B353

Plant Course
Olkiluoto 3

Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions

TD:B353.OL3.057 - Part 1

Confidential as defined in the Olkiluoto 3 Plant Contract. The reproduction, transmission or use of
this document or its contents is not permitted without express written authority. Offenders will be
liable for damages. All rights, including rights created by patent grant or registration of a utility model
or design, are reserved by AREVA.

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH

 Table of Contents

„ Link between Safety Demonstration and Protection System

> Principles of safety demonstration
> Role of the PS
„ Architecture of the Protection System
> Redundancy & Diversity
> PS architecture
„ Core-related PS functions
> Scope and list of DBC events
> Instrumentation
„ Review of all core-related protections functions
> Generic Functions
> Specific Functions
> Anti-dilution Functions
„ Permissive signals

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions
 Link between
Safety Demonstration
and Protection System

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions
 Principles of Safety Demonstration (1/8)

„ According to the concept of defense-in-depth, the EPR safety

demonstration is based on the examination of initiating events which
potentially could occur during the lifetime of the plant.

„ The list of Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs) is given in the Safety

Analysis Report (SAR)

„ The events are classified following their occurrence probability

(Plant Category Conditions):
> DBC 1: normal operation
> DBC 2 events: Incident Conditions
> DBC 3 events: Accident Conditions
> DBC 4 events: Accident Conditions

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 1.1
 Principles of Safety Demonstration (2/8)

“In depth defense” is a state of mind which takes safety into

account from the earliest stages of design, and sets up many
Consequences layers of safety features.

Severe accidents
severe DEC-B Integrity of the containment

serious DEC-A Complete loss of protective

systems

high Mitigation of accidents

DBC2 - 4

Prevent evolution into an

accident
slight DBC1
Prevent departure for normal
operation
100/year 10-6/year 10-7/year
Events frequency of occurrence
AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 1.2
 Principles of Safety Demonstration (3/8)

„ Deterministic approach
> Definition of a list of anticipated events according to occurrence probability and
radiological consequences: the Design Basis Categories (DBC)
> DBC events are caused by the failure of 1 component, of 1 I&C function, of 1 operator
error or loss of site power
> No event taken into account in the design should lead to important radioactive
releases (limited to the close environment)

„ Probabilistic approach
> Examines situations not taken into account in the deterministic safety demonstration.
Example: superimposition of multiple failures
> To optimize the design by identifying the low probability accidents which contribute
most to the core melting probability: the Design Extension Categories (DEC)

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 1.3
 Principles of Safety Demonstration (4/8)

„ Four Design Basis Categories or « DBC »

> DBC1:Transients related to Normal Operation
> DBC2: Anticipated Operational Occurrences (10-2/y.r < f)
> DBC3: Infrequent Accidents (10-4/y.r < f < 10-2/y.r)
> DBC4: Limiting Accidents (10-6/y.r < f < 10-4/y.r)

„ Two Design Extension Categories or « DEC » which provide a frame for

the design of additional equipments needed to meet probabilistic objectives.
> DEC-A events related to the prevention of core melting: complex sequences
> DEC-B events related to the prevention of large radioactive releases in case of low
pressure core melt: severe accidents

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 1.4
 Principles of Safety Demonstration (5/8)

„ There are safety criteria to respect. They are defined in terms of radiological
limits
„ Radiological limits are not convenient for thermal-hydraulic and nuclear studies
> Acceptance criteria (or decoupling criteria)
„ Acceptance criteria are defined to cope with thermal hydraulic and neutronic
transient calculations
> T&H and neutronic transient calculations can be decoupled from radiological
calculations
> Acceptance criteria fulfilled  radiological limits met
„ Main Acceptance criteria regarding fuel failures and coolability are for DBC2
events:
> Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR)
> Fuel pellet melting (Temperature)
z Decoupling criterion : Linear Power Density (LPD)

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 Principles of Safety Demonstration (6/8)

„ DBC2: No fuel damage

> No rupture of the fuel cladding
z No departure from nucleate boiling: DNB Ratio > threshold supplied by the CHF correlation
z Total number of fuel rods reaching DNB < 0.1 %
> Non melting in the fuel pellets: maximal linear power density < 590 W/cm

„ DBC3 : No significant change in fuel geometry and no cladding failure

> Total number of fuel rods reaching DNB < 1 %
> Peak cladding temperature < 650 °C

„ DBC4: Limit fuel and cladding damage, ensure fuel coolability

> Total number of damaged fuel rods < 10 %.
> Excessive embrittlement of the cladding shall be prevented: clad temperature < 1200 °C
> Fragmentation and melting of the fuel rods shall be prevented.
> The maximum hydrogen generation shall not exceed 1 % of the amount, which can be developed, if
the whole active cladding surrounding fuel pellets would react with the coolant (LOCA criterion)
> Fuel flow channels shall not be blocked so that the coolability of the fuel shall not be endangered

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 1.6
 Principles of Safety Demonstration (7/8)

„ Safe plant states

> Controlled state
Q The fast transient is finished, the plant is stabilized
z Core subcritical
z Core power is removed
z Core coolant inventory is stable
z Radioactive releases remain below acceptable limits
> Safe shutdown state
Q Residual heat removal is durably ensured
z Core subcritical
z Radioactive releases within the limits of corresponding DBC events
z Decay heat removed durably

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 1.7
 Principles of Safety Demonstration (8/8)

„ STANDARD REACTOR STATES

„ Events postulated in the safety analysis are supposed to occur during normal
plant states:
> Power states and hot and intermediate shutdown (State A),
> Intermediate shutdown above 120 °C (State B),
> Intermediate and cold shutdown with SIS/RHRS in operation (State C),
> Cold shutdown with RCS open (State D),
> Cold shutdown for refueling (State E),
> Unloaded Core (State F).

