Paper 1d

Incidents in Ammonia Plants at

IFFCO Aonla Unit
The paper describes three separate incidents in Ammonia plants of IFFCO Aonla Unit. These
incidents involved leakage of corrosive GV solution, sudden shifting and twisting of pipeline and its
supports and leakage of ammonia synthesis gas from valve body. Extent of damage due to these
leakages, efforts to contain the leakage and remedial measures to avoid such incidents in future are
also highlighted in the paper.

Rajiv Srivastava
IFFCO Aonla Unit, Bareilly, INDIA

Tarun Kaushik
IFFCO Aonla Unit, Bareilly, INDIA

Introduction Three separate incidents which occurred in these

Ammonia plants and could have been
FFCO Aonla unit operates two ammonia- catastrophic are described in this paper.

I urea plants in the state of Uttar Pradesh,

India. Ammonia plant I and II were
commissioned in 1988 and 1996 respectively.
Both the ammonia plants are 1740 MTPD
capacity plants based on M/s. Haldor Topsoe
technology.
The carbon dioxide removal system in both the
plants is Giammarco Vetrocoke (GV) two-stage
regeneration system. The GV solution contains
27 wt% potassium carbonate along with
diethanolamine (DEA) and glycine as activators,
and 0.4 wt% vanadium pentoxide as corrosion
inhibitor.
The only difference between the two plants’
carbon dioxide removal systems is the number
of hydraulic turbines. The Ammonia plant I has
one hydraulic turbine, while Ammonia plant II
has two hydraulic turbines.
A. Damage to 20” GV rich
solution pipeline at exit of GV
Absorber
The Incident
This incident occurred in the GV system of
Ammonia plant II. The Ammonia-II plant was
shut down on Feb 04, 2007 to attend other plant
maintenance jobs. As a practice, the GV
absorber exit rich solution line emergency shut
off valve 33 USV-101 was closed by actuating
the trip group (IS-5). This was done to prevent
liquid flow from absorber bottom.

2009 37 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 The GV absorber was depressurized in order to
work on the passing of the inlet isolation valve
of hydraulic turbine (see Figure 9) of semi lean
pump. After replacing the passing valve, the GV
system was kept ready for start up.
On Feb 06, 2007, start-up activities were being
initiated and the GV circulation was to be
established in preparation for vanadation and
process gas purification.
At this time the following events occurred:
• A liquid level was established in the absorber
bottom sump and at about 15:00 hrs, the GV
absorber was pressurized to 15 kg/cm2g (213
psig) using natural gas NG, as per
conventional practice for GV section start-
up. The lean GV solution pump was started
and flow of lean solution into the GV
absorber was initiated through the lean
solution flow control valve.
• At about 90 % absorber level, lean solution
flow to absorber was stopped, the three
absorber level control valves were closed
from operating panel and IS-5 (trip interlock
permitting opening of the 33 USV-101 valve,
which is 20” pneumatically operated ball
valve shown in Figure 1 at the rich solution
outlet from GV absorber bottom) was reset.
Figure 1. 33USV-101 installed at Absorber
bottom rich solution outlet line
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
This reset of IS-5 trip group should have opened
the 33USV-101 valve, but in the field it did not
open. Two more attempts were made at resetting
the USV, as past experience has found the
USV’s some times tend to get stuck closed and
would not open on the 1st or 2nd attempt.
However the USV did not move to open
condition.
At this time the instrument department was
informed and they were working on the solenoid
and instrument air tubing when the 33USV-101
suddenly snapped “Open”.
This sudden and fast opening movement of the
33USV-101 was accompanied with a loud
sound, vibration and movement of the down
stream piping. At this instant the GV system
start up activities were immediately suspended
and 33USV-101 was closed immediately.
It is worthy to note that 33 USV-101 is designed
for “Slow Opening” and “Fast closing”. This
“effect” is realized in the actuator by inbuilt
design.
The Damage
It was observed that the 20” SS-321 piping
down stream the 33 USV-101 and leading to the
two hydraulic turbines (see Figure 9) had
moved by almost 300 mm (1.0 ft). The supports
of the three level control valves had broken but
not moved much. One of the 2” drain lines from
this line to the underground GV solution tank
had twisted significantly. The 20”x14” reducing
tee and the 14” elbow on the 14” GV solution
lines to the two hydraulic turbines had twisted.
The entire hydraulic turbines inlet pipe
assembly, incorporating both inlet closing
valves, had moved significantly from its
supported position. Pipeline supports were also
dislodged. See Figures 2 and 3.
38 2009

