisionmaking. Midrange theories
“were not general accounts of all foreign policy behavior but instead
were accounts of either the foreign policies of some types of states, or
foreign policy [as uniquely constructed] in specific situations” (S.
Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2012b: 4). Running counter to the tradi-
tional covering law approach characteristic of North American social
science at the time, the benefits of midrange theorizing were seized on
sporadically by enlightened minds such as James Rosenau (1974), but
not consistently enough either to establish midrange approaches as a
new addition to the panoply of FPA approaches, or to keep FPA itself
from falling out of fashion within the wider political and social sciences
in the 1980s.
Its ability to indicate so much, while accounting for so little, may
explain the comparative unpopularity of FPA throughout the 1980s; that,
and the inability of comparative foreign policy to generate a framework
that could be extended beyond types of states to types of foreign policy
behavior. Nevertheless, FPA comprehensively laid the foundation that
focused the original ontology of acceptable explanandum, but simultane-
ously encouraged a wide variety of epistemological and methodological
approaches in terms of conceptualizing explanandum and processing
explanans.
European AFP accordingly became rooted not only in FPA, but also
in the solid base that IR theory has played in its political science canon,
the growing presence of EU integration theory within both the political
and social sciences, and the rise of EU member state−specific analyses.
Across the political and social sciences, there is a fine-grained appreci-
ation of the IR canon (in both its classic and contemporary variants) and
its ability to provide exceptionally helpful, possibly complementary
realist, liberalist, constructivist, and poststructuralist conceptual founda-
tions to assist the study of war, peace, conflict, cooperation, and societal
development.
As illustrated below, a close reading of the European offerings with
North American vehicles like the journal Foreign Policy Analysis or the
general ethos of European foreign policy vehicles demonstrate this
trend. Other examples can be drawn from the 2008 and 2012 gathering
of foreign policy theories, actors, and cases by European analysts Steve
Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne of European and North Amer-
ican scholars alike for a studiously IR-focused approach, including
William Wohlforth on realism, Michael Doyle on liberalism, Jeffrey
Checkel and Trine Flockhart on constructivism, Lene Hansen on dis-

course analysis as well as Walter Carlsnaes regarding the interlinking of
IR theories to explain the range of foreign policy structures and actors
(S. Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2008b, 2012a). It is instructive to con-
sider that these scholars would not normally be thought of as working in
the field of FPA by North American FPA scholars. A similar textbook,
edited by North American scholars, would probably have included a
very different list of authors. This trend toward greater integration with
mainstream IR theory is also exemplified in other European works: for
example, Mohammed Yunus (2003) draws on European philosophical
and legal history that underwrites the IR canon to explain the evolution
and implementation of foreign policy, while Ilya Prizel (1998) demon-
strates the use of constructivism, sociology, psychology, and identity
studies to explore connections between national identity and foreign
policy.
European integration theory does not always sit happily within the
expansive terrain of IR theory, any more than does its principal referent,
the EU. Analyzing the foreign policy of the EU itself means interrogat-
ing IR axioms for their steadfastness in continuing to dictate key areas
of European actorness (particularly where member states continue to
hold the whip hand), while simultaneously appreciating it as a multifac-
eted, multilevel, and multilocational dynamic that eschews easy catego-
rization, cannot be reduced to zero-sum power plays, and requires
something of a conceptual collision (or possibly collusion) merely to
appreciate all of its moving parts (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 11–
34). Key sovereign reflexes will continue to dominate the foreign policy
dynamics of both the EU and numerous other international organiza-
tions; and much in IR-led FPA and AFP will be well served by such out-
looks. However, with its emphasis on the institutional and socializing
modes by which identities, interests, consensus, and growth are man-
aged, incrementally via spillover, structurally via federal units, as well
as by legal, social, political, economic, and even cultural transforma-
tions, EU integration theory has slowly proved capable of explicating
the endlessly complex institutional iterations manifested by the EU.1
The broad impact of EU integration theory can be seen in three separate
types of analysis, as illustrated above: (1) those that feature country-
specific examinations of the construction of a given national foreign
policy as it pertains to, and operates separately from, the impact of the
EU; (2) those that concentrate largely on the entity of the EU itself, as a
series of interlocking policymaking institutions; and (3) as a conse-
quence of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, studies that have begun to reflect on
the diplomatic machinery of the EU entailed in the hub-and-spoke struc-
ture of the European External Action Service led by the High Represen-
tative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and its
European Union Delegations, and that continue a substantial tradition of
scholarly work discerning the nature of EU “actorness.” Indeed, even
these three types of analysis are not exhaustive of the myriad methods
of engaging with European foreign policy analysis.
In the nearly two decades since the founding of the European Union
in 1993, all three areas have witnessed a genuine flourishing of analysis.
State-based foci include initial encyclicals of EU member states’ foreign
policies by Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (2001a) to state-specific
comparisons by Dimitrios Kavakas (2001) to recent investigations of
various EU member state foreign policies by Pernille Rieker (2005),
Alister Miskimmon (2007), Mairi Maclean and Joseph Szarka (2008),
Juha Jokela (2010), Daniel Thomas (2011), and Michael Baun and Dan
Marek (2012). This camp is inherently comparative, identifying two,
three, or in some cases almost all of the EU member states to discern the
tension between national imperatives over foreign policy making and the
pull of the EU in a number of key areas. Larger states, for example, seem
to have greater difficulty eschewing their sovereign heritage in this
respect, and do not automatically or easily regard the EU as an appropri-
ate or even alternative institutional framework for either active strategies
or reactive crisis responses (Gross 2009). Smaller states are assumed to
more easily adopt EU policy as part of the overall magnifying force
entailed in joining the EU, where bigger is better. A variety of interesting
outsiders, however, suggest that neither of these generalizations can be
carried too far. Large and midsized states continue to act pragmatically
in pursuance of their national interest, which may coincidentally support
an active EU policy, while smaller states with a history of neutrality may
favor attitudes strongly contrary to the Europeanization of foreign policy
making (de Flers 2011; Whitman, Hadfield, and Manners 2015).2 Explo-
rations of the top-down impact of the EU upon member states (generally
attributable to the broad-based dynamic of Europeanization) began in
earnest with Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (1999, 2006), Brian
White (2001), and Christopher Lord and Nicholas Winn (2001) to be
joined by Hazel Smith (2002), Michael Smith (2003), Roland Dannreuther
(2003), Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, and Brian White (2004), Ben
Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (2004a), and, more recently, Xymena
Kurowska and Fabian Breuer (2011) and Fraser Cameron (2012). The
initial survey of the European Union’s “capability-expectations gap” by

Christopher Hill (1993) then yielded a generation of studies determining
the modes, intensity, and effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy impact
and the actorness of the EU itself. The most recent iteration are studies
examining the emergence of an EU strategic culture as a method by
which to explain the tension between integrationist efforts at construct-
ing an emphatically “Union” foreign policy in key areas and the abiding
interests of the member states themselves to continue to define and
defend their own national foreign policies, either independently of, or in
uneasy parallel with, those of the EU (Cornish and Edwards, 2005; C.
Meyer 2006; Biava 2011).
What are the results? In disciplinary terms, Manners and Whitman
were among the first to recognize an emerging FPA-AFP split, suggest-
ing as early as 2001 the existence of “a divergence of practices between
Europe and North America in terms of the development of foreign poli-
cies, and in terms of foreign policy analysis undertaken by scholars”
(Manners and Whitman 2001b: 4). The outcome in their opinion was
twofold: a split that questioned “to what degree European scholars pay
attention to the work of US scholars, and vice versa . . . [and] the devel-
opment of a critical mass of existing and new European scholars who
are writing in the field of FPA in a European context” (Manners and
Whitman 2001b: 4).
More broadly, differences in the degree of integration with main-
stream IR theory have produced a number of results. The Europeans,
ironically, appear to interpret the levels of analysis originally outlined
by US neorealist scholar Kenneth N. Waltz far more broadly than his
North American FPA compatriots, instinctively using the tripartite levels
of analysis (first image: state leaders; second image: domestic makeup
of states; and third image: systemic level) to determine a wide range of
state behavior as it emerges from micro, intermediary, and macro levels
respectively, and the integrative consequences of such behavior (Waltz
1979). European scholars are able to tackle the social, economic, and
normative dynamics that motivate states and institutions alike, and sub-
sequently orient policy, largely because they are all derivatives of the
multifaceted nature of EU integration theory that promotes a distinct
ability to inject a variety of intervening variables into the analytical
mix. Accordingly, European theorists are perhaps rather more at ease in
understanding both the discrete differences between, and the profound
hybridity that links microscopic dynamics of individual perception,
beliefs, and motivational cultural bias, the mesoscopic forces of a given
domestic structure as it impacts on national preferences, and the macro-
scopic power distribution at the structural level.
The choice of levels of analysis is thus profoundly wider within

AFP—for, with the meso level, comes the ability to theorize on integra-
tion in general and think clearly about the use of intervening variables
and dynamics to connect, and complicate, the original state-structure
dyad.3 The variety of meso-level theorizing in EU studies is fertile
indeed; that is, investigations that focus primarily on the role of an inter-
mediary level, actor, or factor (and not to be confused with midrange the-
ories). Meso-level factors look closely at the role of intervening factors
and their ability to operate as an interface; for example, between domestic
and international (such as regionalism), or between social and political
forces (such as networking). EU-oriented meso-level theories can there-
fore cover everything from social networking to multilevel governance, to
the position of EU law between national and international law, to the
impact of the EU market on structures of global political economy.
Second, given the intensely social and institutional quality of the
changes wrought on European political structures, and perforce on those
determined to study them, AFP has little of the dogmatic attachment to
quantifying variables, producing regressions, and so forth. There is far
more effort at getting IR theories to sensibly underwrite—or falsify—
the political developments by which, for example, key aspects of mod-
ern European sovereignty have been attenuated, the modes by which an
extensive political union have emerged from a common market, and the
emergence of a foreign policy structure in which national interests are
agreed and implemented collectively. All such developments run deeply
against the grain of FPA’s traditional state-centrism and focus on deci-
sionmaking; yet they represent the contemporary European political
reality, which—having outstripped theory making at virtually every
juncture—requires an increasingly innovative set of precepts by which
to explain, but chiefly understand, precisely how and why such a colos-
sal experiment has occurred at all.
Given that FPA has remained a largely state-centric enterprise, Euro-
pean AFP scholars have had to move farther afield to find the theoretical
tools to address these unprecedented developments. But this only deep-
ens the divide between them and their transatlantic cousins. And as indi-
cated above, one of the most profound reasons for this divide is the
enduring tension of whether, and how, to make use of IR theory.
Covering Laws or Historical Contingency?
The original commitment of FPA was to open the black box of state for-
eign policy decisionmaking in search of agency, and to do so in a theo-
retical fashion whereby specific cases were seen as instances of theoret-

ical propositions. State-centric in its foundations, FPA operated as a
form of micro-level analysis for IR theory, deconstructing grand gener-
alities of the state and state outcomes in the form of behavior. FPA
demonstrated that reassuring IR axioms were revealed as messy, contin-
gent, conditional, and contextual; reified actor-general units like the
state, operating in some variants of North American IR theory via math-
ematical codes of game theory, were thus dismembered. First, principles
were filtered through myriad levels of analysis, micro-level (the indi-
vidual leader, and his or her personality and characteristics), to interven-
ing variables and structures including small group dynamics, organiza-
tional processes, bureaucratic politics, domestic political contestation,
culture, and more macro levels of analysis, including that of the state in
the international system.
Ironically, the deconstructive nature of FPA was firmly entrenched in
a deductive, nomothetic methodology that simply accepted the need to
subsume all micro- and intervening-level findings of state behavior (how-
ever esoteric) within covering law explanations. Case studies were inter-
esting only insofar as they elucidated broader scope conditions or appli-
cable extensions of a given theoretical proposition. The rigors of being a
branch of political science (with the emphasis on science) meant that in
all endeavors to link together component theories as to how precisely a
state makes foreign policy, the ultimate test was prediction (or postdic-
tion), for that would imply falsifiability. Again, there is no small irony in
the observation that while FPA insisted that examination of the specific
actor of the state entailed myriad esoteric explorations of processes and
policies, inputs and outputs, causes and effects, human decisions and state
behavior, and individual and group dynamics, the form that theory ulti-
mately took in explaining the outcome of a state’s foreign policy was ide-
ally generic and ahistoric. The goal of FPA, as Alexander L. George puts
it, was simple: to generate “actor-specific theory” (1993, 1994, 2002). In
other words, whatever idiographic particularisms used to explain one
instance of foreign policy decisionmaking would undoubtedly be applica-
ble to understanding any form of decisionmaking, whether or not it had
anything to do with foreign policy. Much within these developments can
be attributed to the enormous impact of behaviorism in North American
political and social science, which prompted a renaissance of the scien-
tific approach, that as Carlsnaes argues,
had a decisive effect on both the public policy and realist-oriented per-
spectives on the study of foreign policy. Its impact on the former was per-
haps the more deep-going in the sense that it changed its character alto-
gether from being an essentially idiographic and normative enterprise—

i.e. analysing specific forms of policy or prescribing better means for its
formulation and implementation—to one that aspired to generate and test
hypotheses in order to develop a cumulative body of empirical general-
izations. (Carlsnaes 2012: 115)
This stance, however, left a number of European analysts and practition-

ers deeply unconvinced of a number of things. First, the North American
genealogy of political science, rather than international history, appeared
to have disconnected foreign policy from its conceptual source of politi-
cal philosophy and its empirical bedrock of diplomatic history, replacing
it with generic catchall categories that produced a field of study with a
rather curious mix of the anodyne and the unwieldy. Reducing great
swaths of diplomatic history and political forces (whether axioms and
accidents) to a subcategory of either political science (in the United
States) or international relations (in Europe) risked the pedantic dissec-
tion of a key European certainty; namely, that foreign policy is simulta-
neously the source and the substance of international relations and
innately domestic in derivation.4 As Carlsnaes—himself a good example
of the European camp—argues, the substance of foreign policy
“emanates from issues of both domestic and international politics,” and
“is conducted in complex internal and international environments” pre-
cisely because it “straddle[s] the boundary between the internal and the
external spheres of a state” (Carlsnaes 2012: 113).
Second, the exquisitely interdependent nature of states and state
structures to European eyes could not so easily be reduced to any actor-
specific category. European history had for centuries been underwritten
by a political reality that rarely privileged action over interaction, state
over system, territory over community. Not only was foreign policy an
accepted method by which all manner of different polities conversed
and negotiated with each other, ideas of what truly defined a state, and
its internal and external mediums, let alone the correct message by
which to represent those mediums, remained deeply contested, as evi-
denced in the writing of political philosophers including Jean Bodin,
Hugo Grotius, David Hume, Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Immanuel Kent, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, John Stuart
Mill, and Leopold von Ranke (A. J. Williams, Hadfield, and Rofe
2012). Even for hard-nosed pragmatists, the sociocultural institution
known as the balance of power was understood to be equally important
to the particular states being balanced.
The result is that, despite the postwar North American upsurge in
public interest that produced public diplomacy and the upswing in
researching foreign policy as a field of study, the task of nailing down

timeless theory was regarded as best left to North American political
scientists and IR theorists (at best), and largely discounted as an aca-
demic endeavor of any note in Europe (at worst). The welter of postwar
and Cold War theorizing about foreign policy thus was not only deduc-
tive in form, but North American in content. North American FPA theo-
rists themselves struggled to produce a single overarching theory on
international relations, systems, and politics, moving from decision-
making, to comparative foreign policy (McGowan and Shapiro 1973),
to a variety of midrange theories that captured some (but not all) aspects
of the input-output dyad of foreign policy.
Interestingly, European foreign policy analysts, however, have
never felt particularly debilitated by the lack of a comprehensive cover-
ing law for FPA. This is likely the case because, first, contemporary IR
theory is understood to sufficiently (if tacitly) underwrite the generic
modes of statecraft; and, second, because the EU has in its various iter-
ations provided examples for more than half a century of permanent
testable structure that has visibly institutionalized a gamut of policies,
both domestic and foreign.
Mapping the Transatlantic Divide Between FPA and AFP
Against this historical and theoretical background, readers by now can

discern certain basic tensions between the categories of investigation
and modes of analysis used in North American FPA and European
schools of AFP. Rather more detail, however, is needed to decrypt the
nature of the tensions from the selection of the aims and methods of the
two schools. In this section, we explore five areas of disconnect within
the FPA-AFP dyad:
• Explanatory objectives (including ontology, explananda, and epis-

temology);
• Theoretical proclivities;
• Methodological proclivities;
• Theory ethnocentrism; and
• Community building.
The Explanatory Objectives of the Field

