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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL

ATP 1(C), Vol. I

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION


MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS)
CHANGE 8 TO ATP 1(C), VOLUME I
ALLIED MARITIME TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES

September 2000

1. Change 8 to ATP 1(C), Volume I, is a NATO-CONFIDENTIAL document. It shall be transported,


stored and safeguarded in accordance with agreed security regulation, until entered in the basic AP.

2. Change 8 to ATP 1(C), Volume I, is NOT TO BE EFFECTED UNTIL THE NATO EFFECTIVE
DATE (NED) which will be published by the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS).

3. The following pages are contained in this change:

NATO Cover Sheet for Change 8: Page 1 of 2


National Letter of Transmittal: Page 2 of 2
U.S. Publication Notice: Page IIa (Reverse Blank)

Pages to be entered in the basic AP: XXI thru LII; 1-13 , 1-14; 1-17 thru 1-20; 1-29 thru 1-32; 2-5, 2-6;
2-17, 2-18; 2-25 thru 2-27 (Reverse Blank); 3-1 thru 3-49 (Reverse Blank); 4-7 thru 4-14; 5-1, 5-2; 5-17,
5-18; 6-1 thru 6-4; 6-16c, 6-16d; 6-19, 6-20; 6-20a thru 6-20f; 6-21 thru 6-26; 6-31, 6-32; 6-35, 6-36; 6-41
thru 6-44; 6-47, 6-48; 6-53 thru 6-64; 6-67 thru 6-80; 7-5, 7-6; 7-9 thru 7-12; 8-1, 8-2; 8-9, 8-10; 8-19,
8-20; 8-29, 8-30; 9-3 thru 9-8; 9-19 thru 9-22; 9-35, 9-36; 9-36a (Reverse Blank); 9-77, 9-78; 10-9, 10-10;
10-17 thru 10-20; 13-1, 13-2; 13-11 thru 13-21 (Reverse Blank); 14-1 thru 14-4; A-1 thru A-3 (Reverse
Blank); Glossary-11, Glossary-12; Glossary-12a (Reverse Blank); Glossary-15, Glossary-16; Glos-
sary-16a (Reverse Blank);Glossary-21, Glossary-22; Index-1 thru Index-31 (Reverse Blank); LEP-1 (Re-
verse Blank); LEP-3 (Reverse Blank).

4. Prior to making the change, verify the attached pages against the list at paragraph 3.

5. Insert the new pages and destroy the superseded ones in accordance with the local procedures for the de-
struction of documents.

6. Check the List of Effective Pages (LEP).

7. Amend the Record of Changes page to reflect the latest status of ATP 1(C), Volume I.

0410 LP7001028

1 of 2 CHANGE 8
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
(This Page is NATO-Unclassified)
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(C) Vol. I

September 2000

PUBLICATION NOTICE ROUTING

1. Change 8 to ATP-1(C), Volume I, Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Proce-


dures, is available in the Navy Warfare Publications Library. Effective date will be
promulgated by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command for De-
partment of the Navy holders.

2. Summary of Change 8:

a. Revises SOCA information in Chapter 1.

b. Expands the special rules of the road in Chapter 2.

c. Reorganizes and reissues Chapter 3.

d. Amends ROE, aircraft emergency, controlled airspace, waterspace management, and submarine
safety information in Chapter 6.

e. Amends coordinated attack method information in Chapter 9 and reinserts Attack Methods 1A
and 2A.

f. Numerous changes have been made throughout the publication to correct errors or maintain
currency of information.

Navy Warfare Publications Custodian

Navy warfare publications must be made readily available to


all users and other interested personnel within the U.S. Navy.
Classified navy warfare publications are to be treated in the
same manner as other classified information.

Note to Navy Warfare Publications Custodian


This notice will assist you in providing information to cognizant personnel. It is not accountable.

IIa (Reverse Blank) CHANGE 8


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Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and


Procedures
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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PART I — GENERAL

CHAPTER 1 — ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND READINESS

SECTION I — ORGANIZATION
1100 TASK, TYPE, AND WARFARE ORGANIZATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1D10
1101 Task Organization — Task Force Numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1D10
1102 Task Organization — Task Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1D10
1103 Changes in Task Organization Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1D10

SECTION II — COMMAND
1200 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1D12
1201 Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1D12
1202 Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1D12
1203 Delegation of Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1D12
1204 Chain of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1205 Command System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1206 Exercising Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1210 STRUCTURE FOR THE COMMAND OF MARITIME FORCES . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1211 Full Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1212 Operational Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1D13
1213 Operational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1D14
1214 Change of Operational Control (CHOP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1D14
1215 Tactical Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1D14
1216 Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 1D14
1217 Tactical Control (TACON) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1E1
1218 Command by Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1E1
1219 Command of Allied Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1E1
1220 COMMAND OF AIRCRAFT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 1E1
1230 COMMAND DURING REPLENISHMENT AT SEA . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7 1E2
1231 Method of Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7 1E2
1232 OPTASK RAS: The OTC Promulgating the Replenishment Program . . . . 1-7 1E2
1233 OPSTAT UNIT: Supplying Ship Providing Details of Rigs to
Customer Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8 1E3
1234 OPSTAT CARGO: Supplying Ship Reporting Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8 1E3

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1235 COMMAND IN MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8 1E3


1240 COMMAND IN OPERATION AWKWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8 1E3
1245 COMMAND IN SEAWARD DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8 1E3
1250 COMMAND IN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8 1E3
1251 Authorities for Submarine Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a 1E4
1260 COMMAND IN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a 1E4
1261 Parallel Chains of Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a 1E4
1262 Designation of Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a 1E4
1263 Relationships During Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a 1E4
1264 Command During Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9 1E6
1265 Consultation Between Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9 1E6
1266 Consultation Between Corresponding Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9 1E6
1267 Naval Authority Over Landing Force Units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9 1E6
1270 NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9 1E6
1271 Convoy Commodore and His Deputies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 1E7
1272 Implementation of Naval Control of Shipping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 1E7
1280 COMMAND DURING SUPPORT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 1E7
1281 Support Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 1E7
1282 Support Operations, Situation A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 1E7
1283 Support Operations, Situation B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11 1E8
1284 Support Operations, Situation C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11 1E8
1290 OTHER SUPPORT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11 1E8

SECTION III — TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA


1300 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12 1E9
1301 Command of Large Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12 1E9
1302 Delegation of Command Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13 1E10
1305 Command and Control Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13 1E10
1306 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13 1E10
1310 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15 1E12
1311 Delegation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15 1E12
1312 Warfare Commander and Coordinator Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 1E13
1313 Promulgation of Duties and Delegation of Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20 1F3
1320 TASKING METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20 1F3
1321 Maritime Tactical Message System (MTMS) — Purpose and
Method of Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20 1F3
1322 RAINFORMs — Purpose and Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24 1F7
1323 Tactical Data Link Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24 1F7

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SECTION IV — READINESS
1400 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1410 READINESS TO GET UNDERWAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1411 Notice to Get Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1412 Preparing for Sea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1413 Getting Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 1F8
1420 READINESS FOR ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 1F9
1421 Operational Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 1F9
1422 Inoperable Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 1F9
1423 Command Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 1F9
1424 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27 1F10
1425 Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27 1F10
1430 GENERAL DEGREES OF READINESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27 1F10
1440 PARTICULAR DEGREES OF READINESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1441 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Damage Degrees
of Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1442 Engineering Degrees of Readiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1450 WEAPON ALERT STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1460 AIRCRAFT ALERT STATES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 1F11
1470 THREAT WARNINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29 1F12

SECTION V — RAPID AMENDMENT OF TACTICS AND PROCEDURES


1500 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49 2C12
1510 PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49 2C12

CHAPTER 2 — POSITION, MOVEMENT, AND MANEUVERING

SECTION I — POSITION AND MOVEMENT


2100 POSITION/REFERENCE SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2D2
2101 World Geographic Reference System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2D2
2102 Universal Transverse Mercator Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 2D4
2103 Cartesian Coordinate Grid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 2D4
2104 ASW Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 2D5
2105 Bearing and Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 2D5
2106 Quick Reference System (QRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4a 2D6
2107 Position/Bearing Accuracy Suffixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4a 2D6
2108 Altitude or Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 2D8
2109 Check Sum Digits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 2D9

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2110 STANDARD POSITIONS/REFERENCE POINTS/


POSITION REPORTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 2D9
2111 Data Link Reference Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 2D9
2112 Helicopter Reference Point (HRP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6a 2D10
2113 Harbor Reference Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7 2D12
2114 Ship as Anchoring Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7 2D12
2115 Routes and Reference Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7 2D12
2116 Convoy Route Position Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 2D13
2117 Reporting and Exchanging Data on Positions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 2D13
2120 COURSE AND SPEED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9 2D14
2121 Course and Speed Made Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9 2D14
2122 Position and Intended Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10 2E1
2123 Endurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2E2
2130 ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2E2
2131 Reporting Time of Arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2E2
2132 Entry Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2E2
2133 Anchoring in Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2E2
2134 Berth Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2E2

SECTION II — RULES FOR MANEUVERING


2200 PRINCIPAL RULES FOR MANEUVERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2E2
2201 Unit of Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2E2
2202 Distance and Interval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 2E2
2203 Standard and Reduced Tactical Diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 2E3
2204 Acceleration and Deceleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 2E3
2205 Speeds While Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14 2E5
2206 Speed Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 2E6
2210 STATIONING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 2E6
2211 Joining and Leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 2E6
2220 THE GUIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16 2E7
2221 Automatic Changes of the Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16 2E7
2240 SPECIAL MANEUVERING RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16 2E7
2241 Individual Action to Avoid Danger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16 2E7
2242 Special Rules of the Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17 2E8
2243 Sea Manners and Customs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17 2E8
2244 Executing Maneuver at Prearranged Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18 2E9
2245 Scouting Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18 2E9
2246 Ships Towing Acoustic Arrays or Other Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18 2E9
2250 MAN OVERBOARD — STANDARD PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . 2-18 2E9
2251 Peacetime Recovery Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19 2E10
2252 Wartime Recovery Maneuvers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21 2E12

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2253 Rescue Helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21 2E12


2254 Man Overboard Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21 2E12
2260 BREAKDOWN AT SEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21 2E12
2270 NIGHT AND FOG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22 2E13
2271 Navigation Lights on Darkened Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22 2E13
2272 Whistle Signals While Maneuvering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22 2E13
2273 Standard Fog Signals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22 2E13
2274 Entering Fog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22 2E13
2280 WARTIME CRUISING PRECAUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23 2E14
2281 Darkening Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23 2E14
2282 General Precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23 2E14

SECTION III — EVASIVE STEERING


2300 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23 2E14
2301 General Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23 2E14
2310 ANTISUBMARINE EVASION AND TORPEDO
COUNTERMEASURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24 2F1
2320 ANTI-FPB EVASION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27 2F4
2321 Maneuver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27 2F4

CHAPTER 3 — DISPOSITION OF FORCES

SECTION I — FORMATIONS
3100 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 2F10
3105 BASIC SYSTEM OF FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 2F10
3106 Forming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 2F10
3107 Maneuvering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 2F10
3110 GENERAL TYPES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 2F11
3115 CIRCULAR FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 2F11
3120 OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 2F13
3121 Broad Operational Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 2F13
3125 TYPICAL OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7 2G2
3126 Destroyer Type Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7 2G2
3127 Transport/Logistic Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 2G4
3128 Replenishment Formations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12 2G7
3130 CONVOY FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11

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3140 MISCELLANEOUS FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11

SECTION II — DISPOSITIONS
3200 GENERAL TYPES OF DISPOSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3201 Forming a Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3202 Maneuvering a Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3210 TYPICAL OPERATIONAL DISPOSITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3211 Carrier Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
3212 Special Disposition 2W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-24 3C13
3213 Replenishment Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27 3D2
3214 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Threatened Sector Protection) 2V . . . . . . . . 3-27 3D2
3215 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Including Missile Ships) 3V . . . . . . . . . 3-29 3D4
3216 Circular Dispositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29 3D4
3217 Cartwheel Disposition/Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-31 3D6
3218 4W Disposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33 3D8
3220 DISPOSITION PLANNING FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36 3D11

SECTION III — SCREENS


3300 PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36 3D11
3310 TYPES OF SCREEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37 3D12
3311 Screen Selection and Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37 3D12
3312 Stationing Screen Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38 3D13
3320 DESCRIPTION OF SCREENS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38 3D13
3321 Sector Screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38 3D13
3322 Skeleton Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39 3D14
3323 Helicopter Windline Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-42 3E3
3324 Departure and Entry Screens. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-42 3E3
3325 Screen for Damaged Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43 3F4
3330 MANEUVERING WITH A SECTOR SCREEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46 3E7
3331 Maneuvering With Skeleton Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46 3E7
3332 Instructions for Convoy Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46 3E7
3333 Helicopters in the Screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47 3E8
3334 Control of Screen Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47 3E8
3335 Pickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48 3E9
3337 Towed Array Ships in the Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48 3E9
3340 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48 3E9
3341 Instructions for Individual Screen Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48 3E9
3342 Screen Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49 3E10

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CHAPTER 4 — COMMUNICATIONS

SECTION I — TACTICAL COMPLANS


4100 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 3E14
4110 COMMUNICATION PLAN (COMPLAN) DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 3E14
4120 COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 3F1
4121 Net Control Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 3F1
4122 Voice Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 3F2
4123 Call Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 3F2
4124 Use of RATT for Tactical Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 3F2
4125 DATA LINK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 3F3
4126 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 3F3
4127 Types of Data Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 3F3
4128 Procedural Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 3F3
4129 Emission Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 3F3
4130 COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 3F3
4131 COMSEC Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 3F3
4132 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5 3F4
4133 Authentication Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5 3F4
4140 ANTIAIR WARFARE (AAW) COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6 3F5
4141 AAW Reporting Net. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 3F6
4142 AAW Coordination Net (Force/Sector) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 3F6
4143 Local AAW Coordination Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 3F6
4144 Inner Warfare Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 3F6
4145 Outer Warfare Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 3F6
4146 Combining AAW Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 3F6
4147 Single Net Information and Plotting (SNIP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 3F7
4148 Joint AAW Shore Coordination (JAAWSC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 3F7
4149 AAW Data Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 3F7
4150 AAW Call Signs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 3F7
4155 SURFACE WARFARE COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 3F7
4156 Surface Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a 3F8
4157 SAG Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a 3F8
4160 ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . 4-8b 3F9
4161 Search and Attack Unit (SAU) Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9 3F10
4170 SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9 3F10
4171 Basic Considerations and Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9 3F10
4172 Submarine Broadcast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9 3F10
4173 Tactical Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10 3F11

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4174 Submarine Reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12 3F13


4175 CONVOY COMMUNICATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12 3F13
4180 AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12 3F13
4181 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12 3F13
4185 HELICOPTER COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13 3F14
4186 Helicopter Control Nets — General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14 3G1
4190 COMMUNICATIONS FOR DECENTRALIZED COMMAND
AND CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14 3G1

SECTION II — TACTICAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE COMMUNI-


CATIONS (SATCOM)
4200 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15 3G2
4201 Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15 3G2
4202 Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15 3G2
4203 Electronic Warfare (EW) Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15 3G2

CHAPTER 5 — ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE (EAW)

SECTION I — OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION


5100 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 3G4
5101 Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 3G4
5110 DIRECTION AND COORDINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 3G5
5111 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 3G5
5112 Functions Which May Be Delegated to EWC/ASWC . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 3G5
5113 Individual Ship Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 3G6
5120 VOICE REPORTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 3G6
5121 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 3G6
5122 EW Reporting of Confidence Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 3G6
5123 EW Intercept Bearing Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 3G6

SECTION II — EMISSION POLICY (EP)


5200 CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 3G7
5201 Silent Emission Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 3G7
5202 Enemy Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 3G8
5210 BREAKING SILENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 3G8
5220 POST-ATTACK EMCON AND COMSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 3G8

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SECTION III — EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON)


5300 EMCON CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 3G8
5301 EMCON Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 3G11
5310 CONSTRUCTION OF EMCON PLANS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 3G11
5320 EMISSION DIAGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 3G11

SECTION IV — ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE


(EAW) TASKING
5400 TASKING OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10 3G13
5401 Electronic Warfare Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10 3G13
5410 ESM TASKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10 3G13
5411 ECM Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11 3G14
5420 ACOUSTIC WARFARE TASKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 4C9

SECTION V — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC


SUPPORT MEASURES (ESM/AWSM)
5500 INTERCEPTION, DETECTION, AND DIRECTION FINDING
(DF) OF TRANSMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 4C9
5510 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI) OF SEARCH
EQUIPMENT BY OWN TRANSMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 4C9
5511 Acoustic Interference of Search Equipment by Own Transmissions . . . . 5-13 4C10
5520 RECORDING ENEMY EMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13 4C10
5530 LOCALIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF ENEMY EMISSIONS . . . . . 5-13 4C10
5531 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13 4C10
5532 Recognition, Classification, and Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13 4C10
5533 Disposition of Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14 4C11

SECTION VI — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC


COUNTERMEASURES (ECM/ACM)
5600 EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC
COUNTERMEASURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14 4C11
5610 JAMMING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14 4C11
5611 The Objective and Effects of Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14 4C11
5612 Jamming Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15 4C12
5613 Control of Electronic Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15 4C12
5620 COMMUNICATIONS JAMMING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15 4C12
5630 DECEPTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15 4C12

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5631 Active Deception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16 4C13


5632 Passive Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16 4C13
5650 ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16 4C13

SECTION VII — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC


PROTECTIVE MEASURES (EPM/APM)
5700 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16 4C13
5710 EPM/APM CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16 4C13
5720 REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECM/ACM . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17 4C14
5721 Reducing the Effectiveness of Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17 4C14
5722 Measures Against Deception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17 4C14
5723 Reducing the Effectiveness of Electronic Neutralization . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 4D1
5724 Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion (MIJI) . . . . . . . . . 5-18 4D1

SECTION VIII — AREAWIDE ELECTRONIC WARFARE


COORDINATION
5800 ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION CELL (EWCC). . . . . . 5-18 4D1
5801 EWCC Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 4D1
5802 Additional EWCC Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19 4D2

CHAPTER 6 — GENERAL WARFARE INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION I — RULES OF ENGAGEMENT


6100 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 4D6
6110 PLANNED RESPONSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 4D6

SECTION II — PICTURE COMPILATION AND SCOUTING


6200 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 4D6
6201 Picture Compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 4D6
6210 THE PICTURE COMPILATION PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 4D6
6220 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 4D7
6221 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 4D7
6222 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 4D7
6223 Operational Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 4D7
6230 ELEMENTS OF PICTURE COMPILATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 4D7
6240 THE PROCESS OF PICTURE COMPILATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 4D8
6241 Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 4D8

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6242 Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 4D8


6243 Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 4D8
6244 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 4D9
6245 Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 4D12
6250 SCOUTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 4D12
6251 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 4D12
6252 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 4D12
6253 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 4D12
6254 Planning of Scouting Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6 4D13
6255 Scouting Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7 4D14
6256 Surveillance Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7 4D14
6257 Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7 4D14
6258 Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8 4E1
6260 TASKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8 4E1
6261 Shadowing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9 4E2
6262 Information Exchange Between Shadowing and Relieving Units . . . . . . 6-9 4E2
6263 Countershadowing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9 4E2
6264 Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10 4E3
6265 Countermarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10 4E3
6266 Tattletale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10 4E3
6270 PICTURE COMPILATION AND WEAPON EMPLOYMENT . . . . . . 6-10 4E3
6280 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11 4E4

SECTION III — DATA COMPILATION


6300 DATA COMPILATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 4E5
6301 Reference Publications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 4E5
6302 OTC’s Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 4E5
6303 Means of Data Compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 4E5
6304 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 4E5
6310 SURVEILLANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 4E5
6311 Surveillance Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 4E5
6312 Coordination of Data Compilation in the Surveillance Coord-
ination Surveillance Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 4E5
6313 Force Track Coordinator (Air) (FTC-A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 4E5
6314 Force Track Coordinator (Surface) (FTC-S) and Force Track
Coordinator (Subsurface) (FTC-SS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 4E6
6320 CONTACT REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 4E6
6321 General Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 4E6
6322 Responsibility for Passing Information About Contacts . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 4E7
6323 Air Raid Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 4E7
6324 Surface and Subsurface Raid Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15 4E8
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6325 Other Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15 4E8


6326 Warfare Commander Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16 4E9
6330 COMMUNICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16a 4E10
6350 TACTICAL USE OF DATA LINKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16a 4E10
6351 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16a 4E10
6352 Integration With Standard Tactical Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16a 4E10
6353 Tactical Use of Link 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16a 4E10
6354 Tactical Use of Link 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16a 4E10
6355 Wide-Area Link Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16b 4E11
6356 Link 11 Waveform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16b 4E11
6360 LINK MANAGEMENT UNIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16b 4E11
6361 Data Net Control Station (DNCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d 4E13
6362 Gateway Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d 4E13
6363 Link Broadcast Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d 4E13
6364 Grid Reference Unit (GRU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d 4E13
6370 PROCEDURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d 4E13
6371 Grid Lock Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d 4E13
6372 Link 14 Plotting Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18 4F1
6373 Procedures for Reporting Own Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18 4F1
6380 SECURITY AND EMISSION CONTROL
CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18 4F1

SECTION IV — AIR OPERATIONS


6400 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 4F2
6401 Maritime Tasking Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 4F2
6402 Air Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 4F2
6403 Informing the OTC of Operations in His Vicinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 4F3
6405 TYPES OF OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 4F3
6406 Operations Integral to a Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 4F3
6407 Support Operations Tasked by Maritime Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 4F3
6410 PROCEDURES FOR AIRCRAFT IN TRANSIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 4F10
6415 IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION OF SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 4F10
6416 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22 4F11
6417 Identification/Recognition Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23 4F12
6418 Responsibilities of the Aircraft Control Unit (ACU) . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25 4F14
6419 Support Aircraft Joining a Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25 4F14
6425 EMPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT WHILE ON DIRECT
SUPPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27 4G2

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6426 ASW Mission Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28 4G3


6427 Sonobuoy Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28 4G3
6428 Avoidance of Sonobuoy Mutual Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28 4G3
6429 Identification and Recognition by Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28 4G3
6440 MPA TO MPA TURNOVER PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28a 4G4
6441 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28a 4G4
6442 On-Task Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28b 4G5
6443 Procedures for Specific Turnover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28b 4G5
6444 Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28c 4G6
6445 SUPPORT OPERATIONS CONTROLLED BY OTHER
AIR FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28c 4G6
6450 AIR COORDINATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28c 4G6
6451 Responsibilities of Units Carrying Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29 4G8
6452 Tactical Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29 4G8
6453 Independent Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30 4G9
6454 Controlled Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30 4G9
6455 Factors Determining Type of Operations and Control. . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b 4G11
6456 Courses and True Bearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b 4G11
6470 SAFETY PROCEDURES FOR MARITIME AIR
OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b 4G11
6471 Fixed-Wing Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b 4G11
6472 Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31 4G12
6473 Low-Altitude Rules (Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Helicopters) . . . . . . . . 6-32 4G13
6474 Lateral and Vertical Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33 4G14
6475 Use of Lights by Ships and Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33 4G14
6476 HAG Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34a 5C9
6477 Cooperation With Fixed-Wing Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34a 5C9

SECTION V — SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS


6500 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35 5C12
6501 Ship Movements During Flight Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35 5C12
6502 Helicopter In-Flight Refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36 5C13
6505 CARRIER OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36 5C13
6506 Duties in a Task Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36 5C13
6507 Carrier Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36 5C13
6509 Flying Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36 5C13
6510 MANEUVERING FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36 5C13
6511 Method A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-37 5C14
6512 Method B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-37 5C14
6513 Method C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-38 5D1
6514 Maneuvering for Emergency Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 5D2

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6515 Antisubmarine Precautions During Delays While


Operating Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 5D2
6516 Maneuvering for Low Visibility Recovery Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 5D2
6517 Course and Relative Wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 5D2
6518 Operations at Night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 5D2
6519 Operations in Low Visibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 5D2
6520 AIR OPERATIONS IN A CONVOY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41 5D4
6530 CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41 5D4
6531 Offensive Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41 5D4
6532 Command of Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-42 5D5
6533 Offensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43 5D6
6540 REQUEST FOR CV AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44 5D7
6550 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44 5D7
6551 Ship Control Zones (SCZ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44 5D7
6552 Aircraft Launch/Departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44 5D7
6553 Procedure for Returning Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45 5D8
6554 Marshal Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45 5D8
6555 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45 5D8
6556 Carrier Approach Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45 5D8

SECTION VI — AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE


6600 AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47 5D10
6601 General Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47 5D10
6602 Communications During Aircraft Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48 5D11
6603 Rescue Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50 5D13
6604 Ditching, Bailout, and Ejection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-54 5E3
6605 Diversion of Ship to Locate Survivors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-54 5E3

SECTION VII — SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND MEASURES TO


AVOID MUTUAL INTERFERENCE
6700 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55 5E4
6701 Implementation of Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55 5E4
6702 Implementation of Water Space Management (WSM) Procedures . . . . . 6-55 5E4
6710 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55 5E4
6711 Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56 5E5
6712 Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56 5E5
6713 Types of Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56 5E5
6714 Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56 5E5
6715 Identification/Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56 5E5
6716 Initiation of Self-Identification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56 5E5
6720 ROUTES AND REFERENCE POINTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57 5E6
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6730 RESTRICTED AREAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57 5E6


6731 Controlled Airspace, Air Corridors, and Safety Sectors . . . . . . . . . . 6-57 5E6
6732 Shore Bombardment and Bomb Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58 5E7
6733 Blind Bombing Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58 5E7
6734 Controlled Waterspace, Waterspace Management Areas,
and ASW Weapon Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58 5E7
6735 Procedures for Request and Allocation of WSM Areas. . . . . . . . . . . 6-64 5E13
6736 Emergency Transit of Surface Forces Through SAAs or
JTAAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64 5E13
6737 Procedures for Surface Ships Entering Restricted Areas . . . . . . . . . . 6-65 5E14
6740 SAFETY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65 5E14
6745 SAFETY OF AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 5F1
6746 Weapon Restrictions — General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 5F1
6747 Weapon Control Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 5F1
6750 SPECIAL SURFACE SHIP PRECAUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67 5F2
6751 Surface Ship Notices and Advisories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67 5F2
6752 Radiation Hazards (RADHAZ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67 5F2
6760 SAFETY PROCEDURES FOR SUBMARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67 5F2
6761 Compensatory Allowances for ASW Weapons Employment . . . . . . . . 6-67 5F2
6762 Submarine-Generated Search Area (SGSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68 5F3
6763 NOTACK Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72 5F7
6764 Safety Lanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 5F11
6765 Command Relationships of Transiting Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 5F11
6766 Responsibility to Assist Disabled Submarines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 5F11
6770 SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR SUBMARINE
OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 5F11
6771 Submarine Movements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 5F11
6772 Action on Suspected Mutual Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77 5F12
6773 Operations Inherently Dangerous to Subsurface
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-78 5F13
6774 Action at Time of Increased Tension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-78 5F13
6780 PREVENTION OF MUTUAL INTERFERENCE
BETWEEN SUBMERGED SUBMARINES AND
SURFACE SHIPS WITH TOWED ACOUSTIC
DEVICES STREAMED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-79 5F14

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PART II — WARFARE PROCEDURES

CHAPTER 7 — ANTIAIR WARFARE (AAW)

7000 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 5G8


7001 Command and Control in Antiair Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 5G8
7002 Sector AAW Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 5G8
7003 Local AAW Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 5G9
7004 Force Track Coordinator — Air. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 5G9
7005 Individual Ship Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 5G9
7010 STATIONING ANTIAIR WARFARE UNITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 5G10
7011 Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 5G10
7012 Surface Pickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 5G10
7013 Aircraft Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 5G10
7014 Surface-to-Air Missile Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 5G10
7015 Units With Self-Defense Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4 5G11
7020 ANTIAIR WARFARE AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4 5G11
7021 Airborne Early Warning Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4 5G11
7022 Combat Air Patrol Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5 5G12
7023 Electronic Warfare Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6 5G13
7024 Aircraft Authentication on AAW Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7 5G14
7030 ANTIAIR WARFARE COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7 5G14
7040 ANTIAIR WARFARE COORDINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7 5G14
7041 Methods of Antiair Warfare Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8 6C9
7042 Missile Engagement Zone. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9 6C10
7043 Crossover Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9 6C10
7044 Fighter Engagement Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 6C11
7045 Safety Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 6C11
7046 Watch Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 6C11
7047 Positive ECM Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 6C11
7048 Missile Arc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 6C11
7050 SPECIAL ANTIAIR WARFARE REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 6C11
7051 Types of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 6C11
7052 Target Engagement Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 6C11
7053 Missile State Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11 6C12
7054 Ammunition State Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11 6C12
7055 Aircraft Operating Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12 6C13
7060 ANTISHIP MISSILE DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 6C14
7061 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 6C14
7062 Disposition and Stationing Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 6C14
7063 Employment of AAW Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 6C14
7064 Detecting and Determining Types of Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 6D1
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7065 Use of Sensors and EMCON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 6D1


7066 Selecting ASMD Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 6D1
7067 Coordinating ASMD Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15 6D2
7068 Planning ASMD Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15 6D2
7069 Promulgating ASMD Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17 6D4
7070 EXECUTING ASMD REACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17 6D4
7080 CARRIER BATTLE GROUP AIR DEFENSE TACTICS . . . . . . . . . 7-20 6D7
7081 Inner and Outer Defense Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20 6D7
7082 Inner Defense Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20 6D7
7083 Outer Defense Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20 6D7
7084 Inner Defense Zone Coordinator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21 6D8
7085 Outer Defense Zone Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21 6D8
7086 CAP Stationing Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22 6D9
7087 Return to Force Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22 6D9
7088 VL Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-23 6D10

CHAPTER 8 — ANTISURFACE WARFARE

SECTION I — GENERAL
8100 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 6D14
8101 Command in Antisurface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 6D14
8102 Force Track Coordinator (FTC) Surface and Subsurface . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 6D14
8103 Concept of Antisurface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 6D14
8104 Surface Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 6E1
8105 Surface Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 6E1
8110 WEAPON STATE REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7 6E6

SECTION II — ANTISURFACE WARFARE BY SURFACE UNITS


8200 SURFACE ACTION CHECKOFF LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8 6E7
8201 Surface Action Group (SAG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8 6E7
8202 Surface Action Group Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 6E8
8203 Standard Surface Action Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 6E8
8204 Towed Array Ships in Antisurface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 6E9
8205 Pickets in Antisubmarine Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 6E9

SECTION III — ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH AIR COOPERATION


8300 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 6E9
8301 Antisurface Operations Support by Fixed-Wing Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 6E9
8302 Antisurface Operations by Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 6E9
8303 Cooperation Between Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Helicopters . . . . . . . . 8-11 6E10
8304 Employment of a Helicopter Action Group (HAG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11 6E10
8305 Helicopter Identification/Recognition and Attack Tactics. . . . . . . . . . 8-11 6E10

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8306 Operation Velocipede . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-14 6E13


8307 Attack Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15 6E14

SECTION IV — ANTISURFACE WITH SUBSURFACE


COOPERATION
8400 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15 6E14
8401 Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16 6F1
8402 ASSM Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16 6F1
8403 Tactical Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16 6F1
8404 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17 6F2

SECTION V — THIRD PARTY TARGETING


8500 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17 6F2
8501 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17 6F2
8502 Over-the-Horizon Targeting Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18 6F3
8503 Accuracy of Target Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18 6F3
8504 Selection and Stationing of a Target Reporting Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19 6F4
8505 Target Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19 6F4

SECTION VI — DEFENSE AGAINST SURFACE THREAT


8600 DEFENSE AGAINST MISSILE-ARMED SHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20 6F5
8601 Detection of Missile Carrier(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20 6F5
8602 Actions Upon Interception of Target/Threat Radars. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20 6F5
8603 Anti-FPB Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22 6F7
8604 Air Anti-FPB Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22 6F7
8605 Air Plan BLUEBELL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22 6F7

CHAPTER 9 — ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

9000 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 6G4


9001 Command in Antisubmarine Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 6G4
9002 Force Track Coordinator (Surface) (FTC-S) and Force Track
Coordinator (Subsurface) (FTC-SS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 6G4
9010 DEFINITIONS OF ASW OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 6G4
9011 ASW Area Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 6G4
9012 ASW Associated Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 6G4
9013 ASW Direct Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 6G4
9014 Ranges of ASW Sensors and Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 6G4
9020 ASW WEAPON STATE REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 6G5

SECTION I — EMPLOYMENT OF ASW UNITS


9100 ASW SHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 6G6

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9101 Surface Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 6G6


9105 SURFACE SHIP TOWED ARRAYS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 6G6
9106 General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 6G6
9107 Stationing of Towed Array Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4 6G7
9108 Towed Array Screen Station Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6 6G9
9109 Towed Array Zero-PIM Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6 6G9
9110 ASW HELICOPTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 6G10
9111 General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 6G10
9112 ASW Helicopter Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 6G10
9120 ASW FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 6G10
9121 General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 6G10
9122 Conduct of Airplans for Fixed-Wing ASW Aircraft and
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 6G11
9123 Aircraft in Support of Towed Array Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 6G11
9125 PASSIVE SONOBUOY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9 6G12
9126 Sonobuoy Pattern (JEZPAT) Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9 6G12
9127 Sonobuoy Interference Avoidance Plan (SIAP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9 6G12
9130 ASW SUBMARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 6G13
9131 General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 6G13
9132 Support Submarine Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 6G13
9133 Employment of Submarines in Area Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 6G13
9134 Employment of Submarines in Direct Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11 6G14
9135 Command, Control and Communications in Direct Support
Submarine Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11 6G14
9136 Stationing Considerations for Support Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12 7C9
9138 Employment of Submarines in Associated Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13 7C10
9139 STOVEPIPE Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13 7C10
9141 Aided Intercept by Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14 7C11
9142 Operation DISROBE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15 7C12

SECTION II — CONTACT PROSECUTION


9200 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17 7C14
9201 Contact Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17 7C14
9202 Contact Classification Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17 7C14
9203 Contact Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19 7D2
9210 ASW ATTACK POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 7D4
9211 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 7D4
9212 Surface Ship ASW Attack Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 7D4
9213 Fixed-Wing Aircraft ASW Attack Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 7D4
9214 Helicopter ASW Attack Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 7D4
9215 Attack Restrictions When Operating With Support Submarines . . . . . . 9-22 7D5

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9216 Assessing Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22 7D5


9220 COORDINATED ASW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23 7D6
9221 Datums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23 7D6
9222 ASW Search Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23 7D6
9223 Collision Hazard During ASW Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23 7D6
9230 COORDINATED ASW ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24 7D7
9231 Action on Gaining Contact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24 7D7
9232 Action by Units in the Vicinity of the Unit Gaining Contact . . . . . . . . 9-24 7D7
9233 Sending Reinforcements to the Scene of Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25 7D8
9234 The SAU Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25 7D8
9235 SAU Approach to a Contact or Datum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26 7D9
9236 SAU Commander/SAC Intended Employment of Units. . . . . . . . . . . 9-29 7D12
9237 Aircraft Reports to the SAU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30 7D13
9238 Changing Scene of Action Commander (SWAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31 7D14
9240 ACTION FOLLOWING CONTACT WHEN DIRECT
SUPPORT FORCES ARE INVOLVED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31 7D14
9241 Support Submarine Gains Initial Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31 7D14
9242 ASW Aircraft Gains Initial Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31 7D14
9243 Passive Sonar Capable Surface Ship Gains Initial Contact . . . . . . . . . 9-32 7E1
9244 Coordinated Prosecution With Supporting Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . 9-32 7E1
9245 ASW Aircraft Response to a Submarine-Generated Contact . . . . . . . . 9-32 7E1
9246 Contact Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-33 7E2
9247 Submarine/Air Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-33 7E2
9248 Submarine Associated and Direct Support Message
Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-33 7E2
9250 SHIP TOWED ARRAY CONTACT PROSECUTION . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 7E3
9251 Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 7E3
9252 TAS Ship/Aircraft Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 7E3
9253 Lost Contact Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 7E4
9260 COORDINATED ATTACK METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 7E4
9261 ASW Ship and Helicopter Attack and Support Methods . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 7E4
9262 ASW Ship Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 7E4
9263 Vectored Attacks (VECTACs). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37 7E8
9264 MAD Verification (MADVEC) Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38 7E9

SECTION III — NUCLEAR OPERATIONS


9300 EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ASW WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-41 7E12
9301 Considerations in Employment of Nuclear ASW Weapons . . . . . . . . 9-41 7E12
9310 COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITIES AND
INTENTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-42 7E13
9311 OTC’s Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-42 7E13

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9312 OTC’s Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-42 7E13


9313 Responsibilities of Commanders Subordinate to the OTC . . . . . . . . . 9-43 7E14
9320 CONTROL PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44 7F1
9321 DUSTBIN Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44 7F1
9322 Release Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45 7F2
9323 Control Procedures for Nuclear ASW Weapon Attack . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46 7F3
9330 NUCLEAR ASW WEAPON YIELDS AND
EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-47 7F4
9340 AIRCRAFT ARMING POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-47 7F4
9350 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49 7F6
9351 Spread of Base Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49 7F6
9352 Safe Standoff Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49 7F6
9353 Ship’s Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50 7F7
9354 Escape Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52 7F9
9355 Re-Entry Into Contaminated Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53 7F10
9356 Summary of Decisions and Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53 7F10
9360 BREVITY CODE WORDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53 7F10

CHAPTER 10 — PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

SECTION I — GENERAL INFORMATION


10000 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1 8D14
10001 Naval Control of Shipping Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1 8D14
10002 Activation of the Naval Control of Shipping Organization . . . . . . . . . 10-1 8D14
10003 Prerogatives of Commanding Officers of Allied Warships . . . . . . . . . 10-1 8D14
10004 Factors Affecting Merchant Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1 8D14
10005 Regional Naval Control of Shipping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 8E1
10006 Full Naval Control of Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 8E1

SECTION II — REGIONAL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING


10010 REGIONAL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING
PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 8E1
10011 Naval Control of Shipping Region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 8E1
10012 Shipping Risk Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 8E1
10013 Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 8E1
10014 Shipping Control Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 8E2
10015 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 8E2
10016 OPTASK RNCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 8E3
10017 Scope of Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 8E3
10018 Escort Commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 8E4
10019 Protective Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 8E4

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10020 Sailing Order Folder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 8E4


10021 Allied Worldwide Navigation Information System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6 8E5
10022 Protection of Shipping Against General Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6 8E5

SECTION III — FULL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING


10030 FULL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 8E6
10031 Convoy Commodore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 8E6
10032 Communication and Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 8E6
10033 Convoys Joining at Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 8E6
10034 Convoy Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 8E7
10035 Stationing Convoy Ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 8E7
10036 Forming Up a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 8E7
10040 CONVOY PROCEDURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10 8E9
10041 Shipping Requiring Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10 8E9
10042 Routing a Convoy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11 8E10
10043 Rerouting a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11 8E10
10044 Regrouping a Convoy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11 8E10
10045 Replenishment of Convoy Escorts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11 8E10
10046 Group Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11 8E10
10050 MANEUVERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 8E11
10051 Bad Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 8E11
10052 Altering Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 8E11
10053 Salvage and Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13 8E12
10054 Instructions on Arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13 8E12
10060 PROTECTION OF CONVOYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13 8E12
10061 Protection of Convoy Against Submarine Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13 8E12
10062 Protection of Convoy Against Air Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14 8E13
10063 Protection of Convoy Against Surface Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14 8E13
10064 Protection of Coastal Convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19 8F4
10070 CONVOY FORMATION SELECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-20 8F5
10071 Broad Front Rectangular (Grid) Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-20 8F5
10072 Adjustable Columnar Unit Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-21 8F6
10073 Random Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-22 8F7
10074 Reverse Arrow Head Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-22 8F7
10075 Circular Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24 8F9
10076 Group Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-26 8F11
10077 Advice on Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-26 8F11

CHAPTER 11 — AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

SECTION I — INTRODUCTION
11000 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 8G2

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SECTION II — EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS


11010 CONCEPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 8G2
11011 Types and Sequence of Amphibious Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 8G2
11012 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 8G4
11013 Fire Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4 8G5
11014 Planning Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 8G6
11015 The Initiating Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 8G6
11016 Basic Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 8G6
11017 Detailed Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 8G6
11018 Joint Service Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 8G6

SECTION III — COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS


11020 DESIGNATION OF COMMANDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7 8G8
11021 Relationship During Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7 8G8
11022 Command During Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7 8G8

SECTION IV — COMMAND AND CONTROL


11030 CONSULTATION BETWEEN COMMANDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8 8G9
11031 Consultation Between Corresponding Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8 8G9
11032 Naval Authority Over Landing Force Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8 8G9
11033 Airspace Control During Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8 8G9
11034 Transfer of the Control of Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8 8G9
11035 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8 8G9

SECTION V — LOGISTIC SUPPORT


11040 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9 8G10
11041 Logistic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9 8G10
11042 Logistic Planning Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9 8G10

CHAPTER 12 — NBC WARFARE

12000 HAZARDS FROM NUCLEAR BURSTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 8G14


12001 Types of Bursts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 8G14
12002 Flash and Initial Radiation Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 8G14
12003 Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 8G14
12004 Blast and Underwater Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 9C9
12005 Base Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 9C9
12006 Residual Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 9C9
12007 Range of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 9C9
12010 BASIC CONCEPT OF DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 9C9
12011 General Tactical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 9C9
12012 Principles Affecting All Dispositions and
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 9D1

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12013 Principles Affecting Carrier Group Formations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 9D1


12014 Principles Affecting Convoy Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 9D1
12015 Action Prior to Nuclear Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 9D2
12016 Tactics Following a Nuclear Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 9D2
12020 SELECTION OF FORMATION RENDEZVOUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 9D2
12021 Emergency Rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 9D2
12025 REPORT ON OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 9D2
12030 EMPLOYMENT OF OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10 9D3
12040 BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10 9D3
12041 Survival of Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10 9D3
12042 Wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 9D4
12043 Detection Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 9D4
12044 Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 9D4
12045 Hygiene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 9D4
12046 Decontamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 9D4
12050 CHEMICAL WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 9D4
12051 Delivery of Chemical Agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12 9D5
12052 Nature of Chemical Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12 9D5
12053 Environmental Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12 9D5
12054 Threat to Naval Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12 9D5
12055 General Tactical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13 9D6
12056 OTC’s Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13 9D6
12057 Chemical Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13 9D6
12058 Aircraft Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13 9D6
12059 Contamination of Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13 9D6
12060 GRADUATED LEVELS OF NBC THREAT AND
MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-15 9D8

CHAPTER 13 — MINE WARFARE

13000 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 9D12


13001 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 9D12
13002 Mineable Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 9D12
13003 Types of Mines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 9D12
13004 The Nature of a Minefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 9D13
13005 Types of Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 9D13
13006 Jettisoning Mines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 9D13
13007 Urgent Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 9D13
13010 MINELAYING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 9D13
13011 Information to Friendly Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 9D13
13012 Execution of Minelaying. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3 9D14

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13013 Procedures for and Methods of Surface Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3 9D14


13020 SUPPORT OF SURFACE MINELAYING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . 13-3 9D14
13030 MINE COUNTERMEASURES (MCM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3 9D14
13031 Passive Mine Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4 9E1
13032 Self-Protective Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4 9E1
13033 Conduct of Surface Ships in Mined Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-5 9E2
13034 Active Mine Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-11 9E8
13035 Command Responsibilities in MCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-11 9E8
13040 MCM OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-11 9E8
13050 SUPPORT OF MCM OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12 9E9
13060 TRANSIT OF SHIPS THROUGH MINED AREAS — LEAD
THROUGH OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12 9E9
13061 Transit of Submarines Through Mined Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-15 9E12
13062 Evacuation of Anchorages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-21 9F4
13063 Reporting Mine Explosions/Detections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-21 9F4

CHAPTER 14 — DEFENSE AGAINST UNDERWATER ATTACK IN HARBOR

14000 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 9F8


14010 DEFENSE AGAINST ATTACK BY UNDERWATER
SWIMMERS (Operation AWKWARD). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 9F8
14011 Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 9F8
14012 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2 9F9
14013 States of Readiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3 9F10
14014 Action to be Taken by Individual Ships When Operation
AWKWARD is Ordered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3 9F10
14020 ACTION AFTER ATTACK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-4 9F11

APPENDIX A — LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 9F14

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Glossary-1 9G4

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index-1 10D12

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PART I — GENERAL

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CHAPTER 1 — ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND READINESS

Figure 1-1 Example of Task Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1D11


Figure 1-2 Levels of Command and Control Within the OTC’s Warfare
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21 1F4
Figure 1-3 Example of Warfare Command and Coordination Incorporated
in a Task Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-22 1F5
Figure 1-4 Example of Assigned Command and Coordination Functions
in a Force Using a CWC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23 1F6

CHAPTER 2 — POSITION, MOVEMENT, AND MANEUVERING

Figure 2-1 Sample Georef Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2 2D3


Figure 2-2 Sample CCG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 2D5
Figure 2-3 Standard Distances and Maneuvering Intervals. . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13 2E4
Figure 2-4 Turning Distances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14 2E5
Figure 2-5 Acceleration-Deceleration Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14 2E5
Figure 2-6 Quick Reference System (QRS) Overlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-29 2F6

CHAPTER 3 — DISPOSITION OF FORCES

Figure 3-1 Stationing Ships in Formation by Circular Method . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 2F12


Figure 3-2 Rotating Formation Axis, Guide in Station Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 2F14
Figure 3-3 Rotating Formation Axis, Guide Not in Station Zero . . . . . . . . . . 3-6 2G1
Figure 3-4 Destroyer Type Ship Formation 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7 2G2
Figure 3-5 Destroyer Formations 21, 22, 23, and 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8 2G3
Figure 3-6 Transport/Logistic Rectangular Ready Formation 50 . . . . . . . . . 3-10 3G5
Figure 3-7 Replenishment/Logistic Circular Ready Formation 51 . . . . . . . . 3-11 3G6
Figure 3-8 Replenishment Formation — Circular Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13 2G8
Figure 3-9 Replenishment Ready Formation — Circular Type
(Air Attack Possible). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14 2G9
Figure 3-10 Replenishment Formation With Skeleton Screen Diagram . . . . . . 3-15 2G10
Figure 3-11 Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivering/Supplying
Ship in Use (Lifeguard Next Alongside) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17 2G12
Figure 3-12 Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying
Ship in Use (Lifeguard Next Alongside to Port). . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18 2G13
Figure 3-13 Replenishment of Escorts — Two Delivering/Supplying
Ships Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-19 2G14
Figure 3-14 Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivering/Supplying
Ship in Use ( Lifeguard Not Replenishing) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20 3C9

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Figure 3-15 Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying


Ship in Use (Lifeguard Not Replenishing). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-21 3C10
Figure 3-16 Departure and Entry Formations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23 3C12
Figure 3-17 Special Disposition 2W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25 3C14
Figure 3-18 Replenishment Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27 3D2
Figure 3-19 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Threatened Sector Protection) 2V . . . 3-28 3D3
Figure 3-20 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Including Missile Ships) 3V . . . . . . 3-30 3D5
Figure 3-21 Disposition 4W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-34 3D9
Figure 3-22 Construction of a Sector (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40 3E1
Figure 3-23 Sector Screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41 3E2
Figure 3-24 Skeleton Screen Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43 3E4
Figure 3-25 Example of Sector Departure/Entry Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-44 3E5
Figure 3-26 Example of Grid Departure/Entry Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-45 3E6

CHAPTER 4 — COMMUNICATIONS

Figure 4-1 Example of EPM/Reduced Tactical COMPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 3F1

CHAPTER 5 — ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE

Figure 5-1 Emission Diagram Example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 3G11


Figure 5-2 EW Tasking Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11 3G14

CHAPTER 6 — GENERAL WARFARE INSTRUCTIONS

Figure 6-1 Scouting Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6 4D13


Figure 6-1A The Picture Compilation and Weapon Employment Process . . . . . 6-11 4E4
Figure 6-2A Approach Corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24 4F13
Figure 6-2 Air Strike Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-42 5D5
Figure 6-3 Air Sweep Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43 5D6
Figure 6-4 Multi-Picket Approach Corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46 5D9
Figure 6-5 Single Picket Approach Corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46 5D9
Figure 6-6 Rescue Destroyer Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-51 5D14
Figure 6-7 Waterspace Management Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59 5E8
Figure 6-8 ASW Compensatory Allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68 5F3
Figure 6-9 Submarine-Generated Search Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69 5F4
Figure 6-10 Air-to-Air SGSA Handover During Area Operations . . . . . . . . . 6-73 5F8
Figure 6-11 NOTACK Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-74 5F9

PART II — WARFARE PROCEDURES

CHAPTER 7 — ANTIAIR WARFARE (AAW)

Figure 7-1 Example of Zone Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8 6C9

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CHAPTER 8 — ANTISURFACE WARFARE

Figure 8-1 Ideal Disposition of CANDLE and ATTACKER. . . . . . . . . . . 8-13 6E12


Figure 8-2 Aircraft Flightpaths for Air Plan BLUEBELL . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26 6F11

CHAPTER 9 — ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

Figure 9-1 Example of SIAP Between Two Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9 6G12


Figure 9-2 Datum Approach Triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28 7D11
Figure 9-3 DUSTBIN Area ORANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45 7F2
Figure 9-4 Template for ASW Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52 7F9
Figure 9-5 Airplan 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-59 7G2
Figure 9-6 Airplan 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-60 7G3
Figure 9-7 Airplan 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-61 7G4
Figure 9-8 Airplan 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-63 7G6
Figure 9-9 Airplan 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-65 7G8
Figure 9-10 Airplans 41, 42, 43 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-66 7G9
Figure 9-11 Airplan 44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-68 7G11
Figure 9-12 Airplan 45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-70 7G13
Figure 9-13 Airplan 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-72 8C9
Figure 9-14 Airplan 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-74 8C11
Figure 9-15 Airplan 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-76 8C13
Figure 9-16 Deleted.
Figure 9-17 Deleted.
Figure 9-18 Attack Method 3A (Geographic Sector) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-79 8D2
Figure 9-19 Attack Method 3A Mod (Modified Geographic Sector). . . . . . . . 9-80 8D3
Figure 9-20 Attack and Support Method 11AH (Bear) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-81 8D4
Figure 9-21 Attack, Support, and Lost Contact Method 14AH/14SH
(Cordon) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-82 8D5
Figure 9-22 Search Plan 1S (Oak Tree). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-83 8D6
Figure 9-23 Search Plan 2S (Acorn) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-84 8D7
Figure 9-24 Search Plan 2SH Mod (Acorn Modified) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-87 8D10

CHAPTER 10 — DEFENSE OF SHIPPING

Figure 10-1 Generic MERSHIP RCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6 8E5


Figure 10-2 Infrared Hotspots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 8E6
Figure 10-3 Convoy Formation Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-9 8E8
Figure 10-4 Search Plan 52S BEETROOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16 8F1
Figure 10-5 Search Plan 53S CARROT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19 8F4
Figure 10-6 Broad Front Rectangular (Grid) Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-20 8F5
Figure 10-7 Adjustable Columnar Unit Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-22 8F7
Figure 10-8 Random Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-23 8F8
Figure 10-9 Reverse Arrow Head Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24 8F9

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Figure 10-10 Circular Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-25 8F10


Figure 10-11 Group Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-27 8F12

CHAPTER 11 — AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Figure 11-1 Planning Sequence for Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6 8G7

CHAPTER 12 — NBC WARFARE

Figure 12-1 Above Water Burst Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4 9C11


Figure 12-2 Range of Effects of Base Surge (Underwater Burst) . . . . . . . . . 12-5 9C12
Figure 12-3 Underwater Burst Effect Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-6 9C13

CHAPTER 13 — MINE WARFARE

Figure 13-1 Normal Channel With Offset Buoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12 9E9


Figure 13-2 Information Flow for Transits of Mined Waters. . . . . . . . . . . 13-17 9E14
Figure 13-3 Measuring the Distance of the Lead Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-20 9F3

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LIST OF TABLES
PART I — GENERAL

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CHAPTER 1 — ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND READINESS

Table 1-1 OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-30 1F13


Table 1-2 OTC’s Functions in AAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-33 1G2
Table 1-3 OTC’s Functions in ASUW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-35 1G4
Table 1-4 OTC’s Functions in ASW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-37 1G6
Table 1-5 OTC’s Functions in Screening Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-39 1G8
Table 1-6 OTC’s Functions in Air Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-40 1G9
Table 1-7 OTC’s Functions in Air Resource Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . 1-41 1G10
Table 1-8 OTC’s Functions in Electronic and Acoustic Warfare . . . . . . . . 1-42 1G11
Table 1-9 OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Convoy
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-44 2G13
Table 1-10 OTC’s Functions in Departure and Entry Operations . . . . . . . . . 1-45 2G14
Table 1-11 OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Mine Warfare . . . . . . . 1-46 2C9
Table 1-12 MTMS Messages — Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-47 2C10

CHAPTER 2 — POSITION, MOVEMENT, AND MANEUVERING

Table 2-1 Maneuvering Formation When Using Evasive Steering . . . . . . . 2-25 2F2

CHAPTER 3 — DISPOSITION OF FORCES

Table 3-1 Table of Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 2F11


Table 3-2 Table of Allocated Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 2F11
Table 3-3 Table of Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 3C11
Table 3-4 Disposition Planning Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36 3D11
Table 3-5 Determining Sector Size for ASW Unit in a Sector
Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-42 3E3

CHAPTER 4 — COMMUNICATIONS

Table 4-1 Authentication Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6 3F5


Table 4-2 Typical Advance Notification Requirements for Submarine
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10 3F11

CHAPTER 5 — ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE

Table 5-1 Basic EMCON Plan Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 3G9


Table 5-2 Radiation Status Indicators (RSIs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9 3G12
Table 5-3 Standard Communication Antijam Measures/Procedures . . . . . . 5-17 4C14
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CHAPTER 6 — GENERAL WARFARE INSTRUCTIONS

Table 6-1 List of Tracking Identification Methods and Criteria . . . . . . . . . 6-4a 4D10
Table 6-1A Link 11 Operational Employment Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16c 4E12
Table 6-2 Table of Aircraft Mission Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20a 4F4
Table 6-3 Checklist of Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct
Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20b 4F5
Table 6-4 ASW Mission Designator Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20e 4F8
Table 6-4A Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28d 4G7
Table 6-4B Operational Combinations of Terms Which Must Be
Used to Tactically Control Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30a 4G9
Table 6-4C IMC Vertical Separation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34 5C9
Table 6-5 Night Lighting Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-40 5D3
Table 6-6 Signals From Aircraft in Distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49 5D12
Table 6-7 Signals From Rendezvous Destroyer or Other Ships . . . . . . . . . 6-49 5D12
Table 6-8 Signals From Ship to Aircraft in Distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50 5D13
Table 6-9 Rescue Destroyer Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53 5E2
Table 6-10 Night Rescue Stations (Helicopter Ship Operations) . . . . . . . . . 6-54 5E3

PART II — WARFARE PROCEDURES

CHAPTER 7 — ANTIAIR WARFARE (AAW)

Table 7-1 SAM State Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12 6C13


Table 7-2 Criteria for Calling ZIPPOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16 6D3
Table 7-3 ASMD Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18 6D5

CHAPTER 8 — ANTISURFACE WARFARE

Table 8-1 Surface Action Checkoff List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3 6E2


Table 8-2 Methods for Passing Target Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21 6F6
Table 8-3 Anti-FPB Checkoff List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-23 6F8
Table 8-4 Criteria for Air Plan BLUEBELL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-25 6F10

CHAPTER 9 — ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

Table 9-1 ASW Airplans, Attack and Support Methods, and Search Plans . . . . 9-2 6G5
Table 9-2 Airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 6G10
Table 9-2A Passive Acoustic Designation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19 7D2
Table 9-3 ASW Search Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23 7D6
Table 9-4 Selecting the Approach Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27 7D10
Table 9-5 Coordinated Employment of ASW Units at Scene of Action . . . . . 9-30 7D13
Table 9-6 ASW Attack and Support Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36 7E5
Table 9-7 Deleted.