Figure 2. The 20” down stream piping that
suffered most damage
Figure 3. Hydraulic turbine inlet line with
moved supports
Actions
Reviewing the damage to the piping and their
support system, it was decided to isolate the 20”
piping (see Figure 9) leading to the hydraulic
turbines. This piping had suffered the most
damage due to sudden line movement.
Subsequently the absorber was de-pressurized
and the line downstream of 33 USV-101 was
drained of GV solution. The hydraulic turbine
inlet lines were also drained. A blind was
inserted in the downstream flange of 33USV-
101. This downstream line was thoroughly
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drained and flushed with demineralized water
(DMW).
The 20” common line leading to hydraulic
turbines inlet was cut and a blind plug made
from 60 mm thick SS-304 plate was placed
inside the 20” line at down stream of last elbow
(see Figure 9) and welded with full NDT
procedures. These actions were done to isolate
the damaged line for future inspection and
repairs. Absorber level control valves supports
were checked and rectified.
GV circulation was established after removing
blind from 33USV-101 downstream flange and
plant was further started up. The normal start up
procedure was followed for starting GV
circulation.
The Analysis
a) For normal GV system start-up, the usual
practice was to first take the absorber
bottom liquid seal, then pressurize the GV
absorber up to 15 kg/cm2g, close the three
absorber level control valves and thereafter
open the 33 USV-101. This time also this
practice was followed.
b) The 33 USV-101 was repaired around 6
months back for passing. Since then there
had been around 3-4 occasions when it was
closed and opened during plant shut down
and start-up.
c) When draining the 33 USV-101 downstream
lines, it was observed that both the isolation
valves of each of the three level control
valves were passing even at minimum back
pressure from the down stream side (towards
the necklace line leading to the top of the
HP regenerator).
d) During draining and de-pressurizing of the
damaged pipeline, even at 0.2 kg/cm2g (2.84
psig) and 51 % level in absorber, the
33USV-101 could not be operated. This
indicated a specific problem not related to
the differential pressure across the valve.
39 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 e) Sometimes GV solution has a tendency to
crystallize which might have resulted in
temporary jamming of the internal ball of
the USV.
f) After the replacement of the inlet isolation
valve of the hydraulic turbine during the
plant shutdown, and subsequent preparation
of the GV system for startup, a portion of
the solution inlet line to the hydraulic
turbine might not have got primed fully.
Thereafter when the 33USV-101 valve
snapped open, a sudden movement of liquid
plug inside the pipeline leading to the
hydraulic turbine might have caused the
damage.
g) The actuator of 33USV-101 is designed to
permit slow opening and fast closing of the
valve by controlled instrument air filling and
bleeding rate. When 33USV-101 was not
opening by jogging the valve, the valve was
then tried to open by directly forcing air to
the actuator. This increased air pressure and
air filling rate might have caused the stuck
valve to snap open.
Conclusions
To avoid recurrence of such problem in future,
the following has been envisaged:
B. Damage to 16” Butterfly
Valve in the Ammonia
Synthesis Loop
The Process
This incident occurred in the ammonia synthesis
section of Ammonia plant-I. The plant
originally had a conventional S-200 ammonia
synthesis converter. As part of a plant upgrade,
a new S-50 converter was installed down stream
of the existing S-200 converter (see Figure 10).
A new HP waste heat boiler (WHB) was also
installed downstream of the S-200 converter to
utilize the reaction heat generated in the S-200
converter.
Normal operating pressure and temperature in
the ammonia synthesis loop are 200 kg/cm2g
(2845 psig) and 440 ºC (825 ºF) at the inlet of
the new WHB. In order to regulate gas flow
through this WHB during plant start-up, a 16”
manual butterfly valve (BUV 648, see Figure 4)
has been installed at the inlet of WHB. This
valve was procured as per M/s Haldor Topsoe
data sheet from M/s Bohler Hochdrucktechnik,
Germany. The valve material is A 182 F347 H.

- Installation of a 20” valve on the common

line to hydraulic turbines, as close as possible
to 33 USV-101 to avoid long length of empty
line in case of draining.