In our view, the heart of the transatlantic division concerns the two most
salient points of foreign policy analysis. First, precisely what is the
object of foreign policy analysis? Which aspect is to be analyzed: what

is the explanandum of foreign policy? As the raw material of foreign pol-
icy, the explanandum could constitute virtually anything from the inter-
national structure, to state behavior, to “the processes and resultants of
human decisionmaking reference to or having known consequences for
foreign entities” (Hudson 2005: 2), to the specific “stages of decision-
making . . . from problem recognition, framing and perception to more
advanced stages of goal prioritization, contingency planning, and option
assessment (Hudson 2007: 4). The choice of the explanandum is thus an
ontological choice about the categories and characteristics of actors from
which foreign policy—as a process or a behavior—emerges. It is also a
choice that is inevitably affected from the outset by the levels of analysis
dilemma facing all scholars.
Second, what is to be used in pursuit of this explanandum? What fac-
tors can be drawn on to provide a better knowledge of a given foreign
policy objective, and what tools can be used by which to analyze it? In
other words, what is the explanans of foreign policy? Simply put, the
explanans comprises “those factors that influence foreign policy decision-
making and foreign policy decision-makers,” or which affect the state, or
indeed the system (Hudson 2007: 5). The choice of the explanans is thus
an epistemological choice in terms of deciding what categories of knowl-
edge assist in explaining the chosen objective of analysis, and a method-
ological decision regarding the particular approach by which to test, val-
idate, and prove or falsify a given explanandum.
While the explanandum defines from the outset the specific inves-
tigative objective around which all analysis must subsequently revolve,
the explanans lays down the explanatory method by which the objective
is to be properly explained. And yet, on this most quintessential of foun-
dations, FPA itself has had a rather anarchic history, a plethora of
approaches on the merits of a wide range of explanandum and explanans.
With European variants contributing their own perspectives on the defin-
itive ontology, requisite epistemology, and necessary methodology, the
end result has for many years been a veritable proliferation of attitudes
and orientations to the study of foreign policy. And yet as will be seen,
within this conceptual blossoming are found discernable preferences of
approach, particularly concerning the choice of explanandum.
Taking Carlsnaes’s definition as a baseline, we can suggest that a
workable explanandum for the analysis of foreign policy is to explore
any of the following highlighted categories:
those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals,

commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental represen-
tatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed to-

wards objectives, conditions and actors—both governmental and non-
governmental—which they want to affect and which lie beyond their ter-
ritorial legitimacy. (Carlsnaes 2002: 335; emphasis added)
Potential (though inexhaustive) categories of foreign policy analysis,

both units and levels, could include:
• The actions of states (as inputs or outputs);

• The methods by which actions are expressed;
• The goals of states, explicit or implicit (as inputs or outputs);
• The actions of governmental representatives;
• The status of sovereign (and nonsovereign) communities in pur-
suance of a foreign policy;
• The manner in which states formulate, direct and implement
internal objectives toward the external environment (as inputs or
outputs);
• The way in which states comprehend their external environment
and its effect on their desire to affect it; and
• The role of territorial legitimacy or sovereignty in determining all
of the above.
The key question therefore is whether North American and European

scholars differ in their choice of these most basic categories, and with
what effect? The heritage of the two schools provides an initial answer
regarding their choice of explanandum, although a discernable prefer-
ence for individual and state-based variables, alongside quantification
of aspects of power, pervades the North American side, with more dif-
fuse foci on societal structures, motivations, and system-level institu-
tionalization generally typify its non–North American counterpart.
In simple terms, using the original political science dyad of Martin
Hollis and Steve Smith (1990), North American FPA scholars appear
predominantly focused on explaining (and possibly predicting) foreign
policy while their European and British counterparts are more interested
in identifying how to understand it. A good comparison is the statement
by North American FPA scholar Laura Neack, who argues that good
theory making falls neatly within the scientific method and whose prime
objective should be deductive explanations that assist in producing
workable generalizations:
Theories are also used to help us tell the future, or predict. An explana-
tion of a single incident in the past might be interesting, but it cannot tell
us anything about the future. This is a problem for scholars, but even
more so for foreign policy makers. . . . Theories about how the world
works can help policy makers generalize from the past to new experi-
ences, thereby helping them know which policy to undertake and which
to avoid. . . . Theories are of no use to analysts or policy makers if they
are too particular, or overly specified. . . . Theories need to go beyond
single instances; theories need to apply to a group or class of cases that
share similar characteristics. (Neack 2003: 14–17; emphasis added)
In studying European foreign policy—whether focused on individual

states or on the EU as a whole—Sonia Lucarelli, however, suggests not
only a dramatically inductive approach, but one founded in constructivist
and social theory that enables a high degree of verstehen or understand-
ing in the Weberian sense, allowing them to argue that foreign policy has
less to do with the “hardware” of military, personnel, and institutions,
but rather the “software dimensions (including visions, aspirations,
worldviews, principles, norms, and beliefs)” (Lucarelli 2006: 1) by
which scholars come to understand the inner workings of a given unit.
She suggests—pace (Neack 2003)—that their approach represents a dis-
tinctly European trend in which
an increasing emphasis is placed on understanding, conceptualising, and

thinking more broadly about the EU as a political entity which partici-
pates in world politics, and is partially constituted by that participation.
This book is an attempt to move into a generation of scholarship which
goes beyond the phases [hardware approaches] described above, and
tries to think thoroughly about the way in which the EU is constituted as
a political entity by the values, images and principles . . . which shape the
discourse and practice of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world.
(Lucarelli 2006: 1; emphasis added)
Both AFP and FPA schools share largely the same ontological precepts
as to what constitutes foreign policy, and would recognize not only the
international and domestic forces producing state behavior in Carl-
snaes’s (2002: 335) definition above, but their own work exploring
those same forces. Whether those forces tend toward conflictual or
cooperative outcomes is subsequent to the primary ontological unity
arguably shared by both FPA and AFP. But an epistemological unity is
rather more difficult to determine; conflict versus cooperation is just
such an example, successfully dividing scholars who profess the same
ontological foundation. Not all concepts are shared, not all precepts are
agreed on.
The crack in the transatlantic foundation seems to be between shared
ontological agreement over the myriad variables that can decently con-
stitute the explanandum for the analysis of foreign policy, and an episte-
mological split over how they are subsequently to be understood, which
in turn has produced a related split over the choice of methodology.
In terms of ontology, FPA is avowedly actor specific, focusing on
statist units to explain inputs and outputs. AFP involves more complex
ideas of what constitutes actors and actor-specific categories; heavier
emphasis is being placed on examining statist and nonstatist units, and
on the filter that sets up inside/outside dimensions for constructing input
and output. This difference stems from the different role that IR theory
has played on either side of the Atlantic. In the United States, realist and
neorealist perspectives heavily undergird foreign policy actors of state,
statesperson (domestic), and diplomat (external) as well as foreign pol-
icy practices of statehood, statecraft, strategy, security, prosperity, and
so forth. In Europe, realist perspectives remain heavily counterbalanced
by neoliberal, constructivist, and poststructural methods of defining
states, nonstates, and their interdependent practices, with European inte-
gration theory adding variants, including liberal intergovernmentalism,
neofunctionalism, and new institutionalism: “theoretical frameworks as
lenses through which EU foreign policy and the political dynamics that
drive it can be better understood and explained” (Keukeleire and Del-
reux 2014: 321). A far wider canon is on offer, and thus made use of by
European scholars in their AFP, including those authors outlined above.
North American FPA scholars make theoretical claims that tend to
echo a realist ontology, and whose epistemology is empirical, its pre-
ferred methodology quantitative (i.e., datasets), and capable of render-
ing generalizations. Across the Atlantic, broader views have made their
way onto the scene. As argued by three British scholars in a recent text-
book, “To treat FPA as the only approach to the study of foreign policy
would limit our discussions. . . . [R]educing the study of foreign policy
to be only FPA-related is inaccurate, since many more theories are
involved than those covered by FPA” (S. Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne
2012b: 4). They use IR theory to produce foreign policy typologies that
are identifiably realist, liberal, constructivist, and discursive as well as
engaging with midrange filters of grand strategy, geopolitics and geo-
economics, foreign policy tools, media, culture, and religion as depend-
ent variables. European approaches thus make prominent use of the
panoply of contemporary IR theory (rather than political science) and,
as will be seen, European integration theories to analyze aspects of
national policies as foreign, from input to output.
Explananda: Process or Policy?

FPA ontologies are twofold in nature: whether to privilege the input or
the output side of the equation. North American FPA appears more pol-
icy or impact based while European AFP emphasizes the content, con-
text, multilevels, and bargaining entailed in constructing the process.
The work of Carlsnaes is instructive here. He argues that there exist
two fundamentally different explananda currently in use in foreign pol-

icy analysis. The first is characterized by a focus on decision-making
processes in a broad sense, while the second makes a clear distinction be-
tween such processes and policy, defined more narrowly as a choice of
action in the pursuit of a goal, or set of goals. . . . Studies focusing on ex-
plaining the choice of specific policies rather than decision-making
processes do so because they view policies as resulting from such
processes rather than being part of them. (Carlsnaes 2012: 88, 90; see
also Hill 2003)
There is certainly a tendency among European scholars to emphasize

the input component by examining processual patterns in preference to
(and sometimes at the expense of) the impact-driven output of policy.
An interesting example is the popularity among European scholars of
the category of actor and, in turn, the quality of “actorness” engendered
by a multifaceted unit like the EU, as initially explored by Bretherton
and Vogler (1999).
“Actorness” was coined early on in the European camp to denote
the multifarious ontology of the EU, an odd socioeconomic-political
entity that exists in terms of its sheer presence, its active use of instru-
ments, and conscious response to external opportunities. Actorness in
foreign policy terms means the ability of such an actor to display the
full range of process-to-policy dynamics, regardless of the absence of
statehood. The EU has done precisely this by collapsing two of the three
key phases inherent in getting from process to foreign policy: basic
cooperation and intermediary coordination. Deep integration of its for-
eign policy, however, has yet to truly move beyond the newly consti-
tuted position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, bridging both Commission and Council,
and a variety of decisionmaking niceties designed to speed up approval
and implementation.5 The drawback, of course, is that the heavy Euro-
pean emphasis on process can come at the expense of examining the
impact of foreign policy. In some significant ways, the EU has yet to
come of age as an impact-led foreign policy actor, and analyzing EU

foreign policy is difficult in this sense. There is plenty of data on actor-
ness to be sure, but it does not always count as evidence of impact.
Equally however, given the enormous institutional, transborder, and
regional complexity of the United States itself, it is odd that this appar-
ently flexible concept has not been taken up with any real vigor in FPA.
Epistemology
It may be less easy to find striking differences here between the two
schools of thought. At first blush, FPA scholarship appears quasi-mono-
lithic, causal, nomothetic, and focusing on the potential for prediction and
standardizing the explanandum as well as falsifying research strategies.
AFP epistemology has a greater emphasis on the idiographic and consti-
tutive. Yet IR theory has provided a fairly even base here, particularly the
rationalist streak in both realist and liberal and even conventional con-
structivist accounts, predisposing theorists to “search for patterns, gener-
alizations and abstractions, suggesting that we avoid treating phenomena
as unique and . . . cultivate our impulses to always search for more gen-
eral theoretical insights” (Jorgensen 2004: 19). While Knud Jorgensen as
a European finds this rule “absolutely splendid and hence a very fruitful
component of any research strategy,” he warns that “the nomothetical
ideal lurks in the background,” and puts his finger on the central Euro-
pean anxiety, namely, ignoring the local (Jorgensen 2004: 19).
Supporting an earlier argument made by Norman Denzin and
Yvonna Lincoln (1994), Jorgensen’s argument becomes clear: “Nomo-
thetic approaches fail to address satisfactorily the theory and the value-
added nature of facts, the interpretative nature of enquiry and the fact
that the same set of facts can support more than on theory” (Jorgensen
2004: 20). The danger in this stance was also articulated best from
within the North American camp by James N. Rosenau and Mary Dur-
fee, who argue that “theory involves generalizing rather than particular-
izing and requires relinquishing, subordinating” (1995: 185). Failure to
do so has made AFP an easy target for North American criticism in this
regard, for example by Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffman who early
on denounced European scholarship as “longer on detailed description
than analysis” (1990: 276).
Theoretical Proclivities
As discussed above, one of the hallmarks of North American FPA has
been its implicit goal of a grand unified theory (GUT) of foreign policy
decisionmaking that would be both cross-nationally applicable as well

as ahistorical in nature. While few scholars actually engaged in the
effort to develop such a GUT, the unstated (though well understood)
goal harmonized well with the actor-specific covering law approach to
theorizing within the subfield. Further, it is difficult to rebut the asser-
tion that FPA is best known for its more cognitively oriented work. This
trademark theme places FPA clearly in the camp of scholars interested
in agents and agency. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suggest
that FPA is therefore insufficiently interested in structures because there
is no other research agenda in IR so concerned with how agency is
shaped by the milieu and the structures in which it finds itself, whether
that be the dynamics of a small group or the inertia of a large organiza-
tion (Allison 1971). What can be argued, however, is that FPA largely
concerns itself with structures only insofar as they condition agency,
rather than how structures instantiate actors or are more causally consti-
tutive of agency.
Unsurprisingly, European-derived AFP has more pluralist leanings.
First, from the perspective of pure theory, European scholars have been
less persuaded by parsimony and more comfortable with utilizing the
full panoply of IR literature, and are particularly attached to the ratio-
nalist or absolute gains ethos of neoliberal institutionalism. Second, the
practical development of a credibly neoliberal institutional entity in the
form of the EU deeply informs their work. It is therefore difficult for
AFP scholars to privilege agency over structure in the way that their
North American counterparts do.
Practically, politically, and conceptually, the EU has collapsed dis-
tinctions between state and structure, between intergovernmental and
supranational modes of decisionmaking, and consequently between a
host of familiar analytical dyads like deductive/inductive, state/individ-
ual, and structure/society. However, inasmuch as the EU retains its sov-
ereign imperative by virtue of its constituent member state units, AFP
retains an uneasy balance between orthodox state-centric views of a
materialist structure and innovative nonstate views of institutional actor-
ness and norm-based rule making. What is interesting is that the rigor-
ous attachment to IR theory found elsewhere in underwriting AFP does
not necessarily produce useful studies of the EU itself. As Jorgensen
argues, while most “theory-informed research” on the EU’s CFSP
employs the deductive method . . . [in which] every imaginable theory

has been applied: realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, regime theory,
world systems theory . . . these applications have been conducted in a
“single shot” fashion and more often than not they focus on case studies
of selected policies or institutional aspects. We are thus far from having
reached a critical mass of applications and thus are unable to fully assess
the potentials of each theory. (2004: 14)
Thus, European deductivism does no more than “contribute to the art of

testing theories developed elsewhere and sometimes reflecting other
experiences and often serving other purposes” (Jorgensen 2004: 14).
Inductivism appears a better method of apprehending foreign policy
data from the EU; stronger still would be a hybrid approach fusing key
elements in a tailor-made hypothesis that captures the EU’s nonstate
ambiguities. Jorgensen laments that “very few theoretical studies of the
CFSP have been conducted in such an inductive exploratory fashion”
(2004: 14).6 In simple terms, European scholars have a better sense of
the theoretic “ground” (Hudson 2007: 3) by which to analyze foreign
policy (AFP) but appear to have done less with it, while North Ameri-
can scholars operate with a more limited purview of the theoretic under-
pinnings of FPA but perhaps have done more with it.
Methodological Proclivities
It is also true that even a cursory comparison of FPA literature on either
side of the Atlantic reveals a much higher percentage of FPA articles using
quantitative analytic techniques, compared to AFP. (Interestingly however,
while AFP remains largely qualitative, many recent studies seem to be
adopting a deductive approach, as explored below.) For example, personal-
ity has been studied with word count content analysis, which lends itself
well to statistical analysis. Small group dynamics have been studied using
quantitative thematic content analysis. Events data studies are another tech-
nique that lends itself to analysis by way of moving averages and other sta-
tistical analyses. It must be pointed out, however, that while quantitative
FPA research does not typically resemble the type of large-N, macro-level
independent and dependent variable statistical studies emanating, say, from
the World Bank, there is no antipathy toward using statistics and mathe-
matical modeling in FPA. Indeed, based on its “scientistic” roots in behav-
ioral social science of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, a determi-
nation to use falsifiable methods is a continuing legacy of the subfield.
European perspectives have long favored the use of history (diplo-
matic and domestic), as well as historical process tracing and compara-
tive country studies. There is a good balance generally between deduc-
tive approaches using IR theory as something of a loose covering law to
test against specific instances, and inductive approaches examining the
empirical development of EU foreign policy along three axes: “bureau-
cratic structure, substantive policy remit and decision-making capacity”

