G.R. No.

L-32432 September 11, 1970

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,

vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR,
as members thereof, respondents.

Facts: Imbong and Gonzales assail the constitutionality of RA 6132

Resolution 2: which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose
constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district
who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen
Resolution 4: amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the
convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative
districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative
district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as
those required of members of the House of Representatives,"
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132,
implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914.

Ruling:

Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of
the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its
broad law-making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because —

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the

Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional
amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of
each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-
fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to

call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary
implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal
power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number,
apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of
funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of
the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details
indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody
the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present

Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained
in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively
 pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing
details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not
expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution
from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not
clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to

provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention,
Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing
legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of
Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by
the President is no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a
legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress
can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent
Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details.

WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including
Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without
costs.

G.R. No. L-60258 January 31, 1984

SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Principal: the choice of method of proposal, i.e., whether made directly by

Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full discretion of the legislature.

Facts: This petition for prohibition seeks the declaration as unconstitutional of Sections 4 and 22
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, insofar as
it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of May 17, 1982 "from representing or
allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party ... or prohibits a political
party, political group, political committee ... from intervening in the nomination of a candidate in
the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support
directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election."

it is prayed that — judgment be rendered declaring the 1982 Barangay elections NULL AND
VOID ab initio, for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and directing the holding of new barangay
elections without any ban on the involvement of political parties, political committees, political
organizations and other political group.

The petitioner contends —

 (a) That the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of barangay
officials is violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form
associations arid societies for purposes not contrary to law.

(b) That the ban is incompatible with a democracy and a parliamentary system of
government.

Issue: Whether the BP Blg 222 is unconstitutional- No

Ruling: Outside of the cases where the Constitution clearly requires that the selection of
particular officials shall be thru the ballot and with the participation of political parties, the
lawmaking body, in the exercise of its power to enact laws regulating the conduct of elections,
may in our view ban or restrict partisan elections. We are not aware of any constitutional
provision expressly or impliedly requiring that barangay officials shall be elected thru partisan
electoral process. Indeed, it would be within the competence of the National Assembly to
prescribe that the barangay captain and councilmen, rather than elected, shall be appointed by
designated officials such as the City or Municipal Mayors or Provincial Governors. If barangay
officials could thus be made appointive, we do not think it would be constitutionally obnoxious to
prescribe that they shall be elective, but without political party or partisan involvement in the
process in order to promote objectivity and lack of partisan bias in the performance of their
duties that are better discharged in the absence of political attachment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. No costs.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held
on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the
morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is
entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the
COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said
plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic

Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no
force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding  of a plebiscite co-incident with
the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the
Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be
exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for  ratification separately
from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative
to the Constitution.

HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of
a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as
well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious
whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if
not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any
single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (G.R. NO. L-1123)

Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were

suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to
take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued
that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of
each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) –
which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already
entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it
could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of
the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the
SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of
the enrolled bill or resolution.

Issue: WON the Court can take cognizance of the issue.

Ruling:

No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional
or statutory provisions. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of
political question. However, in Coleman v. Miller, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of
a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not
justiciable. If a ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. There is no logic in attaching political character to one
and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by Congress. If a political question conslusively binds the judges out
of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the “enrolled bill” rule born of that respect.

Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 220, provides two
methods of proving legislative proceedings:

By the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or copies certified by the clerk or

secretary or printed by their order; and

In case of acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries
thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof.

In US v. Pons, the Court looked into the journals because those were the documents offered in
evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was
placed before the Court; and it had not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would
not have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law.

Even if both journals and an authenticate copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of
the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment
theory, for the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the 2 ways specified in
Section 313 of The Code of Civil Procedure. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the 2 documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if
discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and
of the due enactment thereof.”

G.R. No. L-52265 January 28, 1980

SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON

AUDIT, NATIONAL TREASURER, and DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, Respondents.