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Table 9-8 SAC Courses of Action With Nuclear ASW Weapons . . . . . . . . 9-43 7E14
Table 9-9 Material Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-47 7F4
Table 9-10 Time Late or Offset — Probability of Success . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48 7F5
Table 9-11 Helicopter Stand-off Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50 7F7
Table 9-12 Surface Ship Stand-off Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51 7F8
Table 9-13 Summary of Decisions and Actions for Nuclear ASW
Weapon Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-54 7F11
Table 9-14 Brevity Code Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-58 7G1

CHAPTER 10 — DEFENSE OF SHIPPING

Table 10-1 Regional Naval Control of Shipping Transmission Guidance. . . . . 10-4 8E3
Table 10-2 ASW Surface Search Plans for Convoy Escorts . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14 8E13

CHAPTER 12 — NBC WARFARE

Table 12-1 Blast Damage Ranges in Yards From Ground Zero . . . . . . . . . 12-3 9C10
Table 12-2 NBC Aide-Memoire (Nuclear) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-7 9C14
Table 12-3 Commander’s Guide on Radiation Exposure State, Dose Levels,
Probable Tactical Effects, and Risk of Exposure Criteria . . . . . . 12-10 9D3
Table 12-4 NBC Aide-Memoire (Chemical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-14 9D7
Table 12-5 Graduated Levels of NBC Threat and Minimum Individual
Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-16 9D9

CHAPTER 13 — MINE WARFARE

Table 13-1 Actions for Transiting Units in Mine Danger Areas . . . . . . . . . 13-16 9E13

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1302 (NC) DELEGATION OF COMMAND c. The OTC delegates to more than one sub-
FUNCTIONS ordinate commander several warfare functions.

a. Considerations. A centralized com- d. The OTC delegates to subordinates


mand is the most direct way of allowing the OTC within geographic areas (or sectors) warfare func-
to make use of his experience and ability. How- tions relevant to that area, but may retain any part
ever, circumstances and command facilities can of the overall function for himself. This form of
make delegation necessary. Some factors are: delegation can be used by a principal warfare com-
mander as well, if so assigned.
(1) Mission.
e. A special form of delegation as described
(2) The threat. in item b. is that the OTC of a large force may allo-
cate all his warfare functions for the defense of a
(3) Need for quick action or reaction. force to a Composite Warfare Commander (CWC)
while retaining overall responsibility for the mis-
(4) Necessity to carry out many actions in sion. The CWC may, in turn, delegate some or all
different places at the same time. warfare functions as described above.

(5) Practical inability of the OTC to exer- Note


cise all functions because of excessive work-
load or the requirements of some actions for Item a. describes centralized command
specific knowledge of facilities. while options in items b. through e. all
describe forms of decentralized com-
(6) Lack of appropriate display and com- mand.
munications facilities.
1306 (NC) RESPONSIBILITIES
(7) Force size and composition.
a. OTC’s Responsibilities. The OTC
1303 — 1304 SPARE has overall responsibility for accomplishing the
mission of the force and for executing defense.
1305 (NC) COMMAND AND CONTROL The OTC’s policy and procedure for succession of
OPTIONS command authority as well as designation of the
standby OTC should be specified in advance of
The OTC is always responsible for formu- the operation in the OTC’s orders. The OTC shall
lating and promulgating policy. Other OTC func- specify the chain of command between himself
tions, including warfare functions, may, based on and, when designated, the CWC, principal warfare
factors stated in Article 1302, be delegated to sub- commanders, coordinators, supporting command-
ordinates within the constraints of the Rules of En- ers, and the forces under their tactical command
gagement (ROE) in force and stated policy. For and/or control. This may be done by task number
the three principal warfare areas, the OTC has the designation or by stipulating which task groups,
following options: units, or elements are designated for each com-
mander. The detailed OTC’s responsibilities for
a. The OTC retains command in the princi- mission execution and defense of the force are
pal areas of warfare by retaining all the warfare listed in Table 1-1 and those for a convoy operation
functions. in Table 1-9 and mine warfare in Table 1-11. The
OTC’s responsibilities cannot be delegated.
b. The OTC delegates to one subordinate
commander one or more warfare functions.

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b. Principal Warfare Area Responsi- plan. Details of responsibilities and functions


bilities. In exercising his responsibilities, the are to be found in Tables 1-1 through 1-4 and
OTC must consider both the threat to the force and are explained in Chapter 6. Functions may be
the units which he has available to counter the delegated to warfare commanders.
threat. However, no single threat may be consid-
ered in isolation; consequently, no tactic to coun- (4) Mine Warfare Coordination. The
ter a specific threat may be employed without OTC is responsible for formulating and prom-
considering its effect on the security of the force ulgating mine warfare policy. Detailed respon-
from other threats which may subsequently mate- sibilities and functions are found in Table 1-11.
rialize. The OTC’s detailed functions are found in Mine warfare functions may be delegated to a
Tables 1-1 through 1-11. There are two categories designated Mine Warfare Coordinator (MWC),
reflected in the tables: as indicated in the table.

(1) Those functions of the OTC which may d. The Convoy Responsibilities of
be delegated to a CWC. the OTC. The OTC is responsible for the safe and
timely arrival of the convoy. Detailed responsi-
(2) Those functions which may be dele- bilities and functions are found in Table 1-9 and
gated to warfare commanders, coordinators, or are explained in Chapter 10.
others to control assets and take action neces-
sary to execute the promulgated policy. (1) Mercantile Convoy. The OTC of the
escorting ships is not altered when a more sen-
c. Coordination Responsibilities. ior naval officer is present in a naval ship desig-
nated as part of the convoy and not part of the
(1) Air Coordination. The OTC is re- escort.
sponsible for coordinating all friendly air move-
ment within his area of interest. As he will not (2) Military Convoy. The senior naval
always know the position and intention of all officer of the ships in convoy and escorting
friendly units, he must exercise coordination ships will designate the OTC of the combined
partly by procedural means. The detailed force in accordance with Article 1216.
functions of the OTC for air coordination are
to be found in Table 1-6 and are explained in (3) When a Support Force is in Situa-
Chapter 6, Section IV. They may be dele- tion A. (See Article 1282.) When the OTC of
gated to an Air Coordinator. the support force is senior to the OTC of a mer-
cantile convoy, he should consider allowing the
(2) Electronic and Acoustic Warfare OTC of the convoy to remain in tactical com-
(EAW) Coordination. The OTC is responsi- mand. This maintains continuity of command
ble for determining and promulgating force and the previous close liaison between the OTC
EAW policies. Details of responsibilities and of the convoy and the convoy commodore.
functions are to be found in Tables 1-1 and 1-8
and are explained in Chapters 5 and 9. EW func- (4) Unescorted Convoy. In the absence
tions may be delegated to the Electronic War- of a warship escort, the convoy commodore is
fare Coordinator (EWC). Guidance on the to command the convoy.
application of acoustic warfare is to be found in
ATP 28. e. OTC’s Functions for Departure
and Entry Operations. The functions of the
(3) Surveillance. The OTC is responsi- OTC are found in Table 1-10 and are explained in
ble for establishing the surveillance areas for Chapter 3.
each area of maritime warfare within the overall
guidelines of the general picture compilation 1307 —1309 SPARE

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(1) The Electronic Warfare Coordi- responsiveness to the AAW, ASW, ASUW,
nator (EWC). The EWC is the principal advi- and EW information needs of the OTC.
sor to the OTC in all matters pertaining to the
employment and exploitation of the electro- (2) The Air Coordinator. The Air Coor-
magnetic and acoustic spectrum. Accordingly, dinator exercises coordination within the force
he has broad responsibilities, which impact air coordination area. The duty for air coordina-
upon task group planning as well as the man- tion should be assigned to the unit which has the
agement and control of all active and passive greatest number of electronic aids to aircraft
weapons, sensors, and electronic communica- navigation and control, the largest number of
tions equipment which operate in or target the experienced air control personnel, and the best
electromagnetic spectrum/environment to in- air picture facilities. This duty may be collo-
clude: ESM, ECM, EPM, EMCON, OPDEC, cated with the AAWC, AREC, HEC, or ASWC.
OPSEC, SIGINT (COMINT/ELINT), and
SIGSEC (COMSEC/ELSEC). The extent to (3) The Air Resource Element Coor-
which the EWC exercises actual control over dinator (AREC). The AREC is a resource
assets is scenario dependent and should be manager. He may, under certain circumstances,
clearly stated by the OTC and understood by exercise tactical control for particular aircraft
the principal warfare commanders. The EWC’s (i.e., for aircraft projecting power ashore), but
planning and management responsibilities en- his primary role remains that of asset allocation
compass several areas. The EWC’s functions and of informing the warfare commander of the
are found in Table 1-8. In addition: status of these assets, the results achieved by
them, and the information gained from their
(a) The EWC must ensure that force sensors. Particular functions of the AREC are de-
assets are employed to support the require- tailed in Table 1-7 and amplified in Chapter 6.
ments of the OTC and principal warfare
commanders. Coordination between the (4) The Helicopter Element Coordi-
EWC and the principal warfare command- nator (HEC). When two or more ships other
ers is vital to ensure that all assets with than a CV are helicopter equipped, a central
ESM, ECM, and EPM capabilities are man- scheduling authority for flight operations from
aged effectively. these ships is useful. In a multithreat environ-
ment, the assets controlled by this coordinator
(b) The EWC is the principal manager may be in demand by any of the principal war-
of the electromagnetic and acoustic spec- fare commanders. The HEC’s functions, there-
trums. The EWC will formulate, promul- fore, will in many ways parallel those of the
gate, control, and monitor the EMCON plan AREC, with whom he should coordinate, con-
based upon the OTC’s emission policy. The cerning helicopters. Additional functions found
ASWC must operate force acoustic emitters in Table 1-7 can be delegated to the HEC for
within the effective EMCON plan. The non-CV-based helicopter operations. HEC
ASWC has the authority to break acoustic functions will be delegated by the OTC, gener-
EMCON in defense of the force. He must, ally to the senior commanding officer of
however, notify the EWC of his actions. helicopter-equipped ships. These coordinating
functions will normally not apply to amphibi-
(c) The EWC must ensure that the ous force and logistic helicopters. Requests for
force deception plan and assets are em- helicopters embarked in other than the CV and
ployed in a manner which facilitates the amphibious and logistic ships will be direct to
mission and policy of the OTC. the HEC. The OTC must be made aware of heli-
copter scheduling, tasking, and flight opera-
(d) The EWC must ensure that cryp- tions in order to be able to resolve potential
tologic assets, both organic and nonorganic, requirement conflicts. The HEC should prom-
are employed in a manner which facilitates ulgate a daily flight schedule.

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(5) The Submarine Operations Co- (a) Direction Functions:


ordinating Authority (SOCA). The SOCA
functions as the primary point of contact in the 1. Delegating, as appropriate,
task force/group with the SUBOPAUTH and specified functions to other units in
submarines assigned to him concerning coordi- his local group.
nated operations matters. The OTC/CWC may
retain this function or delegate it to a subordi- 2. Establishing watch zones for
nate commander (normally, but not necessar- units in his group.
ily, the ASWC) depending on the role of the
submarine (e.g., ASUW, special warfare. sup- 3. Broadcasting the local picture to
port of amphibious warfare, etc.). units of the group on the local coor-
dination net.
(a) Division of SOCA Functions.
In large operations, the OTC/CWC may (b) Coordination Functions. Cor-
retain selected submarine coordination relating and evaluating reports from units in
functions (e.g., WSM coordination) and company and, where appropriate, relaying
delegate all other functions (e.g., TACON) this information to the OTC/CWC or war-
to one or more subordinate commanders. In fare commander.
doing so, unambiguous lines of coordina-
tion shall be retained between the task (c) Control Functions. The local
group and the SUBOPAUTH, and between warfare coordinator controls the local coor-
individual submarines and the commanders dination net.
to whom they are assigned. Division of sub-
marine coordination functions can provide (7) The Mine Warfare Coordinator
a task group greater flexibility in submarine (MWC). The MWC is the principal advisor to
employment, but it is not required if a single the OTC on matters pertaining to mine warfare.
commander can effectively accomplish He is responsible for coordinating the laying of
SOCA functions for all submarines. minefields in support of the OTC and the efforts
of supporting mine countermeasures (MCM)
(b) Submarine Element Coor- forces, which are usually not under the direct
dinator (SEC)/Submarine Advisory command or control of the OTC/CWC. Spe-
Team (SAT). The SEC is the principal ad- cific functions of the MWC include:
visor to the SOCA for submarine opera-
tions. Assignment of a SEC to the SOCA (a) Employment of tactical mining
staff should be considered anytime subma- against targets of opportunity, using force
rines operate in associated support and is assets.
required in direct support (unless this re-
quirement is waived by the SUBOPAUTH). (b) Coordination with appropriate
While not always necessary, a SAT — com- commanders for the laying of tactical mine-
posed of additional watchstanders — may fields and the execution of mining plans.
be required depending on the scenario.
SEC/SAT becomes an integral part of and is (c) Tasking of MCM forces assigned
co-located with the SOCA staff. to the tactical command of the OTC/CWC.

(c) SOCA and SEC/SAT functions and (d) Coordination with appropriate lo-
responsibilities are described in ATP 18. cal commanders for response to enemy min-
ing of choke points, safe havens, or operating
(6) Local Warfare Coordinator. When areas, and for the execution of MCM plans.
two or more units are in company, a local
warfare coordinator may be designated. Local (e) Maintaining and disseminating a
warfare coordinators have the following plot of relevant mine warfare information to
functions: the force.

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e. Asset Control and Coordination. (4) Submarines. Submarines operating


in support of a task group will conduct opera-
(1) Picket Ships, Towed Array Ships, tions as directed by the OTC/CWC (or desig-
or Other Ships. Picket ships, towed array nated subordinate commander acting as the
ships, or other ships operating at a considerable SOCA) or, in the case of associated and area op-
distance from the main body will normally op- erations, the SUBOPAUTH. When in support,
erate under the tactical control of a warfare the submarine is to communicate directly with
commander. As previously set forth, force the SOCA regarding coordination of tactical
AAW weapons systems may be tasked by the operations and the exchange of intelligence and
AAWC and force ASUW weapons systems by targeting information.
the ASUWC, even though the ship is under the
tactical control of another commander. A ship’s f. Delegation to Commanders of
stationing should be coordinated to consider Functional Groups.
the requirements of all warfare commanders.
Because tasking of a ship’s weapons by one war- (1) The OTC may designate commanders
fare commander may interfere with its primary of functional groups, such as deception groups,
tasking, such action must be preceded by prior underway replenishment groups, etc. This
concurrence of the warfare commander having commander will be implicitly responsible for
tactical control. If required, tactical control may all local warfare functions within his group. He
be temporarily passed to another commander may delegate these functions to units under his
(e.g., two Harpoon-equipped towed array ships control; in this case, the unit executing those
could be directed to form a surface action group functions may be designated a local warfare co-
(SAG) and temporarily operate under the tacti- ordinator. The group commander reports action
cal control of the SAG commander). taken, contact information, etc., to the OTC
and/or warfare commander, as appropriate.
(2) Ships in the Inner Screen. Ships in
the inner screen will normally operate under the (2) The following is a list of the most com-
tactical control of the screen commander (SC), monly used titles (see the glossary for defini-
with that authority delegated to him by the tions and indicated chapters for additional
OTC/CWC. The ships’ inner screen positions information):
will be assigned by the SC in accordance with
the OTC’s or warfare commanders’ require- (a) Screen Commander (SC), see
ments. These ships, like those in paragraph (1), Chapter 9.
may possess ASUW capabilities and the
ASUWC may, if assigned authority to do so, di- (b) Search and attack unit (SAU)
rect the SC to detach units as a SAG, but not commander, see Chapter 9.
before getting prior concurrence of the ASWC,
AAWC, or CWC as appropriate. To simplify (c) Surface action group (SAG) com-
coordination, the SC should also, whenever mander, see Chapter 8.
possible, be the ASWC. However, as noted pre-
viously, in large dispositions there may be sev- (d) Helicopter action group (HAG)
eral SCs or none, depending upon force commander, see Chapter 8.
disposition.
(e) Main body group (MBG) com-
(3) Rescue Destroyer. During flight mander.
operations, the unit designated as rescue de-
stroyer should be under the tactical control of (f) Underway replenishment group
the CV’s commanding officer and not be re- (URG) commander.
moved from the rescue station without his con-
sent. Rescue destroyers, like all other surface (g) Deception group (DCG) com-
units, may be tasked by the AAWC for emer- mander (including missile traps and wolf
gency AAW support, and by the ASUWC and traps).
ASWC for “in-place” firings.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

g. Delegation to Control Units. To f. Air plans, see Chapter 9.


carry out control functions, it is necessary to per-
form specialized duties which are generally dele- g. ASW tasking, see Chapter 9.
gated and distributed among the various units in
the force. A complete list of such duties is con- h. Maritime air tasking, see Chapter 6,
tained in the Duty Table (ATP 1, Vol. II, Table D). Section IV.

1313 (NC) PROMULGATION OF DUTIES i. Operation orders/plain text/voice


AND DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS transmissions.

a. The term “duty” is used to define war- j. Submarine tasking and coordination
fare commander/coordinator and other functional messages (see APP 4 and ATP 18).
assignments. ATP 1, Vol. II, Table D, lists all du-
ties. Certain duty assignments may be promul- 1321 (NR) MARITIME TACTICAL MES-
gated by appropriate commanders. SAGE SYSTEM (MTMS) — PUR-
POSE AND METHOD OF USE
b. The term “functions” refers to the ac-
tions and tasking listed in Tables 1-1 through 1-11. a. Purpose. The MTMS consists of stan-
These functions will be delegated by the OTC, dardized messages and may be used:
CWC, and other commanders as appropriate to the
command structure/force needs. (1) To convey operational instructions or
intentions.
c. Figure 1-2 depicts levels of command
and control within the OTC’s warfare organiza- (2) To pass operational information to tac-
tion. Figures 1-3 and 1-4 provide examples of the tical commanders at sea.
command structure incorporating duty and war-
fare function assignments. (3) To report operational information be-
tween commanders and from subordinate to
1314 — 1319 SPARE higher formations.

1320 (NR) TASKING METHODS (4) To notify organizations of impending


and actual operations of units engaged in mari-
The OTC and other maritime commanders time warfare.
have at their disposal different means of tasking
the forces under their command. Suggested meth- b. Method of Use. MTMS messages are
ods of tasking are as follows: to be used as shown in Table 1-12. Detailed in-
structions and the message structures are found in
a. Maritime Tactical Message System APP 4.
(MTMS), see Article 1321.
c. Ships Should Receive All Relevant
b. RAINFORM System, see Article 1322. MTMS Messages Before Joining a Force.
Cooperating aircraft should receive the relevant
c. Tactical signals (ATP 1, Vol. II, Article MTMS messages at such a time that the informa-
3415 — Duty Table With Governing Group BV). tion is available at the preflight briefing. Sections
that are not required or applicable should be omit-
d. Appropriate tasking signals (e.g., OP- ted. Whenever possible it is advisable to issue
TASK EW — Article 5401 and APP 4). standing MTMS messages covering the total peri-
od of operation. Changes are then only necessary
e. TASMO tasking messages (APP 4 and for individual items which change.
ATP 34).

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

b. A deck alert requires more warning than a. Color Code. The color code applied to
an airborne alert. The OTC should bear in mind a threat warning denotes the severity of the evalu-
that the presence of aircraft on the flight deck may ated threat:
hamper freedom of maneuver and that deck alerts
on board small ships may restrict the use of other Color Code Evaluation
weapon systems. The OTC may use OPTASK
AIR (see APP 4) to order alert states for helicop- WARNING ATTACK IS UNLIKELY
ters on all ships in the formation. WHITE WITHOUT ADEQUATE
WARNING
-EXAMPLES-
WARNING ATTACK IS
YELLOW PROBABLE
2 fighter aircraft Alert 5 . . . Two
fighter aircraft ready to become air- WARNING ATTACK IS IMMINENT,
borne 5 minutes after the order to RED OR HAS ALREADY
launch has been given. COMMENCED

1 ASW helicopter Alert 20 . . . One b. Type of Threat. The following plain


ASW helicopter ready to become air- language words are to precede the color code to
borne 20 minutes after the order to denote the type of threat:
launch has been given.
AIR
1461 — 1469 SPARE
MINES

NBC
1470 (NC) THREAT WARNINGS
SURFACE
A threat warning is informative only. Force
or individual unit actions are not therefore linked SUBMARINES
to it automatically. An OTC may sometimes order
measures of a temporary nature (including those NOTE
for use with ASMD) when a threat warning is
promulgated (e.g., changing the EMCON plan). In For promulgation of mine threat, see
many cases, however, such actions are more ap- also AHP 1.
propriately linked to detections and enemy reports
(emergency signals). 1471 — 1479 SPARE

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 1-1. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions

NO. RESPONSIBILITIES

OTC’S RESPONSIBILITIES
(Which cannot be delegated)

101 Promulgate policies and plans to accomplish the mission set forth by higher authority, providing a de-
scription of his intentions to his subordinate commanders.

102 Direct and monitor operations.

103 Establish command, control and communications policy, promulgate warfare command assign-
ments, and establish the force task organization if not already established by higher authority.

104 Establish the degree of authority delegated, specifying command functions assigned to each Princi-
ple Warfare Commander (PWC).

105 Establish and (with the assistance of appropriate warfare commanders and coordinators) promul-
gate policies for force:

(a) Picture Compilation Plan.


(b) Electronic and acoustic emission, including Emission Control and Emission Security.
(c) Radar frequency plans.
(d) Electromagnetic compatibility.

106 Promulgate a force Communications Plan, including alternate plans, designating circuits and fre-
quencies and establishing guard requirements and circuit priorities.

107 During periods of tension, request the Rules of Engagement (ROE) appropriate to his mission from
higher authority.

108 Formulate and promulgate plans for power projection and operations against land targets in conjunc-
tion with appropriate commanders.

109 Plan and coordinate logistics requirements.

110 Responsibilities specific to convoy operations as given in Table 1-9.

111 Designate a Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority (SOCA) to coordinate with the Subma-
rine Operations Authority (SUBOPAUTH) and assigned submarines.

112 Provide for submarine tactical communication requirements in the overall communications plan (OP-
TASK COMMS). Ensure all aircraft and surface ship circuit operators are aware of GUERRILLA pro-
cedures.

113 When appropriate, ensure that a Submarine Element Coordinator (SEC) (or Submarine Advisory
Team (SAT) if additional personnel are required) is available to commanders serving as SOCA.

114 Specify procedures for consolidation of SOCA responsibilities when joining task groups with each
having submarines assigned.

115 to 119 SPARE

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 1-1. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions (Cont.)

NO. FUNCTIONS

FUNCTIONS
(Which may be delegated to a warfare commander/coordinator)

120 Promulgating the policy for Operational/Tactical Deception.

121 Formulating and promulgating the policy for planned responses.

122 Promulgating the policy for, and when authorized, directing the employment of nuclear weapons.

123 Formulating and promulgating general safety policy or assigned units including policy for air-
craft/units joining the force.

124 Providing air, surface, and subsurface units as available to appropriate PWCs, coordinating their re-
spective efforts and, when necessary, resolving conflicting requirements.

125 Requesting assignments of such external assets as may be required.

126 Designating position and intended movement (PIM), disposition and force surveillance areas, and
maneuvering the force.

127 With other appropriate commanders, arranging for coordination of air, surface, and subsurface sur-
veillance with other friendly forces operating within or adjacent to the force surveillance area.

128 Specifying desired search efforts outside the established force surveillance area, requesting addi-
tional assets as necessary.

129 Specifying reference systems for air/surface/submarine contact reporting.

130 From all information available obtained from external sources and/or PWCs, resolving any existing
conflict, and constructing, displaying, and passing to the force a composite picture of the tactical
situation.

131 Evaluating information to establish probability areas/sectors for air, surface, and subsurface threats.

132 Ordering degrees of readiness.

133 Informing SUBOPAUTH of task force/group intentions and movements.

134 Requesting support submarines as required. (Not applicable if submarines are permanently as-
signed to the task group.)

135 Coordinating submarine and task force/group Waterspace Management (WSM) requirements with
SUBOPAUTH.

136 Providing SUBOPAUTH long-term submarine employment requirements and coordinating information.

137 Promulgating communications procedures and protocols required for submarine operations applica-
ble to the specific scenario. (See ATP 18.)

138 Promulgating or otherwise ensuring all elements of the force, including nonorganic support units,
have the effective SUBOPAUTH WSM Allocation and Status message for the area in which they are
operating.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 1-1. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions (Cont.)

NO. FUNCTIONS

139 Providing assigned submarines with tailored intelligence support by Force Summary message by
tactical communications or via the SUBOPAUTH for relay on the submarine broadcast.

140 As required, exchanging on-scene tactical coordination and intelligence information with assigned
submarines. Maintaining an updated Force Situation Report for immediate relay on tactical circuits.

141 Acting as or designating the SGSA Coordinating Authority.

142 Overseeing on-scene operations to ensure submarine safety from attack by friendly forces.

143 When delegated by the SUBOPAUTH, assuming tactical control (TACON) of designated submarines.

144 to 199 SPARE

Note

Standby OTC will be prepared to assume the duties of the OTC.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
reporting an area of probability derived from two TUDE 151 is 15,100 feet) or using the ICAO
or more passive bearings. The suffixes are: term FLIGHT LEVEL.

a. Position: NOTE

Within a 2-mile radius — XRAY FLIGHT LEVEL is only to be used


Within a 10-mile radius — YANKEE when altitude is reported by the air-
Outside a 10-mile radius — ZULU craft (secondary surveillance radar,
IFF, or voice).
From NAVSTAR GPS unit — GOLF PAPA
NOTE b. Depth. If an accurate depth of a sub-
merged track cannot be determined, an estimated
There is no appreciable error unless depth may be reported using the appropriate
otherwise stated. APP 7 brevity code words (i.e., SHALLOW,
DEEP), or if an accurate depth can be determined,
b. ESM bearings: it may be reported as DEVILS (in tens of feet; e.g.,
DEVILS 30 is 300 feet).
Within 2° — ALFA
Within 5° — BRAVO NOTE
Within 10° — CHARLIE
· NATO publications are in the process
Outside 10° — DELTA of being amended to the following
NOTES standard units of measurement:

(1) Bearing accuracy is CHARLIE, (1) Range — yards.


unless otherwise stated.
(2) Distance — nautical miles.
(2) The word “CLASS” is inserted
before A, B, C, and D. (3) Altitude — feet.

2108 (NR) ALTITUDE OR DEPTH (4) Depth of all objects in water, in-
cluding bottom depth and thermal fea-
When reporting positions, it may be appro- tures, in meters with feet or fathoms
priate to include an altitude or depth report. (as appropriate) in brackets using con-
version of 1 meter = 3.28 feet and
a. Altitude. If an accurate altitude of any rounded off to the nearest meter when
air track cannot be determined, estimated altitude exact figures are required. When using
is to be reported using the appropriate APP 7 only approximate figures the conver-
brevity code words (i.e., VERY LOW, LOW, sion may be rounded off accordingly
MEDIUM, HIGH, VERY HIGH). (e.g.: 250 fm should be rounded off to
450 m rather than 457 m).
(1) Friendly Air Tracks. The altitude of
friendly aircraft can be reported using the (5) Thickness of ice — centimeters
words ANGELS (in thousands of feet; e.g., and/or meters.
ANGELS 1 DECIMAL 5 is 1,500 feet) or
HEIGHT (in feet, e.g., HEIGHT 400 is 400 (6) Temperatures — degrees Celsius.
feet) or using the International Civil Aeronauti-
cal Organization (ICAO) term FLIGHT · The standard units above are not to
LEVEL (e.g., FLIGHT LEVEL 250 is 25,000 be confused with the code words
feet). RANGE and ALTITUDE. For
safety purposes during the transi-
(2) Other Air Tracks. The altitude of tion period, the depth of all objects
other air tracks can be reported using the word will be in meters followed by feet or
ALTITUDE (in hundreds of feet; e.g., ALTI- fathoms in brackets.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
2109 (NR) CHECK-SUM DIGITS 2111 (NC) DATA LINK REFERENCE
POINT
a. To avoid confusion caused by errors in
transmission, check-sum digits are to be used on a. The data link reference point (DLRP) is
all positions, courses, speeds, and times when sent the common point from which all positional infor-
by RATT. Check-sum digits may also be used for mation on data link is derived. The DLRP is estab-
ranges, frequencies, etc. lished by the OTC, in a geographic position,
before commencing link operations, but may be
b. To derive the check-sum digit, the num- changed for operational and/or security reasons.
bers in the position, course, speed, or time are to be In principle, the DLRP should be the same posi-
added together and the total put after the appropri- tion as the CCG origin, thus ensuring that picture
ate element. Only the last figure of the summation compilation is derived from using the same origin
is to be used; that is, if the total comes to “19,” only by TDS and non-TDS units when cooperating.
the “9" is used.
b. The force track coordinator(s) is (are)
-EXAMPLES- responsible for an accurate tactical (data link) pic-
ture and for raid reporting within the force or in a
(1) Position — 5004N9 15642W8. sector, using voice compilation nets. The grid ref-
(The 9 and 8 are the check-sum digits.) erence unit (GRU) is responsible to the OTC for
maintaining the accurate position of the DLRP
(2) Course — 225T9 degrees true or and the CCG origin. The GRU holds by definition
225M9 degrees magnetic (The 9 is the the correct position of the DLRP and/or grid ori-
check- sum digit.) gin.

(3) Speed — 15KT6. c. Establishing the DLRP. Although


(The 6 is the check-sum digit.) more than one DLRP can be established for con-
secutive periods and/or for geographic areas, only
(4) Time — 281030Z4. one DLRP per data link should be effective during
(The 4 is the check-sum digit.) a certain period. The geographic positions of
DLRPs and the times of change are to be estab-
2110 (NU) STANDARD POSITIONS/ lished well in advance by the OTC through means
REFERENCE POINTS/POSITION of OPORD, OPGEN, etc.
REPORTING
d. Initiating the DLRP. When com-
The standard positions in the force are: mencing link operations, all PUs insert the DLRP
in their TDS. On completion, the GRU executes a
a. QQ — The center of the front of the main grid lock.
body or convoy when not in circular formation.
e. Maintaining the DLRP. The accurate
b. TT — Originator’s present position. position of the DLRP is maintained by the GRU.
When necessary, the GRU executes a grid lock
c. XX — The standard position established check to assist in updating PUs.
by the OTC on which a search, enemy reporting
and so forth is to be based. f. Changing the DLRP. Changing the
DLRP causes disruption of the tactical picture for
d. YY — Addressee’s present position. a short period and should therefore only be exe-
cuted when the tactical situation permits. On com-
e. ZZ — The center of the force. pletion of changing the DLRP and when all PUs
have entered the DLRP in their TDS, the GRU
NOTE executes a grid lock. Non-TDS fitted ships are to
shift the CCG accordingly.
Whenever possible, XX should be
coincidental with the DLRP.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
2242 (NR) SPECIAL RULES OF THE b. Screen Ships. When a formation
ROAD consists of a main body and screen, ships of the
screen are to keep clear of those of the main body.
The following rules are applicable to Allied When, from any cause, a ship of the main body
naval ships and overrule the International Regula- finds herself so close that collision cannot be
tions for Preventing Collisions at Sea in the cir- avoided by action of the screen ship alone, she also
cumstances described. shall take such action as will best avoid collision.
Rule 15 of the International Regulations for Pre-
a. Right of Way. Priority is in the follow- venting Collisions at Sea is not to apply between
ing order. screen ships and ships of the main body (but see
Chapter 3 for instructions for individual screening
(1) Helicopters when hovering with so- units).
nar in the water are to be considered as ships not
under command. A helicopter in the dip or 2243 (NR) SEA MANNERS AND
hover is not to be approached by ships within CUSTOMS
500 yards.
With the exceptions stated in Article 2242,
(2) Mine Countermeasures Units, the International Regulations for Preventing Col-
which includes helicopters operating tethered lisions at Sea are to be observed by ships in forma-
MCM equipment, have the right of way when tion. However, in order to facilitate maneuvering,
showing the appropriate signal over ships en- the instructions in this article are to be observed,
gaged in replenishment or ships engaged in the but in each case where one ship is directed not to
launching or recovery of aircraft. MCM heli- hamper the other, the ship required to keep clear of
copters with gear streamed are not to be ap- the other is so to conduct her movements through-
proached by ships within 1,000 meters. out that her heading and/or proximity to the other
are not such as to introduce any doubts whatsoever
(3) Ships Engaged in Replenish- as to her intentions. She should also, if possible,
ment (other than VERTREP) have the right of indicate her intentions by signal. However, if
way over carriers and other ships engaged in doubt does arise, the International Regulations for
flight operations. Preventing Collisions at Sea (or, where applica-
ble, any local port rule) are to apply, except as in
(4) Ships Engaged in Launching or Article 2242.
Recovery of Landing Craft Utilities have
the right of way except over ships or formations a. General Conduct of Ships in the
showing the appropriate signals and are to be Presence of Formed Units. Ships joining,
regarded as described at the above stated prior- leaving, approaching, or passing through a forma-
ity configurations (1), (2), and/or (3). tion must not hamper ships already in formation.

(5) Ships Engaged in Launching or b. Mine Countermeasures Units.


Recovery of Aircraft have the right of way
except over ships or formations showing the (1) Vessels or Formations engaged in
appropriate signals that are engaged in replen- mine clearance operations (as described in Rule
ishment (other than VERTREP) or mine coun- 27f of the International Regulations for Pre-
termeasures operations; other ships are to keep venting Collisions at Sea 1972 (modified
clear (see Chapter 6). 1983)) are not to be approached nearer than
1,000 meters. Under no circumstances is a ship
(6) Ships Engaged in Launching or to pass through a mine clearance formation.
Recovery of Arrays have the right of way
except over ships or formations showing the (2) Helicopters engaged in mine coun-
appropriate signals and are to be regarded as de- termeasures operations are to be considered as
scribed at the above stated priority configura- ships not under command when operating
tions (1), (2), (3), (4), and/or (5). tethered countermeasures equipment (see Arti-
cle 2242a(2)).

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
c. Ships Not in Station. Ships that are ordered to be carried out at ___ is to be executed at
not in station are not to hamper those in station. that time without further signaling. Unit com-
However, ships in station should not stubbornly manders are to issue necessary instructions in
maintain their course and speed if danger of colli- advance.”
sion exists.
2245 (NR) SCOUTING UNITS
d. Passing Between Ships in a Line.
No ship is to pass between ships in a line without Special maneuvering rules for scouting
(in the case of a junior) asking permission, or (in units will be found in Chapter 6.
the case of senior) indicating her intention to do
so. It then becomes the responsibility of the ship 2246 (NR) SHIPS TOWING ACOUSTIC
passing through the line to avoid hampering the ARRAYS OR OTHER DEVICES
other ships.
Ships towing acoustic arrays or other de-
e. Passing Through a Formation. If vices do not have complete freedom of maneuver.
ships are required to pass between ships in a for- They will not normally display lights or day
mation or between lines, it is the responsibility of shapes indicating conduct of special operations
the ships passing through the formation to avoid and are responsible for informing any unit closing
hampering the movements of the other ships. No them of any special restrictions.
ship is to attempt to pass through a formation of
minesweepers with sweeps streamed. 2247 — 2249 SPARE

f. Senior Officer’s Orders to Keep 2250 (NR) MAN OVERBOARD —


Clear. If a senior officer wishes a junior officer STANDARD PROCEDURES
who has the right of way to keep clear of him, the
senior officer is to issue timely orders. a. The ship from which a man falls over-
board is to use the following procedure:
g. Restricted Waters. In restricted wa-
ters, a small ship must not hamper the movements (1) Use the rudder and engines as appropri-
of a large ship. ate to avoid the man.

2244 (NR) EXECUTING MANEUVER AT (2) Drop a lifebuoy; in peacetime, also


PREARRANGED TIME drop a day/night pyrotechnic marker.

a. Ordering the Maneuver. Maneu- (3) Mark the plot.


vers, such as altering course and speed or chang-
ing the formation, can be ordered to be executed at (4) In peacetime, the above information is
a specific time or on arrival in a prescribed posi- to be passed regardless of the EMCON plan in
tion; in these cases no further signal to execute the force.
maneuver will be made by the OTC, though unit
commanders may have to make signals to their (5) Sound at least six short blasts on the
units. whistle.

b. When Signaling Is Restricted. (6) Maneuver according to rules set forth


When it is desired to restrict signaling during a in Articles 2251 or 2252, as appropriate.
particular period in the future, such as during
darkness or when nearing the enemy’s coast, the (7) Secure active sonar if tactical situation
OTC can use the following signal: “The maneuver permits.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 2-1. (NU) Maneuvering Formation When Using Evasive Steering

ON EXECUTE ¶ WHEN ZIGZAGGING · WHEN WEAVING


OF THE
SIGNAL
FOR

Cease Make Cease


µ

Auto- Return to Maneuver Auto- Resume


matic- Base Relative Resume Applicable matic- Without Applicable
ally Course to on Signal to ally Signal to

TURN Yes No Present Leg Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant


TOGETHER of Zigzag Formation Formation
2. All Screens 2. All Screens

Yes No To True Yes Mercantile


Course Indi- Convoys
cated

WHEEL Yes Yes Base Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant


Course Formation Formation
2. All Screens 2. All Screens

No Yes To True Yes Mercantile


Course Convoys
Indicated

CHANGE OF No No— 1. Combatant No— 1. Combatant


BASE Adjust to Formation Adjust Formation
COURSE OF New Base 2. Convoy to New 2. All Screens
10° OR LESS Course 3. All Screens Base 3. Independent
4. Independent Course

CHANGE OF Yes No— Present Leg Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant
AXIS See Note of Zigzag Formation Formation
2. All Screens 2. All Screens

CHANGE OF Yes No— Present Leg Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant
FORMATION See Note of Zigzag Formation Formation
OR 2. All Screens 2. All Screens
DISPOSITION

CHANGE IN No No 1. Combatant No 1. Combatant


TIME ZONE Formation Formation
2. Convoy 2. All Screens
3. All Screens 3. Independent
4. Independent

SEARCH Yes Yes Base Yes Search Line No Yes Search Line
TURN Course

NOTE: If the signal “CEASE ZIGZAG, RESUME BASE COURSE” is ordered concurrently with either a change in formation
or disposition, or a rotation of axis, ships may proceed to their own station and resume base course when in station if it is
safe and quicker to do so.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 2-25 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
(3) Surface Escorts should take account iv. If a torpedo is detected more
of the requirements to maintain contact, attack than 150° on the bow, alter course away
the submarine and defend the main body, then: and steady 30° beyond the reciprocal of
the initial bearing.
(a) Alter course between 60° and 90°
if possible to place the contact on the oppo- (b) If the Ship is Turning, the turn
site bow and, if the tactical situation per- should be continued or increased. Course
mits, displace ship 1,000 yards across the should be steadied 30° beyond the initial
bearing of the submarine. Use limited bearing of the detection if turning toward,
wheel as necessary to avoid loss of contact or 30° short of the reciprocal of the initial
in the turn. bearing if turning away.

(b) If possible, units should simultane- (c) In Both of the Above Cases, main-
ously change speed with the alteration of tain new course until the ship is at least
course by an increase or decrease of at least 3 1,000 yards clear of its original track when
knots. torpedoes were first detected. This will take
the ship clear of a possible torpedo pattern.
(c) Units should not be steady with the
contact within 15° of the bow if towed de- (2) Torpedo Reported by Other Units.
coys are streamed and activated.
(a) If the position of the firing subma-
(d) If towed decoys are not streamed, rine is not known, a single ship should nor-
they should be streamed and employed in mally turn stern towards the reporting unit
accordance with current employment doc- and increase to maximum speed to clear the
trine for the decoy in use. torpedo danger area; escorts should not ex-
ceed maximum sonar speed. If the position
d. Torpedo Countermeasures To Be of the firing submarine is known and it is
Executed When a Torpedo Is Detected. not clear whether or not the reporting unit is
the target, then a single ship should carry
(1) Torpedo Detected By Own Units. out torpedo countermeasures in accordance
On detecting a torpedo, units should increase with paragraph 2310d(1).
to maximum speed, except that escorts should
not exceed maximum sonar speed, and activate (b) The OTC of a multiship main body
decoys. is to maneuver the force clear of the threat.

(a) If the Ship Is Not Turning, units NOTE


should alter course as follows:
· The torpedo countermeasures
i. If a torpedo is detected within above are based on the assumption
30° of the bow, alter course to comb the that the threat is a straight-running
track and, when the torpedo has passed, torpedo with limited or no program-
make a bold course alteration to clear a mable logic.
possible torpedo pattern.
· Increasing speed is not always the
ii. If a torpedo is detected between best way to avoid a torpedo. A silent
30° and 70° on the bow, alter course to- speed can be defined on modern
ward and steady 30° beyond the initial ships, which can be combined suc-
bearing. cessfully with an evasive course,
especially if the ship is fitted with a
iii. If a torpedo is detected on a torpedo detection device. This tac-
bearing more than 70° but less than tic will be ineffective against wire-
150° on the bow, alter course away and guided torpedoes.
steady 30° short of the reciprocal of the
initial bearing.

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 2-26 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
2320 (NC) ANTI-FPB EVASION (2) Maneuver by TURN or CORPEN to
keep the line of ships close to the normal threat
Whenever possible, a force should keep axis for as long as possible; keep ships closed
well clear of areas in which FPBs are probable, up for mutual support and ease of maneuver.
such as fishing fleets and groups of islands, and When the threat could be different from
should maintain at least 40 nm of sea room, pref- straight-running torpedoes, the torpedo coun-
erably more, in all directions. When such areas termeasures (maneuvers and decoy employ-
cannot be avoided, they should if possible be tran- ment) will be based on threat assessment and
sited in daylight. When a threat is located, the carried out in accordance with respective na-
force should turn away to increase the time avail- tional doctrines.
able for countermeasures using high speed and
short-leg zigzag. In addition, a long-leg zigzag (3) Maneuvering should be aimed at:
may be considered in order to mislead enemy
FPBs in calculating their interception. (a) Keeping FPBs within destructive
range of aircraft.

2321 (NC) MANEUVER (b) Evading until all ship’s weapons


are ready.
a. Against Missile-Firing FPBs.
(c) Upsetting the enemy’s fire control
(1) Keep FPBs at as great a range as possi- solution.
ble from the main body.
c. Assigned Mission. Maneuvering is
(2) Main body units should turn away from also subject to the assigned mission. A surface unit
the threat. should complete its assigned mission while simul-
taneously combating the FPB. A surface unit
(3) Escorts should carry out countermea- screening large combatants should place itself be-
sures between the main body and the threat. tween the main body and the threat. A surface unit
operating alone should maneuver to keep the FPB
(4) Once missiles are detected, ships at maximum effective gun range and to minimize
should maneuver considering weapon arcs the rate of closing.
while providing least radar target and optimiz-
ing chaff and decoy employment. d. Other Factors. Whenever possible, a
surface unit should attempt to get up-sea of an
b. Against Torpedo-Firing FPBs. FPB, as the latter cannot sustain at a high speed
into the wind and sea. If FPBs attempt a pincer’s
(1) Maneuver to keep FPBs on the quarter movement, a surface unit may maneuver to en-
when a contact is evaluated as hostile or possi- gage both pincers, or only one pincer at a time, de-
bly hostile to keep the weapon system arcs pending on the tactical situation and firepower
clear, reduce the closing range rate, and prevent available. Use of a smoke screen should be consid-
FPBs from closing within 4,000 to 5,000 yards ered. Use of illuminants at night between a surface
forward of the beam. unit and the threat may reduce the enemy’s visual
capability. See also Chapter 8.