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 Role of the Protection System (1/2)

„ Role of the PS:

> To provide all the protection and engineering safeguard I&C functions used
to reach the controlled state in case of DBC 2, 3 or 4 on-site event
z Automatic functions
z Manual actions

> To also provide some extent I&C functions needed to reach the safe
shutdown state from the controlled state

> Monitoring and services related to these functions

> In addition : operational controls and monitoring

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 1.9
 Role of the Protection System (2/2)

„ Role of the Protection Function:

> The I&C function needed to
z Initiate a reactor trip
z Ensure reactor emergency cooling
z Ensure isolation of reactor containment
z Or other safety function necessary in a postulated accident to meet the acceptance criteria

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 1.10
 PS - Architecture

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 PS Architecture (1/4)

„ Four fold redundant structure > 2/4 logic-of-vote*, can deal with:
> 1 channel with failure (Single Failure Criteria)
Safety requirement
> 1 channel in maintenance
> 1 channel with spurious order Availability requirement
*: for most of the PS functions

„ 2 independent sub-systems to ensure diversity

> Sub-system A / Sub-system B
> If 1st signal given by A (resp. B), 2nd signal given by B (resp. A)
> If permissive used in reactor trip function, then it is implemented in the same-
subsystem as the function

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 PS Architecture (2/4)

„ Processing among specialized units

> RAU: Remote Acquisition Unit (acquisition of SPNDs)
) specific distribution of SPND signals within the PS
> APU: Acquisition and Processing Unit (acquisition of sensors)
> ALU: Actuator Logic Unit (voting logics and actuation)

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 1.12
 Four fold redundant structure
PS Architecture (3/4)

RAU

APU

ALU

2 independent sub-systems

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 PS Architecture (4/4)
Remote Shutdown
Station Main Control Room Service Technical
Center Support Center

SICS

Safety Information &

PICS SICS
Control System

Process Information &

PICS
Control System

Reactor Control,
HW RCSL Surveillance and
Limitation System
Backup SAM RCSL PS SAS PAS
PS Protection System

SAS Safety Automation System

PAS Reactor trip

breakers, Process Automation
PAS
control rod System
Other actuation
systems PAC PAC PAC
Priority and Actuator
Control Module

Control Rod Drive

CRDM
Mechanism

S.Acc SAM Severe Accident I&C

actuators
SC2 S.acc
sensors sensors
SC3 SC2 SC2/SC3 SC3 SC3 SC4/EYT SC4/EYT TXS TXP HW
sensors CRDM sensors actuators sensors actuators sensors actuators Backup

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 PS – Core-related functions - Scope

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions
 PS Core-related Functions - Scope (1/7)
Scope – List of functions
„ Reactor trip functions
Generic > RT on High Linear Power Density
protection
functions RT on Low DNBR (and high quality)

> RT on Ex-core high neutron flux rate of change

RT on High Core Power Level ( and Low Saturation Margin)
Specific RT on low RCP Speed
protection RT on Low-low loop flow rate
functions RT on Low loop flow rate
RT on high neutron flux (Intermediate Range) NB: all those RT signals are
RT on Low doubling time (Intermediate Range) followed by a Turbine Trip signal

> + Manual RT
„ CVCS isolation functions
> CVCS isolation on Anti-dilution (No RCP in operation condition)
CVCS isolation on Anti-dilution (Standard shutdown states condition)
CVCS isolation on Anti-dilution (Power condition)
„ Other functions
> Alarm on High neutron flux (Source Range)
> + EBS actuation on High neutron flux (Source Range)
LTH: low threshold
> + Manual EBS actuation
HTH: high threshold
„ Permissive signals
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 PS Core-related Functions - Scope (2/7)
Scope – List of DBC events
DBC2 events (FSAR - OL3)
FAMILY INITIATING EVENT

Increase in Heat Removal Feedwater Malfunction Causing a Reduction in Feedwater Temperature (States A
and B)
Feedwater Malfunction Causing an Increase in Feedwater Flow (States A and B)
Excessive Increase in Steam Flow (State A)
Inadvertent Opening of a Main Steam Relief Train or Main Steam Safety Valve
(State A)

Decrease in Heat Removal Total Loss of Load and/or Turbine Trip (State A)
Loss of Condenser Vacuum (State A)
Inadvertent Closure of One Main Steam Isolation Valve (State A)
Short-Term (< 2 Hours) Loss of Offsite Power
Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow (Loss of All MFW Pumps and of the Startup and
Shutdown Pump) (State A)
Loss of One Cooling Train in the Residual Heat Removal Mode (States C and D)

Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate Loss of One Reactor Coolant Pump (State A)

Increase/Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Spurious Pressurizer Heating (State A)

pressure Spurious Pressurizer Spraying (State A)

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 PS Core-related Functions - Scope (3/7)
Scope – List of DBC events
DBC2 events (FSAR - OL3)
FAMILY INITIATING EVENT

Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies
Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power
(State A)
Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal with Reactor Sub-
critical (State A)
Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment up to Rod Drop (State A)
Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction Causing a Decrease in
Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant System (States A to E)

Increase in Reactor Coolant System Inventory Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction Causing an Increase in
Reactor Coolant System Inventory (State A)
Spurious Startup of the Safety Injection System (States A to E)

Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Inventory
Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction Causing a Decrease in
Reactor Coolant System Inventory (State A)
Very Small Loss of Reactor Coolant (e.g. Small-Diameter Instrument Line
Break) (States A and B)
Uncontrolled Level Drop in the Reactor Coolant System (States C and D)

Primary to Secondary Leakage Steam Generator Tube Leak (up to 1 Tube) under Realistic Conditions (State A)

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 PS Core-related Functions - Scope (4/7)
Scope – List of DBC events

DBC3 events (FSAR - OL3)

FAMILY INITIATING EVENT

Increase in Heat Removal Small Steam System Piping Failure (< DN 50) Including Break of Connecting Lines
(< DN 50) to SG (States A and B)

Decrease in Heat Removal Inadvertent Closure of All Main Steam Isolation Valves
Long-Term (> 2 Hours) Loss of Offsite Power (State A)
Small Feedwater System Piping Failure (< DN 50) Including Break of Connecting
Lines (< DN 50) to SG (States A and B)

Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Flow Forced Decrease of Reactor Coolant Flow (4 Pumps) (State A)
Rate
Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal (States B, C and D)
Uncontrolled Single Control Rod Withdrawal (State A)
Inadvertent Loading and Operation of a Fuel Assembly in an Improper Position
(State E)
Heterogeneous Boron Dilution Resulting from an Improper Reactor Coolant Pump
Startup (State C)
Heterogeneous Inherent Boron Dilution in SB-LOCA (State A)

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 PS Core-related Functions - Scope (5/7)
Scope – List of DBC events

DBC3 events (FSAR - OL3)