(Tonra and Christiansen 2004b: 5).
Theoretical Ethnocentrism
The eminent British scholar A. J. R. Groom asserts that the North Amer-
ican view of FPA is overly narrow: “It was essentially an American
agenda with disturbing elements of parochialism that ignored emerging
global problems. In short, it was a research agenda fitted for a particular
actor, not for FPA or more generally” (2007: 210). In this critique,
North American visions of the corpus of FPA scholarship focus almost
exclusively on North American scholars or those writing in North
American journals. Groom feels that “foreign policy [study] was origi-
nally conceived in terms of changing the world and responding to a
changing world to make it better, whatever that might mean,” with an
emphasis on the study of diplomacy (2007: 214). Groom is particularly
dismayed at the continued state-centric focus of North American FPA:
“In the evolution of foreign policy studies, now more grandly known as
FPA, over the last century or so, we find that it has become a more lim-
ited tranche of a much more complicated world” (2007: 214).
British theorist Brian White (2004: 48) argues similarly that “despite
the transformed nature of contemporary world politics,” FPA is outdated
because it remains locked into “state-centric realism” with, as Michael
Smith puts it, “the state and governmental power” still providing the
“central conceptual building blocks of the field” (2001, quoted in White
2004: 48). In particular, the North American–made “tools of traditional
foreign policy analysis add relatively little to our understanding of the
EU” (Lister 1997: 6). However, such perspectives heighten a serious lack
of comprehension of the part of European scholars, who assume that all
US-based IR theory is state-centric (it is obviously not), and also that the
overlap between FPA and IR is theoretically uninteresting. This, in turn,
worsens the current sense of ethnocentrism in North American FPA as
experienced by European scholars. European scholars may be au fait
with the behavioral turn in IR (comprising the Second Great Debate), but
are not au courant with the behavioral strides within FPA itself. This
means that despite their comprehensive engagement with either conven-
tional or critical schools of constructivism, and occasional clear-sighted
understanding of the application of poststructuralism, there is not always
a decisive connection with either the original motivations or methods of
decisionmaking analysis that lies at the heart of FPA or its contemporary
developments.
There is a genuine paradox here. FPA is regularly lambasted by

European scholars for its undue emphasis on state-centrism while US
(IR) scholars criticize FPA for its overly broad purview of multiple,
mostly substate factors; its kitchen-sink type of approach to understand-
ing international affairs; its impunity at crossing disciplinary boundaries
to engage psychologists, sociologists, organizational behavior scholars;
and so forth (the classic critique is Herbert McCloskey 1962). The par-
adox exists simply because the variety of North American FPA scholar-
ship, however wide, is comprehensively state-centric and actor-specific
based. The irony is that US foreign policy continues to fit exquisitely
well within state-centric purviews, so there remains a firm empirical
and conceptual goodness of fit for North American scholars, whatever
the multidisciplinary avenue taken toward the analysis of US foreign
policy. The further irony is that FPA can clearly exist in a variety of iter-
ations, North American and European, but it has not yet done so with
any degree of conceptual commensurability; hence, the existence of an
evolving divide between the two based on misapprehensions as to what
the other side is (or should be) doing.
Community Building: Integration or Separation?

While FPA does not have its own professional organization within the
United States, it is the second-largest section of the International Stud-
ies Association (ISA), and is primarily North American in membership.
North American FPA scholars pressed for the creation of Foreign Policy
Analysis, as an ISA-sponsored journal. Debuting in 2005, and now
ranked by ISI, the mandate of the FPA journal is instructive. It is at once
“diverse, comparative and multidisciplinary,” intent on crossing “theo-
retical, methodological, geographical and disciplinary boundaries,” and
aims ambitiously at “theoretical and methodological integration.”7 The
articles are indeed diverse and pleasingly multi- rather than interdisci-
plinary. However, the goal of crossing the FPA-AFP boundary is
arguably not reached, apart from North American contributors writing
on non–North American subjects and European contributors occasion-
ally looking at North American topics. For the most part, the content of
Foreign Policy Analysis, however, is not only overwhelmingly North
American in terms of the academic pedigree of its contributors, but
illustrates the tenacity of FPA’s North American roots even when non–
North Americans are the authors.
The evidence for this assertion is as follows. First, there is a prepon-
derance of US-based authors and North American themes. Second, both
the explanandum and the explanans of the majority of articles revolve

around the “actor-specific focus” by which “foreign policy analysis, as a
field of study, is characterized.”8 Within the actor-specific mode, FPA is
defined as the typical input-output hinge through which international
affairs swings; that is, “the study of process, effects, causes or outputs of
foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-specific
manner.”9 Third, as Tables 8.1 and 8.2 indicate, there is a visible prefer-
ence for “old-school” FPA, in terms of both categories of investigation
and modes of analysis. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 provide a snapshot of the state
of the art typifying FPA and AFP approaches, during the first year of
publication of the journal Foreign Policy Analysis, and set the stage for
a similar review of a 2012 issue that is explored in the conclusion of this
chapter.
Five observations offer themselves on the basis of this brief compar-
ison in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. The first observation is the derivation of the
contributors; Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 3, November
2005, is well balanced, with two of the five contributions hailing from
Europe, and three of the five identifiably subscribing to the modes and
methods of the AFP school. The second is precisely that one can—with a
few exceptions—arguably see the distinction that we have been dis-
cussing in this chapter. In the FPA camp, both contributors are reliably
typical of the quasi-deductive, emphatically quantitative approach to
deconstructing traditional FPA inputs (cognitive factors and problem rep-
resentation), or a US-based case study (UNSC Resolution 1441, 2002).
Both make use of a dependent variable that can be rendered as event
data, measured and aggregated, either through Verbs in Context System
(VICS) or Kansas Event Data System (KEDS-TABARI) (conflict, in the
case of Sylvan et al.); while the independent variable (problem represen-
tation) is similarly measured, multidimensionally scaled, and scored. A
mere six tables of intense data aggregation finally allow Donald A. Syl-
van, Andrea Grove, and Jeffrey D. Martinson the freedom to declare
simply that “in short, a central message from either Palestinian or Israeli
elites has a distinct impact on the behavior of the other group or side”
(2005: 291; emphasis in original). The third observation is that here—
and elsewhere in virtually every subsequent issue of the journal—North
American–based proponents of FPA are methodologically habituated to
testing a hypothesis as the central part of their analysis. Fourth, contrib-
utors favoring an AFP-orientation, in this instance, Charles F. Parker and
Eric K. Stern (himself a European-based American), generally forgo pre-
cisely this methodology in favor of conceptual, comparative, defini-
tional, categorization tools that support “understanding how and why” a
given foreign policy response was crafted and enacted (2005: 301). To
be sure, Parker and Stern draw on classic FPA roots in investigating the
role of strategic surprise as it emerges from “psychological, bureau-
organizational, and agenda-political approaches to the study of policy-
making processes” (2005: 302). But their “examination of the empirical
record” and the “evidence” examined is distinctly qualitative, producing
working categories (e.g., decisionmaking pathologies), with accompany-
ing examples simply drawn from statements (Parker and Stern 2005).
Table 8.1 Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 3, November 2005:

FPA Contributions
Author (Institution) Explanandum Explanans

D. A. Sylvan (Ohio), Cognitive factors; Coded problem representation;
A. Grove (Westminster), problem representation; KEDS-TABARI computer
and J. D. Martinson (Ohio) statements of Middle East program generating event
and Northern Ireland leaders data on deeds
B. G. Marfleet (Carleton) France and US diplomatic VICS, computer-based
and C. Miller (Minnesota) clash on UNSC Resolution quantitative content analysis
1441 (2002) preferred of public statements
outcomes, perceptions of
preferences
Notes: FPA is foreign policy analysis. KEDS-TABARI is the Kansas Event Data System. VICS is
Verbs in Context System.
Table 8.2 Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 3, November 2005:

AFP Contributions
Author (Institution) Explanandum Explanans

B. Ozkececi-Taner Institutionalized ideas at work IR theory, constructivism
(Macalester College, in Turkish decisionmaking
St. Paul, MN, and
Maxwell School,
Syracuse, NY)
C. F. Parker and E. K. Stern Examining September 11 Psychological,
(both Uppsala University, strategic surprise, vulnerability, bureau-organizational,
Finland) and vigilance agenda-political literature
P. Burnell (University of US vs. EU political strategies Democratization literature,
Warwick, UK) for democratization strategy, goal-setting,
multilevel governance theory
Notes: AFP is analysis of foreign policy. IR is international relations. EU is European Union.
The compulsion found in FPA to quantitatively aggregate data is thus

usually replaced in AFP by qualitative assigning of theoretic categories
derived from both the conceptual literature and the evidence comprising
the case study (e.g., overvaluation, overconfidence, insensitivity, wishful
thinking) (Parker and Stern 2005: 305).
The fifth and final observation is the assumed goodness of fit
between IR theories and FPA. As Binur Ozkececi-Taner’s study of the
impact of institutionalized ideas on coalition foreign policy making sug-
gests, despite its central place in IR, “constructivism (in its various ver-
sions) has not been able to generate actor-specific theories that would
help us explain or predict how a state would act under certain circum-
stances” (2005: 271). Ozkececi-Taner, however, approaches the FPA-IR
problematique by not only examining the links between FPA and IR, but
moving the analysis forward instead by “domesticizing constructivism”
through a focus on “domestic political ideas as explanatory variables,”
and effectively using the opportunity “to go micro” (2005: 271; empha-
sis in original).
Comparisons with European and British journal mandates reinforce
the sense of a transatlantic divide. There is no European counterpart to
Foreign Policy Analysis. If we examine possible journals that might
aspire to such a distinction, three common attributes across the Euro-
pean Foreign Affairs Review, the Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, and the Review of International Studies are evident, as a brief
review illustrates.10 First, the three journals evidence a laudatory avid
commitment to thick interdisciplinary work within the social sciences
(rather than comparative multidisciplinary snapshots across political
sciences, qua foreign policy analysis. Worryingly, however, there is no
clear reference in any of their mandates to FPA as a recognized field of
academic enquiry.
The European Foreign Affairs Review, for instance, functions as “an
interdisciplinary medium for the understanding and analysis of foreign
affairs issues which are of relevance to the European Union and its mem-
ber states on the one hand and its international partners on the other”
with the aim of “meeting the needs of both the academic and the practi-
tioner” via “political science and policy-making, law or economics.”11
The Cambridge Review of International Affairs meanwhile reinforces the
earlier point that European foreign policy seems at home when grounded
in international relations theories, publishing scholarship “on interna-
tional affairs, particularly in the fields of international relations, interna-
tional law and international political economy.”12 The preeminent output
of the Review of International Studies is even more expansive, with a
long-standing commitment to scholarship “in international relations and

related fields such as politics, history, law, and sociology.”13
The omission of FPA at the level of journals in Europe is paralleled
by the same neglect as a university course of study. As a pedagogic
offering, foreign policy analysis is offered as a course at both the under-
graduate and graduate levels at many, though not most, universities in
the United States (Breuning 2010). Due in no small measure to its
agreed-on canon of classic works and its organizational efforts through
ISA, FPA has not become as diffuse a subfield as others such as interna-
tional political economy. In Europe, on the other hand, as a rough online
survey of available modules suggests, foreign policy analysis is offered
as an upper-year undergraduate module in an increasing number of uni-
versities, but it is by no means widespread. And the canon taught is more
naturally IR theory and social sciences, rather than political science and
North American–derived FPA. Such modules are generally likely to be
roundly marginalized by a larger number of case-specific modules
offered in European, British, German, Russian, or Asian foreign policy.
Conclusion
Having suggested that there is a variety of tensions between the original

North American school of FPA and its non–North American counter-
parts in Europe, the conclusion of our chapter must pronounce on the
implications of such divergence. We submit that the divergence can be
alternatively seen as problematic, or as a great opportunity.
For those concerned with the overall coherence of the body of work
undertaken under the broad aegis of FPA-AFP, these are troubling
times. In addition to IR theory’s uneasy role as either heresy for one
side or gospel for the other, the fivefold split outlined above indicates
that the potential for the divergence between FPA and AFP to become
reified and permanent does exist. A variety of outcomes suggest them-
selves. Most likely, both the categories of investigation and modes of
analysis that reasonably fall within the purview of FPA-AFP—the
explanandum and explanans of the discipline—will continue to prolifer-
ate. Interdisciplinary overlaps will be abundant, but at the cost of a sub-
field that excludes nothing and accordingly may say little about any-
thing. The starkest distinction—that of qualitative versus quantitative
methodologies—risks becoming permanently entrenched to the point
where each stance takes on normative hues, suggesting that certain
approaches are or are not acceptable within a given school. Further
splintering could see FPA being identified solely with a distinctly

empiricist (rather than empirical) school, and AFP itself understood as
increasingly theory-heavy, risking further FPA-AFP sectarianism. This
unfortunate state of affairs has the potential to transform into an
impasse what is currently a cultural variation.
Indeed, the most recent issue of Foreign Policy Analysis available
at the time of this writing (Volume 8, Issue 3, July 2012) indicates that
the impasse is alive and well and operates in a reliably North-to-South
fashion. Of the six contributors:
• A Turkish contributor, tackling religion and preferences in Turkish

foreign policy using both IR (liberalism, constructivism, and
rationalism) and game theory to model expectations and quantify
subjective estimates (Güner 2012);
• A North American coauthored team examining human trafficking
and its connection to the legal or illegal status of prostitution
using a combination of theoretical and statistical approaches
(Marinova and James 2012);
• A North American contributor comparing US troop deployments
with development aid, via controlled econometric regressions
(Kane 2012);
• A North American contributor examining the behavioral decision-
making of strategic risks and surprise via datasets, within- and
between-sample tests, and multivariate negative binomial regres-
sion (Helfstein 2012);
• A European contributor investigating the role of foreign-affiliated
universities in constituting soft power via “structured, focused
comparison” between soft power and transnational actors (inter-
viewed), and absent “large data sets” (Bertelsen 2012: 296); and
• A British contributor comparing US coercive diplomacy and
diversionary incentives against Iran, using corresponding theories
and discourse analysis (Davies 2012).
On the basis of the FPA-AFP disciplinary boundaries elucidated above,

Güner (2012) appears as the only atypical European AFP contribution
while FPA—with no disciplinary outliers—is represented in this issue at
any rate with little deviation from its preferred investigatory foundations.
On the other hand, for those unconcerned with the overall coherence
and output of the study of foreign policy, these are exciting times, and
the divergence noted by the more pessimistic outlook may turn out to be
a blessing for the field. The sheer number of conference panels, work-
shops, and plenary sessions dedicated to a wide array of foreign policy

topics is stunning, and increasing. From ISA to the University Associa-
tion for Contemporary European Studies, from the American Political
Science Association to the European Consortium for Political Research,
from North America to Europe and beyond, the study of state foreign
policy behavior is robust indeed. The original variety of approaches first
launched within FPA remains a foundation for North American devotees
and a springboard for European analysis, particularly in the area of deci-
sionmaking, which is a particular favorite of those dissecting EU poli-
cies. Attempts at midrange theorizing, which fell on fallow ground in the
1980s, have been resuscitated as new and interesting bridge-building
options like neoclassical realism (Hadfield 2010; Lobell, Ripsman, and
Taliaferro 2009; Rose 1998; Zakaria 1998; Christensen 1996b; Schweller
2006); poliheuristic theory of decisionmaking (Mintz 2004, 2005, 2007);
and diplomacy studies (Criekemans 2011).
Formerly AFP-typical use of IR theory, cultural studies, and com-
parative history are clearly making headway in FPA camps while quan-
titative methodologies are gaining traction—at least as a basic tool to be
taught to students—in Europe more widely than before, as evidenced
above. The impasse may abide in methodological terms, but there is
some clear evidence—ironically outside the traditional venues of publi-
cation—that is less profound than before, as suggested by the multifar-
ious modes of investigation that have emerged in the past half-dozen
years in the range of conferences, colloquia, and journals mentioned
above. Variety has taken hold and moved the traditional raw material of
FPA forward, to the point that its very ambiguity increases its analytic
appeal.
In sum, FPA—modified by AFP understandings—may possess
enough intermediary or swing characteristics as an area of study to
allow it to quite naturally straddle differing levels and units of analysis
as well as reconcile theoretic oppositions. The point of a swing player
(to use an energy metaphor) is to pump in spare conceptual capacity,
usually drawn from domestic reserves, to balance international uneven-
ness. The most obvious area for such swing characteristics is the mid-
dle, meso plain of analysis that features (if not actually brokers) com-
mon aspects from macro (state behavior) and micro (decisionmaking)
forces alike. Fareed Zakaria (1998), for example, suggests that, while
theories of international politics (including theories of state) currently
concentrate on explaining outcomes and results at the systemic level,
theories of foreign policy must move forward from systemic stimuli to
account for a far broader range of inputs. This is a good balance, but
what is still needed is more attention to the building of explicit concep-

tual bridges between the two sides.
Surely a decent FPA-AFP hybrid is that first bridge-building step,
which would be able—not unlike a parallel movement in IR in the form
of neoclassical realism—to explain and illuminate both “the reasons for
a nation’s efforts” in pursuing a particular goal while also accounting in
some way for the reasons and results of those efforts in the domain of
international politics (Zakaria 1998: 14). However, as observed a few
years ago, theoretical integration is as yet “a promise unfulfilled for the
time being” (Hudson 2007: 184).
In sum, there are some observable divergences between FPA and
AFP, which we would suggest are becoming increasingly salient over
time. While some differences may be fairly superficial in nature, we
detect others that may lead in the future to a real parting of the ways.
We do not believe this outcome is either necessary or inevitable.
Instead, the divergence more constructively calls us to dig deeper for
the roots and the ramifications of what we see. It is possible that the
tension between the visions of FPA and AFP may in fact be instructive
and, as we reflect on them, we may develop a more unified and coher-
ent stance that bridges more than just the transatlantic divide.
Notes
1. The best range of theorizing on EU integration is found in European

