Daf Ditty Beitzah 20: Semicha (on the korban)

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2
The Gemara raises a question with regard to the halakha itself: And do Beit Shammai hold that
obligatory peace-offerings do not require placing of hands on the head of the animal? But isn’t
it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with
regard to the placing of hands itself that it is required in the case of obligatory peace-offerings.
With regard to what, then, did they disagree? They disagreed with regard to the halakha that
states that immediately following placing hands on the head of an offering is its slaughter. As
Beit Shammai say: It is not necessary to be particular in this regard, and the ceremony of placing
hands on the animal’s head may be performed even on the eve of the Festival, long before the
animal is slaughtered. And Beit Hillel say: It is necessary, and therefore one who brings an
offering on a Festival must place his hands on the animal’s head on the Festival itself.

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The Gemara answers: The tanna of the mishna said what he said in accordance with the opinion
of this tanna, as it is taught in a different baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said:
Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to the halakha that immediately
following placing hands on the head of an offering is its slaughter, that it is necessary. With
regard to what, then, did they disagree? They disagreed with regard to the placing of hands
itself on the head of obligatory peace-offerings. Beit Shammai say: It is not necessary, and Beit
Hillel say: It is necessary.

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§ The Gemara returns to the basic dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. The Sages
taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving Hillel the Elder, who brought his burnt-
offering to the Temple courtyard in order to place his hands on the animal’s head on a Festival.
The students of Shammai the Elder gathered around him and said to him: What is the nature
of this animal that you are bringing? Hillel, being humble and meek, did not want to quarrel with
them in the Temple and therefore concealed the truth from them for the sake of peace. He said to
them: It is a female, and I have brought it as a peace-offering, as burnt-offerings are always
male. He swung its tail for them so that they would not be able to properly discern whether the
animal was male or female, and they departed.

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On that day, when the incident became known, suggesting that even Hillel had accepted
Shammai’s view, Beit Shammai gained the upper hand over Beit Hillel, and they sought to
establish the halakha in this regard in accordance with their opinion. But a certain Elder of
the disciples of Shammai the Elder was there, and Bava ben Buta was his name, who knew
that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel in this matter. And he sent for

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and brought all the high-quality sheep of Kedar that were in Jerusalem, and he stood them in
the Temple courtyard and said: Anyone who wishes to place his hands on the head of an animal
should come and place his hands there. And on that day Beit Hillel gained the upper hand
over Beit Shammai, and they established the halakha in this case in accordance with their
opinion, and there was no one there who disputed the matter in any way.

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And sometime later there was another incident involving a certain disciple from among the
disciples of Beit Hillel who brought his burnt-offering to the Temple courtyard in order to
place his hands on the animal’s head on a Festival. A certain disciple from among the disciples
of Beit Shammai found him and said to him: What is this placing of hands? Why do you place
your hands on the animal’s head and thereby violate the statement of Beit Shammai? He said to
him: What is this silence? Why do you not stay silent, as the halakha was not established in
accordance with their opinion? He silenced him with a rebuke, and he, Beit Shammai’s disciple,
departed quietly.

Abaye said: Therefore, it is clear from here that a Torah scholar whose colleague says
something reprimanding or insulting to him should not answer back with something more than
his colleague had said to him, to avoid adding fuel to the fire, as in the above story the one said
to the other: What is this placing of hands? and the latter responded to the former using the
same language: What is this silence?

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Summary

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:1

Leaning on obligatory shelamim

A Tanna taught in front of Rabbi Yitzchak bar Abba that the verse which says that Aharon offered
the olah (on the 8th day of milu'im) and performed its service kamisphat – like the rule teaches
that he followed the rules of a voluntary olah. This teaches that one must lean on obligatory olah
just as on a voluntary one. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Abba told him that this braisa follows Bais Shamai,
who do not learn the requirement of leaning for an obligatory shelamim from a voluntary one, as
Bais Hillel, who do learn it, would also learn leaning for an obligatory olah from a voluntary one.
The Gemora challenges this, as perhaps Bais Hillel only know that leaning is required on an
obligatory shelamim from an obligatory olah, but not from a voluntary one, and therefore they also
agree to this explanation of the verse cited by the Tanna.

The Gemora asks how Bais Hillel could learn this. Just as they can't learn from a voluntary
shelamim, since it is not as common, they also should not learn from an obligatory olah, since it is
not fully burned. The Gemora answers that they can learn from the common denominator of the
two. Although a voluntary shelamim is more common, that cannot be the reason for leaning, since
an obligatory olah is also not common, and still needs leaning. Similarly, although an obligatory
olah is fully burned, that cannot be the reason for leaning, since a voluntary shelamim, which is
not fully burned, also needs leaning.

The Gemora challenges Rabbi Yitzcha bar Abba's assumption that Bais Shamai do not require
leaning on obligatory shelamim from a braisa in which Rabbi Yossi says that the dispute of Bais
Shamai and Bais Hillel about obligatory shelamim is not the requirement for leaning, but when the
leaning must be done. Bais Shamai says it need not be done immediately prior to the sacrifice, and
therefore must be done before Yom Tov, while Bais Hillel says it must be immediately prior, and
therefore must be done on Yom Tov.

The Gemora answers that Rabbi Yitzchak bar Abba follows Rabbi Yossi beRabbi Yehuda, who
says in another braisa that they agree that leaning must be done immediately prior to the sacrifice,
and their dispute is whether one needs to lean on obligatory shelamim at all. 3. Bais Shamai and
Bais Hillel The Gemora cites a braisa which relates a story about Hillel, who brought a Yom Tov
olah to the Bais Hamikdash on Yom Tov to lean on and offer.

The students of Shamai gathered around him and asked him what type of sacrifice he was offering.
To avoid strife, he told them that it was a female to be brought as a shelamim and waved its tail in
front of them as if to prove its gender. On that day, Bais Shamai had the upper hand over Bais
Hillel, and they tried to establish the ruling like them. One elder of Bais Shamai knew that the true
ruling was like Bais Hillel, and he therefore send messengers to bring all the good sheep in

1
http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Beitzah_20.pdf

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Yerushalayim to the Bais Hamikdash. He stood them up and announced that whoever wants to
come and lean on them may do so. On that day, Bais Hillel had the upper hand, and they established
the ruling like them, with no one protesting.

The Gemora cites another story about a student of Bais Hillel who brought an olah to the Bais
Hamikdash to lean on. A student of Bais Shamai encountered him and asked ma zu smicha – what's
this leaning?!, to which the student responded, ma zu shtika – what's this [? Better is] silence!,
silencing him with his rebuke. Abaye says that we learn from here that when a young Torah
scholahr is told something to which he must reply, he should answer in the same measure as what
he was told, as the student of Bais Hillel responded in the same fashion as the student of Bais
Shamai spoke to him.

The Gemora cites braisos detailing the debate between Bais Shamai and Bais Hillel. Bais Hillel
argued that if on Shabbos, when one may not do work for his own needs, he may offer sacrifices
to Hashem, on Yom Tov, when one may do work for his own needs (i.e., food preparation), he
should certainly be allowed to offer sacrifices. Bais Shamai countered that we see from voluntary
sacrifices, which are not offered on Yom Tov, that this logical argument is incorrect. Bais Hillel
countered that voluntary sacrifices are different, since they have no set time in which they must be
brought, as opposed to the obligatory sacrifices of Yom Tov, which may not be brought afterwards.
Bais Shamai responded that the Yom Tov sacrifices are also not limited to Yom Tov, since they
may be brought throughout the holiday, but Bais Hillel consider them to be limited in time, since
one may not bring them once the holiday is over. Bais Shamai responded that the verse says that
one may do work lachem – for you, which excludes doing work for Hashem (i.e., sacrifices), but
Bais Hillel replied that the other verse says that we must celebrate a holiday Lashem – for Hashem,
which includes any work done for Hashem. The Gemora explains that Bais Hillel say that the
phrase “for you” excludes work done for a nonJew or an animal.

Chulin in the Courtyard of the Beis HaMikdash

The Gemara states that there was an incident where Hillel brought his olahs reiyah to the Courtyard
of the Bais HaMikdash to perform semichah on Yom Tov. The students if Bais Shammai
questioned Hillel regarding the animal, and Hillel responded that it was a female animal that he
was bringing as a shelamim. Hillel shook the tail of the animal as if to show them that it was a
female and they left. Bais Shammai was hoping to have the upper hand over Bais Hillel, when
Bava Ben Buta, an elderly student of Shammai, who knew that the halacha followed Bais Hillel,
sent messengers to bring the best sheep from Jerusalem. He placed the sheep in the Courtyard of
the Bais HaMikdash and he declared that whoever wanted to lean on an animal and offer the animal
as a sacrifice could do so. On that day Bais Hillel had the upper hand over Bais Shammai and the
halacha was established in accordance with Bais Hillel and no one objected.

Tosfos wonders how Bava ben Buta brought sheep into the Courtyard of the Bais HaMikdash, as
there is a rule that one cannot bring Chullin into the Courtyard of the Bais HaMikdash. Tosfos
answers that Bava Ben Buta did not necessarily bring the animals into the courtyard of the Bais
HaMikdash. Rather, he brought them onto the Temple Mount.

Do not Leave the Master’s Table Empty

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The Gemara states that Bais Hillel used the following kal vachomer to prove that one can offer an
olahs reiyah on Yom Tov. If on Shabbos, when cooking is prohibited, one can offer sacrifices to
HaShem, then certainly on Yom Tov, when cooking is permitted, one should be allowed to offer
sacrifices. It is only just that your table should not be full while your Master’s table is empty. It is
worth noting that this expression, “your table should not be full while your Master’s table is
empty,” is applicable to all situations in life. One manifestation of this idea is regarding prayer.
One normally assumes that prayer is for one’s own self, where he has the opportunity to request
that HaShem provide him with his needs. Rav Shimshon Pinkus zt”l and yibadel maichayim
lechayim, Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, Shlita, in Aleinu Leshabeiach, write that if one has the
opportunity to be granted an audience with the King of Kings, it will seem foolish to squander this
opportunity by making trivial requests. Rather, when one prays to HaShem, he should pray that
the great desecration of HaShem’s Name in the world be removed and that we merit the arrival of
Moshiach speedily in our days.

"SEMICHAH" FOR "SHALMEI CHOVAH"

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:2

The Gemara records two different traditions among the Tana'im with regard to the dispute between
Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel about Semichah. Some Tana'im explain that the dispute is whether
Semichah is permitted on Yom Tov or whether it is prohibited on Yom Tov because it involves a
transgression of the prohibition against using a live animal ("Mishtamesh b'Ba'alei Chayim").
Others say that the dispute is whether or not there is an obligation to perform Semichah at all for
Korbanos of Shalmei Chovah (obligatory Korbenos Shelamim, as opposed to voluntary ones) even
on a weekday.

RASHI (DH Beis Shamai Hi) explains that according to the second opinion (that the dispute is
whether or not there is an obligation of Semichah at all), Beis Shamai maintains that the obligation
to perform Semichah with a Korban Chovah does not override the laws of Yom Tov.
Rashi's words are difficult to understand.

When Rashi writes that Semichah does not override the laws of Yom Tov, he implies that on an
ordinary weekday Semichah for an obligatory Korban is permitted. However, Semichah should be
prohibited on an ordinary weekday as well, because leaning on the animal when there is no
Mitzvah to do so is considered Avodah b'Kodshim, using a sanctified animal for one's own
purposes (as the Gemara says in Chagigah 16b). If Rashi means that these Tana'im maintain that
Semichah does not need to be done with all of one's strength (and thus the act does not constitute
Avodah b'Kodshim), then why should the act be prohibited even on Yom Tov? Semichah which

2
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/beitzah/insites/bt-dt-020.htm

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is not done with all of one's strength does not constitute "Mishtamesh b'Ba'alei Chayim" (as the
Gemara in Chagigah says), just as it does not constitute Avodah b'Kodshim, and thus it should be
permitted on Yom Tov.

The Gemara in Chagigah (16b) quotes Rebbi Yochanan who says that the rabbinical enactments
of Shevus should not be taken lightly, because we find that (according to Beis Shamai) the Rabanan
enacted a prohibition of Shevus against performing Semichah on Yom Tov even though Semichah
is a Mitzvah d'Oraisa. The Gemara there asks what new teaching Rebbi Yochanan intends to
convey; we know that Beis Shamai prohibits Semichah on Yom Tov, because the Mishnah
explicitly says so. The Gemara answers that Rebbi Yochanan is teaching that the Mishnah should
be understood like the first approach mentioned above, that the dispute about Semichah is whether
or not Semichah may be done on Yom Tov, and not whether or not there is any obligation to do
Semichah in the first place (even on a weekday).