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CHAPTER 3

Disposition of Forces

SECTION I — FORMATIONS

3100 (NR) SCOPE way is in no way related to the block numbers pre-
scribed in subparagraph a. above.
This section describes types of formations
for operational use. Basic rules for ordering are in e. Signaling. An operational purpose
ATP 1, Vol. II. Where special rules and proce- formation is signaled by using the FORM pennant
dures are necessary (e.g., for replenishment), followed by the formation number and purpose
these are detailed in following articles. letter(s). The use of the purpose letter(s) simplifies
the procedure when reforming because of the rule
3105 (NC) BASIC SYSTEM OF that when shifting from a basic “ready” formation
FORMATIONS to an antiair warfare or nuclear defense formation
there is usually no change in the Guide, course,
a. In the interests of flexibility and simplic- speed, or axis. A signal is also available to facili-
ity, this section prescribes certain basic “ready” tate forming the type formations described in sub-
formations and provides tables with each that list paragraph c. Above.
station assignments for varying numbers and
types of ships. 3106 (NC) FORMING

b. Numbering. Operational purpose for- The OTC specifies the appropriate forma-
mations are allocated formation numbers from 20 tion for the existing tactical and operational situa-
to 99, with formations designed for similar pur- tion, the Guide, course, speed, axis, and ships’
poses allocated numbers from the same block (see station assignments. The OTC may direct subordi-
Table 3-1). The purpose of a formation is indi- nate commanders to assign stations to their re-
cated by appending the appropriate purpose and spective ships. Upon execution of the signal to
identification letter(s) as required to the formation form an operational formation, ships shall move to
number (see Table 3-1). Numbers not allocated in their new stations independently, hoisting station
this chapter may be used as desired by appropriate numbers by day when ordered (see ATP 1, Vol.
authority. II). Units already formed will be maneuvered by
order of their unit commanders when the forma-
c. Basic Types. Formations 50 and 51 tion ordered is linear in nature and the new forma-
are basic “ready” formations. They are designed tion can be achieved by a unit maneuver.
so that antiair warfare (except for 50) and nuclear
defense formations can be assumed with mini- 3107 (NC) MANEUVERING
mum delay. The appropriate antiair warfare and
nuclear defense formations are indicated by the a. Course and Axis Changes. Forma-
suffixes “V” and “Z” respectively. Other basic tion axis changes are indicated and illustrated in
formations (circular destroyer, replenishment, Article 3115. Disposition course and axis changes
amphibious group sector, and departure and entry should for simplicity ordinarily be given in multi-
formations) are also included in this chapter. ples of 5°. When the disposition axis is rotated, the
OTC of each formation is to maneuver his forma-
d. Additional Types. Additional type tion to resume the station relative to the old axis.
formations may be specified by type commanders Unless the rotation is a small one, the maneuver
for use by ship types not included in the main allo- will take a long time to complete.
cations above. These are indicated by prefixing
ship type indicator letters to the number of the for- b. Change in Organization or Com-
mation (see Table 3-1). The number used in this position of the Force. When any change in the
listed type or task organization is issued by the

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3110 (NR) GENERAL TYPES


Table 3-1. (NU) Table of Formations
Formations are formed by linear or circular
methods. Line formations consist of single and
Formation Numbers
multiple line formations and are described in ATP
20 to 29 Destroyer Formations 1, Vol. II. Formations are listed in Table 3-2.
30 to 39 Large Combatant Formations
40 to 49 Spare 3115 (NC) CIRCULAR FORMATIONS
50 to 59 Transport/Logistic Formations
60 to 69 Replenishment Formations
a. Formation Center and Axis. The
direction of a formation axis is signaled as a true
70 to 79 Amphibious Formations
bearing; however, if there is any doubt as to the po-
80 to 89 Surface Action Formations
sition of formation center, the OTC is to indicate it
90 to 99 Miscellaneous Formations (including by true bearing and distance from the Guide or an
Departure and Entry Formations)
indicated ship.
Purpose Identification Letters
b. Circular Stationing. The circular
C Cruising Q Normal method of stationing is shown in Figure 3-1. The
D Departure (Sortie) R Ready station in the center is called station zero and the
E Entry S Antisubmarine circles are numbered consecutively outward from
F Fueling (Replen- T Column the center. Circle spacing is 1,000 yards, unless
ishment) U Screening otherwise ordered; thus the circle of radius 5,000
G Gunnery V Antiair Warfare yards is known as Circle 5 and that of 7,300 yards
H Bombardment W Special as Circle 7.3. The location of a station is described
J Approach X Exercise
K Attack Y Assault Table 3-2. (NU) Table of Allocated Formations
L Low Visibility (Amphibious)
M Minelaying or Z Nuclear Defense
Sweeping Type Number Purpose

Principal Ship Type Indicator Letters Single 1, 2, 3, 4 Maneuvering in Close


Line Company
A Auxiliary M Minesweeper
C Large Combatant N Minelayer Multiple 5, 6, 7, 8, Maneuvering in Close
Line 9, 10, 11, Company
D Destoryer R Aircraft Carrier 12
L Amphibious S Submarine
Destroyer 20, 21, Circular (20) and
Type 22, 23, 24 Special Formations
(NATO-RESTRICTED)
Transport/ 50 Rectangular Ready
OTC or when units join or depart, the formation Logistic 50V Rectangular, Antiair
does not automatically change. No ship is to move 51 Warfare
from its present station until a signal is made or- 51V Circular, Ready
dering a new formation or, in the case of a single 51Z Circular, Antiair Warfare
ship, a signal ordering the ship concerned to move Circular, Nuclear De-
to its new station. Screen units may adjust station fense
to cover gaps. When dissolving a formation, the Replenish- 60 Circular
OTC will ensure that the formation is oriented to ment 61 Circular Ready
permit units to proceed on a safe course when de-
62 With Skeleton Screen
tached. Normally, the OTC will detach screen
units first; when these units are clear, the main Sortie and 90D Sortie
body will be dissolved in an orderly manner. Entry 90E Entry

3108 — 3109 SPARE


(NATO-RESTRICTED)

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Figure 3-1. (NU) Stationing Ships in Formation by Circular Method

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by the number of the circle on which it lies fol- b. Ready (R) Formations. These pro-
lowed by its direction relative to the formation vide a compromise between optimum subsurface
axis measured clockwise from 000° to 359°. and optimum air protection. They may be readily
shifted to either a cruising or antiair warfare for-
c. Taking Station. Upon execution of mation. They retain acceptable protection against
the signal to form a circular formation, ships move all threats while permitting maximum offensive
to their new stations independently and, when or- operations.
dered, are to hoist station numbers by day.
c. Antiair Warfare (V) Formations.
d. Stationing Units of More Than These provide protection against medium-speed,
One Ship. A unit stationed in a circular forma- medium-altitude aircraft, when there is little like-
tion is normally a single ship, but exceptions will lihood that nuclear weapons will be employed;
occur when it becomes necessary for a unit con- defense against higher performance aircraft can
sisting of more than one ship to occupy a station. best be achieved by employing AAW dispositions
Unit(s) so stationed shall not be of such size as to (such as 2V) which combine the advantages of
hamper adjacent units(s) and shall take station dispersion (to reduce the effectiveness of nuclear
according to tactical requirements (see ATP 1, attack) with decentralization of control and
Vol. II). defense in depth (to obtain warning and time
in which to act with CAP and missiles). These
e. Rotating Formation Axis. The di- principles are covered in Chapter 7. Antiair war-
rection of a formation axis is rotated by signaling a fare formations are assumed when an air attack is
new direction; the axis then rotates by the shortest probable, but plans for assuming them should be
way to the new direction. A formation axis is not made in advance to ensure electromagnetic com-
to be rotated more than 60° in one step. Figure 3-2 patibility of ships with missile systems.
illustrates rotation of the axis when the Guide is in
station zero and Figure 3-3 illustrates rotation when d. Nuclear Defense (Z) Formations.
the Guide is not in station zero. (For ease of com- These are designed to minimize nuclear blast
parison, ships are in the same initial stations and damage by dispersion. The mutual support af-
the formation axis is rotated 30° in both figures.) forded by surface-to-air missiles replaces that
formerly afforded by antiaircraft guns in close
3120 (NC) OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS formations; random steering and higher speeds
compensate for the reduction in effectiveness of
Formations more complex than linear and close ASW measures. Nuclear defense formations
circular formations are used to fulfill operational are assumed when nuclear attack is probable and
purposes, such as carrier or amphibious opera- are ordered as a passive measure or as one of the
tions, surface action, and replenishment at sea, and antiair warfare (V) dispositions described in para-
must provide for effective action in a multithreat graph c.
environment. Because of the inherent element of
surprise, submarines, FPBs, guided missiles, and e. Formations Containing Surface-
aircraft are predominant threats. to-Surface Missile Capable Ships. Forma-
tions containing surface-to-surface missile capa-
3121 (NC) BROAD OPERATIONAL ble ships should optimize missile strike capability
CATEGORIES while minimizing mutual interference between
force AAW posture and antisurface ship missile
a. Cruising (C) ASW Formations. capabilities.
These provide the best protection against the sub-
surface threat by making the most effective use of 3122 — 3124 SPARE
ASW units.

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Figure 3-2. (NU) Rotating Formation Axis, Guide in Station Zero

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Figure 3-3. (NU) Rotating Formation Axis, Guide Not in Station Zero

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3125 (NU) TYPICAL OPERATIONAL one. Upon execution, the ship which will occupy
FORMATIONS station one will become the Guide. While the for-
mation is forming, the Guide maintains course and
3126 (NC) DESTROYER TYPE speed, unless otherwise directed, and indicates
FORMATIONS course and speed by information signal. Station
assignments are normally the same as the ship’s
a. The formations in this article are appro- allocated sequence number. The commander or-
priate for use by destroyer type ships when operat- dering the formation should assign stations when-
ing in separate formations. ever there is any question. Station coordinates are
read from Figure 3-4 opposite the station number
b. Formation 20 — Destroyer Type and under the number of ships in the formation.
Circular Formation is designed for use when
operating in an area where air attack is probable c. Formations 21 Through 24 Are
(for example, on picket station). The course and Special Formations. They are illustrated in
formation axis coincide upon forming, the axis Figure 3-5.
passing from formation center through station

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Figure 3-4. (NU) Destroyer Type Ship Formation 20

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Figure 3-5. (NU) Destroyer Formations 21, 22, 23, and 24

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3127 (NC) TRANSPORT/LOGISTIC abreast; formations with larger numbers of


FORMATIONS transport/ logistic ships should conform to the
station designator table (Table A) in Figure 3-6.
a. Principles. The typical transport/ Support ships present are stationed using Table B.
logistic formations provided in this article are
based on the following principles: c. Formation 50V — Transport/
Logistic Rectangular Antiair Warfare For-
(1) Construction. Because transport/ mation uses the same large ship stations as For-
logistic ships have limited maneuverability mation 50.
characteristics, a linear formation is suitable
for simplicity of station-keeping. Formation 50, d. Formation 51 — Transport/
a multiple line, rectangular formation, is suit- Logistic Circular Ready Formation provides
able in areas in which the subsurface threat is for excellent tactical control (Figure 3-7), and of-
primary; when the air threat is primary, use For- fers the compactness that is essential to ASW and
mation 51, a combination circular and colum- AAW gunnery protection. It is flexible in that it
nar formation. permits a rapid shift into an antiair warfare forma-
tion or an orderly shift into a nuclear defense for-
(2) Distances and Intervals of about mation when radial expansion from the Guide is
1,000 yards each for transport/logistic ships required. The OTC may direct transport/logistic
will provide sufficient maneuvering space for and large support ship commanders to assign sta-
conventional threats. Unless otherwise or- tions to their respective ships. Transport/logistic
dered, distances and intervals in Formations 50 ship stations are determined by referring to the sta-
and 51 are 1,000 yards for transport/logistic tion designator table (Table A) and diagram in
ships. Support ships present take stations 1,500 Figure 3-7; large support ship stations are given in
yards outboard of transport/logistic ships on Table B.
bearings relative to the axis. Distance and inter-
vals, for both support ships and transport/logis- e. Formation 51V — Transport/
tic ships, are increased to 3,500 yards for Logistic Circular Antiair Warfare Forma-
nuclear defense. tion uses the same large ship stations as Forma-
tion 51.
(3) Formation Axis and Course nor-
mally coincide. f. Formation 51Z — Transport/
Logistic Circular Nuclear Defense Forma-
(4) Screen Units are stationed in accord- tion is formed by radially expanding Formation
ance with Chapter 3. 51. Transport/logistic ships expand radially on the
same bearings as in Formation 51 until a distance
b. Formation 50 — Transport/ of 3,500 ya rds is e sta blishe d be tween
Logistic Rectangular Ready Formation, them — thus stations on ring A will form on cir-
suitable for day or night cruising (Figure 3-6), cle 3.5, those on ring B on circle 7, and those on
provides excellent protection against submarines ring C on circle 10.5; support ships form on the
and yet permits a rapid shift into an antiair warfare same bearings as in Formation 51, but 3,500 yards
formation. The OTC may either specify station as- outboard of the transport/logistic ship formation.
signments prior to ordering the formation or may If the threat of nuclear attack is the primary threat
direct transport/logistic and support ship type and extends over long periods, formations of more
commanders to do so for their respective ships. than 19 transport/logistic ships should be sepa-
For best protection from submarines, two or three rated into two or more formations (see Disposition
transport/ logistic ships should be fromed in a line 1AF in Figure 3-18).

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Figure 3-6. (NU) Transport/Logistic Rectangular Ready Formation 50

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Figure 3-7. (NU) Transport Logistic Circular Ready Formation 51

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3128 (NC) REPLENISHMENT the first ship to starboard of the center of the line
FORMATIONS on the replenishment course is the Guide.

a. Typical replenishment formations (see (2) When a carrier is present, it is normal


Figures 3-8, 3-9, and 3-10) are based on the princi- for the OTC to designate the Guide of the sup-
ples outlined below. If the threat of nuclear attack plying unit alongside the carrier as the unit
is the primary threat and it extends over long peri- guide. When two or more carriers are replenish-
ods, protection through dispersion may be obtained ing simultaneously, the OTC must designate
by assuming Replenishment Disposition 1AF. the most appropriate ship as Guide.

b. Principles. The following principles d. Replenishment Course and Axis.


apply when establishing a replenishment
formation. (1) Selecting the Course. Tactical re-
quirements will normally dictate the replenish-
(1) Supplying ships should be stationed in ment course but some operational factors that
one or more lines, known as service lines, with need to be considered when selecting the re-
ships in line-abreast not less than 1,000 yards plenishment course are water depth including
apart and with service lines 2,000 yards apart. potential shallow water effect along the course,
carrier aircraft launch and recovery operations,
(2) The main body of the force should be and weather.
stationed in waiting lines astern of the service
lines, but, if enemy air attack is possible, ships (2) C onditions U nder N or m a l
of the main body should be stationed to meet Weather. For normal weather conditions, the
the requirements of AA weapons defense. optimum course for replenishment is with the
wind and sea within two points of dead ahead; if
(3) When practicable, areas should be made the wind and sea are from different directions, it
available in which carriers engaged in flight is preferable to head more nearly into the sea to
operations can maneuver inside the screen. reduce rolling.

(4) Typical replenishment formations are (3) C onditions U nder R ou g h


shown in Figure 3-8 through 3-10. Weather. Under some conditions of rough
weather, consideration may be given to replenish-
(5) When conducting vertical replenish- ing on a downwind course, to reduce the amount
ment and alongside replenishment simultane- of water coming aboard ships with low freeboard.
ously, the supplying ship will be assigned a The controlling factor under these conditions is
station in the service line. the ability of the ships to hold the replenishment
course without excessive yawing.
(6) When a replenishment ship is conduct-
ing vertical replenishment only, it may be or- e. Replenishment Speed. Operational
dered to move to a special VERTREP station in considerations influence the selection of the speed;
close proximity to the customer ship. Unless for instance, if the replenishment course is away
otherwise ordered, this station will be 500 yards from the area of subsequent operations, a low
on the unengaged beam of the customer ship. speed might be desirable; this, however, conflicts
with the need for a high speed as an ASW measure.
(7) Should carriers need increased maneu-
vering room when proceeding from the second (1) Speed During Fueling Opera-
to the first service line, the OTC may change the tions. The power required by the cargo fuel
distance between service lines as desired. pumps limits the speed of many oilers to about
13 knots during fueling operations. The along-
c. Guide. side steering control of some ships is unduly
affected at speeds below 8 knots. When not lim-
(1) Unless otherwise ordered, the Guide is ited by this condition, replenishment speed
the center ship of the leading service line. If should be 10 to 18 knots.
there is an even number of stations in this line,

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Figure 3-8. (NU) Replenishment Formation — Circular Type

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Figure 3-9. (NU) Replenishment Formation — Circular Ready

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Figure 3-10. (NU) Replenishment Formation — With Skeleton Screen

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(2) Fueling Destroyers. With good sea (3) If one side of the delivering/supplying
conditions, destroyers may be fueled from heavy ship is in use (Figure 3-11), escorts from the
ships or fast oilers at speeds up to 20 knots. wing station on the engaged side of the service
unit proceed to the lifeguard station, to the along-
(3) Transferring Mail And Person- side station, then to the wing station on the un-
nel. Under good sea conditions, light mail can engaged side of the delivering/supplying ship.
be transferred between ships at speeds up to 25
knots and heavy materials and personnel at (4) If both sides of the delivering/supply-
speeds up to 16 knots. ing ship are in use (Figure 3-12), escorts from
the port (even) side of the screen rotate in suc-
f. Ordering the Replenishment cession from the port wing station, to the life-
Formation. guard station, to the port alongside station, then
to station number 2 in the screen. Escorts from
(1) The OTC will inform the commander the starboard (odd) side of the screen rotate in
of the other force, in advance, of: succession from the starboard wing station,
then to station number 1 in the screen.
(a) The replenishment formation to be
adopted, and the direction of the formation (5) Refer to Figure 3-13 for example of re-
axis. plenishment procedures when two delivering
ships are used.
(b) The replenishment course and
speed. (6) Screen units are to rig the appropriate
side before commencing the approach. They
(2) Even though the force commander may must be alert to the progress of the units en-
be junior to the RAS force commander, the gaged in replenishment. They should also be
former’s desires should determine the course prepared in advance for rapid rigging of the op-
and speed of the formation under normal posite side of the ship to preclude any delays
circumstances. due to rerigging should the receiving side be
changed immediately prior to going alongside.
g. Underway Replenishment of Es-
corts. These procedures provide for the orderly (7) Ships alongside must be meticulous in
replenishment of ships, making optimum use of the use of PREP. All signals will be repeated by
the delivering/supplying ship, and maintaining flashing light or voice transmission addressed
maximum antisubmarine protection of the replen- to the next ship to follow alongside.
ishment formation.
(8) Screen ships are to proceed when
(1) Normal replenishment speeds are in relieved at screen stations unless otherwise
the range of 12 to 15 knots. When a sufficient ordered.
number of escorts are available, it is desirable
to employ pickets to provide defense in depth. (9) In some tactical situations, it may be
Usually, however, when all round coverage is advantageous to assign one ship as lifeguard for
required, the scarcity of escorts permits only the replenishment. If so, the procedures shown
the establishment and maintenance of a main in Figure 3-14 will be used when only one side
screen. of the delivering/supplying ship is rigged.
When both sides of the delivering/supplying
(2) The first approach units and an initial ship are rigged, procedures shown in Figure
lifeguard are to be designated. 3-15 are used.

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Figure 3-11. (NU) Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivery/Supplying Ship in Use
(Lifeguard Next Alongside)

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Figure 3-12. (NU) Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying Ship in Use
(Lifeguard Next Alongside to Port)

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Figure 3-13. (NU) Replenishment of Escorts — Two Delivering/Supplying Ships Used

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Figure 3-14. (NU) Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivering/Supplying Ship in Use
(Lifeguard Not Replenishing)

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Figure 3-15. (NU) Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying Ship in Use
(Lifeguard Not Replenishing)

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3130 (NU) CONVOY FORMATIONS expeditious movement of ships leaving or enter-


ing harbor while protected against enemy threats.
Details of convoy formations are contained They provide maximum protection for vulnerable
in Chapter 10. units against the threat of mines or submarine at-
tack and as much protection against air attack as is
3140 (NC) MISCELLANEOUS possible. The order of ship types and the intervals
FORMATIONS and distances between ships are given in Figure
3-16. The OTC may specify the sequence of ships
Departure (Sortie) and Entry Formations within types or delegate such authority to the sen-
90D and 90E provide for the orderly and ior commander of each type in the formation.

SECTION II — DISPOSITIONS

3200 (NC) GENERAL TYPES OF intervals and station assignments. In a disposition,


DISPOSITION a formation axis need not be oriented in the same
direction as the disposition axis. If the threat
A disposition is a combination of two or warrants stationing pickets, the disposition OTC
more formations, and may be formed by linear or specifies the picket disposition, axis, stations to be
circular methods. Certain specific operational dis- filled, and interval from disposition center; he also
positions are prescribed in this section. Disposi- designates which groups provide pickets for each
tions are ordered using FORM M (see ATP 1, station. Unless otherwise directed, each group
Vol. II) and are assigned number-letter designa- commander will station linking units to maintain
tions based on the number of the disposition and a voice radio or visual communications with the
purpose-letter suffix(es). A type indicator letter next inboard adjacent group whenever his move-
may be inserted between the number and purpose- ments within the disposition make it necessary.
letter if desired. (See Table 3-3.)
3202 (NC) MANEUVERING A
3201 (NC) FORMING A DISPOSITION DISPOSITION

The disposition OTC specifies the disposi- Instructions for maneuvering dispositions
tion, guide group, course, speed, axis, and group are in relevant articles.

Table 3-3. (NU) Table of Dispositions 3203 — 3209 SPARE

3210 (NU) TYPICAL OPERATIONAL


Type Number Purpose DISPOSITIONS

Carrier 2W Run-in and Strike 3211 (NC) CARRIER DISPOSITIONS


Phase of Carrier Task
Group Operations
In a carrier disposition, carrier formations
Replenishment 1AF Nuclear Defense are normally spaced about 12 to 15 miles apart to
permit voice communication and mutual support
Antiair Warfare 2V Threatened Sector for the disposition as a whole. The formations are
Protection
generally stationed on a line of bearing at right an-
3V Threatened Sector
Protection (Using gles to the disposition axis, which is usually kept
Missile Ships) near to the wind direction. The formations thus
have freedom of movement upwind and down-
wind, without interfering with one another.
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Figure 3-16. (NU) Departure and Entry Formations

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3212 (NC) SPECIAL DISPOSITION 2W compromise may result in escorts being sta-
tioned at ranges other than the optimum for an-
a. Description. Special Disposition 2W tiair warfare.)
is a multi-purpose disposition which may be used
during the run-in or strike phase of carrier task (4) Types of gun or missile systems fitted
group operations. It is designed to satisfy the fol- in the forces.
lowing requirements:
(5) Types of air attack expected.
(1) Dispersal of forces to protect against air
attack. (6) Degree of deception required.

(2) Disguise of the exact positions of valu- (7) Electronic emission policy desired.
able heavy units.
(8) For close-in stationing, consideration
(3) Use of random courses or speeds by should be given to electromagnetic compatibil-
units of the disposition in order to confuse at- ity of the missile ships.
tack aircraft, search and submarines.
(9) Predicted sensor performance under
(4) Mutual support. existing or expected environmental conditions.

b. Disposition Axis. Disposition axis is f. Stationing of Carriers, Command


always 000°. Ships, and Other Heavy Ships. These ships
are assigned to selected stations by the following
c. Stations. Each station is a circular area criteria:
of radius equal to disposition circle spacing unless
otherwise ordered. A change in the radius of a sta- (1) Carriers occupy stations not on the
tion does not affect the overall arrangement of sta- boundaries of the disposition and should not
tions. Disposition center is at the center of station normally be placed on adjacent stations.
zero and should preferably be marked with a ship.
The centers of other stations lie on concentric (2) The AAWC’s ship occupies a station in
hexagons separated by twice disposition circle the direction of the air threat.
spacing, and stations are numbered to the right and
left of the disposition axis (see Figure 3-17). Addi- (3) Maximum spacing between heavy
tional stations can be made available as required ships is desired.
by the use of additional concentric hexagons.
g. Stationing of AAW Ships. These
d. Disposition Movement. The dispo- ships are best placed in the most likely direction of
sition and speed of advance of the disposition is to attack at a distance that must be a compromise be-
be the course and speed of the PIM unless other- tween the following:
wise ordered. Disposition center corresponds to
the PIM unless otherwise ordered. (1) Giving the major unit unrestricted use
of her short range guns and missiles.
e. Selection of Stations. Stationing of
units depends on: (2) Giving a carrier sea room to operate
aircraft.
(1) Number of escorts available.
(3) Giving a missile ship sea room to ma-
(2) Number of major ships to defend. neuver to enable missile firing arcs to be open.

(3) Relative subsurface, air, and surface (4) Keeping the missile ships clear of the
threats. (As a submarine threat normally exists, position of maximum friendly air activity.

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Figure 3-17. (NU) Special Disposition 2W

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(5) Keeping the missile ships in good data (4) Station assignments.
transmission or voice communication with the
major units. (5) Radius of particular stations (if not
equal to disposition circle spacing).
h. Stationing of Radar Pickets. These
ships are to be stationed an appropriate distance k. Maneuvering Instructions.
from disposition center at predetermined rather
than randomly selected positions. (1) Scheduled changes of course and speed
(according to the PIM) are to be executed
i. Stationing of Other ASW Ships. without further signal by all units at the time
These ships may be stationed as SAUs to provide indicated.
ASW support. These stations may be changed by
the ASWC or screen commander as appropriate (2) The disposition may be maneuvered as
and as necessary to combat the submarine threat, a whole or individual units may maneuver as
advising the OTC as practicable. desired to avoid known submarine positions.

j. Disposition Orders. The following (3) Carriers, SAUs, and plane guards turn
instructions are to be included when ordering Dis- toward or away from each attack as appropriate
position 2W: at high speed to expedite change of station be-
tween SAU stations and plane guard station.
(1) Disposition circle spacing (in miles).
(4) Station-keeping is by own dead reckon-
(2) Force PIM. ing, satellite, or other navigational techniques.
Accurate navigation is essential, especially in
(3) Disposition center if other than force dispersed formations.
PIM.

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3213 (NC) REPLENISHMENT


DISPOSITIONS

Replenishment Disposition 1AF is de-


signed to give protection from the threat of nuclear
attack by dispersion of the forces (Figure 3-18).
This disposition reduces over concentration of re-
plenishment units in any area. Disposition 1AF is
composed of two or more replenishment units on a
line of bearing at right angles to the disposition
axis; the axis is normally coincident with the
replenishment course. The units may be in
Replenishment Formation 60, 61, or 62 while re-
plenishing or in readiness for replenishment. For-
mation 50 or 51 may also be used. The units will be (NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
from 12 to 15 miles apart, with the flagship of the
disposition in the center unit. Figure 3-18. (NU) Replenishment Disposition
3214 (NC) ANTIAIR WARFARE
DISPOSITION (THREATENED necessity of providing adequate maneuvering
SECTOR PROTECTION) 2V space for flight operations. Similarly, some
asymmetric stationing is desirable in order to
a. Description. Disposition 2V provides exploit its deceptive potential. When necessi-
defense in depth, decentralized control, and dis- tated by flight operations, carriers may maneu-
persion adequate for nuclear attack. It is appropri- ver as required within a circle of 10 miles radius
ate for use when it is desired to concentrate the from their assigned stations.
defense in the general direction of the antiair war-
fare axis (see Figure 3-19). Designed principally (3) Surface Pickets are stationed in in-
for carrier task forces in which no missile ships are ner and outer picket rings. The following fac-
present, it may nevertheless be successfully em- tors are considered in assigning stations:
ployed by any group or force assigned pickets and
CAP or missile ships. ASW protection is difficult (a) Number of picket ships available.
to attain because of the separation of units, and for
this reason the disposition should not ordinarily be (b) Evaluation of enemy threat, size,
employed unless the air threat is greater than the type, and probable approach sectors.
submarine threat.
(c) Picket ship radar, ESM, communi-
b. Disposition Axis. Disposition axis is cation, and air control capability.
the antiair warfare axis.
(d) Number, location, and type of an-
c. Station Assignments. tiair warfare ships.

( 1) Se c to r AAW Co o rd i nators (e) CAP on station capability.


(SAAWCs) are assigned by the OTC to provide
for an appropriate number of sectors. In the ex- (4) AEW Pickets are stationed to provide
ample shown, the SAAWC’s ships are on the early warning against low fliers, usually work-
30-mile circle. ing directly with a surface picket (see Chapter 7).
Where aircraft range and equipment are suit-
(2) Carriers are stationed to provide maxi- able, some models of AEW aircraft can provide
mum protection from air attack commensurate warning coverage at all altitudes and may be
with the discharge of their assigned mission. used as an advance picket line ahead of the fore-
Compromise in positioning may be necessary in most surface pickets. Such aircraft may be ca-
order to afford maximum coverage by accom- pable of controlling CAP.
panying forces, taking into consideration the

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Figure 3-19. (NU) Antiair Warfare Disposition (Threatened Sector Protection) 2V

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(5) ASW Units. Surface escorts and/or SAAWC’s ship. Possible arcs of missile fire are
fixed and rotary-wing ASW aircraft are provided shown to illustrate the desirability of close-in sta-
for carriers and antiair warfare ships commen- tioning to achieve mutual support. Stationing of
surate with the submarine threat and ASW force the missile hips is based on consideration of the
available. These units conform to the movements threat and types of missile ships available. In the
of the ship being screened. Although Disposition example shown, the missile ships are on the 20-
2V is based on the air threat being greater, all mile circle. Surface pickets, AEW pickets, and
ASW measures should be taken that do not con- ASW units are stationed using the principles set
flict with antiair warfare needs. forth and illustrated in Disposition 2V. In the ex-
ample shown, four medium range and four short
3215 (NC) ANTIAIR WARFARE range missile ships are used. In disposition 3V
DISPOSITION (INCLUDING (see Figure 3-20) station assignments are indi-
MISSILE SHIPS) 3V cated in positions relative to the disposition axis
(AAW axis). However, AAW stations assign-
a. Description. Disposition 3V features ments will be promulgated using TRUE bearings
defense in depth and decentralized control, similar in every case.
to Disposition 2V, but is designed for the use of
missile ships as well a CAP (see Figure 3-20). 3216 (NR) CIRCULAR DISPOSITIONS

b. Disposition Axis. Disposition axis is The method of stationing a circular disposi-


the antiair warfare axis. tion is similar to that described in Article 3115 and
shown in Figure 3-1 except that circle spacing is in
c. Station Assignments. One of the miles, rather than in thousands of yards, as in cir-
missile ships in each sector will be designated the cular formations.

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Figure 3-20. (NU) Antiair Warfare Disposition (Including Missile Ships) 3V

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3217 (NC) CARTWHEEL DISPOSITION/ c. Execution.


FORMATION
(1) Disposition Sectors.
a. Description. The CARTWHEEL dis-
position is designed to permit task groups to oper- (a) Sectors will normally be allocated
ate loosely in mutual support. It may be ordered in in accordance with the sector screen format.
Support Situation B or C, the latter being prefer- Alternatively, the standard lettered sectors
able where, for example, one task group is provid- as specified for the CARTWHEEL forma-
ing ASW support to more than one other. tion in subparagraph c(2)(a) below may be
used, but the depth of radius of each sector
(1) In this disposition, task groups are allo- must in this case be signaled.
cated to separate sectors, each sector being un-
der the control of its own sector commander, (b) Sectors will be based on the center
who is normally also the CTG. In some in- of the task force (ZZ). If no ship is stationed
stances the CTF may allocate sectors to task in ZZ, the geographic PIM or ZZ will be
units for a specific task, in which case the CTU signaled.
becomes the sector commander.
(2) Formation Sectors.
(2) Sector commanders in a CART-
WHEEL disposition may in turn station their (a) The CARTWHEEL formation
units in a CARTWHEEL formation. Care must will be divided into lettered sectors, which
be taken to ensure that the outer boundaries of will be as follows, unless otherwise
that formation do not extend beyond the limits ordered:
of the disposition sectors.
Sector ALFA 000 to 120 6 to 20 kyd
(3) The CARTWHEEL formation may
also be used by OTCs of groups operating Sector BRAVO 120 to 240 6 to 20 kyd
independently.
Sector CHARLIE 240 to 359 6 to 20 kyd
b. Purpose. Sector DELTA 000 to 359 0 to 6 kyd

(1) To provide a disposition or formation


that will allow an OTC or CTG to delegate the (b) Any changes to the above bearings,
tactical control and conduct of affairs to se- radii, or depths of sectors will be promul-
lected subordinate commanders or units while gated when the formation is ordered. Sectors
retaining the means to rapidly resume control. will be based on station Zero, the center of
the task group or task unit as appropriate. If
(2) To provide a defense that will allow for no ship is in station Zero, the geographic
immediate and preplanned threat reactions. PIM of station Zero will be signaled.

(3) To provide deception and disguise in a d. Helicopter Sectors. Dipping heli-


formation that will conceal high value units copters may be assigned sectors for stationing by
(HVUs). sector commanders, or may be assigned sectors
outside the CARTWHEEL, using the sector screen
(4) To provide a disposition or formation method of ordering.
that will allow attachments and detachments to
take place with minimal confusion and need for e. Method of Ordering. The CART-
subsequent reorganization. WHEEL disposition or formation will be signaled
using the format in ATP 1, Vol. II.

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f. Mutual Interference. The OTC must a CARTWHEEL disposition. Sector commanders


allocate safety zones between groups, taking into are to maneuver their forces on TF/TG Tactical
account: UHF; otherwise, maximum use is to be made of
visual signaling.
(1) The risk of collision.
i. Sector Commanders.
(2) The field of fire required by the ships of
the HVU’s inner screen to engage incoming (1) Will be units listed first in each sector
missiles and aircraft. allocation.

g. Policies. (2) Are responsible for maneuvering units


in their own sectors, and selecting the forma-
(1) Sector defense allows for immediate tion for those units.
threat reaction by sector commanders, but the
OTC retains the power to override if necessary. (3) Should aim to remain within UHF radio
range of the OTC when possible. (This will
(2) The OTC will detail additional group or clearly not be possible with the likely extended
force assets to a sector if the situation dictates. distances of a disposition).

(3) Sector boundaries may be crossed to (4) Are responsible for immediate actions
prosecute submarine or surface contacts. to counter any threat in their sectors, calling for
assistance if required. They should also con-
(4) The OTC will pass joining information sider detaching HVUs to a disengaged sector.
to units including sector allocations and sector HVUs so detached are to report to the sector
commander. Sector commanders are then to al- commander of their new sector.
locate stations within their sector or formation.
j. Position and Intended Movement
(5) Replenishment units will normally (PIM). The OTC will signal the base course and
be moved between sectors for RAS(L)(A). speed, and any zigzag for a unit at the formation
Sequence will be ordered by the OTC or CTG. center. Sector commanders are to maneuver the
groups or units in their sector as required by the
h. Communications. Generally all units policies in force and as required to respond to a
should use the same tactical COMPLAN within a threat. Zigzags may be ordered for HVUs.
CARTWHEEL formation, or within a sector of

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3218 (NC) 4W DISPOSITION axis, the letters I and O are omitted. Lettering is
A to Z (less I and O).
a. Description. Disposition 4W pro-
vides a framework for operating forces in widely (3) Larger segments are described by com-
dispersed groups. It can be used to assign Battle binations of the inclusive alphanumeric boxes
Group(s)/Task Group(s)/Task Unit(s)/Task Ele- which include that segment (e.g., segment
ment(s)/individual units to a specified dispersed PQ1516 defines a 20 nm X 20 nm segment con-
operating area relative to a Force PIM. It can be taining subsegments P15, P16, Q15, Q16).
used to define surveillance areas, execute inter-
cept of hostile units, prevent mutual interference (4) The disposition axis is oriented parallel
and execute operational deception (OPDEC). to the lettered lanes. Normally, the disposition
axis is parallel to PIM track to allow efficient
b. Terminology. positioning of screen forces in the van of the
disposition. However, if the PIM course changes
(1) Disposition 4W. This refers to the frequently, or the nature of the threat does not
entire Grid as illustrated in Figure 3-21. require positioning of screen forces in the van,
or the type of friendly forces assigned (e.g.,
(2) Segment. Any square within the merchant convoy) precludes changing the axis
Grid. The term segment is used to avoid confu- with PIM course changes, then it may be sim-
sion with AAW Sectors or formation/screen pler to orient the axis to an appropriate bearing
stations. Large segments can be identified by and keep it constant regardless of PIM.
specifying the borders of the segment.
(5) The geometric center of the grid is
(3) Line. The boundaries dividing the seg- Point N13. Unless otherwise designated this
ments in either direction (e.g., Line AB or Line will also be disposition center and PIM origin.
0405).
d. Execution. Disposition 4W will nor-
(4) Lane. The area between two specified mally be ordered by instructions in the OPGEN/
lines (e.g., Lane C or Lane 04). A number of OPTASKs or other appropriate messages. The OTC
lanes can be grouped together (e.g., Lane LN). or designated warfare commander will specify
Included lanes need not be designated. segment assignments for all groups/units. These
assignments must be made in close coordination
(5) Point. Intersection of Grid lines. A with other warfare commanders/coordinators.
point is described as the southwest corner of a Segment assignments may be executed by tactical
single square segment with the Grid oriented voice signal using the “STATION S” signal.
north, (e.g., Point C19 is at the intersection of
Line BC and Line 18-19). e. Group Formation. The commander
of each group in the disposition is responsible for
c. Grid Construction. his group’s formation/screen within his assigned
segment whenever more than one ship is assigned.
(1) The 4W Disposition Grid, as shown in Unless otherwise directed, a group may maneuver
Figure 3-21, is 240 nm X 240 nm and is divided anywhere within its assigned segment.
into 10 nm X 10 nm square segments. If a larger
or smaller disposition is required the OTC/ f. Disposition Guide. Normally, there
CWC can use a portion of Disposition 4W, will not be a “Disposition Guide.” The disposition
change the size of the squares, or add new lanes moves with PIM. Therefore, all formations in Dis-
in ascending alphanumeric order. position 4W maneuver with PIM within their as-
signed segment. The OTC/CWC will designate a
(2) The 10 nm X 10 nm segments are de- disposition center (normally Point N13) and a dis-
scribed by the letter and number which include position axis which establishes the position and
that segment (e.g., H24). In labeling the lettered orientation of the Grid to PIM.

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(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 3-21. (NU) Disposition 4W

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g. Communications. The OTC must be The following procedures apply to grid reorien-
capable of communicating with each group at any tation with planned PIM changes.
time. If EMCON precludes HF communications,
the OTC must establish alternate communication (a) Large Axis Changes. A large
links. The following communications considera- axis change is any change in which rotation
tions pertain: results in different segment locations for a
unit or group. In this event, the following
(1) Common HF/SATCOM circuits should procedures may be used:
be designated for intergroup communications.
Each group may be assigned separate UHF i. Reassign Grid Squares. This
frequencies for intragroup communications. is done by overlaying the new Grid ori-
entation over the old and determining
(2) Warfare commanders should be able what the new segment assignments
to communicate with all units (regardless of should be. Such reassignments should
groups) having primary capability in their war- be included in the signal executing the
fare function. axis change. This procedure eliminates
any requirements to maneuver. How-
h. Maneuvering Procedures. ever, units may not be correctly aligned
to threat axis.
(1) Segment Changes. Periodically, it
will be necessary to change segment assignments. ii. Retain Original Grid Seg-
To minimize mutual interference or possible ment Assignments. This procedure
hostile action against friendly forces, intra-grid will require most units to maneuver to
maneuvers should be ordered by tactical signal. new Grid locations. The time required
This signal may be transmitted initially over a to perform this maneuver will vary and
voice circuit, and should be followed up by record may be considerable.
traffic. It is essential that all commanders/warfare
commanders and the SOCA be made aware of the (b) Small Axis Changes. When
details of the change. the disposition axis is rotated, the com-
mander of each group is to maneuver his
(2) Shadowing and Marking. Units formation to remain in its assigned seg-
will frequently be tasked to conduct surveillance ment. If the before and after position of the
or shadowing in a particular segment of the Grid. segments is such that all ships remain
Units conducting such missions should avoid within their original segment, no additional
entering segments assigned to other groups or procedures are required. A larger course
units. After arrival in a specified segment, the change can be accommodated using this
movement of a unit will be largely determined method by dividing it into a series of smaller
by the target of interest it is following. Hence, course changes over a period of time.
these units should notify their warfare com-
mander of their entry into unassigned segments (4) Immediate Course Changes.
as soon as it can be forecast.
(a) Normally such changes should be
(3) Planned Course Changes. The made with a TURN signal. The 4W Dispo-
OTC’s OPGEN normally will specify task force sition axis is not changed and all units and
PIM. The disposition will move with PIM and groups maintain the same true bearing and
the disposition axis will be PIM track unless oth- range from disposition center as before.
erwise specified. The OTC or SOCA is responsi- Disposition center moves off PIM in direc-
ble for relaying appropriate information to tion of the turn at ordered speed.
support submarines and the SUBOPAUTH.

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(b) If there is a common net that is be-


ing guarded by all TF units, then a TURN Table 3-4. (NU) Disposition Planning Factors
signal can be executed by the IMMEDI-
ATE EXECUTIVE method. At least one
ship in each group and/or each group com- a. MISSION
mander should be required to acknowledge b. THREAT ASSESSMENT
the signal. The OTC or SOCA is responsi- 1. Enemy’s likely course of action
ble for relaying appropriate information to 2. Enemy’s wepon systems capabilities
support submarines and the SUBOPAUTH. 3. Enemy’s command, control and communi-
If there is not a common circuit or if there is cations capabilities
enough time, then the DELAYED EXECU- 4. Enemy’s ECM, ESM, and acoustic
TIVE method can be used. This can be done capabilities
on a tactical voice circuit, such as the 5. Enemy’s intelligence state
TF/TG OTH Command met, to all group c. STATIONING
commanders. After this is done, each group 1. PIM
commander would put the signal over a lo- 2. Defense in depth
cal group UHF circuit, such as the Tactical 3. Own capabilities — offensive and defensive
Maneuvering net. Another option would be 4. Use of chaff
to send a HIGH PRECEDENCE tactical sig- 5. Deception
nal over the TF Broadcast with a specified 6. Use of pickets
execute time and direct each group com-
7. Advanced offensive positions
mander to acknowledge receipt.
8. Reconnaissance
3220 (NC) DISPOSITION PLANNING 9. Own deficiencies
FACTORS 10. Replenishment
11. Mutual interference and support
Table 3-4 contains the main factors to be 12. Intercepts
considered in the planning of force dispositions as d. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNI-
set forth in detail in this and other publications. It CATIONS
is not exhaustive, and is intended to be a guide 1. Emission policy
only, and should be reviewed as the tactical situa- 2. Communicaitons requirements
tion changes. 3. Data links
4. Navigation
e. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
f. ENVIROMENTAL FACTORS
1. Weather
2. Propagation: above water and below water
g. FLIGHT OPERATIONS

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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SECTION III — SCREENS

3300 (NR) PURPOSE e. Entry Screen. The purpose of the en-


try screen is the protection of the main body as it
The purpose of a screen is to protect a main passes through the area immediately to seaward of
body or convoy. It may be designed to provide the swept channel, particularly during the period it
protection against aircraft, missiles, submarines, is changing formation prior to entering the swept
or surface forces. In a multithreat environment, channel. When the main body is large, and entry
due consideration must therefore be given to the screen using the same procedure as for a departure
assessment of threat priorities and the advanced screen should be ordered by the OTC.
warning which can be obtained by the force. Since
the threat can change during an operation, con- 3311 (NC) SCREEN SELECTION AND
tinuous reassessment of the situation is necessary DESIGN
to maintain the efficiency of the screen. Since
present weapons and sensors demand defense in Selection and design of the screen are based
depth, screens should be adequately dispersed, upon the OTC’s appreciation of the situation. For
thus increasing the enemy’s problem in recogniz- details of various factors involved, see ATP 28 and
ing and attacking the main target. ATP 31. The OTC should consider the following:

3310 (NC) TYPES OF SCREEN a. The Mission.

a. Sector Screen. Sectors are chosen to b. The Situation.


exploit the individual equipment capabilities of
various screen units and to provide flexibility and (1) The threat:
defense in depth. Sectors are defined by true bear-
ings and distances from screen center. Screen (a) Enemy forces (surface, subsur-
units patrol assigned sectors; the amount of patrol- face, air, or combined).
ling and the size of the sector depend on the speed
advantage of the screen unit over the main body or (b) Enemy capabilities (sensors,
convoy. Random maneuvering in sectors has the weapons, standoff capability, nuclear war-
advantage of disguising the disposition of the heads, jammers).
force and thus poses an additional recognition
problem to an enemy. (c) Enemy’s possible courses of action.

b. Skeleton Screen. Screen units are (2) Characteristics of the area of operations:
disposed relative to a rectangular main body or
convoy and patrol stations or ordered lines. (a) Distances (to own and enemy
bases, to own and enemy supporting forces).
c. Helicopter Windline Screen. A
helicopter screen is provided for a carrier tempo- (b) Oceanographic factors (water
rarily during flight operations, relative to the carri- depth, marine life, wrecks, sonar conditions,
er’s track into the wind. and currents).

d. Departure Screen. When the main (c) Meteorological factors (visibility,


body is large, forming up may require consider- sea state, radar conditions, wind direction
able time, and it may be desirable to wait for the and speed).
moment when the main body is in formation to or-
der screen units to their appointed station in the (3) Own forces:
cruising screen. In this case, a departure screen is
to be ordered to protect the main body while it is (a) Screen units (number and types,
forming up. When the main body is small, it may radar, EW, sonar, weapons, communica-
not be necessary to form a departure screen. tions replenishment requirements).

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(b) Main body or convoy (composi- (2) Effective screen coordination is re-
tion, size and spacing, speed, maneuver- quired between the various warfare command-
ability, defensive capabilities). ers and the screen commander.

(c) Support forces (pickets, aircraft, (3) The requirement for early detection of
surface forces, submarines, auxiliaries). threats and the selection of the appropriate
response.
c. Opposing Courses of Action.
(4) Outer screen surface units should not
(1) Enemy’s overall specific objectives. be stationed too near the limit of the main
body’s radar cover. When these units are lost on
(2) Own courses of action. radar and reappear during a confused situation,
they run the risk of being engaged by friendly
3312 (NC) STATIONING SCREEN UNITS forces.

a. Inner Screen. In addition to its ASW (5) The stern sector must not be
advantages, particularly against diesel subma- forgotten.
rine torpedo attacks, an inner screen provides
the best concentration of defensive fire and may 3313 — 3319 SPARE
be the only possible formation with a small
number of screen units. The risk of confusion is 3320 (NU) DESCRIPTION OF SCREENS
reduced over that which is likely to be incurred
when friendly forces are dispersed. Screen units 3321 (NC) SECTOR SCREEN
stationed from 5 to 7 nm from the main body are
unlikely to detect FPBs on radar before they reach a. Description. The center is ZZ or QQ,
optimum firing range. The inherent disadvantages unless otherwise ordered. Sectors are allocated by
of the inner screen may be alleviated when air- indicating sector boundaries and sector depth
craft are used to provide radar early warning and (separated by a tack) followed by the call sign of
distant ASW forces are used to provide early the unit assigned to that sector (see Figure 3-23).
warning of submarine contacts.
(1) Sector Boundaries are ordered by a
b. Outer Screen. An outer screen may group of four numerals. First two numerals in-
provide a more effective defense against the an- dicate the true bearing of the left boundary in
ticipated threat than an inner screen would. The tens of degrees; the second two numerals indi-
long-range, passive detection capability of sup- cate the true bearing of the right boundary in
port submarines, sonobuoy-equipped ASW air- tens of degrees.
craft, and towed array surface ships provides a
reasonable ASW search coverage of a large area (2) Sector Depth is also ordered by a
and platform acoustic covertness inhibits the ene- group of four numerals. First two numerals in-
my’s ability to maneuver to avoid detection. These dicate the inner limit and the second two the
units may be stationed in the order of 25 to 100 nm outer limit of the sector in thousands of yards
from the main body as an outer screen to counter from the screen center.
the threat of the medium-range, missile-equipped
submarine and to provide an initial line for de- -EXAMPLE-
fense in depth against submarine torpedo attacks.
Note that submarines are assigned stationary areas SCREEN K–ZZ–0307–0510 c/s DD 4
and are never used in moving screens. The search
capability of these units is reduced when they are Meaning: DD 4 is allocated a sector
employed in inner screens. Other factors to con- 030° to 070° true, depth 5,000 to
sider with an outer screen are: 10,000 yards from ZZ.

(1) Coordination of the outer screen units (3) Increments of 5° or 500 yards are
may be complicated by a lack of communica- ordered by using ANS.
tions capability.

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-EXAMPLE- submarine that fires both torpedoes and short


range missiles. In this case, maintaining UHF
SCREEN K–ZZ–20 ANS 33 ANS– voice and link communications is an important
02 ANS 07 c/s DD 6 factor.

Meaning: DD 6 is allocated a sector 3322 (NC) SKELETON SCREEN


205° to 335° true, depth 2,500 to 7,000
yards from ZZ. a. Description. Stations assigned are
relative to a corner or side of the main body or
b. Stationing a Main Body or Military convoy.
Convoy. Ships of a main body or military convoy
may be stationed by the sector method, but the fact b. Ordering a Skeleton Screen. Sta-
that they are a part of the main body or military tions or patrol lines are ordered by using the skele-
convoy must be made clear to the force. Ships sta- ton screen diagram (Figure 3-24).
tioned by this method carry out random move-
ments within their sectors. (1) Station Allocation. A station is allo-
cated by signaling one or two letters from the
c. Sector Size for ASW Units in a diagram, followed by a number to indicate the
Sector Screen. ATP 28 provides a general nearest distance in thousands of yards, fol-
method to be used when designating the screen to lowed by the call sign of the unit assigned to
determine the approximate size of the area that a that station. The use of two letters to allocate a
unit can effectively sweep. station indicates a middle line between two sin-
gle letters from the diagram.
(1) To determine sector size for ASW units
in a sector screen against a torpedo firing sub- -EXAMPLE-
marine, the following simpler method can also
be used. In this method, the size of the sector al- SCREEN G–DE 5 c/s DD 6
located to an ASW unit is related to its tactical
sonar range (TSR) and its station relative to the Meaning: DD 6 is allocated the station
mean line of advance (MLA) of the main body 45° on starboard bow of the main body
or convoy (ahead, bow, beam, quarter, and or convoy at 5,000 yards.
astern), as in Table 3-5 and Figure 3-22. Speeds
used are representative for main body or con- (2) Patrol Line Allocation. A patrol
voy speed, escort speed, and submarine ap- line is allocated by signaling two stations as in
proach speed. True submarine approach speeds station allocation.
may exceed those used in Table 3-5.
-EXAMPLE-
(2) Instructions for the use of Table 3-5 are
included in the table. Two parameters are ob- SCREEN G–CD 5 E 5 c/s DD 6
tained: sector frontal width and sector depth.
The sector is then constructed as in the example Meaning: DD 6 is allocated the pa-
provided in Figure 3-22. Sector parameters are trol line between 15° and 60°on
independent of the distance of the sector from starboard bow of the main body or
screen center. convoy at 5,000 yards.