Integration Theory, by Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (2004, 2009), including
chapters on the inner mechanisms of EU integration: federalism (Burgess) and
(neo-)functionalism (Schmitter and Niemann); the application of IR theory: lib-
eral intergovernmentalism (Schimmelfennig and Moravcsik); social construc-
tivism (Risse) and discourse analysis (Waever); and normative theory (Bellamy
and Attucci); as well as their contemporary EU-specific iterations of gover-
nance (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch; Peters and Pierre).
2. In addition to the range of monographs in this area, a selection of recent
journal articles analyzing European state-specific foreign policy permutations
includes Economides (2005); Valasek (2005); Oppermann and Viehrig (2009);
de Flers and Müller (2011); as well as book reviews by Gegout (2008) and
Ginsberg (2012).
3. See, for example, the huge range of work on EU and governance, EU
multilevel governance, policy networks, and regionalism (e.g., Telo 2007; or
several contributions in Wiener and Diez 2004, 2009).
4. Hans Morgenthau’s attempts to reduce the cardinal elements of foreign pol-
icy, as found in his Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(1948), is a good example of postwar US theory struggling to capture sweeping
European understandings on the root causes and consequences of foreign policy.
5. The jury is still out as to whether large parts of EU foreign policy (still
largely within the sovereign remit of its twenty-seven member states) are
merely held “in common” (thin), or formulated “commonly” (thick). To play
devil’s advocate with the cardinal structure of the EU, namely the acquis com-
munautaire, that which has been agreed on (acquis) does not necessarily pro-
duce a common policy community.
6. The reasons for this are ironic: CFSP is either deemed by realists as too
inconsequential to study (a national appendage), or by poststructuralists of all
stripes as too unwieldy (a global phenomenon in a regional context).
7. See the journal’s homepage, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10
.1111/(ISSN)1743-8594, accessed March 4, 2012.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. The journal International Affairs has been excluded because it is not a
nonaffiliated journal, but rather housed within the think tank of the Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs (Chatham House). While providing an analytical
approach, its focus is on contemporary world politics rather than foreign policy
strictu sensu, and as such is not a traditional vehicle for either FPA or AFP
offerings.
11. See the European Foreign Affairs Review 2012 mandate, www.kluwer
lawonline.com/productinfo.php?pubcode=EERR, accessed March 4, 2012.
12. Like the European Foreign Affairs Review, the Cambridge Review of
International Affairs too “is committed to diversity of approach and method
and encourages the submission of multi- and inter-disciplinary academic contri-
butions from academics and policymakers.” See the journal’s homepage,
www.tandf.co.uk/journals/ccam, accessed March 4, 2012.
13. See the Review of International Studies homepage, http://journals.cambridge
.org/action/displayJournal?jid=RIS, accessed March 4, 2012.
9
Implications for
Mainstream FPA Theory
Klaus Brummer
The field of foreign policy analysis (FPA) originated in the

United States in the 1960s and 1970s and, to this day, it remains domi-
nated by US scholars and US case studies. The continued US-centeredness
of the field can be illustrated by the journal Foreign Policy Analysis,
which is published by the International Studies Association (ISA) and
represents a premier outlet for theory-driven analyses of foreign policy
decisionmaking processes and outputs. For instance, in 2010, 56 percent
of the submissions to the journal came from the United States; in 2011,
60 percent; in 2012, 54 percent; and, in 2013, 49 percent. What is more,
94 percent of the published articles in 2010, 71 percent in 2011, 56 per-
cent in 2012, and 64 percent in 2013 were authored by scholars based at
US institutions (ISA 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a). While there has been a
trend toward a “de−North Americanization of this field of inquiry,” as
Valerie M. Hudson notes in the introduction to this volume, (Chapter 1),
it seems that some type of plateau has been hit where US-based scholars
still predominate in the field of FPA.
Not accurately reflected in those numbers, though, is the existence
of a growing body of non–North American FPA research (e.g., Korany
and Dessouki 1984, 2008; Korany 1986a; Braveboy-Wagner 1989,
2003a, 2008a, 2008b; Hinnebusch and Ehteshami 2002; Khadiagla and
Lyons 2001; Adar and Ajulu 2002; Hey 2003; Adar and Schraeder
2007).1 With their works, non–North American theorists have been able
to pinpoint the aspects of FPA theory that are ethnocentric and predi-
cated on North American assumptions and experiences. As a result, this
research has extended FPA geographically, conceptually and theoreti-
169
170 Klaus Brummer
cally, and empirically. Against this background, the main contention of

this volume is that mainstream FPA can be enriched by a greater under-
standing and awareness of non–North American FPA scholarship, which
is uniquely positioned to catalyze theoretical innovation in the subfield.
Accordingly, the chapters assembled in this volume provided sys-
tematic examinations of the state of the art of FPA research in states and
regions beyond North America, including India, China, Japan, the Arab
world, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. In this concluding chapter, I
summarize and synthesize the main findings of the individual contribu-
tions and suggest avenues for future research.
Observations and Implications
The Absence of FPA as a Distinct Field

of Academic Inquiry Beyond North America
One observation that can be found in virtually all chapters on the state
of the art of foreign policy research beyond North America is that FPA
as an academic subdiscipline of international relations (IR) is not a uni-
versal phenomenon. This is not to say that, in certain countries or
regions, there is no inquiry pertaining to foreign policy at all. Rather,
the point is that analyses are typically not characterized by key hall-
marks of mainstream FPA scholarship, such as actor-specific theorizing
and a focus not only on decisionmaking outputs but also on the deci-
sionmaking processes leading up to those outputs (Hudson 2012: 14).
Instead, much of the scholarship beyond North America proceeds either
from a structural or systemic level of analysis or is not (at least not
explicitly) grounded in theory to begin with.
While several chapters in this volume address this issue, the absence
of FPA—at least in the mainstream US variant—as an academic disci-
pline is most prominently emphasized in Chapter 4 on FPA in India by
Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi. In India, foreign policy research
is predominantly conducted under the heading of international studies
(IS), which is India’s counterpart to US IR but also features some charac-
teristics of area studies and diplomatic history. International studies is
either driven by structural determinants or is a set of atheoretical accounts
of major political leaders. Indeed, the absence of theory-driven analyses
of foreign policy is among the key characteristics of Indian IS, the roots
of which can be traced back to, among other things, the aspiration of
research to be policy relevant and thus applicable as well as to the con-
Implications for Mainstream FPA Theory 171
cept of theory as a Western enterprise from which Indian scholars wanted

to distance themselves after their country’s independence. Largely miss-
ing therefore are theory-driven studies that examine, for instance, individ-
ual leaders by employing a cognitive or psychological approach, or deci-
sionmaking groups using the governmental politics model or groupthink,
or foreign policy decisionmaking processes more generally.
Huiyun Feng makes similar observations in Chapter 2 on FPA in
China. Feng argues that FPA has not (yet) become a subfield of IR in
China. Efforts in this direction have begun only recently, but they are
hampered by at least three conditions. First, despite gaining some
momentum after the end of the Cold War, Chinese FPA scholarship is in
its infancy or “early learning stage.” That is, a significant amount of
Chinese FPA scholarship is focused on, or limited to, introducing main-
stream FPA theory to Chinese academia rather than applying the theo-
ries empirically, let alone contributing to theoretical innovation. Second,
in China the field of IR is in itself not clearly delineated, but instead
closely associated with international relations history and diplomacy
studies. Both aspects are detrimental to the emergence of FPA as a dis-
tinct subfield of IR. Third, mostly for ideological reasons the analysis of
foreign policy in China used to focus predominantly on countries other
than China, which also has posed an obstacle to the development of the
field. Lately, however, this final factor has started to change, above all
in response to China’s rise as a regional and global actor.
What needs to be emphasized, though, is that FPA as a distinct field
of academic inquiry that is mirrored in the structures of professional
organizations (e.g., the FPA section within the ISA, which is the second-
largest section of the organization) is absent in countries in the Global
South as well as in non–North American Western nations. Even in Ger-
many the major professional organization, the Deutsche Vereinigung für
Politische Wissenschaft (German Political Science Association), does
not feature a section on FPA; a thematic group on foreign and security
policy was established recently in February 2014 as a subgroup of the
IR section. And while the British International Studies Association does
sponsor two working groups on foreign policy—one on British foreign
policy, the other on US foreign policy—both groups are primarily
driven by their empirical focus on their respective states rather than par-
ticular theoretical approaches in the tradition of FPA.
In short, the existence of differing research traditions with little
common ground in combination with a lack of a disciplinary identity
poses considerable challenges to mutually beneficial exchanges between
172 Klaus Brummer
mainstream North American FPA scholarship and FPA scholarship

beyond North America. On a more positive note, however, the different
foci of non–North American FPA scholarship contain the promise of
complementarity and thus mutual enrichment and cross-fertilization, a
potential that seems to warrant further exploration. For instance, by pro-
viding empirically dense accounts of their country’s recent as well as
ancient foreign policies, Indian and Chinese scholars, or any other non–
North American scholars for that matter, can—and in some instances
already do—offer unique empirical material that both they and main-
stream FPA researchers can subsequently draw on in more theory-
informed research. Not least due to their language skills and cultural
knowledge, indigenous scholars are uniquely positioned to provide such
works which, however, would have to be published in English in order
to be widely received. Publishing empirically rich works in English not
only would contribute to the further internationalization of non–North
American FPA scholarship, but also would provide an opportunity to
move beyond the mere introduction of mainstream concepts toward the
application and eventual innovation of mainstream FPA theory.
The Uneasy Relationship Between

FPA and IR in Non–North American Settings
Probably the main reason that FPA has such a hard time establishing
itself as a subdiscipline of IR beyond North America is that, in non–
North American settings, the use of grand IR theories such as neoreal-
ism or social constructivism as foreign policy theories seems to be
almost completely controversial. In the Indian case, if theory is used at
all it is quite common to use realist theory, with its emphasis on struc-
tural and systemic factors, to analyze foreign policy (Ganguly and
Pardesi, Chapter 4 in this volume). In a similar vein in Chapter 2 on
FPA and China, Feng contends that Chinese scholars frequently use the-
ories such as Marxism, liberalism, constructivism, and realism to
explain foreign policy. Indeed, whereas FPA scholarship in the main-
stream sense (e.g., actor-specific theorizing) is in its infancy in China,
as mentioned above, since the end of the Cold War there has been a
lively discourse on Chinese foreign policy employing IR theories—
above all, realism. Chapter 5 on FPA in the Middle East by Raymond
Hinnebusch and Chapter 7 on FPA in Latin America by Rita Giacalone
also report the prominent use of systemic or structural IR theories such
as neorealism, constructivism, and Marxism for the analyses of the for-
eign policies of the states in the respective region, above all to depict
the environment within which decisionmakers have to act.
What is more, this observation on the blurring of boundaries

between FPA and IR theory is not limited to non-Western countries or
regions, but also extends to Europe. An indicative example is that a
prominent edited volume on Germany’s postunification foreign policy
employs neorealism, liberalism, and constructivism as analytical lenses
(Rittberger 2001). In a similar vein, foreign policy textbooks authored
or edited by European scholars frequently feature discussions on the
possible use of IR theories as foreign policy theories (e.g., Beach 2012;
S. Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2012a; Brummer and Oppermann 2014).
Conversely, FPA textbooks authored by scholars based at US institu-
tions typically do not contain a substantial discussion of grand IR theo-
ries or, if they do, they use those theories to illustrate how FPA—partic-
ularly with its specific focus on agency—is different from IR theory
(e.g., Breuning 2007; Hudson 2007; Mintz and DeRouen 2010).2 Addi-
tionally, in Chapter 8 on FPA in Europe in this volume, Amelia Hadfield
and Valerie M. Hudson refer to “a proclivity to draw less extensively on
FPA precepts and methods and to make greater use of IR theory and
methodology” (Hadfield and Hudson in this volume) when characteriz-
ing contemporary European foreign policy scholarship. What is more,
Hadfield and Hudson even discern a trend toward integrating analyses
of foreign policy with IR theory in Europe. The practical implication of
the latter is that European scholars can choose from a much wider array
of levels of analysis than their US counterparts, including a prominently
used mesoregional level (see discussion in the subsection New Regional
Actors and a New Regional Level of Analysis Beyond North America
below), which makes the European FPA scholarship less state centric
than its North American counterpart.
The Method Cleavage Between

North American and Non–North American FPA
While FPA research beyond North America is broader in scope (e.g.,
with regard to the levels of analysis used), it is much narrower than
mainstream FPA research when it comes to the methods employed in
conducting research. Indeed, an issue that is discernable in virtually all
chapters in this volume on the state of FPA research in non–North
American states and regions is that FPA researchers there use predomi-
nantly qualitative methods while quantitative methods or formal model-
ing seem to be largely absent. For instance, in Chapter 2 on FPA in
China, Feng contends that in terms of methods FPA scholarship is lim-
ited to “detailed descriptions and historical narratives” (Feng in this vol-
ume). Virtually identical statements pertaining to an almost exclusive
174 Klaus Brummer
focus on qualitative methods can be found in the chapters on FPA in

India (Ganguly and Pardesi, Chapter 4), the Middle East (Hinnebusch,
Chapter 5), and Latin America (Giacalone, Chapter 7). Once again, this
observation of differences between FPA scholarship in North America
and that in non–North American countries is not limited to non-Western
countries or regions. Also, in Chapter 8 on FPA in Europe, Hadfield and
Hudson refer to the “sustained use of historical, social, and ideational
approaches operationalized via qualitative approaches” as representing
one of the hallmarks of European foreign policy scholarship. Quite
tellingly, these authors refer to the latter as “analysis of foreign policy
(AFP)” to further indicate the substantial differences in methods (as
well as in ontology and epistemology) between European and North
American foreign policy scholarship.
Equally interesting, this qualitative bias in FPA scholarship beyond
North America does not seem to be motivated by the presumption that
other methods have little validity when trying to make sense of foreign
policy beyond North America. Rather, the main reason for the absence
of quantitative methods or formal modeling is apparently that training
in these methods is not typically part of the political science or interna-
tional relations curricula. In this sense, Ganguly and Pardesi (Chapter 4)
observe for India that even at the graduate level methods courses are not
compulsory, let alone those dealing with quantitative methods. A largely
identical observation is made by Feng (Chapter 2) for China where, in
her view, the lack or limited quality of training in methods—particularly
quantitative methods and formal modeling—inhibits progress in FPA
scholarship. On the upside, though, Feng also notes that there is an
increasing awareness in China of the existing deficiencies in methods
training that is being addressed through, among other things, summer
courses.
Overall, the picture that emerges is that, beyond North America,
political science or international relations students receive little training
in quantitative methods or formal modeling. As a result, the predomi-
nant use of qualitative methods occurs by default rather than by choice.
It is certainly not motivated by any substantial methodological issue
that would render obsolete the applicability of those methods in non–
North American settings. Yet in Chapter 4 on FPA in India, Ganguly and
Pardesi point to a further reason for the paucity of methods training in
non–North American settings. According to these authors, in the Indian
case, it seems that the aspiration of foreign policy scholarship to be
applicable also contributes to the lack of training in methods since the
latter’s additional value to the goal of producing policy-relevant output

is being called into question.
Limited Exposure to FPA Research Beyond North America