It is clear from the Gemara in Chagigah that if the dispute is whether or not there is ever an
obligation to perform Semichah, the opinion of Beis Shamai would not teach anything about the
severity of Shevus (i.e., that it overrides a Mitzvah d'Oraisa). Why, then, does Rashi write that
even according to the opinion that the dispute is whether or not there is ever an obligation of
Semichah, Semichah is prohibited on Yom Tov because of Shevus? (REBBI AKIVA
EIGER in GILYON HA'SHAS and in DERUSH V'CHIDUSH to Chagigah 16b, and TOSFOS
REBBI AKIVA EIGER on Mishnayos)

The SHA'AR HA'MELECH (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 3:13; see RASHASH) suggests
illuminating answers to these questions.

(a) Rashi was bothered by a basic question on the Gemara's discussion. The SHITAH
MEKUBETZES here (in the name of TOSFOS) and the PNEI YEHOSHUA ask that if the
dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel involves the general issue of whether or not there is
an obligation of Semichah for an obligatory Korban, then why is this dispute recorded here in
Maseches Beitzah? It has no relevance to the Sugya at all. This is the question which bothered
Rashi. (The Pnei Yehoshua leaves this question unanswered. Tosfos, cited by the Shitah
Mekubetzes, answers that the Mishnah's intent is to teach that Beis Hillel, who argues and permits
Semichah, permits it even on Yom Tov.)

In order to answer this question, Rashi understands that it must be that even if there is no obligation
to perform Semichah for a Korban Chovah, if one does perform Semichah he fulfills a Mitzvah.
(This is also the view of the ME'IRI in Chidushim, DH Hu d'Amar and DH d'Amar Lach.) (A
similar concept is expressed in Eruvin 96b, where Rebbi Yosi and Rebbi Shimon rule that women,
although exempt from the obligation of Semichah, are nevertheless permitted to do Semichah and
their act does not constitute Avodah b'Kodshim.) The owner of any Korban (and only the owner)
is allowed to do Semichah even though there is no obligation to do Semichah for that particular
Korban, and his act is not considered Avodah b'Kodshim.

Accordingly, on an ordinary weekday Semichah for Shalmei Chovah is permitted and is not
Avodah b'Kodshim, because one fulfills a Mitzvah when he does it. On Yom Tov, however, when
one does Semichah (even when Semichah for that Korban is obligatory) he transgresses the Isur

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d'Rabanan of "Mishtamesh b'Ba'alei Chayim." Since, in this case, there is no obligation to do
Semichah, the Rabanan did not permit one to perform an optional Semichah on Yom Tov.3

(b) To answer the second question, the SHA'AR HA'MELECH explains the Gemara in Chagigah
as follows. The reason for the Gemara's assertion -- that the fact that Beis Shamai prohibits
Semichah on Yom Tov does not show that Shevus is severe enough to override a Mitzvah d'Oraisa
-- is not because there is no obligation of Semichah whatsoever, but because Semichah is not
an obligation but is only permitted to be done. According to the other opinion which says that there
certainly is an obligation of Semichah for Shalmei Chovah, the fact that the Rabanan decreed that
Semichah not be done on Yom Tov shows the severity of Shevus (in that it overrides even a
Mitzvah d'Oraisa of Semichah).

Rebbi Akiva Eiger apparently does not accept this answer because, as the Sha'ar ha'Melech points
out, Rashi in Chagigah implies that according to the opinion that Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai argue
about whether there is a Mitzvah of Semichah altogether for Shalmei Chovah, Beis Shamai
maintains that one may not perform Semichah on an ordinary weekday just as one may not perform
Semichah on Yom Tov (see RASHASH).4

THE REASON TO PERMIT "SHECHITAH" OF KORBANOS ON YOM TOV

Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel argue whether one may slaughter obligatory Korbenos Shelamim,
such as the Shalmei Chagigah, on Yom Tov. Each one proposes logical arguments for his position.
The Gemara records two different traditions among the Tana'im with regard to their dispute about
Shechitah. According to the first Tana, Beis Hillel maintains that since Shechitah is permitted for
one's personal consumption, it certainly should be permitted for the sake of Gavo'ah (offering a
Korban to Hash-m). According to the second Tana (Aba Shaul), Beis Hillel maintains that it is not
proper that one's own table is full when Hash-m's table, so to speak, is lacking.

Beis Shamai argues that Beis Hillel's Kal v'Chomer is not valid. Everyone agrees that Nedarim
and Nedavos may not be offered on Yom Tov even though the logic of Beis Hillel's Kal v'Chomer
should permit them. Since the Kal v'Chomer is not valid, the Shechitah of Shalmei Chovah should
also be prohibited.

Beis Shamai continues and proves his opinion from the verse which says "Lachem," implying that
one is permitted to do Melachah only "for you" but not for purposes of Gavo'ah, and therefore one
is prohibited to slaughter Shalmei Chovah on Yom Tov.

3
Rashi's approach -- that Rebbi Yosi and Rebbi Shimon permit one to perform an optional Semichah -- contrasts with the approach
of TOSFOS in Chulin (85a, DH Nashim) who says that even according to Rebbi Yosi, a woman is permitted to perform Semichah
only without all of her strength, for such an act involves only an Isur d'Rabanan of being "Mezalzel b'Kodshim" (demeaning
Kodshim) and not an Isur d'Oraisa of Avodah b'Kodshim. Rashi disagrees with Tosfos and says that according to Rebbi Yosi a
woman may perform Semichah with all of her strength, even though leaning on an animal of Kodshim is normally prohibited
because of the Isur d'Oraisa of Avodah b'Kodshim.
4
See, however, Insights to Chagigah 7b. See also KEHILOS YA'AKOV, who suggests another answer to Rebbi Akiva Eiger's
question based on the Yerushalmi cited by TOSFOS in Pesachim 66b, DH v'Ha: According to Rashi, there exists a rabbinical
obligation to perform Semichah with Shalmei Chovah; the Rabanan's enactment of Semichah is not considered Avodah b'Kodshim.

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Beis Hillel responds with a verse that supports his opinion. The verse says "la'Hashem," which
teaches that Melachah may be done for the sake of Gavo'ah.

Why does Beis Shamai base his opinion on the case of Nedarim and Nedavos and the verse of
"Lachem"? Beis Shamai should simply say that he maintains that there exists no principle of
"Mitoch" and thus Shechitah of a Korban should be prohibited on Yom Tov because the act is not
necessary for Ochel Nefesh (food preparation). (Beis Shamai maintains that one may perform a
Melachah on Yom Tov only for the purpose of Ochel Nefesh, and one may not perform a Melachah
-- which is normally done for Ochel Nefesh -- for any other purpose. See 12a.)

In addition, the Gemara earlier (12a) expresses a doubt whether or not Beis Hillel maintains that a
principle of "Mitoch" exists. Why does the Gemara there not prove from Beis Hillel's opinion here
that Beis Hillel applies the principle of "Mitoch"?

Apparently, the Gemara maintains that the Shechitah of a Korban is permitted not because of
"Mitoch" but because the Korban itself is considered Ochel Nefesh. Since a Jew may eat part of
the Korban, it is considered Ochel Nefesh. Moreover, the Mizbe'ach's consumption of the Korban
is considered "Ochel Nefesh" for Gavo'ah, as the Gemara in Chulin (81b) refers to the burning of
the Korban as "Achilas Mizbe'ach." 5

THE LOGIC OF "MITOCH"

Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel argue whether one may slaughter obligatory Korbenos Shelamim,
such as the Shalmei Chagigah, on Yom Tov (see previous Insight). Each one proposes logical
arguments for his position. The Gemara records two different traditions among the Tana'im with
regard to their dispute about Shechitah. According to the first Tana, Beis Hillel maintains that since
Shechitah is permitted for one's personal consumption, it certainly should be permitted for the sake
of Gavo'ah (offering a Korban to Hash-m). According to the second Tana (Aba Shaul), Beis Hillel
maintains that it is not proper that one's own table is full when Hash-m's table, so to speak, is
lacking.

The Gemara earlier (12a) concludes that Beis Hillel applies the principle of "Mitoch."

(a) According to Aba Shaul, Beis Hillel permits Shechitah for all types of Korbanos (including
Nedarim and Nedavos) and does not accept the Derashah of "Lachem" (Melachah of Ochel Nefesh
is permitted only "for you" and not for Hash-m). Beis Hillel argues that "it is not proper for your
table to be full and your master's to be empty." If Aba Shaul's intent is to defend the reasoning of
Beis Hillel, why does he not simply say that Beis Hillel permits Shechitah of Korbanos because
he applies the principle of "Mitoch"? Why does Aba Shaul need to give logical arguments?
(b) Moreover, why does the Tana who argues with Aba Shaul assert that Beis Shamai and Beis
Hillel agree that the Shechitah of Nedarim and Nedavos is not an act of Ochel Nefesh and is
prohibited? According to this Tana, Beis Hillel should permit the Shechitah of Nedarim and
Nedavos because of "Mitoch."
5
Alternatively, offering a Korban is considered Machshirei Ochel Nefesh, because it is not proper that one's own table is full
when Hash-m's table, so to speak, is lacking.

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(a) TOSFOS (12a, end of DH Hachi Garsinan) explains that "Mitoch" only permits an act which
is needed for Yom Tov itself ("Tzorech Yom Tov"). Nedarim and Nedavos do not involve any
"Tzorech Yom Tov," and therefore "Mitoch" cannot permit their Shechitah. This is why Aba Shaul
must mention the additional logic (that it is not proper for one's table to be full while the table of
one's master is empty) in order for Korbanos of Nedarim and Nedavos to be "Tzorech Yom Tov."
(b) The reason why Beis Hillel prohibits offering Nedarim and Nedavos on Yom Tov according
to the first Tana is because of "Lachem." "Lachem" teaches not only that Melachah for the purpose
of Ochel Nefesh of Gavo'ah is prohibited, but also that the principle of "Mitoch" does not permit
Melachah for Gavo'ah, as Tosfos earlier writes (12a, DH ha'Shochet).

However, TOSFOS and TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ (19a) give a different answer. They
explain that if not for the verse of "la'Hashem," one might have thought that all Korbanos are
prohibited to be offered on Yom Tov except for the Korban Chagigah, because of the verse that
Ula cites in defense of Beis Shamai (19a), "v'Chagosem Oso" (the Chagigah may be brought, but
not any other Korban).

The MAHARSHA wonders why Tosfos does not write simply that one might have thought that
all Korbanos are prohibited to be brought on Yom Tov because the verse says, "Lachem" (for you
and not for Hash-m), which Beis Shamai here uses as proof against Beis Hillel. Why does Tosfos
here mention the verse of "v'Chagosem"?

The answer might be that in the first Beraisa cited in this Sugya, Beis Hillel agreed that Nedarim
and Nedavos may not be offered on Yom Tov. Why, then, did Beis Shamai assume that he had a
proof against Beis Hillel's opinion from "Lachem" when he knew that Beis Hillel himself derived
from "Lachem" the prohibition against offering Nedarim and Nedavos on Yom Tov? It must be
that Beis Hillel had a second reason for prohibiting Nedarim and Nedavos other than "Lachem."
What is that reason? It must be the verse of "v'Chagosem."

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:6

We learned in the Mishnah (19a) that Bet Shammai restricted the kinds of sacrifices that could be
brought on Yom Tov to those that are obligatory on those days, while Bet Hillel permit all types of
sacrifices to be brought.

Hillel and Shammai lived at the end of the second Temple period, so their disagreement is not one
that involves only theoretical principles, but practical ones, as well. The Gemara relates that Hillel
haZaken entered the Temple precincts on Yom Tov with a korban olah that he planned to sacrifice.
A korban olah is totally burned on the altar, and none of it is eaten – neither by the kohanim nor
by the person who brings it. Students of Shammai haZaken approached him and asked what his
intentions were. Hillel wanted to avoid an altercation, so he fibbed, “I am bringing this as
a korban shelamim” – a sacrifice where part is offered on the altar, but there are also parts that are

6
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_beitzah_1420/

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eaten by the kohanim and by the owner. This conciliatory stand taken by Hillel led to a situation
where the students of Shammai were ready to claim victory and have the final ruling on this matter
follow Shammai’s teaching.