- A DMW filling connection and a high point

priming vent has been provided at the down
stream of 33USV-101 for the line going to
hydraulic turbines. A filled line would
dampen the effect of sudden opening of
33USV-101.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 40 2009

 Figure 4. The 16” butterfly valve at the inlet of
the WHB.
The Incident
On Jan 14, 2008, when the Ammonia-I plant
was under start-up after a brief shutdown, this
butterfly valve on the gas inlet line of WHB was
tried to open, but the valve remained stuck
closed and would not open by the actuator. So
the valve actuator was dismantled and the
maintenance crew tried to force open the valve
by a chain block arrangement. During these
efforts for opening the valve, with the system
pressure around 100 kg/cm2 (1422 psig), the top
portion of the valve spindle sheared off at the
location of the upper locking pin of the spindle
and flew up breaking the structural platform
gratings above it (see Figure 5). Synthesis gas
containing hydrogen, ammonia and other
explosive gases started coming out of the
system to the atmosphere at high pressure and
temperature. This heavy leakage of synthesis
gas could have led to a catastrophic fire and
casualty leading to shut down of the plant for
several months.
2009
Figure 5. The butterfly valve under the platform
with broken grating
Actions
The plant people working in the immediately
vicinity rushed to a safe distance keeping the
leak under observation. The Fire & Safety team
put a water curtain around the leaking gas jet.
Simultaneously, the synthesis loop was
depressurizing through process vent valve. The
system was depressurized to positive pressure
(~10 mmWC) in about two hours. Fortunately,
no fire occurred, and due to favorable wind
direction, ammonia vapors were dissipated
without causing much panic.
After depressurizing, the system was purged
with inert gas, and the damaged valve was
replaced with inert gas blanketing on upstream
and downstream side. The plant was then
started normally.
Problem Faced in these Butterfly
valves
A similar valve was also installed in Ammonia
plant-II. Since commissioning, these valves
have presented problems of gas leakage from
glands and flanges. Despite tightening, the
leakage could not be stopped completely. Once
41 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 during opening and closing of the valve, the
actuator connecting rod (valve stem) sheared off
from its pin joint and actuator became
inoperable. The other actuator was installed in
its position to operate the valve and the matter
was taken up with the supplier, M/s Bohler
Hochdrucktechnik. In response, the supplier
supplied some spare items (stem, connecting
rod, etc.) to repair the actuator. The actuator
was repaired and reinstalled in Ammonia-I
valve.
After sometime the slot in the stem in which
actuator was fitted was found broken and the
actuator had become in operable. So to operate
the valve, the actuator was removed and the
valve was operated manually by a chain block
arrangement.
Conclusion
These butterfly valves continue to be
problematic with continuous leaks from glands
and flanges despite repeated tightening. We are
still looking for solutions in order to have a
valve in such process conditions that will be free
from leakages. Meanwhile, the manufacturer is
supplying modified valve spindle arrangement
with locking arrangement which will ensure that
the spindle does not blow off in any condition.
C. Failure of Isolation Valve
Body in Potassium Carbonate
Service
The Process
In Ammonia plant-I the rich GV solution from
absorber bottom is let down through two
absorber level control valves and a hydraulic
turbine. The level control valves and hydraulic
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
turbine are installed in parallel to each other.
The GV solution from outlet of level control
valves and hydraulic turbine is sent to the top of
Regenerator.
The hydraulic turbine is provided with manual
inlet (20”) and outlet isolation valves (24”). At
the downstream of the 20” inlet isolation valve
another pneumatically operated valve is
provided to stop the hydraulic turbine remotely
(see Figure 11). The first manual inlet isolation
valve is a SS ball valve with carbon steel body.
In order to keep the level control valves in
operating range, the inlet isolation valve of
hydraulic turbine was always kept in throttled
condition.
The Incident
On the night of Oct 07, 2008, the GV system of
Ammonia plant–I was running normally.
Suddenly at 22:30 hrs, a lot of steam with liquid
spray was observed near the bottom area of
absorber. Due to night hours and the steam
surrounding the area, it was difficult to sight and
pinpoint the source of leakage, however it was
obvious that there was a big leak of GV solution
from absorber bottom. Concurrently a fast drop
in the level of absorber was also observed in the
main control room.
Actions Taken
In order to isolate the leakage point, the trip
valve 13USV-101 at the absorber bottom rich
solution outlet line was closed from the control
room leading to a plant shutdown. Process gas
was vented to the flare stack from upstream of
the absorber. The absorber gas inlet isolation
valve which is a motor driven valve, was also
closed remotely. The pneumatically operated
valve on the absorber outlet gas line was also
closed to completely isolate the absorber. GV
solution pumps feeding solution to absorber
were also stopped.
42 2009
 Despite closing the low-level trip valve 13
USV-101, the level in absorber continued to fall
due to 13USV-101 passing. Gradual
depressurizing of absorber was started to flare to
stop explosive gas escaping from absorber
bottom under high pressure. Meanwhile the