(3) Sector for helicopters should be at least c. Screening in Restricted Waters.


6,000 yards clear of sectors for ships when they Stations may be assigned by using the skeleton
are stationed ahead of ships. Use of helicopters screen diagram. A typical, narrow-front skeleton
in the outer half of the missile detection zone screen is shown in Figure 3-24.
should be considered when the threat is a

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(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 3-22. (NU) Construction of a Sector (Example)

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(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 3-23. (NU) Sector Screen

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Table 3-5. (NU) Determining Sector Size for ASW Unit in a Sector Screen

Speed (Knots) Factors for Escorts Stationed Relative to MLA Remarks

Main Escort AHEAD BOW ABEAM QUARTER ASTERN Factors are based
Body (335 to 025) (025 to 255) (065 to 115) (115 to 155) (155 to 205) on estimated sub-
or (295 to 335) (245 to 295) (205 to 245) marine approach
Convoy speeds (knots) of:

8 to 12 15 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 AHEAD 5


18 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.0 BOW 8
21 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.5 ABEAM 12
24 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.0 QUARTER 16
27 2.5 3.1 3.9 4.4 4.4 ASTERN 18
H/C 4.0 4.5 5.0 6.0 Up to 8

13 to 16 18 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.4 AHEAD 5


21 2.2 2.2 2.8 3.5 3.9 BOW 12
24 2.2 2.2 3.3 4.2 4.6 ABEAM 16
27 2.3 2.3 3.6 4.5 5.0 QUARTER 18
H/C 4.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 Up to 8 ASTERN 18

17 to 20 21 2.1 2.1 2.5 — — AHEAD 5


24 2.1 2.2 3.0 — — BOW 12
27 2.2 2.3 3.5 — — ABEAM 18
H/C 3.5 4.0 5.0 — —

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Enter table with speeds used and bearing of intended sector to find factor.
2. To find sector frontal width, multiply escort’s TSR by the factor.
3. Sector depth — for ships, multiply TSR by 4/3 using at least 3,000 yards; for helicopters, use 4,000 yards.
4. Use sector frontal width and sector depth to construct a sector as shown in Figure 3-30.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

3323 (NC) HELICOPTER WINDLINE the screen commander should order the cruising
SCREEN screen to be formed so that the screening units are
in their cruising stations as the Guide passes point
Available helicopters are ordered to sec- O. (See Chapter 2.) Sufficient time should be al-
tors, stations, or patrol lines ahead of a carrier lowed so that screening ships do not proceed at a
launching or recovering aircraft. The break-dip speed higher than optimum sonar speed and are
position is to be at least 5,000 yards from the car- able to employ tactical countermeasures while
rier at all times. A helicopter windline screen may taking up their cruising stations.
be ordered by using either the sector method or by
stationing the helicopter(s) relative to the carrier. b. The two methods of ordering departure/
entry screens are sector and grid. The choice between
3324 (NC) DEPARTURE AND ENTRY them depends only on convenience of ordering in
SCREENS their particular geographic location.

a. When the departure/entry screen is or- c. Sector Departure/Entry Screens.


dered, units proceed independently to the sectors
or areas assigned and then patrol at random within (1) Description. Units are allocated
them. More than one unit may be allocated to a sin- patrol sectors for which they are responsible,
gle sector or area, in which case, the screen com- using the sector method of ordering with the
mander is to specify the unit that is to coordinate screen center given as a geographic position.
their patrol. In the case of departure operations,

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(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 3-24. (NU) Skeleton Screen Diagram


Screen center is usually best placed on point X (c) Area allocations. Areas are desig-
or along the line X-O. nated by the grid reference indicating the
southwest corner of each patrol area. Patrol
(2) Method of Ordering. areas are to be 3 miles square unless other-
wise ordered. If a larger area is ordered, the
(a) Form departure/entry screen sector. grid reference is to be followed by a two-
figure group, the first figure indicating the
(b) Screen center. East-West dimension and the second figure
the North-South dimension in miles. Patrol
(c) Sector allocations. areas may be overlapped.

(3) Example. An example is given in (3) Example. An example is given in


Figure 3-24. Figure 3-25.

b. Grid Departure/Entry Screens. 3325 (NC) SCREEN FOR DAMAGED


SHIPS
(1) Description. Ships are allocated pa-
trol areas for which they are responsible, the The sector method should be used for order-
boundaries of these areas being specified by the ing screens for damaged ships. If the speed of a
use of CCG preferably locked to a prominent damaged ship is low, screen units should be allo-
geographic feature. cated large sectors in order to provide an all
around protection and so that they can use ade-
(2) Method of Ordering. quate tactical countermeasures for their own
defense.
(a) Form departure/entry screen.
3326 — 3329 SPARE
(b) Grid reference position (the grid
position of point X must also be specified).

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(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 3-25. (NU) Example of Sector Departure/Entry Screen

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(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 3-26. (NU) Example of Grid Departure/Entry Screen

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3330 (NC) MANEUVERING WITH A and must not exceed 90°. Caution must be exer-
SECTOR SCREEN cised to ensure that large shifts do not result in
screen units hindering the main body and a re-
a. Conduct of Ship Screen Units. duction in screen protection for an excessive
Units are to patrol widely throughout their sectors period of time.
and when a subsurface threat exists, to choose that
speed which makes for the best use of sonar in the (2) Changing Depth of Sector. When
conditions prevailing. Units should take account the situation requires a rapid change of the screen,
of the movement of adjacent screen units in order units may be ordered to change the inner and
to avoid undue gaps. For safety reasons a unit is not outer limits of their sector in the direction of or
to close nearer than 500 yards to the boundary sepa- away from the screen center by a specified
rating its sector from one occupied by another number of thousand of yards. Such changes
unit. should not be less than 1,000 yards.

b. Conduct of Helicopter Screen (3) Main Body or Convoy. Ships of the


Units. Helicopters are to dip randomly through- main body or convoy that are stationed by the
out their sectors. They may mark-dip in advance sector method may be maneuvered by the OTC
of their sectors but must break dip within it. Heli- the same way as screen units.
copters operating under tactical direction should
maneuver to cover adjacent helicopter sectors left 3331 (NC) MANEUVERING WITH
temporarily vacant. For safety reasons, a helicop- SKELETON SCREENS
ter must break dip if it closes within 500 yards of a
sector boundary common to an adjacent occupied a. Conduct of Screen Units. Units are
sector. to patrol their stations or patrol lines unless other-
wise ordered. The way of patrolling is at the com-
c. Alteration of Course. If the base manding officer’s discretion, unless it is specified
course of the main body or convoy is altered, by the OTC. The extent of patrolling depends, for
screen units continue to patrol their sectors. example, on the distance between adjacent screen
units and on the speed advantage over the convoy
d. Screening a Carrier During Flight or main body.
Operations. The conduct of screen units de-
pends on the method used for carrier flight opera- b. Turn-Together or Emergency
tions (see Chapter 6): Turn by Convoy or Main Body. Screen units
maintain true bearings and distances from the
(1) If Method A is used, the rules in sub- main body or convoy.
paragraph c above apply.
c. Wheeling by Main Body or Con-
(2) If Method B is used, screen units are to voy. Screen units maneuver to maintain their rela-
patrol their sectors in the upwind direction. tive bearings and distances from the main body or
convoy.
(3) If Method C is used, screen units should
anticipate a turn into the wind by moving up- 3332 (NC) INSTRUCTIONS FOR
wind in their sectors. CONVOY SCREENS

e. Adjusting the Screen. To adjust the General instructions for ordering and con-
screen, units may be ordered to shift their sector duct of screens are contained in earlier articles in
boundaries or to change the depth of their sector. If this section. Specific responsibilities of convoy
the tactical requirements are not met by adjusting, screen ships follow:
the screen must be reordered.
a. Maintaining Convoy Discipline.
(1) Shifting Sector Boundaries. Units Screen ships are to assist the convoy commodore
are ordered to shift their sector clockwise or in maintaining convoy discipline by reporting
counterclockwise by a specified number of tens ships that make smoke, show lights, lose station,
of degrees. Such shifts should be at least 10° make unauthorized use of radio, pump bilges, or

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dump refuse. They are to use initiative and warn 3334 (NC) CONTROL OF SCREEN
merchant ships directly when immediate action is HELICOPTERS
necessary, informing the OTC and convoy com-
modore of the action taken. a. Helicopter Control Unit. The OTC
(or screen commander, if delegated) may assign
b. Maintaining Convoy Formation. the control of helicopters to one or more helicopter
Screen ships are to make every effort to keep ships control units (HCUs). The duties of the HCU are
in their proper stations. The OTC may order a the same as those of an ACU. In the case of a
screen ship to escort one or more scattered ships; windline screen, the OTC should order the number
he may also remedy poor station keeping by order- of helicopters required and designate the carrier as
ing screen ships to lead the flank columns of the HCU. Helicopters may also be ordered to operate
convoy until individual merchant ships have re- independently.
gained station. OTCs must report merchant ship
casualties by a MERCASREP. b. Procedure When Helicopters Are
Employed on Screening Duties.
c. Action When Ship Is Damaged. A
screen ship on observing that a ship has been dam- (1) The OTC (or screen commander, if
aged is immediately to report the occurrence and delegated) assigns helicopter screen stations.
the cause, if known, to the OTC, and at night, if
possible, is to fire two white rockets. It must not be (2) The OTC (or screen commander, if
assumed that the OTC is aware of a ship being delegated) normally allocates one or more heli-
damaged until the fact has been reported to him. copters to each HCU.

d. Rescue of Survivors. Action to (3) HCU passes to helicopters their sector


counter a threat and continued protection of the boundaries and sector limits, or the bearings and
convoy are to take precedence over the rescue of distances of their stations from a suitable refer-
survivors. When survivors are sighted in the vicin- ence point (e.g., QQ or ZZ)
ity during a search for a submarine, life rafts
should be dropped. If required, the OTC is to des- (4) HCU directs the movements of the
ignate screen ships, as soon as they can be spared, helicopters under positive control to ensure safety.
to pick up survivors and to screen other ships en-
gaged in rescue work. c. Procedure When Carrying Out
Evasive Steering. When evasive steering is be-
3333 (NC) HELICOPTERS IN THE ing carried out, HCUs must coordinate helicopter
SCREEN movements with ship movements so as to avoid
unacceptable gaps in the screen.
The rules for ordering helicopter screens or
assigning helicopters a station or sector in a sur- (1) Very-Long-Leg or Long-Leg Zig-
face screen are the same as those for ordering sur- zag Plan. When one of these plans is in force,
face screens. However, stations or sectors helicopters in the screen need only be informed of
assigned to unspecified helicopters must be desig- this fact and of the alterations of course at least one
nated by addition of “DESIG H” after the station dip cycle before they take place.
or sector assigned.
(2) Short-Leg Zigzag Plan. When this
-EXAMPLE- plan is in effect, helicopters in the screen may be
taken under positive control. Helicopters should
SCREEN G–N8C8 DESIG H not be employed along the short legs except in the
direction of the force movement.
Meaning: In this skeleton screen, there
is a helicopter patrol line 8,000 yards d. Information to Helicopters. Heli-
ahead of the main body or convoy. copters must be kept informed of the situation by
their HCUs to enable them to perform their func-
tions properly. Information, such as course and
speed alternations, evasive steering in use,

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adjustment of the screen, and contacts obtained by 3340 (NU) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
other units, are all required by helicopters in the
screen. 3341 (NC) INSTRUCTIONS FOR
INDIVIDUAL SCREEN UNITS
3335 (NC) PICKETS
a. Report on Joining a Screen. On
a. Ordering. Picket stations are ordered joining, the commanding officer is to report to the
either by true bearing and distance from screen OTC and screen commander any defect that af-
center or by the sector method. When fixed-wing fects his operational capability and his fuel state.
aircraft are employed as pickets, airplans from
Chapter 8 may be used. b. Rejoining the Screen. Units rejoin-
ing a screen are to proceed to their previously as-
b. Maneuvering. The true bearings and signed station, unless otherwise ordered.
ranges of picket stations do not change with altera-
tions of course by the main body or convoy. If new c. Replenishment of Screen Units.
picket stations are desired, the OTC (or screen When screen units are to conduct replenishment,
commander, if delegated) should order them well the procedure will be as follows:
in advance of the alteration of course.
(1) Screen ships are to proceed when re-
c. AAW Pickets. For further details of lieved at screen station unless otherwise ordered.
tasking and maneuvering pickets in the AAW role,
see Chapter 7 and ATP 31. (2) Remaining screen units act in accor-
dance with subparagraph f below.
3336 (NC) TOWED ARRAY SHIPS IN THE
SCREEN (3) Screen units rejoining after replenish-
ment act in accordance with subparagraph b
The procedures for stationing surface ships above.
equipped with towed array systems are similar to
those for other surface ships with the following (4) Screen helicopters may be refueled by
additional considerations. surface units.

a. TAS Ship. The TAS ship may require d. Bad Weather Conditions. If, during
at least 2 hours to localize and attack passive con- bad weather, a screen unit is unable to maintain the
tacts. The dimensions of the patrol station as- speed necessary to accomplish the task without
signed should therefore include an allowance for damage or serious effects on its sensor perform-
at least 2 hours of force movement along the PIM. ance, the commanding officer is to report to the
In addition, a requirement to conduct Sprint and OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) the
Search Tactics may require elongation of a sector. maximum speed he can maintain.

b. TAS Ship Stations. TAS ship sta- e. Equipment Failure. Any sensor or
tions may be designated to include the ASW func- weapon system failure in a screen unit is to be re-
tion and for suitably equipped units those of EW, ported immediately to the OTC (or screen com-
or ASUW, or AAW pickets. mander, if delegated) and to adjacent units,
including the estimated time at which repairs will
(1) TAS equipped ships may also be em- be completed. A gap caused by this failure is to be
ployed in stationary patrol areas for operations covered, as far as possible, by adjacent units by ad-
such as entry/departure screens and defended justing their patrol without leaving their assigned
lanes. sectors, stations, or patrol lines, unless the screen
commander decides to adjust or reorder the
(2) More detailed explanations of TAS screen.
ship employment are found in Chapter 9 of
ATP 28. f. Filling a Gap. If a screen unit leaves
the screen, units in sectors, stations, or patrol lines
3337 — 3339 SPARE adjacent to it are to maneuver in their sector,

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station, or patrol line so as to cover as much of the the carrier leave their sectors, stations, or patrol
gap as possible. They will leave their sector, sta- lines to screen the carrier.
tion, or patrol line only if ordered to do so.
j. Taking Up or Changing Sectors or
g. Right of Way. Ships of the main body Patrol Lines. Ships should proceed at maximum
or convoy have right of way over screen ships, un- sonar speed or operational speed as the tactical
less the latter are in contact with submarines. A situation dictates.
helicopter in the dip or hover is not to be ap-
proached by ships within 500 yards. k. Station Keeping by Helicopter. A
helicopter should be in its allocated station or sec-
h. Navigational Hazards. Individual tor at the moment of breaking dip for next jump.
ships are responsible for avoiding navigational
hazards. 3342 (NC) SCREEN ADJUSTMENT

i. Bulging the Screen. If, during ma- The OTC, or the screen commander when
neuvering a carrier by Method B (see Chapter 6), delegated this responsibility, will adjust the screen
the length of flight operations necessitates the car- whenever there is a change in the tactical situation
rier to proceed outside the screen, the screen is to or in the number of screen units available.
bulge. In this case, the two screen units ahead of

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4141 (NC) AAW REPORTING NET c. Establish watch zones.

The AAW reporting net, normally an HF d. Issue weapon restriction orders.


(SSB) voice net controlled by the FTC-A, is used
for exchanging information about the positions, 4144 (NC) INNER WARFARE NET
identities, and supplementary information of air
contacts. The duty of FTC-A is normally held by This is the primary AAW voice coordinat-
the AAWC, but may be delegated. ing, control, and reporting net for all AAW capa-
ble units within the inner defense zone (IDZ). All
aircraft transiting the IDZ will check in with the
4142 (NC) AAW COORDINATION NET inner defense zone coordinator (IDZC) upon
(FORCE/SECTOR) launch from CV and when entering the IDZ at 100
nm from CV. Net control is IDZC.
This net is normally an HF (SSB) voice net
controlled by the AAWC or SAAWC. Main types 4145 (NC) OUTER WARFARE NET
of traffic are:
This is the primary CAP/AEW UHF report-
a. Threat warnings and ZIPPO calls. ing net. Nonorganic aircraft entering the AAW
surveillance area will check in with the outer de-
b. Orders relative to CAP or AEW assign- fense zone coordinator (ODZC) on this circuit to
ments, stationing, and relieving. receive clearance into the area. Net control is
ODZC.
c. Weapon coordination (target assign-
ment, weapon designation). 4146 (NC) COMBINING AAW NETS

d. Weapon restriction orders relative to In order to economize on the number of HF


safety sectors. SSB sets in use, the AAW coordination and AAW
reporting nets may be combined into a single net,
e. Target engagement messages (TEMs). known as the AAW coordination and reporting
(AAW (C&R)) net. This is the primary voice coor-
f. Reports of AAW ammunition states. dinating, control, and reporting net for IDZC,
ODZC, and AAWC. This net is not to be confused
g. Coordination of homing for lost aircraft. with the SNIP net described in Article 4147. The
success of the combined net depends on good cir-
h. Coordination and direction of the initial cuit discipline; the ability to pass information de-
phase of SAR. pends on the complexity of the real-time situation.
However, it is essential that the following infor-
i. Shore coordination when appropriate. mation be included:

a. Initial detection and tracking reports of


4143 (NC) LOCAL AAW COORDINATION evaluated threats.
NET
b. Engagement and results of engagement.
This is a UHF voice net controlled by the
LAAWC. The main uses of this net are to: c. Tracking reports of friendlies that could
be mistaken as hostile.
a. Provide a clear picture of the local air
situation to enable point defense weapon control- d. CAP and missile ship position reports
lers to identify targets. when not on station.

b. Promulgate threat warnings and ZIPPO e. CAP, AEW, and ASW aircraft launch
calls. and mission reports.

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4147 (NC) SINGLE NET INFORMATION When lettered call signs are used, they will nor-
AND PLOTTING (SNIP) mally be assigned in the OPTASK AAW message.
Letter designators are assigned to AAW units as
This is the primary HF net used between follows:
SAAWCs to coordinate AAW measures. The
SNIP net is controlled by the AAWC. SAAWCs a. W — Collective call sign for all primary
will use other nets to affect tracking and weapon and secondary AAW units.
control functions within their respective sectors of
responsibility. b. _W — Antiair warfare commander
(AAWC) for a specific CWC organization.
4148 (NR) JOINT AAW SHORE COOR-
DINATION (JAAWSC) Remark: The first letter of this call sign is sig-
nificant and unique for the CWC organization
This net is used for selective reporting of to which the AAWC belongs. The first battle
the air picture between the air defense agency group will be allocated the letter “A,” the sec-
ashore and the AAWC and AEW aircraft, when ond “B,” etc.
appropriate. It may also be used to pass some
TASMO messages (see ATP 34) and intercontrol- c. _C — Alternate AAWC for a specific
ler and aircraft handover traffic. CWC organization. For first letter see remark
above.
4149 (NC) AAW DATA LINKS
d. D to P — Single letters for primary
a. Link 4A. Primary means of communi- AAW units.
cation between E-2C/E-3/TDS (Link 4) ships and
CAP, whether it is one-way close control, two- e. Q to R — Single letters for EW aircraft.
way close control, or one-way broadcast control.
f. S — For all ASUW units.
b. Link 11 (UHF/HF). Used to exchange
track data and weapons control information be- g. T to Z (except W) — Single letters for
tween AAW TDS equipped units and is the pri- AEW stations.
mary means by which IDZC and ODZC exchange
information. h. Dual letters for secondary reporting
units. First letter of call sign is that of primary
(1) This circuit is essential to AAW units AAW unit assigned as LAAWC. Second letter is
within a time-critical IDZ. A to Z (except I and O). Ensure call signs assigned
to secondary reporting units do not conflict with
(2) For purposes of the outer air battle those previously assigned to warfare commanders
(OAB), Link 11 net participants should be held to and coordinators.
a minimum with an AEW acting as NCS.
4151 — 4154 Spare
(3) Silent SAM units in the ODZ will receive
tactical AAW picture via Link 11 (receive only). 4155 (NC) SURFACE WARFARE
This operation permits units detecting new con- COMMUNICATIONS
tacts to get the information rapidly on the data link.
a. Surface Surveillance. Communi-
4150 (NC) AAW CALL SIGNS cation requirements for surface data compilation
are detailed below.
Encrypted or one- or two-letter call signs
may be used on AAW circuits. The OTC will b. Surface Action Group (SAG). SAG
promulgate which system will be used in his force. communications are described in Article 4157.

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(3) Each towed array ship should be capa- 4171 (NC) BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
ble of coordinating the localization process AND GUIDELINES
with assigned aircraft using secure voice UHF
communications. a. Tradeoffs between covertness and coor-
dination will be necessary when conducting coor-
(4) All towed array units must be capable dinated operations. Planning should recognize
of receiving the recognized surface and subsur- that communication delays are often a necessary
face picture transmitted by the force track coor- adjunct to submarine operations. Additionally, an
dinator or other authority out to the limits of the inverse relationship exists between the time a sub-
ASW area of interest. marine spends in a communications posture
(depth and speed limited) and mission effective-
(5) A single net may meet the requirements ness, when the submarine’s tasking requires it to
of items 1 and 2. In a small force, it may also in- operate at high speed or below communications
clude the subsurface raid reporting function. depth for extended periods of time. Historically,
the submarine operational broadcast controlled by
the SUBOPAUTH is the most reliable means of
4161 (NC) SEARCH AND ATTACK UNIT providing coordination, tasking, and intelligence
(SAU) COMMUNICATIONS information to submarines. This method is often
slower than tactical communications, however, and
On dispatch of a SAU, responsibility for its provision must be made for the rapid, on-scene
communication requirements is transferred from exchange of intelligence and coordinating infor-
the OTC to the SAU commander. In general, the mation as required by the tactical situation.
existing ASW circuits will continue to be manned
by the SAU, with the remainder shifting to an al- b. Brevity. As a rule, communications
ternative ASW control frequency (Procedure AL- with submarines should be brief. Structured mes-
PHA, see ACP 176) or screen tactical frequency sage formats in APP 4, Vol. I, Chapter 3, and ATP
(Procedure BRAVO). Careful thought must be 18 are designed to contain all information required
given to the emission policy adopted by the SAU by the SUBOPAUTH and individual submarines
commander to avoid alerting hostile units to the in a concise summarization. The SUBOPAUTH
existence, composition, or position of the SAU, may edit (or screen off the submarine broadcast al-
and to this end use should be made of standard together) lengthy messages that are not specifi-
tabulated messages, such as the ASW Action Table cally oriented to the submarine’s employment.
in ATP 1, Vol. II. Single-Letter Maneuvering Sig- The objective is to avoid overloading the subma-
nals may be used for SAU action. rine communication system with message traffic
not directly relevant to submarine/task group op-
erations. Extracts of operational messages with in-
4170 (NC) SUBMARINE COMMUNI- formation may be consolidated and included in
CATIONS Support Submarine Force Summary and Situation
Report messages contained in APP 4. OPTASK
Communications with submarines differ messages, because of their length, normally are
significantly from those with other force assets not relayed via the submarine broadcast. Never-
and present the most significant challenge in ef- theless, they are important, and efforts should be
fecting mission coordination and tasking. Keys to made to provide them by a means other than the
success are reliable long-range communications submarine broadcast (e.g., mail, courier, shore/
between the task group and the SUBOPAUTH guard ship communications, etc.).
and dependable, redundant, on-scene tactical cir-
cuits for the exchange of intelligence; command, 4172 (NC) SUBMARINE BROADCAST
control, and coordinating information; and target-
ing data with assigned submarines. Planners and a. Submarines receive message traffic on an
commanders must be familiar with the submarine accountable broadcast transmitted by the SUB-
communication procedures and capabilities that OPAUTH. How the broadcast is to be used for
are addressed in detail in ATP 18. command and control of units operating with a task
group should be coordinated with the SUBOPAUTH

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

prior to support operations. The information trans- Table 4-2. (NU) Typical Advance Notification
mitted on the broadcast must be prioritized and coor- Requirements for Submarine Operations
dinated with the SUBOPAUTH and SOCA.
Generally, those messages containing operational
ADVANCE NO-
level tasking (e.g., SUBNOTEs) will have first EVENT TICE
priority, and those for tactical level tasking and co- (Hours)
ordination will have second priority. Messages
generated by the task group may be edited to fit on Support Submarine Request 24 to 48
the broadcast. Use of communications ZPW (auto-
Mission Change 10 to 14
matic cancellation) procedures applicable to per-
ishable information will allow early removal of Waterspace Change Notification 12 to 30
these messages from the broadcast and signifi-
cantly reduce overall traffic loading. Further in- Final Over-the-Horizon Targeting 2 to 3
formation on submarine broadcasts is contained in
ATP 18.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
b. Lead-Time Requirements. De-
pending on its role and communication schedule, The objective is to ensure tactical communication
lead time required to ensure submarine receipt of paths and coordinating instructions are clear to all
tasking, coordinating instructions, intelligence, etc., participants and that necessary and timely intelli-
can be significant. Unless the submarine is main- gence information can be rapidly exchanged be-
taining a near continuous communications connec- tween the task group and submarine.
tivity with the SOCA, plans should be based on
worst-case message delivery time and maximize use b. GUERRILLA Procedures. The code
of scheduled submarine broadcast cycles. Table word, GUERRILLA, is used by a submarine to in-
4-2 contains examples of lead-time requirements dicate that it has HIGH PRECEDENCE traffic for
based on normal broadcast cycles of 8 to 12 hours. the SOCA or a designated commander/unit in the
task group. This code word identifies the transmit-
c. Maritime Rear Link (MRL). Estab- ting ship as a submarine and is intended to alert
lishing a MRL between the OTC/SOCA and other circuit operators to clear the net as soon as
SUBOPAUTH is essential for most operations and possible. Procedures are contained in ATP 18.
will greatly simplify coordination of submarine
tasking and waterspace management requirements. c. Tactical Circuits. Communications
planning should provide for primary and secon-
d . B ARNST ORM Pro c edures. dary voice and data circuits for use with the SOCA
BARNSTORM is a single, serialized message that as well as alternate circuits for urgent communica-
may be used by the SUBOPAUTH to transmit tion with any element of the task group. The intent
submarine tasking, area assignment, waterspace is to provide the submarine a “best bet” circuit
management application, intelligence, and other op- when time is of the essence, while limiting the
erational information on the submarine broadcast. need for frequent changes in the submarine’s basic
The objective is to ensure that submarines conduct- communications plan setup. First priority should
ing communications intensive operations receive be satellite communications (if fitted), followed
all required information without placing excessive by line-of-sight UHF, and HF. Changes that do oc-
traffic load demands on the submarine broadcast. cur should be reflected in periodic Force Sum-
mary message updates.
4173 (NC) TACTICAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS d. Special Communication Win-
dows. Depending on tasking, special communi-
a. Specific tactical circuits as well as spe- cation windows outside the submarine’s normal
cial communication procedures for submarine co- broadcast cycle are generally disruptive to subma-
ordination should be identified in the OPTASK rine operations and, where possible, should be
COMMS. This information should also be in- minimized. There are occasions, however, when use
cluded in the initial request for submarine support. is appropriate; e.g., to conduct initial rendezvous

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with coordinating air or surface forces, to provide to line-of-sight range and may further be re-
updated over-the-horizon cruise missile targeting duced by sea state and low-power output.
information to the submarine, or to order/confirm
implementation of a contingency plan. Requests (2) DOWNLINK.
for special communication windows may be in-
cluded in the Support Submarine Request and sub- (a) Keyed Sonar. Depending on
sequent Force Summary/SITREP messages or environmental conditions, keyed sonar
discussed directly with the submarine on tactical provides a reasonably reliable DOWN-
coordination circuits. LINK for “Bellringer.” Under good condi-
tions, high-power, low-frequency sonars
e. UPLINK/DOWNLINK Considera- can be effective if the transmitting surface
tions. Frequently, tactical situations will require ship is within 40 to 70 nm of the submarine.
immediate communications outside established PROBE ALERT, a modification to certain
communication windows. Procedures for UPLINK US sonars, provides a coded pulse capability.
and DOWNLINK should be clearly specified in Arranging specific signals to be used and
the Support Submarine Request or appropriate keeping them simple and few in number,
OPTASK (if held by the submarine) and changes before the operation, will facilitate commu-
identified in the Force Summary message. nications on both the transmitting ship and
receiving submarine. Both collective and
(1) UPLINK. individual submarine callup codes should
be considered if multiple submarines are as-
(a) SATCOM Buoys. For subma- signed to a task group. ATP 18 contains fur-
rines so equipped, SATCOM buoys can be ther details on keyed sonar employment.
used to send messages via SSIXS to the
SUBOPAUTH for relay to the SOCA. Con- (b) Sound Underwater Signal
tact reports sent via SATCOM buoy are nor- (SUS). Two general types of SUS are
mally recorded in OTH GOLD format. This available. One employs explosive charges
permits target data to be entered directly into to produce an omnidirectional, broadband
the supported force’s intelligence data base. signal. The other is nonexplosive and uses a
battery-powered device that alternately
(b) ECB/SLOT Buoys. Submarine- transmits discrete preset frequencies. Pulse
launched expendable communications length and sequence may be varied on some
buoys (ECB) and one-way tactical (SLOT) systems. Keyed sonar (PROBE ALERT)
buoys are a reliable communications option and SUS are overt acoustic communication
if the submarine must remain at search methods that can reveal the presence of the
depth. ECB/SLOT buoy use requires that an transmitting unit as well as the possible
ASW aircraft be available for monitoring. presence of a friendly submarine. Depend-
If continuous aircraft coverage cannot be ing on the scenario, geographic location,
maintained, specific monitoring periods that and EMCON plan in effect, deception tac-
will be available should be made known to tics using routine, random transmissions
the submarine. The useful range of ECB/ from unit(s) of the force should be consid-
SLOT buoy radio transmissions is limited ered whether a submarine is assigned or not.
ATP 18 contains further details on SUS
codes and employment.

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4174 (NC) SUBMARINE REPORTING are to be included in the Form Green/Brown/


Brown Deviation to OTCs and submarine operat-
Specific submarine reporting requirements ing authorities to allow the circuit to be monitored.
must be tailored to the scenario and clearly under-
stood by all parties prior to operations. Keeping b. Aircraft on Direct Support Opera-
the SOCA informed of contacts, search and en- tions. These aircraft will maintain communica-
gagement results, intentions, and status is essen- tions with their shore-based controlling authority
tial. Prompt contact, post-engagement, and peri- on MATELO until they join the force. Thereafter,
odic situation reports from each submarine are key they will communicate with the specified agency
to the SOCA maintaining a master “fused” plot of within the force (e.g., force marshaler or ASW
operations, and the OTC’s ability to coordinate, ACU), until they depart the force. Normally, the
allocate, or reassign assets as the operational situa- OTC will exercise tactical control of aircraft
tion evolves. Recommended communication traf- through an aircraft control unit (ACU), which will
fic handling and event sequencing procedures are guard operational and safety frequencies. When-
addressed in ATP 18. Message formats for contact ever practicable, aircraft will monitor MHQ
and periodic situation reports are contained in ARCNs. Contact reports will not be sent to the
APP 4, Vol. I. MHQ unless ordered specifically by the OTC.
During direct support operations, the MPA’s first
4175 (NR) CONVOY COMMUNICATIONS communications priority is to the OTC. Subject to
the Emission Policy (EP), contact reports may be
Convoy communications will be conducted sent to the OTC on HF if contact is not possible on
on International Maritime Mobile (IMM) single UHF. On departing the force, aircraft will
frequency VHF channels. As a minimum, there is re-establish communications with their shore-
a need for: based controlling authority on MATELO. The fol-
lowing general communication procedures apply
a. A channel, with several alternatives, for during direct support operations:
communication between the Convoy Commodore
and the ships of the convoy. (1) RATT Procedures. MPA on direct
support can use RATT:
b. A separate channel for communication
between the OTC and the Convoy Commodore. (a) To pass joining messages.

4180 (NU) AIRCRAFT COMMUNI- (b) To overcome communication


CATIONS problems encountered when the identifica-
tion safety range (ISR) is greater than the
4181 (NC) MARITIME PATROL AIR- UHF communication range.
CRAFT (MPA) COMMUNICATIONS
(c) To allow exchange of tactical in-
a. Area Operations. MPA on area formation between MPA and surface/sub-
oper-ations will establish two-way communications surface units.
with their shore-based controlling authority using
the appropriate Maritime Air Communications (d) To allow submarines to operate
Organization (MATELO) frequencies. In addi- Post Box and Blind Broadcast procedures.
tion, ground/air broadcasts are available. During
area operations, the MPA’s first communications (e) To provide the OTC secure com-
priority is to the MHQ. MPA operating on area op- munications with submarines operating in
erations will pass traffic to the MHQ on the Air associated or direct support.
Reporting and Control net (ARCN), which oper-
ates in either a RATT or voice mode (RATT is de- (f) When necessary to clear urgent
signed to be primary). Modes of operation and the signal traffic from surface forces to shore
primary and secondary frequencies for the circuit authorities.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(2) UHF Procedures: e. MPA Control Nets — General.

(a) Read-back procedures are not to (1) A MACA, when required, will commu-
be used. nicate with and control aircraft by the following
types of communication:
(b) Secure RATT may be used on UHF
circuits, if fitted, to achieve the communicat- (a) Point-to-point communication.
ion requirements listed in paragraph b(1).
(b) Air/ground/air communication.
(3) SITREPs to OCA. If the EP permits,
the aircraft is to transmit an encrypted encoded SI- (2) During area/surveillance operations,
TREP to the OCA on completion of an incident af- MPA will be under the control of the OCA/parent
ter informing the OTC of the shift of HF channel. MACA; however, other MACAs within the
If this is not permissible while on task, the report is area should also be information addressees on
to be transmitted during the transit back to base message traffic. During Direct Support opera-
when the aircraft is at least 100 nm from the force. tions, MPA will be under the tactical control of
Detailed communication procedures that are to be the OTC.
used on direct support operations are contained in
ACP 176 and ATP 28. 4185 (NC) HELICOPTER COMMUNI-
CATIONS
c. Air/Submarine Operations.
Communications with helicopters place
(1) Communications between MPA and primary reliance upon radio, but visual signals
submarines will be primarily by UHF in the fol- may be used for short-range communication (e.g.,
lowing preferred order: in launch and recovery operations) when a restric-
tive emission policy is in force. Helicopter com-
(a) Secure voice. munication fits are broadly detailed in ATP 29.
When more specific information is required, OP-
(b) Secure UHF RATT. STAT UNIT (see APP 4) may be used as a means
of promulgation. The aircraft’s communication
(c) Uncovered UHF voice, using low- capability must be carefully considered when the
level code. emission policy and communications plan are
formulated.
(2) HF communications will normally be
restricted to the interception of blind or indi- a. Circuits. These will normally be
rect read-back broadcasts by the submarine. specified in the OPTASK AIR (see APP 4) and de-
Messages for relay via the MPA to other units tailed in the COMPLAN. Circuits available for
or shore authorities are to be formatted in this function are described in ACP 176.
accordance with ACP 127 procedures. (See
ATP 28.) b. Communications Relay. Some
helicopters have a capability to monitor SLOT
d. Maritime Air Control Authorities buoys and may be used, subject to other screening
(MACA) (may be a cell within the MHQ). All commitments, to relay intercepted messages to the
MACAs will monitor circuits during MPA area OTC or SOCA (ASWC).
and Direct Support operations. Messages received
by a MACA from MPA will be relayed on to the c. Tactical Data Links. Some helicop-
aircraft’s parent MACA. ters have the capability to communicate with a
parent ship through a tactical data link.

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4186 (NC) HELICOPTER CONTROL tions. To allow for required maintenance and
NETS — GENERAL emergent casualties, communications plans
should, as a goal, task no more than 90 percent of
a. Communication Circuits. Commu- the communications equipment in any unit. To ac-
nication nets for helicopter control are detailed in complish this, it may often be necessary to com-
ACP 176. Selection of a suitable circuit will nec- bine some circuit requirements and/or assign
essarily be a function of the helicopter’s employ- guard ships for some nets. Communications plans
ment, but the OTC must bear in mind the limited should include instructions for smooth transitions
communication facilities available in most aircraft through various EMCON conditions. UHF air-
and control units. Where interoperation with other borne relay planning must also be included to per-
types of aircraft is required (e.g., in ASW), it will mit a n uninte rrupte d flow of e sse nt i al
normally be prudent to use a common control cir- communications without violating RADHAZ re-
cuit for both — to aid information flow and to strictions or EMCON plans.
economize on communication equipment and
frequencies. c. Circuit Operation. Standard oper-
ating procedures apply to each circuit. The OTC
b. Emission Security (EMSEC). Care and coordinators will act as net control station
must be taken that transmissions between ships (NCS) on their respective warfare nets. Warfare
and aircraft are subject to the same EMSEC con- commanders or their FTCs will be NCS for their
straints as those between other force units. Details respective coordination and reporting nets. NCS
of EMSEC procedures are in Chapter 5. duties will be transferred from a primary com-
mander to an alternate commander when the war-
c. Voice Procedures. Voi ce proc e- fare commander role is transferred. NCS will be
dures for helicopter control are in APP 1. responsible for maintaining proper circuit disci-
pline and ensuring that proper security procedures
d. Brevity Code Words. Brevity code are followed. Authentication and encryption will
words used in helicopter control are in APP 7. be used as required on all uncovered circuits in ac-
cordance with the OTC’s and/or EWC’s instruc-
4190 (NC) COMMUNICATIONS FOR tions. Where possible, voice circuits should be
DECENTRALIZED COMMAND operated in a secure mode.
AND CONTROL
d. Merger of Communications Cir-
a. General. When the OTC delegates cuits in Combined TG Operations. The mer-
tactical control of units in a force or group as de- ger of two independent TGs into a combined TF
scribed in Chapter 1, there will be specific com- will require one set of warfare nets to be secured
munication requirements between the OTC and while additional units join the remaining nets.
appointed warfare commanders and coordinators, Having a number of units switching circuits can be
and between warfare commanders and coordina- complicated and, if not handled correctly, cause a
tors and their assigned units. To meet these re- considerable amount of confusion. A suggested
quirements, the OTC and warfare commanders procedure for shifting warfare coordination re-
and coordinators have certain circuits, described sponsibilities upon joinup of two major TGs might
in ACP 176, at their disposal. involve the following:

b. Plans. When drafting a communica- (1) The OTC of the force/group being
tions plan, the OTC and warfare commanders and joined specify 24 hours in advance the EMCON
coordinators must consider the communications plan in effect and tactical communications cir-
assets of units assigned. Smaller units can easily cuits currently in use.
become overburdened by too great a communica-
tion requirement. Requirements for manning the (2) Designated OTC issue a change to the
nets and the net priorities should take into account OPGEN to reflect new warfare commander and
each ship’s role as well as its abilities and limita- coordinator assignments (24 hours in advance).

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CHAPTER 5

Electronic and Acoustic Warfare (EAW)


SECTION I — OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION

5100 (NR) INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE of the electromagnetic spectrum, through the use
of electromagnetic energy. There are three subdi-
This chapter covers the basic procedures visions of ECM — electronic jamming, electronic
and instructions for electronic and acoustic war- deception, and electronic neutralization.
fare together with emission policy and control.
Detailed electronic and acoustic warfare (EAW) (3) Electronic Protective Measures
information is contained in ATP 31 and ATP 28, (EPM). That division of EW involving actions
respectively. The ability of a military force, as part taken to ensure friendly effective use of the
of the overall C2W plan (see AJP-1), to make ef- electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s
fective use of the electromagnetic and acoustic use of the electromagnetic energy. There are
spectrum while, at the same time, preventing or re- two subdivisions of EPM — active EPM and
ducing the enemy use thereof, will play an impor- passive EPM.
tant part in deciding the outcome of any future
conflict. A comprehensive and viable emission (a) Active EPM. Detectable
plan together with capable electronic and acoustic measures, such as altering transmitter parame-
warfare systems are as important as any other plan ters as necessary, to ensure friendly effective
or weapon system in a commander’s arsenal, and use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
must be fully integrated into all military operations.
For the purpose of this chapter, EAW means elec- (b) Passive EPM. Undetectable
tronic and/or acoustic warfare. measures, such as operating procedures and
technical features of equipment, which are
5101 (NR) DEFINITIONS meant to ensure friendly effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
a. Electronic Warfare (EW). Military
action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, b. Acoustic Warfare (AW). Military
which encompasses the interception and identifi- action to use the underwater acoustic spectrum to
cation of the electromagnetic emissions, the em- the advantage of friendly forces by exploiting en-
ployment of the electromagnetic energy, emy emissions and controlling friendly emissions.
including directed energy, to reduce or prevent
hostile use of electromagnetic spectrum, and ac- There are three divisions within AW:
tions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.
(1) Acoustic Warfare Support Meas-
EW comprises three divisions: ures (AWSM). That division of AW involving
actions to search for, intercept, and identify ra-
(1) Electronic Warfare Support diated underwater acoustic energy for the pur-
Measures (ESM). That division of EW in- pose of exploiting such radiations. The use of
volving action taken to search for, intercept, AWSM involves no intentional underwater
and identify electromagnetic emissions and acoustic emissions and is generally not detect-
locate their sources for the purpose of immedi- able by the enemy.
ate threat recognition. It provides a source of in-
formation required for immediate decisions in- (2) Acoustic Countermeasures
volving ECM, EPM, and other tactical actions. (ACM). That division of AW involving actions
taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective
(2) Electronic Countermeasures use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. ACM
(ECM). That division of EW involving actions involves intentional underwater acoustic emis-
taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use sions for deception or jamming.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(3) Acoustic Protective Measures (1) Issue the list of threat and target emit-
(APM). That division of AW involving actions ters (Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)) .
taken to ensure friendly effective use of the under-
water acoustic spectrum, despite the enemy’s use (2) Assign the ESM/AWSM duties and
of acoustic energy. APM involves anti-AWSM ESM/AWSM guards as appropriate.
and anti-ACM, and may not involve underwa-
ter acoustic emissions. (3) Coordinate with the AC/AREC/HEC
for aircraft support, the OTC/CWC/SOCA for
(4) The three divisions of electronic submarine support, and/or the OTC/CWC for
and acoustic warfare are parallel and surface support.
complementary.
(4) Coordinate and control ESM/AWSM
c. Frequency Management. Ensure activities on the appropriate net.
frequency deconfliction and coordination, with
particular concern that safety frequencies are (5) Collect, evaluate, recognize/classify
adequately assigned, throughout the force. intercepts, and disseminate data.

5110 (NR) DIRECTION AND (6) Correlate information obtained from


COORDINATION own sensors with information available from
other sources.
5111 (NR) GENERAL
(7) The EWC allocates racket numbers.
The OTC/CWC is responsible for EAW; he
may delegate functions in Table 1-8 to an c. ECM/ACM Activities. The EWC/
Electronic Warfare Coordinator (EWC) and Ta- ASWC coordinate and control ECM/ACM activi-
ble 1-4/1-8 to an Antisubmarine Warfare Com- ties respectively within the force. Coordination
mander (ASWC). To best exploit its potential, with all warfare commanders is required. They
EAW policies and activities must be harmonized perform the following functions, if delegated by
with other warfare policies and activities. The the OTC/CWC:
OTC/CWC promulgates the Emission Policy (EP)
for the force, which will be reflected in the Emis- (1) Direct the employment of force decoys
sion Control Plan (EMCON Plan). To accomplish according to the policy formulated by the
the mission, the electromagnetic and acoustic en- OTC/CWC.
vironment in which the force will operate is a ma-
jor factor of the situation assessment. (2) Coordinate the employment of active
jamming and of electronic neutralization de-
5112 (NR) FUNCTIONS WHICH MAY BE vices according to the policy formulated by the
DELEGATED TO EWC/ASWC OTC/CWC.

a. Formulation of EMCON Plans. The (3) Advise the OTC/CWC on planned


EWC and the ASWC are the OTC’s/CWC’s prin- responses.
cipal advisors on the formulation of his Emission
Policy (EP). Once the OTC/CWC promulgates the (4) Coordinate with the AC/AREC/HEC
EP, the ASWC will develop the acoustic portions for aircraft support, the OTC/CWC/SOCA for
of the EMCON plans and the EWC will develop submarine support, and/or the OTC/CWC for
the electronic portions. Both portions will then be surface support.
incorporated into the force EMCON plans, which
will be coherent in intent and support the EP. (5) Advise the OTC/CWC, the SC, and
warfare commanders on unit disposition to
b. ESM/AWSM Activities. The EWC/ achieve the optimum balance between ECM/
ASWC assign the ESM/AWSM duties and guards ACM effectiveness and counter-surveillance
as appropriate. They perform the following func- posture.
tions, if delegated by the OTC/CWC:

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5720 (NC) REDUCING THE EFFEC-


TIVENESS OF ECM/ACM Table 5-3. (NU) Standard Communication
Antijam Measures/Procedures
The enemy’s use of ECM/ACM can be pro-
tected against by using measures against jam- MEASURE DESIGNATOR
ming, deception, and neutralization.
Frequency shift to column or ONE
frequency(ies) on circuit(s)
5721 (NC) REDUCING THE EFFEC- nominated.
TIVENESS OF JAMMING
Start parallel keying on TWO
additional column(s) or fre-
Measures to protect against jamming include: quency(ies) ordered.

a. Destruction of the jammer. Change from current column THREE


to nominated column in COM-
PLAN ordered.
b. Dissemination of accurate information
from unjammed units. Change from day to night or FOUR
night to day frequency as
appropriate.
c. Disposition of assets.
OTC/CWC will direct units to FIVE
d. Technical EPM/APM measures in part of radio spectrum clear of
jamming after ESM search.
equipment.
Activate TF/TG MF. SIX
e. Frequency shifting (see Table 5-3). Set watch on underwater SEVEN
telephone.
f. Communication antijam plans.
Revert to morse on this circuit. EIGHT
g. Sensor antijam plans. NOTES 1. Procedures for the use of antijam
measures are contained in APP 1.
h. Frequency diversity.
2. Measure may be ordered on the
5722 (NC) MEASURES AGAINST affected circuit on any other usable
DECEPTION circuit, on the antijam coor-dination
circuit, or by pre-arranged visual or
Protective measures against deception acoustic signal.
include:
3. Where possible, one station is to
remain on the affected circuit(s) to
a. Frequency diversity. occupy the jammer.
b. Exchange and comparison of data
within a force to eliminate false information.

c. Disposition of assets. (NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Use of technical EPM/APM measures.

e. Frequency shifting and authentication of


communication circuits.

f. Discreet identification.

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5723 (NC) REDUCING THE EFFEC- destination. The term “meaconing” can also be ap-
TIVENESS OF ELECTRONIC plied to the seduction of mobile SATCOM aerials
NEUTRALIZATION by an airborne platform. In both cases, meaconing
is achieved by transmitting an alternative signal.
Measures to protect against electronic neu- In intrusion, an enemy gains access to a communi-
tralization include: cation system (voice or data link) and manages to
insert false data or instructions. Jamming and in-
a. Physical protection. terference normally involve the use of electro-
magnetic energy to degrade communication and
b. Technical EPM features. radar/weapon systems to varying degrees.

5724 (NC) MEACONING, INTERFER- b. Whenever an MIJI incident is experi-


ENCE, JAMMING, AND enced, the OTC/EWC should be informed imme-
INTRUSION (MIJI) diately. The EWC should attempt to identify the
source of the MIJI, so that the necessary actions
a. Meaconing is the deception of a naviga- can be taken to reduce the effects. The area EW co-
tion aid, such as tacan or DME, with the aim of de- ordination cell (EWCC), may be able to assist in
coying an aircraft from its intended course or the identification of MIJI sources.

SECTION VIII — AREAWIDE ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION

5800 (NC) ELECTRONIC WARFARE those of all other forces in the commander’s AOR
COORDINATION CELL (EWCC) to achieve overall control of the electromagnetic
spectrum. These coordination actions executed by
a. EW impacts on all warfare activities. the EWCC will serve to support the commander’s
This impact has necessitated the creation of an at- overall operational plan.
sea EW coordinator (EWC). The EWC, acting on
behalf of the OTC/CWC, coordinates the activi- 5801 (NC) EWCC RESPONSIBILITIES
ties of EW assets within the force. It is essential
that both at-sea and shore-based commanders at Consistent with the resources available,
all levels have experienced EW staffs to coordi- EWCC responsibilities include, but are not neces-
nate areawide EW assets and activities. To pro- sarily limited to:
vide this intercommand coordination function, an
electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) a. Planning.
should be established by a commander in his area
of responsibility (AOR) when a joint force or (1) Prepare EW aspects of operations
more than one force are employed, thereby maxi- plans, orders, and data bases, including recom-
mizing the impact of limited EW resources. mendations on Rules of Engagement (ROE) for
EW and NATO Precautionary System (NPS)
b. The EWCC is the commander’s mecha- measures.
nism for coordinating EW assets within his AOR.
It will be established as an integral part of the oper- (2) Make recommendations to the com-
ations staff at the level(s) deemed appropriate to mander on tasking component commanders to
support the operation, and will provide the means provide EW support as required.
of coordinating all EW activities.
(3) Identify requirements for intelligence
c. EW efforts of the force managed by the support to EW operations.
EWC will be coordinated by the EWCC with

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

CHAPTER 6

General Warfare Instructions


SECTION I — RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

6100 (NC) INTRODUCTION NATO forces to use force. Following a declara-


tion of counter aggression, ROE generally limit
In the conduct of peacetime operations, the otherwise lawful use of force.
maritime units normally base their conduct on In-
ternational Law, the International Rules of the 6110 (NC) PLANNED RESPONSES
Road, and the Geneva Convention. Those units
under national command are further guided by a. Initial Responses. As very short ad-
national instructions, while those units under the vanced warning of an attack may occur, it is essen-
operational command of the Major NATO Com- tial that initial responses to specific detections be
manders (MNCs) conform to NATO instructions. planned and promulgated by the OTC. To ensure
The national/NATO instructions providing this quick reactions, planned responses should be:
supplementary guidance are designated as Rules
of Engagement (ROE). (1) Matched to the actual threats.