At that moment, Bava ben Buta, one of Shammai’s students who recognized that Hillel’s position
was the accepted one, stepped forward and arranged for a large number of choice cattle to be
brought to the Temple. He called upon the onlookers to perform semikha on the animals and bring
them as sacrifices, which was a public admission that Hillel’s position was to be accepted. From
that time on there was no longer any debate on this matter.

The Talmud Yerushalmi relates the story in a slightly different manner, reporting that Hillel’s
modesty almost led to the acceptance of Shammai’s position. At that moment the Temple emptied
of korbanot since no one was willing to come to sacrifice. This led Bava ben Buta to curse the
people who brought on this situation, saying “the houses of these people should be made desolate,
just as they made desolate the house of our Lord.” He then ordered 3,000 cattle brought and
announced that people should resume bringing sacrifices, so that the mikdash should not stand
empty on Yom Tov.

Sara Ronis writes:7

Over the course of our Daf Yomi study, we’ve seen a lot of disputes between Hillel and Shammai.
Usually, they issue opposing opinions in the academy. Today, they rumble in the street.

A mishnah on yesterday’s daf gives the context for today’s story, a dispute about which offerings
can be brought on festivals:

Beit Shammai say: One may bring peace offerings, but one may not place his hands on them.
However, one may not bring burnt offerings.

Beit Hillel say: One may bring both peace offerings and burnt offerings, and one may even
place his hands on them.

Shammai says only peace offerings, no burnt offerings, may be brought on a festival — and
absolutely no laying one’s hands on the sacrifice. Beit Hillel, however, is characteristically more
permissive, allowing both peace offerings and burnt offerings — and the laying on of hands.

Today’s daf then continues:

There was an incident involving Hillel the Elder, who brought his burnt offering to the Temple
courtyard on a festival in order to place his hands on it.

7
Myjewishlearning.com

17
The students of Shammai the Elder gathered around him and said to him: What is the nature
of this animal?

He said to them: It is a female, and I have brought it as a peace offering.

The Torah requires that specific sacrifices be either a male or female animal — a burnt offering
must be male and a peace offering must be female. Remember, Hillel’s position is that it is
permitted to bring a (male) burnt offering on the holiday, while Shammai disagreed. But when
surrounded by disciples of the rival school, instead of admitting to what he was doing, Hillel told
them it was a female animal and, for good measure:

He swung its tail (obscuring its genitals) and they departed.

Perhaps recognizing that he was vastly outnumbered — one elder surrounded by many students of
the opposing school — Hillel obscured his animal’s sex and the truth.

Hillel’s choice highlights the kinds of pressure that being a lone voice in a crowd can put on people
— even people of great repute — and the physical danger that could be a part of these kinds
of halakhic debates.

Every choice, of course, comes with consequences. Hillel’s deception worked and so, it now
appeared to all the observers that Hillel was agreeing with Shammai’s position:

On that day, Beit Shammai gained the upper hand over Beit Hillel, and they sought to establish
the halakhah in this regard in accordance with their opinion.

And yet, although Hillel was intimidated into publicly conceding to Shammai, the
halakhah still ultimately follows Hillel, thanks to an unexpected hero:

A certain elder of the disciples of Shammai the Elder was there — Bava ben Buta was his name
— who knew that the halakhah was in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel in this matter.
And he sent for and brought all the sheep of Kedar that were in Jerusalem, and he stood them
in the Temple courtyard and said: Anyone who wishes to place his hands on the head of an
animal should come and place his hands there.

And on that day Beit Hillel gained the upper hand over Beit Shammai, and they established the
halakhah in this case in accordance with their opinion, and there was no one there who disputed
the matter in any way.

Shammai’s students wield enormous power in this story — both as a mob, and Bava ben Buta as
an individual. It was a crowd of Shammai's students that forced Hillel into pretending to comply
with his ruling. But it was just one of Shammai’s students who defended Hillel and effectively
fought off the mob.

I’ve never bought a sheep, but an internet search tells me that I should expect to pay about $300
for one. In antiquity, they were far more valuable, and Bava ben Buta apparently chose to buy all

18
the sheep of Kedar to make this matter right! As a student of Shammai, he is not generally someone
who agrees with Hillel. Yet to uphold the integrity of the halakhic system, and counter his fellow
disciples’ tactics of intimidation, he takes a public stand in defense of the man with whom he
usually disagrees — and spends a significant amount of money to do so.

Bava ben Buta models the moral courage of an individual who chooses to take a stand against
bullies, even bullies with whom he ordinarily agrees (which makes it much harder). Little mattered
more to the rabbis than halakhah — but they knew it had to be decided the right way, without
intimidation.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:8

Our daf (Beitzah 20a) recounts a dramatic story where the elderly sage and disciple of Shammai,
Baba ben Buta, prevented Shammai’s opinion concerning semicha (the leaning upon an animal
sacrifice prior to their slaughter as described in Vayikra 3:2 which Shammai ruled was forbidden
on Yom Tov) from becoming a rule of law by protesting within and blockading the Azarah
(Temple Courtyard). This is because Baba ben Buta was convinced of the correctness of Hillel's
opinion who permitted the practice and because, had he not done so, Shammai’s opinion would
have been adopted.

To say this in a different way, Baba ben Buta publicly protested for the adoption of a rule that was
not reflective of the ‘camp’ to which he belonged because, in this instance, he sincerely believed
that the opinion held by the other ‘camp’ was the right one.

Clearly, Baba ben Buta was not someone who decided what was right or wrong based on personal
connections or partisan loyalties. Instead, he boldly stood up for what he believed was right – even
if this meant taking a different position to those in his ‘camp’.

Significantly, elsewhere in the Gemara we see further examples of the wisdom, insight and
humility of Baba ben Buta. For example, in Gittin 57a we read how his smart thinking and
detective work saved a woman from leaving her marriage without a Ketubah, and in Nedarim 66b
where he suffered physical abuse from a woman but overlooked this for the sake of the Shalom
Bayit between her and her husband.

It should be noted that from the first story in Beitzah 20a we get the impression that Baba ben Buta
is bold and unbending. Yet from the story in Nedarim 66b it is clear that he is profoundly humble
and is prepared to suffer for doing the right thing.

This blend of boldness and readiness for self-sacrifice is essential for all Dayanim. However, as
noted in the parting letter of Dayan Shlomo Deichovsky to his fellow Dayan upon his retirement
from the Beit Din HaGadol in Jerusalem (see http://bit.ly/2JC8mfi), there are times when Dayanim
– especially in our generation - lack one or both of these qualities. Given this, he instructed his

8
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

19
fellow Dayanim, while making reference to Sanhedrin 7a, that: ‘A judge must be prepared to enter
Gehinnom and be wounded by the sword because of his judicial rulings’.

Moreover, while quoting the words of the Maharshal, he added how, ‘The Sages were ready to
die, in order to demonstrate the fitness of a family about whom a false rumour had spread. All the
more so in our day… that we must act with all our strength to silence and nullify such rumours’.
Then, again directing his words to his fellow judges, Dayan Deichovsky wrote, ‘we must not fear
disagreement, the law must be decided, and not always in accordance with the more stringent
position. A judge cannot always follow the path of ‘glatt’. He must often rule for a time of pressing
need or as an emergency measure, in order not to cause a greater calamity’ (while then adding –
with respect to the laws of gittin, that ‘a bill of divorce given under duress frightens me less than
the state of no bill of divorce. There are ways to deal with a coerced bill of divorce, and it is often
valid, at least after the fact. But there is no way to deal with the situation of no bill of divorce’).

I mention all this because Baba ben Buta inspires me, and also because I recently experienced an
unpleasant reaction from a particular individual as a result of previously taking the necessary steps
to help protect people in my neighbourhood. And the reason for me sharing this is to highlight the
fact that doing the right thing doesn’t always bring honour, glory or guarantees of security. On the
contrary! Oftentimes, doing the right thing means taking a stand that is different to others for the
sake of justice, morality, and truth. And it is when things like this occur, I think of people like
Baba ben Buta, Dayan Shlomo Deichovsky (and many other heroes and heroines from whom I
draw significant inspiration). Admittedly, these individuals may not be famous in quite the same
way as others. But for me, they are my heroes, because they remind me that there is a price to
everything – including, and especially, when doing the right thing.

20
 The Path of Hillel
Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:9

There is arguably no greater figure in Talmudic literature than that of Hillel the Elder. He combined
the Torah leadership of Moshe Rabbeinu[1] with Aharon's peace-making and love for all. It is not
by chance the Talmud teaches that if not for Hillel, Torah would have been forgotten from amongst
the Jewish people (Sukkah 20a). It is only natural that Hillel's primary teaching[2] is, "be of the
students of Aharon, love peace and seek peace, love people and bring them closer to Torah" (Avot
1:12). The stories about his humility, patience and dedication to Torah study are legendary (see,
for example, Shabbat 31a). It was Hillel who laid the groundwork for the Mishnah and ultimately,
the Gemara. Alas, it is not easy to emulate Hillel.
"And what is an argument for the sake of heaven? These are the arguments between Hillel and
Shammai" (Avot 5:17). The commentaries point out that the Mishnah was most precise. The
arguments between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai did not rise to the level of arguments for the sake
of heaven[3]. Such debates require great knowledge, complete dedication, and utmost attention.
"When students of Hillel and Shammai who did not serve their teachers fully multiplied, disputes
increased in Israel and the Torah became like two[4]" (Sanhedrin 88b). There are only three
debates recorded between Hillel and Shammai themselves (Shabbat 15a), but 316 debates between
their students, Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai.
A series of incidents recorded in the Gemara provide a window into the difference between acting
for the sake of heaven and not reaching that level.
When coming to the Temple for Yom Tov, one brought two types of sacrifices: a korban shelamim,
peace offering, that would serve as the main course for one's Yom Tov meal; and an olat rieah, a
burnt offering, in fulfillment of the verse, "you shall not see My face empty handed" (Shemot
23:15), understood by our Sages as obligating a sacrifice dedicated to G-d upon arrival at the
Temple. As the olah was of no human benefit on Yom Tov, Beit Shammai ruled that one may not
bring it on Yom Tov itself; rather, it is to be brought either before or after the chag.
The Gemara (Beitza 20a) relates that Hillel, who disagreed on this point, brought the olat rieah on
Yom Tov. The students of Shammai surrounded him, asking him the nature of the korban he was
bringing. As a korban olah may only be brought from a male animal, Hillel answered, "it is a
female, and it is for a korban shelamim". As Rashi notes, due to his great humility, he "spoke an
untruth in order to preserve peace"[5]. Hillel then swung the tail of the animal so they would think
it is a female, a trick that worked; and the students of Shammai left. Hillel correctly surmised that
they would not check too closely to verify if it was male or female. His persona actually helped
diffuse a potentially sticky situation.

9
https://torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/beitza-20-the-path-of-hillel

21
The Talmud relates that on that same day, "Beit Shammai got the upper hand on Beit Hillel, and
they planned to establish the law like them; and there was an elder, one of the students of Shammai
the Elder--and Bava ben Buta was his name--who knew the law followed Beit Hillel. And he sent
and fetched all the sheep of Kedar (the best sheep - Rashi) that were in Jerusalem and put them in
the Temple Court, and said: Whoever wishes to lay on hands, let him come and lay on hands; and
on that day, Beth Hillel got the upper hand and the halacha was established according to their
opinion, and there was no one there who disputed it". As a general rule, when one brought a
sacrifice to the Temple, one was required to lean his hands on the animal, something that Beit
Shammai said could not be done on Yom Tov. Yet Bava ben Buta, a student of Shammai, knew
the halacha was like Beit Hillel and took measures to ensure such would happen--even against his
own personal view.
Yet there are few like Hillel or Bava ben Buta. The Gemara continues with a much more tense
encounter between the students of Hillel and Shammai. "There was an incident with a disciple of
Beit Hillel who brought his korban olah into the Temple Court and [prepared] to lean on it. A
disciple of Beit Shammai found him, and said to him: What is the laying on of hands? He replied:
What is silence? He silenced him with a rebuke, and he went away". While Abaye notes that the
response was measure for measure, the exchange highlights the nastiness that all too often
accompanies differing interpretations of Rabbinic law.
Alas, there are few who are capable of emulating Hillel.