Differences between FPA research in North America and in other parts
of the world not only manifest themselves in the training and subse-
quent use of certain methods. There also exists an even more fundamen-
tal unevenness in the course of university education in the exposure to
FPA in particular and the social sciences more generally. Indeed, in
non–North American settings, even students of political science or inter-
national relations might not encounter FPA during their studies, simply
due the fact that courses on that subject are not offered. In this sense,
Hadfield and Hudson argue in Chapter 8 that, while most US universi-
ties offer courses on foreign policy analysis at both the undergraduate
and graduate level, in Europe courses on foreign policy are hardly wide-
spread and more often than not are strongly influenced by IR theory
(see the subsection The Uneasy Relationship Between FPA and IR in
Non–North American Settings above). A similar observation is made for
India where degree programs on IS (which, as mentioned above, is
intrinsically different from mainstream FPA to begin with) are also lim-
ited in number (Ganguly and Pardesi, Chapter 4). When it is possible
even for students specializing in political science or international rela-
tions never to encounter FPA during their studies, it comes as little sur-
prise that students pursuing other degrees are even less likely to do so.
In addition to the limited number of courses offered, another reason
for the lack of exposure to FPA, or the social sciences more generally
for that matter, lies in the different curricular structures across North
American and many non–North American states. For instance, in Ger-
many students pursuing a medical degree, a law degree, or a degree in
engineering, to give but a few examples, focus more or less exclusively
on their respective field of study. With compulsory social science
courses typically lacking in the curricula, those students are likely to
finish their university education without any, and most certainly no sig-
nificant, exposure to the social sciences, let alone FPA. However, while
in Western countries a lack of familiarity with the social sciences is
mostly a matter of choice based on students’ preferences, in non-West-
ern countries there might be also cultural and religious justifications for
rejecting the liberal arts. Another cultural issue impeding the advance-
ment of FPA scholarship that has come up in this volume is the lack of
176 Klaus Brummer
a tradition of critical academic exchanges on theoretical or substantive

issues, as Feng observes for China (Chapter 2).
Data Challenges Beyond North America

The chapters in this volume highlight several issues pertaining to data
concerning the application of (mainstream) FPA theories to non–North
American contexts. Obviously, the most crucial issue for any type of
FPA research is one of the availability and accessibility—or indeed
lack—of information. On this count, there is great variation, as the chap-
ters on FPA in various states and regions of the world show. It is hardly
surprising that availability and accessibility of data is much more con-
strained in nondemocracies, as mentioned, for instance, by Hinnebusch
in Chapter 5 on FPA and the Middle East. In a similar vein, in Chapter 2
on China, Feng points to a slow and restricted declassification of official
documents.
At the same time, it would be erroneous to assume that such chal-
lenges present themselves in only non-democratic states. In democra-
cies, there is also the issue of declassification of documents, which is
sometimes delayed or uneven. What is more, as Ganguly and Pardesi
show in Chapter 4 on India, in democracies too there can be problems
accessing already declassified material, with access to official archives
being granted only to a certain group of scholars rather than to every
scholar interested in the documents.
In addition to problems emanating from certain types of or deficien-
cies in political systems, there is also a cultural issue at play that poses a
challenge to the application of FPA theory to non–North American states
(such as an oral tradition in countries that simply are not used to record-
ing, let alone publishing or translating, every piece of state action,
including speeches of the political leaders). As a result, researchers face
the challenge not only of having to deal with non-English texts, but also
of obtaining transcripts of official speeches in the first place. More often
than not, this cultural issue is exacerbated by poorly equipped institu-
tions in charge of keeping the state records.
Hybrid and Indigenous Analytical Constructs

in the Non–North American Context
The chapters in this volume show that non–North American scholars
have occasionally employed mainstream FPA theory, such as prospect
theory, group decisionmaking models, or the bureaucratic politics model.
Concerning the latter, several chapters caution against expanding the

scope of the bureaucratic politics model too broadly. In states where bar-
gaining processes are somewhat unstable or ministerial organizations
weakly institutionalized, or in states with a predominant leader, the
applicability of classical FPA constructs that focus on decisionmaking
processes seems limited. This argument is in line with Steve Smith’s
claim that “the particular context within which North American bureau-
cratic politics takes place is quite peculiar. . . . Thus, the extension of
Allison’s models to other countries may be a less straightforward enter-
prise than he implies” (1989: 122). For instance, in Chapter 5 on FPA
and the Middle East in this volume, Hinnebusch refers to the importance
of patrimonial traditions and charismatic leaders in conjunction with the
lack of institutional constraints on the political leaders (e.g., due to the
existence of a weak foreign policy bureaucracy), which makes it easy for
the predominant leader to marginalize both the foreign ministry and the
foreign minister. Similar arguments can be found in Chapter 6 on FPA in
Africa by Korwa G. Adar. Here, too, Adar argues that weak institutions
place only limited constraints on the individuals in charge of foreign pol-
icy, typically the president of a country, and thus have limited impact on
foreign policy decisionmaking processes and outputs.
Clearly, the application of mainstream FPA theory to non–North
American settings contains several benefits; for instance, regarding the
delineation of the construct’s scope conditions or, more generally, the
identification of aspects of the constructs that are ethnocentric and pred-
icated on North American assumptions and experiences. Equally
intriguing, though, are what may be called “hybrid” (Tickner 2003b:
330) or fused analytical constructs, which integrate state- or region-
specific insights into existing mainstream concepts in order to enhance
the latter’s explanatory scope and value in a non–North American envi-
ronment. As this volume shows, there have been some deliberate efforts
to adapt North American constructs to make them more amenable to the
specific political, cultural, and other circumstances of the respective
state or region.
Examples of hybrid concepts abound in Chapter 7 on FPA in Latin
America by Giacalone, including: works by Helio Jaguaribe (1979) on
national dependency, Juan Carlos Puig (1975, 1980) on heterodox
autonomy, Carlos Escudé (1989) on peripheral realism, Roberto Russel
(1990) on peripheral neoidealism, Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian
(2001) on relational autonomy, José María Vázquez Ocampo (1989) on
realist autonomy, and Mario Ojeda (1976) on relative sovereignty. All of
those authors use mainstream concepts, such as realism and idealism,
178 Klaus Brummer
and adapt them in order to make sense of the particular foreign policy
challenges faced by Latin American countries, which in the authors’
views emanate primarily from the particular quality of center-periphery
(or autonomy-dependency) relations. Another example of a hybrid con-
cept can be found in Chinese foreign policy scholarship, where the
country’s ancient history and philosophy have been rediscovered and
used as a source of progress for theory building (Feng, Chapter 2).
Building on insights drawn from social constructivist theory, scholars
have introduced a Chinese variant of the theory rooted in the concept of
guan xi, which highlights the process of social construction among
states instead of limiting itself to the impact of social identity and norms
as such.
In addition to developing hybrid analytical constructs, which inte-
grate local insights to mainstream theory, non–North American scholars
have developed indigenous concepts tailored to fit the unique or at least
different circumstances of their respective country or region relative to
North America from where virtually all mainstream FPA theory has
emanated. Examples for this can be found in Chapter 4 on FPA in India
where Ganguly and Pardesi discuss the concepts of nonalignment and
Panchsheel. By refraining from aligning with either of the superpowers
during the Cold War, the goal of nonalignment was to put (Jawaharlal
Nehru’s) India in a position to pursue an independent and interest-dri-
ven foreign policy. Panchsheel, or the Five Principles, represents an
ideational complement to the more realist-inspired concept of nonalign-
ment. Those principles, which include, among other things, respect for
other states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity and call for nonaggres-
sion and peaceful coexistence, were supposed to represent the basis for
an international order that could guarantee the security and independ-
ence of postcolonial states. Those principles informed the creation of
the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s. There are also efforts in the
emerging Chinese foreign policy scholarship to devise new concepts
based on the exploration of traditional Chinese political thought on for-
eign policy; for instance, with respect to discerning the importance of
morality and leadership for, or in, foreign policy (Feng, Chapter 2). The
most extensive efforts to come up with new concepts for the analysis of
foreign policy, however, can be found in the European scholarship that
seeks to make sense of the European Union (EU) as a foreign policy
actor (see discussion in the subsection New Regional Actors and a New
Regional Level of Analysis Beyond North America below).
In short, there are several hybrid and indigenous analytical con-
structs out there. However, virtually none of them qualifies as FPA in
the mainstream North American understanding of the field, which

brings the discussion back to the blurring of boundaries between IR the-
ory and FPA in non–North American research. If anything, the hybrid
constructs are endeavors to adapt insights from IR theory to a non–
North American environment. This might be the reason as to why there
has been little engagement with those concepts by mainstream FPA
scholars. In this sense, when discussing nonalignment and Panchsheel,
Ganguly and Pardesi lament that “mainstream American academia has
tended to either ignore these concepts altogether or dismiss them as
variants of well-known concepts without critically examining and intel-
lectually engaging with them” (Chapter 4).3 On a more positive note,
though, Ganguly and Pardesi report that Indian scholars are currently
revisiting the concept of nonalignment in light of the country’s growing
regional and global clout. What is more, the issue of nonalignment has
also excited the interest of Chinese FPA scholars (Feng, Chapter 2).
Since research along those lines might have implications for either
country’s foreign policy conduct, studying the concept seems all the
more pertinent, even from a mainstream perspective.
Different Foreign Policy Actors

in Non–North American Settings
Mainstream US FPA scholarship focuses primarily on the role of the
executive (the US president and his advisers) and, to a lesser extent, on
the role of the legislative branch (Congress) in foreign policy. Com-
pared with the US political system, some of the major foreign policy
actors identified for non–North American settings, as well as some of
the dynamics that characterize the interplay between those actors during
the decisionmaking process, seem rather unusual (see also discussion in
the following subsection New Regional Actors and a New Regional
Level of Analysis Beyond North America). For instance, in Chapter 3
on FPA in Japan, Yukiko Miyagi emphasizes the crucial role that the
iron triangle has played in the country’s foreign policy making process.
During certain periods this triangle—formed of senior bureaucrats,
members of the ruling party or parties, and the business community—
was so powerful that it could bypass the prime minister and implement
its foreign policy preferences on its own.
The at times intimate interplay between political parties and the
executive is also a prominent feature in the Middle East (Hinnebusch,
Chapter 5). Syria’s intervention in Lebanon in 1976, which was moder-
ated by the fact that Syria’s president was constrained by a strong polit-
180 Klaus Brummer
ical party, is a case in point for the theory that this interconnection can
have a strong impact on a country’s foreign policy. At the same time, if a
party on the one hand and the executive, or different branches thereof, on
the other are controlled by different factions, this too can have detrimen-
tal effects on the quality of the foreign policy decisionmaking process
and eventual output. This is illustrated by Syria’s decision to intervene in
Jordan in 1970, which saw a radical faction that controlled the party pit-
ted against a more moderate faction in control of the army. The ensuing
disunity eventually led to Syria’s “underperformance” (Hinnebusch,
Chapter 5). In contrast to such explanations, it is fair to say that in main-
stream FPA elite fragmentation is discussed first and foremost with
respect to the executive branch rather than with respect to political par-
ties or an executive-party nexus, and is typically ascribed to bureaucratic
conflict rather than to party-political cleavages among officeholders.
One of the more general implications for FPA theory is to get a better
grasp of the impact of oligarchic factionalism on foreign policy making.
This issue comes up in several countries of the Middle East. One example
is Saudi Arabia where foreign policy is made by the ruling oligarchy.
However, the decision group (i.e., the royal family) is tied together by
blood (Hinnebusch, Chapter 5). With blood relationships or religion4
being crucial for the composition of decision units, whether they are sin-
gle groups or coalitions, and given the greater number of persons being
involved in those groups, group decisionmaking processes in such set-
tings should follow dynamics different from those typically discerned in
the mainstream literature on small groups (e.g., Janis 1982; Hart, Stern,
and Sundelius 1997).
Finally, in Chapter 5 on FPA in the Middle East, Hinnebusch refers
to the role of a transnational ideology (i.e., pan-Arabism) as a possible
driver for the foreign policies of a group of states in the MENA region.
The pursuit of pan-Arab interests was supposed to supersede, or at least
complement, the pursuit of national interests of all states adhering to the
ideology, thus leading to a similar foreign policy behavior among the
states in question. At the same time, though, the chapter emphasizes that
pan-Arabism can be, and has been, interpreted in different ways by dif-
ferent countries and leaders. This has occurred due to, among other
things, differences in the security environment of the respective country,
their foreign policy roles, and their identities as well as differences in
the personal interests or idiosyncratic characteristics of the countries’
leaders. Thus, a transnational ideology does not necessarily lead to uni-
form foreign policy behavior among the leaders and, ultimately, to the
states adhering to this ideology. Indeed, the emerging cleavage within
Arab states between Sunnis and Shi’a has already pitted countries
within the region (or subgroups or geographical regions within coun-
tries) against each other rather than uniting them behind a common
transnational ideology.
New Regional Actors and a New

Regional Level of Analysis Beyond North America
A final issue that follows from the discussion of FPA research beyond
North America is the emergence of new foreign policy actors along with
a new level of analysis; that is, new at least when seen from the vantage
point of foreign policy making in North America. The first dimension
(actors) refers to the growing importance of regional and subregional
organizations as independent actors in foreign affairs. As far as levels of
analysis are concerned, this relates to regional effects on the foreign
policies of states, and thus to a level of analysis located between the
effects that national attributes have on foreign policy and the effects of
the international system. True, for several decades students of regional
integration processes and here, above all, of European integration, have
examined both the role of today’s EU as a foreign policy actor and the
impact that regional integration has had on the participating countries
across all dimensions of the political (polity, politics, and policy). It is
equally true, though, that mainstream FPA constructs have largely failed
to acknowledge either development, most likely because the United
States does not experience its involvement in organizations such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as having serious
implications for national sovereignty.
In this volume, the importance of regional organizations as foreign
policy actors and the region as a level of analysis have been most
prominently addressed in the contexts of FPA research in Africa and
Europe. In Chapter 6 on FPA in Africa, Adar illustrates the effect of the
various organizations, both regional (African Union) and subregional
(such as the Southern African Development Community [SADC] and
the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS]), on the
foreign policies of their member states. True, at times those organiza-
tions are used by their member states merely as arenas for interstate bar-
gaining which, if states wield veto power, leads to lowest-common-
denominator decisions if not deadlock. Frictions within the African
Union over the International Criminal Court, within the SADC over cer-
tain military interventions, and within ECOWAS between its anglo-
phone and francophone members illustrate the challenges associated
182 Klaus Brummer
with interstate bargaining. However, what also happens is that the