ROE are directives to military forces (in- (2) Promulgated so as to permit rapid
cluding individuals) that define the circum- updating.
stances, conditions, degree, and manner in which
force, or action which might be construed as pro- (3) As simple as possible.
vocative, may, or may not, be applied. ROE are
not to assign tasks or give tactical instructions. b. Promulgation. Unless otherwise di-
With the exception of self-defense, during peace- rected in planned responses, the implementation
time and operations prior to a declaration of coun- of such a plan carries with it the automatic upgrad-
ter aggression, ROE provide the sole authority to ing of the appropriate threat warning to RED.

SECTION II — PICTURE COMPILATION AND SCOUTING

6200 (NU) INTRODUCTION The process of all actions and activities aimed
at compiling a plot is called picture compilation.
This section describes the process of pic-
ture compilation, which is fundamental to mari- In maritime operations, picture compilation
time operations, and scouting, which is the will normally be executed to support decision
observation of the surrounding environment. making in relation to the mission. The nature of
More detail of the methods for gathering informa- the mission will dictate the importance of the plot
tion and exploitation of the recognized picture are and what information is to be derived from it.
contained in the relevant warfare publications:
ATP 18, ATP 28, ATP 31, and ATP 34. In support of the overall plan, the OTC
and/or delegated authorities are to develop, for-
6201 (NR) PICTURE COMPILATION mulate, and implement the picture compilation
plan.
In all maritime operations, ranging from
peacetime through increasing tension to hostili- 6210 (NU) THE PICTURE COMPILATION
ties, it is necessary to compile a plot of surface, air, PLAN
and subsurface contacts.
The picture compilation plan should take
into account the following three items:

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

a. General considerations. a. Mission.

b. Elements of picture compilation. b. Threat.

c. The process of picture compilation. c. Peacetime, time of tension, time of war.

6220 (NU) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS d. Rules of Engagement (ROE).

General considerations in developing the e. Directives from superior authority.


picture compilation plan are:
6230 (NC) ELEMENTS OF PICTURE
a. Environment. COMPILATION

b. Resources. In general terms, picture compilation


should result in the determination of the following
c. Operational situation. four elements:

6221 (NU) ENVIRONMENT a. WHAT:

There are three basic elements of the envi- (1) Environmental descriptors (surface,
ronment which should be considered: subsurface, land, air and space).

a. Geographic location of the area of op- (2) Identity (hostile, suspect, unknown,
erations (e.g., open ocean, inshore). neutral, assumed friend, friend).

b. Environmental factors (e.g., oceano- b. WHERE:


graphic, meteorological, atmospheric, etc.).
(1) Position.
c. Familiarity with the geographic location
and environmental factors. (2) Bearing.

6222 (NR) RESOURCES (3) Area of probability.

The OTC or delegated authorities should as- (4) Height.


sess all resources available to support the picture
compilation plan: (5) Depth.

a. Intelligence information. c. WHITHER:

b. The capabilities and limitations of the (1) Course.


available assets and their sensors and the probabil-
ity of gaining contact with them. (2) Speed.

c. Dissemination capabilities (e.g., data d. WHEN:


link systems, voice communications, messages).
(1) Time of contact report or of informa-
6223 (NC) OPERATIONAL SITUATION tion in the report.

In maritime operations, the operational sit- All elements should be amplified if possi-
uation will significantly affect the production and ble or required (e.g., type, class, nationality, Dop-
implementation of the picture compilation plan. pler, behaviour, time late, etc.).
Important elements are:

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

6240 (NR) THE PROCESS OF PICTURE ficult to determine. However, broad values for
COMPILATION both coverage factor and frequency of cover may
be required in planning. In such cases, the follow-
Picture compilation can be subdivided into ing values of sweep width may be used:
five processes:
(1) Sonar — Surface ships — twice tacti-
a. Detection. cal sonar range.

b. Localization. (2) Radar — 70 percent of twice maximum


range of detection.
c. Recognition.
(3) Visual by aircraft in accordance with
d. Identification. Table 6-1 of ATP 31.

e. Dissemination. (4) ESM — 70 percent of twice maximum


range (provided target is making electromagnetic
6241 (NC) DETECTION emissions).

a. The detection process includes the em- 6242 (NR) LOCALIZATION


ployment of sensors in a certain area or volume, to
determine the presence or absence of contacts or The localization process includes the em-
contact-related data. The presence of contacts or ployment of sensors to determine the positional
contact-related data should stimulate the other information and movements of a contact
four processes. (WHERE/WHITHER). The positional informa-
tion, which might be an area of probability or a
b. The detection process can be aimed at the bearing, can be relative to a platform, absolute, or
detection of specific contact(s) in a clear-cut area. in a grid system.

c. Probability of gaining contact depends 6243 (NR) RECOGNITION


on the following:
The recognition process includes the em-
(1) Sensor probability of detection (sen- ployment of sensors in order to determine charac-
sor’s sweep width). teristics of a contact. The collected characteristics
should be compared with reference data which can
(2) Coverage factor. lead to correlation, with a level of confidence. The
degree to which recognition will have to be exe-
(3) Frequency of cover. cuted should be ordered by the appropriate author-
ity and can range from very rough (e.g.,
(4) Duration of mission. combatant/merchant) to fine (e.g., name of con-
tact). In general, recognition is the interpretation
(5) Type and behavior of target. of data collected by sensors. The recognition con-
fidence levels which can be used are:
(6) Time late and last known position.
a. Certain Target. Positively recognized
(7) Operator performance. by type, visually or electro-optically, and by a
competent person and continuously tracked after
(8) Environmental and geographic factors. initial recognition.

d. These factors should be applied to the b. Probable Target.


conduct of scouting missions against surface and
subsurface targets. As it is often impossible to (1) A certain target that has been tracked
assign values to these factors because of the prob- intermittently and is confidently considered to
lems in predicting sensor performance and target be the same target, or
behavior, the probability of gaining contact is dif-

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(2) A contact viewed by imaging radar (h) A contact viewed by imaging ra-
whose image quality provides strong cumula- dar whose image quality provides indica-
tive evidence with positive indicators that are tors that are consistent with a type of enemy
consistent with a type of enemy unit, or unit.

(3) Strong, cumulative information based c. Possible Target. A contact that has a
on any two of the following: lower degree of recognition than that required for
probable. The confidence of the recognition must
(a) A contact with an electronic emis- be amplified as follows:
sion unique to a type of enemy unit.
(1) High Confidence — A contact which
(b) A contact with acoustic emissions satisfies only one of the criteria required for
unique to a type of enemy unit. probable.

(c) In a position predicted by enemy (2) Low Confidence — A contact which


or intelligence reports. has indications that it may satisfy the criteria
and further investigation is required.
(d) Sighted visually or using electro-
optics but not positively recognized. 6244 (NC) IDENTIFICATION

(e) Radar target with tracking and/or The identification process includes the as-
formation consistent with that expected of signment of one of the six standard identities to a de-
the enemy. tected contact (hostile, suspect, unknown, neutral,
assumed friend, friend). The assignment of a stan-
(f) Active sonar contact with tracking dard identity will be executed by the appropriate or
and/or formation consistent with that ex- designated authority, based upon the available data
pected of the enemy. (mostly localization and/or recognition data) and a
set of rules (identification criteria), laid down by the
(g) Missile release by target. appropriate authority. Table 6-1 provides examples
of identification methods and criteria.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
RSI Mode Advantage Disadvantage Mode Descriptor
U FULL ROLL 1. Optimum update rate 1. Net cycle time (NCT) may Permanent
(Unrestricted CALL 2. Complete exchange of be long
Transmission) data/information between PUs 2. Risk of participating units
being intercepted and
detected
U PARTIAL ROLL 1. Call-up is directed 1. Repetitive call-up of par- Full report by designated
(Unrestricted CALL 2. Exposed units may stay silent ticipants prolongs NCT PU during PARTIAL ROLL

Table 6-1a. (NC) Link 11 Operational Employment Options


Selective or 3. Any PU has access to the net CALL or ROLL CALL
Sequential BROADCAST — Sequential
Transmission) Transmission
U ROLL CALL 1. Covert posture for PU other than 1. Repetitive call-up Silence (See Note)
(Unrestricted BROADCAST DNCS 2. Force picture depends on
Continuous (Extreme Version 2. Any PU has access to the net DNCS
Transmission of PARTIAL
of DNCS) ROLL CALL
U or E BROADCAST 1. Higher update rate from assigned 1. No information from other Permanent
(Unrestricted unit PU
6-16c

Continuous 2. Force covert other than desig- 2. Broadcast unit detectable


Transmission nated PU due to emissions
of Designated 3. No directive control
Unit — PU) possible
E SHORT 1. Force covert 1. Lowers update rate Preplanned action — OTC
(Essential BROADCAST 2. Vital information can be broad- 2. Poor force picture compi- option. The most covert
Transmission) cast immediately lation mode. Tranmission allowed
3. No directive control in accordance with OTC’s
possible schedule (See Note)
S SILENCE 1. No ESM detection possible 1. No information exchange Preplanned aciton (See
2. Immediate access to the net by 2. No force picture Note)
SHORT BROADCAST

ATP 1(C), Vol. I


NOTE: Some units may choose the quantity of tracks or command and control orders selected for each transmission (selective
SHORT BROADCAST). If the OTC plans to use these capabilities, he should ensure that they are available and promulgate
CHANGE 8

them in the OPTASK LINK format (sets UNITFLTR, AREA or GENTEXT).


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

6361 (NC) DATA NET CONTROL 6364 (NC) GRID REFERENCE UNIT
STATION (DNCS) (GRU)

The DNCS is the participating unit in a link The GRU is the unit designated by the OTC
organization for air, surface, and subsurface data to maintain the OTC’s geographical reference
compilation who performs the technical manage- point.
ment of the net.
a. The GRU is responsible for:
a. The responsibilities are:
(1) Carrying out general grid locks as or-
(1) Advise the FTC-A on the use of fre- dered by the AAWC/FTC-A.
quencies and link parameters.
(2) Acting as reference for individual grid
(2) Initiate and terminate the data net, un- locks where possible.
der the overall directives of the OTC.
(3) Monitoring the positional accuracy of
(3) Control the order in which units are transmitted data by link participating units.
called in Roll Call mode of operation (Link 11).
(4) Ensuring his data systems’ naviga-
(4) Monitor and analyze the data nets from tional input is both up-to-date and accurate.
link establishment to link termination (techni-
cal performance). b. The GRU should be chosen by the OTC
on the basis of:
b. The DNCS is chosen on the basis of:
(1) Position in the force, ensuring:
(1) Central location relative to other link-
fitted units, which it must interrogate. (a) Good link communications.

(2) R a d i a t i o n h a z a r d a n d E M C O N (b) Greatest track density coverage.


considerations.
(2) Large and accurate track reporting
(3) State of equipment. capability.

6362 (NC) GATEWAY UNIT (3) Accurate navigational facilities.

In groups working with more than one TDS (4) Reliability of link participating unit.
system (i.e., Link 11) a gateway unit is assigned. A
gateway unit is a participating unit that is operat- 6365 — 6369 SPARE
ing on both links and is responsible for transfer
of selected track data between the two link sys- 6370 (NU) PROCEDURES
tems. The transfer can be manual or automatic.
6371 (NC) GRID LOCK PROCEDURE
6363 (NC) LINK BROADCAST UNIT
a. Grid Locks. The GRU executes grid
For Link 11 and Link 14, a broadcast unit locks on completion of the insertion of the DLRP
may be assigned. This unit will transmit data from into the various TDS, or after changing the DLRP.
his TDS system to other units, who will only re- Grid locks are also executed periodically to reduce
ceive this data but not answer or retransmit. The errors in grid reporting.
receiving units will either plot this data manually
or automatically.

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SECTION IV – AIR OPERATIONS

6400 (NR) INTRODUCTION tasking authority and tactical command may be


delegated to the aircraft commander. Direct sup-
The discussion in this section encompasses port operations are normally carried out within the
maritime operations outside TASMO by aircraft: OTC’s surveillance area. The radius of direct sup-
port operations about the force will be determined
1. Organic to a force. by the OTC and will vary according to:

2. Carrier- or land-based providing support 1. The threat.


to a force at sea.
2. The number and type of aircraft
3. Conducting air operations in the mari- available.
time environment.
3. Area coverage desired.
6401 (NR) MARITIME TASKING
AUTHORITIES 4. EMCON plan in force.

Maritime aircraft under the operational The OTC is to inform the tasking authority
control of a maritime commander may be tasked of the dimensions of his surveillance area and of
by a shore authority if land-based, or by the OTC if subsequent changes, emission policy permitting.
shipborne on a force at sea. When tasking mari-
time aircraft, the tasking authority, MHQ, or OTC b. Associated Support. In specific
should: cases of communications or other control difficul-
ties, associated support may be provided. Aircraft
1. Employ the appropriate aircraft in a safe tasked on associated support will operate inde-
manner to accomplish the assigned task. pendently of other forces at sea; however, their
tasking is in support of a specific force. They may
2. Inform all units of all friendly aircraft be tasked to support that force by providing con-
operating in the vicinity. tact information and to receive intelligence from
the OTC who is being supported. The aircraft may
3. Disseminate pertinent information to all be tasked to establish communications with the
units in the area in a timely manner. supported force to prevent mutual interference.
The OTC of the supported force cannot take tacti-
4. Liaise with air defense authorities and cal control of the aircraft unless authorized by the
civil air control authorities including NO- aircraft tasking authority. The aircraft commander
TAM actions. should be briefed on the degree of support it can
give to the OTC.
6402 (NC) AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS
c. Area Operations. Area operations
Maritime aircraft may be assigned to pro- are conducted in areas within which enemy forces
vide support to forces at sea in one of three forms. are known to be, through which enemy forces are
likely to pass, or within which it is desirable to
a. Direct Support. Aircraft assigned to deny the enemy freedom of action. In addition, op-
direct support of a force at sea will operate under erations may be related to the protection of mari-
the tactical control of the OTC who is being sup- time forces scheduled to enter the area in the future
ported. Operational control will remain with the or to provide defense in depth to distant forces.

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Land-based aircraft on area operations are under 6407 (NR) SUPPORT OPERATIONS
the operational control of a shore-based authority. TASKED BY MARITIME
Tactical command and control of the aircraft con- AUTHORITIES
ducting the mission is normally delegated to the
aircraft commander by the tasking authority. Air- a. Air Operations Outside TASMO.
craft commanders should be briefed on the where- Air operations in support of forces at sea outside
abouts of friendly naval forces and as to whether TASMO, which are controlled by maritime
or not they may react to a request from these forces authorities, are normally tasked by standard
to assist in the protection of contacts within the air- MTMS or other messages such as the ATO. The
craft’s operating area. Notwithstanding such authori- tasking authority should stipulate in the FORM
zation, the original tasking authority has the right to GREEN both the form of support of each mission
resume control of the aircraft at his discretion. and the specific mission type by promulgating
mission designators from Table 6-2.
6403 (NR) INFORMING THE OTC OF
OPERATIONS IN HIS VICINITY (1) Mission Designators. The Table 6-2
mission designators can only be changed by the
OTCs are to be informed by the appropriate aircraft’s original tasking authority or the air-
coordinating authority of any aircraft employed craft commander if delegated tactical com-
on area operations in the vicinity of their force. mand. Therefore, if an OTC wishes an aircraft
to do more than one mission type, it must be re-
If a force at sea is to be supported by land- quested in the support request message, FORM
based aircraft in associated or direct support, the GREEN REQUEST. The ASW mission type is
OTC will be informed by the appropriate coordi- subdivided and once the tasking authority has
nating authority of the type and nature of support authorized an ASW operation, the supported
being provided in response to the direct support OTC can modify the ASW tasking during a
request, using the standard RAINFORM formats. mission by using the ASW mission designators
In the case of shipborne aircraft support, the OTC in Table 6-4.
of the force providing the support should keep the
OTC of the supported force, and, if possible, shore (2) Mission Type. Table 6-2 lists the
authorities, informed of the flying schedule and mission types which maritime aircraft may be
intentions using the standard MTMS formats. tasked. Details on the various scouting mis-
sions are in Section II of this chapter.
6404 SPARE
b. Antisurface Operations. The aim
of antisurface operations by aircraft is to ensure
the detection, and early engagement of enemy sur-
6405 (NU) TYPES OF OPERATIONS face forces in order to deny their effective employ-
ment. Aircraft can effectively locate and shadow
6406 (NR) OPERATIONS INTEGRAL TO enemy naval surface forces. In war, aircraft should
A FORCE remain outside the effective envelope of ship-
borne missile and gun defense systems whenever
Helicopter and carrier borne aircraft which possible while searching for, identifying, shadow-
are an integral part of the force are under the tacti- ing, and subsequently attacking hostile forces. At
cal command of an OTC. They are assigned tasks times, it may be necessary to establish the iden-
as directed by the OTC or warfare commander as tity of contacts detected at ranges in excess of the
required. Although the employment of these air- identification/recognition capability of the aircraft
craft is not a support operation, the procedures in sensors. Ideally, this identification/recognition
this chapter sometimes apply. should be done by a small, high-speed, low-level,
maneuverable aircraft equipped with radar, ESM,

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 6-2. (NU) Table of Aircraft Mission Designators

FORM OF AIR SUPPORT OPERATION (Notes 1 and 4) Designator


Area Operations AQ
Associated Support AS
Direct Support DS

MISSION TYPES (Notes 1, 3, and 4)


Air Surveillance SV
Antiair Warfare AD
Antisurface Operations SW
Area Search SA
ASW Operations (Note 2): Further amplified with more
mission designators in Table 6-4 KS
Attack (Surface Targets) AT
Barrier BR
Investigate IN
Mining Operations MI
Reconnaissance RE
Screen SC
Search and Rescue SR
Search and Shadow:
a. Overt search, identification, and AR
b. Overt search, covert identification, and low shadow CP
c. Overt search, covert identification, and low shadow HR
d. Overt search, covert identification, and low shadow NV
e. Covert search identification, and shadow SX
f. Covert search, identification, and high shadow WZ
Surveillance SU
Training TN

Notes:

1. Tasking authorities are to use mission designators to promulgate the form


of air support operation and the mission types in all Forms GREEN.

2. To be used by tasking authority for all types of ASW operations (i.e., ASW
surveillance, air-sub operations, area, associated, or direct support opera-
tions).

3. Amplification of mission, such as reporting/tracking instructions or attack


criteria may be required, e.g., “BR + Report hourly.”

4. These designators may also be used in other message traffic to describe


aircraft employment.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 6-3. (NU) Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support

SERIAL ACTION UNIT ACTION


NO.

1 OTC/ACU On receipt of FORM GREEN, transmit the joining instructions


message in accordance with paragraph 6419b.

2 MHQ Relay the joining instructions message to the aircraft. If for any
reason the MHQ is unable to relay the message to the aircraft, it
is to inform the OTC/ACU.

3 Aircraft Complete aircraft joining message and transmit it to MHQ for dis-
patch to ACU. (See Note 5 or Serial 8.)

4 Aircraft Transit under tactical control of sector operations center (SOC) or MHQ.

5 Aircraft Select assigned IFF/SIF codes as ordered in FORM GREEN.


Communications should be attempted with the force before the
aircraft reaches the gate.

6A Aircraft If radar handover expected, monitor handover on promulgated


handover circuit and establish communications with the force
marshaller, nominated controller, or OTC. (See Notes 1 and 2.)

6B Aircraft If nonradar handover expected, establish communications with


force marshaller, nominated controller, or OTC on RATT or voice
on ASW or marshalling circuits as promulgated. Pass: type of air-
craft, time at gate/ISR, direction of approach, and altitude. (See
Notes 1 and 2.)

7 Force Marshaler/ Respond to aircraft (see Note 1); challenge aircraft IFF or pass
Nominated identity procedure to be done (if required). Pass:
Controller/OTC
a. Call sign and position of ACU
b. Direction and distance to patrol area
c. Altimeter setting (QNH)
d. Communications security protection aspects of EMCON plan
(see Note 6)
e. Inform aircraft if ACU has received FORM GREEN
f. Time check
g. Clearance to descend and proceed to patrol area, as required,
and
h. If required, new control RATT or voice frequency, and control
of aircraft to ACU
i. Gridlock.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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Table 6-3. (NU) Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support (Cont.)

SERIAL ACTION UNIT ACTION


NO.

8 Aircraft Call ACU and ascertain if ACU has received aircraft joining mes-
sage. If not received, pass all items below; if received, update
appropriate items below:
a. Sortie number
b. Any restrictions to role (see Note 3)
c. Serial numbers of OPGEN and OPTASK received
d. ON/OFF task times
e. Serial number of the latest WSM message received
f. Aircraft data link coordination information.
Be prepared to pass following additional information if ACU
informs aircraft that no FORM GREEN was received:
g. Aircraft type
h. Weapon load
i. IFF mode setting.

9 ACU ACU pass following joining instructions message (See Note 4):
a. Identify maneuver if no previous voice communications estab-
lished. Pass ship’s position and clearance to close/descend.
b. Threat assessment, mission designator and
employment/airplan, gridlock (if not already completed by force
marshaller), controller grade, control rules in force
c. EMCON
d. EW task
e. PIM, if different
f. Update important data from OPGEN and OPTASK if different
g. Update important data from JTAA or SAA, if different; or pass
latest WSM serial number
h. Update air safety information not previously transmitted, in-
cluding other aircraft activity

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 6-3. (NU) Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support (Concl.)

SERIAL ACTION UNIT ACTION


NO.

9 ACU (Cont.) i. Lost communication procedures


j. Weapons restrictions and rules of engagement
k. DUSTBIN status and area (if appropriate)
m. SITREP, including in TA operations current contact acoustic
data (i.e., target sources, frequencies, source levels, aspect de-
pendencies and advice or sensor depth)
n. 1. Bathy and active acoustic information if different than
predicted range
2. In TAS operations: ambient noise
p. Weather, QNH, water depth, and tidal stream
q. Call sign and position of important and detached units
r. Times of ship/air RATT schedules (if applicable)
s. Data link coordination information.

Note
Only information required need be sent.

10 Aircraft Report to ACU when in patrol area.

Notes:
1. Whenever joining an unsecure voice circuit, proper authentication must be used.
2. Helicopters are to close at altitudes that will allow early radar detection by the force being joined
and at speeds below 140 knots.
3. Restrictions should include any significant change in standard weapon load or any
unserviceabilities.
4. ACU should not duplicate any information already held by the aircraft.
5. Aircraft joining message is to be:
a. In accordance with MATELO Handbook
b. Of IMMEDIATE precedence
c. Addressed to the OTC/ACU
d. From the aircraft call sign.
6. The communications security protection (CSP) aspects of an EMCON plan are reflected by RSIs
A, D, and X.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 6-4. (NU) ASW Mission Designator Table

Mission Mission Threat (3) Sensor Remarks


Designator Aim (2)
(1) (4)

EM Deter All Radar - may be Optimize radar operating mode for


augmented by deterrence
sonobuoys

ZY Deter and All Radar - may be 1. Optimize radar operating for de-
Detect augmented by terrence
passive sono- 2. Patrol at best compromise
buoys altitude for radar and sonobuoy
detection

NL Detect and All Radar - may be 1. Optimize radar operating for de-
Deter (active augmented by tect
and passive) passive sono- 2. Patrol at best altitude for radar
buoys detection

JK Detect (pas- Primary Passive sono- 1. Patrol at altitude for best


sive) nuclear buoys sonobuoy monitoring
2. May be used against noisy/die-
sel-electric if known/assessed to
be snorting

FE Detect (pas- Nuclear Passive sono- Patrol at altitude for best sonobuoy
sive/active) (and/or buoys - may be monitoring
diesel- augmented by
electric) radar

SN Support sub- All As required 1. May be combined with another


marine ASW compatible secondary mission
operations 2. Patrol at altitude for best
sonobuoy/communications moni-
toring

Notes
(1) Tasking authorities are to use mission designators to promulgate the mission form and mission
type (Table 6-2). The OTC will order the specific ASW mission designator (Table 6-4).
(2) Specific requirements to “Report,” “Track,” and/or “Destroy” are to be ordered additionally by the
tasking authority, e.g., “ZY + Destroy,” “FE + Track + Report.”
(3) The tasking authority/OTC is to specify the type of threat, if known.
(4) If BLIND BROADCAST, POSTBOX, or AIRMAIL procedures are required, the FORM GREEN is
to be amplified accordingly.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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and ECM for self-protection. In some situations, it (1) Aided Intercept. A submarine is pro-
may be necessary for MPA/MRR aircraft or heli- vided with target location information by air-
copters to identify the contact, but before ordering craft or other forces.
such a mission the OTC/MHQ must consider all
the factors including the possibility of losing the (2) AIR/SUB Support Operations.
aircraft to enemy defenses. Cooperation between MPA and submarine when
both are on area operations. There are three levels
c. ASW Operations. Air ASW support of cooperation under these conditions:
operations can be conducted by helicopters or by
fixed-wing aircraft. Shore-based aircraft are (a) Mutual Cooperation. This is the
tasked by shore authorities to support forces at sea. highest level of cooperation. The air and
Shipborne aircraft can be tasked by their OTC to submarine patrol areas (APA and SPA)
provide direct support to support other OTCs. In overlap.
either case, standard aircraft tasking formats as de-
tailed in APP 4 should be used. (b) Indirect Cooperation. The APA
and SPA are within communication dis-
The tactical procedures to be used on ASW tance. Units operate independently unless
missions are in this publication, ATP 28, and ap- one requests support from the other.
propriate tactical instructions issued by the tasking
authority. The ASW mission designators in Table (c) Surveillance Cooperation. This is
6-4 should be used by the OTC to task aircraft on the lowest level of cooperation. Aircraft
ASW missions and in GREEN REQUESTs. carry out surveillance and make a blind
broadcast to assist the submarine.
There are many occasions when the long-
range detection capability of the submarine can be (3) ASW Operations Utilizing Sub-
exploited or complemented by the use of cooper- marines in Direct Support. Submarines
ating aircraft. The combination of effective detec- may be called on to protect surface forces by
tion by the submarine and subsequent rapid coordinating their operations with other ASW
response by the aircraft provides a valuable sys- units. Aircraft may assist the submarine in con-
tem of defense and surveillance against surface or tact prosecution and may also assist OTC/sub-
subsurface enemy forces. In this context, cooper- marine communications.
ating units must be aware of each other’s tactics
and limitations. The types of AIR/SUB operations 6408 — 6409 SPARE
are:

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

6410 (NC) PROCEDURES FOR AIRCAFT “Not found” message is to be made to the author-
IN TRANSIT ity ordering the mission. The aircraft may request
the OTC to use homing procedure; however, the
a. Enemy Contacts. Aircraft com- OTC may not wish to break radio silence to an-
manders are to be briefed before takeoff on action swer the request or to use homing procedure. The
to be taken on contacts gained while in transit. aircraft is to continue searching for the force.
Briefing shall take the form of transit instructions
as follows: (2) When Found. When the force is
found, an encrypted “Found” report is to be made
(1) Transit Instructions A (TRANS- only if a “Not found” report has been made previ-
ALFA). The aircraft is not to report or investi- ously or if the aircraft has been ordered to make
gate enemy contacts. Contacts gained are to be this report. The position of the force is only to be
logged and reported after flight. The aircraft is included in a “Found” report when the aircraft
to attempt to adhere to scheduled task times. commander considers that the estimated position
is in error to such an extent that any delay in trans-
(2) Transit Instructions B (TRANS- mitting this information would adversely affect
BRAVO). The aircraft is to report enemy con- subsequent operations. The “Found” report, if
tacts to its controlling authority and to the OTC made, is to be transmitted at least 50 miles from
of the supported force. It is not to investigate the force. However, once the aircraft is under the
such contacts and is to continue its briefed mis- tactical command of the OTC, it shall be the OTC’s
sion unless otherwise ordered. responsibility, considering his EMCON plan, to de-
termine the range from the force at which the
(3) Transit Instructions C (TRANS- “Found” report shall be sent.
CHARLIE). The aircraft is to attempt identi-
fication and report all enemy contacts. Con- 6415 (NR) IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION
currently with the report, the aircraft shall take OF SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
the following action:
It is important that all aircraft asked to sup-
1. Submarine — Destroy it whenever pos- port a force at sea, be positively identified as friendly
sible, unless in a subsurface restricted area. as they close the force. When the aircraft de-
In prehostility phase, track it in accordance parts from its base/force at sea, its identity is known
with Rules of Engagement. The time spent and the transfer of control and identification/
investigating an enemy contact shall be in recognition to the supported force can be done by
accordance with preflight briefing or fur- radar handover or nonradar handover procedures.
ther orders.
a. Radar Handover. This procedure is
2. Surface ships — Endeavor to shadow used when there is overlapping radar coverage at
until further orders are received. the transit altitude between the departure air con-
trol area and the air control area around the sup-
3. Aircraft — Endeavor to identify and as- ported force. The controllers effect a positive
certain course and speed. transfer of control of the aircraft after mutual self
identification.
b. Search for Friendly Force.
b. Nonradar Handover. This proce-
(1) Not Found. If the force is not found dure is used when there is a gap in radar coverage
within one hour of the expected time, an encrypted at the transit altitude or when EMCON denies the

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

use of radar and positive handover by controllers located to make the transit of the supporting air-
is not possible. Aircraft who are tasked to support craft as short as possible and clear of enemy units.
a force and are controlled by maritime authorities Gates can be promulgated as position geographic
are to use the appropriate self identification and or relative to a force. In either case, the aircraft
joining procedures listed in Article 6417 and Ta- must be capable of locating the gate by its own
ble 6-3. Aircraft who are controlled by other air navigation system or radar. There may be a
forces will use the procedures in ATP 34. number of gates. When the entry/exit gates are
promulgated relative to a force at sea, the gates are
6416 (NR) DEFINITIONS normally at least 150 nm from the force/disposi-
tion center. Since many aircraft radars cannot de-
The terms used by maritime aircraft during tect and identify a surface force at 150 nm, the gate
support operations are listed below and are illus- should be promulgated as a range and bearing
trated in Figure 6-2A. from PIM and not from ZZ or QQ.

a. Departure Location. The location 1. The entry/exit gate is 5 nm in radius (10


from which the supporting aircraft departs, in- nm in diameter) from the surface to 25,000
cluding an airfield, carrier, or another ship. feet MSL and reserved as an MPA climb/
descent zone to and from assigned altitudes.
b. Force Air Coordination Area
(FACA). The FACA is that area surrounding a 2. The gate will be the only point of entry
force within which air coordination measures are and departure for aircraft. Altitudes, as
required to prevent mutual air interference be- specified in RAINFORM GREEN, should
tween all friendly surface and air units and their be at or near the upper limit of the gate in
weapon systems. Normally, the FACA will coin- order to enable rapid and positive identifi-
cide with the AAW area or the area of ASW direct cation by the force and ensure UHF
support, whichever is the greater. The size and communications.
shape of the area will usually be prescribed by the
OTC and will depend upon the limits to which tac- d. Marshalling Gate. This is the point
tical control of aircraft must be exercised. If two or to which aircraft fly for air traffic control purposes
more FACAs overlap, the senior OTC is responsi- prior to commencing an outbound transit or after
ble for overall coordination. completing an inbound transit before landing.
Marshalling gates will always be within radar cov-
c. Handover Gate. The handover gate erage of the designated controller (e.g., airfield,
is the point at which the control of the aircraft, if CRP, CRS, SOC, carrier, force marshaller, etc.)
radar handover is used, changes from one control- and will be defined geograpically or relative to the
ler to another. The handover gate position is deter- force. The gate is a position clear of enemy units,
mined by agreement between the shore ADC and and suitably located for transit from supporting air
the OTC. departure positions.

d. Entry/Exit Gate. The entry/exit gate f. Identification Safety Range (ISR).


is the point to which an aircraft will proceed to The ISR in maritime operations is the minimum
commence the transit inbound or outbound from range to which an aircraft may close an assumed
an airfield or force at sea. It should be suitably friendly force without having been positively

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

identified to ensure that the force does not mistake which case, the routing must be included in the
the aircraft for hostile. It should not be confused OTC’s OPGEN/OPTASK updates or agreed to
with the various self-defense safety ranges that between the shore ADC and the OTC. When es-
aircraft are advised to use when approaching/in- tablishing approach corridors, the OTC must
vestigating unknown contacts. The ISR normally consider the communications that will be avail-
encompasses the force MEZ if zone AAW coordi- able for joining and marshalling, the direction of
nation is being used. In larger dispositions this the friendly bases from which aircraft might
may not always be possible. In any case, the ISR come, threat axis, areas in which support aircraft
must, as for entry/exit gates, be easily located by will be employed once on patrol, location of
aircraft supporting a force. As with entry/exit gates, TOMCAT and AEW pickets in a large disposi-
ISR relative to ZZ or QQ will be difficult to locate tion, and AAW coordination such as MEZ and
accurately when EMCON, large dispositions, and FEZ.
longer ranges are considered. Normally, ISRs
should be established relative to the promulgated h. Identification Safety Point (ISP).
PIM rather than the position of the force (ZZ or When the gate is not within the radar cover of the
QQ) whose disposition about the PIM is dynamic. ships or when two-way communications are not
established between the ACUs, the ISP is the point
g. Approach Corridor. The approach at which aircraft on joining the force will attempt
corridor is usually established on a line between to establish two-way communications with the
the entry/exit gate and the force/disposition cen- ships and commence identification procedures.
ter. If the force center cannot be determined by the Unless otherwise promulgated the ISP will be a
aircraft’s radar, the corridor will be on a line be- position at 150 nm from ZZ on a direct line be-
tween the entry/exit gate and the PIM position. tween the in-use gate and ZZ. There may be oc-
The inner boundary is determined by the ISR. The casions when tactical considerations dictate de-
approach corridor width is normally 5 nm either viation from the direct route from gate to ZZ. In
side of the line. Depending on the mode of prom- which case, an ISP may be included in the OTC’s
ulgation the corridor may be fixed geographically OPTASK AAW update or agreed between the
or move in the following manner (see Figure 6-2A): shore ADC and the OTC, otherwise the ISP need
not be promulgated.
1. If the entry/exit gate is fixed geographi-
cally and the ISR is relative to the force dis- 6417 (NC) IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION
position center, the approach corridor will PROCEDURES
pivot about the entry/exit gate as its inner
end moves with PIM and its length will Tentative initial identification/recognition
change. of friendly aircraft may be assumed when an air-
craft, showing the proper IFF/SIF code, enters and
2. If the entry/exit gate and ISR are estab- settles down on the heading of the designated ap-
lished relative to force/disposition center, proach cooridor or sector. Positive identificaiton/
the corridor orientation and dimensions recognition will be considered as established
will not change but the entry/exit gate and when an aircraft has been visually sighted and
the corridor will move with the force. recognized by CAP, other known friendly
aircraft, or a surface ship. If not sighted, positive
There may be occasions when tactical con- identification/recognition may be assumed if at
siderations dictate deviation from the direct route least one planned IFF/SIF change or identity
from entry/exit gate to the force/PIM position. In maneuver has been made. The following self
identification procedures are established:

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
Figure 6-2A. (NC) Approach Corridors
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 6-24 CHANGE 8
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

a. IFF/SIF Identity. This may be ordered d. Informing aircraft under his control of
by the use of the term “Perform Identity movements of other friendly and enemy aircraft;
(designation).” keeping them informed of the tactical situation.

(1) Identity — Squawk IDENT. e. Assisting aircraft that are operating in-
ALFA dependently or are controlled by shore-based
authorities.
(2) Identity — Switch to STANDBY
BRAVO for 1 minute.
f. Relaying tactical information to and
(3) Identity — (Wartime Only) Shift from aircraft.
CHARLIE for 2 minutes to the
war-time mode/code as- g. Safety of all aircraft under his control.
sign- ments designated
for the next half hour
period, then return to 6419 (NC) SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
the current mode. JOINING A FORCE

b. Identity. If positive identification/ a. Preparation. The OTC will promul-


recognition cannot be established through gate handover gates, entry/exit gates, altitudes,
IFF/SIF identity, one of the following shall be or- ISP, ISR, PIM, communication window times,
dered by the controlling unit. etc., in the appropriate MTMS messages. It is es-
sential that the aircraft receive all this information
well before takeoff. The FORM GREEN will also
(1) Identity — Carry out one 360° or- provide further information.
DELTA bit.
(2) Identity — Carry out a left or right b. Joining Instructions Message.
ECHO 90° turn holding new
heading for 1 minute, (1) The OTC/ACU should, whenever pos-
returning to corridor at a
45° angle. sible, send a joining instructions message to the
tasking authority and the airbase or parent ship
(3) Identity — Carry out encoded Vec- to promulgate and update information regard-
FOXTROT tor. ing the mission. The message should contain
the information listed in Table 6-3, Serials 7
6418 (NR) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE and 9. The message can be transmitted by any
AIRCRAFT CONTROL UNIT (ACU) means and should be received by the airbase at
least 4 hours before aircraft takeoff.
Aircraft on direct support are under the tac-
tical control of the OTC, who in turn normally (2) The signal should be of IMMEDIATE
delegates that function to an Aircraft Control Unit precedence to both action and information ad-
(ACU). General responsibilities of an ACU are as dressees. The first words of the text should be
follows: “FOR ...” (e.g., “FOR NWD GREEN 257
FROM (c/s ACU) TO (c/s MPA)”).
a. Ordering the tactical employment of air-
craft as required by the OTC/AAWC/ASWC/ c. Approaching the Force. The OTC
ASUWC and specifying the type of control. should establish approach corridors for friendly
aircraft to use when joining a force. In extreme
b. Keeping the OTC fully informed of air- conditions of weather and EMCON, he may dic-
craft status and of any other factors affecting air tate a rigidly designed flight profile for aircraft
operations. joining, operating on station, and departing a task
force/task group. The design of such a flight pro-
c. Informing the OTC or air coordinator of file must take into account the force composi-
movements of aircraft under control and in the op- tion/disposition with respect to ASW, AAW,
erations area. ESM, ASMD, and airspace coordination in IMC.
In a large disposition, the force AAW posture may
permit engagement of MPA or other friendly

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

aircraft attempting to join long before communi- made only if a “Not found” report has been
cations have been established or identification has made previously or if the aircraft has been
been completed. This is especially true when pick- ordered to make this report. The position of
ets or deception groups are used. Therefore, it is the force is only to be included in a “Found”
essential that aircraft remain in these corridors un- report when the aircraft commander consid-
til identified as friendly by the OTC. ers that the estimated position is in error to
such an extent that any delay in transmitting
(1) Aircraft at ISP. The aircraft should be this information would adversely affect
at the ISP (entry/exit gate if no ISP) at the prom- subsequent operations.
ulgated ON TASK time and if early it is to hold
there until ON TASK time. The aircraft then d. Use of Checklist.
flies down the approach corridor, attempting to
establish communications with the Force Mar- (1) The checklist in Table 6-3 is designed
shaler/Nominated Controller/OTC on the to be for both RATT and voice joining. When-
promulgated frequency when closing the force ever RATT is available, it should be used in
within the approach corridor. If the aircraft preference to voice as it is clearer, faster, and
reaches the ISR and has not established com- reduces traffic on busy voice circuits. The
munications with the OTC and has not been OTC’s EMCON plan will indicate which infor-
identified as friendly, it is to hold at the ISR mation must be encoded when voice is used.
within the corridor and continue to attempt
communications. If after 15 minutes at the ISR, (2) Whenever voice joining procedures are
no communications have been established, the used, the OTC should consider using the abbre-
aircraft is to transit towards the entry/exit gate viated format (paragraph e), thereby reducing
inside the corridor until the aircraft commander the time for establishing the aircraft on patrol.
considers it safe and:
e. Abbreviated Joining Procedure. It
(a) Unless otherwise directed, carry is sometimes necessary to expedite joining proce-
out an appropriate Airplan beyond the ISR dures; for example, when an action is in progress
and outside a safe range from unidentified during arrival of aircraft. Such a procedure should
or hostile contacts. include only the following items:

(b) Make periodic attempts to estab- (1) From Aircraft:


lish communications on the promulgated
joining circuit or other force circuits, such (a) Authentication.
as Scene of Action; and
(b) Number and type of aircraft/heli-
(c) If the aircraft commander consid- copters, identity of senior aircraft/helicop-
ers he cannot provide useful support or if his ter, persons on board (POB).
activities may conflict with carrier-based
operations, he is to clear the force to a suit- (c) Joining from.
able distance and inform MHQ that he is un-
able to join and request instructions. (d) Joining for/Request employment.

(2) Not Found/Found Procedure. Note

(a) Not found. If the force is not found The following additional information
within 1 hour of the expected time, an en- should be passed if different from the
crypted “Not found” message is to be made tasking signals:
to the authority ordering the mission.
Altitude
(b) When found. When the force is Weapon load
found, an encrypted “Found” report is to be Off task time.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
(3) Adjacent Patrol Areas. Aircraft pa- datory. The order FREEZE should be followed by
trol areas may be ordered with common the order MELT as soon as the situation allows
boundaries, but to prevent mutual interference (see ACP 165). Fixed-wing aircraft are not to posi-
between adjacent aircraft, a safety zone must be tion themselves so that the slipstream strikes a he-
established 15 nm either side of the common licopter or causes a helicopter to maneuver to
boundary. Aircraft intending to prosecute a avoid the slipstream. If, for some reason, it becomes
contact within this safety zone, and prior to en- imperative for the helicopter to leave the hover be-
tering an area in which another aircraft is oper- fore recovering the sonar transducer, an emer-
ating must, when the situation and EMCON gency breakdip may be executed by cutting the
policy permit, broadcast on the briefed fre- cable. The aircraft may also attempt a freestream
quency their position, altitude, and intentions, recovery by leaving the hover with the transducer
including the position of the contact under in- still streamed; attempting to recover the trans-
vestigation, and maintain a continuous radar ducer in flight. In this situation, the aircraft will
watch for other aircraft. transmit “Emergency streamer.” Fixed-wing air-
craft within 2 nm are to vacate the airspace below
Subject to the EMCON plan in effect, ASW 1,000 feet.
aircraft employed on operations in adjacent ar-
eas should be allocated tacan channels for use b. Joining Procedures for Helicopters.
in the air-to-air mode to assist in the safe sepa-
ration of such units. MHQs should allocate ta- (1) Communication Procedures.
can channels to aircraft under their tactical Communication procedures for helicopters
control. Coordination between MHQs and joining or departing a maritime force are de-
OTCs will normally be necessary to avoid tailed in APP 1.
conflict.
(2) Airmove Messages. Airmove mes-
Note sages may be used to determine and confirm
which agency has tactical control when aircraft
To use the air-to-air tacan capability are being transferred between ships and shore,
between suitably equipped aircraft, and to enable overdue action to be initiated at
aircraft in adjacent areas should be al- the earliest opportunity. Details of airmove
located channels with a difference of messages are in ATP 34.
63 between channel numbers (e.g., 21
and 84, or 33 and 96). (3) Transit. In situations where radar cov-
erage of the forces does not overlap, the transit
(4) Aircraft Emergencies. The emer- is to be conducted on the transit control fre-
gency communication procedures used by the quency. Other aircraft on this frequency may be
MPA will be in accordance with the procedures used to provide communication relay facilities
contained in ACP 135 and ICAO documentation. to simplify the transfer of control of the aircraft
to the force marshaler. Attention is drawn to the
6472 (NC) HELICOPTERS significance of the establishment of two-way
communication in the transfer of operational
a. General. Helicopters may ditch with- control.
out warning and should, whenever possible, be
kept under constant surveillance by a surface unit. (4) Join/Rejoin. Due to the low altitude
Helicopters in the dip are to be considered ships of the majority of helicopter operations and the
not under command. When working at close quar- small radar-echoing area of most helicopters, it
ters, it is the responsibility of ships to avoid heli- is unlikely that positive identification/recogni-
copters. Ships should not pass within 500 yards of tion as described in Article 6417 will be
hovering helicopters, and should pass preferably achieved at ISRs in excess of 50 nm. However,
on the downwind side. To assist in passing, use the slow approach and distinctive emissions as-
should be made of the order FREEZE or JUMP, sociated with many helicopters should greatly
both of which when given to helicopters are man- assist in identification/recognition after the
helicopter has entered the ISR.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Helicopters joining or rejoining a force When a fixed-wing aircraft is required to


should obtain clearance from the AAWC or operate below 700 feet, all helicopters and
controlling unit to close within ISR. The con- fixed-wing aircraft in the area are to be
trolling unit should then order standard identifi- placed under positive control whenever
cation/recognition procedures in accordance practical. However, in many situations,
with Article 6417. placing helicopters under positive control
and fixed-wing aircraft under advisory con-
When a restrictive Emission Policy is in trol will satisfy flight safety requirements
force or when two-way radio communication without restricting visibility.
has not been established, thus precluding a pro-
cedural clearance, the OTC/AAWC should (3) Minimum altitude for fixed-wing air-
consider the adoption of some or all of the fol- craft by day when flight visibility is greater
lowing procedures: than 3 nm — 100 feet.

(a) Nominating “slot times” at the ISR (4) Unless aircraft are cooperating and are
for returning helicopters. on the same frequency, or can see each
other, the following minimum lateral or
(b) Ordering specific approach alti- vertical separation is to be arranged:
tudes and speeds for returning helicopters.
(a) In the case of a fixed-wing aircraft
(c) Ordering briefed maneuvers and a helicopter: 1,500 yards lateral or
and/or IFF identifications to be performed 300 feet vertical.
every 10 minutes while closing, until
identified. (b) In the case of two fixed-wing air-
craft: 3 miles lateral or 500 feet vertical.
The procedures adopted should be stated in
the OPTASK AAW and OPTASK AIR. (c) In the case of two helicopters: 1,500
yards lateral or 300 feet vertical.
6473 (NC) LOW-ALTITUDE RULES
(FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND (5) Fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters con-
HELICOPTERS) ducting VECTAC or MADVEC proce-
dures may overfly a helicopter in the dip or
a. Flying of Helicopters. Aircraft ap- hover position, but are to maintain a mini-
proaching a force are to assume that helicopters mum vertical separation of 200 feet.
are flying unless otherwise informed. The appro-
priate ACU is to inform aircraft on joining, of the Notes
state of helicopter flying, and subsequently of any
changes. 1. When operating with an aircraft
towing MAD, the above limitations
b. Standard Rules. Unless otherwise shall be strictly obeyed. The towed
ordered, or overriding tactical considerations dic- MAD sensor body and cable can trail as
tate, the following rules apply when fixed-wing much as 120 feet below the aircraft.
aircraft and helicopters are operating in proximity
(in the order of 10 miles): 2. When aircraft or helicopters are
dropping sonobuoys, a lateral separa-
(1) Maximum altitude for ASW helicop- tion of 1,500 yards must always be en-
ters — 400 feet. forced to ensure the safety of aircraft
operating at lower altitudes.
(2) Minimum altitude for fixed-wing air-
craft at night or when visibility is 3 nm or 3. It is imperative that a force QNH be
less — 700 feet (except for aircraft in the established by the Air Coordinator
carrier approach and landing patterns). (AC) and updated regularly to ensure
aircraft separation within the force.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

SECTION V — SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

6500 (NR) SCOPE speed, using the delayed executive method when
EMCON conditions permit, or by flashing light
This section covers aircraft operations from if radio silence is in force. Minor changes should
carriers and other ships with aircraft embarked. be promulgated as information signals as time
The types and roles of aircraft are varied. Ordinar- permits.
ily, the employment and responsibility for such
aircraft remains with the task group commander, c. Ships Operating Vertical (VTOL)
who must exercise care when positioning these and Short Takeoff and Landing (VSTOL)
ships in the task group to facilitate coordinated Aircraft. Ships operating VTOL/VSTOL aircraft
flight operations. Detailed procedures are also are not normally subject to the same constraints as
found in ATP 28 and ATP 31. those imposed on a CV operating non-VSTOL
aircraft; however, they have to turn towards the
6501 (NC) SHIP MOVEMENTS DURING wind for takeoff and landing but are unlikely to
FLIGHT OPERATIONS require high speed. Operating method B (Article
6510) is preferred because of the flexibility of
a. Right of Way. Ships engaged in the VSTOL.
launching or recovery of aircraft have the right of
way, except over the ships and formations noted in d. Positioning of Ships Operating
Chapter 2. If a ship must pass a ship that is con- Helicopters. Large ships, such as LPH or LHA,
ducting flight operations, she should pass to star- will often need considerable sea room and free-
board when the ship is on the flight operations dom of maneuver when operating helicopters.
course or to leeward when the ship is not on the They should be positioned in sectors or areas of a
flight operations course. suitable size and shape to allow them to remain
protected while operating helicopters. They can, if
b. Adjustment of Movements. When necessary, operate in the same way as a carrier.
carriers are operating aircraft, ships in the forma- Commanding officers of such ships should advise
tion other than rescue destroyers are to adjust their the OTC of the size of the sector or area required
course and speed to maintain true bearing follow- and the preferred operating method whenever
ing minor adjustments made by the carrier. Rescue helicopter operations are likely to be prolonged.
destroyers shall maintain relative bearing and dis- Escorts will also need sea room, but can maneu-
tance from the carrier. Minor adjustments are de- ver, launch, and recover helicopters more quickly
fined as alterations of course of not more than 10° than larger ships. Their requirements for helicop-
and alterations of speed of not more than 2 knots ter operations are unlikely to be a major factor in
from the promulgated flight operations course and the tactical positioning of the ships.
speed (F CORPEN). During periods of darkness
or low visibility, the carrier shall signal impending e. Landing Circuit. Ships should keep
course or speed changes to her escorts and receive clear of the path normally followed by aircraft in
an acknowledgment before altering her course or the landing circuit.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

6502 (NC) HELICOPTER IN-FLIGHT a. Sector Median. The median of each


REFUELING sector will be on the extension of the line joining
the center of the formation to the ship concerned.
HIFR employed by task force units extend
flight endurance. HIFR ships shall be prepared to b. Arc of Each Sector. The arc of each
conduct HIFR operations on 30 minutes notice. of these sectors will be calculated by dividing the
360° of arc by the number of ships involved. Thus,
6505 (NR) CARRIER OPERATIONS with two ships, each sector will cover an arc of
180°; with three ships, 120°; with four ships, 90°.
6506 (NC) DUTIES IN A TASK GROUP
c. Limits. Flying sectors extend upward
a. Ready Deck System. The OTC may and outward as far as necessary.
order one carrier to keep its landing area ready as a
spare landing field for immediate use by aircraft
from other carriers. 6510 (NC) MANEUVERING FOR FLIGHT
OPERATIONS
b. Duty Carrier System. The OTC may
divide the operating day among the carriers pres- A flight operations course and speed is used
ent with each responsible for providing CAP, for maneuvering ships operating aircraft. FLEX
tanker, ASW, Middleman/AUTOCAT, ELINT, DECK carrier operations may be required to sup-
or surveillance services for the entire force dur- port AAW tactics during periods of rising tension.
ing the period assigned. This operational requirement may adversely im-
pact battle group PIM or available sea room, as the
6507 (NC) CARRIER DISPOSITIONS carrier is required to remain on flying course for
long periods. Three methods of maneuvering ships
Typical carrier task group dispositions are for flight operations are available. Unless other-
given in Article 3211. wise ordered by the OTC, Method A is to be used.