[1] The Talmud divides Hillel's life into three periods of 40 years--his arrival in Israel from Bavel at age 40, his study of Torah
until age 80, and his sustaining the Jewish people for another 40 years. Our Sages thus equate him to Moshe Rabbeinu, living to
120 (Sifri, Devarim 36:7).
[2] This is the first of Hillel's teachings mentioned in Pirkei Avot, which lists the transmission of the Oral Law and records a
teaching that "defined" the essence of each Sage.
[3] If such is true of the great schools of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai I shudder to think what the arguments of our days are to be
considered. I recall Rav Schachter noting (and I do not recall in whose name he quoted such) that we have not had arguments for
the sake of heaven for hundreds of years already. This is a scary thought--especially considering how often people state that they
are only fighting for the sake of heaven.
[4] The relationship between this passage and the Gemara's statement (Eiruvin 13b) regarding the disputes between these two great
academies that "these and those are the words of the living G-d" requires further investigation.
[5] This willingness to lie for peace became a major point of contention between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, with the former
arguing that one may praise the bride before the groom even if he himself does not believe his words of praise, and Shammai
arguing that such is an unacceptable falsehood (see Ketuvot 16b-17a).

"Laying" the Table for the Controversy Over Semicha

Ephraim Diamond writes:10

Source 1 These sources set forth the biblical foundations requiring Semicha for personal
Korbonos
‫ד׳‬:‫ויקרא א׳‬

10
https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/65427?lang=bi

22
 (‫ ָי֔דוֹ ַ֖ﬠל ֣ר ֹאשׁ ָהֹע ָ֑לה ְו ִנ ְרָ֥צה ֖לוֹ ְלַכֵ֥פּר ָﬠ ָֽליו׃ )ד‬x‫ְוָסַ֣מ‬

Leviticus 1:4
(4) He shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, that it may be acceptable in his
behalf, in expiation for him.

‫ב׳‬-‫א׳‬:‫ויקרא ג׳‬

(‫ ָיד ֙וֹ ַﬠל־ )ב( ְוִאם־ ֶ֥זַבח ְשָׁל ִ֖מים ָק ְרָבּ ֑נוֹ ִ֤אם ִמן־ַהָבָּק֙ר ֣הוּא ַמְק ִ֔ריב ִאם־ָזָכ֙ר ִאם־ ְנֵקָ֔בה ָתּ ִ֥מים ַיְק ִריֶ֖בנּוּ ִלְפ ֵ֥ני ְיה ָֽוה׃ )א‬Ÿ‫ְוָסַ֤מ‬
‫֣ר ֹאשׁ ָק ְרָבּ ֔נוֹ וְּשָׁח֕טוֹ ֶ֖פַּתח ֹ֣אֶהל מוֵֹ֑ﬠד ְוָז ְר֡קוּ ְבֵּנ֩י ַאֲהֹ֨רן ַהֹכֲּה ִ֧נים ֶאת־ַה ָ֛דּם ַﬠל־ַהִמְּזֵ֖בַּח ָס ִֽביב׃‬

Leviticus 3:1-2
(1) If his offering is a sacrifice of well-being— If he offers of the herd, whether a male or
a female, he shall bring before the LORD one without blemish. (2) He shall lay his
hand upon the head of his offering and slaughter it at the entrance of the Tent of
Meeting; and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall dash the blood against all sides of the
altar.

Source 2

These Mishnayos set forth the basic rules of Semicha. Generally limited to personal KorbonosAn
agent (Shliach) does not perform SemichaIf Semicha is not done the Korban remains validSemicha
is done by placing your hands on the animals' headSemicha takes place in the Beis
HaMikdashSemicha should take place immediately prior to sacrificing the animal

‫ח׳‬-‫ז׳‬:‫משנה מנחות ט׳‬

(‫ רבי שמעון אומר אף שעירי )ז‬.‫ ושעיר המשתלח‬.‫ חוץ מן הפר הבא על כל המצות‬.‫ אין בהם סמיכה‬.‫כל קרבנות הצבור‬
‫ והיורש סומך ומביא נסכים וממיר‬.‫ חוץ מן הבכור והמעשר והפסח‬.‫ כל קרבנות היחיד טעונים סמיכה‬.‫עבודה זרה‬:

(‫ בשתי )ח‬.‫ על הראש‬.‫ וסמיכה שירי מצוה‬.‫ והעבד והשליח והאשה‬.‫ סומא ונכרי‬.‫ חוץ מחרש שוטה וקטן‬.‫הכל סומכין‬
‫ ותכף לסמיכה שחיטה‬.‫ ובמקום שסומכין שוחטין‬.‫ידים‬:

Mishnah Menachot 9:7-8

(7) All of the offerings of community do not require the laying on of hands except the bull
that is offered for [the transgression] of any of the commandments, and the scapegoat. Rabbi
Shimon says: also the goats offered for [the transgression] of idol worship. All the offerings
of an individual require the laying on of hands except the first-born, the cattle tithe, and the
pesach. And an heir may lay his hands [on them], and he may bring the libations, and [if he
wrongfully] substitutes [another animal for it, it is holy].

(8) All perform the laying on of hands except for a deaf-mute, a shoteh, a minor, a blind
person, a non-Jew, a slave, an agent, and a woman. The laying on of hands - the last part of
the commandment [of bringing the offering] - is on the head, and [is performed] with both

23
hands, the place they would slaughter is where the hands are laid [upon the animal], and
immediately after laying hands upon it they would slaughter it.

Source 3 This Mishna describes the Rabbinic prohibition on utilizing an animal (e.g., leaning on
for support) on Yom tov.
‫ב׳‬:‫משנה ביצה ה׳‬

(‫ לא )ב‬.‫ ואלו הן משום שבות‬.‫ חייבין עליו ביום טוב‬.‫ בשבת‬.‫ משום מצוה‬.‫ משום רשות‬.‫כל שחייבין עליו משום שבות‬
‫ ואלו הן משום‬.‫ ולא מרקדין‬.‫ ולא מספקין‬.‫ ולא מטפחין‬.‫ ולא שטין על פני המים‬.‫ ולא רוכבין על גבי בהמה‬.‫עולין באילן‬
.‫ ולא מחרימין‬.‫ ולא מעריכין‬.‫ לא מקדישין‬.‫ ואלו הן משום מצוה‬.‫ ולא מיבמין‬.‫ ולא חולצין‬.‫ ולא מקדשין‬.‫ לא דנין‬.‫רשות‬
‫ אלא אוכל נפש בלבד‬.‫ אין בין יום טוב לשבת‬.‫ קל וחומר בשבת‬.‫ כל אלו ביום טוב אמרו‬.‫ולא מגביהין תרומה ומעשר‬:

Mishnah Beitzah 5:2

(2) Any [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat as a matter of shevut [restrictions established
by the Sages regarding Shabbat to prevent violation of Torah-level Shabbat prohibitions,
and to increase its sanctity], or as an optional matter [i.e. something not fully a mitzvah], or
as a mitzvah, one is also liable [for such an act] on a holiday. And these are [the acts for
which one is liable] as a matter of shevut: one may not climb a tree, and one may not ride
atop an animal, and one may not swim in water, and one may not clap, nor slap [thighs], nor
dance. And these are [the acts for which one is liable] as an optional matter: one may not
judge [a court case], and one may not betroth, nor perform chalitzah [the ceremony
performed to release a widow of a childless man from the obligation of levirite marriage],
nor perform yibum [the enactment of a levirite marriage of the widow of a childless man].
And these are [the acts for which one is liable] as a mitzvah: one may not consecrate
[anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make something cherem
[proscribed from personal use, possibly due to being dedicated to the Temple], nor raise
terumah or tithes out [from one's produce]. All of these were said [to be forbidden] regarding
holidays so, a fortiori, [they must also be forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no difference
between [the laws of] holidays and Shabbat except only for okhel nefesh [certain types of
food preparation which, though forbidden on Shabbat, are permitted on festivals].

Source 4

These Mishnayos describe the generational dispute surrounding Semicha. The juxtaposition of
these two Mishnayos provides strong support for interpreting the first Mishna as also describing
Semicha on Yom Tov.

‫ג׳‬-‫ב׳‬:‫משנה חגיגה ב׳‬

(‫ ניתאי הארבלי )ב‬.‫ יהושע בן פרחיה אומר שלא לסמוך‬.‫ יוסי בן יוחנן אומר לסמוך‬.‫יוסי בן יועזר אומר שלא לסמוך‬
‫ אבטליון אומר‬.‫ שמעיה אומר לסמוך‬.‫ שמעון בן שטח אומר לסמוך‬.‫ יהודה בן טבאי אומר שלא לסמוך‬.‫אומר לסמוך‬
‫ הראשונים‬.‫ הלל אומר לסמוך‬.‫ שמאי אומר שלא לסמוך‬.‫ נכנס שמאי‬.‫ יצא מנחם‬.‫ הלל ומנחם לא נחלקו‬.‫שלא לסמוך‬
‫ ושניים להם אב בית דין‬.‫היו נשיאים‬:

24
 (‫ ובית הלל אומרים מביאין שלמים ועולות )ג‬.‫ אבל לא עולות‬.‫בית שמאי אומרים מביאין שלמים ואין סומכין עליהם‬
‫וסומכין עליהם‬:

Mishnah Chagigah 2:2-3

(2) Yose ben Yoezer says not to lean hands [on the Chagigah sacrifice]; Yose ben Yohanan
says to lean hands. Yehoshua ben Perahia says not to lean hands; Nitai the Arbelite says to
lean hands. Yehuda ben Tavai says not to lean hands; Shimon ben Shetach says to lean
hands. Shemaya says to lean hands; Avtaliyon says not to lean hands. Hillel and Menahem
did not disagree. Menahem left and Shammai entered. Shammai says not to lean hands;
Hillel says to lean hands. The first [of each pair] was the nasi [head of the Sanhedrin] and
the second [of each pair] was the av beit din [vice-head of the Sandhedrin].

(3) Beit Shammai says, they bring peace offerings [on Yom Tov] and do not lay their hands
on them, but they do not bring burnt offerings. And Beit Hillel says, they bring both peace
offerings and burnt offerings and lay their hands on them.

Source 5

This Mishna is the source for Chagigah 2:3. There are two distinct disputes embedded in this
Mishna. First, is whether one should be bringing an Oleh on Yom Tov (everyone agrees a
Shelamim may be brought as it is "Ochel Nefesh"). The second is whether one can perform
Semicha on Yom Tov immediately prior to bringing his Korban or may he perform Semicha prior
to Yom Tov. Embedded in the second dispute is whether or not Semicha must immediately precede
the slaughtering of the Korban or may it be done earlier.

‫ד׳‬:‫משנה ביצה ב׳‬

(‫ )ד‬.‫ ובית הלל אומרים מביאין שלמים ועולות‬.‫ אבל לא עולות‬.‫ ואין סומכין עליהן‬.‫בית שמאי אומרים מביאין שלמים‬
‫וסומכין עליהם‬:

Mishnah Beitzah 2:4

(4) Beit Shammai say: Shelamim [offerings whose various parts are consumed by their
owners, by the priests, and by the fire on the altar] may be brought [on a festival], and one
does not lean upon them [as one normally does when bringing a sacrifice], but not olot
[offerings that are entirely burnt on the alter]. And Beit Hillel say: shelamim and olot may
be brought [on a holiday], and one does lean upon them.

Source 6

The following sources, the Tosefta, Talmud Yerushalmi and Talmud Bavli expand and expound
on the dispute over Semicha. The sources can be broken down into three distinct topics.

1. The history of Halachik Disputes (Machlokes) --These are highlighted in yellow.

25
 2. The particular dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel over Semicha on Yom Tov-
-These are highlighted in blue
3. A story of Hillel Hazaken and his attempt to bring a Korban Olah on Yom Tov and how a
member of Beis Shammai helped establish the Halacha like Hillel. These are highlighted
in purple.

The sources create an idyllic picture of Halachik history. At first, any time there was uncertainty
or a difference of opinion over a particular Halacha, they would pose the question to the great 71-
member Sanhedrin that sat inside the Beis HaMikdash. If someone had a tradition as to the proper
rule (‫ )אם שמעו אמרו‬they would accept the tradition. Otherwise, the august group would vote and
determine the Halacha according to the majority. For reasons we will discuss, the one issue they
could not resolve was the dispute over Semicha. Following Shammai and Hillel, their students no
longer were capable of properly being instructed and from then on disputes multiplied.