FAMILY INITIATING EVENT

Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Inventory
Inadvertent Opening of a Pressurizer Pilot Operated Safety Valve (State A)
Small-Break LOCA (< DN 50), Including a Break in the Extra Borating System
Injection Line (State A)
Small-Break LOCA (< DN 50), Including a Break in the Extra Borating System
Injection Line (State B)

Primary to Secondary Leakage Steam Generator Tube Rupture (1 Tube) (State A)

Others Failure of a Main Controller

DBC2 Events with Loss of 1st RT Signal

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 PS Core-related Functions - Scope (6/7)
Scope – List of DBC events

DBC4 events (FSAR - OL3)

FAMILY INITIATING EVENT

Increase in Heat Removal Steam System Piping Break (States A and B)

Decrease in Heat Removal Feedwater System Piping Break (States A and B)

Long-Term (> 2 Hours) Loss of Offsite Power (State C)

Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Flow Reactor Coolant Pump Seizure (Locked Rotor) (State A)
Rate Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Break (State A)

Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies Spectrum of Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection Accidents (States A and B)
Boron Dilution due to a Non-isolable Rupture of a Heat Exchanger Tube
(States C, D and E)

Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Intermediate- and Large-Break LOCA (up to Surge Line Break (States A and B)
Inventory Large-Break 2A-LOCA (State A)
Residual Heat Removal System Break Outside Containment (State C)
Small-Break LOCA (< DN 50), Including a Break in the Extra Borating System
Injection Line (States C and D)

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 PS Core-related Functions - Scope (7/7)
Scope – List of DBC events

DBC4 events (FSAR - OL3)

FAMILY INITIATING EVENT

Primary to Secondary Leakage Steam Generator Tube Rupture (2 Tubes in 1 SG) (State A)

Anticipated Transients > Resulting from failure of the protection system (State A)
o Increase on the steam flow;
Without Scram
o Loss of main feedwater;
o Loss of Offsite power;
o Primary coolant boron concentration decrease;
o Uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal.
> Resulting from mechanical blockage of all shutdown Increase on the steam flow (State A)
o Loss of main feedwater;
o Loss of Offsite power;
o Primary coolant boron concentration decrease;
o Uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal./control rods

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 PS – Core-related functions -
Instrumentation

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 PS Core-related Functions - Instrumentation (1/7)
I&C Sensors used in the Protection system
+ Equipment/service compartments pressure
+ Containment pressure SG pressure
+ SAB sump level
+ SAB pressure
+ 10kV busbar voltage and frequency
SG
PZR pressure P SG level
Rod drop position PZR level Z
R

Cold leg Hot leg Hot leg + EFWS flowrate

temperature temperature pressure Loop level + CCWS temperature
Cobalt
SPNDs
Excore
Detectors
CVCS
charging
line
boron meter Reactor
Pressure RCP
Reactor
Vessel speed
Coolant
Pump

+ RCP power supply

∆P over the pump

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 PS Core-related Functions - Instrumentation (2/7)
Special case of SPNDs (1/3)

Ceramic Insulator Al2O3 Background cable

210 mm
Compensation Current

Co-59 Emitter Signal Cable Sheath Emitter Current

∅ = 2 mm

„ SPNDs are neutron detectors that give a current proportional to the neutron flux
„ SPNDs are placed inside the core, where they constantly remain during power
operation
> Continuous and accurate monitoring of the neutron flux.

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 »Radial allocation PS Core-related Functions - Instrumentation (3/7)
A B C D E F G H J K L M N P R S T Special case of SPNDs (2/3)
17

16 12
15 1
14

13 11
12 10
11 2 3
10

7 9 8
6 4
5 5
4

3 7
2 6
1

X Division 1 X Division 3

X Division 2 X Division 4

„ SPNDs:
> neutron detectors with Cobalt emitter
> 12 fingers with 6 detectors

»Axial allocation
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 PS Core-related Functions - Instrumentation (4/7)
Special case of SPNDs (3/3)

„ To cope with asymmetrical accidents:

All 72 SPNDs are allocated in the 4 divisions

„ SPNDs are used in

> RT on High Linear Power Density function

> RT on low DNBR function

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 PS Core-related Functions – Instrumentation (5/7)
4 core symmetrical RCCAs Case of RCCAs
per sub-bank
> Each RCCA of one
sub-bank is affected to one
division of the PS

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 PS Core-related Functions - Instrumentation (6/7)
Case of Ex-core neutron detectors

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 PS Core-related Functions - Instrumentation (7/7)
Principle of the online Boron Meters

Neutron
source Pulse Measurement

‹ PC
‹ TXS

Counter
Tubes

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 PS – Core-related Functions - Review
I Generic Functions
II Specific Functions
III Anti-dilution Functions

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (1/18)
Generic / Specific protection channels
DBC 2 EVENTS

FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY

TO MEET FUEL CENTERLINE MELTING

AND DNB CRITERIA

HIGH LINEAR POWER DENSITY AND LOW-DNBR

(GENERIC) PROTECTION CHANNELS

CONSISTENT WITH FAST ACCIDENTS ?

no yes

SLOW ACCIDENTS SPECIFIC PROTECTION CHANNELS:

OK FAST RESPONSE TIME CHANNELS

UNABLE TO "MEASURE"
HLPD and Low-DNBR THE MAX LPD AND DNBR VALUES
CHANNEL ACCURACY
VALIDATION CALCULATIONS NEEDED TO
DEMONSTRATE THE CRITERIA
COMPLIANCE WHEN THE REACTOR TRIP
OCCURS
ASSUMPTIONS ARE NEEDED FOR
NECESSITY OF A THE CALCULATIONS
LCO MONITORING
Limiting Conditions of
SYSTEM
Operations MONITORING
« RCSL »
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 PS Core-related Functions - Review I (2/18)

Finger 3 : 6 SPNDs Finger 4 : 6 SPNDs Finger 11 : 6 SPNDs

RT on High Linear Power Density (HLPD)

RAU is an I&C module dedicated

Remote Acquisition Unit Division 1 only to SPND signal acquisition
Note A/D
Division 2 : Fingers number 1, 5 ,8
Division 3 : Fingers number 6, 9, 10
Division 4 : Fingers number 2, 7, 12
„ Protect against the risk of melting at the center of the fuel
pellet
I3(6)
6 values
I4(6)
6 values
I11(6)
6 values
to division 2 „ Decoupling criteria: LPD must remain lower to a certain limit
to division 3 (whatever the postulated initiating event)
to division 4
„ Maximal LPD is directly derived from the 72 SPND
measurements after calibration
from division 2
from division 3
from division 4 „ Calibration purpose :
> Compensate changes of signal level in the course of the fuel cycle (due
I3(6) I1(6) I6(6) I2(6) I4(6) I5(6) I9(6) I7(6) I11(6) I8(6) I10(6) I12(6) to sensor depletion)