6508 SPARE a. Method A — Maneuvering the


Whole Formation Together. This method
6509 (NC) FLYING SECTORS usually is employed for all extensive flight opera-
tions at night or in low visibility because of the
When two or more ships operating aircraft danger of operating ships independently within a
are in company, each ship is allotted a flying sec- formation under such conditions.
tor for her aircraft. Flying sectors are calculated as
follows:

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Preparations can be made when it has been deter- b. Duties of Carrier With a Convoy.
mined in advance that the aircraft are to be The carrier will normally assume the following
launched and landed under known low visibility duties:
conditions. It is also necessary that standard pro-
cedures be established for use when aircraft must (1) Aircraft Control Unit and in
operate unexpectedly in unfavorable weather. addition:
When low visibility conditions are encountered or
appear imminent, an early decision must be 1. Provide and control carrier aircraft
reached as to how airborne aircraft are to be han- within the requirements laid down by the
dled. One or more of the following procedures OTC.
may be used depending on existing conditions.
2. Coordinate the homing of land-based
1. Aircraft orbit as directed until own ship aircraft conducting joining procedures.
has steamed into an area where visually
controlled landings can be made. 3. Control aircraft in search and rescue
duties.
2. Aircraft land ashore in friendly territory
if conditions permit. (2) AAW Commander. Except for those
duties relating to the control of emissions, and the
3. Aircraft land on other appropriate ships control of EW equipment, these particular duties
which are operating in an area where visu- remain the responsibility of the OTC unless spe-
ally controlled landing can be made. cifically delegated.

4. Aircraft land ion designated appropriate c. Carrier in Situation B or C. The


ships, using a ship-controlled type of low relationship between the responsibilities of the
visibility approach. OTC of a carrier group and the OTC of a convoy
are described in Chapter 1.
5. Aircraft land on designated appropriate
ships using an aircraft-type low visibility d. Procedures for Aircraft Operating
approach. With Convoy. Detailed procedures for aircraft
joining and departing convoys are given in Sec-
6. Aircraft abandoned by ditching or bail- tion IV of this chapter.
ing out in an area designated by the OTC.
6530 (NR) CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS
6520 (NC) AIR OPERATIONS IN A
CONVOY 6531 (NC) OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS

a. Carrier in Situation A. The normal a. Strike Formations. The purpose of


station for a carrier in Situation A (Chapter 1) is strike formations is the destruction of enemy sur-
within the “box.” During flight operations, the face targets. They are comprised of:
carrier should operate in the area astern of the con-
voy, remaining within the “box” whenever possi- 1. Attack aircraft equipped with weapons
ble. Except during flight operations, the carrier, which have a high capability of destruction.
when in the “box,” is to maneuver with the con-
voy. The carrier is not to pass between ships or be- 2. Escort aircraft, including fighter air-
tween lines in a convoy formation unless ships are craft, which protect strike aircraft against
spaced 2,000 yards or more apart. enemy opposition.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
b. Sweep Formations. The purpose of destroyed. He is to fly with an escort, in the most
sweep formations is the destruction of enemy air- suitable position for observing the strike, without
craft. They are comprised of fighter aircraft and seeking combat himself, and is to report all special
support aircraft (AEW and EW). circumstances in the target area that may affect the
arming, briefing, or conduct of future strikes. The
task force commander may also designate an air-
6532 (NC) COMMAND OF AIR FORCES borne coordinator and a standby airborne
coordinator when a large-scale fighter sweep is
Figures 6-2 and 6-3 illustrate the command contemplated. The airborne coordinator’s aircraft
organization of aircraft for offensive, strike, and may require additional communication equipment.
sweep operations. See also Article 1220 for com-
mand of aircraft. b. Strike Commander. A strike com-
mander for the aircraft from each task group tak-
e. Airborne Coordinator. When a suc- ing part in a particular strike is designated by each
cession of strikes is initiated, or when several tar- task group commander. The strike commander
gets exist in one area, the task force commander is leads the strike aircraft to and from the target and
to designate an airborne coordinator and a standby is responsible for the conduct of the strike, subject
airborne coordinator. The duty of the airborne to the orders of the airborne coordinator, if pres-
coordinator is to direct all aircraft formations in ent. Each task group commander also designates a
the target area to the best advantage, thereby en- standby strike commander. The strike commander
suring that no important target is missed and that or standby strike commander is normally either
no part of the strike is wasted on targets already the attack leader or the escort leader.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 6-2. (NU) Air Strike Command

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
(1) Attack Leader. The attack leader is c. Sweep Commander. A sweep com-
designated by the task group commander and is mander for the aircraft from each task group tak-
in command of all attack aircraft from the task ing part in a particular sweep is designated by each
group. He may also be the strike commander, if task group commander. The sweep commander is
so designated by the task group commander. responsible for the conduct of the sweep subject to
Attack aircraft from each ship will be led by the orders of the airborne coordinator, if present.
their leader to report to the attack leader for the Each task group commander also designates a
strike. standby sweep commander.

(2) Escort Leader. The escort leader is 6533 (NC) OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
designated by the task group commander and is
in command of all fighter aircraft assigned to The organization for offensive carrier air
escort the attack aircraft from the task group. operations depends on may factors: the nature of
The escort leader may also be the strike com- the targets, whether surface or air, the time within
mander if he is so designated by the task group which the required results will have to be
commander. Fighter aircraft from each ship as- achieved; the constraints of the defensive organi-
signed to the escort will be led by that ship’s zation of the force; and the availability of other air-
fighter leader to report to the escort leader for craft. Offensive air operations generally fall into
the strike. two categories, strike or sweep.

a. Strike Operations.

(1) Major Strike. An action in which


there is a coordinated attack by a large number
of aircraft, often from multiple air wings. In ad-
dition to attack aircraft, other aircraft included
are fighter escort, target CAP (TARCAP), bar-
rier CAP (BARCAP), and support aircraft, all
deployed in a single formation or multiple for-
mations. A major strike is normally recovered
on a ready deck prior to launching of the next
formation.

(2) Limited Strike. An action which con-


sists of a coordinated attack, similar to a major
strike; but with a smaller number of aircraft.
This type of strike is preferred for sustained op-
erations, or when the requirement is to get a
moderate number of aircraft to the objective in
the shortest possible time (e.g., for the neutrali-
(NATO-RESTRICTED) zation of an enemy airfield over a sustained pe-
riod). Aircraft engaged in a limited strike are
Figure 6-3. (NU) Air Sweep Command normally recovered after another formation is
launched.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I
(3) Continuous Operations. An ar- c. Alert Requirements. Alert require-
rangement that permits offensive air operations ments should be included in the hard copy mes-
to be conducted over an extended period. This sage provided by the warfare commanders to the
method is used when the destruction of the ob- AREC for determining the next day’s airplan.
jective(s) can be achieved by snall formations, Changes in alert requirements will be of most im-
rather than by the concentrated firepower of mediacy, and must be rapidly communicated to
major or limited strikes. Each recovery is pre- the AREC. The OTC will resolve any conflicts in
ceded by the launching of a similar number and alert requirements and will retain alert launch
type of aircraft. authorization until specifically delegated to the
particular warfare commanders (see Tables 1-2 to
b. Sweep Operations. Sweep opera- 1-5). Even when this authorization is granted it
tions are designed to eliminate the enemy’s air ca- must be used with caution. Warfare commanders
pability and are organized in a similar fashion to should consider, and the AREC should make them
strikes. The principal difference is in the composi- aware of, major disruptions to scheduled launches
tion of the formations that are launched. The deck which may be caused by too great a frequency of
load consists primarily of fighters and escort air- alert launches.
craft selected for the specific mission. Escorts usu-
ally include AEW and EW aircraft. 6550 (NR) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

6551 (NC) SHIP CONTROL ZONE (SCZ)


6540 (NC) REQUEST FOR CV
AIRCRAFT a. General. An SCZ is an area activated
around a ship operating aircraft, which is not to be
a. Requests for CV Aircraft. Carrier- entered by other aircraft without permission.
based air assets will be requisitioned through the
AREC. That coordinator will endeavor, insofar as b. Fixed-Wing Operations. For ships
possible, to meet the several warfare command’s operating fixed-wing aircraft, a zone of 10 nm
requests, and will issue and promulgate to the radius from sea level to 5,000 feet MSL is estab-
OTC and warfare commanders the daily airplan. lished. These are nominal values and may be
In order to aid the AREC in his planning and en- changed as the situation dictates. Outside the SCZ,
sure that their own requirements are entered into there are special additional rules such as those for
this planning, each warfare commander should returning friendly aircraft. These rules will apply
provide the AREC a message request of projected out to a considerable distance, depending on
aircraft requirements for inclusion in the next weather conditions, and will be promulgated sepa-
day’s airplan. Requests should reach the AREC rately. A SCZ may be permanently activated when
about 1800 local time. The OTC should receive an continuous flying is taking place or aircraft are at
information copy. Needs will change, and these alert states.
changes should be communicated to the AREC.
c. Helicopter Operations. For ships
b. Requests for Tactical Aircraft. Re- operating helicopters, a zone of 2 nm radius from
quests for tactical aircraft embarked aboard ships sea level to 500 feet AMSL will be activated.
other than the CV (e.g., HARRIERs on board RN
CVs) will be directed to the AREC. Marine aircraft 6552 (NR) AIRCRAFT LAUNCH/
(fixed-wing and helicopters) remain under the DEPARTURE
command of the landing force commander. Re-
quests for marine aircraft by warfare commanders/ a. Fixed-Wing Aircraft. When
coordinators should be coordinated by the AREC launched from CVs, all jet and turboprop aircraft
and submitted to the Tactical Air Coordinator em- normally proceed directly to a point at least 7 miles
barked with the landing force commander. ahead of the ship at an altitude of 300 to 500 feet,
then jets fly a 10-mile arc, turboprops a 7-mile arc to

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

The OTC or AAWC may select any of the (1) Identification/recognition and self-
corridors for each day of a particular exercise or identification procedures are identical to those
operation. Corridors activated are normally prom- described in Article 6417 and 6556a except
ulgated indicating the corridor by number, the call that:
sign of the Tomcat, and its tacan channel.
(a) Aircraft must report initially at a
b. Approach Sectors. These sectors are specified tacan distance from the sector ta-
more flexible than fixed-approach corridors and can picket.
may be assigned in conjunction with tacan ap-
proach control pickets for each sector. Initial re- (b) Friendly aircraft will be desig-
porting distances from each approach control unit nated track numbers and shall be reported
will be promulgated by the OTC. The essential and plotted by all units.
difference between this system and fixed-friendly
approach corridors is that the aircraft may return (2) The use of approach sectors is particu-
from any bearing within the specified sector, the larly applicable to formations where dispersion
position of each aircraft being reported on AAW is minimized and aircraft normally return di-
nets. rectly to the force. Friendly aircraft may transit
missile engagement zones on direct return
routes when directed by the AAWC or SAAWC.

SECTION VI — AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE

6600 (NR) AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND and integrated into the flight schedule (for heli-
RESCUE copter operations, use OPTASK AIR HELO,
paragraph H1). This allows maximum aircraft us-
The measures set forth in this section cover age from all ships in company with minimum in-
the more common problems encountered and the convenience to each.
procedures used for handling aircraft in distress.
b. Lost Aircraft Control. The OTC may
6601 (NR) GENERAL PROVISIONS detail one ship as lost aircraft control to coordinate
the homing of all lost aircraft. However, any ship
a. Emergency Landing Ship. When- that has lost an aircraft should begin to identify it
ever possible, the OTC should make specific pro- and home it, and the ship should immediately no-
vision for emergency landings by designating tify lost aircraft control of the steps that are being
another appropriate ship as the emergency landing taken.
ship. This assignment should be on a rotation basis

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

c. Continuous Watch on Airborne b. Emergency IFF. An aircraft in dis-


Aircraft. Ships are to maintain a current estimate tress is to turn on its EMERGENCY IFF and set in
of the time of return of their aircraft and keep, in- Code 77 on Mode 3. In daylight operations, if the
sofar as possible, a continuous watch on their aircraft is within visual range of the ship, the use of
movements. They are to be alert for emergency EMERGENCY IFF is optional.
IFF or other indications of aircraft in distress and
are to plot and report such signals, taking further c. Pilot Voice Report. If possible, the
action as conditions indicate. pilot of an aircraft requiring an emergency landing
is to inform the ship with which he is in communi-
d. Escort Aircraft. Whenever possible, cation as to the nature of the trouble. He must state
an escort aircraft will accompany the aircraft in whether he requires an IMMEDIATE or DE-
distress back to the force; assist in the emergency FERRED emergency landing and whether or not
landing procedure as directed, or as conditions in- he can take a wave-off. The pilot is then to furnish
dicate; remain with the distressed aircraft until it such amplifying information as conditions permit
enters the landing circuit; and maintain watch un- or require.
til the emergency landing is completed.
d. Minimum Voice Transmission
e. Aircraft Not Involved to Keep During Aircraft Emergencies. Voice trans-
Clear. Whenever other aircraft become aware of mission should be clear, concise, and kept to a
an emergency landing in progress, they must keep minimum consistent with safety. Aircraft and
clear of the entire operating area concerned. ships not concerned in the emergency must keep
silent on the frequencies in use for the emergency.
f. Rescue Destroyer and Rescue He-
licopter. The duties of rescue destroyers and res- e. Use of Visual Signals. During a
cue helicopters are described in Article 6603. landing with radio failure or lost communications,
the use of appropriate visual signals is mandatory.
6602 (NR) COMMUNICATIONS DURING To expedite landings the visual signals in Tables
AIRCRAFT EMERGENCIES 6-6, 6-7, and 6-8 are to be used by NORDO air-
craft and ships involved. The same signals will be
The following provisions apply to aircraft used by NORDO aircraft which are additionally in
in distress requiring an emergency landing and to distress.
the ships involved.
f. Establishing Visual Contact. The
a. Responsibility. aircraft in distress and the ship should establish vi-
sual contact with each other as far in advance of
(1) Escort. The escort of an aircraft in the emergency landing as is practicable. When ini-
distress assists by sending or relaying radio, ra- tial visual contact is to be made with the rendez-
dar, or visual messages, using the same proce- vous destroyer or other ship, the aircraft in distress
dures as described for the aircraft in distress. should start signaling as soon as it approaches
within reasonable visual range of the ship.
(2) Ship. Ships must be alert for radio, ra-
dar, or visual indications of aircraft in distress g. MAYDAY. The international distress
and assist in relaying messages between the dis- call MAYDAY should only be used when an air-
tressed aircraft, the OTC, and the parent ship as craft is threatened by serious and imminent danger
conditions indicate. and is in need of immediate assistance.

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Table 6-9. (NC) Rescue Destroyer Stations

Station Bearing Relative to Distance from Operating Aircraft (yards) Station Limits When
Number* Flight Operations (yards) Stationed
Course
NORMAL RESCUE DESTROYER STATIONS
1 200° 1,000 to 1,500 Day/Night
2 270° 2,500 Night
2A 270° 1,500
3 330° 3,000 Night
3A 000° 2,000
SUPPLEMENTAL RESCUE DESTROYER STATIONS
1N 200° Distance (yards) = (ship speed x 100) - 300. Not less than 1,200 Day/Night
nor more than
2,500**
1SN Initial station bears Initial distance is 1,500 yards; the rescue destroyer steams Not less than 1,200 Day
325°; rescue at a speed less than signaled speed and the ship operating nor more than
destroyer slides aircraft overtakes her. During the slide-back, the rescue 2,500**
back to station destroyer maneuvers to maintain the 1,500 yard distance.
bearing 200° Time required to complete slide-back may be controlled by
using a speed of relative motion commensurate with the
estimated time required to complete the launch or recovery.
When the slide-back is completed, distance is determined
using the distance formula for station 1N.
2SNX 190° (relative to 1,500 (normally) 1,200 to 2,500 Day/Night
course of carrier)
3SNX 190° (relative to 3,000 (normally) 1,200 to 2,000 Day/Night
course of carrier) (from station 2SNX)
4SNX The rescue destroyer operates on a station which has an inner limit of 2,000 yards and an outer limit of not more
than 6 minutes from the ship. The destroyer gains the outer limit of its station upwind and drops back at such a
relative speed that the outer sownwind limit will not be exceeded, passing the ship not closer than 2,000 yards.
If the destroyer has not dropped back to the outer limit of station by the time the launch/recovery has been
completed, the destroyer turns ealier or faster to facilitate gaining the outer limit of station.
On downwind courses, the destroyer repeats the procedure in reverse (that is, sliding back from the outer limit
downwind of the ship to the outer limit upwind, passing the ship not closer than 2,000 yards).
When winds are light and variable and the ship turns toward the destroyer to hunt for the wind, the destroyer
maneuvers clear promptly.
When the ship’s sled is in use on courses out-of-the-wind, the destroyer maneuvers to clear the sled by at least
3,000 yards.
* Number and number-letter stations are not occupied simultaneously. ** OTC may specify maximum distance.

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(4) At Night. The pilot should first at-


Table 6-10. (NU) Night Rescue Stations tempt to establish visual contact. He should
(Helicopter Ship Operations) turn on all available lights and try to land about
2,000 yards ahead of a destroyer in the rear
Bearing Distance
semicircle. After landing, he should signal his
Station Relative to From position in the water if it is at all possible to do
Number Flight Helicopter so. The nearest destroyer in the screen is to pro-
Operations Ship ceed to rescue the crew without further orders.
Course (yards)
(degrees)
b. Bailing Out or Ejecting. The fol-
1H 180 1,000 lowing procedures are designed to facilitate the
rescue of personnel who must abandon aircraft by
2H 270 1,000 bailing out or ejecting.
3H 000 1,500
(1) Location. Pilots who must bail out or
4H 090 1,000 eject should try to do so in such a location that
the aircraft will crash well clear of any ship, and
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL) that they themselves will land in a location most
favorable for rescue operations, preferably near
one of the leading destroyers of the screen.
6604 (NR) DITCHING, BAILOUT, AND Modern aircrew emergency equipment contain
EJECTION an emergency transmitter beacon, sending a
signal on 243.0 MHz. A DF position should be
a. Ditching. The following procedures established to help locate the aircrew.
are designed to facilitate the safe landing and sub-
sequent rescue of the crew of an aircraft that must (2) Escort Aircraft. One or more other
ditch at sea. aircraft or part of the CAP should standby the air-
craft in distress while the crew bails out or ejects
(1) Location. The pilot should attempt to and visually locate the parachute’s water entry.
ditch in a location most favorable for rescue op-
erations. (3) Establishing Watch Over Per-
sonnel in the Water. The escort aircraft
(2) In a Rough Sea. If the sea is rough, a should establish a watch over survivors in the wa-
ship may be detailed to make a slick when time ter; the watch should be relieved on station and a
is available. The pilot of the ditching aircraft continuous watch should be maintained, insofar
should time his approach to land in the slick as practicable, until the survivors are rescued.
when it is in optimum condition for a water
landing. A destroyer (or helicopter) is to be de- (4) Marking Location of Survivors.
tailed to take up a rescue station about 1,500 Dye markers, smoke floats, and smoke lights
yards downwind of the ship making the slick. should be used to mark the position of survivors
When the landing is made, the destroyer or heli- in the water, as conditions indicate.
copter should proceed to rescue the crew with-
out further orders. 6605 (NR) DIVERSION OF SHIP TO
LOCATE SURVIVORS
(3) In an Emergency. In an emergency
or when the tactical situation does not permit When radio communications cannot be es-
the foregoing preparations to be made, aircraft tablished with a surface ship which an aircraft
forced to ditch near the fleet should try to land wishes to divert, the aircraft should first establish
about 2,000 yards on the lee bow of one of the self-identification and then indicate the location of
leading destroyers of the screen. survivors by:

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1. Circling the ship at least once at low 5. Dropping smoke flares in the direction
altitude. of the incident if possible.

2. Flying across the bow of the ship at low This procedure should be repeated until the
altitude and, at the same time, rocking the ship acknowledges by following the aircraft or by
aircraft. hoisting the international flag NOVEMBER to in-
dicate that it is unable to comply. In either case, the
3. Sending a message by visual signaling ship is to report her actions to the OTC. Crossing
or dropping a message if possible. the wake of the ship close astern at low altitude
and rocking the aircraft means that the assistance
4. Heading in the direction of the incident. of the surface ship is no longer required.

SECTION VII – SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND MEASURES TO AVOID


MUTUAL INTERFERENCE

6700 (NR) SCOPE 5. VDS/DTAS Note, CATAS ADVI-


SORY, and Surface Ship Notes.
This section details responsibilities and
procedures for the establishment and use of safety 6. SMAA functions.
zones and areas, and measures necessary to ensure
safety of friendly air, surface, and subsurface 6702 (NC) IMPLEMENTATION OF WATER
forces from mutual interference. SPACE MANAGEMENT (WSM)
PROCEDURES
6701 (NC) IMPLEMENTATION OF
PROCEDURES Normally water space is managed by NOIs,
VDS notes, SUBNOTES, etc. In a period of in-
This section contains rules and procedures creasing tension, WSM procedures may be imple-
for both peace and wartime. Wartime procedures mented at any time but should be in force shortly
will be implemented at NATO Reinforced Alert or after Simple Alert is declared.
earlier, if ordered, by a Major NATO Commander
or his designated subordinate. The transition from 6703 – 6709 SPARE
peace to wartime procedures will have an effect on:

1. SUBNOTE procedures.
6710 (NU) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2. Restricted areas.
The complexities of modern warfare neces-
3. Water space management (WSM) areas: sitate promulgation of certain basic doctrines ap-
plicable to all services and commands to prevent
(a) Submarine action areas (SAAs). or minimize mutual interference during opera-
tions. Measures to prevent or minimize mutual in-
(b) Joint action areas (JTAAs). terference are those coordinated actions required
of appropriate commanders to ensure that the op-
(c) ASW free areas (ASWFAs). erations of forces under their direction are coordi-
nated in such a manner as to prevent or minimize
4. Permanently and temporarily estab- the adverse effects of actions of any one unit upon
lished exercise areas. the operations of others.

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6711 (NU) AUTHORITY 4. Provision of adequate recognition and


identification procedures.
Basic rules for measures to avoid mutual in-
terference are prescribed on the basis of joint and 5. Timely provision of essential opera-
combined agreements. Detailed rules and proce- tional data by controlling authorities and a
dures in consonance with the basic rules are prom- similar exchange between forces where in-
ulgated in appropriate service publications and by terference may occur.
subordinate commanders as specified in Article
6712. During an emergency, and when, in the 6714 (NR) COMPROMISE
judgment of the commander involved, time does
not permit reference to higher authority, the speci- In the event of compromise of any of the
fied rules and procedures may be temporarily set provisions or measures to prevent or minimize
aside. When such action is taken, the commander mutual interference, commanders are responsible
involved must notify other appropriate command- for seeing that immediate action is taken to notify
ers, setting forth the reasons for the change. the authority establishing the particular measures
and other commanders who may need to know.
6712 (NU) RESPONSIBIITY
6715 (NR) IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION
Each commander shall ensure that such
detailed rules, procedures, plans, and methods of The proper use of the procedures prescribed
operation, as he considers necessary for dissemi- for identification/recognition is an essential fea-
nation at his level of command, are in consonance ture in avoiding mutual interference. Procedures
with those of higher echelons and are coordinated for identification/recognition are sent forth in
with parallel echelons. Moreover, dissemination AMSI 10. Friendly submarines are to steer the
shall leave no doubt as to the responsibilities that promulgated safety course while identification/
result. Commanders down to the lowest echelons recognition procedures are being carried out.
of a force are responsible for making certain that Identification/recognition procedures for friendly
adequate measures are taken to prevent or mini- aircraft are in Article 6417.
mize interference with the operations of other
friendly forces. 6716 (NR) INITIATION OF
SELF-IDENTIFICATION
6713 (NR) TYPES OF MEASURE
The responsibility for initiation of identifi-
Measures to prevent or minimize mutual cation procedures is assigned below and has uni-
interference include, but are not limited to, the versal application:
following:
1. Aircraft identify themselves to friendly
1. Assignment of nonconflicting missions surface units.
insofar as practicable.
2. Aircraft determine identity of surface
2. Designation of relative importance of units and of other aircraft before attacking.
missions where conflict of missions must
occur. 3. Aircraft and ground forces are mutually
responsible for establishing their own
3. Scheduling of tactical tasks so as to limit friendly identity.
conflict in space, time, or area.

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4. Ground forces and surface forces are (1) Advise other commanders sufficiently
mutually responsible for establishing their in advance to permit dissemination of restric-
own friendly identity, except where special tions to all personnel concerned,
instructions for harbor entrance control are
effective, or when special orders are issued (2) Specify the geographic limits and, if
for specific operations. appropriate, the altitude limits of the restricted
areas, and
5. Submarines identify themselves to
friendly surface ships and aircraft, except in (3) Provide for the timely disestablishment
submarine action areas and submarine of a restricted area as soon as conditions no
safety lanes. longer require its existence.

6. When ships of different size encounter b. Safety zones are normally used for non-
each other, it is normally the responsibility combat operations.
of the smaller ship to establish its friendly
identity to the larger ship. c. Air and surface restricted areas include:

7. Within similar types, there is a mutual (1) Controlled airspace, air corridors, and
responsibility for establishing friendly safety sectors.
identity; that is, air-air, ship-ship,
submarine-submarine, and ground-ground. (2) Shore bombardment and bomb lines.

(3) Blind bombing zones.


6720 (NR) ROUTES AND REFERENCE
POINTS 6731 (NR) CONTROLLED AIRSPACE,
AIR ROUTES/AIR CORRIDORS,
Routes and reference points are established AND SAFETY SECTORS
for the purpose of facilitating control of surface,
air, and subsurface traffic so as to reduce interfer- Controlled airspace, air routes, air corri-
ence between forces making passage in the same dors, and safety sectors are used to provide the
area. Routes and references points are established safe transit of aircraft. Inputs for coordination and
by appropriate commanders. Common routes and deconfliction of airspace requirements, of all serv-
reference points should be promulgated when nec- ices involved in an operation, are required by
essary to ensure understanding between forces op- the designated airspace control authority for
erating in adjacent areas. Information concerning the establishment and dissemination of the air-
common routes and reference points should be space control plan. Further details are found in
disseminated to forces about to enter or leave an ATP 40.
area, as well as to appropriate commands in adja-
cent areas. When no conflict with established a. Controlled Airspace. Prior coor-
routes and reference points would result, appro- dination with the appropriate authority is required
priate commanders may promulgate additional when a controlled airspace is used by tactical or
routes and reference points for the temporary use formation flights. Aircraft using a controlled air-
of their own forces. See also Chapter 2, Section I. space shall not be subject to attack by friendly sur-
face, submarine, or air forces unless positively
identified as enemy or unless they commit a hos-
6730 (NR) RESTRICTED AREAS tile act. Controlled airspace will be in accordance
with those published in appropriate flight infor-
a. Commanders establishing restricted ar- mation or ICAO publications or as promulgated
eas shall: by appropriate commanders.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

b. Air Routes and Air Corridors. rine in a moving haven established by a


Unless being identified as hostile, or committing a SUBNOTE (see Article 6734).
hostile act, ships and ground batteries are forbid-
den to fire at any aircraft in air corridors or on air c. Submarines shall normally keep clear
routes. Normally air routes/air corridors are es- of blind bombing zones; when submarines must
tablished only when a major air, or joint opera- enter such a zone, they shall be protected by a
tion is involved, and participating aircraft pass SUBNOTE. During an emergency, a submarine
near own forces. entering a blind bombing zone without prior
timely notification (normally 24 hours is required)
c. Safety Sectors. Safety sectors are must accept the risk of attack by friendly aircraft.
employed in AAW areas and are not the same as Targets that a submarine may engage should be
airways. They are covered in detail in Articles those permitted in Article 6734.
6416, 6556, and 7045.
6734 (NC) CONTROLLED WATER-
d. Identification Coordination. When SPACE, WATERSPACE MAN-
maritime units are operating within, or in the AGEMENT AREAS, AND ASW
vicinity of airspace controlled by other agencies, it WEAPON RESTRICTIONS
must be ensured that identification criteria are
coordinated between all agencies concerned, and a. Waterspace Management (WSM)/
known by all users of that particular airspace. Prevention of Mutual Interference (PMI).
Effective WSM and PMI are essential to ensure
6732 (NR) SHORE BOMBARDMENT safety of friendly submarine and surface forces. A
AND BOMB LINES clear understanding of each function is required
by all commands involved with submarine and/or
Shore bombardment and bomb lines are ASW operations. WSM and PMI are the responsi-
used in coordinated operations with ground bilities of the area SUBOPAUTH.
forces. The policy regarding establishing and us-
ing these lines shall be at the discretion of the ap- (1) Waterspace Management. WSM
propriate commanders. Tactical and forward is an essential element of the overall battle-space
(safe) bomb lines are normally prescribed by a control plan required for any maritime opera-
troop commander according to his assessment of tion. Its principal purpose is to allocate water-
the requirement for coordinating air strikes with space in terms of ASW weapons control to
his ground forces. (See ATP 30.) permit the rapid and effective engagement of
enemy submarines while preventing inadver-
6733 (NC) BLIND BOMBING ZONES tent attacks on friendly submarine and surface
forces. Essentially, WSM is a set of specifically
Blind bombing zones are used to permit air- defined submarine and ASW force operating
craft to conduct operations unimpeded by the dan- areas and attack rules. WSM procedures are
ger of attack by friendly forces. Rules governing implemented by the SUBOPAUTH on the be-
actions within blind bombing zones follow: half of the area commander. They should be in
place whenever use of ASW weapons by any
a. Aircraft may attack any target encoun- type of platform becomes probable. WSM may
tered in a blind bombing zone without inquiry as to be applied on any scale — local, regional, or
its identity, except for a submarine in a moving ha- theater-wide — depending on the crisis
ven established by a SUBNOTE (see Article situation, the existing or projected submarine
6734), or a surface ship in an area of operations threat, and requirements of the area com-
about which the aircraft have been notified (see mander. Areas are published by geographic
Article 6734). reference or grid specified by the theater
commander. Elements of WSM may be im-
b. Surface Ships shall normally keep plemented individually or in combinations to
clear of blind bombing zones; when surface ships provide measures appropriate to operations
must enter such a zone, the notice procedure in Ar- ranging from peace support to hostilities.
ticle 6734 shall apply. Surface ships may attack Figure 6-7 illustrates WSM areas and rules.
any submarine encountered, except for a subma-

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Figure 6-7. Waterspace Management Areas

(2) Prevention of Mutual Interfer- (1) ASW Free Area. An ASW free area
ence. For submarine operations, PMI proce- (ASWFA) is one in which no friendly subma-
dures are specifically intended to prevent rines are operating. There are no restrictions on
submerged collisions between: the use of ASW weapons, except when operat-
ing in the vicinity of a boundary with a SAA,
(a) Friendly submarines. JTAA, SSL, or other activated submarine oper-
ating area when the necessary ASW weapon
(b) Submarines and friendly surface compensatory allowances must be applied (see
ships’ towed bodies. Article 6761).

(c) S ubmarines and any othe r (2) Submarine Action Area. A subma-
submarine hazards (e.g., detonations, sub- rine action area (SAA) is an area that contains
mersibles, oil drilling operations, etc.). one or more friendly submarines. Only subma-
rine ASW weapons are authorized within an
Note: PMI using STOVEPIPE procedures can SAA.
be found in Article 9139.
(a) Submarines are allocated subma-
b. Definitions of Principal WSM rine patrol areas (SPAs) and moving havens
Areas. ASW attack rules apply to attacks against (MHNs) within an SAA to avoid mutual in-
all contacts classified as submarines regardless of terference between submarines. While the
whether they are surfaced or submerged. locations of SAAs are promulgated by the
SUBOPAUTH to all friendly forces in the
region, the specific locations of SPAs and

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

MHNs within SAAs are normally only pletely or partly by message. If activated, SSLs
passed to the submarines concerned and ap- are special cases of SAAs.
propriate submarine movement authorities.
c. Havens. Static havens and moving ha-
(b) Surface or air ASW attacks are vens (MHNs), which may be stationary, are estab-
prohibited in an SAA. lished to provide a measure of security to subma-
rines and surface ships in transit through areas in
(c) Surface forces should not nor- which existing attack restrictions would be inade-
mally enter an SAA. quate to prevent attack by friendly forces. Addi-
tionally, moving havens in peacetime prevent or
(3) Joint Action Area. A joint action minimize mutual interference among friendly sub-
area (JTAA) is one in which a single friendly marines or among friendly submarines and ships
submarine is operating in coordination with air- operating VDS/DTAS systems. Submarines can
craft or in associated or direct support of sur- be made available for exercises with other forces
face forces. Air and surface ASW attacks are during transit only when prior arrangements have
prohibited throughout the JTAA unless a been made. Ships operating towed acoustic de-
submarine-generated search area (SGSA) or vices under circumstances where a VDS/DTAS
NOTACK area has been established. NOTE is required should be routed in moving ha-
vens. (See Article 6780 and paragraph (4) below.)
(a) A separate JTAA is to be estab-
lished for each submarine with which coor- (1) Static Havens. Offensive opera-
d i n a ted operations are pl anne d or tions within a static haven are limited as fol-
envisaged. Note that JTAAs may be used lows:
for submarines tasked in primary roles
other than ASW; e.g., ASUW, strike war- (a) Aircraft and Surface Ships
fare, special operations, etc. shall not attack a submarine and shall not at-
tack surface ships unless they are positively
(b) Surface forces should normally identified as enemy.
not enter a JTAA unless the submarine op-
erating in the JTAA is on associated or di- (b) Submarines shall not attack
rect support of this force and provision for other submarines or surface ships unless
implementation of SGSA procedures has they are positively identified as enemy.
been made.
(2) Submarine Moving Havens
(4) ASW Area of Responsibility. The (MHNs). MHNs may be assigned by the SUBO-
ASW area of responsibility (ASW AOR) of a PAUTH to submarines to prevent or minimize the
surface force is a geographically fixed region or risk of attack between friendly submarines in war-
specified area around PIM in which the OTC, time (e.g., when a submarine is repositioning
as opposed to an area commander, exercises within an SAA occupied by other friendly subma-
ASW responsibility. Size and configuration is rines) or to prevent mutual interference in peace-
determined by the OTC based upon the nature time. Submarine MHNs are established by
of the threat and assets available to counter. Ide- BARNSTORM procedures in ATP 18 or by a sub-
ally, the ASW AOR should be an ASWFA that marine notice (SUBNOTE) promulgated in ac-
permits unrestricted use of air and surface ASW cordance with the procedure in Article 6771. The
weapons. If an SAA or JTAA waterspace is in- sides of the submarine MHN are always described
cluded in or overlaps the ASW AOR, strict in the following sequence — miles ahead, miles
compliance with ASW weapons control proce- behind, and miles on either side of the submarine’s
dures in this chapter is required. ordered position.

(5) Submarine Safety Lanes. Subma- (a) Wartime. The dimensions of


rine safety lanes (SSLs) are available as a set of MHNs will be dictated by operational require-
lanes superimposed on the grid, or geographi- ments. Unless otherwise specified, the standard
cally described, and may be activated com- wartime submarine MHN has the following

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

dimensions from the submarine’s ordered (3) Operations Within a Submarine


position: Moving Haven in Wartime. In wartime, op-
erations within a submarine MHN are limited
i. Outside the Mediterranean and as follows:
Baltic Seas: 50 miles ahead, 100 miles
behind, and 15 miles on each side. (a) Aircraft and Surface Ships.
ASW attacks are prohibited.
ii. In the Mediterranean Sea east
of longitude 05°55’W (except for the NOTE
Aegean Sea) and in the Baltic Sea en-
tered in latitude 57°45’N: 20 miles For procedures when surface forces
ahead, 40 miles behind, and 15 miles require access to an SAA or JTAA, see
on each side. paragraph e below.

iii. In the Aegean Sea: 5 miles (b) Submarines. A submarine in a


ahead, 10 miles behind, and 3 miles on MHN shall not attack another submarine
each side. unless it is positively identified as enemy.

(b) Peacetime. In peacetime, (4) Surface Ship Moving Havens. In


SUBOPAUTHs are requested to restrict wartime, surface ship moving havens are estab-
the size of the MHN to the minimum to lished by surface ship notices, which will be
meet the submarine’s operational require- promulgated in accordance with Article 6737.
ments — preferably an area 20 miles In peacetime, they will be established by a
ahead, 30 miles behind, and 5 miles on ei- VDS/DTAS NOTE in accordance with Article
ther side of the submarine’s ordered posi- 6780. A surface ship moving haven will nor-
tion. In peacetime, the shape of the MHN mally be a circle centered on the ordered posi-
may be varied to suit operational require- tion of the ship (or Guide of a group of ships).
ments, in which case the dimensions are The OCA or ship originating a surface ship
to be stated in the SUBNOTE. moving haven notice will determine the radius
of a circular haven, taking into consideration
(c) In Restricted Waters. MHNs such factors as the size of a group of ships and
should be reduced in size in restricted wa- the probable tactical maneuvers. The size of
ters, in which case the dimensions must be surface ship moving havens should be kept to
stated in the SUBNOTE. They shall be es- the minimum consistent with the foregoing re-
tablished for submarines in transit even quirements in order to minimize the area of pro-
though they are under escort. hibited attack. A surface ship is responsible for
remaining within its established haven. When
(d) Request for Change to unable to do so in wartime, the ship shall inform
SUBNOTE. A submarine is responsible the OCA concerned as soon as practicable and
for remaining within the submarine MHN designate new planned positions. In peacetime,
established by the SUBNOTE. When un- Article 6780 is to be followed. Within surface
able to do so, the submarine shall request ship moving havens, offensive operations are
a change to the SUBNOTE from the limited so that surface ships will not be attacked
SUBOPAUTH under whose operational unless positively identified as enemy or unless
control he is operating and, in peacetime, they commit a hostile act. Attacks on aircraft
with information to the SMAA. Such re- and submarines will be governed by the desig-
quests for changes to a SUBNOTE will in- nation of the surrounding zone or area. When
clude the reason therefore, and will be the movements of cartel ships, enemy hospital
assigned a precedence consistent with the ships, neutrals, etc. are known, they can best be
urgency of the situation, up to and includ- safeguarded by the dissemination of a notice of
ing IMMEDIATE if necessary. surface ship moving haven.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

d. C o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n A r e a tice that can be given, measured from the time


Allocations. of receipt and time of new requirement.

(1) Communication schedules and maxi- (a) More Than 24 Hours From
mum speeds of advance will affect the planning Receipt of Requirement. When more
and promulgation of changes in submarine area than 24 hours notice can be given, the OTC
allocations. must decide whether the aim of the mission
is best served by seeking separation or mu-
(2) The inherent difficulties in providing tual support from submarines within SAAs.
adequate information exchange with a covert He must request an ASWFA or JTAA.
submarine demand that communications be
limited and strictly scheduled. Additionally, al- (b) Less Than 24 Hours But
though a submarine may receive a message af- More Than 18 Hours From Receipt of
ter a short while after release, it would not Requirement. It is emphasized that the
normally transmit an acknowledgment for following is an emergency procedure and
OPSEC reasons. These constraints dictate that might be impossible to implement. In this
a SUBOPAUTH cannot normally assume re- case the OTC may request Operation
ceipt of a message, transmitted by broadcast to a GRASSHOPPER from the SUBOPAUTH.
submarine, for at least 12 hours after initial trans- This orders all affected submarines to move
mission. to a small preplanned part of their allocated
area. The duration of GRASSHOPPER and
(3) For both operational effectiveness and the area required must be defined. See Arti-
survivability, a submarine is restricted in speed. cle 6736 for detailed instructions for Opera-
Limitations may be imposed for sonar search tion GRASSHOPPER.
purposes, to ensure continuous communica-
tions, to conserve battery capacity, or to mini- (c) Less Than 18 Hours Notice
mize snorkel periods. A low speed of advance From Receipt of Requirement. An al-
by submarines is a sensible planning assumption. teration of the plans at this notice is not suf-
ficient for any course of action other than
(4) OTCs and MHQs should therefore give for the force to prohibit ASW attacks. It
the SUBOPAUTH the earliest possible notifi- must be emphasized that the short notice
cation of desired routes and water assignments. might be insufficient even to warn friendly
The SUBOPAUTH will acknowledge requests submarines of the transit of friendly surface
as soon as possible (normally within 4 hours of forces. Ships must be aware that they may
receipt). The acknowledgment will be either a be open to attack by a friendly submarine
WSM Allocation and Status message or a denial. and therefore must make every attempt to
make their identity known.
(5) Own mining operations are to be con-
ducted only after preliminary coordination with NOTE
the appropriate SUBOPAUTH. This is also
valid for the conduct of mine countermeasures DTAS/VDS-fitted ships that are pass-
to a limited extent as discussed in Chapter 13. ing through an SAA or JTAA must re-
trieve the DTAS/VDS system unless
e. Procedures for WSM Allocation. GRASSHOPPER is in force. If a CA-
TAS system is considered a hazard to
(1) Procedures for Use When Sur- certain classes of submarine, the
face Forces Require Access to a Sub- SUBOPAUTH will advise of any re-
marine Action Area or Joint Action Area quirement to retrieve the CATAS.
(other than one established for their use). The CATAS-fitted ships must recognize
procedure to be followed depends upon the no- the possibility of damage or loss unless
the system is retrieved.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(2) Procedures Within a Joint Action NOTE


Area. By definition, a JTAA will always contain
a single friendly submarine. Accordingly, air and A minimum of 12 hours notice must be
surface ASW attacks are prohibited throughout given to a submarine ordered to execute
a JTAA until such time as an SGSA or NO- SUB/AIR cooperation procedures.
TACK area is established by the submarine.
(5) Procedures for Submarines
(3) Procedures Within an ASW Area Within an SAA/JTAA. Submarines shall
of Interest. consider as enemy and may attack any target
encountered, subject to specific orders to the
(a) The SUBOPAUTH operating sub- contrary from higher authority and the cur-
marines within the ASW AOI may be re- rent interpretation of international law. Sub-
quested by the area or surface force marines shall not attack ships believed to be
commander to provide associated support neutral or ships encountered along a route or
to the force. If assigned, the SUBOPAUTH in an area of friendly ship operations about
must designate the submarine operating which they have been notified. No ship en-
area as an SAA or JTAA. countered under the circumstances set forth
in the preceding sentence shall be attacked
(b) To provide maximum ASWFAs unless the ship has been identified as enemy
for forces in transit, JTAA sizes for subma- beyond possibility of doubt.
rines are to be kept as small as feasible con-
sidering the requirements of submarine f. Coordination Responsibilities.
operations.
(1) The SUBOPAUTH will:
(c) If the transiting force stops to carry
out local operations, JTAAs or SAAs in the (a) Implement and promulgate SAAs,
vicinity may be modified to provide sup- JTAAs, SSLs, and widely and on a regu-
port more appropriate to stationary PIM lar basis ASWFAs on behalf of the area
operations. commander.

(4) Procedures for ASW Aircraft. (b) Order Operation GRASSHOPPER.

(a) In an ASWFA. No ASW restric- (c) Promulgate to appropriate authori-


tions apply for ASW aircraft in an ties SPAs and MHNs within SAAs.
ASWFA.There are no restrictions on the
use of ASW weapons, except when operat- (d) Liaise with other authorities over
ing in the vicinity of a boundary with a cooperation within JTAAs.
SAA, JTAA, SSL, or other activated sub-
marine operating area when the necessary (2) OTCs and MHQs can:
ASW weapon compensatory allowances
must be applied (see Article 6761). (a) Request ASWFAs or JTAAs.

(b) Over an SAA. ASW aircraft (b) Request Operation GRASSHOP-


should not normally be tasked over an SAA. PER.
If such occurs, however, aircraft ASW at-
tacks are prohibited. (c) Establish and promulgate ASW
AOIs.
(c) In a JTAA. Attacks by ASW air-
craft are prohibited until such time as a NO- (d) Seek arbitration as appropriate.
TACK area is established by the submarine.
SUB/AIR cooperation procedures in accor- g. Operations After Loss of Subma-
dance with ATP 18, Chapter 12, apply rine Command and Control. The SUBO-
when so ordered. PAUTH will ensure ASWFAs are promulgated by
regular message. In the event of loss of submarine

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

command and control, unrestricted ASW opera- (b) A denial of a request.


tions can continue in ASWFAs using the informa-
tion contained in the last promulgation message. c. Format for WSM Messages. Formats
These operations must remain outside SSLs. for WSM messages are in accordance with APP 4.

6735 (NC) PROCEDURES FOR 6736 (NC) EMERGENCY TRANSIT OF


REQUEST AND ALLOCA- SURFACE FORCES THROUGH
TION OF WSM AREAS SAAs OR JTAAs

a. Procedures. a. Operation GRASSHOPPER.

(1) Purpose. The purpose of this (1) Purpose and Aim. To allow a tran-
paragraph is to formalize the procedure to be siting surface force, at short notice, the maxi-
followed when requesting or allocating ASW- mum freedom for the use of ASW weapons by
FAs, JTAAs, and SAAs. minimizing the size of SAAs or JTAAs in the
quickest possible way.
(2) Aim. The aim is to provide a standard
method to divide water effectively between the (2) Considerations.
commands involved.
(a) This operation is to be regarded as
b. Considerations. an emergency procedure.

(1) In order to reduce message traffic, WSM (b) If a STOVEPIPE Plan is in force,
messages will initially not be addressed lower GRASSHOPPER may be requested, but
than CTF/CTG level of any ASW capable cannot be authorized unless the STOVE-
force. CTGs and subarea commanders are re- PIPE Plan can be canceled.
sponsible for further dissemination as required.
(c) The submarine’s ability to operate
(2) To ensure uniformity of WSM plots, effectively will be significantly reduced
the SUBOPAUTH will issue a serialized WSM during the execution of these procedures.
message for his area of responsibility at an in-
terval not exceeding 24 hours. If a new WSM b. Execution of Operation GRASS-
message is not issued within 24 hours, the last HOPPER.
WSM message remains effective.
(1) Description. When surface forces are
(3) If required the SUBOPAUTH will is- required to enter an SAA or JTAA at short no-
sue numbered amendments to serialized WSM tice, the SUBOPAUTH can order a submarine
messages when time does not allow waiting for to withdraw into a preplanned part of its SPA,
the next serialized WSM message. defined as a MEADOW.

(4) After a new serialized WSM message (2) Definition of a MEADOW. A


has become effective, the former serialized MEADOW is a static submarine haven that is ef-
WSM messages and amendments are automati- fective only during the period and in the area in
cally canceled. which Operation GRASSHOPPER is in effect.
MEADOWs will be defined by the Area Com-
(5) WSM requests received by the SUBO- mander when he promulgates the ASW grid.
PAUTH will be acknowledged as soon as prac-
ticable (normally within 4 hours of receipt) by NOTE
IMMEDIATE message. The acknowledgment
will be in the form of: If a submarine has been allocated
only a part of a grid area (in which
(a) An amendment to a serialized case the SAA or JTAA boundary is
WSM message, or cutting through the MEADOW), this
MEADOW is canceled.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

6750 (NC) SPECIAL SURFACE SHIP (2) Unit commanders are to ensure that
PRECAUTIONS transmitters with a power density of 100 watts
per square meter (100 W/m2) or greater at a dis-
6751 (NR) SURFACE SHIP NOTICES tance of 100 yards do not irradiate ships or air-
AND ADVISORIES craft within the 100 W/m2 radius.