As noted above, embedded within the Machlokes over Semicha on Yom Tov are two disputes.
First, whether one may bring a Korban Olah on Yom Tov. According to Beis Shammai one cannot
bring an Olah since it is wholly burnt rather than eaten, there is no purpose for such a Korban on
Yom Tov. Beis Hillel permits a person to bring a Korban Olah on Yom Tov based on the principal
that how can we concern ourselves with our food and not also be concerned with Hashem's.
However, everyone agrees that you can bring a Shelamim on Yom Tov.

Separately, they argue whether or not one is permitted to perform Semicha on Yom Tov itself
(whether for the Korban Olah according to Beis Hillel and the Shelamim according to everyone).
According to Beis Shammai, you are permitted to do Semicha prior to bringing the Korban;
consequently, he does not permit a person to violate the Rabbinic prohibition on using an animal
on Yom Tov. According to Beis Hillel, however, one can only perform Semicha at the time of
bringing the Korban and cannot do so earlier. When pitting the obligation to perform Semicha
against the Rabbinic prohibition on using animals on Yom Tov, he allows Semicha to be
performed.

Taking a step back, on a very practical level this dispute had meaningful consequences for the
population. According to Beis Shammai a person who could not make the trek to the Beis
HaMikdash (whether for the Festivals or any other time) could still send Korbonos and participate
in ritual life since he could perform Semicha at home and send his Korban with a Shaliach.
Whereas, according to Beis Hillel, this is Halachacily impermissible, and such a person would not
be able to participate in the Temple ritual.

According to the sources, both disputes were eventually resolved. The sources vary slightly but
the major details remain the same. The Talmud Yerushalmi's version is the most dramatic retelling.
Briefly, Hillel once arrived at the Beis HaMikdash on Yom Tov prepared to bring a Korban Olah.
Shammai's students quickly surround him (in an effort to prevent an Olah from being brought) and
Hillel resorts to obfuscating the gender of the animal and pretends it is a female (which cannot be
used for an Olah) and that he is bringing a Shelamim. Shammai's students invariably decide it's
time to bring an end to the dispute by bringing the matter to a vote.

26
However, one student, Bava ben Butah knew that the Halachah was like Beis Hillel. According to
the Yerushalmi's retelling, Bava was inspired/prompted by the reality of the fact that under Beis
Shammai's paradigm the Beis HaMikdash was empty on Yom Tov. Rather than teeming with
people it was desolate. Perhaps as a result of not being able to perform Semicha--while not
absolutely required, it was very much a part of the Korban process for people--people refrained
from bringing any Korbnos (including Shelamim) on Yom Tov. Preferring to wait until Chol
HaMoed or after Shavuous when they could bring the Korban in the preferred manner.

To remedy the situation Bava went out and brought 3,000 animals to the Beis HaMikdash and
urged the population to come and bring them--including allowing them to perform Semicha. And
with that display he established the Halacha like Beis Hillel. Presumably as to both permitting
Olos on Yom Tov and allowing Semicha to be performed at the same time. [One interesting note
is whether the allowance of Semicha was only according to Hillel's rule that it must be performed
immediately prior to slaughtering the animal or was it even according to Shammai who allowed
you to perform Semicha earlier if need be. In other words, did they change the requirement for
Semicha or did they dispense with the Rabbinic prohibition on using animals even when not
directly conflicting with Semicha].11

‫ו׳‬-‫ד׳‬:‫תוספתא חגיגה ב׳‬

(‫מימיהן לא נחלקו אלא על הסמיכה חמשה זוגות הן שלשה מזוגות הראשונים שאמרו ]שלא[ לסמוך ושנים מזוגות )ד‬
‫האחרונים שאמרו לסמוך ]שלשה[ היו נשיאים ושנים ]מהן[ אבות בית דין דברי רבי מאיר ]רבי יהודה אומר שמעון בן‬
‫שטח נשיא[ יהודה בן טבאי אב ב"ד‬

‫אמר רבי יוסי בתחלה לא היתה מחלוקת בישראל אלא בית דין של שבעים ואחד ]היה[ בלשכת הגזית‬... ‫היו יושבין מתמיד‬
‫של שחר עד תמיד של בין הערבים ובשבתות ובימים טובים נכנסין לבית המדרש שבהר הבית ]נשאלה הלכה[ אם שמעו‬
‫אמרו להם ואם לאו עומדין במנין אם רבו המטמאין טימאו אם רבו המטהרין טיהרו משם הלכה יוצא רווחת בישראל‬

‫משרבו תלמידי שמאי והלל שלא שמשו כל צרכן ]הרבו[ מחלוקת בישראל ]ונעשו כשתי תורות‬...

(‫איזו היא סמיכה שנחלקו עליה בית שמאי אומרים אין סומכין ביום טוב ושלמים החוגג בהן סומך עליהן מערב יום )ה‬
‫ ]בית הלל אומרים מביאין שלמים ועולות וסומכין עליהן[טוב‬...

(‫מעשה בהלל הזקן שסמך על העולה בעזרה וחברו עליו תלמידי בית שמאי אמר להם באו וראו שהיא נקבה וצריכין )ו‬
‫אנו לעשותה זבחי שלמים הפליגן בדברים והלכו להם מיד גברה ידן של ב"ש ובקשו לקבוע הלכה כמותן והיה שם בבא‬
‫בן בוטא שהוא מתלמידי בית שמאי ]ויודע שהלכה כדברי בית הלל[ בכל מקום ]והלך[ והביא את כל צאן קדר והעמידן‬
‫בעזרה ואמר כל מי שצריך להביא עולות ושלמים יבוא ויטול באו ונטלו ]את הבהמה והעלו עולות[ וסמכו עליהן בו ביום‬

11
My read of the sources suggest that Shammai's students were more concerned over an Olah being brought than whether or not
Hillel was going to perform Semicha. The former would impugn the Beis HaMikdash as a whole (i.e., by having to be burnt on the
Mizbeach) whereas Hillel's desire to perform Semicha was a personal choice. However, all of the Bava ben Butah sources have
him exhorting the population to come and bring Korbonos and to perform Semicha. This suggests that he was concerned with both
issues. This then requires an explanation why the next statement in each of these sources is about a student of Hillel's bringing a
Korban and performing Semicha who is stopped by a student of Shammai's demanding the former not perform Semicha. Hillel's
student shuts down the objection with seemingly positive results. (I.e., establishing that Semicha can be performed on Yom Tov).
While it may simply be a secondary form of support it does seem like it is meant to establish the Semicha rule. See Lieberman,
Tosephta Kepshuta, Moed, pp 1200, n. 42 suggesting that Shammai and Hillel only disputed Semicha, it was their students who
added the dispute of Korbnei Olah on Yom Tov.

27
‫ושוב מעשה ]בתלמיד אחד[ מתלמידי בית הלל שסמך על העולה ]נקבעה הלכה כדברי בית הלל ולא ]ערער אדם בדבר‬
‫‪.‬בעזרה מצאו תלמיד אחד מתלמידי בית שמאי אמר לו מה זה סמיכה אמר לו מה זה שתיקה שתקו בנזיפה‬

‫‪Tosefta Chagigah 2:4-6‬‬

‫‪...‬‬
‫תלמוד ירושלמי חגיגה י׳ ב‪:‬ג׳‬

‫בראשונה לא היתה מחלוקת בישראל אלא על הסמיכה בלבד ועשו שמאי והלל ועשו אותן ד' משרבו תלמידי ב"ש‬
‫ותלמידי ב"ה ולא שימשו את רביהן כל צורכן ורבו המחלוקת בישראל ונחלקו לשתי כתות אלו מטמאין ואלו מטהרין‬
‫ועוד אינה עתידה לחזור למקומה עד שיבוא בן דוד ר' חייה בשם ר"י לא תהא שבות קלה בעיניך שהרי סמיכה אינה‬
‫אלא רשות ונחלקו עליה אבות העולם א"ר יוסה זאת אומר שאדם צריך לכבוש את כובדו דלא כן מה אנן אמרין אסור‬
‫‪.‬ליגע בבהמה בי"ט‬

‫‪Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 10b:3‬‬

‫‪...‬‬
‫תלמוד ירושלמי חגיגה י״א ב‪:‬ב׳‪-‬י״ב א‪:‬א׳‬

‫‪:‬ב"ש אומרים מביאין שלמים ואין סומכין עליהן אבל לא עולות וב"ה אומרים מביאין שלמים ועולות וסומכין עליהן‪...‬‬
‫ב"ש אומרים הותרה סמיכה שלא כדרכה וב"ה אומרים לא הותרה סמיכה שלא כדרכה אי זו היא סמיכה שלא כדרכה‬
‫מאתמול א"ר זעירה כל עמא מודיי באשם מצורע שסמך עליו מאתמול לא יצא שלמי נדבה שסמך עליהן מאתמול יצא מה‬
‫‪ ...‬פליגין בשלמי חגיגה בית שמאי עבדין לון כשלמי נדבה ב"ה עבדין לון כאשם מצורע‬

‫מעשה בהלל הזקן שהביא עולתו לעזרה וסמך עליה חברו עליו תלמידי ב"ש התחיל מכשכש בזנבה אמר להן ראו נקיבה‬
‫היא ושלמים הפליגן בדברים והלכו להן לאחר ימים גברה ידן של ב"ש וביקשו לקבוע הלכה כדבריהם והיה שם בבא בן‬
‫בוטא מתלמידי ב"ש ויודע שהלכה כב"ה ופעם אחת נכנס לעזרה ומצאה שוממת אמר ישמו בתיהן של אלו שהישמו את‬
‫בית אלקינו מה עשה שלח והביא שלשת אלפים טלי מצאן קדר וביקרן ממומין והעמידן בהר הבית ואמר להן שמעוני‬
‫אחיי בית ישראל כל מי שהוא רוצה יביא עולות יביא ויסמוך יביא שלמים ויסמוך באותה השעה נקבעה הלכה כבית הלל‬
‫‪ ...‬ולא אמר אדם דבר‬

‫מעשה באחד מתלמידי ב"ה שהביא עולתו לעזרה וסמך עליה וראהו אחד מתלמידי ב"ש אמר להן מה זו סמיכה אמר לו‬
‫‪: ...‬מה זו שתיקה ושיתקו בנזיפה והלך לו‬

‫‪Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 11b:2-12a:1‬‬

‫‪...‬‬
‫ביצה כ׳ א‪:‬י׳‪-‬כ׳ ב‪:‬ב׳‬

‫וסברי בית שמאי שלמי חובה לא בעו סמיכה והתניא אמר רבי יוסי לא נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל על הסמיכה עצמה ‪.....‬‬
‫שצריך על מה נחלקו על תכף לסמיכה שחיטה שבית שמאי אומרים אינו צריך ובית הלל אומרים צריך הוא דאמר כי האי‬
‫תנא דתניא אמר רבי יוסי בר' יהודה לא נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל על תכף לסמיכה שחיטה שצריך על מה נחלקו על‬
‫‪:‬הסמיכה עצמה שבית שמאי אומרים אינו צריך ובית הלל אומרים צריך‬

‫ת"ר מעשה בהלל הזקן שהביא עולתו לעזרה לסמוך עליה ביו"ט חברו עליו תלמידי שמאי הזקן אמרו לו מה טיבה של‬
‫בהמה זו אמר להם נקבה היא ולזבחי שלמים הבאתיה כשכש להם בזנבה והלכו להם ואותו היום גברה ידם של בית שמאי‬
‫על בית הלל ובקשו לקבוע הלכה כמותן והיה שם זקן אחד מתלמידי שמאי הזקן ובבא בן בוטא שמו שהיה יודע שהלכה‬

‫‪28‬‬
‫כבית הלל ושלח והביא כל צאן קדר שבירושלים והעמידן בעזרה ואמר כל מי שרוצה לסמוך יבא ויסמוך ואותו היום‬
‫גברה ידן של בית הלל וקבעו הלכה כמותן ולא היה שם אדם שערער בדבר כלום‬: ‫שוב מעשה בתלמיד אחד מתלמידי‬
‫ב"ה שהביא עולתו לעזרה לסמוך עליה מצאו תלמיד אחד מתלמידי ב"ש אמר לו מה זו סמיכה אמר לו מה זו שתיקה‬
‫שתקו בנזיפה והלך לו‬...