> Follow the power distribution evolution in the course of the fuel cycle
Acquisition & Processing Unit > Flux Map needed (AMS) + reference heat balance
(APU)
Division 1

Compensation module

Self adaptating filter

INCORE
72 values
Ii(j)

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (3/18)
INCORE RT on High Linear Power Density (HLPD)
72 values
Ii(j)
x KLPD „ Calibration principle
Linear power
density
> Increase the number of values representative of the core
Qi(j)
peak power
Calculation
for 72 values
> Each SPND signal is fitted on the maximum value of the
corresponding axial zone
> Core divided in 6 axial adjacent zones.
Against
2nd MAX spurious signal z The 12 SPND at the same elevation are fitted on the same
maximum value
1
X
1+T3p
> Calibration on core flux map every 15 days or every
1+T2p 1+T4p
month
See figure 6

HTH HTHAS
Abnormal
sequence
signal
HTHAS HTH „ Processing
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
> Second max treatment : Spurious actuation avoided
> Comparison with high threshold values
AND
2/4 2/4 2/4 > Automatic threshold degradation in case of SPND
failures (Threshold values depend on the number of
AND OR invalid SPND)
> Inhibition below a low level of power
OR
Permissive P2 z 10 % NP (P2)
Permissive P2

AND AND > Logic signals sent to RCSL (limitation)

> In case of detection of an abnormal sequence, specific
Reactor Trip PT signal to RCSL
threshold

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (4/18)
RT on Low DNBR

„ Low DNBR RT function : Table of contents

> Boiling phenomenon
> DNB limit
> Input and DNBR algorithm
> Axial power reconstruction
> Calibration principle
> Processing (symmetrical events)
z Main function
z Outlet quality
> Processing (asymmetrical and specific events)
z Needs
z Detection
z Global processing
> Overview of the function
z In Functional Requirements of PS
z In PS Functional Diagrams

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 PS Core-related Functions - Review I (5/18)
RT on Low DNBR
„ Principles of heat exchange along a heated channel: Boiling phenomenon
Single-phase vapor
> The heat exchange coefficient depends on the local properties of coolant flow, which
evolve all along the hot channel.
> As the coolant rises along the channel its physical properties are modified, because its
temperature increases, along with the temperature of the channel wall. The height of the
channel can be divided into a certain number of zones having different properties.
z A lower zone, in which the wall temperature and the coolant temperature are below the saturation
temperature. In this zone, the flow is single phase and the heat exchange regime is one of forced
convection. The heat exchange between the cladding and the coolant is good and the temperature
difference remains small, not exceeding several ten of degrees.
z Starting from a certain length of tube, the wall temperature exceeds the coolant’s saturation
temperature Tsat whereas the coolant remains at a temperature less than Tsat. Bubbles then
began to appear along the cladding wall, while the coolant remains strongly undersaturated. These
bubbles improve the thermal exchange, because they do not remain stuck to the wall, but are
carried along the coolant flow. Consequently, they transmit calories from the wall to the coolant.
z The coolant continuing to heat up, the density and the size of the bubbles increase. Suddenly,
there is a coalescence of the bubbles and the creation of a stable vapor film along the cladding
wall. From this moment on, the heat exchange degenerates (h decreases, thus Tcladding
increases).
> This degradated heat exchange is explained, among other reasons, by the fact that steam
has a lower thermal conductivity than does water. It occurs when a certain value of
thermal flux has been reached, and leads to “Departure from Nucleate Boiling” (DNB) and
single-phase liquid
burnout.

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 3.5
 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (6/18)
RT on Low DNBR
„ DNB Limit
> To avoid any damage to the cladding due to an excessive increase in the temperature the heat flux
Q must not exceed a certain value Qc (critical flux). For this, a parameter that plays a fundamental
role is used. The DNBR (Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio) which is equal to the ratio of the
critical flux to the real value at any time.

> The critical flux is determined experimentally. A correlation is established that allow, for a given
channel, determining the critical flux Qc as a function of the flow characteristics (pressure, flow
rate, inlet and outlet enthalpies, quality, etc.) and the geometrical characteristics of the channel
(hydraulic diameter, grid spacing and type).

> DNBR is determined on line in the Protection System

Typical cell DNB risk : rupture of the first barrier

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (7/18)
RT on Low DNBR

„ Inputs and DNBR algorithm

> Needs to calculate a DNBR
z Thermal and Hydraulic initial conditions at the entrance of the hot channel (Enthalpy, quality,
mass velocity…) + power distribution of hot channel
z Enthalpy rising along the hot channel
z Critical Heat Flux correlation (analytic form)
z Output quality (Correlation validity)
> Inputs for the function: Initial conditions at the entrance of the hot channel
z Tin : Cold Leg Temperature measurement
z Pin : Pressurizer Pressure measurement
z Ω: RCP speed (relative flow rate)
> Inputs for the function: Enthalpy rising along the hot channel
z SPND : Used to elaborate a fine axial power distribution of the hot channel
z Polynomial reconstruction of the axial power distribution by using the 6 SPND values of a finger
z + results from previous function

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (8/18)
RT on Low DNBR
„ Axial Power reconstruction
„ Objective of the reconstruction : to calculate the DNBR from the power distribution of the
hot rod.
„ Reconstruction principle : to use the 6 SPND measurements of each one of the 12 fingers
to find a power shape that approximate the real axial power shape in the hot rod.