regional or subregional organizations exert an independent and, more
often than not constraining, effect on certain member states, particularly
those that find themselves in violation of the organizations’ norms and
standards as enshrined in their charters, and so forth. Indeed, in several
instances regional or subregional organizations have become foreign
policy actors in their own right. At times, the organizations act in con-
cert; for instance, when it comes to authorizing or legitimizing military
interventions, which can have implications for the foreign policies of
individual states. Quite interestingly, Adar also refers to the hopes that
are being placed on subregional or regional organizations in Africa that
they will contribute to more inclusive and participatory foreign policy
decisionmaking processes within their member states, thereby making
the regional organizations agents in the democratization of national for-
eign policy.5
In short, in African FPA scholarship, there is certainly an awareness
of the increased importance of regional organizations when accounting
for the foreign policies of individual states in Africa. At the same time,
the discussion shows that there have been only limited efforts by
African scholars to grasp this phenomenon theoretically. What is more,
scholars who have engaged in such exercises typically have employed
approaches that resemble those used in the European context, to which
the discussion now turns (Adar, Chapter 6).
Theorizing not only on the effect of regional integration on the for-
eign policies of participating states but also on the role of the EU as an
independent actor in foreign affairs is much more advanced in European
FPA scholarship. Given the decade-long scholarly investigation of the
regional integration process in Europe, this is hardly surprising. Yet one
has to keep in mind that the EU’s role in foreign policy is a comparatively
new phenomenon that dates back only to the Treaty of Maastricht, which
did not enter into force until 1993.6 Ever since, however, the EU’s role
and activities in foreign affairs have belonged to the most dynamic fields
of European integration research. This includes research on the influence
and impact of the EU on the foreign policies of its member states, which
is more often than not conducted under the heading of Europeanization
(e.g., Baun and Marek 2012; Wong and Hill 2012; also Hadfield and
Hudson, Chapter 8 in this volume).7 The regional level is conceptualized
as being both a constraint on and an opportunity for the foreign policies
of the EU’s member states. Among other things, the former relates to
increased transaction costs for states following, for instance, from the
requirement for consultation and coordination among a considerable
number of states (at the time of this writing, the EU has twenty-eight
members) in a policy area that is dominated by unanimous decisionmak-
ing. On the other hand, the EU also offers several opportunities for states
such as a multiplier effect by providing both tangible (e.g., joint military
deployments under the European flag) and, at least as important, nontan-
gible (standing, reputation, influence, etc.) resources.
In addition to scrutinizing the effect of the EU on the foreign policies
of its member states, there is an extensive debate on the role of the EU as
a foreign policy actor. Conceptually driven research discusses, among
other things, the type of foreign policy actor that the EU has become.
While the characterization as “normative power Europe” (e.g., Manners
2002, 2006; Forsberg 2011; Whitman 2011; for a critique see Hyde-Price
2006; Merlingen 2007; Brummer 2009) is the most prominent one, other
strands of the literature refer to the EU as a “realist-normative power”
(Ruffa 2011); a “normal power” (Wood 2009; Pacheco Pardo 2012); an
“ethical power” (Aggestam 2008); a “military power” (Wagner 2006);
and even a “superpower” (McCormick 2007). Besides, scholars have
examined the extent to which the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), which according to the EU’s treaties is predominantly intergov-
ernmental in nature, may be more supranational than meets the eye (e.g.,
Juncos and Pomorska 2011; Sjursen 2011; Dijkstra 2012; Howorth 2012).
Clearly, the degree of supranationalism in CFSP has implications for the
actorness (Hill 1993; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; also Hadfield and Hud-
son, Chapter 8 in this volume) of the EU since the more supranational this
policy realm de facto is, the more leeway the organization has as a foreign
policy actor independent from its member states.
This is not the place to evaluate, let alone settle, any of those dis-
cussions. What is important from the standpoint of this volume is that,
in African FPA scholarship and even more in the European one, there is
a vibrant exchange with regard to both the conceptualization of regional
organizations as foreign policy actors and the effects of the regional
level on individual states’ foreign policies. The same can hardly be said
for US scholarship. Given the importance of regional integration and
regional institutions in Africa, Europe, and beyond, mainstream FPA
theory would clearly benefit from a greater attention both to the emer-
gence and the role and function of independent regional actors, particu-
larly with an eye toward understanding how these actors affect the for-
eign policies of their member and nonmember states. Exploring more
fully this national-subregional or national-regional nexus can provide
useful insights for theory building in FPA and, in doing so, alleviate the
state-centrism of mainstream FPA scholarship.
184 Klaus Brummer
The Ways Forward
The overall conclusion to be drawn from this edited volume is that

mainstream North American FPA research will benefit from a more
thorough engagement with FPA research conducted in states and regions
beyond North America. Three of the areas where this added value will
be realized, among others, are: first, existing FPA theories, which after
all are middle range in nature, will be sharpened by obtaining a better
understanding of their scope, and thus explanatory power; second, the
analytical toolbox of FPA will be broadened by incorporating hybrid or
indigenous analytical constructs developed within non–North American
political contexts; third, taking up FPA research beyond North America
will expand the empirical foundation from which more theory-informed
works can embark.
The discussion also offers several closely interrelated suggestions
as to how FPA scholarship in non–North American countries can be
strengthened. First, like it or not, English is the undisputed lingua franca
in the field of FPA, and in IR more generally. Thus, if non–North Amer-
ican FPA scholars would write more extensively in English, this would
lead to a much wider dissemination of their scholarship (through confer-
ence attendances and eventual publications) not only to North American
audiences, but also to scholars from other non–North American states
and regions. Second, training in methods should be expanded. This not
only would offer new avenues for exchange among non–North Ameri-
can and North American FPA scholars, which currently is often ham-
pered by a methodological divide, but it would also provide non–North
American scholars with additional tools to use to address new or differ-
ent questions in their research. Third, on a more general level, moving
past descriptive works to a more avowedly theoretical orientation would
facilitate the search for less North American–bounded FPA theory.
Finally, there is no doubt that unless FPA is taught in departments of
international relations or political science across the world, there is little
chance that a generation of indigenous FPA scholars will arise. Increas-
ing the number of exchange programs—on the levels of both students
and faculty—between North American and non–North American univer-
sities is one way to familiarize a broader number of students and schol-
ars with FPA research.
These efforts from the non–North American side must be matched
by efforts on the North American side, and by joint efforts as well. For
example, in order to address the traveling concept problem that came up
in virtually all of this volume’s contributions, there should be additional
efforts to further specify the scope conditions of mainstream FPA theo-

ries. Here, a comparative approach in which mainstream concepts are
deliberately used by country or regional experts from North America
and beyond against multiple non–North American cases could be partic-
ularly promising. Closely related, there should be increased efforts to
broaden the applicability of analytical tools at the disposal of FPA
researchers such as automated content analysis systems. Pointing in the
right direction are ongoing efforts to broaden the applicability of the
program Profiler Plus which, among other things, can be used to estab-
lish leadership traits or operational codes of decisionmakers, by devel-
oping coding schemes for languages such as German, Chinese, or Turk-
ish. Moreover, mainstream scholars should devote greater attention to
the importance of nontraditional foreign policy actors, such as regional
organizations as highlighted in Chapter 6 on Africa and Chapter 8 on
Europe. Indeed, the discussion suggests that moving more fluidly from
the domestic to the regional level of analysis and back seems to be of
increasing importance when trying to explain the foreign policy of both
African and European states.
Last but certainly not least, there is also a sociological dimension to
the discussion. For example, professional organizations—above all the
FPA section of the ISA comes to mind—should have as an explicit goal
to provide scholars from non–North American institutions greater expo-
sure and also greater representation. Right now, the FPA section of ISA
is emblematic of the dominance of North American scholars in the field.
Indeed, since its creation in the early 1970s, the section has been led
exclusively by scholars based at North American institutions: until 2014
out of a total of forty-one presidents, not a single one has come from a
non–North American institution (ISA 2014b). There is no information
available on the number of the section’s officers-at-large—who together
with the president and the vice president as program chair form the sec-
tion leadership—from non–North American institutions, but the odds
are that there have been only a few. This is a relatively easy fix, if there
is a will to do it.8 Moreover, the FPA section could be the vehicle for the
organization of networking meetings at the margins of the ISA confer-
ences. These conferences would deliberately bring together North
American and non–North American FPA scholars, and include as a mat-
ter of course members of the editorial team of Foreign Policy Analysis.
Finally, when putting together the ISA convention program, the section
vice president, in his or her capacity as program chair, could ensure that
a certain number of panels sponsored by the FPA section come from
scholars beyond North America, or that there is non–North American
186 Klaus Brummer
representation on most section panels. This also would help increase the
visibility of non–North American FPA scholarship.
In sum, FPA would benefit both from North American scholars
reaching out to their non–North American counterparts, and from non–
North American scholars doing the same. As this volume demonstrates,
there is so much to be gained theoretically and empirically. Foreign pol-
icy analysis will have a brighter future if we think of it as a future that
belongs to all of us.
Notes
1. For further references, see the individual chapters of this volume.

2. Of course, there are also IR scholars who doubt that their theories can be
used as theories of foreign policy (e.g., Waltz 1996).
3. For a recent exception from a historical perspective, see Rakove (2013).
4. On the role of religion in foreign policy see, for instance, Baumgartner,
Francia, and Morris 2008; Warner and Walker 2011; Glazier 2013.
5. In Chapter 7 on Latin America by Giacalone in this volume, one can
find a different aspiration associated with regional integration processes, which
are seen as a means for pursuing autonomy and thus for decreasing, or even
shedding, dependency.
6. Initial efforts of regional integration in the foreign, security, and defense
realm (the European Defense Community) collapsed in the mid-1950s. The first
palpable success in this context came not until 1970, when the European Polit-
ical Community was set up, albeit initially outside the treaty framework of the
then European Community (EC). After some progress made in the context of
the first major revision of the EC’s founding treaties with the so-called Single
European Act, which entered into force in 1987, it was the Treaty of Maastricht
that established a Common Foreign Security Policy as the second of three pil-
lars of the newly established EU. On the evolution of CFSP, see K. Smith
(2008) and M. Smith (2003).
7. On the more general literature on the Europeanization of EU member
states, see Featherstone and Radaelli (2003), Graziano and Vinck 2006, and
Ladrech (2010).
8. One relatively easy way to increase the diversity of the section leadership
would be to reserve one of the currently three officer-at-large positions for a
scholar based at a non−North American institution. In the medium and long
term, more far-reaching innovations could be considered, such as installing some
type of rotation between North American and non−North American scholars in
the presidency or, alternatively, establishing a dual North American/non−North
American presidency.
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The Contributors
Korwa G. Adar is professor in the Department of International Relations at

United States International University, Nairobi, Kenya.
Klaus Brummer is associate professor at the Institute of Political Science, Uni-

versity Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany.
Huiyun Feng is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International

Studies for 2015 and associate professor in the Department of Political Science
at Utah State University, United States.
Sumit Ganguly is Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civiliza-

tions and professor of political science and director of research at the Center on
American and Global Security at Indiana University, United States.
Rita Giacalone is professor of economic history in the Department and Gradu-

ate School of Economics at Universidad de Los Andes, Venezuela.
Amelia Hadfield is senior lecturer in politics and international relations, Jean

Monnet Chair in EU foreign affairs, School of Psychology, Politics and Sociol-
ogy, at Canterbury Christ Church University, United Kingdom.
Raymond Hinnebusch is professor of international relations and Middle East

politics at the University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom.
Valerie M. Hudson is professor and George H. W. Bush Chair in the Bush

School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, United
States.
Yukiko Miyagi is research fellow in the Institute of Middle East, Central Asia
and Caucasus Studies at the University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom.
Manjeet S. Pardesi is lecturer in international relations at Victoria University

of Wellington, New Zealand.
229
Index
Abe, Kazuyoshi, 43 agent-oriented theory, 2, 147–148

Abuja Accords (1995, 1996), 115 AHSG. See Assembly of Heads of State and
ACHPR. See African Court on Human and Government
People’s Rights Akbar, 58, 73–74
actor-specific theory, 102, 106, 128–129, al-Assad, Hafez, 81, 85–87, 97
148, 154–157, 161 al-Bashir, Omar, 109
Adar, Korwa G., 12, 177, 181–182 Allinson, James, 92, 96
Adegboyega, Kasali M., 103 Allison, Graham T., 4, 83, 177
Adogambe, Paul, 6 Alnasrawi, Abbas, 91
AFP. See analysis of foreign policy al-Qaeda, 118
Africa, sub-Saharan states: actor-specific Ambe-Uva, Terhembe N., 103
theory, 102, 104–106, 116–117; Amer, Abdel Hakim, 83–84
backbenchers in parliaments, 104; American Political Science Association, 166
conflict resolution, 107, 114; coups Amin, Samir, 80, 92
d’état, 108; crimes against humanity, analysis of foreign policy (AFP), 12, 140–
107–109; decolonization, 101; 147, 164–169; community building, 160–
democratization, 104–105; external 164; epistemology, 156; explananda,
dimensions of foreign policy, 102, 106– 155–156; explanatory objectives, 150–
116; FPA scholarship, 6, 12, 101–102; 154; methodological proclivities, 158–
human rights violations, 107–108; 159; ontology, 153–154; split with FPA,
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 146; theoretical ethnocentrism, 159–160;
102, 107, 116–118; internal dimensions theoretical proclivities, 156–158
of foreign policy, 102–106; liberation An Analysis on Contemporary International
movements, 113, 118, 119n9; multilateral Politics (Wang), 22
diplomacy, 115; opposition political analytical tools, applicability of, 185
parties, 104; parliaments, 103–104; Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese
peacekeeping, 114–115; presidential Power (Yan), 30–31
dominance, 101; regional normative Anda, Michael, 101
consensus, 115–116; sovereignty, 109, Anderson, Andrew, 110
119n3; state-centric approaches, 116–117; APRM. See African Peer Review
structural foreign policy, 116–117. See Mechanism
also names of individual countries Arab-Israeli War (1967), 82–83, 90
African Court on Human and People’s Arab uprisings (2011–2012), 11, 94–97, 99
Rights (ACHPR), 108 Arab world, 11, 77–93; bureaucratic politics
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), model, 83; constructivist approach, 85–
108 87; core-periphery system, 94; corporatist
African Union (AU), 12, 102, 106–110, 181; conception of state, 93; decisionmaking,
Constitutive Act, 107–108 81–84, 96–97; dependence theory, 79;
231
232 Index
disciplinary debates, 79–80; domestic Brazil, 123, 127–129, 133, 135

politics, 87–90; elites and Brecher, Michael, 11, 61, 81
decisionmaking, 81–84, 98–99; factional Breda dos Santos, Norma, 137n8
politics, 83, 98, 180; global environment, Bretherton, Charlotte, 155
94; identity, 85–87, 96–97; and British International Studies Association,
international relations (IR) debates, 79– 171
80; intrastate level, 96–97; leader-centric Bueno, Clodoaldo, 127–128
literature, 89; leadership-level bureaucratic politics approaches, 24–26, 41,
psychological studies, 82; levels of 68, 83, 132, 176–177
analysis, 81–93; Marxism, 79, 90, 92–93; Burundi, 110
national security, 98; neoclassical realism, Bush, George W., 55
84–85; omni-balancing, 88; pan-Arabism, Bustamante, Ana Marleny, 135
11, 80, 88, 94–95, 180; political economy
approaches, 90–93, 98; power balance, Calder, Kent, 41–42
83–85, 97–99; public role in Camara, Dadis, 115
decisionmaking, 97–98; rational actor Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
model, 83; regional environment, 94–95; 163–164
relations with Japan, 51–54; rentier state capability-expectations gap, 146
thesis, 90–92; role analysis, 85–87; state Cardoso, Fernando, 122
consolidation, 89; state formation, 95–96; Carlsnaes, Walter, 148–155
state-society relations, 87–90; subaltern Carvajal, Leonardo, 126, 134, 136
realism, 94; transstate identities, 80, 95; case studies, 2, 118, 148, 169. See also
transstate public space, 86; tribes, 89–90, comparative studies
92; unionist initiatives, 88–89. See also CEDAW, Convention on the Elimination of
Middle East and North Africa (MENA); All Forms of Discrimination Against
names of individual countries Women
archives: availability of, 4, 17–18. See also Cervo, Amado, 127–128
documents CFSP. See Common Foreign and Security
Ardila, Martha, 133 Policy
area studies: China, 26–27; India, 58–60, Chacón, Susana, 132
65–67, 74 Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz, 92
Argentina, 123–126, 132, 135; external debt China: area studies approach, 26–27;
crisis (1982), 123 bureaucratic approaches, 24–26;
Aristotle, 20 cognitive approaches, 24–26;
Asian Survey, 66 constructivism, 23–24; diplomatic history
Aśoka (Mauryan emperor), 58, 73–74 studies, 16–18, 26–27; FPA scholarship,
Assembly of Heads of State and 10–11, 15–16, 34, 171; great powers
Government (AHSG), 107, 110 research, 29–30; guan xi (network
AU. See African Union connection), 31; historical records, 31;
autonomy debates, 121–130, 136 international relations (IR) studies, 16–
Ayoob, Mohammed, 94 18; international relations (IR) theories,
Ayubi, Shaheen, 82–83, 89, 98 18–24; liberalism, 18, 22–23; Marxism,
Azawad National Liberation Movement, 118 18–20; micro-level approaches, 19, 24–
26; new archive (new Cold War history)
backbenchers, 104 school, 17; one-party political system,
Baghdad Pact, 87 27–28; “peaceful rise” strategies, 28;
Bajpai, Kanti P., 59 problems in FPA, 32–34; psychological
Barnett, Michael, 80, 85–86, 88, 90, 96–97 approaches, 24–26; realism, 20–21; study
Basrur, Rajesh M., 63, 68 of Chinese foreign policy, 27–29, 31–32;
behaviorism, 148–149, 158 traditional philosophies, 30–31, 35n4,
Behera, Navnita Chadha, 69 178
Ben-Gurion, David, 81 China National Association for International
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 83 Studies, 17
Brand, Laurie, 90–92 China’s Foreign Policy Decisionmaking
Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline, 3, 5–6 (Hao and Lin), 26
Index 233
Chinese Academy of Social Science, 26 Cuban missile crisis, 2

