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Hazard Identification of Railway Signali
Hazard Identification of Railway Signali
org International Journal of Automation and Power Engineering (IJAPE) Volume 2 Issue 2, February 2013
Hazard Identificaiton of Railway Signaling
System Using PHA and HAZOP Methods
Jong‐Gyu Hwang*1, Hyun‐Jeong Jo2
On‐demand Transit Research Team, Korea Railroad Research Institute, Uiwang‐si, Gyeonggi‐do, Soutn Korea
*1 jghwan@krri.re.kr; 2hjjo@krri.re.kr
Abstract system life cycle is necessary. This hazard control
Railway signaling system requires the high level of safety activity is consisted of various stages such as hazard
since these have to ensure safe operation of the train. identification stage, hazard risk assessment stage,
According to these reason, safety‐related regulations for hazard risk control stage, etc. reflecting them to the
railway signaling systems are internationally standardized. design on the basis of results of this hazard and risk
To secure the safety required by international standards, the analysis. To draw the hazard which is the basis of
hazard control is necessary with system lifecycle, and the whole hazard activities among these various stages,
hazard identification is needed to hazard control. To draw the application of PHA and HAZOP method is highly
this hazard which is the basis of whole hazard control, there
recommended (HR: Highly Recommend) for the
are very many techniques such as PHL(Preliminary Hazard
List), PHA(Preliminary Hazard Analysis), HAZOP,
hazard analysis on railway system in the IEC 62425,
FMEA(Failure Mode Effect Analysis), etc. in the activities which is the international standard. In addition, these
and methods. The PHA and HAZOP method is two methods are highly recommended by the Yellow
recommended for hazard analysis at IEC standards, but this Book also which corresponds to the guideline to safety
method has several unsuitable problems to apply to railway activities of British railway system[RailTrack, 2000].
signaling system. In this paper we recommend the modified Among these two techniques, PHA is methods to
HAZOP method, which would be suitable for analyzing identify the early stage hazard, and the HAZOP are
safety of the railway signaling systems. And also an example used as detailed methods to draw hazards based on
of PHA and this method applied to real system is also
the hazard drawn at the early stage. The HAZOP
included.
technique is the formalized technology to draw the
Keywords hazard, and there are cases where HAZOP methods
RailwaySignaling System; PHA; HAZOP were applied in some preceding studies in Korea to
draw the hazard of railway signaling systems.
Introduction
However, since HAZOP method which was
The electronic and computerized railway signaling standardized internationally[IEC 61882, 2001][Redmill,
systems have replaced the existing mechanical systems, 1997] has been initially designed and developed in the
resulting in intelligent and automatic high‐ chemical plant industry, its effect and efficiency of
performance systems. For the existing electrical and application are declined due to the elements not
mechanical systems, empirical approaches and suitable for applying existing parameters and guide
engineerʹs intuition are mainly used to identify any words to railway signaling systems as they
faults, assuring a certain degree of safety in the are[Sirnivasan, 1998][M.U.Noh, 2001][Venkat, 2000],
railway signaling systems. However, the new E.Habibi]. Therefore, this paper proposed parameters
computerized railway signaling systems do not allow and guide words possible to be applied to the hazard
the safety assurance based on such empirical analysis of railway signaling system effectively while
approaches to detect faults. Therefore, IEC maintaining existing HAZOP method, and it was
(International Electrotechnical Commission) requires named as HAZOP‐R(HAZOP for Railway Signaling)
more rigorous safety activities to assure the safety in in this paper[KRRI, 2011][J.G.Hwang,2010].
the railway signaling systems[IEC 61508, 1998][IEC
The hazard identification is the basic activity in hazard
62278, 2002] [IEC 62425, 2005].
management procedure. It is impossible to delete or
To secure the safety required by international mitigate of hazards in system development lifecycle, if
standards, the hazard control in accordance with the the hazards were not identified. This paper studied
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International Journal of Automation and Power Engineering (IJAPE) Volume 2 Issue 2, February 2013 www.ijape.org
application technology of PHA method to draw the PHA are methods to identify the early stage hazard,
initial hazard which is the most fundamental stage and the FMEA and HAZOP are used as detailed
and HAZOP‐R method to the railway signaling methods to draw hazards based on the hazard drawn
systems to identify concretely the initial hazards. And at the early stage.
also the results of consequence analysis on identified
hazards by ETA (Event Tree Analysis) were
represented.