Axial reconstruction
Reconstruction axiale
400.000

350.000

300.000
puissance linéique (W/cm)

250.000

200.000

150.000

100.000

50.000

0.000
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
hauteur (cm)
P(z) Mesures collectrons

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (9/18)
RT on Low DNBR

„ Calibration principle (KDNB)

> Increase the number of values representative of the minimum of DNBR

> SPND signal fitted on the corresponding power of the core hot channel given by the core flux map
(AMS)

> At time of calibration : 12 identical reconstructed axial power distributions

> Calibration on core flux map every 15 days or every month

„ Processing (symmetrical events)

> Second min treatment : Spurious actuation avoided

> Comparison with low threshold values

> Threshold values depend on the number of invalid finger (automatic degradation of setpoint)

> Inhibition below a low level of power 10 % NP (P2)

> Logic signals sent to RCSL (limitation)

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 SPND values
PS Core-related Functions – Review I (10/18)
(72)
RT on Low DNBR
Cold Leg
PZR Pressure RCP speed
Temperature
Acquisition & calibration

Fine axial power shape (12) Thermal Hydraulic conditions calculations

Calculation of DNBR
(12 values – one per finger)

Second Min

Lead Lag module

RT on low DNBR :
Low threshold
DNBRT Main PS function
P2 permissive 2/4

AND

RT on low DNBR

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (11/18)
RT on Low DNBR
SPND values
Cold Leg
(72) PZR Pressure RCP speed
Temperature

Fine axial power shape (12) Thermal Hydraulic conditions calculations

Calculation of DNBR – Calculation of outlet quality

(12 values – one per finger)

Calculation of outlet quality : Second Min Second Max

Validation of the DNBR correlation Lead Lag module Lead Lag module

Low threshold High threshold

DNBRT XOUTT

2/4 2/4

P2 permissive
OR

AND

RT on low DNBR

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (12/18)
RT on Low DNBR
„ Asymmetrical and specific events
„ Rod drop signal
> Use of RCCA position measurements

> Detection of rod drop

> Specific threshold

„ Imbalance signal
> Use of SPND measurements

> Detection of single rod withdrawal

> Specific threshold

„ Insertion limit (IL) signal

> Use of RCCA position measurements

> IL are power dependent

> Detection of RCCA over-insertion (dilution at power)

> Specific threshold

„ Abnormal sequence signal

> Use of control rods position measurements

> Detection of abnormal sequence

> Specific threshold

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (13/18)
RT on Low DNBR
„ Needs (Asymmetrical and specific events)
> Needs of RT on low DNBR for asymmetrical core related events
z Gain in DNBR operational margin
– Distribution of 72 SPND signals in each PS division

DNBR

Nominal

Operational margin

(II)
Surveillance (LCO)

Specific RT (I)

Criterion
time
Specific event (I) taken into account Specific events (I & II) taken into account
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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (14/18)
„ Needs (Asymmetrical and specific events) RT on Low DNBR
> Needs of specific treatment and threshold
z To take into account the increase of the representativeness error for the determination
of the on site threshold values
z To not overestimate the RT threshold of the “main” Low DNBR function
z To detect the event
DNBR

DNBR Asymmetrical
event
Symmetrical Representativeness error
event
or
Tracking Error (TE)

4
3
2
1 2 3 4 1

Physical value

Min DNBR Min DNBR

Min DNBR used in Safety Analyses DNBR i − DNBR min

coeur
1st min : not used due to 2nd min treatment (avoid spurious actuation) TE i = coeur
2nd min : not used – Single Failure Criterion (SFC) applied DNBR min
3rd min : used in Safety Analyses (SA)

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (15/18)
Specific events : Detection
RT on Low DNBR

SPND values Nuclear power

RCCA positions Control rods positions
(72) PRD

Derivative signal Insertion sequence detection

Calculation of imbalance signal
Allocation to control banks
Drop detection

Imbalance signal
Calculation of insertion limits
1/N

Insertion limit signal

Abnormal
sequence
2/4 1/4 2/4 detection 2/4

2/4
OR

Abnormal sequence signal

Imbalance/rod drop signal Rod drop signal (2/4) Insertion limit signal

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 PS Core-related Functions - Review I (16/18)
RT on Low DNBR
Calculation of DNBR
(12 values – one per finger)

Second Min First Min

Lead Lag module Lead Lag module

Low threshold Low threshold Low threshold Low threshold

DNBRT DNBRT DNBRT DNBRT
(abnormal sequence) (rod drop) (imb/rod) (insertion limit)

Abnormal sequence Rod drop (2/4) Imbalance/rod drop Insertion limit

signal 2/4 2/4 signal 2/4 signal 2/4
signal

AND AND AND AND

OR

P2
Specific events : AND
Global processing

RT on low DNBR

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 PS Core-related Functions - Review I (17/18)
RT on Low DNBR
Overview : In Functional requirements

RCP speed Cold Leg Primary RCCA QUALITY QUALITY DNBR DNBR DNBR SPND Rod RCCA RCCA DNBR
INCORE Abnormal Insertion
Temperature Pressure 72 values Positions limit 1st MAX 2nd MAX 2nd MIN 1st MIN 1st MIN imbalance drop IL AS 1st MIN
Ii(j) sequence
Loop 1 Loop 1 1st sensor signal signal DNBRTrod drop
Div 1 signal (XOUTT) (XOUTT) (DNBRT) DNBRTLI DNBRTimb/rod signal signal signal

Power density (N)

filter filter WDNBRi(j)
a b c d e f g h x i
x (W/cm)
min

Thermalhydraulic conditions Fine Div 2 Div 2 Div 2 Div 2 Div 2 Div 2 Div 2 Div 2 Div 2 Div 2
- HIN - ROIN axial power shape Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4
- Hl - GIN
Rod
- Hv - TSAT QQi(N)
Drop
detection
Div1 2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 1/4 2/4 2/4
12 zones

SPNDs j
ENTHALPY RISE Imbalance or
CALCULATIONS Signal
IMB
l and and
Output Quality DNBR calculations z
1/N
XOUTi DNBRi
12 values
k and
12 values

1st 2nd 2nd 1st

MAX MAX MIN MIN Limitation signal
to RCSL
LTH
filter filter filter filter
l j
OR DNBRTAS

HTH HTH LTH LTH LTH HTH Permissive P2

DNBRTLI Rod Drop
y x
XOUTT XOUTT DNBRTimb/rod DNBRTrod drop IMBT
and and Div 2 Div 2

AND Div 3
Div 4
Div 3
Div 4

a b d e i f g h
or
2/4 2/4
Reactor Trip
LTH LTH k
LTH LTH
P2
DNBPT DNBPTAS
DNBRTAS DNBRT
and
&
&
x
y c or z
Partial trip signal
to RCSL
Abnormal sequence logic

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review I (18/18)
Overview : In I&C functional diagrams
RT on Low DNBR

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 3.18
 PS – Core-related Functions - Review
I Generic Functions
II Specific Functions
III Anti-dilution Functions