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Current World and Socialism, 20
30, 34
Chinese National Interests Analysis (Yan), Darfur region of Sudan, 29, 108, 110
20 data issues, 4, 9–10, 17, 176
Chinese Research Association of History of David, Steven, 88, 95–96
International Relations, 17 Dawisha, Adeed, 11, 81, 89, 98
Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change deductivism, 158
(4Cs), 105 deep forces, 127–128
class-based analysis, 19 Defense Tribe (Japan), 46
CLB (Japan), 48 DeHaven, Mark, 106
cognitive approaches, 24–26, 128, 157 Democratic Party of Japan (Nihon Minshu
Cohen, Stephen P., 70 tō), 47, 50
Colacrai, Miryam, 134 democratic peace theory, 22–23
Cold War, 17–18, 21, 27–28, 38, 150 Democratic Republic of Congo, 111–112
collective action problem, 21 democratization, 104–105
collective implementation of foreign policy Deng Xioaping, 19–20
structure, 147 Denzin, Norman, 156
Colombia, 133–134 dependency theory, 79, 122–123
colonialism, 60, 64, 101 Dessouki, Ali Hillal, 78, 80, 96–97
Common Foreign and Security Policy Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische
(CFSP), 140, 183 Wissenschaft (German Political Science
Common Security and Defense Policy Association), 171
(CSDP), 140 developing countries. See Global South;
Communist Party (Japan), 50 third world
community building, 160–164 Diplomacy in the Middle East (Brown), 78–
comparative studies, 2, 10, 136, 142–143, 79
145, 158, 160–163, 185 Diplomatic History of Modern India
concerted autonomy, 126 (Heimsath and Mansingh), 67
conflict resolution, 107, 114 diplomatic history studies, 16–18, 26–27,
Conflict Unending (Ganguly), 70 65–67, 149
confrontation autonomy, 129 discourse analysis, 131, 144, 165
Confucianism, 24, 30, 35n4 Dlamini-Zuma, Skosazana, 109
consensual policymaking, 45, 55 Dobson, Hugo J., 41
Conservative New Party (Japan), 47 documents: Chinese historical records, 31;
constructivism, 12, 18, 23–24, 85–86, 128, declassification of, 17–18, 64, 68, 176;
131–132, 134–136, 178; domesticizing, selective access to, 64
163; guan xi (network connection), 31; domestic politics, 2, 87–90, 99, 103, 126,
and Japan, 39 130, 135, 163
Conte, Lansana, 115 Dominguez, Jorge, 122, 125, 131
content analysis, 131 Domínguez, Roberto, 132
continental constitutionalism, 108 Dulles, John Foster, 73
continental foreign policy making, 116 Dunne, Tim, 7
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Durfee, Mary, 156
of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), 9 Economic, Social and Cultural Council
core-periphery system, 94 (ECOSOCC), 108
Corigliano, Francisco, 132 Economic Commission for Latin America
corporatist conception of state, 93 and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 122, 127
Cotonou Agreement (1993), 115 Economic Community of West African
coups d’état, 108 States (ECOWAS), 12, 102, 113–116,
covering law approach, 143, 147–150, 157 118, 181; member states, 119n10
Cox, Robert W., 19, 125–126 Economic Community of West African
crimes against humanity, 107–109 States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG),
critical theory approach, 19, 125, 129–131 114–115, 118
234 Index
Eden, Anthony, 82 objectives, 150–154; geographic

education in foreign policy analysis, 62, extension of, 141; hallmarks of, 1–2;
164, 175, 184 levels of analysis, 1–2, 4, 130, 146–147,
Egypt, 84–85, 90, 97–98; intervention in 173, 181, 185; methodological
Yemen, 81; Marxist writers, 92–93 proclivities, 158–159, 173–174; multiple
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, 93–94 approaches to, 151; non–North American
Elwy, Yasser, 92, 96 research, implications for mainstream
empirical focus, 34, 172 FPA, 10–13, 169–186; as North American
epistemology, 152–154, 156 enterprise, 3–8, 142; ontology, 152–155;
Epsteyn, Juan Claudio, 133 paradigms, 142; split with AFP, 146;
Erikson, Erik, 83 swing characteristics of, 166; theoretical
Escudé, Carlos, 123–126, 129 ethnocentrism, 3, 7–10, 159–160;
ethnocentrism in FPA scholarship, 3, 7–10, theoretical proclivities, 156–158; “US-
159–160 ness” of, 3–8, 185. See also analysis of
EU. See European Union foreign policy (AFP)
Europe: history of, 149. See also analysis of Foreign Policy Analysis (journal), 1, 143,
foreign policy; European Union; names 160–163, 165, 169, 185; authorship of
of individual countries articles, 7, 161; mandate of, 160
European Consortium for Political Foreign Policy Analysis: Unexplored Land
Research, 166 (conference), 25
European External Action Service, 145 Foreign Policy Bureau (Japan), 54
European Foreign Affairs Review, 163 Foreign Policy Decision Making (Zhang),
European Union (EU), 12, 111, 116–117, 25
139–140, 143–147, 150, 153–159, 178, FPA. See foreign policy analysis
181–183; actorness, 144, 146, 155–156; Francis, David, 114
integration theory, 143–144; meso-level Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
theorizing, 147, 173 125
explananda, 143, 150–151, 155–156 Furukawa, Teijiro, 43
explanans, 143, 151
G8. See Group of Eight
factional politics, 83, 98, 180 Gandhi, Indira, 65
Faletto, Enzo, 122 Gandhi, Mahatma, 59
Fang Changping, 23 Ganguly, Sumit, 11, 70–71, 170, 174–176,
Fearful Symetry (Hagerty), 70–71 178–179
Feng Huiyun, 10, 171–174, 176 Gause, F. Gregory, 88, 91
Feng Yujun, 25 General Affairs Council (Japan), 47
Fernández, Luis, 132–133 geopolitics, 129
Finnemore, Martha, 23 George, Alexander L., 2, 148
Ford Foundation, Follow-Up Program of German Political Science Association
Latin American Foreign Policies (Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische
(PROSPEL), 132 Wissenschaft), 171
Foreign Affairs Review, 25–26 Germany, 173
foreign language training programs, 62 Giacalone, Rita, 12, 172, 177–178
The Foreign Policies of Arab States (Korany global environment, 94
and Dessouki), 78 global legal regime advocates, 109
Foreign Policies of the Global South Global Public Problems and International
(Braveboy-Wagner), 3, 5–6 Cooperation (Su), 22
The Foreign Policies of the Middle East Global South, 3–8, 77, 79, 171. See also
(Hinnebusch and Ehteshami), 79 third world
foreign policy analysis (FPA), 1–13, 18–19, global-systemic level of analysis, 4
164–169; categories of, 152; Gong Li, 29
deconstructive nature of, 148; as distinct González, Guadalupe, 125, 131
field beyond North America, 170–172; Gortari, Salinas de, 132
explananda, 143, 150–151, 155–156; Gotōda, Masaharu, 46
explanans, 143, 151; explanatory Gramsci, Antonio, 125–126
Index 235
grand unified theory (GUT), 156–157 ideational world order, 72

great power politics, 20, 28–29, 38, 69 identity, 85–87, 96–97
Groom, A.J.R., 6–7, 159 Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle
Group of Eight (G8), 39 East (Telhami and Barnett), 80
Grove, Andrea, 161 ideology, influence of, 28
Grovogui, Siba, 5–6 IGO. See intergovernmental organizations
Guáqueta, Alexandra, 134 impact-driven output, 155–156
Guinea, 115–116, 119n5 import-substituting industrialization, 123
Guinea-Bissau, 108, 110, 115 impunity, 109–110
Gulf Cooperation Council, 94 India: access to government documents, 64;
Gulf War (1990–1991), 38, 44–45, 49–50 area studies, 58–60, 65–67, 74;
Güner, Sardar, 165 bureaucratic politics, 68; colonial legacy,
Gupta, Sisir, 66 60, 64; declassification of documents, 64,
GUT. See grand unified theory 68, 74; diplomatic history, 67; foreign
language training programs, 62; FPA
Hadfield, Amelia, 7, 12, 139, 173–175 scholarship, 11, 57–58, 61, 64, 67–69, 74,
Hagerty, Devin, 70–71 170; higher education, 62; ideational
Halperin, Morton, 4 world order, 72; Institute of Defence
Han Fei Zi, 35n4 Studies and Analyses, 64; international
Hao Yufan, 26 relations (IR), 58–61; international studies
Harknett, Richard J., 88, 91 (IS), 58–67, 69; leaders, 57–58, 68;
harmonious world strategy, 20 nonalignment, 57, 71–74; nuclear
hegemonic sustaining theory, 20 weapons, 65–67, 71; Panchsheel, 11, 57,
Hegemonic System and International 71–72; peer review, 63; policy approach
Conflict (Qin), 20 to foreign policy, 61; political science, 59;
Heikal, Hassanein, 80 political theory, 73; process approach to
Heimsath, Charles H., 67 foreign policy, 61; realist tradition, 67;
Hermann, Margaret G., 8 relational studies, 65; research by Western
heterodox autonomy, 122 scholars, 69–71; research funding, 63;
High Representative of the Union for security issues, 58; social psychology, 68;
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 155 theoretical concepts, 57–58
Hill, Christopher, 146 India and the China Crisis (Hoffman), 71
Hinnebusch, Raymond, 11, 94, 172, 176– India: Emerging Power (Cohen), 70
177, 180 India in the World Order (Nayat and Paul),
Hirano, Sadao, 43 69–70
historical contingency approaches, 147–150 Indian Council for South Asian
historical materialism, 19 Cooperation, 63–64
historical social constructions, 128 “The Indian Dilemma” (Gupta), 66
historical-structural approach, 122 Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos,
Hoffman, Stanley, 156 and Vietnam (SarDesai), 70
Hoffman, Stephen A., 71 “The Indian Nuclear Explosion” (Jaipal), 66
Hollis, Martin, 152 India-Pakistan relations, 68, 70–71
Hoste, Christopher, 110 India’s Foreign Policy (Ganguly), 70
How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in “India’s Nuclear and Space Programs”
the Third World (Korany), 3–4 (Marwah), 66–67
Hudson, Valerie M., 12, 61, 102, 130, 139, “India’s Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee”
169, 173–175 (Noorani), 66
Hui, Victoria, 31 India’s Search for Power (Mansingh), 65
Hu Jintao, 20 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, 73
human rights violations, 107–108 inductivism, 158
Hussein, King of Jordan, 87, 89 Institute for American Studies in the
hybrid analytical constructs, 176–179 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
hypotheses testing, 161 (CASS), 29
Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses,
ICC. See International Criminal Court 64
236 Index
Institute of World Economics and Politics, scenes policy coordination (nemawashi),

29–30 45; bottom-up policy process (ringisei),
Integración y Comercio, 135 44, 53–54; bureaucratic politics model,
interdependence, 123; of states, 149 41; business community (zaikai), 49;
interdisciplinary work, 2, 163 Cabinet Office, 45–49; compromise, 51;
interest groups, 51–52 consensual policymaking, 45, 55;
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), constitution, 48; constructivism, 39; crisis
102, 107, 116–118. See also names of decisionmaking, 44–45; cross-party
individual organizations leagues (giin renmei), 51; electoral
International Affairs, 168n10 districts, 45; electoral reform (1994), 50;
international community, integration into, 22 elite consensus, 41; elite fragmentation,
International Criminal Court (ICC), 106, 41–42, 55; elites, centralization within,
109–110, 181 42–43; foreign policy studies, 11, 38–40,
international history, 149 55–56; independent experts, 51–52;
internationalizing scholarship, 33–34 interbureaucratic struggle, 48; interest
International Organization, 64 groups, 51–52; and Iraq War (2003), 39–
international political economy (IPE), 9 40, 42–44, 51; iron triangle, 41, 45, 179;
International Political Science Association media and public opinion, 52–53;
(IPSA), 3 mercantile foreign policy, 37, 39; Middle
international principles, 124 East-Japanese relations, 51–54; military,
international relations (IR): appreciation of 38–40, 48–49, 55; national norms, 52–53;
canon in Europe, 143; community nonmilitarist foreign policy, 37; as
relationship with state apparatus, 61; and nontraditional great power, 38; opposition
FPA, 1, 12, 144, 146, 149, 159–160, 172– parties, 50; party influence, 51; peace
173, 178; historical cases testing Western constitution, 40; pluralism, 43; policy
theories, 31; scientific methods of, 33; coordination between NAAB and MEAB,
suspicion of, 59; theories, 18, 148, 154, 55; policymaking case studies, 44–55;
163–164, 172–173 policy tribes (zoku), 42, 46; prime
International Relations of the Middle East minister, 45–49; public opinion, 43, 52–
(Fawcett), 94 53; realism, 11, 37, 39–40; ruling
International Security, 64, 66 coalition, 47; Self-Defense Forces (SDF),
International Studies, 63–64 39–40, 44, 49; theoretical approaches,
International Studies Association (ISA), 1, 40–44; think tanks, 52; top-down policy
7, 160, 166 process, 44–45; as trading state, 11, 39–
international studies (IS) in India: and area 40, 54; two-party system, 47, 50; United
studies, 58–59, 65–67; evolution of States, relations with, 38–40, 54
discipline, 61–64; and theory, 59–61 Japan Defense Agency (JDA), 49
intervention by invitation, 126 Japan-Iraq Parliamentary Friendship
intrastate level, 96–97 League, 51
IPSA. See International Political Science Japan’s Contemporary Foreign Relations
Association (Liu), 26
IR. See international relations Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 51
Iraq, 91–92 Jawaharlal Nehru University School of
Iraq War (2003), 19, 39–40, 42–44, 51 International Studies, 62–63
IS. See international studies JDA. See Japan Defense Agency
ISA. See International Studies Association Jiang Zemin, 20
Israel, 81. See also Arab-Israeli War (1967) Jordan, 86, 89–92
issue-based studies, 29 Jorgensen, Knud, 156–158
Itamaraty (Brazil), 128, 133 Jouejati, Murhaf, 85–86, 96–97
JSP. See Japan Socialist Party
Jaguaribe, Helio, 122, 125, 127
Jaipal, Rikhi, 66 Kabila, Laurent, 112
James, Laura, 82 Kansas Event Data System (KEDS-
Japan: anomalies of, 37, 55–56; TABARI), 161
antimilitarist norms, 39–40; behind-the- Karawan, Ibrahim, 87
Index 237
Karnad, Bharat, 67 textual analysis, 131, 136; trade

Kautilya, 62, 73 negotiations, 133–134; two-level game,
Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi, 39 133–134; US relations, 122–134, 137n5.
KEDS-TABARI. See Kansas Event Data See also names of individual countries
System Lawson, Fred, 87, 91
Keidanren (Japan), 49 leader-centric literature, 89
Kenya, 103–105, 110, 119n6, 119nn1–2 leaders: charismatic, 177; foreign policy
Keohane, Robert, 156 decisions, 68; narrative accounts of, 57–58
Keppler, Elise, 109 legitimization, 21, 29
Keukeleire, Stephan, 116 Lesotho, 111–112
Kirchner, Nestor and Cristina, 132 Lessa, Carlos A., 137n7
Koizumi, Junichiro, 42, 44–45, 47, 55 Levy, Jack, 90
Komara, Kabine, 115 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 43, 45–51
Kōmei Party (Japan), 47 liberalism, 18, 22–23
Korany, Bahgat, 3–4, 11, 78–80, 96–97 liberation solidarity, 113
Korean War, 18 Liberia, 114–115
Kraig, Michael R., 71 Li Bin, 19
Libya, 91–92
Lal, Rollie, 70 Lincoln, Yvonna, 156
Latin America: actor-specific theories, 128– Lin Minwang, 26
129; autonomy debate, 121–130, 136; Lisbon Treaty (2009), 140, 145
bureaucratic politics, 132; cognitive Li Sheng, 26
elements, 128; concerted autonomy, 126; Liu Feng, 21
confrontation autonomy, 129; Liu Jiangyong, 26
constructivism, 12, 128, 131–132, 134– Liu Yongtao, 19, 23
136; content analysis, 131; deep forces, logistic state, 128
127–128; dependency theory, 12, 122– Lorenzini, María A., 134
123, 129; discourse analysis, 131; Lucas, Russell E., 87
economic development, 123–124; Lynch, Marc, 86, 97
European theoretical influences, 134;
external theoretical influences, 130–135; Maastricht, Treaty of, 182
FPA scholarship, 12, 121; geopolitics, MacNaughtan, Jennifer, 116
129; group decisionmaking, 132–133; Madagascar, 108, 110–112
heterodox autonomy, 122; historical The Making of India’s Foreign Policy
social constructions, 128; import- (Bandyopadhyaya), 65
substituting industrialization, 123; Mali, 108, 110, 118
individual decisionmakers, 132; Mandela, Nelson, 111
institutional neoliberalism, 132–133; Manners, Ian, 146
interdependence, 123; international Mansingh, Surjit, 65, 67
principles, 124; intervention by invitation, The Many Faces of National Security in the
126; logistic state, 128; migration, 133; Middle East (Korany, Noble, and
nationalism, 130–131; nonalignment, Brynen), 79
123; nonmaterial forces, 128; parasitic Mao Tse-tung, 18–19
state foreign policy, 126; parliamentary Martinson, Jeffrey D., 161
participation, 135; peripheral idealism, Marwah, Onkar, 66
12; peripheral neoidealism, 124; Marxism, 18–20, 79, 90, 92–93, 128–129
peripheral realism, 12, 123–124, 129, materialism, 21
137; public opinion, 135; rational choice Mauritania, 108, 110
model, 132; realism, 124, 136; regional Mbeki, Thabo, 113
integration debate, 126–127, 129–130; McCloskey, Herbert, 160
relational autonomy, 125; relative MCND. See Military Council for National
autonomy, 137n3; relative sovereignty, Defense
124; soft-revisionism, 129; subnational MDC. See Movement for Democratic Change
actors, 135; subnational level of analysis, MENA. See Middle East and North Africa
131, 135; subterranean institutions, 126; Menem, Carlos, 124
238 Index
Meng Honghua, 22 nationalism, 130–131