FIG. 2 SAFETY ACTIVITY PROCEDURE WITHR SYSTEM LIFE‐
CYCLE FOR SIGNALING SYSTEM
FIG. 1 HAZARD MANAGEMENT PROCEDURE Among these techniques, PHA and HAZOP
FIG. 1 is the one showing the process of safety activity techniques are the well‐used method to identify the
in this aspect of hazard management briefly. That is, hazard, and IEC 62425 which is the international
the safety activity of system requires the identification standard related with the safety of railway signaling
of hazard, hazard risk evaluation, and the hazard risk system and the Yellow Book of Bitish railways
control to manage it at the allowable level shown by recommend to utilizing it as the means for hazard
the hazard, and its verification process. This process analysis. PHA is methods to identify the early stage
will be carried out repeatedly until the feedback of hazard, and the HAZOP are used as detailed methods
each stage is always done and the hazard is drawn, to draw hazards based on the hazard drawn at the
controlled to make it to the allowable level and early stage. The PHA is method to identify the early
validated. stage hazard, and the HAZOP is used as detailed
methods to draw hazards based on the hazard drawn
FIG. 2 is the one showing the safety activity stage for at the early stage. But the general HAZOP technique
signaling systems drawn through relevant has some weakness to apply as it is to railway
international standards and analysis on the preceding signaling, we proposed the modified HAZOP
studies, etc., and it is the FIGure showing the technique and applied to identified the hazards in this
comparison with each stage of system life cycle paper.
presented in the IEC 62278, and the main outputs by
The identified hazards from above two methods have
each stage of safety activity together.
to be analyzed the consequence to obtain the deleted
As explained previously, the hazard management or mitigated measures on hazard risk. The
activity of signaling system is based on the consequence analysis on identified hazards was
identification of hazard, and it is the procedure where executed using ETA(Event Tree Analysis) method.
drawn hazard is analyzed and controlled. There are This paper studied application technology of PHA and
very many techniques such as PHL(Preliminary HAZOP technique to the signaling systems to draw
Hazard List), PHA, HAZOP, FMEA(Failure Mode the hazard which is the most fundamental stage in
Effect Analysis), etc. in the activities and methods to safety activities, and ETA to analyze the hazard
draw this hazard. Among these techniques, PHL and consequence.
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International Journal of Automation and Power Engineering (IJAPE) Volume 2 Issue 2, February 2013 www.ijape.org
TABLE 1 PARAMETERS FOR HAZOP‐R TABLE 2 GUIDE WORD FOR HAZOP‐R
Guide
No. Parameter Description Description Related parameter
word
No, Not, There is no defined Interface, Time, Action,
None parameter. Limit, Procedure, Data
․Data interface between wayside equipment and
on‐board equipment Performed or considered Action, Procedure,
Part of
partly Outside, Data
․Communication interface between the wayside Performed earlier than
operator and vehicle driver Early Time, Action, Data
defined time
1 Interface Performed later than
․Data interface between sub‐systems Late Time, Action, Data
defined time
․Data interface between related systems Excess and increase of the
More Limit, Data
variables
․Communication interface between the wayside
Shortage and decrease of
operator (system) and maintainer Less Limit
the variables
Interface, Action, Limit,
Other than Abnormal parameter
․Train operation time based on the train schedule Procedure, Outside, Data
․Operation time of the on‐site facilities When defining deviations in the train control systems
2 Time in combination with parameters and guide words
․Software data processing time
defined previously, it is like TABLE 3.
․Generally defined time
TABLE 3 DEVIATION FOR HAZOP‐R
Devi
․Operation of operator, driver, maintainer No Part of Early Late More Less Other
ation
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FIG. 3 BLOCK DIAGRAM OF CRD SYSTEMS AS A TARGET
SYSTEM
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control and DCM(Distance Control Module) which is Hazard 2 : Another train was entered within the
in charge of the train protection function such as train permitted movement authority
distance control. The actual conFIGuration of CRD
Hazard 3 : Direction of point machine was
system is shown FIG. 4.
converted during the movement of train
Prelimilary Hazard Analysis Hazard 4 : Train driving too fast at the abnormal
PHA analysis technique is the starting stage of hazard speed
control which finds out and analyzes hazards possible TABLE 4 PHA RESULTS ON HAZARD‐2 OF CRD SYSTEMS
to be occurred in each of the systems. PHA will
Hazard Causes Effect Mitigation
analyze potential hazards which can be occurred in
the system by drawing hazards to be drawn in the Perform the validation
preliminary design stage. Analysis is performed on the on block setup,
Failure in setting the validation on train
basis of higher level documents for the function and permitted movement
Train
location, and validation
collision
conFIGuration of target system and the entire interface Hazard‐2 : authority of train on train status to set the
of human being with other systems. Hazard analysis Another permitted movement
train was authority.
activity to be performed during the PHA process shall entered
perform the initial stage evaluation on the severity of within the Receive information on
drawn hazards and frequency of occurrence. Results permitted Failure in train brake Train the on‐board equipment
movement (emergency brake) collision status continuously and
are used to determine where the quantified analysis
authority supervise it.
will be necessary in the future, and they make the
complete analysis and risk evaluation possible to be Failure in
Train Perform the validation
identification of train
performed through repetition and complementation collision on train location.
location
according to the progress in detailed design of system.
