THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
was validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
1. De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay
election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay
Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno
as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as
members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of
February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall
commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall
have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the
ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective
and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office
by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their
term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay
Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be
deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of
the Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent
OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force
and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art
3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by
petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides
in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election
Act of 1982 should still govern.
2. Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 Phil.139 (1936)
ISSUE: Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction.
FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the
respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were
candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov.
15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election
protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that
Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that
the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of
protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme
Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
DECISION: Dismissed
​ ATIO DECIDENDI: In this case, the nature of the present controversy
R
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is
held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of
the election protest filed by Ynsua.
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
1. Bacani v. Nacoco 100 PHIL 468 (1956)
FACTS:
1. Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of
Manila. During the pendency of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293
entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO'), Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Nat’l
Coconut Corporation) , requested the said stenographers for copies of the
transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the
needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their
bills for the payment of their fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to
Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
3. Subsequently, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse
said amounts by virtue of a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO, being a
government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question.
4. Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within
the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the
defendants set up as a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity
within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
hence, exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.
No, it is not.
1. GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not
come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. While
NACOCO was organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to
a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of
providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper
utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has
chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate
power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to
the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and
the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as
any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from
our government.
2. There are functions which our government is required to exercise to
promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are
exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise
to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.
3. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between
parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property,
and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of
citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state
from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests.’
4. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public
education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of
trade and industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government
shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government
should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not
naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which
by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than
is any private individual or group of individuals.
2. PVTA v. CIR 65 SCRA 416 (1975)
Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the
increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged
overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in
accordance with CA No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and
lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to
pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is
exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is
exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary
functions.
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of
the government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the
welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between
constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of
the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered
this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.”
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them
deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental
agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced
in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its
overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of
governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily
follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of
the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner
does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.
A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155
renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed
order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself
to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime
service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of
personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear,
therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice
for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.
3. Govt. of the Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad 35 PHIL. 728
FACTS:
About $400,000 were paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the
inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damaged by the
earthquake on June 3, 1863, in the Philippines. Upon the petition of the
governing body of the respondent, the Philippine government directed its
treasurer to turn over to the respondent the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund
in installments of $20,000 each. Petitioner now brings suit to recover said
amount with interest against respondents in behalf of the various petitions of
the persons and heirs to whom the relief was intended. Defendant contends
that the amount was given as a donation and that the court erred in stating
that the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish government in its
rights.
ISSUE:
Does the government of the Philippines have authority to file a suit against
the respondent?
HELD:
The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to
enforce all charities of public nature. The court further asserted that said
amount was not a donation and that respondent is liable for the debt
regardless of the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. It is
said that there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the
inhabitants of the ceded region, however, the circumstances present in the
case are not political in nature. The great body of municipal law which
regulates private and domestic rights continue in force until they are
abrogated or changed by the new ruler. As such, the government has the
authority to file a suit on behalf of its people by virtue of the principle of
parens patriae.
4. Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 PHIL 113 (1945)
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue
the proceedings in petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation,
issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated
and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court during the
Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and that the government
established during the Japanese occupation was no de facto government.
ISSUES:1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the
Japanese occupation remain good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidate all judgments and judicial
acts and proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said
courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government
established by military forces and thus a de facto government of the second
kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are
not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed
that the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial
processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of
the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts depends
upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such
laws, not political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and
continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the
present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases, not of
political complexion.
5. People v. Gozo 53 SCRA 476 (1973)
FACTS:
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation
within the territorial jurisdiction of Olangapo City. She demolished the house
and built another one in its place without securing a building permit from the
City Mayor of Olangapo City. The City Court of Olangapo found her guilty of
violating a municipal ordinance that requires permit from the municipal mayor
for construction of building as well as any modification, repairs or demolition
thereof.
On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Gozo put in issue the validity of such
ordinance by invoking due process. She likewise questioned the applicability
of the ordinance to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval
base leased to the American Armed Forces; she contended that the
municipal government could not exercise therein-administrative jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
Whether municipal ordinance is valid?
Whether the municipal corporation retains its administrative jurisdiction over
the area where Gozo‘s house was located?
HELD:
YES, the municipal ordinance is valid. The authority to require building
permits is predicated upon the general welfare clause. Its scope is wide, well
nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public morals,
public safety, and the well-being and good order of the community.
YES, the municipal corporation retains its administrative jurisdiction over the
said area. By the agreement, the Philippine Government merely consents
that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was
given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offenses. The Philippine jurisdiction retains not only jurisdictional rights not
granted, but also such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities
for reasons of their own decline to make use of.
Moreover, the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation is the property of a
state force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal
self-determination and self-restriction. x x x A state is not precluded from
allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such
areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as
native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
dismissed, but it does not disappear. Therefore, it is with the bases under
lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement
of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
6. Laurel v. Misa 77 PHIL 856 (1947)
Facts:
In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting
on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the
theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid
and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the reason that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens
thereto was then suspended.