Occeña Law Office for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:
Petition for prohibition seeking to restrain respondents from implementing Batas Pambansa Big.
51 (providing for the elective and/or appointive positions in various local governments), 52
(governing the election of local government officials scheduled on January 30, 1980), 53
(defining the rights and privileges of accredited parties), and 54 (providing for a plebiscite,
simultaneously with the election of local officials on January 30, 1980, regarding the proposed
amendment of Article X, Section 7, of the 1973 Constitution). The constitutional issues raised
are: (1) whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to authorize the holding
of local elections; (2) assuming it has such power, whether it can authorize said elections
without enacting a local government code; (3) as g it may validly perform the foregoing, whether
it can schedule such elections less than ninety, (90) days from the passage of the enabling law;
and; (4), assuming further that the proposed amendment to Article X, Section 7 of the
Constitution is valid, whether the plebiscite can be legally held together with the local elections.
The thrust of Petitioner's arguments is that these issues should be resolved in the negative.

After deliberating on the memoranda and arguments adduced by both parties at the hearing as
January 15, 1980, the Court finds no merit in the petition.

1. The legislative power granted by Section 1, Artcle VIII of the Constitution to the National
Assembly has been explicitly vested during the period of transition on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa by Amendment No. 2 to the constitution. The only station is that it shall not exercise
its treaty ratification powers provided in Article VIII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution. The
legislative power has described generally as being a power to make, alter and laws. 1It is the
peculiar province of the legislature to probe general rules for the government of society. The e
of the legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and
promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct. 2It is a recognized principle in
constitutional law that the legislative body possesses Plenary power for all purposes of civil
government The 1egislative power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is, therefore, Complete,
subject only to the limitation that the interim Batasang Pambansa shall not exercise the power of
the National Assembly in the ratification of treaties. 3 The power to regulate the manner of
conducting elections, to Prescribe the form of the official ballot, and to provide for the Manner in
which candidates shall be chosen is inherently and historically legislative. Petitioner has. not
cited any provision of the Constitution, as amended by the Amendments of 1976, which
expressly or by implication deny to the Interim Batasang Pambansa the authority to call for local
elections. It is a well established rule that where no exception is made in terms, none will be
made by mere implication or construction. The wordings of a constitutional provision do not
have a narrow or contracted meaning, but are used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all
contingencies. Petitioner's invocation of the Report of the Committee on Transitory Provisions of
October 13, 1972 does not. support his contention that the Interim Batasang Pambansa has no
power to call local elections. The purported report refers to the interim National Assembly in
Article XVII, the convening of which was rejected by the Filipino people. As We stated in Peralta
v. Commission on Elections:

It should be recalled that under the terms of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the
membership of the interim National Assembly would consist of the Incumbent President and
Vice-President, the Senators and the Representatives of the old Congress and the Delegates to
the Constitutional Convention who have opted to serve therein. The Filipino people rejected the
convening of the interim National Assembly, and for a perfectly justifiable reason.

By September of 1976, the consensus had emerged for a referendum partaking of the character
of a plebiscite which would be held to establish the solid foundation for the next step towards
normalizing the political process. By the will of the people, as expressed overwhelmingly in the
plebiscite of October 15 and 16, 1976, Amendments Nos. 1 to 9 were approved, abolishing
the interim National Assembly and creating in its stead an interim Batasang Pambansa. This
was intended as a preparatory and experimental step toward the establishment of full
parliamentary government as provided for in the Constitution. (at p. 61).

In the search for the meaning of the language of the Constitution, reference may be made to the
historical basis of the provisions. The historical events and circumstances which led to the
ratification of Amendments Nos. I to 9 of the constitution show the manifest intent and desire of
the people to establish, during the period of transition, a government that can effectively provide
for the nation's peaceful and orderly transition from a crisis to a full parliament system of
government.

2. Neither can We find in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution any requirement that the
enactment of a local government code is a condition sine qua non for the calling of the local
elections by the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Indeed, the holding of local elections does not, in
any manner, preclude the enactment of a local government code by the Batasang Pambansa at
some later period. There cannot be any doubt that our local governments are basic and
fundamental units in our democratic institutions, To strengthen these institutions, the election of
local officials should be periodically held. 5 Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to adopt such a
technical or strained construction as will unduly impair the efficiency of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa in meeting the challenges and discharging its responsibilities in response to the
problems arising in a modernizing and dynamic society. The legislative decision to call for local
elections in order to enable the Filipino people to exercise their sovereign right to choose their
local officials cannot, therefore, be faulted as a violation of the Constitution.