The start of PHA analysis is the PHL which is the HAZOP‐R
collection of identified hazards, and PHA analyzes
The result of HAZOP for the train operating in the
these hazards in more details. Additionally, design
direction of route that is not the defined route, which
information is compared with the hazard checklist to
is the first hazard, is shown in TABLE 7. Causes and
identify the hazard which was not predicted in
measures against situations where the entry of train
advance. And the PHA output includes the design
into the wrong route and the movement of train in the
method which was established to remove or mitigate
wrong direction can be occurred due to the failure in
identified hazards and system safety requirements.
control of train route, which is one of the main
Since PHA starts in the early stage of project in the
functions of CRD system, were established. Total of
design stage, the usable data are in the incomplete
three parameters applicable to the hazard and two
level. In case where these incomplete data are
guide words were applied. And they were analyzed as
modified and complemented, they must be modified
the case where the information on train location
and added in the next stage accordingly.
cannot be identified due to the interruption of
After drawing hazards, the process which establishes interface between CRD and train or where the
causes and measures against them must be performed. movement authority cannot be transmitted, and as the
Since it is the stage where the design was not cases caused by the abnormal operation of point
accomplished concretely yet, the measure to be machine and abnormal control command.
established cannot be detailed also.
The hazard analysis through HAZOP‐R made the
We drew the highest level 4 hazards for hazard highest hazard of CRD system which was drawn from
analysis as follows with CRD system based on the definition on the highest function as its target for
explained in the previous PHA analysis as its target. analysis. After this hazard identification, consequence
Among of them, an example hazard is shows in analysis by identified hazard will be executed through
TABLE 5. Among them, one example hazard is shown ETA method on it, and it will go through a process to
in TABLE 5. hazard management. And it will go through the stage
Hazard 1 : Train was entered into the abnormal where the allocated safety requirement, and the
route mitigation technologies presented in the course of
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Conse
Physical measures such as the technical
Param Guid Deviat
e
eter word ion
Causes Description quenc Mitigation diagnosis, warning, control, and protection
es
system
Approach between
Failure in
trains cannot be
Train Emergency stop of train
Procedural engineering measures such as the
identified due to
identification of
the unavailability
collisio if it is impossible to rules, procedures, and process knowledge of
train location n interface with the train
of identifying train operator
locations
Train entered into
Not Failure in the unsafe Train Identification of
No operat switching of direction since the collisio information on failure
ed point machine point machine was n of point machine
not operated
Action Train entered into FIG. 5 CONNECTIONAL PROCESS OF CONSEQUENCE
Abnor Switching of the unsafe Identification of ANALYSIS
Train
Oth mal point machine in direction since the information on
collisio
er operati the wrong point machine was
n
failure/direction of The ETA(Event Tree Analysis) method is applied to
on direction switched in the point machine
wrong direction the consequence analysis for the identified hazards on
Omission of
CRD systems. The ETA method is known as a popular
Failure in
information on
information on Train
Redundancy design of
approach to consequence analysis of vital systems.
direction of train collisio
moving
movement from n
CRD system Result on performance of consequence analysis on
direction of train
No CRD system hazard of target evaluation system by above described
No
data
Error in setting
Setting of ETA method is as follows. Results of consequence
movement Train
movement
authority for train collisio
Redundancy design of analysis on target evaluation system Hazard‐3 were
authority for CRD system
different from the n drawn in the ratio of 30.5% for train collision, 5% for
train
train route setup
Data stoppage of train, and 64.4% for the safety status. That
Approach to the
Error in setting other train due to
Train
Redundancy design of is, the safety in the level of 70% can be guaranteed if
collisio
train route the wrong route CRD system we can cope with it systematically by receiving the
n
setup of train
Oth
Abnor speed, location and status information, etc. from the
mal Train entered into
er
data Error in the unsafe route train, even though the train enters into the abnormal
Train
command to due to the Redundancy design of
collisio route. Therefore, the most important thing in the
switch point abnormal CRD system
n
machines switching of point Hazard‐3 is to prepare the plan which can secure the
machine
interface with the train to the maximum.
Consequence Analysis of the Identified Hazards
Analysis on causes and consequences of occurrence
must be performed for the drawn hazards of target
system, and the degree of risk according to it must be
calculated. Consequence analysis to be applied to the
hazard is performed by the question like ‘what if the
hazard is occurred?’ Purpose of the consequence
analysis is to draw, record and quantify possible
consequences which can be excluded from the hazards. FIG. 6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF TARGET SYSTEM
The most important matter in the consequence HAZARD‐1
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