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions
 PS Core-related Functions – Review II (1/7)
RT on excore high flux rate of change
PRD
Note :
2nd sensor to division 2 Measurement
3rd sensor to division 3
4th sensor to division 4 1st sensor

x KCALN
„ Limits the consequences of excessive reactivity
increase from an intermediate to nominal power
Nuclear Power
level
QN
„ Used for accidents for which Low DNBR channel is
too slow (i.e. accidents with fast increase of core
Derivative Signal reactivity)
- Permissive P2 and P3
QND
- Nuclear power level signal
„ Power level is derived from Power Range Detectors
& Nuclear power level
(PRD)
HTH
„ Calibration on power level from on secondary heat
balance
„ Processing : Derivative signal and threshold
Div 2

„ Power level value used for permissives P2 and P3

Div 3
Div 4

2/4

Reactor Trip

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 Hot leg Cold Leg Hot Leg
Pressure WR Temperature WR Temperatures NR PS Core-related Functions - Review II (2/7)
1st sensor Loop 1 Loop 1 RT on High Core Power Level
Filtering Filtering
TINF TOUTF

„ Used as 2nd signal for accidents using HLPD and

Thermal & hydraulic conditions
Low DNBR protection functions
- HIN - ROIN
- HOUT - ROAVG
- HAVG - HSAT > Use of diverse sensors

x KCALTH „ Signal derived by an primary enthalpy balance

CORE POWER SATURATION from:
LEVEL MARGIN
QTHF DHSAT > Cold leg temperature meas.

> Hot leg temperature meas.

HTH LTH > Hot leg pressure meas.

„ QTHI = KCALTH x ( HOUT – HIN ) x WIN

Div 2 Div 2
Div 3 Div 3
Div 4 Div 4

> KCALTH is calibrated on secondary heat balance

2/4 2/4
Permissive P5 Permissive P5 „ RT on high core power level
AND AND
„ RT on low saturation margin (for validity)
„ Effective above P5 (Power condition)

Reactor Trip

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review II (3/7)
RCP speed RCP speed RT on Low RCP speed (4 RCPs)
(spare)

Loop 1 Loop 1

Note :
Loop 2 to division 2
Loop 3 to division 3
„ Limits the consequences of a loss of
Loop 4 to division 4
electric supply of all RCPs, for which the
low DNBR channel is too slow (LOOP,
forced decrease of reactor coolant flow)
LTH „ Signal is derived from speed
Permissive P7 measurement of each RCP
- RCP not in operation status
„ RT on low RCP speed
> Around 91 % of Nominal speed
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
„ Inhibition in shutdown states
> Below 130 bars (P12)
2/4

Permissive P12

AND

Reactor Trip

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review II (4/7)
RT on Low-Low Loop flow rate (one loop)
Loop 1 Loop 2 Loop 3 Loop 4

Flow rate Flow rate Flow rate Flow rate

Measurement Measurement Measurement Measurement

1st sensor 1st sensor 1st sensor 1st sensor

Square root Square root Square root Square root

extraction extraction extraction extraction
of the of the of the of the
∆PRCP signal ∆PRCP signal ∆PRCP signal ∆PRCP signal
„ Limits the consequences of a loss of one
x Kflow x Kflow x Kflow x Kflow
RCP
„ Signal derived from loop flow rate
measurements:
LTH LTH LTH LTH > 4 ∆P measurement per loop
> Flow rate = sqrt(∆P)
[ low-low ] [ low-low ] [ low-low ] [ low-low ]
> Calibration via KFLOW, evaluated at BOC
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4 „ RT on Low-Low loop flow rate
> Around 25 % of nominal flow
2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4
„ Inhibition below 75 % NP (P3)
> Allowing limitation actuation

OR

Permissive P3

AND

Reactor Trip

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 Loop 1 Loop 2 Loop 3 Loop 4 PS Core-related Functions – Review II (5/7)
Flow rate Flow rate Flow rate Flow rate RT on Low loop flow rate
Measurement Measurement Measurement Measurement

1st sensor 1st sensor 1st sensor 1st sensor

Square root Square root Square root Square root

extraction extraction extraction extraction
of the of the of the of the
∆PRCP signal ∆PRCP signal ∆PRCP signal ∆PRCP signal

x Kflow x Kflow x Kflow x Kflow „ Diverse signal in case of LOOP

[ low ]
to RCSL
[ low ]
to RCSL
[ low ]
to RCSL
[ low ] „ Signal derived from loop flow rate
LTH LTH LTH LTH measurements
Div 2 Div 2 Div 2 Div 2
> As previously defined
Div 3 Div 3 Div 3 Div 3

„ RT on low flow in two loops

Div 4 Div 4 Div 4 Div 4

2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4

> Around 85 % of nominal flow

„ Inhibition in shutdown states

> Below 130 bars (P12)
2/4

Permissive
„ Signals sent to RCSL (Limitation)
„ Signals sent within PS (For 3-loop
Permissive P12 Permissive
P12 P12
AND operation)
AND AND AND AND

Reactor Trip

Loss of RCP2 Loss of RCP3

OR Loss of RCP4
Loss of RCP1

3-loop operation

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review II (6/7)
Alarm on High neutron flux (source range)
ACTUALIZATION
manual
SRD
Note :
Only three sensors
Measurement „ SAR purpose
1st sensor
> Limits the consequences of reactivity increase
events in shutdown conditions (boron dilution –
Flux level
Complex sequences feature
QNS
Heat exchanger tube rupture)

Filter „ Operational purpose

Alarm setpoint
> Criticality and flux surveillance
elaboration
„ Signal is derived from Source Range
HTH HTH
Permissive
P5 P2 Detectors :
OR > High neutron flux alarm
Div 2
Div 2 Div 3 Note :
Div 3
1/3 from main control room
> Audio signal (klaxon)
1
2/3 2/3
> EBS actuation

AND AND „ Inhibition by IRD (P5)

EBS Alarm
Actuation Operator action

EBS
Manual actuation

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review II (7/7)
RT on High neutron flux and low doubling time (intermediate range)
IRD
Note :
2nd sensor to division 2 Measurement
3rd sensor to division 3