Our Daf Beitzah 20a:10-20b:2

... And do Beit Shammai hold that obligatory peace-offerings do not require placing of hands
on the head of the animal? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei said: Beit Shammai and
Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to the placing of hands itself that it is required in the
case of obligatory peace-offerings. With regard to what, then, did they disagree? They disagreed
with regard to the halakha that states that immediately following placing hands on the head of
an offering is its slaughter. As Beit Shammai say: It is not necessary to be particular in this
regard, and the ceremony of placing hands on the animal’s head may be performed even on the
eve of the Festival, long before the animal is slaughtered. And Beit Hillel say: It is necessary,
and therefore one who brings an offering on a Festival must place his hands on the animal’s
head on the Festival itself. The Gemara answers: The tanna of the mishna said what he said in
accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a different baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son
of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to the halakha
that immediately following placing hands on the head of an offering is its slaughter, that it is
necessary. With regard to what, then, did they disagree? They disagreed with regard to the
placing of hands itself on the head of obligatory peace-offerings. Beit Shammai say: It is not
necessary, and Beit Hillel say: It is necessary. § The Gemara returns to the basic dispute between
Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.

The Sages taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving Hillel the Elder, who brought
his burnt-offering to the Temple courtyard in order to place his hands on the animal’s head on
a Festival. The students of Shammai the Elder gathered around him and said to him: What is
the nature of this animal that you are bringing? Hillel, being humble and meek, did not want to
quarrel with them in the Temple and therefore concealed the truth from them for the sake of
peace. He said to them: It is a female, and I have brought it as a peace-offering, as burnt-
offerings are always male. He swung its tail for them so that they would not be able to properly
discern whether the animal was male or female, and they departed. On that day, when the
incident became known, suggesting that even Hillel had accepted Shammai’s view, Beit
Shammai gained the upper hand over Beit Hillel, and they sought to establish the halakha in
this regard in accordance with their opinion. But a certain Elder of the disciples of Shammai
the Elder was there, and Bava ben Buta was his name, who knew that the halakha is in
accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel in this matter. And he sent for and brought all the
high-quality sheep of Kedar that were in Jerusalem, and he stood them in the Temple courtyard
and said: Anyone who wishes to place his hands on the head of an animal should come and
place his hands there. And on that day Beit Hillel gained the upper hand over Beit Shammai,
and they established the halakha in this case in accordance with their opinion, and there was
no one there who disputed the matter in any way.

29
And sometime later there was another incident involving a certain disciple from among the
disciples of Beit Hillel who brought his burnt-offering to the Temple courtyard in order to place
his hands on the animal’s head on a Festival. A certain disciple from among the disciples of
Beit Shammai found him and said to him: What is this placing of hands? Why do you place
your hands on the animal’s head and thereby violate the statement of Beit Shammai? He said
to him: What is this silence? Why do you not stay silent, as the halakha was not established in
accordance with their opinion? He silenced him with a rebuke, and he, Beit Shammai’s disciple,
departed quietly.

Source 7

The Gemara derives from the fact that there was even a dispute whether one can perform
Semicha on Yom Tov that Semicha requires you to press and lean down on the animal with all
your weight. Something that is not obvious from the Mishna. Second, we see that while women
were not obligated in performing Semicha, they still desired to do so. The Semicha process was
comforting in its own way perhaps by allowing a person to fully appreciate the magnitude of
what was about to take place.

‫י״ט‬-‫י״ד‬:‫חגיגה ט״ז ב‬

.... ‫אמר רמי בר חמא שמע מינה סמיכה בכל כחו בעינן דאי ס"ד לא בעינן בכל כחו מאי קא עביד ליסמוך מיתיבי‬
[‫ ב( דבר אל בני ישראל וסמך בני ישראל סומכין ואין בנות ישראל סומכות רבי יוסי ור' )ישמעאל( ]שמעון‬,‫)ויקרא א‬
‫אומרים בנות ישראל סומכות רשות אמר רבי יוסי סח לי אבא אלעזר פעם אחת היה לנו עגל של זבחי שלמים‬
‫והביאנוהו לעזרת נשים וסמכו עליו נשים לא מפני שסמיכה בנשים אלא כדי לעשות נחת רוח לנשים ואי ס"ד סמיכה‬
‫בכל כחו בעינן משום נחת רוח דנשים עבדינן עבודה בקדשים אלא לאו ש"מ לא בעינן בכל כחו לעולם אימא לך בעינן‬
‫בכל כחו דאמר להו אקפו ידייכו אי הכי לא מפני שסמיכה בנשים תיפוק ליה דאינה לסמיכה כלל א"ר אמי חדא ועוד‬
‫קאמר חדא דליתא לסמיכה כלל ועוד כדי לעשות נחת רוח לנשים אמר רב פפא שמע מינה צדדין אסורין דאי ס"ד צדדין‬
‫מותרין לסמוך לצדדין אלא לאו שמע מינה צדדין אסורין‬

Chagigah 16b:14-19

....Rami bar Ḥama said: You can learn from here, from this dispute, that the mitzva of
placing hands requires not only placing one’s hands on the animal’s head, but we also require
that one places his hands with all his strength. For if it enters your mind that we do not
require all his strength, what prohibition does one violate by placing his hands? Let him
place them on a Festival as well, as this does not resemble a prohibited action at all. The
Gemara raises an objection to this from a baraita: “Speak to the children of [benei] Israel”
(Leviticus 1:2). The word benei literally means: Sons of. And it states nearby: “And he shall
place his hand on the head of the burnt-offering” (Leviticus 1:4), from which we learn that
the sons of Israel place their hands, but the daughters of Israel do not place them. Rabbi
Yosei and Rabbi Yishmael say: It is optional for the daughters of Israel to place their hands.
They may place their hands if they so choose, although they are not obligated to do so. Rabbi
Yosei said: The Sage Abba Elazar related to me the following incident: On one occasion, we
had a calf for a peace-offering, and we brought it to the Women’s Courtyard, and women
placed their hands on it. We did this not because there is an obligation of placing hands in
the case of women, but in order to please the women, by allowing them to sacrifice an

30
offering, in all of its particulars, as men do. Now, if it enters your mind that we require
placing hands with all one’s strength, would we perform work with consecrated offerings in
order to please the women? Placing one’s hands forcefully on an animal is considered
performing work with it, and if one does it without being obligated to do so, he has thereby
performed work with an offering. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this that we do
not require placing hands with all one’s strength? The Gemara rejects this: Actually, I could
say to you that we do require placing hands with all one’s strength, but here they allowed
women to place their hands by saying to them: Ease your hands and do not press forcefully,
so that their hand placing should not constitute work. The Gemara retorts: If so, then the
reason formulated as: Not because there is an obligation to place hands in the case of women,
is irrelevant to this law. Let him derive the permission for women to do so from the reason
that it is not considered placing hands at all. If placing hands must be performed with all
one’s strength, this action the women are performing does not constitute placing hands.
Rabbi Ami said: He stated one reason and another. One reason is that it is not considered
placing hands at all, as it is not performed with all of one’s strength; and another reason is
that they allowed it in order to please the women. Rav Pappa said: Learn from this that
anything upon which one may not place objects or upon which one may not sit on Shabbat,
its sides are likewise prohibited, for if it enters your mind to say that the sides are permitted,
they could have told the women to place their hands on the sides, i.e., on the head of the
animal rather than on its back, as the head of the animal is considered as if it were one of its
sides. Rather, must one not conclude from this that the sides are prohibited?

Source 8

All of the above discussion assumes (as does the Talmud and all traditional Meforshim) that the
Zugos were arguing whether or not Semicha on a Korban was permitted on Yom Tov. While it's
clear what Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel were arguing over, it's not 100% clear that that is what
the Zugos were arguing about. While the Mishna uses the terminology ‫ לסמוך ושלא לסמוך‬,
nonetheless, it's not exactly the same. Among the Scholars, there has been much discussion as to
the nature of the dispute. While many agree with the Gemara's conclusion, others have tried to find
suitable substitutes. What follows is a brief recap.

Guiding the discussions are observations and questions like:

• Why would Beis Shammai disrupt the bringing of Korbonos over a Shevus of leaning on
an animal?
• the juxtaposition of the two Mishnayos in Chagigah.
• What was it about this dispute that could not be resolved over so many generations?
• Why is there a need for a separate dispute by Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel?
• The Tosefta says ‫איזו היא סמיכה שנחלקו עליה‬regarding Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel and if
they are the same as the Zugos why the limiting nature of the question?

Reliance and the Authority of the Chachomim and Tradition:

According to Solomon Zeitlin, the subject of the Zugos's dispute is not over physical Semicha on
an animal, rather it is over the reliance on and the authority of the Chahcomim. In other words,

31
how much to be "‫ "סומך‬on the Chachomim's traditions and innovations in Halacha. He attempts to
prove this dispute transcended all five generations of Zugos by identifying identifying Halachos
each of them said and showing how they can be attributed to their views of how much or, if at all,
to rely on the changing traditions of the Chachomim.particular statements of Halachos each of
them said and showing how they can be attributed to their views over reliance on the Chachomim.
One cogent point he makes is that according to his understanding, we can add Mishna 2:2 to the
prior set of Mishanyos dealing with the types and nature of Torah Shel Ba'al Peh, i.e., this Mishna
concludes that grouping. Solomon Zeitlin, The Semikah Controversy between the Zugoth, JQR,
New Series 4:4 pp 499-517. For Zeitlin's exposition on Shammai and Hillel's dispute over Semicha
on Yom Tov see, Solomon Zeitlin, The Semikah COntorversy between the School of Shammai
and Hillel, JQR, New Series, 56:3 pp. 240-244.

Laying of hands at time of Ordination:

Some scholars have suggested that the preserved dispute is whether or not rabbinic ordination
required the laying of the hands on the student's head. The ambiguity can be seen in the differing
interpretations given by traditional commentators to the opening line of Mishna 1:3 in Sanhedrin.
There is says, ‫ ִדְּבֵרי ַרִבּי ִשְׁמעוֹן‬,‫ ִבְּשׁ¸ָשׁה‬,‫ְסִמיַכת ְזֵק ִנים ַוֲﬠ ִריַפת ֶﬠְגָלה‬. Many of the commentators, taking
their que from the Gemara and the context of the Mishna, understand the Mishna to be referring
to Semicha on a Korban. Specifically, the special Korban brought by the Court when a wrongful
ruling is relied and acted upon by the majority of the people. The Rambam, on the other hand,
interprets our Mishna as referring to Rabbinic Ordination. Others, including the R"AV and Yachin
suggest that the Mishna is referring to both scenarios. Either way, it highlights the ambiguity of
the term Samach.12

Traditionalist Views:

Even among those who accept the traditional interpretation that the Zugos' controversy is over
Semicha on an animal, they nonetheless dispute the contours and the particulars of the dispute.

• Zecharias Frankel, Darchei HaMishna, Breslau pp. 43-44 suggests that while the dispute
may have started over the appropriateness of Semicha on Yom Tov, as noted above,
underlying that that dispute was how you viewed the core obligation of Semicha. Was it
simply the preferred way to bring a Korban or was it obligatory? Allowing Semicha on
Yom Tov meant it was likely obligatory and if obligatory, that meant those who lived far
from the Beis HaMikdash could not send Korbonos. [per the Gemarah eve according to
Beis Shammai they could perform Semicha the day before--but perhaps he does not read
that into the Mishna.] According to Frankel, this dispute proved wider and enveloped
Korbonos throughout the year. The Chachomim, rather than resolving the issue, allowed it
to remain an open question thus allowing each individual to choose whether to come and
perform Semicha or send his Korban to the Beis HaMikdash without performing Semicha.

12
See sources and rebuttal at Lawrence A. Hoffman, The Origins of Ordination, in Rabbinic Authority, Papers Presented before he
Ninety-First Annual Convention of the Central Conference of American Rabbis ("CCAR"), Vol. XC, Part Two, Ed., Elliot L.
Stevens, CCAR Press 1982, pp. 71-94 notes 1-10.

32
• Isaac Hersh Weiss, Dor Dor V'Dorshav, Vol. 1, pp 98, takes exception to Frankel's
limitation and argues that the controversy was over Semicha on Yom Tov and the reason
it lasted so long was that it was, in part, the prototype for the developing disputes among
the Peirushim and Tziddukim. At its core, the Machlokes whether to perform Semicha in
the face of a Rabbinic prohibition. Pitting the Biblical imperative against the Rabbinic
injunction.