mercantile foreign policy, 37, 39 national norms, 52–53
Merke, Federico, 131, 135 national reputation argument, 21
meso-level theorizing, 147, 173 national security, 98
mesoregional level of analysis, 173 nation state: classes of, 6; realist conception
messianism, 131 of, 105
METI. See Ministry of Economy, Trade and Nayar, Baldev Raj, 69–70
Industry Neack, Laura, 152–153
Mexico, 122, 124–125, 131, 133 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 58–59, 67, 71–73
Meyer, Lorenzo, 125 neoclassical realism, 84–85
micro-level approaches, 19, 24–26, 148 neoliberal institutionalism, 157
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 80– neoliberalism, 132–133
83, 87–88, 90, 93–96, 99, 179–180. See neorealism, 20, 39
also Arab world; names of individual Neves, Alessandra de Lima, 133–134
countries new archive (new Cold War history) school,
Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau 17
(Japan), 54–55 Nigeria, 105–106, 119n5
midrange theories, 143, 166 Ni Shixiong, 20
Military Council for National Defense Niu Jun, 17
(MCND, Madagascar), 112 nomothetic methodology, 148, 156
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry nonalignment, theory of, 57, 71–74, 123,
(METI, Japan), 42, 45, 48–50, 53–54 178–179
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, Japan), nonmaterial forces, 128
42, 48, 53–54 Noorani, A.G., 66
Minor, Michael, 41 North American Affairs Bureau (Japan), 54
Misperceptions in Foreign Policy Making North American FPA. See foreign policy
(Vertzberger), 71 analysis
Mitterand, François, 9–10 North American Free Trade Agreement
Miyagi, Yukiko, 11, 179 (NAFTA), 9
MOFA. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs North Korea, 38
Mohan, Raja, 68 Norway, 103
Moi, Daniel arap, 105 nuclear weapons, 38, 65–67, 71
Moreno Ocampo, Luis, 119n5 Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security
Morgenthau, Hans, 20, 167n4 (Karnad), 67
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC,
Zimbabwe), 113 OAU. See Organization of African Unity
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Obasanjo, Olusegun, 105–106
Africa, 118 Ocampo, José María Vázquez, 124
Mubarak, Hosni, 93, 97–98 oil states, 52–54
Mufti, Malik, 88–89, 96 Ojeda, Mario, 124
Mugabe, Robert, 111–113, 119n9 Ojukwu, Chris, 106
multilateral diplomacy, 115 Olaya, Sandra, 136
multiplicity of actors, 117 oligarchic factionalism, 180
Muramatsu, Michio, 42 omni-balancing, 88–90, 95
ontology, 152–155
NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Onuki, Janina, 135
Agreement OPDS. See Organ on Politics, Defense and
Nakano, Minoru, 42 Security
Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 46 opposition parties, 50, 104
Nandy, Ashis, 66 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 106–
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 81, 83, 90, 93 108. See also African Union (AU)
National Council for Democracy and Organ on Politics, Defense and Security
Development (Guinea), 115 (OPDS), 111–113
National Interests in International Society Osorno, Guillermo, 134
(Finnemore), 23 Ozkececi-Taner, Binur, 163
Index 239
Pan-African Parliament (PAP), 108 Puig, Juan Carlos, 122, 125

pan-Arabism, 11, 80, 88, 94–95, 180 Putnam, Robert, 133–134
Panchsheel, 11, 57, 71–72, 178
paradigmatic approaches, 34, 128 Qin Yaqing, 18, 20, 23, 31
parasitic state foreign policy, 126 qualitative methodologies, 173–174
Pardesi, Marjeet S., 11, 170, 174–176, 178– quantitative methodologies, 158, 161, 166,
179 173–174
Pardo, Rodrigo, 137n3 Quarterly Journal of International Politics, 30
Parker, Charles F., 161–162
Parker, Richard B., 82, 98 Radio Cairo, 87
parliaments, 103, 135 Raghavan, Srinath, 67
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Rajoelina, Andry, 112–113
125 Ramírez, Carlos Luna, 131, 134
Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 59 Rana, A.P., 73
Paul, T.V., 69–70 Rapopart, Mario, 123
Peace and Security Council (PSC), 107– rational actor model, 83
108, 110 rational choice model, 132
peacekeeping, 38, 114–115 Ravalomanana, Marc, 112–113
Pellicer, Olga, 124–125 realism, 18, 20–21, 35n4, 37, 40, 67, 159–
People’s Republic of China. See China 160, 172; peripheral, 123–124, 129, 137
peripheral neoidealism, 124 realist autonomy, 124
peripheral realism, 123–124, 129, 137 regional actors, 181–183
Perón, Juan D., 124 regional environment, 94–95
Persaud, Randolph, 6 regional integration, 126–127, 129–130,
personal rule–oriented explanations, 105 181–183
Ping, Jean, 109 regional normative consensus, 115–116
Pinheiro, Leticia, 133 relational autonomy, 125
pluralism, 43, 157 relational studies, 65
Policy Affairs Research Council (Japan), relative autonomy, 137n3
46–47 Renouvin, Pierre, 128
policy approach to foreign policy, 61 rentier state thesis, 90–92
political economy approaches, 90–93, 98 Review of International Studies, 163–164
political philosophy, 149 Rocha, Antonio Ramalho de, 133
political psychology, 25–26 role analysis, 85–87; national role
political science, 148–149 conception, 128
Politics Among Nations (Morgenthau), 20 romanticism, 131
positivism, 6 Rome Statute, 109. See also International
power politics, 21, 72 Criminal Court
Presidential Advisory for International Rosenau, James, 6, 78, 140, 156
Affairs, 133 Russell, Roberto, 125, 132, 136, 137nn4–5
PRI. See Partido Revolucionario Russia, 17, 25–26, 29, 94. See also Soviet
Institucional Union
Prizel, Ilya, 144 Ryan, Curtis, 91
process approach to foreign policy, 61
process-to-policy dynamics, 155 Sadat, Anwar, 82, 85, 90, 93
professional organizations, 171, 185 SADC. See Southern African Development
Prohuber, Henio Hoyo, 130–131 Community
PROSPEL. See Ford Foundation, Follow- SADCC. See Southern African
Up Program of Latin American Foreign Development Coordination Conference
Policies Sadowsky, Yahya, 86–87
PSC. See Peace and Security Council Sahni, Varun, 67
psychological approaches, 24–26, 82, 132, Salloukh, Basil, 89, 96
142 Sánchez, Leandro, 132
psychological-perceptual model, 4 Santa María, Luis Valdivia, 131
publication in academic journals, 33–34 Santana, Helton R. Presto, 134
240 Index
Saraiva, Miriam Gomes, 128 Su Changhe, 22

SarDesai, D.R., 70 Sudan, 110
Saudi Arabia, 4, 88, 91, 180 Suez War, 82
Schiavon, Jorge, 132–133 Suito, Susumu, 43
Schraeder, Peter, 103–105 Sukarno, 72
Self-Defense Forces (SDF, Japan), 39–40, Sun Xuefeng, 18, 21, 29
44, 49 supranationalism, 183
Sharett, Moshe, 81 Sylvan, Donald A., 161
Shaw, Tim, 4 Syria, 55, 85–87, 89, 91, 97; intervention in
Shen Zhihua, 17–18 Jordan, 83–84, 180; intervention in
Shigeru, Yoshida, 39 Lebanon, 81–82, 179–180
Shinoda, Tomohito, 42
Sierra Leone, 114, 118 Takahashi, Toshiyuki, 43
Silva, Alexandra de Mello e, 132 Taylor, Charles, 105–106, 115
Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da (Lula), 133 Telhami, Shibley, 84, 86, 98
Sino-Indian War, 71 textual analysis, 131
Smith, Michael, 159 “The Theoretical Development and
Smith, Steve, 7, 152, 177 Limitations of Foreign Policy Analysis”
social actors, 26, 133 (Li), 16
social constructivism, 23, 134, 178. See also Theory of International Politics (Waltz),
constructivism 20
Social Democratic Party (Japan), 50 third world, 3–5, 78, 88, 90. See also Global
social psychology, 68 South
Social Theory of International Politics three-world theory, 19
(Wendt), 23 Thucydides, 20
soft-revisionism, 129 Tian Xia (All Under Heaven) international
South Africa, 105, 109–113 system theory, 31
South Asia Survey, 63–64 Tibet, 72
Southern African Development Community Tickner, Arlene B., 73, 124, 126, 132–134
(SADC), 12, 102, 110–113, 117–118, Togo, 104, 108, 110, 114
181; member states, 119n8; OPDS Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel, 125, 136, 137nn3–5
(SADC troika), 111–113 Toure, Ahmed Sekou, 115
Southern African Development transnational ideology, 180–181
Coordination Conference (SADCC), 110 transstate identities, 80, 95
Souza, Amaury de, 135 transstate public space, 86
Souza, Graziene Carneiro de, 127 Tsvangirai, Morgan, 113
sovereignty: African states, 109, 119n3; “The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis”
attenuation of, 147; relative, 124 (Ganguly and Kraig), 71
Soviet Union, 2, 66, 68, 72, 84–85, 90, 93, two-level game, 133–134
102. See also Russia
state-centric approach, 7, 12, 116–117, 145, understanding, Weberian sense of, 152–153
147–148, 157, 159–160 Understanding China and India (Lal), 70
state-societal level of analysis, 4 unionism, 88–89
state-society relations, 87–90 United Nations: Foreign Policy Bureau, 55;
Stern, Eric K., 161–162 peacekeeping operations, 38
Strategic Analysis, 63–64 United States: Latin American relations,
structural foreign policy, 116–117 122–134, 137n5; Middle East relations,
structural international relations (IR) 11, 84–85; relations with Japan, 38–40,
theories, 172 54; relations with Saudi Arabia, 91;
subaltern realism, 94 theoretical influences, 134
subnational actors, 135 universal categories, 6
subnational level of analysis, 131 University Association for Contemporary
Subrahmanyam, Krishnaswamy, 68 European Studies, 166
subterranean institutions, 126 U Nu, 72
Index 241
US-Japan Security Treaty (1951), 39 Williams, Paul D., 108

US-Pakistan alliance, 72 Wing of Hegemony (Men), 22
Woodrow Wilson Center, 17
VanDenBerg, Jeffrey A., 88, 91 World of Nuclear Powers, A (Buchan), 66
van Wolferen, Karel, 41 World Politics, 64
Vázquez, Alba Gámez, 132 world systems theory, 19, 79–80
Velázquez, Rafael, 132
Venezuela, 129, 131, 134–135 Xu Jun, 29
Verbs in Context System (VICS), 161 Xun Zi, 35n4
Vertzberger, Yaacov Y.I., 61, 71
Vieira, Joao Bernardo, 115 Yamoussoukro Agreement (1991), 115
Vivekanandan, Jayashree, 74 Yang Kuisong, 17
Volger, John, 155 Yang Yuan, 21
Yaniv, Avner, 88
Waie, Tagme Na, 115 Yan Xuetong, 30, 33
Wallenstein, Immanuel, 19 Yin Jiwu, 25
Walt, Stephen, 80, 84, 94 Yuan Zhengqing, 23–24
Waltz, Kenneth, 20–21, 62, 132, 146 Yunus, Mohammed, 144
Wang Cungang, 19, 29
Wang Mingming, 25 Zakaria, Fareed, 166–167
Wang Xuedong, 21 ZANU-PF. See Zimbabwe African National
Wang Yan, 23 Union–Patriotic Front
Wang Yizhou, 20, 22, 28–29, 33 Zhang Feng, 31
War and Peace in Modern India Zhang Lili, 25, 29
(Raghavan), 67 Zhang Qingmin, 25
Wei Zhongyou, 21 Zhao Tingyang, 31
Wendt, Alexander, 23 Zhou Enlai, 72
“The Western Neorealism and the Critiques Zhou Fangyin, 31
of Constructivism” (Liu), 19 Zimbabwe, 111–113, 117
White, Brian, 159 Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic
Whitman, Richard, 146 Front (ZANU-PF), 113
About the Book
North American scholars typically do not hesitate to make pro-

nouncements about foreign policy processes and outcomes in other countries.
And despite ample evidence to the contrary, the perception that foreign policy
analysis is still largely a North American scholarly enterprise persists. For-
eign Policy Analysis Beyond North America challenges this perception, pro-
viding a rich overview of work by scholars in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin
America, and the Middle East and also highlighting theoretical and empirical
insights that may catalyze new waves of progress in the field.
Klaus Brummer is associate professor of political science at the University

of Erlangen-Nuremberg. Valerie M. Hudson is professor and George H. W.
Bush Chair in the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas
A&M University.
242

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Foreign Policy Analysis

Beyond North America

and in the United Kingdom by

© 2015 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN 978-1-62637-197-2 (hc : alk. paper)

British Cataloguing in Publication Data

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements

1 Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America 1

2 Foreign Policy Analysis in China 15

3 Japan Through the Lens of Foreign Policy Analysis 37

4 Foreign Policy Analysis in India 57

5 Foreign Policy Analysis and the Arab World 77

6 Foreign Policy Processes in African States 101

7 Latin American Foreign Policy Analysis 121

8 North American and European Foreign Policy Analysis 139

9 Implications for Mainstream FPA Theory 169

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is now a mature subfield of inter-

many intellectual disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, organiza-

A North American Enterprise?

authors think there is nothing worthwhile in the literature to build upon”

Fast-forward almost twenty years after Korany’s volume, at a time

Either by benign neglect or sheer intellectual hubris, the vast majority of

What Grovogui is asserting is that FPA, like all theoretical approaches

purposefully justifies parochial institutions of politics, law, economics,

As a result of their educational and intellectual backgrounds, most

ing elements of parochialism that ignored emerging global problems. In

To date, models of foreign policy decision-making have had a distinctly

Let us examine Hermann’s observation before turning to a road map of

Ethnocentrism’s Effects on FPA Scholarship

In what ways may the spatiotemporal origins of a body of social science

in a subordinate position—not only in the material world, but also in the

would work best,” even though he was referring to himself. When we

Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America

As a result, we assert that FPA’s promise as a theoretical enterprise can

it is much easier—politically—to study the foreign policies of nations

After that, Korwa G. Adar reviews the FPA literature in sub-Saharan

favor explanations that explore the historical contingency surrounding

The rise of China and the increasing importance of US-China

Chinese Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy

“Foreign policy analysis” (外交政策分析) is an alien or unfamiliar term in

China’s Study of Diplomatic History

torical narratives continue to be the major research methods in the Chi-

First, it breaks the ideological and governmental constraints on the under-

The Theoretical Approaches to FPA in China

relations” together with “realism” the total number of articles is 868,

Marxism. Because China is the largest socialist-communist country in

foreign policy, Jiang Zemin’s great power diplomacy, and Hu Jintao’s

Realism. The Western IR theory of realism rooted in Aristotle and

Liberalism. As a twin brother of realism, liberalism also entered the

In the Chinese Academic Journals Full-text Database, there are

Constructivism. Since the late 1990s, Chinese scholars have begun to

ing the attention of Chinese scholars. As a competing theoretical

Bureaucratic, Cognitive, and Psychological Approaches

however, it is a new theoretical perspective for Chinese scholars. On

relations. From the same school of political psychology, Lin Minwang

The Area Studies Approach

Empirical Focal Points of China’s Studies of Foreign Policy

directions in foreign policy (e.g., Li Kaisheng 2011). For example,

The Unique Contributions of Chinese FPA

As mentioned earlier, the study of foreign policy in China is at the early

have paved a new theoretical and intellectual path to reform current IR

Ironically, foreign scholars face fewer constraints in writing about