„ Limits the consequences of reactivity

4th sensor to division 4
1st sensor

x KCALNI increase events when the reactor is

Nuclear Power started up (uncontrolled RCCA
QNI withdrawal)
„ Signal is derived from Intermediate
Permissive P5
Doubling time signal Range Detector measurements
IDTF
„ Calibration (KCALNI) on secondary heat
balance
HTH HTH LTH LTH „ Outputs:
> Reactor trip on High neutron flux
(around 35 % NP)
Permissive P6 OR > Reactor trip on low doubling time
(around 10 s)
Div 2 Div 2

> Limitation signal to RCSL

Div 3 Div 3
Div 4 Div 4
1

2/4 2/4 „ Effective below 10 % NP (P6)

AND

AND AND
Limitation signal
to RCSL

Reactor Trip Reactor Trip

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 PS – Core-related Functions - Review
I Generic Functions
II Specific Functions
III Anti-dilution Functions

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions
 PS Core-related Functions – Review III (1/6)
Anti-dilution protection functions (general 1/3)

„ Safety Analyses regarding dilution events are mainly based on “Anti-

dilution” protection functions
„ Anti-dilution protection functions are based on boron concentration
measurements (CVCS charging line) and cover all the reactor states
> Anti-dilution in shutdown conditions with RCP not in operation
z Ensures also mitigation of the risk of heterogeneous dilution
> Anti-dilution in standard shutdown states conditions
> Anti-dilution in power conditions
„ With RCP in operation an algorithm calculate the reactor coolant boron
concentration by modeling the equations of the mass conservation of
boron in the reactor coolant system
> Use of CVCS flow measurements
> Use of RCS coolant mass
„ Redundant CVCS isolation upstream CVCS pump suctions
> Switch on IRWST done in parallel (not safety classified)

dBCP
MP = Qinj ∗ (BCinj − BCP ) P = primary / inj = injected
dt
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 PS Core-related Functions – Review III (2/6)
Anti-dilution protection functions (general 2/3)

dBCP
MP = Qinj ∗ (BCinj − BCP )
dt

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review III (3/6)
Anti-dilution protection functions (general 3/3)

Main sources of dilution

Charging line

Letdown line
RHRS-CVCS link

Seal injection line

CVCS isolation
CVCS flow measurements

Boron meters

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 3.28
 PS Core-related Functions – Review III (4/6)
Anti-dilution in shutdown conditions with RCP not in operation
Boron meter

CVCS BC

1st sensor

„ Initially designed to cope with heterogeneous

dilution
> Avoid water plug in RCS loop

LTH „ Only use of CVCS Boron Concentration (BC)

measurements
ATWS signal

„ In operation as soon as RCP are stopped

Div 2
Div 3
Div 4 Permissive P7
t 0

2/4 > Permissive P7 based on RCP speed

OR
measurements

AND
„ Isolation of CVCS when measured BC is below
required refueling BC
CVCS RHRS letdown
isolation isolation

Alarm
Operator action

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 3.29
 PS Core-related Functions – Review III (5/6)
Anti-dilution in standard shutdown states conditions
INITIALIZATION
on/off Temperature

Cold leg (WR)

Boron meter CVCS flow
„ Use of calculated RCS boron
Loop 1
CVCS BC

1st sensor 1st sensor Filter

concentration
> Use of CVCS flow measurements

Reactor coolant
„ Primary mass is temperature dependent
SETPONT
mass
elaboration
elaboration > Use of cold leg temperature
Filter „ Reconstructed BC is compared to a
temperature-dependent threshold
ALGORITHM „ Threshold allowing no return to criticality
Reactor coolant boron concentration
(Variable reactor coolant mass)
„ In operation with RCP in service (P7) and
shutdown RCCA inserted
> Permissive P8 based on Shutdown RCCA
LTH LTH position measurements
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
Permissive P7
„ Limitation signals sent to RCSL
Permissive P8
P7 P8
2/4 1

AND
AND

Limitation signal
to RCSL CVCS
isolation

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 PS Core-related Functions – Review III (6/6)
Anti-dilution in power conditions
INITIALIZATION
on/off

CVCS flow

Boron meter
Note :
2nd sensor to division 2 CVCS BC 1st sensor
3rd sensor to division 3
4th sensor to division 4 1st sensor
Filter
„ Use of calculated RCS boron concentration
> Use of CVCS flow measurements
ALGORITHM

Reactor coolant boron concentration

(fixed reactor coolant mass)
„ Fixed primary mass used in algorithm
„ Threshold allowing no return to criticality after a
RT
LTH
„ In operation when shutdown RCCA are totally
extracted (P8)
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4

Permissive P8
2/4

AND

Manual CVCS
Reactor Trip isolation

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 PS – Core-related Functions –
Permissive Signals

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 PS Core-related Functions – Permissive Signals (1/9)
Core related PS permissive signals
„ Permissive signals are introduced to authorize activation or deactivation of certain
protection signals, according to the current operating status of the plant unit

„ The status of the plant is stemmed from sensors measurements

„ The permissive signals authorize or prohibit certain manual or automatic actions:

> Automatic (P-AUTO): its validation (resp. inhibition) leads to automatic performance of actions
> Manual (P-MANU): its validation (resp. inhibition) does not lead to any automatic action but allows the
operator to manually perform actions
„ Activation: P=1 / Deactivation: P=0
% RTP
„ Core-related permissive:
Permissive Name Voting logic
P2 Flux (power range) measurement higher than threshold 2/4 P3 Around 70 %NP
P3 Flux (power range) measurement higher than threshold 2/4
Flux (intermediate range) measurement higher than
P5 3/4
threshold
P6 Thermal power measurement higher than threshold 3/4
P2 / P6 Around 10 %NP
P7 RCP speed lower than threshold (RCP not in operation) 2/4
Shutdown RCCA positions lower than threshold (ARI
P8 2/4 P5 Around 10-5 %NP
condition)
P12 Pressurizer pressure measurement lower than threshold 3/4

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 4.1
 PS Core-related Functions – Permissive Signals (2/9)
Core related PS permissive signals
„ List of permissive signals

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 4.2
 PS Core-related Functions – Permissive Signals (3/9)
Core related PS permissive signals
„ List of permissive signals (Nuclear flux and Power status)
1,0E+10 Power