outlet isolation valves of hydraulic turbine and
level control valves were closed manually in
order to minimize the leakage.
In spite of all these efforts, the GV solution
continued to leak out in the form of a jet stream.
The leaking GV solution soon flooded the entire
nearby floor, the under ground GV effluent
tank, and the open surface drains beside the
Ammonia plant-1. It even overflowed the small
dyke wall provided in the GV area. With falling
pressure and level in the absorber, the extent of
leakage was reduced to some extent, allowing a
clear view of the leaking point. From a
distance, it appeared as if the leakage was from
the downstream flange of the inlet isolation
valve of hydraulic turbine. With great caution
the inlet isolation valve was also closed
manually but GV solution leakage continued
unabated.
Mean while a full work force swung into action
in order to stop GV solution finding its way out
of factory through plant surface drain. The GV
solution is not environment friendly and must be
stopped from going to surface drains.
GV solution was flowing into the surface drains
near the Ammonia plant-1 and moving towards
the offsite main surface drains. Many bunds
were quickly placed at various locations of the
drain using makeshift obstacles. GV solution
was pumped from the over flowing underground
GV effluent tank to large offsites effluent guard
ponds. Portable dewatering pumps were pressed
into service to empty the surface drains (near
Ammonia plant-1) full of GV solution into a
readily available large GV storage tank in the
Ammonia plant-1. With these efforts, GV
solution was prevented from going outside of
the ammonia-urea complex premises.
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Once the absorber was depressurized and almost
all GV solution was drained from it through
permanent drains to GV storage tanks, the GV
solution leakage was stopped. With no leakage,
the leaking valve was inspected after removing
body insulation. A large hole, about 2” in size,
was observed on the valve body from which
leakage had occurred (see Figure 7).
After completely draining the upstream and
downstream lines, the valve was removed. A
new gate valve (see Figure 6) which was
available was installed in its place and normal
plant start up operation was resumed.
Figure 6. The new gate valve installed
downstream of 13USV-101
The extent of leakage was such that 40.0 MT of
potassium carbonate (~ 20 % of total inventory
of GV system) was required to bring up the
normal GV solution concentration on restart of
the plant. Normal annual plant consumption of
potassium carbonate is 20.0 MT.
The Damage
The ruptured valve was later dismantled and its
SS ball was taken out from the CS body. There
was no damage found to the SS ball, however,
the CS body of the valve was found heavily
eroded and corroded from inside (see Figure 8).
The material loss from valve body was so
43 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 extensive that the wall of body was reduced to
only about 1.0 mm thick in many places. It was
surprising that such a thin walled body could
hold GV solution pressure for so long. The
thinning was so wide spread that valve body
could have ruptured in a more violent way
which could have been catastrophic.
Figure 7. The ruptured valve showing the hole
and thinning of valve body.
Figure 8. Inside of the ruptured and eroded
valve body
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
Analysis
During operation this isolation valve was kept in
a throttled condition (i.e. it was not kept opened
fully) to control the liquid flow to the hydraulic
turbine. Another hydraulic inlet control valve
which was provided originally, was removed
much earlier due to damage. The throttling of
the valve, allowed the hot, corrosive CO2 rich
GV solution to flash and impinge continuously
on the inside of valve body while at the same
time flowing turbulently through the partial
opening of the ball of the valve. This continuous
impingement of hot and corrosive solution
eroded and corroded the valve body over a
period of time which ultimately culminated in
failure of the valve body.
The Conclusion
It was not a regular practice to check the valve
body thickness during the plant operation. With
regular thickness measurements, the problem
could have been identified much earlier and
leakage could have been prevented. The
incident also underlines the significance of
proper valve operation. This particular valve
was not meant for flow control and thus should
not have been kept throttled. Now all such
valves have been checked with regular
inspection of valve body thickness
measurements.
The newly installed gate valve is now kept full
open, and a new control valve has been installed
at the inlet of the hydraulic turbine at the
location where the earlier control valve had got
damaged. This control valve is modulated as per
process requirement so as to let a major portion
of the absorber outlet rich GV solution flow
through the hydraulic turbine and a relatively
small flow is letdown through the absorber level
control valves for control of absorber bottom
level.
44 2009
 Figure 9. Schematic of Ammonia plant-II GV system showing 33USV-101 and the
hydraulic turbines.

Figure 10. Schematic of Ammonia plant-II synthesis loop showing the energy saving
modification and the butterfly valve at gas inlet to new WHB .

2009 45 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 Figure 11. Schematic of Ammonia plant-I GV system showing 13USV-101, the hydraulic
turbine and the ball valve which leaked.

Authors

Rajiv Srivastava, JGM (P)

IFFCO Aonla Unit

Tarun Kaushik, DGM (Ammonia)

IFFCO Aonla Unit

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 46 2009