• Yaakov Halevy, Otzar Nechmad, Vol. 3, Isaac Blumenfeld editor, Wien, 1860, pp. 27-40,
takes this to the extreme, identifying the dispute in our Mishna as a vestige of a dispute
with the Essene's. According to Blumenfeld, the Essene's viewed themselves as always
being ritually impure, preventing them from approaching the Beis HaMikdash and bringing
a Korban. Recognizing, however, that to completely disengage from the Temple ritual
would mean cutting themselves off from the entirety of the Jewish nation, they needed to
figure out a way to still bring Korbonos. This was not only an issue for the Festivals, but
for everyday life. The major impediment was the obligation to perform Semicha
immediately prior to the slaughtering of the animal--an impossibility for the Essenes.
However, if they could reinterpret the obligation to one of discretionary conduct, they could
then send their Korbonos to the Beis HaMikdash. This line of thinking is rather extreme
and also is problematic as he takes the liberty of identifying many of the Tanaim in our
Misha as being Essenes.

• E. E. Halevy, Tarbiz, Teves 5719, pp. 154-157: views the controversy from a sociological
perspective. [Some of this is incorporated above in my explanation of the sources]. It is
clear that Semicha was an integral part of the Korban process. It was the most participatory
aspect of the Korban and, therefore, the most meaningful. In the absence of being able to
perform Semicha the people stopped bringing Korbonos, hence the desolation of the Beis
HaMikdash even though everyone agreed they could bring Shelamim. He goes one step
further and suggests that at its core, the Machlokes between the Zugos and Beis Shammai
and Beis Hillel was over the character of the Beis HaMikdash during the Festivals. Would
it have a somber and staid feel in line with the auspicious nature of the day or would it have
a more carnivalesque feel with multitudes streaming in through the gates with their
Korbonos, creating a ruckus and much joyous atmosphere. Those who wanted the former,
understood that limiting the performance of Semicha would have the natural effect of
drastically limiting the quantum and quantity of Korbonos. In other words, the prohibition
or permissibility of Semicha was a proxy for their perception as to and over the nature of
the Beis HaMikdash on the Yomim Tovim.

33
 • Chanoch Albeck, Shisha Sidre Mishna, Moed, p. 511, collecting and rejecting various
interpretations and upholding the traditional view.

• Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Kapshutah, Vol. 5, pp 1200, citing Albeck, E.E Halevy and
Yaakov Halevy favorably.

CONFRONTING KORBANOT13

R A B B I S H M U E L G O L D I N W R I T E S : 14

13
Unlocking the Torah Text: Leviticus, [Gefen Publishing House & OU Press, Jerusalem, Israel, 2013]

14
https://lessons.myjli.com/why/index.php/2016/11/02/confronting-korbanot/

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 Context

With the opening of the Book of Vayikra, we enter the world of korbanot.[1] In chapter upon
chapter of text, God commands the newly formed Jewish nation, encamped at the foot of Mount
Sinai, concerning the rituals that will define the sacrificial rite in the Sanctuary.

Questions

The very existence of korbanot creates a powerful quandary. On the one hand, no area of Torah
law seems more alien to modern sensibilities than that of korbanot. As we confront the Torah’s
sacrificial rites, we find ourselves at a total loss, unable to relate to these seemingly primitive
rituals, wondering why an all-powerful, incorporeal God would demand the offering of animals
and grain in His worship. On the other hand, we cannot deny that the sacrificial rites are an integral
part of Jewish law. Not only are substantial portions of Torah text dedicated to detailed descriptions
of korbanot, but these rituals apparently remain, to this day, a critical component of our national
aspirations and dreams. Jewish liturgy is replete with prayers seeking the rebuilding of the Temple
and the reinstatement of the sacrifices. An honest approach towards the Torah text demands that
we not ignore the existence of korbanot. The questions raised by these puzzling rituals must be
dealt with head-on. Why does God demand offerings of animals and grain as part of His worship?
An all-powerful, transcendent God certainly has no need for physical gifts from man. Do the
Torah-mandated sacrificial rites speak to us, on any level, today? Can any relevant lessons be
learned from these seemingly archaic rituals? Do we really desire a return to the practice
of korbanot?

Approaches

1. Historical Development

Our analysis begins, as it should, at the beginning, with a brief review of the historical development
of korbanot as described in the Torah. This review reveals a number of surprising and significant
points.

A The first textually recorded physical offering to God is brought during the second generation of
man’s existence by Kayin, the eldest son of Adam and Chava. Kayin is promptly followed in this
act by his brother, Hevel.[2] As we have noted previously (see Bereishit: Bereishit
3, Approaches D), the Torah’s testimony concerning God’s selective acceptance of these offerings
is particularly telling: “And God turned to Hevel and to his offering, but to Kayin and to his
offering He did not turn.”[3] The language seems superfluous.

The Torah could have made its point by simply stating, “And God turned to Hevel’s offering while
to Kayin’s offering He did not turn.” Why specify that God turns to “Hevel and to his offering”
but not to “Kayin and to his offering”? Apparently, with the very advent of man’s physical
offerings to the Divine, God wants to establish that He will not consider these rituals in a vacuum.
God does not “accept” or “reject” korbanot or, for that matter, any ritual observance, arbitrarily.
He bases His judgments upon the motivations and actions of the supplicant. While the Torah is not
clear why, something in Hevel’s behavior moves God to accept him and his offering. Conversely,

35
Kayin’s conduct apparently merits divine rejection. Kayin is unable or unwilling to appreciate the
ramifications of this rejection.

Paralyzed in the face of the divine demand for personal introspection and behavioral change, he
instead lashes out against his brother, with tragic consequences. With the first appearance of ritual
worship in the Torah, God immediately places such worship in its proper context. Through a
seemingly simple turn of phrase, He communicates that He does not seek meaningless, arbitrary
acts from man, but, instead, thought-filled, meaningful religious devotion (see Bereishit: Bereishit
3).

B Another telling, continuing pattern is initiated in the Torah with the offerings of Kayin and
Hevel. From this point on, until the birth of the Jewish nation with the Exodus from
Egypt, all korbanot emerge in the Torah as man-initiated events. Driven by a desire to
communicate with an unfathomable God, early man, of his own accord, develops a sacrificial rite.
Noach, Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov each voluntarily bring offerings to God. At no point does
God demand any of these sacrifices. The only two possible exceptions to this rule prove, upon
analysis, not to be exceptions at all.

1. During the Brit bein Habetarim, the Covenant between the Pieces, God commands
Avraham to slaughter a series of animals and divide each animal into two. “Passing
through” the pieces, God then reveals to Avraham a prophetic vision of the Israelites’
eventual descent into bondage and their ultimate redemption.[4]

On a level of pshat, however, the scholars maintain that the animals used in this ritual are not
offerings in the classical sense. Rashi, for example, explains that, as God enacts a covenant with
Avraham, He employs symbolism common to the society of the time. “It was the custom of those
involved in a covenant to divide animals and to pass through them.”[5]

2. During Avraham’s most dramatic test, Akeidat Yitzchak (the aborted sacrifice of Yitzchak),
God commands the patriarch to “raise” his son as an offering on the summit of Mount Moriah.
This “offering,” however, never takes place. Avraham is stopped at the last moment by a heavenly
angel.[6]

While the true purpose of the Akeida remains an ongoing subject of discussion (see Bereishit:
Vayeira 4), one aspect of the event remains unchallenged. The only offering actually brought on
the summit of Mount Moriah occurs after Yitzchak is spared. At that point Avraham, of his own
initiative, offers a ram “in place of his son.”[7] Once again, the korban actually offered is not
commanded by God.

C Everything changes, however, centuries later, on the eve of the Exodus from Egypt. As the
Egyptians brace for the final, devastating plague, the Israelites retreat, upon God’s command, to
their homes. There, in separate family meals, they participate in the first God-commanded sacrifice
recorded in the Torah: the Korban Pesach.[8]

Simultaneous with the birth of the Jewish nation, a divinely ordained sacrificial rite is “born.”
Beginning with that event, korbanot became an integral part of Jewish tradition. Why do things
change so dramatically with the birth of the Jewish nation? Why, at this point,

36
are korbanot transformed from man-initiated to God-commanded rituals? Why does God now
desire korbanot? Answers to these questions are suggested in the deliberations of the rabbis.

1. Philosophical Approaches
A Two separate approaches proposed by the Rambam are central to the rabbinic discussion
of korbanot.

1. In his halachic magnum opus, the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam

categorizes korbanot as chukim, mitzvot for which no reason is given in the Torah. While
one is encouraged to seek meaning in such mitzvot, says the Rambam, God’s true reasoning
may well remain elusive. Shrouded in mystery, chukim such as korbanot emerge as a true
test of our loyalty to God’s will.[9]

2. In his Guide to the Perplexed, however, the Rambam offers a vastly different, rational
approach to the inclusion of korbanot in Jewish law.

Many phenomena in the Torah, he maintains, are based upon the principle that abrupt major change
in human behavior is impossible. Man simply cannot journey immediately “from one extreme to
the other” (see Shmot: Ki Tissa 2, Approaches A). God cannot expect the Israelites, reared in
idolatrous surroundings replete with sacrificial rite, to totally reject rituals that they have come to
see as necessary for communion with the Divine.

He therefore commands his chosen people to sanctify the profane by adapting aspects of the
prevailing sacrificial rite to His worship within the Sanctuary. From this
perspective, korbanot emerge as a divine concession to man’s need. The Israelites’ difficult
transition to their newfound faith is eased through the incorporation of a familiar ritual
path.[10] While the Rambam’s rational explanation for korbanot in the Guide to the
Perplexed sets off a firestorm of controversy among his contemporaries and later scholars (see
below), his observations may not be as revolutionary as they seem.

The Rambam’s theories, according to some authorities,[11] are actually foreshadowed in an earlier
Midrashic source recorded in Vayikra Rabba: Rabbi Pinchas said in the name of Rabbi Levi: The
matter [of sacrifices] can be compared to the story of a prince whose haughtiness leads him to the
consumption of despicable substances. The king determines: “Let my son attend my table regularly
and he will abstain [from his evil doing] of his own accord.” Similarly, because the Israelites were
drawn to idolatrous practices in Egypt and regularly sacrificed to pagan deities, the Holy One
Blessed Be He declared: “Let them offer their sacrifices before Me at all times in the Sanctuary
and they will separate themselves from idolatry.”[12]

Even the Torah text itself seems to lend credence to the Rambam’s approach with the following
commandment concerning the centrality of the Temple service: “And they shall bring [their
offerings] to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to the Kohen . . . and they shall no longer slaughter
their offerings to the demons after whom they stray. . . .”[13] Finally, the Rambam’s suggestions

37
also find support in the earlier described historical development of korbanot in the Torah.
Sacrifices emerge as man, of his own initiative, determines a mode of communication with the
Divine (see above). With the birth of the Jewish nation, God recognizes the Israelites’ continuing
need for such symbolic communication and allows for the retention of the sacrificial rite in his
newly given law.

B Many authorities defend the Rambam’s rational explanation for the existence of korbanot in
Jewish law.[14] Numerous other scholars, however, remain severely critical of the Rambam’s
approach, unwilling to categorize the Torah’s extensive, detailed sacrificial rite as a concession to
human frailties. After dismissing the Rambam’s proposals as “empty words which address a deep
concern in superficial fashion,”[15] the Ramban quotes an alternative approach for those seeking
a rational foundation for korbanot (the Ramban himself prefers a mystical approach). Sacrifices
are offered, he notes, in large measure as a response to man’s failure and sin. God, therefore,
designs the steps of the sacrificial rite to correspond to the three components of human activity
through which sin occurs: thought, words, and deeds.

Sins committed through deed are addressed through the ritual of smicha, whereby the individual
bringing the korban “lays his hands” upon the animal prior to its slaughter. Sins committed
through speech are reflected in the vidui, the verbal confession offered by each supplicant. Finally,
the sinful thoughts and desires that have coursed through the supplicant’s heart and soul are
referenced through the animal’s consumption in the fire of the altar and through the sprinkling of
its blood. As an individual witnesses and participates in these graphic rituals, he is forced to
recognize the extent of his own sinfulness and culpability. Were it not for God’s merciful
acceptance of this korban “in his stead,” the petitioner himself would have merited a place upon
the altar.[16]

C Numerous additional approaches to the concept of korbanot are offered within traditional
Jewish literature. Following are several of them. Rav Saadia Gaon maintains that the sacrificial
rite enables the Israelites to demonstrate the depth of their dedication to God by offering of the
“best of their possessions.”[17]

The Ba’al Hachinuch remains true to his general postulate that a person’s thoughts and sentiments
are shaped, in great measure, by his concrete actions. The performance of symbolic mitzvot is thus
critical to the process of attitude formation. A sinner cannot purify his heart simply through a
passive confession “between himself and the wall.” Such confession requires no real effort and,
therefore, has minimal effect. If, however, the individual is forced to act—if he becomes obligated
in a demanding series of atoning rituals; if he must select from his flock, bring his offerings to the
Sanctuary, and participate in the detailed sacrificial rite—he will then become acutely aware of the
extent of his sin and he will avoid such failure in the future.