Surface ship notices or advisories will only (3) Electro-Explosive Devices (EEDs) are
be required for those specific instances in which not to be exposed in a RADHAZ unsafe condi-
surface ships are required to enter blind bombing tion within a distance of 1,000 yards from other
zones or submarine patrol areas in wartime (see units.
Article 6734), or in peacetime are towing acoustic
devices under the provisions of Article 6780. (4) In the event that units are required to
breach either the 100-yard or 1,000-yard safe
distance, action is to be taken to ensure that risk
6752 (NU) RADIATION HAZARDS transmitters are controlled to ensure safety
(RADHAZ) (e.g., directed to a safe bearing, reduced in
power, or eventually switched off).
a. Ships Fitted With High-Power
Transmitting Equipment. Ships are fitted 6760 (NC) SAFETY PROCEDURES
with a large amount of high-power transmitting FOR SUBMARINES
equipment — radio communications, radar, and
sonar. High-power transmissions are a hazard to Procedures for preventing engagement of
human life because of the effects of radiation on friendly forces are of critical importance and must
the human body. They can also ignite explosive be conscientiously followed, especially within
devices and combustible material. There are also JTAAs. Air and surface units shall not conduct
certain other hazards that originate from the same ASW attacks inside a JTAA unless prior coordina-
source as the radiation hazard, such as the danger tion has been conducted with the submarine per
from rotating antennas and aural shock from the the procedures of this chapter. Likewise, subma-
use of sirens. The commanding officer of each unit rines shall employ ASW and ASUW weapons
is responsible for the safety of his own personnel with due regard for friendly surface units that may
and stores from RADHAZ produced within his be operating within or in the vicinity of the JTAA.
unit. Because of the variety of ships, aircraft, and Within a JTAA, two types of area — submarine-
equipment in NATO forces, it is not always possi- generated search area (SGSA) and NOTACK —
ble for the force commander to provide detailed are used to prevent inadvertent engagement of
regulations for the prevention of RADHAZ acci- friendly submarines. SGSA procedures allow
dents between units. It is therefore also the respon- rapid engagement of hostile submarines by other
sibility of individual commanding officers to warn ASW platforms without having to BELLRING
other units when his unit is within such a range that the friendly submarine, while NOTACK proce-
exceptionally powerful transmitters could be a dures allow direct coordination between the
hazard to personnel in the other units. If feasible, friendly submarine and an attacking ASW plat-
ships are to include details in the RADARAT or form. The two procedures complement each other
SPECINFO paragraphs of OPSTAT UNIT mes- and maximize the operational flexibility of both
sages. It is also the responsibility of each com- submarines and other ASW units.
manding officer to warn other units of stores that
are held in such a location that they could be haz- 6761 (NC) COMPENSATORY
arded by transmissions from the other units. ALLOWANCES FOR ASW
WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

b. Instructions. a. For any ASW engagement, air and sur-


face units shall apply a compensatory allowance
(1) A minimum distance apart of 100 yards which minimizes the risk of that weapon inadver-
is to be maintained between ships and between tently entering an area containing a friendly sub-
ships and aircraft. marine. Conceptually, a compensatory allowance
is a weapons danger zone with a navigation

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Figure 6-8. ASW Compensatory Allowances

safety buffer which applies to SAA, JTAA, specified period of time. While the SGSA is in ef-
activated SSL, MEADOW, NOTACK, and fect, an SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit con-
SGSA boundaries. trols employment of non-submarine ASW
weapons within the JTAA. The manner in which
b. The weapon danger zone is based on the SGSA procedures are implemented depends on
type of weapon, method of employment, run pat- whether the submarine is operating with a task
tern, and estimated acquisition range. This danger group or independently in cooperation with MPA
zone is not intended to be the maximum possible or other land-based tactical aircraft in area opera-
weapon run, but an area which will protect the tions. All message formats associated with SGSA
submarine from a properly operating weapon. establishment, cancellation, and attack authoriza-
Weapon danger parameters are derived from tion are found in APP 4, Vol. I, Chapter 3. Figure
ASW weapon employment publications, and may 6-9 illustrates SGSA attack rules.
also be specified by the ASWC.
a. Definitions.
c. Submarines shall remain clear of their
area boundaries by at least their assessed naviga- (1) SGSA Coordinating Authority/
tion error and take appropriate precautions to pre- Unit is the designated command or platform
vent its own ASW weapons from endangering that controls employment of air and surface
friendly submarines and surface units. ASW weapons within a JTAA when SGSA
procedures are in effect. It is normally a com-
d. Figure 6-8 illustrates compensatory mand or platform with whom the submarine is
allowances. conducting coordinated operations.

6762 (NC) SUBMARINE-GENERATED (a) Task Group Operations. When


SEARCH AREA (SGSA) a submarine is operating with a task group,
a specified commander is to be designated
An SGSA (code name: BULLPEN) is a sta- as the SGSA Coordinating Authority. This
tionary, geographically defined area within a authority coordinates with the submarine
JTAA in which the submarine will operate for a regarding establishment of SGSAs and,
when ASW weapon employment is required

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Figure 6-9. Submarine-Generated Search Area

by air/surface units, coordinates and autho- the submarine is free to maneuver throughout
rizes ASW engagements in the portion of the JTAA.
the JTAA that lies outside the SGSA. SGSA
Coordinating Authority responsibilities will b. SGSA Utilization. Submarines are
normally be assigned to the SOCA. When authorized to use SGSA procedures any time when
ASW weapons are to be employed and the operating in a JTAA. The submarine commanding
submarine is inside the task group’s ASW officer is the final authority in the establishment of
AOR, this should be the task group’s an SGSA. During task group operations, he will do
ASWC. If delegated, these functions shall be so, in liaison with the SGSA Coordinating Author-
performed by a responsible command in the ity, to meet task group requirements consistent with
ASWC’s chain of command, normally no submarine safety and his ability to complete as-
lower than a sector ASWC. signed tasking. In this regard, any request or direc-
tive to a submarine to establish an SGSA should
(b) Area Operations. When a sub- provide sufficient rationale such that the command-
marine not operating with a task group is ing officer understands its intentions and can assess
conducting coordinated operations with and advise the SOCA on issues that may affect sub-
MPA or other land-based aircraft, a single marine safety. The SGSA may also be used for area
on-station aircraft shall act as the SGSA deconfliction purposes other than those strictly as-
Coordinating Unit. Responsibilities are the sociated with ASW. Examples include:
same as for a task group SGSA Coordinat-
ing Authority. (1) Establishing a specified segment of a
JTAA required by a submarine for ASUW,
(2) FREEWHEEL. FREEWHEEL is the strike warfare, intelligence surveillance, spe-
code word used by an SGSA Coordinating cial operations, etc.
Authority/Unit to confirm cancellation of an
SGSA. It is sent to the submarine only after (2) Clearing a portion of a JTAA for sur-
verification that no air or surface ASW attacks face ship transit or emergent submerged inter-
or engagements are in progress or authorized in ference advisory event, aircraft emergency
the JTAA and outside an SGSA. Upon receipt, ordnance jettison, or live fire training exercises.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

c. SGSA Configuration. (c) Submarines shall specify a Stop


time for SGSA duration. The term, “Until
(1) SGSA Size and Location. Task further notice,” shall not be used in order to
group requirements, submarine search capabil- prevent confusion which could result if com-
ity, and communications reliability are the pri- munications with the SGSA Coordinating
mary factors in determining SGSA size and Authority are lost prior to JTAA expiration.
location. Creating an SGSA that is larger than
the submarine can reasonably use for the per- (d) In area operations, the SGSA expi-
formance of its mission during the given time ration time should be no later than the MPA
period may unnecessarily restrict employment off-station time (includes the period of con-
of other assets. Conversely, an SGSA that is too tinuous on-station relief aircraft). This is to
small or poorly situated may inhibit the ability preclude periods when the JTAA outside
of the submarine to carry out assigned tasks and the SGSA would not be covered by either
defeat the purpose of coordinated or coopera- submarine or MPA.
tive operations altogether.
(e) An SGSA may be canceled at any
(2) SGSA Boundary Definition. The time by the submarine or the SGSA Coordi-
SGSA is always defined by specific geographic nating Authority. Once the SGSA expires
reference: latitude and longitude, grid, circle, or or is canceled, the entire original JTAA re-
line. In addition to prescribing derivatives of verts to an area in which release of air/sur-
the standard methods, the OTC or SUBO- face launched ASW weapons is prohibited
PAUTH may establish other appropriate means unless a NOTACK area is established by
of identifying a specific SGSA; e.g., pre- the friendly submarine.
planned areas identified by number or code
name. When used, preplanned areas should d. Coordinating Authority/Unit
overlap to allow creation of sequential SGSAs. Requirements. A submarine shall coordinate
with only one on-scene task group SGSA Coor-
(3) SGSA Duration. The effective period dinating Authority or area operations SGSA Co-
for an SGSA is defined using specific Start and ordinating Unit at a time. The SGSA
Stop times. Duration should normally be equal Coordinating Authority/Unit shall maintain a
to or less than the submarine broadcast cycle plot showing the location and Start and Stop
(usually 8 to 12 hours) but greater than 2 hours. times of each SGSA and an engagement authori-
If duration is longer than the communication in- zation log listing the attacking unit, location,
terval, the submarine is not required to commu- and expiration time for use in coordinating and
nicate each cycle solely to confirm SGSA responding to attack requests.
duration.
e. SGSA Establishment. SGSAs are to
(a) When operating with a task be established with the SGSA Coordinating
group and two-way communication with Authority/Unit using the message format in APP
the SGSA Coordinating Authority has 4, Vol. I. Messages are normally sent via desig-
been established, the submarine should nated tactical circuits and may be included in rou-
obtain concurrence to the SGSA before tine submarine SITREPs. Use of SSIXS by
leaving communication depth to ensure submarines so equipped is also allowable during
that parameters conform to the force’s op- task group operations. SUBOPAUTH should im-
erational requirements. mediately relay such messages sent via SSIXS to
the SGSA Coordinating Authority by the fastest
(b) To facilitate SGSA continuity, the means possible. Once the submarine transmits an
submarine may set more than one SGSA in SGSA establishment message, it shall not leave
a single establishment message so long as the SGSA until the area either expires or is can-
only one SGSA is effective at a time. Simi- celed. This includes situations in which no ac-
larly, an SGSA Stop time may be set to knowledgment of the SGSA establishment
overlap the next tactical communications message is received.
window.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(1) Task Group Operations. A sub- marine is free to operate anywhere in the
marine operating with a task group shall estab- JTAA.
lish the SGSA with the SGSA Coordinating
Authority, who may then authorize engage- (b) If attacks have been authorized,
ments outside the SGSA (including attacks by the SGSA Coordinating Authority shall ac-
MPA operating in support of the task group.) knowledge receipt of the submarine’s mes-
sage and advise that engagements are or
(2) Area Operations. AIR/SUB coop- may be in progress outside the SGSA (spec-
eration procedures per ATP 18, Chapter 12, are ify location). When all attack authoriza-
used in coordinated area operations. An tions have been canceled, confirmation is to
on-station aircraft in the JTAA acts as the be sent to the submarine.
SGSA Coordinating Unit. Note that for area op-
erations, SGSA procedures are executed by the (2) Area Operations. In area operations,
submarine with a single on-station aircraft, the submarine shall cancel the SGSA by con-
which is to coordinate and authorize all attacks tacting the on-station MPA acting as the SGSA
outside the SGSA — its own as well as those of Coordinating Unit. Upon receipt of the cancel-
other ASW aircraft. This duty may be turned lation message, the SGSA Coordinating Unit
over to a relieving aircraft. — after confirming that no ASW attacks are be-
ing conducted in any portion of the JTAA out-
f. SGSA Cancellation by the Sub- side the SGSA — shall concur with the SGSA
marine. To terminate a SGSA, the submarine cancellation. After the SGSA is canceled, the
must send a cancellation message to the SGSA SGSA Coordinating Unit shall not release or
Coordinating Authority/Unit. The message authorize use of ASW weapons until:
should be sent via tactical communications. Use of
SSIXS is also allowable during task group opera- (a) A new NOTACK area or SGSA
tions. The SUBOPAUTH should immediately re- has been established by the friendly subma-
lay such messages sent via SSIXS to the SGSA rine, or
Coordinating Authority by the fastest means pos-
sible. The submarine shall not leave its SGSA un- (b) The contact enters an ASWFA.
til receipt of cancellation concurrence (code word
FREE-WHEEL) by the SGSA Coordinating g. Use of SLOT Buoys. At the subma-
Authority/ Unit per message format in APP 4, Vol. rine commanding officer’s discretion, an SGSA
I, or, in the absence of that concurrence, until the implementation message may be sent by SLOT
Stop time of the SGSA. buoy provided communications have previously
been established with the SGSA Coordinating
(1) Task Group Operations. When op- Authority/Unit. The message must include an en-
erating with a task group, the submarine shall coded position element that must be check de-
cancel the SGSA by contacting the SGSA Co- coded on the submarine before the buoy is
ordinating Authority. Upon receipt of a SGSA released. SGSA messages passed by SLOT buoy
cancellation message, the SGSA Coordinating need not be acknowledged until the two-way com-
Authority shall verify from the SGSA plot and munications opportunity if the SGSA is still in
attack authorization log that no attacks have force. SLOT buoys may not be used to modify or
been authorized outside the SGSA and inside cancel an existing SGSA.
the submarine’s JTAA.
h. SGSA Modification. SGSAs shall
(a) If no attacks have been authorized, not be modified. Changing an existing or pre-
the SGSA Coordinating Authority shall established SGSA requires canceling the existing
concur with SGSA cancellation. The sub- or pre-established SGSA and establishing a new
one.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

i. SGSA Cancellation by the SGSA (3) In that SGSA parameters are set or can-
Coordinating Authority. When the SGSA Co- celed by the submarine with an SGSA Coordi-
ordinating Authority desires to cancel an SGSA, nating Authority/Unit, the details of the SGSA
he must first ensure that no attacks have been geographic position may or may not be an
authorized outside the SGSA and inside the sub- aircrew pre-flight briefing item. In any event,
marine’s JTAA. Once verified, the SGSA Coordi- SGSA location and attack authorization must
nating Authority shall inform the submarine of be obtained from the SGSA Coordinating
SGSA cancellation via local communications or Authority/ Unit before any air or surface ASW
advise the SUBOPAUTH to relay the cancellation weapons are released inside a JTAA.
on the submarine broadcast.
k. Aircraft-to-Aircraft SGSA Hand-
j. SGSA Attack Rules. Attack rules as- over During Area Operations. Figure 6-10
sociated with SGSA procedures apply only within defines the rules for handing over SGSA from one
JTAAs and are not applicable to SAAs and ASW- SGSA Coordinating Unit to another during area
FAs. NOTACK area procedures always apply in- operations. It applies specifically to situations in
side an SGSA and throughout the JTAA which an on-station MPA is being relieved by an-
whenever an SGSA has not been established by other aircraft during independent AIR/SUB coop-
the submarine. Unless a NOTACK area is in ef- eration. These rules do not apply during associated
fect, the SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit or direct support submarine operations.
alone must grant permission before any air or
surface ASW engagements are conducted within
a JTAA. Units desiring to conduct an attack will re- 6763 (NC) NOTACK AREA
quest attack authorization subject to the following:
a. NOTACK Area Specified. In certain
(1) If an SGSA has not been established or circumstances, it is desirable to use other force as-
the target is inside the SGSA, the SGSA Coor- sets to prosecute contacts within the JTAA or
dinating Authority/Unit shall positively deny SGSA. Protection of the friendly submarine is
the request, provide the last known position and maintained by establishing a smaller, stationary
intentions of the submarine, and direct that a area within the JTAA or SGSA around the subma-
NOTACK area be coordinated with the subma- rine known as the NOTACK area. The protected
rine prior to ASW weapon release. submarine is the only unit authorized to release
ASW weapons within this area. Establishment of a
(2) If an SGSA has been established and NOTACK area requires a geographic or relative
the contact is within the JTAA but outside the plot lock between the submarine and another unit,
SGSA, the SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit so that navigation inaccuracies are reduced over a
shall transmit SGSA coordinates and Stop short period of time, and so that positive identifi-
time to the requesting unit and may authorize cation of a submerged contact as a non-friendly
engagement. If the coordinates along with the submarine can be established. Unless otherwise
serial number or code name of the SGSA cur- specified by the submarine, a NOTACK area has a
rently in effect have already been passed to the 10-nm radius and exists for a period of 2 hours
attacking platform, only the serial number/ (unless canceled by the submarine). Attack rules
code name and Stop time need be transmitted. for NOTACK areas within JTAAs and SGSAs are
The attacking platform, in addition to the illustrated in Figure 6-11.
SGSA Coordinating Authority, must verify that
the target is in the portion of the JTAA that is NOTE
outside the SGSA. Compensatory allowances
must be considered in determining whether an Only the submarine may establish a
attack can safely be made if the target is in the NOTACK area in its JTAA or SGSA.
vicinity of the SGSA boundary.

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 6-72 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Figure 6-10. Air-to-Air SGSA Handover During Area Operations

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 6-73 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Figure 6-11. NOTACK Area

b. Requesting a NOTACK Area. A re- unit on assigned ASW coordination frequen-


quest to establish a NOTACK area will be sig- cies. This may degrade the submarine’s ability
naled to the submarine by any means available to continue its search/prosecution of a contact it
that has been authorized by the OTC. Careful con- may hold.
sideration should be given to the method used in
order to maximize the ability of the submarine to (2) Announcing. The submarine must
remain as covert as possible. In addition to two- announce the initiation time and its position us-
way communications, other methods of transmit- ing the NOTACK message format in APP 4,
ting the request are PROBE ALERT/ATAC/ long- Vol. I.
range call up (LRCU), SUS/ESUS, and keyed sonar.
(3) Remaining in the Area. The subma-
c. Submarine Responsibility in Es- rine must remain within the NOTACK area.
tablishing a NOTACK Area. The submarine
will acknowledge a NOTACK area request by (4) Scene-of-Action Commander
either: (SAC). The submarine will be the SAC for the
water space within the NOTACK area.
(1) Establishing a NOTACK area, or
(5) Size of the NOTACK Area. Since
(2) Informing the ASW unit of own inten- NOTACK area rules preclude attacks within
tions to prosecute the contact. the NOTACK area by other than the submarine,
the submarine may elect to adjust the size of the
d. NOTACK Area Procedures. area to other than the standard 10-nm radius.

(1) Establishing a NOTACK Area. The NOTE


submarine may use two-way UHF voice or a
SLOT buoy to establish a NOTACK area. The A NOTACK area does not move. If the
former requires the submarine to come to com- submarine must compensate for in-
munication (periscope) depth and establish tended movement during NOTACK
two-way communications with the requesting area duration, a larger NOTACK area
should be specified.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(6) Changing a NOTACK Area. The NOTE


submarine may elect to change the time, loca-
tion, or dimension of a NOTACK area. This is Any element above that is missing or
accomplished by canceling the old NOTACK cannot be accomplished results in
area and establishing a new NOTACK area . automatic cancellation of the authori-
zation to attack within the JTAA and a
( 7) Ca n c e lin g th e NO TA C K request for a new NOTACK area must
AREA. The submarine may cancel a NO- be initiated.
TACK area at any time. Acknowledgment of
the cancellation by the ASW unit is required (6) Once these conditions are met, ASW
before the submarine may depart the NOTACK attacks may be conducted against targets in the
area. remainder of the JTAA or SGSA outside the
NOTACK area.
e. Aircraft Responsibility in Estab-
lishing a NOTACK Area. ASW aircraft which f. Coordinated Aircraft/Surface Unit
request a NOTACK area must: Attacks. A situation may exist in which other
ASW units are in position to launch an attack
(1) Mark-on-top the submarine or the against an enemy submarine within a submarine
SLOT buoy and establish a plot lock. Alterna- JTAA or SGSA. Thus, the attacking platform may
tively, a satellite positioning system (GPS) may be other than the one marking-on-top the subma-
be used to establish the submarine’s position as rine. In this case, the SAC is the unit conducting
described in paragraph 6763h. the plot lock with the submarine and the SAC must
ensure that the requirements above are met.
NOTE
g. NOTACK Area Message. The spe-
Plot lock may be considered estab- cific message format is for voice, but the same
lished if the aircraft’s position is posi- procedure is applicable for recorded communica-
tively confirmed to the aircraft by the tions with the appropriate modifications.
submarine, whether or not the aircraft
is able to mark-on-top. (1) If a NOTACK area message is received
via two-way voice, the aircraft should read
(2) Ensure that the time and position back for verification. If a SLOT buoy is used,
passed by the submarine equate to the check- the establishment message should be recorded
sum digit provided for each. twice using a 30-second interval to enable the
aircraft to copy without a delay. Additionally,
NOTE the SLOT buoy message must be independ-
ently copied by two separate crew members
An incorrect check-sum invalidates with an identical match of message content.
the NOTACK message and a new re-
quest to establish a NOTACK area (2) NOTACK message format and proce-
must be initiated. dures are given in APP 4.

(3) Plot and maintain the NOTACK area h. Use of Satellite Positioning Sys-
for its specified duration. tem. In lieu of establishing a relative plot
lock, a geographic plot lock (i.e., the passing of
(4) Apply compensatory allowances to a submarine’s position to the cooperating unit)
keep ASW weapons outside of the NOTACK is permissible provided both the aircraft and
area. submarine are equipped with fully functional
satellite positioning systems (e.g., GPS). Dur-
(5) Add navigational drift error for the ing NOTACK establishment, the submarine
aircraft.

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 6-75 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

shall use the brevity word “GLOBAL” to indi- 6765 (NR) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
cate that its position has been established with OF TRANSITING SUBMARINES
GPS.
The OTC of all escorted submarine moves
6764 (NC) SAFETY LANES is normally the escort commander. In the case of
unescorted moves or when the submarines part
Safety lanes are used to facilitate submarine company with the escort for any reason, the senior
and surface ship operations. Rules governing actions submarine commander present shall assume the
within activated submarine and surface ship safety duties of OTC. The commander of an area through
lanes follow. which submarines are transiting will provide rout-
ing instructions for the SUBOPAUTH.
a. Su b m a rin e Sa fe ty Lanes
(SSLs). SSLs are available as a set of lanes su- 6766 (NU) RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSIST
perimposed on a grid, or geographically de- DISABLED SUBMARINES
scribed, and may be activated wholly or in part by
message. In water-space management, activated Any friendly ship or aircraft meeting a dis-
SSLs are a special case of submarine action area abled friendly submarine is to make every effort,
(SAA) (see Article 6734). Additionally, SSLs so far as circumstances permit, to ensure the sub-
may be used in peace-time to prevent or minimize sequent safe passage of the submarine.
mutual interference among friendly submarines
and ships operating VDS/DTAS systems. Offen- 6768 — 6769 (NU) SPARE
sive operations within activated SSLs are limited
as follows: 6770 (NR) SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS
FOR SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
(1) Aircraft. ASW attacks are prohibited. IN PEACETIME

(2) Surface Ships. Procedures for use This section contains additional procedures
when surface forces require access to an SAA for promulgating NATO submarine movement in-
are described in Article 6734. ASW attacks are formation. It also provides a system that meets the
prohibited. OPERATION GRASSHOPPER or requirements for an orderly transition from peace
designation as a JTAA are not applicable to to war. The primary reason for accurate and timely
SSLs. promulgation of submarine movement informa-
tion is to prevent submerged mutual interference.
(3) Submarines. A submarine in an SSL Secondary reasons are to provide information for
shall not attack another submarine unless it is intelligence plots so that submarine contact re-
positively identified as enemy. ports may be properly evaluated and to establish
a search area in case of SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/
b. Surface Ship Safety Lanes. Offen- SUBSUNK based on the routing information
sive operations within a surface ship safety lane given in the SUBNOTE.
are limited so that surface ships will not be at-
tacked while in the lanes unless they are positively 6771 (NR) SUBMARINE MOVEMENTS
identified as enemy or unless they commit a hos-
tile act. Attacks on aircraft and submarines will be a. Authorities. Authorities who have re-
governed by the designation of the surrounding sponsibilities with regard to submarine move-
zone or area. Cartel ships, enemy hospital ships, ments are the Submarine Operating Authorities
and neutral shipping may be routed along surface (SUBOPAUTHs), Submarine Movement Advi-
ship safety lanes, but surface ship moving havens sory Authorities (SMAAs), and Submarine Exer-
are more appropriate. cise Area Coordinators (SEACs).

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 6-76 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Allied nations are responsible for inform- 6772 (NR) ACTION ON SUSPECTED
ing relevant SMAAs about those national subma- MUTUAL INTERFERENCE
rine exercise areas which have been established
permanently as agreed by the nations concerned a. Outside Established Submarine
and are under the control of SEACs. SMAAs are Exercise Areas. The SMAA will advise SUB-
responsible for monitoring submarine and VDS OPAUTHs as soon as interference is suspected.
ship movements and for informing SEACs, However, an interference situation may become
SUBOPAUTHs, and units concerned of possible evident to SUBOPAUTHs concerned as soon as
mutual interference. NATO SMAAs have no SUBNOTEs or changes thereto are promulgated,
authority to control submarine movements. The in which case they should initiate action to elimi-
procedures required below will neither infringe on nate the suspected interference situation without
national prerogatives, infringe on the freedom of waiting for a message from the SMAA. There are
the seas, nor release submarine commanders from no set parameters for determining when an inter-
their responsibilities regarding the International ference situation is deemed to exist, and the
Law of the Seas. They do place a moral obligation good judgment of the authorities involved will de-
on all Allied SUBOPAUTHs to declare accurately termine the necessary action. As a minimum, how-
their submarine operations and in sufficient time ever, interference should be considered to exist
to permit the widest promulgation to “need to when the edge of a moving haven, SPA, or tempo-
know” addressees. rary exercise area is within 10 miles of another
moving haven, SPA, or temporary exercise area.
b. SUBNOTE Procedures. Subma-
rines are routed in peace and in war by means of b. Inside Permanently Established
SUBNOTEs that must clearly and accurately de- Submarine Exercise Areas. The SEAC will
fine the route to be followed. Details are in this be best informed concerning the movements of his
section and APP 4. own submarines within an established exercise
area. On receipt of information of a submarine
c. Notice of Intention (NOI). When ex- transiting through the permanent exercise area,
ercises are being planned it may be considered ad- the SEAC is, if interference is possible, to recom-
visable to establish a temporary submarine mend avoiding action to the SUBOPAUTH in-
exercise area and/or to promulgate the intended volved, keeping the SMAA informed.
track of the submarine well in advance. This
should be done by issuing an intention message to c. Inside Temporarily Established
appropriate addressees in advance of promulgat- Submarine Exercise Areas. The commander
ing a SUBNOTE. This message should state the establishing a temporary submarine exercise area
limits of the area and the duration of its use and/or by a notice of intention (NOI) will be best informed
intended track. Details are in APP 4. concerning the movements of exercise submarines
within the area. On receipt of information of a
d. Diving Restrictions. It is assumed nonexercise submarine transiting through the tem-
that the submarine will proceed along its promul- porary exercise area, the SMAA is responsible for
gated track dived. Those portions of the route that advising the commander who established the area
must be transited surfaced are to be specified in the and the appropriate SUBOPAUTH. The com-
SUBNOTE. Should it be necessary to route the mander who established the area is to decide if in-
submarine dived through permanently established terference is likely and to recommend to the appro-
exercise areas, the provisions of Article 6772 priate SUBOPAUTH, keeping the SMAA in-
apply. formed, whether or not avoiding action is required.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

6773 (NR) OPERATIONS INHERENTLY 6774 (NC) ACTION AT TIME OF


DANGEROUS TO SUBSURFACE INCREASED TENSION
OPERATIONS
a. Wartime procedures will be imple-
a. Various peacetime operations scheduled mented at NATO Reinforced Alert or earlier if or-
by surface and air commanders are inherently dan- dered by a Major NATO Commander (MNC) or
gerous to submerged submarine passage when the his designated subordinate. Timely implementa-
whereabouts of the submarines are unknown to tion of Waterspace Management (WSM) proce-
these commanders. Such operations include: dures, which should be in force shortly after
NATO Simple Alert is declared or earlier, will fa-
(1) Streaming/deployment of VDS, cilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime
minesweeping or minehunting gear, or other procedures.
underwater devices/bodies.
b. The order will be promulgated in time of
(2) Scheduling of live air-to-surface, tension when a greater than normal number of
surface-to-surface, or antisubmarine weapon submarines of NATO nations have begun deploy-
firings. ment and when some of these submarines have
been transferred to NATO command and control.
(3) Hydrographic survey explosive ranging. In a situation in which a submarine is operating in
a stationary MHN (i.e., at speed zero), or in a dif-
b. Recipients of SUBNOTEs should fur- ferently shaped MHN that is not moving, the
ther disseminate submarine movement informa- MHN will be confined to the specified area in
tion to those authorities normally involved in which the submarine is operating at the time of
scheduling these operations in order to avoid mu- execution of the order. When the SUBNOTE in ef-
tual interference. fect has the submarine scheduled to remain in a
stationary MHN for an extended period of time, it
c. It is incumbent on surface and air com- is incumbent upon the SUBOPAUTH to issue an
manders to send a message to the appropriate amendment to the SUBNOTE which changes the
authorities informing them of their intent to sched- MHN to the standard wartime size and delineates
ule operations which may be inherently dangerous clearly how it is to be oriented. When the subma-
to submerged operations. In the case of surface rine is operating within a published local subma-
ships streaming VDS or other towed underwater rine exercise area at the time the order is to be
devices/bodies, the requirements of Article 6780 executed, the local exercise area in which the sub-
shall be followed. In the case of live weapon fir- marine is operating will become an MHN until
ings, the time and geographic area involved such time as the submarine departs the exercise
should be signaled. Commands scheduling hy- area and a normal MHN is in effect. MHNs are de-
drographic survey explosive ranging operations scribed in detail in Article 6765.
should include track information, speed of ad-
vance, times for explosive ranging, and size and c. The order will contain a time of execu-
detonation depth of charges to be used. tion and will be promulgated well in advance so
that authorities and submarines can take appropri-
d. Operations inherently dangerous to sub- ate action at the same time. Normally a new SUB-
merged submarines are frequently undertaken by NOTE should be issued to reflect the change in
civil authorities. These operations require sepa- area and to reflect the different addressees.
rate consideration by authorities with responsibil-
ity for submarine safety. d. BARNSTORM procedures in ATP 18
are the preferred means of promulgating spe-
e. Area commanders and national authorities cific submarine area assignments, once WSM
should issue DANGER AREA NOTICES in ac- procedures are in force.
cordance with APP 4 when they intend to conduct
operations hazardous to submarines.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

6780 (NC) PREVENTION OF MUTUAL (a) The VDS/DTAS NOTE described


INTERFERENCE BETWEEN below is required for safety whenever a
SUBMERGED SUBMARINES AND VDS/DTAS device is to be streamed to a
SURFACE SHIPS WITH TOWED depth greater than 30 meters (98 feet). A
ACOUSTIC DEVICES STREAMED VDS/DTAS NOTE is also required for op-
erations at 30 meters (98 feet) or less when:
a. Safety measures prescribed below shall
be enforced to prevent mutual interference be- i. The water depth is less than 375
tween submerged submarines and surface ships meters (1,200 feet).
with VDS, depressed towed array system
(DTAS), and critical angle towed array system ii. Operation within 40 nautical
(CATAS) devices streamed when operating in miles of the Norwegian Coast.
nonexercise situations in peacetime. This coordi-
nation is required to enhance safety, surveillance iii. Operation in the Aegean Sea
coverage, and avoid conflicts of interest, but is not north of Crete.
intended to prejudice national prerogatives or in-
hibit freedom of the seas. iv. Operation in the French na-
tional exercise areas.
NOTE
(b) The required VDS/DTAS NOTE
Towed torpedo decoys are excluded is to be sent to the appropriate SMAA, using
from these requirements. the message format in APP 4, at least 48
hours before commencing the operation.
(1) Submarine commanding officers must Upon receipt of the VDS/DTAS NOTE, the
assume that all ships which are operating sonar SMAA is to send a message to the origina-
have streamed a towed acoustic device unless tor of the VDS/DTAS NOTE confirming
positively known otherwise and that ships do that there is no safety hazard. If a risk of col-
not know the submarine’s position. A subma- lision between the VDAS/DTAS and a sub-
rine hearing sonar transmissions or other sig- marine is apparent, the SMAA will advise
nals is to remain clear, keeping in mind that the those concerned and request that appropri-
subject unit may be trailing an acoustic device ate action be taken to eliminate the hazard.
up to 4,000 yards astern. A surface ship with VDS and DTAS are not to be streamed until
contact on a friendly submarine must keep his the ship is in receipt of the SMAA confir-
ship and towed array clear of the submarine. mation message, except as noted in para-
graph (5).
(2) VDS may be employed in the active or
passive mode. No active sonar transmissions or (c) Once the confirmation message is
other signals are required, provided the response received, the ship may employ VDS/DTAS
to the VDS/DTAS NOTE has been received in the active or passive mode and no active
from the SMAA. If the towing ship departs the sonar transmission or other warning signals
MHN and the transducer cannot be recovered, are required. If the towing ship departs
the towing ship is to provide a warning signal on MHN and the system cannot be recovered,
some other acoustic device, such as hull- the towing ship is to provide a warning sig-
mounted sonar or underwater telephone. nal on sonar or underwater telephone, as de-
scribed in AXP 1, unless otherwise
(3) VDS/DTAS Safety Precautions. specified by the SMAA.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(4) A ship planning to stream a CATAS at PAUTHs, investigation forces should employ
depths greater than 30 meters (98 feet) is to all acoustic devices in a manner to exploit their
send a CATAS ADVISORY, using the mes- maximum capability for contact investigation.
sage format in APP 4, to the appropriate SMAA When a contact has been classified as “a NATO
at least 48 hours before commencement of the or known friendly” submarine, unless other-
operation. Upon the receipt of the CATAS AD- wise instructed, the ship is to break contact.
VISORY, the SMAA is to send a reply to the
originator of the CATAS ADVISORY ac- (6) Wartime Procedures.
knowledging receipt. In the acknowledgment,
the SMAA may include advice on other units (a) VDS/DTAS NOTES and CATAS
conducting surveillance in the area or advice on ADVISORIES are not required provided
best placement of the sensor for minimizing wartime procedures have been imple-
mutual interference and avoiding duplication mented and Waterspace Management
of effort. Upon receipt of the acknowledgment, (WSM) procedures are in force. (See Arti-
and after considering the SMAA’s advice, the cles 6734 through 6736 and 6774.)
ship may stream its CATAS as stated in the CA-
TAS ADVISORY. If the towing ship departs (b) The use of VDS/DTAS or CATAS
the CATAS ADVISORY area and the system systems is unrestricted in ASWFAs.
cannot be recovered, the towing ship is to pro-
vide warning on sonar or underwater telephone, (c) Surface ships passing through an
as described in the Sonar Signal Code Table of SAA or JTAA (other than one established
AXP 1, at least once every 5 minutes unless oth- for their use) must retrieve their VDS/
erwise specified by the SMAA. DTAS systems unless GRASSHOPPER is
in force. If a CATAS system is considered a
(5) Urgent Contact Investigation. hazard to certain classes of submarine, the
When a ship is required to conduct an urgent in- SUBOPAUTH will advise of any require-
vestigation and time does not permit comple- ment to retrieve CATAS. CATAS-fitted
tion of the procedures in paragraphs (3) and (4) ships must recognize the possibility of dam-
above, VDS/DTAS or CATAS may be used but age or loss unless the system is retrieved.
a VDS/DTAS NOTE or CATAS ADVISORY
should be dispatched by IMMEDIATE prece- (d) The restrictions in subparagraph
dence message. The initial submarine contact (c) above also apply to surface ships in a
report to national or NATO authorities must JTAA established for their use, unless
contain a statement that VDS/DTAS or clearance has been received from the
CATAS is being employed. During investiga- SUBOP-AUTH. The use of VDS/DTAS or
tion of unclassified contacts, ships streaming CATAS systems and any restrictions that
towed acoustic devices should not deliberately may apply should be negotiated between
close the contact within 4,000 yards. When a the surface force commander and the
contact has been classified as “not a NATO or known SUBOPAUTH when a JTAA is established.
friendly” submarine by the appropriate SUBO-

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

7022 (NC) COMBAT AIR PATROL unit knows the time, location, and altitude at
MANAGEMENT which the parent carrier wishes the aircraft to be
returned to her control for recovery.
a. General. CAP aircraft can be either
land based or carrier based. Instructions in this (7) Units controlling another carrier’s air-
article on the use of CAP aircraft are applicable craft are to pass aircraft status reports to the par-
generally, but details given in this article concern ent carrier as soon as they are received from
carrier-based CAP aircraft only. For details con- CAP aircraft. CAP aircraft must pass this infor-
cerning land-based CAP aircraft, see ATP 34. mation immediately on gaining contact with
CAP missions can be more precisely identified the controlling unit.
when one of the following modifiers is used before
the CAP: force CAP (FORCECAP), barrier CAP c. CAP Aircraft Stations. CAP aircraft
(BARCAP), target CAP (TARCAP), rescue CAP should be stationed to engage enemy bombers
(RESCAP), and surveillance CAP (SUCAP). prior to their anticipated weapons release point
CAP aircraft employed in the AAW role are nor- and as listed in ATP 31.
mally referred to as force CAP (FORCECAP).
(1) CAP aircraft may be stationed by the
b. Air Resource Element Coordina- OTC or AAWC at the following altitude bands:
tor (AREC)/CAP Instructions. The following
points are to be considered with respect to CAP (a) High (HICAP) — above 25,000 feet.
aircraft during AAW operations:
(b) Medium (MEDIUMCAP) —
(1) The OTC or AAWC will direct the between 5,000 and 25,000 feet.
AREC to maintain an alert posture and fill as-
signed CAP stations. CAP aircraft will relieve (c) Low (LOWCAP) — between 500
on station or within a specified distance of and 5,000 feet.
station.
(2) Distance of CAP stations from the main
(2) The AREC must keep the OTC or body may vary from overhead to 200 nm. Any
AAWC informed of the ability to maintain alert combination of altitudes and distance is possi-
posture. Weather, maintenance, or deck respot- ble. However:
ting operations may degrade alert posture.
(a) The radial size of sector covered
(3) Alert CAP aircraft will be launched on by a fighter decreases as its distance from
assigned control frequencies to expedite sta- the main body increases.
tioning and/or intercept of assigned raids.
(b) Stationing at long range reduces
(4) CAP aircraft proceed to and return from overall fighter availability due to loss of
assigned stations within safety sectors or on return time in transit and short time on station.
to force (RTF) or minimum risk route (MRR)
profiles. Positive control must be maintained to (c) When employing modern fighters
avoid engagements by friendly units, especially that have a high rate of climb, low and close
when the safety sector is near or traverses mis- CAP stations should generally be preferred,
sile engagement zones or missile arcs. Provi- especially when the direction of the threat
sion should be made for deviation to expedite cannot be determined.
stationing and facilitate prompt intercept action.
d. Procedures. The following proce-
(5) EMCON permitting, carriers will track dures are used to control CAP aircraft:
CAP aircraft operating within their radar cover-
age but controlled by other ships, so that they (1) CAP voice call signs will be used as
can take over control if necessary. follows:

(6) Parent carriers of CAP aircraft controlled (a) On CAP control nets, use the
by other units are to ensure that the controlling squadron call plus a three-number suffix.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(b) On AAW nets, use the word STA- CWC/AAWC. VL should always be de-
TION, followed by the station number. fined as a geographic point (latitude and
longitude). However, a surface tacan can
(c) Airborne CAP aircraft steering, or also be positioned at VL as a navigation aid
whose relief has been launched, will be re- for non-INS equipped aircraft. If VL is de-
ported as STEERED plus station number. fined only by a tacan, long-range CAP may
The launched relief will assume the station have difficulties maintaining station due to
call. intermittent tacan reception. The grid is ori-
ented to magnetic north with distance from
(d) CAP aircraft in alert will be given VL made by letter notation. Fifty (50) nm
stations by the OTC or AAWC, whether or from VL is designated ALFA, 100 nm from
not there is any immediate prospect of VL is BRAVO, etc. The bearing is desig-
launching. Call signs are to be based on nated by a number from 01 through 36
these stations using the procedure in sub- representing a bearing in degrees mag-
paragraph (b). netic. The bearing 010 is designated 01, 110
is 11, 260 is 26, etc. With this as a basis,
(2) The OTC or AAWC may delegate con- any CAP station can be readily identified
trol of CAP stations to an AAW air control unit by a number and a letter. For example, CAP
(AAWACU). This designation is passed on the station 010 at 250 nm from VL is desig-
AAW coordination net. nated station “ONE ECHO.” This grid ref-
erence system provides a simple means of
(3) CAP stations will be assigned using the position both for friendly aircraft and en-
following systems: emy targets.

(a) ZZ Method. (4) Units controlling CAP aircraft are to re-


port to the OTC or AAWC the following infor-
i. Station number. mation on intercepts:

ii. Bearing of the station. (a) Immediately, when initiating an


interception.
iii. Distance in nautical miles from
ZZ. (b) Progress of interception.

iv. Minimum altitude in hundreds (c) If, for some reason, it appears
of feet (or using the words HIGH, ME- doubtful that the interception can be suc-
DIUM, or LOW). cessfully completed within the fighter en-
gagement zone (FEZ).
v. Control channel numbers
(primary/alternate). (d) Immediately, if the interception
fails.
For example, CAP station 2 is to be in a
position that is 060 degrees true, 50 nautical 7023 (NC) ELECTRONIC WARFARE
miles distant from ZZ, and at an altitude of AIRCRAFT
over 25,000 feet. The primary control fre-
quency is channel 12 and channel 8 is the al- Electronic warfare aircraft can be either
ternate. This station would be passed as: land based, carrier based, or ship based. The
STATION 2 — 060ZZ50 — 250 — 12/8. primary function of these aircraft is to provide
electronic warfare support measures (ESM) and
(b) VL Method. In order to simplify electronic countermeasures (ECM) support to
AAW reporting, a standard grid origin has the force, as defined in Article 5101. Coordination
been adopted. The center point of the grid of the EW capabilities of these aircraft is normally
(VL) is a reference point specified by the exercised by the OTC through the Electronic War-
fare Coordinator (EWC).

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

c. Promulgation. The method of coordi- (2) Any change in status of a MEZ is prom-
nation is normally promulgated by the OPTASK ulgated to aircraft and friendly units by the
AAW. An operation order may, in addition, spec- AAWC using the appropriate code words from
ify jammer frequency restrictions and the circum- APP 7.
stances under which the method of weapon
coordination is automatically changed. It is the re- b. Silent SAM MEZ. When covert, long-
sponsibility of the AAWC to ensure that forces in- or medium-range, SAM-equipped ships are sta-
volved are aware of the method of coordination in tioned upthreat, a Silent SAM MEZ may be estab-
use. Procedural messages enable the AAWC to es- lished; this has significant differences from the
tablish, change, or give warning of a change of MEZ described above. The key factors for ships
method, as in the following examples: operating a Silent SAM MEZ are:

(1) Establish — “(Method) coordination (1) Ships remain covert, receiving the air
is in force.” picture via data links.

(2) Change — “Cancel (method) coordi- (2) Ships’ weapon control status is auto-
nation — assume (method) coordination.” matically WEAPONS FREE.

(3) Warning — “At (time) — cancel (3) The OPTASK AAW will contain de-
(method) coordination — (method) coordina- tails of MEZ size, position, and timing.
tion will be assumed.”
(4) No safety sectors are established in a
d. Local Coordination. Local coordina- Silent SAM MEZ.
tion only applies to the employment of self-
defense SAMs, ECM, and guns; it is not an al- (5) No friendly aircraft are allowed in the
ternative to area or zone coordination. The Silent SAM MEZ, except for AEW, ASW, and
LAAWC will compile and promulgate the local ASUW aircraft that are required to operate in
air picture to specifically enable ships to identify the Silent SAM MEZ, providing the following
friendly aircraft and prevent their engagements by criteria are met:
friendly units. No further attempt to coordinate
weapons employment is normally made, and tar- (a) SAM ships must be alerted to the
get engagement messages for self-defense weap- mission, the aircraft must be continuously
ons systems are not required. tracked, and their position transmitted on
data link.

(b) Gridlock between the data-link re-


7042 (NC) MISSILE ENGAGEMENT porting unit and SAM ship is excellent.
ZONE (MEZ)
7043 (NC) CROSSOVER ZONE
a. Standard SAM MEZ. A MEZ will be
established around a SAM ship. Under weapon A crossover zone normally extends 15 nm
control status WEAPONS FREE, the ship is auto- beyond the MEZ, but the width may be varied by
matically cleared to fire at any target penetrating the AAWC and is usually based on the speed of the
the MEZ, unless known to be friendly or unless assumed threat. When a controller anticipates that
otherwise directed by the AAWC. Special fea- an infringement of a crossover zone may occur, he
tures are: is to request a countdown. The fighter is to give a
commentary on the interception, indicating when
(1) Friendly aircraft must not penetrate the it expects to complete. The controller will instruct
MEZ unless positive clearance has been ob- the fighter to break off if necessary, so that the tar-
tained from the AAWC or LAAWC. get can be engaged by another weapon.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

7044 (NC) FIGHTER ENGAGEMENT 7050 (NR) SPECIAL ANTIAIR WARFARE


ZONE REPORTS

Fighters have freedom of action within a 7051 (NC) TYPES OF REPORT


FEZ to identify and engage air targets in accor-
dance with ROEs in force. If the AAWC wishes to There are four types of AAW reports:
engage a particular target in the FEZ with a long-
range SAM, he is to issue an engagement order as- (1) Air raid reports (see Article 6323).
signing the target to a SAM system, ensuring that
the fighter controlling agency is so advised. When (2) Target engagement messages (TEMs).
this order has been issued, a missile arc is auto-
matically established. (3) Missile state reports.

7045 (NC) SAFETY SECTOR (4) Ammunition state reports.

A safety sector is defined by the AAWC 7052 (NC) TARGET ENGAGEMENT


and, when required, coordinated with the respon- MESSAGES
sible ACA, in terms of origin, range, center bear-
ing, width, height band, time, and controlling TEMs are used between AAW units to re-
agency. If more than one safety sector is estab- port on the progress of the air battle, but are not re-
lished, they should be numbered and designated. quired for self-defense weapons. The various
Safety sectors are normally dormant and are acti- types of TEMs are given in APP 1.
vated by the AAWC.
a. Weapons Assignment Report.
7046 (NC) WATCH ZONES This report should be made to the AAWC as soon
as possible after the target has been detected, pref-
When required, watch zones will be as- erably as part of the initial report. A change in as-
signed to ships by the AAWC. Assignment of a signment must also be reported. The proword
watch zone does not imply that the unit should not TAKING indicates that an assignment has been
engage a target outside the sector, but that priority made. For example:
must be given to surveillance and engagement
within it. “This is (call sign) TAKING HOSTILE
1234 with STATION 2.”
7047 (NC) POSITIVE ECM CONTROL
b. HOSTILE (Track Number) BIRD
When the necessity for concealing the pres- TARGET. Used by the AAWC to designate a tar-
ence of the force to the enemy is overriding, the get to be engaged by missiles.
OTC will order positive control over ECM. Ships
will wait for a specific order from the OTC, c. HOSTILE (Track Number) CAP
AAWC, or SAAWC to employ ECM. This method TARGET. Used by the AAWC to indicate that a
applies only to area defense ECM and not to self- target is a primary target for CAP (CAP voice call
defense. See also Chapter 5. may be specified).

7048 (NC) MISSILE ARC d. BIRDS AFFIRM HOSTILE (Track


Number). Used by missile ships to indicate that
This is established automatically when an missile radars are locked on to a particular target
engagement order has been issued assigning a tar- and that the target will pass within missile inter-
get in the FEZ to a SAM system. Unless otherwise cept range.
ordered by the AAWC, the missile arc is 10° wide,
centered on the bearing of the target, and extends e. BIRDS AWAY HOSTILE (Track
to the maximum range of the SAM. Number). Used by missile ships to indicate that
missiles have been fired.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

f. BIRDS NEGAT HOSTILE (Track “This is (call sign) STATION 2 SCRAM-


Number). Used by missile ships to indicate that it MING NORTH.”
is not possible to fire at a designated target (i.e.,
missile directors not locked on, or engaged on l. COVER. An order from the AAWC to a
other targets, or targets did not come within mis- SAM-equipped ship to initiate an engagement on
sile range). a specified track up to the point of firing. This pro-
cedure permits a track to be designated to more
g. ROMAN CANDLE (Coordinates). than one firing unit without multiple engagement
A warning transmitted over all voice reporting of the track.
nets and aircraft guard circuits that a nuclear mis-
sile is about to be exploded in the area indicated. 7053 (NC) MISSILE STATE REPORTS

h. CANYON AFFIRM (Track Num- To inform the OTC and AAWC of SAMs
ber). Used by a ship fitted with a jammer to indi- available, missile states are reported by means of
cate that designated target is being jammed. SUGAR reports, which are passed, without re-
quest, to the OTC and AAWC whenever the mis-
i. HOSTILE (Track Number) sile availability status of any one type of missile is
SPLASHED. Used to indicate that the raid des- reduced by 25 percent of the total missiles carried.
ignated is believed to be destroyed. The OTC and AAWC may also ask for current
SUGAR states, by category or specific type, de-
j. HEADS UP HOSTILE (Track Num- pending upon the requirement. The letters pro-
ber). Used to indicate that action by reporting unit vided in Table 7-1 are to be used.
against target in question has ceased for one of the
following reasons: 7054 (NC) AMMUNITION STATE
REPORTS
(1) When a previously reported engage-
ment has been broken off prematurely (e.g., af- Ammunition states are reported by means
ter shifting to a more threatening target). of CANDY reports, which are passed, without re-
quest, to the OTC and AAWC whenever the am-
(2) If the interception is found to be munition or chaff is reduced by 50 percent of the
impossible. total ammunition carried. The OTC and AAWC
may also ask for current CANDY states. The fol-
(3) At the end of an inconclusive lowing letters are to be used:
engagement.
A 15.2 cm
(4) When a SPLASHED message is shown B 5 in/38
to be untrue. C 5 in/54
k. SALVO HOSTILE (Track Number). D 12 cm
Means “about to engage with Birds,” and is used E 4.5 in
by a SAM ship when it is threatened by a target F 100 mm
that is already being taken by a fighter and the ship G 3 in/50
intends to engage the target with missiles. When
this occurs, it is the responsibility of the ship about H 3 in/70
to open fire to warn the unit controlling the fighter: I 76 mm
J 57 mm
“This is (call sign) SALVO HOSTILE K 40 mm
(TRACK NUMBER) COUNTDOWN
SIXTY NOW (engaging in 60 seconds).” L 30 mm
M 25 mm
The fighter is to be hauled off in ample time N Chaff for confusion
to clear the missile shot and the controller is to P Chaff for distraction
pass the fighter’s disengagement direction:
Q Chaff for seduction

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 7-1. (NU) SAM State Reports

RANGE CATEGORY TYPE DESCRIPTION EXAMPLES


LETTER LETTER
LONG X A Standard - 2 - Extended Range 1. The OTC, requiring the
numbers of long- and
B medium- range missiles
C left in the force, signals:
D (Call Sign) THIS IS (Call
Sign) INTERROGATIVE
E SUGAR XRAY YANKEE
OVER.
MEDIUM Y F Terrier HTR A particular ship, with 16
G Terrier BT Standard - 2 - Extended-
Range and 20 Standard - 2
H Terrier BTN - Medium-Range missiles,
signals the OTC:
I Tartar
J Standard - 2 - Medium Range (Call Sign) THIS IS (Call
Sign) SUGAR REPORT
K Standard - 1 - Extended Range ALFA ONE SIX TACK
JULIET TWO ZERO
L Standard - 1 - Medium Range OVER.
M Standard ARM
2. The AAWC, requiring a
N Sea Dart particular ship to report
Masurca the number of Sea Dart
O missiles remaining,
P Sea Slug 2 signals:
Q (Call Sign) THIS IS (Call
R Sign) INTERROGATIVE
SUGAR NOVEMBER
OVER.
SHORT Z S Point Defense Missiles The ship, with 14 Sea Dart
T missiles remaining, replies:
(Call Sign) THIS IS (Call
Sign) SUGAR REPORT
NOVEMBER ONE FOUR
OVER.
NOTE: Blanks provided are for the OTC’s use for additional missiles if desired.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

For example, a unit that has 48 percent of its (1) Completion of the launch and call signs
100 mm AA ammunition remaining would report: of the aircraft.
“(OTC) this is (call sign) CANDY report — F48
over.” (2) Changes in alert states of CAP aircraft.