Issue:
Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines was then suspended
Held:
No.
Ratio:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of
the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular
government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or
society which constitute the state).
7. Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff 75 PHIL 857 (1946)
FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the
outbreak of war on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in
Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and
organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo
Area. The case at bar is a petition for prohibition praying that respondents be
commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on
the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of the
offense.
ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?
HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War
(2d). The Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had
been recognized by the United States Army. The petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII
Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides that “National Assembly
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment”. The
petitioners are in error for courts-martial are agencies of executive character
and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is
dismissed with costs.
PEOPLE
1. Moya Lim Yao v. Comm. On Immigration 41 SCRA 292
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant on 8 February 1961.
In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip
to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962.
On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was
admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or
Tagalog, except for a few words.
She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment
he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from
any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16.
Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently.
As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today,
there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to
enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called
upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but
such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or
the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is
that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial
or administrative case.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
2. Po Xo Bi v. Rep., G.R. 32398, January 27, 1992
Territory
1. R.A. No. 3046, June 17, 1961 AN ACT DEFINE THE BASELINES
OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES
2. R. A. No. 5446, September 8, 1968 AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION
ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO DEFINE THE BASELINES OF
THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES"
3. P.D. No. 1599, June 11, 1978 ESTABLISHING AN EXCLUSIVE
ECONOMIC ZONE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
4. R.A. No. 9522 – New Phils. Baseline Law
AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE
ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
5. Merlin M. Magalona et. al., vs. Eduardo Ermita, August 16, 2011
Facts:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation
lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in
consonance with UNCLOS I.
RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included
Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in
Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments,
which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of
the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and
classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of
Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the
constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in
violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of
vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy,
sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that
the classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the
fishermen.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since
it is the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief
over the remedy sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a
statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf
under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of
acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS
III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish
a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12
nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from
the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is
a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in
accordance to the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the
petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is
devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base
points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square
nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of
Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed
the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS
III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed
125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the
situation: the country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI
and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to
consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance
with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its
pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has
acquired dominion and sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the
Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522
transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime
pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless
whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the
Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation
and the generally accepted principles of international law. It can be either
passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is
deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent
passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated
thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just
signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim
all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines
enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources
within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international
community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community
will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to
determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment
was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall
backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers
to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas
around our archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step
on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest.
Government
1. Go Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh
ACTS
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First
Instance of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.The
respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the
case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the
ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect
of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines
in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Respondent
additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese
occupation were no de facto government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the
Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation
or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General
MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts.

3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending
before them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by
MacArthur’s proclamation.
Rulings:
1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The
governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto
governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of
the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative
acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer
not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as
well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto
governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the
power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using
the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer
to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration
is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes
place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of
justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the
Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not
usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered
by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation.
This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical
point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to
substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary
will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the
conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity
will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the
ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily
deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and
the government established by the occupant of transient character.
2. Lawyers League for a Better Phils. V. Aquino, May 22, 1986
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March
25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted
by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
The Supreme Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective
control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
3. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 PHIL 778
Sovereignty
1. Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 PHIL 285
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced
to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National
Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is
based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the
military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs
the constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By the principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid
from the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth?
HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the
criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law
martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental
agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was
within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate
Act No. 65. All judgments of a political complexion of the courts during
Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as
such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
2. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, supra
3. Reagan v. CIR 30 SCRA 968
Home
Constitution
William C. Reagan, Petitioner vs Commission of Internal Revenue
by
Dagitab
-
June 17, 2013
0
William C. Reagan, Petitioner vs
Commission of Internal Revenue
Facts:
The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of
Bendix Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided
technical assistance to the United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark
Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine months, before his tour
duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car which valued at
$6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported, petitioner
requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The
request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of
the United States Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.
On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for
$6600, a private in US Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill
of sale executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date William Johnson Jr.
sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a deed of sale
executed in Manila.
 The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the
personal exemption which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income
arising from such transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable
for income tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought refund from the
respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a case within the Court of
Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by
respondent from petitioner.
Ruling:
The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude from
allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional rights
over certain portions of its territory. Such areas sustain their status as native
soil and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished but it
does not disappear.
The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American
armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which states that a
“national of the US serving or employed in the Philippines in connection with
the construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the bases and
residing in the Philippines only by reason such unemployment is not to be
taxed on his income unless derived in the bases which one clearly derived
the Phil.
Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising from the
sale of his automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is within
our territory to tax.
4. Province of North Cotabato v. The Govt. of the R. P., Oct. 14,
2008: Associated State Doctrine
Facts:
Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases
bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:-
GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its
prayer to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the
public and be open for public consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and
void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the
MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare
null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those
respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment
prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and
executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or
similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and
illegal and impleading Iqbal.
The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and
between the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they
signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following
year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August
27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a
number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the
hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an
all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo
assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao
continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the
government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF
suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the
ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and
Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.

MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as
reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act
of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN
Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of
compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles,
territory, resources, and governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have
the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they
have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the
land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First
Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered
into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for
the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of
the Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM,
parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite.
The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be subject to
plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be
subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate
agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction
over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory; they
shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal
waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east
and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters,
the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of
minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into
any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall
have the option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as
environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the
GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of
the government. The BJE shall have participation in international meetings
and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN.
They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and
delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for
environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues
involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part
of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its
resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE
of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship
between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further
discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly
contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build,
develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of which shall be
discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.
Issues:
1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the
exercise of judicial review
2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later
initialed the MOA-AD; and
3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws
Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.
On the Procedural Issue
1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a
need for the exercise of judicial review.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is
the court will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or
mere academic questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is
that there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a
proposal and does not automatically create legally demandable rights and
obligations. Such was denied.
The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of
their duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states
that acts made by authority which exceed their authority, by violating their
duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes,
the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists.
When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts
made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present
controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective does
not negate ripeness.
With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the
Province of Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of
Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their
LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as
taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct
of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On
that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also
given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents
Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy
group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim
Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government
organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced
in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.
On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the
MOA-AD has already been suspended and that the President has already
disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and
academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if
it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is
of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation of
the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the
court the power to hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff is
seeking for damages or injunctive relief.
Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of
the GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is
subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional
amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case,
the government and its negotiating entity.
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the
petitions. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be
subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are
capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of
Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and
academic considering that parties have already complied thereat.

On the Substantive Issue
2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern,
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.
As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right
of the people to demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition
of the duty of the officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's
right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the
exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at
all times accountable to the people.
Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with
reasonable safeguards —the effectivity of which need not await the passing
of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in
the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive
to the people's will.
The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to
the twin rights to information and disclosure. And feedback means not only
the conduct of the plebiscite as per the contention of the respondents.
Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be consulted in
the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and
disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of
discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege
because he already waived it when he complied with the Court’s order to the
unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.
In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related
to such peace talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one
peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from
their total environment.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all
levels on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies.
The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should
have observed the free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it
failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority
exercised by the respondent—since they allowed delineation and recognition
of ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and compromise; such power
cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect.
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no
question that they cannot be all accommodated under the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them:
On matters of the Constitution.
Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties.
The parties manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was
adapted from the international law. In international law, association happens
when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one
state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal,
while maintaining its international status as state; free association is a middle
ground between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many
provisions that are consistent with the international definition of association
which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of
an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The
court vehemently objects because the principle of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution.
On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power
beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the
ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies
recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that
contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State,
much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part
of Philippine territory for independence. The court disagrees with the
respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all
but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. As such
the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic.
On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE
includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of
the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these
areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express
provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly,
assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run
afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas
which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.
On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that
the powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9
of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage of a law is
necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement. The
Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for
amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not concur with
the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making power vested to the BJE
in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole
organ and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nation. Should the
BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states, the former
provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must also be
amended—the provision of the law that promotes national unity and
development. Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does
not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative
ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to
national unity.
On matters of domestic statutes.
o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the
adoption of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said
law specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal
peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all
indigenous people of Mindanao.
o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition
of the ancestral domain is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in
the IPRA law which ironically is the term of reference of the MOA-AD.
On matters of international law.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law
as part of the law of the land. In international law, the right to
self-determination has long been recognized which states that people can
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development. There are the internal and external
self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the external
which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This
principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the
territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only
afforded in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the meaningful
exercise of the right to internal self-determination. International law, as a
general rule, subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that
the right of disposing national territory is essentially an attribute of the
sovereignty of every state.
On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that
indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under international law, but
they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means
for financing their autonomous functions; have the right to the lands,
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the
indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be
the State, through police officers, that will provide for the protection of the
people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does
not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status
of a state; since it would impair the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent states.
On the basis of the suspensive clause.
o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot
be had, since the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect
until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected.
The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to
Memorandum of Instructions from the President stating that negotiations shall
be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity of the country—such
was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD.
Apart from this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the
delegated power to the GRP Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it
will require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The legality of
the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether the President can
exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well
settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself
does not possess. The power of the President to conduct peace negotiations
is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather implied from her
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the
President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress
rebellion and lawless violence.
As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace
negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their
implementation. At all event, the president may not, of course, unilaterally
implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be
prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which
could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for
constitutional amendment and revision.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers
may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for
constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the
arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that
the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly
consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the
Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were
assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is limited only to the
preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but
simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.
o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition
but is a term because it is not a question of whether the necessary changes
to the legal framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation is
mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework –which
changes would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the
suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to
propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the
Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be
adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD.
Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or

unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law,
respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The
MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under
international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of
guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that
they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state
within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and
the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or
the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that
the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through
an undue influence or interference with that process.