(n.cm2 .s-1)
-4
(%RP) -4 10
2 10
10 P3
HQNI2
1,0E+09 -5
-5 P2 10
1
10 10
1,0E+08 P6
-6
-6 10
1 10
1,0E+07 -7
-7
10
-1
10 Nuclear Heating 10
1,0E+06 -8
-2 SRD -8 10
10 10
(cps)
1,0E+05 -9
Zero Power 6
10
-3 10 -9
Physics Tests 10
10
1,0E+04 -10
5
10 -10 10
-4 HQNS2
10 10
1,0E+03 -11
4
10 P5 -11 10
-5 10
10
1,0E+02 Criticality -12
3
10 -12
10
-6
10 10
1,0E+01 -13
2 10
10 IRD
-7 Pre Critical
10 (A)
T t
1,0E+00 PRD
1
10 (A)
-8
10
Fuel Loading
1,0E-01
1
-9
10
1,0E-02

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 4.3
 PS Core-related Functions – Permissive Signals (4/9)
Note :

Permissive P2
2nd sensor to division 2
PRD
3rd sensor to division 3
Measurement
4th sensor to division 4

1st sensor

Nuclear Power Div 1

QN
„ Flux (power range)
measurement higher than
threshold in 2/4
HTH

Div 2
Div 3
„ Based on nuclear power from
Div 4
PRD (+ calibration with KCALN)
2/4

Logic
1 Sub function
P2 = 0 P2 = 1

Inhibition (auto) of RT by : Validation (auto) of RT by :

- High LPD & Low DNBR - High LPD & Low DNBR
-Low PZR pressure - Low PZR pressure

Allows validation by P5 of Inhibition (auto) of SRD functions

SRD functions (and power supply) SRD power supply switch off

Inhibition (auto) of PT by : validation (auto) of PT by :

- High LPD&Low DNBR limitation - High LPD&Low DNBR limitation

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 4.4
 PS Core-related Functions – Permissive Signals (5/9)
Note :
2nd sensor to division 2
PRD Permissive P3
3rd sensor to division 3
Measurement
4th sensor to division 4
1st sensor

Nuclear Power Div 1

„ Flux (power range)
QN
measurement higher than
threshold in 2/4

HTH „ Based on nuclear power from

PRD (+ calibration with KCALN)
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4

2/4

Logic
1 Sub function
P3 = 0 P3 = 1

Inhibition (auto) of RT by : Validation (auto) of RT by :

- Low-low loop flow rate - Low-low loop flow rate
(in two loops) (in two loops)

Inhibition (auto) of PT by : validation (auto) of PT by :

- "Loss of one RCP" limitation - "Loss of one RCP" limitation

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 4.5
 PS Core-related Functions – Permissive Signals (6/9)
P5 VALIDATION
manual
IRD
Measurement
Note :
2nd sensor to division 2
Permissive P5
3rd sensor to division 3
4th sensor to division 4
1st sensor

Nuclear Power
Div 1
QNI „ Flux (intermediate range)
measurement higher than
threshold in 3/4
HTH

Div 2
Div 3

„ Based on nuclear power from

Div 4

3/4
PRD (+ calibration with
KCALNI)

AND
1

S R Memory
with set priority Logic
Sub function

1
P5 = 0
- validation (auto) of the
alarm and EBS actuation by :
high flux level (CNS)
-Switch on : SRD power supply
- Inhibition of RT on High core power level
and Low saturation margin
P5 = 1
- Inhibition (manualy validated) of the
alarm and EBS actuation by :
high flux level (CNS)
-Switch off : SRD power supply
-Validation of RT on High core power level
and Low saturation margin

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 4.6
 PS Core-related Functions – Permissive Signals (7/9)
P6 VALIDATION
manual
Hot leg
Pressure WR
Cold Leg
Temperature NR
Hot Leg
Temperatures NR
Permissive P6
1st sensor Loop 1 Loop 1

CORE THERMAL POW ER ELABORATION

(P6)

Filter Div 1 „ Thermal power measurement

higher than threshold in 3/4
HTH

Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
„ Based on core thermal power
calculation
3/4

AND
1

S R Memory
with set priority

Logic
1 Sub function
P6 = 0 P6 = 1

Validation (auto) of RT by : Inhibition (manualy validated) of RT by :

High neutron flux (IRD) High neutron flux (IRD)
Low doubling time (IRD) Low doubling time (IRD)

Validation of Limitation by : Inhibition of Limitation by :

- High neutron flux - High neutron flux
- Low doubling time - Low doubling time

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 4.7
 PS Core-related Functions – Permissive Signals (8/9)
Note :
Loop 2 to division 2
RCP speed
Permissive P7
Loop 3 to division 3
Loop 4 to division 4
Loop 1

Div 1
LTH „ RCP speed lower than
threshold (RCP not in
operation)

Div 2
Div 3
Div 4
„ Based on RCP speed

2/4
Logic
Sub function

P7 = 1
1
P7 = 0 Validation (auto) of CVCS isolation on :
- Anti-dilution in shutdown conditions
Validation (auto) of CVCS isolation on : with RCP not in operation
- Anti-dilution in standard shutdown Inhibition (auto) of CVCS isolation on :
states conditions - Anti-dilution in standard shutdown
Inhibition (auto) of CVCS isolation on : states conditions
- Anti-dilution in shutdown conditions
with RCP not in operation
Inhibition of Limitation by :
- "Anti-dilution in standard
Validation of Limitation by : shutdown states"
- "Anti-dilution in standard
shutdown states"

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 4.8
 PS Core-related Functions – Permissive Signals (9/9)
Note :
RCCA Permissive P8
lower end positions of shutdown RCCA Position
13 measurements in Div 1 to 3
14 measurements in Div 4 Div 1

Div 1

Lower end position

„ Shutdown RCCA positions (ARI
conditions)
AND

„ Based on lower end RCCA

positions
Div 2
Div 3
Div 4

2/4
Logic
Sub function

1 P8 = 1

P8 = 0 Validation (auto) of CVCS isolation on :

Validation (auto) of CVCS isolation on :
- Anti-dilution in power conditions
Inhibition (auto) of CVCS isolation on :
- Anti-dilution in standard shutdown
states conditions
Inhibition of Limitation by :
- "Anti-dilution in standard
shutdown states"
- Anti-dilution in standard shutdown
states conditions
Inhibition (auto) of CVCS isolation on :
- Anti-dilution in power conditions
Validation of Limitation by :
- "Anti-dilution in standard
shutdown states"

AREVA NP AREVA NP GmbH • B353.OL3.057-1 Rev. C Confidential. All rights are reserved by AREVA. Reactor Protection System – Core related I&C functions Fig. 4.9