3. Section 6 of Article XII of the Constitution does not fix an unalterable period of ninety (90)
days for an election campaign. This provision must be construed in relation to Section 5 of
Article XII thereof which grants to the Commission on Elections the power to supervise or
regulate the operation of transportation public utilities, media of communication, etc. during
the "election period". Section 6 fixes the "election period" by stating that unless fixed by the
Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety (90) days before the
day of election and shall end thirty (30) days thereafter. In Peralta v. Commission on Elections,
supra, We resolved, in effect, this issue by holding that the forty-five day period of campaign
prescribed in Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code was not violative of Section 6 of Article XII of
the Constitution.

4. Considering that the proposed amendment to Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution

extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from
sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the
1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are
unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.=

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO C. SANIDAD vs HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS & HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER

G.R. No. L-44640

October 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
991 to call for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens
Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its
existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the
questions that are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is
whether or not the citizen wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the
approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national
referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16,
and to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting
that the power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of
the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of
October 16. They assert that the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation
renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via
referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of
age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue
raised is political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General
also asserts that at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the
authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs
991 and 1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3
maintained it was of political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one.
This is because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose
amendments to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of
transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly. The normal course has not been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
president undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in
effect, through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the
amendment procedure raises a contestable issue.

JOSE A. ANGARA vs THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
LAUREL, J.:

Facts: In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.

On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the greatest number of
votes.

On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions N0.8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed.  Praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified

Issue:

Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
HELD:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent
of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example,
the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that
this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check
that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote
of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has
also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent
through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers;
and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

Conclusion:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

 (b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof,
the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than
to any of the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear
and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the
rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests
against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and
bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution
of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.
ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION

FACTS:

In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. The provincial
board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for
the said district, for having received the most number of votes. On November 15, 1935, the
petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified/

Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the
Electoral Commission a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”, alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to
prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be
presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for,
the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period

Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “Answer to the Motion of Dismissal” alleging that there is no
legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a
member of the National Assembly after confirmation.

The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936,

denying herein petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and if in the affirmative

2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming
to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly

RULING:
1. Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted
by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.

In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And
if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our
constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework?
To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of
the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly.”

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

YNOT V IAC

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from one province to another but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of
EO 626-A. Ynot averred that EO 626-A was unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard
or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly
confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against
Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so
as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

Ruling: HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-
A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

CIR V CA

Facts: ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES, INC., is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture

and sale of cigar and cigarette products. On 7 May 1991 private respondent received a letter
dated 26 April 1991 from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessing it deficiency Ad
Valorem Tax (AVT).

private respondent thru counsel filed a protest against the proposed assessment with a request
that the same be withdrawn and cancelled. On 31 May 1991 private respondent received
petitioner's reply dated 27 May 1991 denying its protest and request for cancellation stating that
the decision was final, and at the same time requesting payment of the revised amount. Without
waiting for petitioner's reply to its request for reconsideration, private respondent filed on 19
June 1991 a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. On 25 June 1991 private
respondent received from petitioner a letter dated 21 June 1991 denying its request for
reconsideration declaring again that its decision was final. On 8 July 1991 private respondent
paid under protest the disputed ad valorem tax in the sum of P520,835.29.2

CTA- ordered CIR to refund PR.

CHAVEZ VS GONZALES

MARCH 30, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and
NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the
parties to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor
President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in
Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc
recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both
recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had
been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the
compact discs was not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public,
claiming possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the
NBI to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that
airing the Garci Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of
the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint
press statement expressing commitment to press freedom
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to
nullify the “acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on
the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the
Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations
against airing the Garci Tapes.
ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press
release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.
1. Standing to File Petition
Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in
the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a
government action in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action
is directed at such citizen. Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a
free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance that must be defended by
every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.