The Ba’al Hachinuch also suggests that the very act of offering a korban reminds man of the
tenuous nature of his own superiority over the beasts of the field. Man’s distinctiveness lies in his
ability to reason. When an individual’s reasoning fails and he consequently sins, that individual
loses his status as a man and becomes no different from the animal. The Torah, therefore,
commands the sinner to offer a korban in the Sanctuary. The slaughter of the animal and the
consumption of its remains upon the altar graphically demonstrate that a “reasonless” being is
valueless and ultimately destined to destruction.

38
The depth of the supplicant’s failure and the toll of that failure upon his soul are thus
underscored.[18] For his part, the Maharal of Prague perceives the sacrificial rite, with its
intimations of mortality, as a fundamental reflection of the inconsequentiality of all creatures in
the face of God’s greatness. Nothing exists in the world except as a result of God’s kindness and
munificence.[19] Finally, numerous commentaries move beyond general explanations for the
phenomenon of korbanot and painstakingly analyze the symbolic significance of each detail of the
Temple ritual. We will encounter some of their observations in our continued analysis of the book
of Vayikra.

D Perhaps the most telling aspect of the Torah’s sacrificial rite, however, is the most obvious: the
vast majority of korbanot are simply not “sacrifices” in the commonly accepted sense. With
singular exceptions (such as the Olah, the burnt offering, which is consumed in its entirety upon
the altar), portions of every korban are designated as food for the Kohanim, their dependents
and/or the individuals bringing the offering to the Temple.

Even more, the very first obligatory korban recorded in the Torah, the Korban Pesach of the
Exodus, was, in its entirety, a family meal (see above, I, Approaches C). No altar was present, no
Temple service involved. The Israelites were, instead, commanded, on the eve of the Exodus, to
physically consume the Paschal Lamb within the sanctity of their homes and to burn the remainder
in the morning. What then, defines the Paschal Lamb as a korban?

How does this puzzling, seminal ritual set the stage for the entire sacrificial rite to follow? Why
were portions of so many of the later korbanot designated as food? Shouldn’t each korban have
been a true offering to God, consumed entirely in flames upon the altar? We are forced, it would
seem, to reexamine our understanding of korbanot. In contrast to classical “sacrifices,” consumed
entirely on the altar, korbanot were, in large measure, shared meals with God.

Faced with the naturally developing distance between man and his Creator, forced to address the
separation from God that results from sin, the Torah proposes a path, astoundingly profound in its
simplicity: invite God to your table. A korban, deriving from the root word karov, “to draw near”
(see Vayikra 1, note 1), is the mechanism through which an individual can begin to repair and
reestablish his relationship with a personal God. Just as, in the human realm, a shared meal is a
powerful relational tool, so too, a meal consumed with God’s symbolic participation can begin to
address His estrangement from our lives.

Consumed with pomp and circumstance in the very shadow of the Holy Temple—with some
portions placed upon the altar and others shared with the priests and, often, with the supplicants
themselves—each korban became a potentially powerful rehabilitative tool. God’s presence as an
invited, honored guest was palpable and concrete. To the participants these observances were far
from meaningless rituals. They were, instead, shared meals with God, the first steps back to a fuller
awareness of the Divine in their lives.

E What, however, of the future? Do we truly anticipate a return to sacrifices, as maintained in our
prayers? Or is the sacrificial rite rooted in a past from which our nation has moved on? The vast
majority of classical Jewish thinkers insist that our final redemption will feature not only the
rebuilding of the Temple but a full return to the sacrificial rite. Particularly noteworthy is the
position of the Rambam.

39
In spite of this scholar’s willingness to postulate the origin of korbanot as a concession to man’s
limitations (see above, II, Approaches A), he gives no indication that this earthly origin limits the
future applicability of these rituals. After dedicating major portions of his Mishneh Torah, his
practical compendium of laws, to the strictures surrounding korbanot, the Rambam clearly states
towards the end of that work: The Messianic king is destined to rise in the future and reestablish
the Kingdom of David, to build the Temple and to gather the dispersed of Israel. In his day, all the
laws will return to their original state. Korbanot will be offered [my italics],
the Shmita and Yovel years will be observed. . . . Anyone who does not believe this, or does not
await his [the Mashiach’s] arrival, not only denies the words of the prophets but denies the Torah
and Moshe, our teacher.[20]

A solitary alternative position is raised by the first chief rabbi of the State of Israel, Rabbi Avraham
Yitzchak Hacohen Kook. After first maintaining that “with regard to sacrifices it is correct to
believe that all aspects will be restored to their place,” Rav Kook builds on kabbalistic literature
and envisions a “distant time” when all aspects of the world will be elevated. At that time, he
states, humans will no longer need to take the lives of animals for their physical, moral, or spiritual
needs.

The prophet Malachi perhaps references this future period when he states, “Then the grain
offering of Judah and Jerusalem will be pleasing to God as in the days of old and as in former
years.”[21] Strikingly absent from Malachi’s vision is the reinstatement of animal offerings. The
Midrash seems to go even further with the startling prediction “All sacrifices will be nullified in
the future.”[22]

To further strengthen his position, Kook identifies a series of clues within the Torah itself which
he claims reflect the secondary status of animal sacrifices. These offerings remain appropriate as
long as man makes use of animals for other needs, such as food and clothing. The time will come,
however, when man, reaching his highest state of refinement, will no longer feel the need to take
animal life for any purpose. At that point, only grain sacrifices will be offered in the Temple.[23]

Points to Ponder
A number of years ago I fielded a strange phone call in my synagogue office. “I represent,” the
caller said, “a group of Korean Christian ministers who, in the interest of studying comparative
religions, would very much like to visit your synagogue during a Sabbath morning service.” I was
immediately struck by two concerns.

Firstly, I wondered how my congregation would react when a group of Korean Christian ministers
walked in, en masse, without warning one Shabbat morning. Secondly, and more importantly, I
wondered what the ministers themselves, absent prior preparation, would make of our service.
They would not understand the language; the rituals would be alien and difficult to follow; and, to
top matters off, the apparent lack of decorum would be startling (this was before our synagogue’s
successful efforts at decorum improvement).

How would these ministers respond, for example, to children running up and down the aisles, to
groups of adults talking at various points and on various topics during the service? The entire

40
prospect carried, it seemed to me, potential for disaster. I therefore made a stipulation. The group
would be welcome, I said, as long as they were willing to come to the synagogue beforehand for
a private briefing with me. At that time, I would explain the various symbols within the sanctuary,
the nature of our service and our approach to prayer. We would then schedule and announce their
Shabbat visit to the community, thus preparing my congregation for their appearance.

The caller readily agreed, and the date was set for my preliminary meeting with the group at the
synagogue. Having spoken before to groups of other faiths about Judaism, I knew that I had to be
prepared for the unexpected during the question period that would inevitably follow my
presentation. It is always difficult, and at the same time refreshing, to view our traditions through
the eyes of total outsiders.

On one such previous occasion, for example, the first question raised by a group of Catholic
schoolchildren was, “What is the significance of the different colored skullcaps that you wear? Do
they represent a hierarchy within your tradition?” Armed by this time with years of experience,
however, I felt prepared for whatever might come my way. Early on a Thursday morning,
therefore, I found myself in conversation with a group of roughly twenty Korean Christian
ministers in the main sanctuary of my synagogue.

After reviewing some of the philosophical and practical particulars of our Shabbat service and
after showing them various ritual items such as the Torah scroll, the aron kodesh and the ner tamid,
I opened the floor for questions. There was a moment of silence , , , Suddenly a hand shot up:
“Rabbi, where do you do the animal sacrifices?” “What?” I stammered, caught completely off
guard. “Where do you do the animal sacrifices?” Regaining my composure, I began to explain that
animal sacrifices were indeed a part of our tradition but that they had been suspended since the
destruction of the Temple.

My visitors, however, would not let go. For forty-five minutes they continued to pepper me with
educated questions concerning animal sacrifices, convinced that somewhere, somehow, I was
hiding a goat or cow in the basement of the synagogue. Halfway through the session, I began to
realize what was really happening. The assumptions of my guests actually said more about the
foundations of their own faith tradition than about mine. Fundamentalist Christians, these ministers
were driven by a simple developmental equation. Man, tainted with sin, cannot relate to God
directly.

To address this basic problem, the “Old Testament,” therefore, prescribes a Temple rite in which
offerings of animals and grain enable man to gain atonement and approach an unfathomable God.
These sacrifices serve as “substitutes” upon the altar, taking the place of the sinners themselves
and redeeming them from sin. Upon entering the world stage, however, Christianity moves past
the “primitive” Temple rite by substituting the death of Jesus for the sacrifices. When Jesus “dies
for the sins of man,” he replaces the animals on the altar and becomes the essential intermediary
between limited man and a limitless God.

The possibility that Judaism could be practiced without sacrifices was, therefore, to the minds of
my guests, simply unthinkable. Given our lack of belief in Jesus, how else could we relate to an
unreachable God? Only a Judaism incorporating sacrifices as intermediaries between man and the
Divine could serve as a precursor to their own faith system.

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No amount of persuasion on my part could, therefore, convince my guests of Judaism’s
fundamental belief in a direct relationship with God without intermediary. No explanation of the
sacrificial rite as symbolic or educational in purpose could sway them from their firm assumptions.
While my guests and I parted ways agreeing to disagree, and while their Shabbat visit to my
congregation a few weeks later went without a hitch, their powerfully mistaken assumptions
concerning korbanot have haunted me for years. Not because they need to know the truth, but
because we do.

I find myself wondering. . . . How many of my students or congregants would have been able to
respond to the questions raised by the ministers who visited my synagogue those many years ago?
How many Jews today give even a second thought to the purpose and significance of the sacrificial
rite within our tradition?

We understandably avoid confrontation with elements of our tradition which, like korbanot, are
difficult to comprehend and uncomfortable to encounter. Such evasion, however, cedes the
intellectual high ground to those who would challenge our beliefs and question our traditions. As
our brief study of korbanot has demonstrated, every element of the Torah is filled with relevant
meaning and message.

We avoid the discovery and study of those messages to our own detriment and at our own risk.

NOTES

[1] The term korban is usually translated as “sacrifice” or “offering.” As will become clear in this study, however, these
translations do not do the concept justice. The root of the term korban literally means “to draw near.” Korbanot are, therefore,
rituals through which the supplicant attempts to “draw near” to an unfathomable God. For want of a better alternative, however,
we will initially use the popular translations in our text.

[2] Bereishit 4:3–4. While the Talmud does maintain that Adam offered korbanot (Talmud Bavli Avoda Zara 8a) we will limit
our discussion to the evidence of textual pshat (straightforward explanation of the Torah text).

[3] Bereishit 4:4–5.

[4] Ibid., 15:9–16.

[5] Rashi, Bereishit 15:10.

[6] Bereishit 22:1–12.

[7] Ibid., 22:13.

[8] Shmot 12:3–28.

[9] Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Meila 8:8; Hilchot Temura 4:13.

[10] Rambam, Moreh Nevuchim 30:32.

[11] Abravanel, introduction to Vayikra, chapter 4. Note: Other authorities maintain that this Midrash does not support the
Rambam’s views but only suggests that involvement with Torah ritual will inevitably result in abstinence from idolatrous
practices (see Rabbi David Zvi Hoffman, Sefer Vayikra [Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1972], pp. 60–61).

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[12] Midrash Rabba Vayikra 22:7–8.

[13] Vayikra 17:5–7.

[14] Ritva, Sefer Hazikaron, Parshat Vayikra; Abravanel, introduction to Vayikra, chapter 4.

[15] Ramban, Vayikra 1:9.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Emunot V’deiot 3:10.

[18] Sefer Hachinuch, mitzva 95.

[19] Sefer Gevurot Hashem 5:69.

[20] Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 11:1.

[21] Malachi 3:4.

[22] Midrash Rabba Vayikra 9:7.

[23] Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Hacohen Kook, Otzrot Hare’aya, vol. 2, pp. 101–103; Olat Re’aya, vol. 1, p. 292.

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