For ASSM state reports, see Chapter 8. (3) When CAP aircraft are steered for
recovery.
7055 (NC) AIRCRAFT OPERATING
REPORTS (4) When recovery is completed.

The carrier or AAWACU is to make reports (5) When CAP aircraft are on station at al-
of the following to the OTC or AAWC on the ap- titude and under positive control.
propriate tactical net:
(6) Progress of intercept.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

CHAPTER 8

Antisurface Warfare
SECTION I — GENERAL

8100 (NR) GENERAL and air forces in order to deny the enemy effective
use of his surface forces.
a. This chapter contains tactical and proce-
dural instructions for ships (including subma- b. Antisurface operations by surface ships
rines) and aircraft when operating against enemy and submarines include all actions to combat en-
surface forces. Its purpose is to: emy surface forces. In the case of an offensive an-
tisurface action, a SAG will be formed. A SAG
(1) Specify tactics and procedures in anti- may be comprised of surface ships and/or subma-
surface operations. rines. If the action is of a defensive nature, the
OTC may either detach a SAG to counter the sur-
(2) Enable commanders to issue orders and face threat, maintain the integrity of the force, or
instructions to fulfill their responsibilities. avoid any action by altering course with the whole
force, depending upon the significance of the sur-
(3) Enable subordinates to understand and face threat as compared to the air and subsurface
comply with orders and instructions received. threats.

b. Background information on antisurface c. Forces Employed. Antisurface op-


warfare is contained in ATP 31. erations may be carried out by:

8101 (NC) COMMAND IN ANTISURFACE (1) Ships.


WARFARE
(2) Fast patrol boats.
The OTC’s functions in surface warfare, in-
cluding those that may be delegated to the antisur- (3) Fixed-wing aircraft.
face warfare commander (ASUWC), are
summarized in Table 1-3. (4) Helicopters.

8102 (NC) FORCE TRACK COOR- (5) Submarines.


DINATOR (FTC) SURFACE
AND SUBSURFACE (6) Coastal batteries (tactics and proce-
dures are a national responsibility).
The OTC may delegate surface and subsurface
surveillance to one of the warfare commanders. They (7) Mining (see ATP 6).
in turn can assign a FTC. In principle the designated
force track coordinator surface and subsurface per- NOTE
forms the tasks as described in Chapter 6, Article 6314.
Submarine operations are not dealt
8103 (NR) CONCEPT OF ANTISURFACE with in this chapter. Safety precautions
WARFARE to be observed when cooperating with
submarines are prescribed in Chapters
a. Antisurface warfare must make full use of 6 and 9 and details of submarine opera-
the offensive potential of own surface, submarine, tions are set forth in ATP 18.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

d. Coordinated Operations. Antisur- (a) Assuming the optimum force of-


face operations may be carried out by a combina- fensive and defensive posture.
tion of any of the single types of forces listed in
paragraph c, in order to exploit the different ad- (b) The decision to join the enemy in
vantages of their sensor, weapon, and command battle.
capabilities. The most important combinations in
coordinated operations are dealt with in this chap- (c) Selection and localization of par-
ter. The cooperation of those combinations not de- ticular enemy units as prime targets.
scribed must be arranged for ad hoc using the
procedural principles of this chapter. (d) Decision to request area com-
manders’ assets or to use force assets.
8104 (NR) SURFACE POLICY
(e) Decision on the use of submarines
a. Surface Threat. Whenever a surface for detection, identification, and possible at-
threat is deemed to exist, the OTC should promul- tack utilizing either torpedoes or ASSMs.
gate a policy for surface action. An early and com-
prehensive statement of intentions in an Operation (f) Decision on the use of air attack
Order/OPGEN/OPTASK will reduce the require- units and/or employment of ASSMs to pro-
ment for messages, unless the situation changes. vide defense in depth.

b. Surface Policy. The Surface Policy (g) Obtaining accurate target data for
can be stated in broad terms only, or specified in possible engagement.
detail as required. Table 8-1 contains a checkoff
list, based on the phases of surface action outlined (3) Phase 3 — Long-Range Engage-
in Article 8105. They may be used to prepare or- ment.
ders and to update and execute them.
(a) Consideration of detaching air
c. Success of Surface Action. The assets or submarines for long-range attacks.
success of surface action depends on a thorough
understanding of the Surface Policy, a good initial (b) Detachment as necessary of long-
plan, and the initiative of commanding officers. range ASSM units in SAGs with supporting
submarines as appropriate or single units for
8105 (NC) SURFACE ACTION long-range engagements.

a. Phases of Surface Action. Surface (c) Conducting long-range attacks.


action can be broadly stated as taking place in the
following phases. (d) Post-combat.

(1) Phase 1 — Preparation. (4) Phase 4 — Short-Range Engage-


ment.
(a) Events leading to the detection, lo-
calization, identification, and recognition of (a) Detachment of SAGs with short-
the enemy. range missiles, guns, and torpedoes.

(b) A review of the situation against (b) Conducting attacks.


the established policy, planning, and task-
ing. (c) Post-combat.

(2) Phase 2 — Detection, Localiza- 8106 — 8109 SPARE


tion, Identification, Recognition, and
Target Assignment.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(2) The conflicting use of SAM systems for f. Pre-action fire control settings. It is vital
AAW on the one hand and for SAM in the that these are obtained as early in the action as pos-
surface-to-surface (SASS) mode on the other sible. Thus, initial settings on fire control equip-
must be carefully weighed by the OTC. Systems ment must be accurate. However, fire control is
with more than one tracker can maintain both, al- vulnerable to jamming and therefore calibration
though with reduced capabilities. However, most involving fire control radar transmissions may be
medium- and long-range SAM systems have suf- inadvisable and should only be carried out on in-
ficient surface-to-surface capability to favora- struction from the SAG commander.
bly influence the outcome of the surface action.
g. Fire distribution.
8202 (NC) SURFACE ACTION GROUP
POLICY (1) Normal fire distribution. Normal fire
distribution entails the engagement of opposite
In defense of the main body, the primary con- numbers of the enemy force and should as far as
cern must be to remain between the enemy and the possible leave no enemy ship unengaged. If
main body. If the SAG has been detached to destroy, concentration of fire is possible, major enemy
neutralize, or repel missile carrier(s), the SAG ships should receive priority. Normal fire dis-
should do so as far as possible from the main body or tribution is automatically in force.
convoy. In formulating his policy, the SAG
commander must consider the following factors: (2) Targets to individual units. The SAG
commander may make a fire distribution signal
a. Relative capabilities of own and enemy allotting targets to individual units at any time
forces. before or during an action. Special signal
groups are available for this purpose.
b. Likely tactics of enemy forces.
h. Number of missiles to be fired in ASSM
c. The use of ECM. The SAG commander salvos.
should make use of the ECM capability of ships of
the SAG to disrupt enemy fire control, surface warn- 8203 (NC) STANDARD SURFACE
ing sensors, missile systems, and communications. ACTION PLANS

d. The use of deception. When approach- Three standard surface action plans are de-
ing the enemy, the SAG commander should con- tailed in ATP 31, Chapter 8.
sider the use of physical and electronic measures
designed to conceal the size and formation of the a. Plan GREYHOUND. Plan GREY-
SAG. The electronic emission pattern of the SAG HOUND is the plan for SSM attack by ships using
must conform with the deception plan in use. a target reporting unit (TRU) and is best suited for
over-the-horizon (OTH) attacks.
e. The formation. It is important that de-
ployment into the chosen surface-action forma- b. Plan GROUSE. Plan GROUSE is the
tion should have been completed before action plan for SAGs, which may include helicopters, in
commences. The surface-action formation must a coordinated attack against enemy surface units
allow ships to engage with all their weapons, and other than missile-armed fast patrol boats. This
to take avoiding action without endangering adja- plan is best suited for engagements within horizon
cent ships. Unnecessarily large intervals between range.
ships give an enemy with superior speed the op-
portunity to concentrate on one part of the group at c. Plan SNIPE. Plan SNIPE is the plan for
a time. SAGs against missile-armed fast patrol boats.

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8204 (NC) TOWED-ARRAY SHIPS IN AN- 8205 PICKETS IN ANTISURFACE


TISURFACE WARFARE WARFARE

Towed array sonar (TAS) is capable of pas- Pickets are stationed primarily to extend the
sively detecting surface as well as subsurface con- surveillance area, and in littoral areas especially to
tacts at extended ranges. In an area of high surface cover entrances and choke points. A picket-chain
threat, the OTC may consider assigning a TAS consisting of several units might be ordered to
ship to the ASUW role in addition to or in lieu of cover large areas. The ASUW picket may be a sur-
the ASW role. In either case, the resultant effect on face unit, a submarine, or an aircraft. For further
the force’s ASW posture must be considered. details on capabilities and tasking see ATP 31.

8206 — 8209 SPARE

SECTION III — ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH AIR COOPERATION

8300 (NR) GENERAL 8302 (NR) ANTISURFACE OPERATIONS


BY HELICOPTERS
Air assets in support of antisurface warfare
operations may be used for the detection of the en- a. The aim of antisurface operations by
emy, for locating, identification/recognition, and helicopters is to:
reporting in order to contribute to the surface pic-
ture and for target data reporting and transmission. (1) Assist forces in the detection, localiza-
Independent and coordinated attacks on the ene- tion, identification, recognition, and targeting
my’s surface units may be included. The type of of hostile surface forces.
support to be provided by air assets depends on op-
erational requirements and on the capabilities of (2) Attack lightly defended enemy forces,
the air assets. Air assets may also be used to dis- especially fast patrol boats equipped with SSMs.
tract the enemy’s attention from own forces, and
to disrupt the enemy’s command and control. b. Helicopters will normally be integrated
with a surface force that may or may not have
other air support. They may be land based or ship-
borne. When two or more helicopters cooperate
8301 (NR) ANTISURFACE OPERATIONS against a particular surface threat, they form a
SUPPORT BY FIXED-WING HAG. The best-fitted helicopter should become
AIRCRAFT HAG commander (CONTROLLER).

a. The aim of antisurface operations by c. Helicopters in antisurface operations


fixed-wing aircraft is to ensure the detection and may be employed in reconnaissance and attack
engagement of enemy surface forces in order to and may carry out controlled operations or act in-
deny their effective employment. Fixed-wing air- dependently, as ordered by the OTC, or the unit
craft may be employed in: that the OTC has assigned duty as HCU.

(1) Attacks on enemy surface forces. (1) Controlled Operations. When the heli-
copter has two-way communications with and is within
(2) Scouting, using any sensor to acquire the radar range of the control unit, the helicopter is
tactical information. to operate under positive or advisory control.

b. Armed reconnaissance, a combination (2) Independent Operations. When the


of both types, is possible, depending on the tacti- helicopter is beyond radar range and/or commu-
cal situation and available air assets. Detailed in- nication range of the HCU, the helicopter is fully
structions are provided in ATP 31 and ATP 34. responsible for safety, navigation, and the ac-
complishment of its task.

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8504 (NC) SELECTION AND correlation and triangulation of passive data.


STATIONING OF A TARGET The employment of active sensors will depend
REPORTING UNIT upon the emission policy to which the TRU is
subject. The range of the TRU from the target
a. Providing Target Data. Where tar- will be a function of the discrimination possible
get data cannot be provided by the ASSM launch with active sensors and the degree of risk to the
vehicle’s own sensors, selection of the TRU is TRU acceptable to the OTC.
very important to ensure provision of the most ac-
curate and up-to-date information. Target report- (3) Range of ASSM engagement.
ing units may include:
(4) Communication range between the
(1) Radar and/or ESM-fitted helicopters. TRU and the ASSM platform.

(2) Shipborne ASW aircraft. (5) Sensors available in the firing unit.

(3) Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). (6) ASSM flight profile, missile-homing
search capability, and missile facility to receive
(4) Land- or carrier-based fighter/attack/ midcourse guidance corrections.
reconnaissance aircraft.
(7) Geographic and environmental
(5) EW/AEW aircraft. constraints.

(6) Land-based ESM and radar stations, (8) Geometric considerations, including
including installations, such as oil and gas the need for passive sensor baseline.
platforms.
(9) Enemy’s defensive systems.
(7) Surface units, preferably capable of
data link transmissions to the firing unit. (10) Rules of Engagement (ROE).

(8) Submarines. (11) Required recognition level and re-


quired recognition confidence level.
(9) Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs).

b. Radar-Fitted Aircraft. These aircraft 8505 (NC) TARGET REPORTING


usually provide the most effective platforms by
virtue of their mobility, extended sensor horizon, Target data from the TRU can be trans-
and endurance. Reporting accuracy may be in- ferred to the firing unit by voice/RATT report or
creased if the aircraft is fitted with data link trans- by data link.
mission facilities.
a. Voice/RATT Reporting. This has the
c. TRU Stationing. Stationing the TRU disadvantage of being slow in data rate, prone to
will depend upon: inaccuracy, and unless encrypted, it is not secure.
Where voice transmissions are unencrypted, the
(1) Type of vehicle used, including use of a low-grade code is essential to avoid
self-defense capability of the TRU. compromise of friendly positions. Voice/RATT
reports need to be frequent and, if reports are
(2) Sensor fit. Active sensors will provide a passed in grid, a gridlock is required at the
more accurate solution than that obtained by earliest opportunity.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

b. Link Reporting. The data link can be c. Methods Used for Passing Target
directional to a dedicated ASSM platform, or Bearing and Range. Table 8-2 shows the meth-
omnidirectional to permit a number of suitable ods that may be used for passing target bearing
units to achieve a firing solution. The link need not and, when available, range. The selection of the
be dedicated to TPT, because of the high capacity most suitable method depends upon the tactical
of modern data link systems, but may be usefully situation and the equipment of the participants. It
employed simultaneously in other fields of war- must be established by the firing unit. The TRU
fare to best exploit the capabilities of the TRU. should inform the firing unit if it is unable to com-
Caution should be exercised when using data link ply and propose an alternative method. Details are
to ensure sufficient gridlock accuracy and track in ATP 31.
quality for discriminative targeting of a multiship
formation. 8506 — 8509 SPARE

SECTION VI — DEFENSE AGAINST SURFACE THREAT

8600 (NC) DEFENSE AGAINST forces to ensure the timely initiation of suitable de-
MISSILE-ARMED SHIPS fense measures. Especially, in this context, ESM
and airborne surface surveillance efforts must care-
a. For a successful defense against missile- fully be considered and coordinated.
armed ships, the following criteria must be consid-
ered in addition to other procedures for antisurface a. Target/Threat Radars. The intercep-
warfare: tion of electronic emissions will normally be the
first indication of the enemy. Therefore, those ra-
(1) Detection of the missile carrier(s). dar frequencies should be watched continuously
that are known to be surveillance or fire-control
(2) Actions upon interception of threat radars of missile carriers and would therefore pose
radars. an immediate threat (e.g., SQUARE TIE). Careful
ESM tasking is required, including the determina-
(3) Destruction or neutralization of the tion of threat radars.
missile carrier(s) befor reaching its engage-
ment range against friendly forces. b. Use of Active Sensors. The policy
of using own airborne and surface platform
(4) Detection of missile(s) in flight. radars must be carefully matched with ESM task-
ing in order to provide maximum warning and
(5) Deception and jamming of missile bef- minimum interference to ESM equipment and
ore lock-on. minimum ESM data to a launching platform.

(6) Measures to break lock-on of missile. 8602 (NC) ACTIONS UPON


INTERCEPTION OF
(7) Destruction of missile. TARGET/THREAT RADARS

b. Details of defense against missile at- a. Target/Threat Radar Detection.


tacks are set forth in Chapter 7. Once a target/threat radar is detected, the OTC
may decide to attack the missile carrier or avoid
8601 (NC) DETECTION OF MISSILE action:
CARRIER(S)
(1) If an attack is intended, maneuver at
Early warning of missile-launching surface maximum speed to bring own weapons to bear
craft is of vital importance for the defense of own and to minimize enemy weapon effectiveness.

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(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Figure 8-2. (NU) Aircraft Flightpaths for Air Plan BLUEBELL (Cont.)

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 8-29 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
Figure 8-2. (NU) Aircraft Flightpaths for Air Plan BLUEBELL (Concl.)

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 8-30 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

SHIP-LAUNCHED TORPEDOES: S Depth charge (free fall)

H Heavyweight T Depth charge (self-propelled)

J Lightweight -Example-

SHIP-LAUNCHED MEDIUM RANGE: A unit which has 9 torpedoes Mk 46


Mod 5, 3 torpedoes Mk 37 (Mod 0),
M ASW missile and 24 depth charges remaining,
would report:
AIR-LAUNCHED:
“(C/S OTC/SAUC) this is (C/S) —
R Lightweight torpedo CAKE Charlie two four tack Hotel
three tack Juliet nine — over.”

SECTION I — EMPLOYMENT OF ASW UNITS

9100 (NR) ASW SHIPS k. Requirement for nuclear spacing.

9101 (NC) SURFACE SCREENS l. Deception policy.

The design and selection of ASW surface These and other factors are considered in
screens will depend on: ATP 28 and in Chapters 3 and 12.

a. Number of screening units available and 9105 (NR) SURFACE SHIP TOWED
their individual and collective weapons and sensor ARRAYS
fits.
9106 (NC) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
b. Size and disposition of the force being (see also ATP 28)
screened.
a. Generally, the method of employing a
c. Availability of ASW aircraft. towed array ship will depend on the type of array
fitted. Surveillance Towed Array Systems (SUR-
d. Anticipated threat. TAS) tend to have an extremely long length and
are optimized for very slow towing speeds. For
e. Environmental conditions. this reason, they are best suited to stationary op-
erations which allow them to patrol their stations
f. Tactical sonar ranges. at slow speed and to avoid frequent maneuvers
which cause array destabilization and degrade its
g. PIM, including any navigational performance. Tactical Towed Array Systems
constraints. (TACTAS) are specifically designed for higher
speeds and are the best option for moving-PIM op-
h. Requirement for command, control, and erations such as convoy escort. The actual per-
communication, including Emission Policy. formance of an array depends as well on its design.
Critical Angle Towed Array Systems (CATAS)
i. Requirement for supporting operations; tend to be less affected by tow ship noise due to the
for example, replenishment. greater length of tow cable than do arrays towed
from a depressor (DTAS). Hence a CATAS will
j. Requirement for other forms of defense; tend to provide better all round ranges of initial de-
for example, AAW. tection and tracking than can be expected of a
DTAS.

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b. To enhance effectiveness as an ASW towed array ship should institute measures to re-
sensor system, it is necessary for a towed array duce their radiated noise levels. For the same rea-
ship to reduce the range at which it may be counter- son, the towed array ship’s station must be
detected by the submarine. For this reason, the selected so as to be clear of the force’s residual ra-
towed array ship will tend to operate in as silent an diated noise. In particular, the direct path and con-
Emission Policy as possible. It is therefore neces- vergence zone annulus must be avoided. In this
sary for the OTC to provide as much guidance as regard, degradation caused by tow ship noise
possible to the ship prior to its taking up station to and/or endure gaps should also be considered.
avoid unnecessary electromagnetic (EM) emis-
sions which may reveal its presence. The follow- b. Reaction Time. Towed array ships
ing areas should be addressed in appropriate may be stationed ahead, astern, or on the flanks of
messages/orders. a force. Regardless of the relative position chosen,
such ships should be stationed sufficiently far
(1) The policy on contact reporting frequency. from the force to allow the OTC time to react to
detections made by the TAS ships. The actual dis-
(2) The relative importance of station- tance will depend on:
keeping versus contact holding.
(1) Whether the expected threat is
(3) The degree of freedom allowed the equipped with missiles, torpedoes, or a mixture
towed array ship with respect to EMCON in or- of both.
der to prosecute his contacts.
(2) Whether the threat is from nuclear or
(4) Additional assets available to help prose- diesel-electric submarines.
cute contacts and the means of obtaining them.
(3) The type of localization to be employed.
(5) The OTC’s assessment of the tactical
situation, together with a summary of the posi- (4) The time to complete localization. This
tions of friendly, neutral, and hostile shipping, time will vary from several minutes when ships
should be transmitted to the TAS ship as fre- are stationed to allow cross-fixing to several
quently as possible. hours for single-ship TMA localization.

(6) Anticipated changes to PIM and the time (5) Detection envelopes will vary for dif-
the TAS ship is to reposition with respect to it. ferent types of TAS. In addition, the detection
range will vary depending on the direction from
(7) Acoustic intelligence. Area Command- which a submarine closes the force. For exam-
ers and the ASWC should promulgate all cur- ple, a ship stationed astern of the force can ex-
rent target acoustic intelligence in the form of a pect to encounter submarines, moving, closing
brief summary including the significant slowly relative to the force but at a higher and,
sources, frequencies, source levels, modes of thus, noisier true speed than a TAS ship sta-
operation, and aspect dependencies of all tar- tioned ahead. Thus, the range of detection for a
gets of interest in their subordinate’s area. given system can be increased, thereby provid-
ing more reaction time than by choice of station
9107 (NC) STATIONING OF TOWED AR- alone.
RAY UNITS
(6) Whether the OTC is primarily con-
The selection of a station for a TAS ship is cerned with alertment to allow evasion or
based on the following considerations: whether he intends further prosecution.

a. Own Force Noise. The reduction of (7) Other sensors and weapons such as
force noise levels reaching a towed array is an im- ESM or Area Air Defense fitted in the towed ar-
portant element in increasing its detection enve- ray unit.
lope. For this reason, all units operating near a

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c. Communications. The communica- lines of approach (LLA) and the frontal cover-
tion fit of a towed array ship will affect the OTC’s age desired, it may be advantageous to station
stationing decision as well. Ships should not be towed array ships specifically to allow for
stationed at a distance from the OTC/ASWC such cross-fixing. In this event, it will be necessary to
that they are not capable of passing, on a real-time provide reliable communications between the
basis, contact information and of receiving orders TAS ships. If equipment fitment or EMCON re-
from the OTC/ASWC (see Chapter 4). Long-range strictions prevent such communications, an
communications are required between towed acoustically quiet surface ship or an aircraft may
array ships and the OTC/ASWC to: be stationed between the TAS ships to act as a
relay unit. If it is decided to position towed ar-
(1) Station units. ray ships to enable cross-fixing, the following
points are relevant:
(2) Report figure of merit (FOM) and con-
tact data to the OTC/ASWC. (1) The LLA for the anticipated threat
should be covered by the TAS ships.
(3) Request and coordinate nonorganic air
support (from ashore). (2) The TAS ships should be stationed to
provide a significant overlap in their passive
(4) Assign aircraft to a TAS contact coverage to maximize the probability of con-
prosecution. current contact. A separation between TAS
ships equal to UHF communication range opti-
(5) Coordinate the task force/task group mizes both probability of simultaneous contact
response to an ASW contact. and UHF communications.

(6) Join MPA coming on task. This may be (3) The ships should be stationed at a dis-
delegated to the ASWACU (see Chapter 6 for tance along PIM from the main body sufficient
MPA joining procedures). to maximize coverage within the LLA while
minimizing interference caused by force-
d. Mutual Support. Because of the generated noise and providing sufficient reac-
distance at which TAS ships can operate from the tion time for the OTC.
force, mutual support for TAS ships should be
considered in the following areas: (4) Depending on the TAS ship fitment, it
may be necessary for the TAS escort to employ
(1) Defense Against Air Attack. TAS sprint and search tactics to optimize detection
ships tend to operate in the covert mode; there- opportunities in high speed of advance (SOA)
fore, they may be vulnerable to air attack. If un- situations. The OTC must be kept informed of
able to defend itself, some provision should be the TAS escort’s requirement to conduct sprint
made to include the TAS station in the force’s and search as the possible resultant degradation
AAW defended area. to screen integrity must be considered when
formulating his overall ASW plan. If sufficient
(2) Independent Localization and TAS escorts are available, the OTC should con-
Attack. Normally TAS ships are capable of de- sider coordinating their sprint and search cycles
tecting contacts at distances far greater than the so that as one searches the other sprints. In addi-
effective range of their weapon systems and are tion, it may be possible to employ sprint and
often unable to localize to attack criteria. As a search tactics as a means of generating subma-
result, it may be necessary to provide the TAS rine movement. Generally, a short sprint/search
ship with an independent localizing and attacking cycle is preferable to a cycle which employs a
vehicle such as a helicopter or MPA. Surface long period of sprint coupled with long search
ship ASW pouncers may provide another option. times. SOA in excess of 12 knots may degrade
towed array operations.
(3) Communications and Stationing
Considerations. Depending on the limiting

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(5) Delivery boy replenishment is recom- proximity of force-generated noise may reduce
mended for towed array ships in the outer the size of the TAS detection envelope.
screen. If, however, the towed array ship de-
parts station for replenishment, the OTC must c. Astern.
determine the time to return to station and the
method of screening in the interim. (1) Advantages. The principle advan-
tage of the astern station lies in covering the
rear of the force against the approach of the fast
9108 (NC) TOWED ARRAY SCREEN nuclear submarine. Escorts with a low passive
STATION OPTIONS FOM or badly degraded forward endfire may
be best employed in this role particularly if fit-
Towed array surface ships may be stationed ted with a broadband intercept capability.
ahead in the outer or inner screen within the LLA,
or astern of the escorted force. The advantages and (2) Disadvantages. The use of a TAS
disadvantages are: ship astern of the force may reduce the overall
ASW coverage provided ahead within the LLA.
a. Outer Screen.
9109 (NC) TOWED ARRAY ZERO-PIM
(1) Advantages. A station in the outer OPERATIONS
screen will optimize the TAS detection enve-
lope, the frontal coverage, and reduce interfer- Towed array ships may also be employed in
ence caused by force-radiated noise. In zero-PIM operations such as barrier patrols, de-
addition, it will provide the OTC with the most fended lanes, and area surveillance. The OTC
reaction time. should consider these factors:

(2) Disadvantages. In the distant outer a. Selection of Station Size. In direct


screen, the problems associated with command, support operations, the OTC will have to decide
control, and communication are made more dif- on the size of the area to be allocated to a towed
ficult. It is more difficult to provide individual array ship. The size of the area allocated will de-
TAS ships with mutual support. Localization pend on the expected initial PSR for the sensor
and attack will probably require support from involved against the anticipated threat. The actual
air assets and take a significant amount of time size should be such that the revisit time throughout
to accomplish. the area should be small enough to ensure the tar-
get cannot complete a transit through the area be-
b. Inner Screen. tween TAS ship visits.

(1) Advantages. The OTC will have bet- b. Selection of Search Type. This is
ter control over the TAS ship due to improved based on the criteria laid out in ATP 31, Chapter 6,
communications. At the same time, mutual and ATP 28, Chapter 4. When applied to towed ar-
support is more easily provided. ray searchers, the sweep width should be replaced by
the expected PSR. The specific type of search will
(2) Disadvantages. The proximity of depend on the actual operation. For example, to
the TAS ship to the escorted force will consid- search an area or probability (AOP) or datum, the
erably reduce the reaction time available to the expanding square search may provide the best re-
OTC as well as preclude totally effective use of sults whereas for defended lane operations, a lin-
the frontal coverage available. In addition, the ear or crossover patrol may be appropriate.

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9110 (NR) ASW HELICOPTERS 9120 (NU) ASW FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT

9111 (NC) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 9121 (NC) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Stationing of helicopter-carrying escorts in a. Air Operations Procedures. A i r


the screen should be made, if possible, to provide operations procedures described in Chapter 6,
optimum relative wind to facilitate launch and re- Section IV, apply to the tasking of ASW aircraft.
covery without having the escorts leave their as- The OTC’s functions for both ASW and air
signed sectors. coordination are summarized in Tables 1-4 and
1-6.
ASW helicopters may be fitted with son-
obuoys, processors, dipping active/passive sonar, b. Planning. The following factors
airborne radars, FLIR, MAD, ESM, and/or ASW should be considered in planning and controlling
torpedoes and depth bombs. When tasked within a ASW air operations:
force, they may be considered as force assets or as
extensions to ship’s sensors and weapon systems. (1) Overall tactical situation.
Helicopters fitted with sonobuoys and processors
may be tasked in the same way as direct support (2) Assumed or known capabilities and
fixed-wing aircraft. Screening stations for heli- tactics of the enemy.
copters fitted with ASW sensors should be selected
using similar considerations to those for surface (3) Number, type, and capabilities of
units (see Article 9101). However, the limited en- available aircraft, including sensors and weapons.
durance and buoy capacity may make them more
suited for flank screening than the ahead sector. (4) Size and location of area of operations.

9112 (NC) ASW HELICOPTER (5) Environmental conditions.


EMPLOYMENT
(6) Availability and characteristics of co-
ASW helicopters may be allocated for operating and/or supporting units, including
screening duties as indicated in Chapter 3 and may ships, submarines, and other aircraft.
also be ordered to carry out other ASW tasks by
means of the airplans summarized in Table 9-2. (7) Frequency of coverage required (revisit
Full details of airplans for dipping helicopters are time).
in Figures 9-10 to 9-15.
c. Tasking. Fixed-wing ASW aircraft
Table 9-2. (NR) Airplans may be ordered to carry out ASW tasks by means
of dedicated airplans summarized in Table 9-2.
Details of airplans are contained in Figures 9-5 to
Fixed-Wing Dipping 9-9.
Task Aircraft/ Helicopters
Helicopters
d. RAINFORMs. Since aircrews and air
Bearing Investigation 1 41, 42, 43 controllers must be thoroughly briefed, it is man-
datory that Form GREEN be sufficiently detailed.
Datum or Contact 2 44, 47, 48 When land-based aircraft have been ordered to
Investigation
provide support to a force at sea, the OTC of the
Barrier 3 45 force will be informed by means of a Form
GREEN. When organic air support is provided,
Screening 4, 5 41, 42, 43 the flying schedule will be promulgated by appro-
Area Investigation 5 41, 42, 43, priate message.
46

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9122 (NU) CONDUCT OF AIRPLANS FOR PIM on which a relative airplan is based, the
FIXED-WING ASW AIRCRAFT AND airplan is to be reordered.
HELICOPTERS
f. Accuracy of Airplan Origin, Datum,
a. Aircraft Flightpath. The flightpath or Contact Position. When ordering an air-
of an aircraft within an assigned area depends on plan, it may be desirable to use radar to ensure that
the type of aircraft; on the search, localization, and the origin of the airplan, datum, or contact position
navigation equipment available; and on environ- is accurately established. (See Table 9-2.) For spe-
mental conditions. An ASW aircraft joining a cific details of these airplans, see Figures 9-5 to
force should be prepared to inform the OTC of the 9-15.
maximum size of the area that it can search effec-
tively under the prevailing conditions. 9123 (NC) AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF
TOWED ARRAY SHIPS
b. Contact Investigation. When an
airplan is ordered which requires an aircraft to in- The aircraft assigned is required to:
vestigate a contact or bearing, it is essential that
sufficient details of the contact or bearing be a. Join the AAWC/ASWC/ASWACU in
passed to the aircraft to allow the aircraft com- direct support. In associated support and area op-
mander to determine the most appropriate search erations, the aircraft will cooperate with the towed
and localization procedures to be used. array ship, depending on the disposition of forces,
to prosecute contacts.
c. Variations to Airplans. When an
airplan is ordered, the order may include varia- b. Report contacts to the OTC/ASWC/
tions to the airplan and any amplifying instruc- ASWACU in direct support and to the area com-
tions not included in the order table. mander and cooperating individual towed array
ships in area operations. In associated support,
d. Relative Airplans. The term “rela- report contacts to the OTC/AWC/ASWACU and
tive” applied to an airplan implies that the area so to the area commander.
ordered shall assume the intended movement of
the force. It does not affect the bearings associated c. Receive and acknowledge the SAC’s
with airplans. These bearings are always given in AOP, airplans, search plans, and attack plans when
degrees from true North. contact is held.

e. Change of PIM in Relative Airplans. d. Exchange precise target acoustic data


The direction in which ships are to proceed may (type of contact, frequencies, sources, Doppler,
be changed in many ways which may or may not complete bearing information, and target move-
require a change of airplan. To avoid misunder- ment) with the SAC and other cooperating units
standings, whenever it is necessary to alter the when contact is gained (see APP 4 for passive
contact handover procedures).

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(1) LOW CONFIDENCE — A contact


that cannot be regarded as NONSUB and re- Table 9-2A. (NU) Passive Acoustic Designation
quires further investigation. This assessment
may be further amplified by using grades 1 and
Area of F( ) Acoustic/Doppler/
2, 1 being the lower grade. Probability TMA derived area of
(AOP) probability (accuracy
(2) HIGH CONFIDENCE — A contact estimate in miles)
that from the evidence is firmly believed to be a M( ) Closest point of ap-
submarine, but it does not meet the criteria es- proach (CPA)
tablished for PROBSUB. This assessment may (range in yards)
be further amplified by using grades 3 and 4, 3 Line of P Bearing from single
being the lower grade. Bearing sensor

e. NONSUB (Nonsubmarine Con- L( ) Convergence zone


contact (first CZ range
tact). After investigation, a contact that is shown in miles)
to have characteristics that exclude the possibility
that it is a submarine. NONSUB is a firm state- Omni- O Non-convergence zone
directional contact
ment that the classifier is entirely satisfied his con-
tact is not a submarine. When a contact is lost
which was previously classified POSSUB or
PROBSUB, it is dangerous and wrong to amend the tact classification using other sensors as avail-
classification to NONSUB without the most thor- able.
ough investigation.
(3) Command Responsibility. When
9203 (NC) CONTACT REPORTING more than one ASW unit is in contact, the SAC
or OTC (or ASWC if delegated) evaluates all
a. General Considerations. information and classifications and reports the
contact together with his classification.
(1) Initial Contact Reporting and
Classification. To initiate rapid response to (4) Conditions. Since environmental
counter what may be an imminent enemy attack, conditions must be considered in the classifica-
the initial contact (whether classified or not) tion of contacts, ATP 28 must be consulted for
must be reported immediately. When not in- the effects of environmental considerations on
cluded in the initial report, a classification must various sensors.
be made in the subsequent amplifying report.
Where possible, contacts should additionally (5) Contact Information. The method
be amplified by type. Voice contact procedures in which contact was obtained, maintained, or
are contained in APP 1. Enemy contact reports localized may be of assistance in assessing a
are contained in APP 4. passive acoustic contact report. In order to read-
ily describe the method, single-letter designa-
(2) Subsequent Evaluation. Reclassi- tors from Table 9-2B may be included in the
fication of a contact continues throughout the amplifying data block of a Raid Report or En-
entire ASW action, and subsequent reports by a emy Contact Report, e.g., “POSSUB 2251-
unit may amend or amplify the classification. RED 123 TACK 456 ZULU-FOXTROT 10
Prosecuting units must continually review con- NM POSSUB 2251.”

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

b. Support Submarine Contact Re- current as to contact information for coordi-


porting. The precedence of contact reporting nated contact prosecution.
(i.e., task force alertment) or contact engagement;
when, how, and to whom should the submarine (4) In the course of a contact prosecution,
report; and under which circumstances, is highly extended periods (greater than 20 minutes) at
dependent upon the scenario and the distance of periscope depth for the purpose of communica-
the support submarine from the force. Require- tions are to be avoided.
ments placed on the submarine should be clearly
specified by the OTC/SOCA as a preplanned (5) For purposes of contact reporting, a
response in both Associated and Direct Support contact that is regained after more than 1 hour
operations. of lost contact should be treated as a new con-
tact if a lost contact report had been sent prior to
c. Choice of Reporting Method. The regaining contact.
following guidelines are available to the submarine:
d. ASW Aircraft Relaying Contact
(1) If the initial contact report is made us- Reports. Initial contact reports and amplifying
ing a SLOT buoy and the first amplifying report reports will be relayed to the OTC/SOCA or other
is made within 30 minutes using a SLOT buoy, appropriate commander, exactly as received,
and a relay aircraft is on station, then either one without delay. When SLOT buoys are used, the
or both of the reports will be delivered to the channel number, time of receipt and, when avail-
ASWC in approximately 95 percent of the able, SLOT location data will also be passed.
cases.
e. TAS Contact Reports. Towed array
(2) Unless the contact was initially as- ships will report contacts using standard proce-
sessed as near, a loss of contact information for dures (see Article 6320 and APP 4). However,
10 minutes is good cause to come to periscope during TAS contact prosecution, long-range
depth and report by radio. communications will be required (see Article
4160(b)) to:
(3) When reporting by radio, it is appropri-
ate to employ both UHF voice to an ASW air- (1) Report contacts.
craft and a hard-copy message via satellite relay
when such communication paths are available. (2) Exchange contact data with other
The hard-copy message provides accurate mes- towed array ships.
sage delivery to the OTC/SOCA and the UHF
voice report keeps the on-scene ASW aircraft (3) Report threat AOPs as a result of
cross-fixes or TMA.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

9210 (NU) ASW ATTACK POLICY 9213 (NC) FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT


ASW ATTACK POLICY
9211 (NC) GENERAL
a. Policy on Use of Weapons. Policy
a. Types of Attack. Attacks may be on the use of weapons must be specified at brief-
URGENT or DELIBERATE. The purpose of an ings or during the joining procedure. In general,
URGENT attack is to upset the submarine’s plan attack policy depends on the tactical situation and
of action and gain the initiative in the engagement; on the classification of the contact. Fixed-wing
speed of action is essential and outweighs accu- aircraft should follow attack policy in force and, if
racy. The purpose of a DELIBERATE attack is required, show appropriate IFF.
destruction of the hostile submarine using the most
effective ASW weapon for the prevailing tactical b. Urgent Attacks. Regardless of the
situation. Accuracy is more vital than speed. classification, urgent attacks are to be carried out
on contacts which pose an immediate threat. At the
b. ASW Actions. These may be CLOSE SAC’s discretion, aircraft may attack individually
(within 8,000 yards) or STANDOFF (outside or in coordination with other aircraft in accor-
8,000 yards). dance with the following:

9212 (NC) SURFACE SHIP ASW (1) CERTSUB or PROBSUB. Aircraft


ATTACK POLICY should carry out attacks as frequently as oppor-
tunity offers, except in coordinated operations
a. Sonar Contact: in which attacks are conducted in accordance
with the attack policy in force.
(1) If the contact is an immediate threat,
carry out an urgent attack. (2) POSSUB, CONFIDENCE HIGH.
Contact may be attacked by the first available
(2) If the contact is not an immediate threat, means unless otherwise directed.
take appropriate torpedo countermeasures and
carry out a deliberate attack employing medium- (3) POSSUB, CONFIDENCE LOW.
and long-range weapons or vectored attacks Contact will be attacked if it presents an imme-
whenever possible. diate threat.

b. Other Than Sonar Contact: 9214 (NC) HELICOPTER ASW ATTACK


POLICY
(1) If the contact is an immediate threat,
consider conducting an attack on available in- a. Advanced Screening or Search-
formation while maneuvering to gain sonar ing. Attack in accordance with the attack policy
contact and switching on other sensors ordered in force. Show the appropriate IFF, if required.
or permitted by the EMCON plan.
b. Screening (Deliberate Attack).
(2) If the contact is not an immediate threat, Carry out a HOVERTAC in accordance with the
the detecting ship takes appropriate countermea- attack policy in force, or maintain contact until as-
sures and maneuvers to gain sonar contact but is sisting units arrive.
not to leave her station or sector unless
authorized; however, other ships in sectors or c. Screening (Urgent Attack). Carry
patrolling stations should anticipate possible out a HOVERTAC or SELFTAC if the contact is
detachment by moving toward the engaged side an immediate threat and no other unit is in a better
of their sector or patrol line. position.

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9215 (NC) ATTACK RESTRICTIONS (3) Use of air or surface ASW weapons is
WHEN OPERATING WITH unrestricted in an ASWFA.
SUPPORT SUBMARINES
b. Compensatory Allowances.
a. Requirements. ASW attack restric-
tions when operating with a support submarine are (1) Air/Surface ASW Attacks. For
governed by the type of action area in which the sub- any ASW engagement, air and surface units
marine is operating. See Chapter 6. shall apply a compensatory allowance that
minimizes the risk of that weapon inadvertently
(1) No air or surface ASW attacks are per- entering an area containing a friendly subma-
mitted inside a SAA. rine. Conceptually, a compensatory allowance
is a weapons danger zone with a navigation
(2) No aircraft (including helicopters) or safety buffer that applies to SAA, JTAA, and
surface units may attack a submarine contact activated SSL, MEADOW, NOTACK, and
inside a JTAA unless a SGSA or NOTACK SGSA boundaries.
area has been established per the procedures of
Chapter 6. (2) ASW Aircraft With Inoperable
Navigation Systems. ASW aircraft which
NOTE cannot make an accurate assessment of naviga-
tion error because of inoperable navigation
No aircraft or surface unit may attack a equipment may not attack a submarine contact
submarine contact that is within a inside a JTAA or within 10 nm of a SAA or
NOTACK area. Attacks may be con- JTAA boundary without authority, and then
ducted within a SGSA provided a only while under the direction of another unit
NOTACK area has been established. with an adequate navigation capability, such as
Attacks within a JTAA but outside an an ASW helicopter control ship.
established SGSA require authoriza-
tion by the SGSA Coordinating Au- 9216 (NU) ASSESSING DAMAGE
thority/Unit.
The standard method of damage assess-
ment is set forth in ATP 28.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(1) Target bearing, bearing accuracy, time with or are endangered by the running torpedos.
of bearing. DOGBOX is based upon type of torpedo, method
of employment, and estimated acquisition range.
(2) Acoustic signature information. The DOGBOX is time limited to torpedo expiry.
ASW torpedo parameters can be found in ATP 29
(3) Range estimate, and how obtained. Secret Supplement.

(4) Array depth. b. The presence of surface ships or em-


ployment of other ASW weapons within a DOG-
(5) Localization sensors to be employed. BOX may degrade the performance of the running
torpedo. Therefore, the attacking unit must recon-
(6) Observed target behavior. sider the attack and cancel it if:

f. Investigation of the TAS Contact. (1) There is a risk to a friendly unit, or


During the aircraft’s investigation of the TAS
contact, the TAS ship is to pass to the aircraft up- (2) The anticipated effect of the weapon
dated contact information. The TAS ship either is unacceptably degraded due to friendly unit
maintains contact or resumes its patrol as previ- interference.
ously directed by the OTC/shore authority. In the
latter case, the aircraft will assume the duties of 9261 (NC) ASW SHIP AND HELICOPTER
the SAC once in contact. ATTACK AND SUPPORT METHODS

g. Aircraft Gains Contact. When the Table 9-6 summarizes the ASW attack and
aircraft gains contact, it will pass contact informa- support methods available for use by ships alone
tion to the TAS ship in the form of a Raid Report, or by ships and helicopters. When helicopters are
unless otherwise directed by the OTC/shore used in these methods, the letter H must be added
authority. Similar procedures can be used with as a suffix to the method number. Attack and sup-
other units, such as surface ship pouncers. port methods are in Figures 9-16 to 9-21.

9253 (NC) LOST CONTACT 9262 (NC) ASW SHIP ACTIONS


PROCEDURES
a. Attacking Ship. The ship conducting
There is a high probability that a submarine an attack or using aircraft to conduct an attack is
will be unaware of the fact that it has been detected considered to be the attacking ship. The attacking
by a TAS. It will therefore tend to continue its pa- ship’s duties include:
trol or intercept in the same manner it did prior to
detection. For this reason, TAS bearing and track- (1) Delivering a deliberate or urgent at-
ing information decays very slowly and is tacti- tack, as appropriate, to keep maximum pressure
cally exploitable, depending on submarine speed, on the submarine.
for an hour or more after losing contact.
(2) Indicating that she is the attacking ship
9254 — 9259 SPARE and the weapon she will use as directed by the
SAC.
9260 (NU) COORDINATED ATTACK
METHODS (3) Maneuvering in accordance with the
rules for the attack method ordered. If deemed
a. For attacks in which more than one necessary to keep a constant range or open the
ASW unit are involved in close prosecution, the contact, use a figure-of-eight maneuver to en-
attacking unit must upon attack announce an area sure the stern is never pointed towards it. This
from which assisting units should remain clear for will limit chances of the contact being lost in
their own safety. For torpedoes, an area (DOG- the stern arcs of the sonar.
BOX) is established within which units interfere

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 9-6. (NC) ASW Attack and Support Methods

Method Code Purpose Special


3A Geographic Coordinated 2-ship attack 1. Suitable for ships with a variety of
Sector weapon systems.
2. May be used against submarines
using high speed.

3A MOD Modified Coordinated 2-ship attack To be used when one ship is equipped
Geographic with short-range weapons and the com-
Sector bination of weapon systems does not al-
low Attack Method 3A.

11AH Bear 1. Line of bearing support for a To cover a definite direction or a probable
close ASW action. course of action by the submarine.
2. Stand-off attack from a
definite direction.

14AH Cordon 1. Sector support for a close 1. When support or attack is desired from
ASW action. one or more specified sectors.
2. Stand-off attack in sectors. 2. 3,000-yard attack zone based on
3. Circular attack in zone. contact. This is a designated sector
4. Automatic search plan. zero. The radius may be amended by
the SAC, if required.

NOTE

These methods are initiated by the SAC.

(4) Exchanging information and passing (2) Maneuvering in accordance with the
movements and intentions of own ship and at- rules for the attack method ordered to gain and
tacking aircraft under control. maintain sonar contact and remain clear of tor-
pedo interference/weapon danger (DOG BOX)
(5) Indicating by signal immediately when areas. If deemed necessary to keep a constant
the contact is lost or the contact becomes doubtful. range or open the contact, use a figure-of-eight
maneuver to ensure the stern is never pointed
(6) In a close ASW action, transferring the towards it. This will limit chances of the contact
attacking ship responsibility to an assisting ship being lost in the stern arcs of the sonar.
holding contact as the situation dictates.
(3) Exchanging information with the at-
(7) Promulgating the torpedo interference/ tacking ship.
weapon danger (DOG BOX) where appropriate.
(4) Reporting immediately when the con-
b. Assisting Ship. The assisting ship’s tact is lost or becomes doubtful.
duties include:
(5) Reporting when ready to assume the
(1) Maneuvering to keep clear of the at- duties of attacking ship.
tacking ship and to avoid obstructing the attack.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

c. Supporting Ship. Ships not engaged NOTE


in a close ASW action may be used in support.
Medium-range, long-range, or variable depth Multiship participation in an ASW
sonars may best be employed in this role. Support action may cause a considerable increase
ships may then hold contact at long range. Vector in voice communications. Assisting ship
ships or aircraft may hold contact when the and supporting ship(s) should therefore
attacking and assisting ships lose contact. Ships restrict their information in such a
are ordered to support a close action in manner that the attacking ship’s data on
accordance with the rules for the support weapon delivery and safety factors take
method employed. priority over other information.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

ATTACK METHOD 1A
LOCK ON ATTACK

This method is a coordinated attack for use in duties of attacking ship to another ship as cir-
a multiship ASW action. It is particularly useful cumstances require.
when difficulty is experienced in holding contact on
(3) ACTION BY ASSISTING SHIPS.
a high-speed submarine by the sector method. It
When the SAC orders the attack, assisting
also provides a good safety factor for ships maneu-
ships maneuver to stations at the range or-
vering at high speeds. Other ships present may be
dered by the SAC to contain the contact within
ordered to carry out support plans Bear (11A). The
a good holding formation. For two ships, sta-
aim is to contain the submarine between the ships
tions should be in the quarter opposite the at-
of the SAU, maintain contact, and attack.
tacking ship. For three ships, stations should
a. GENERAL be apexes of an equilateral triangle oriented to
best suit the position of all ships at the time of
(1) DISTANCE APART OF SHIPS. Opti-
ordering and centered on the contact. For the
mum distance between ships is between 2,000
few times when ambiguity could arise, the
and 3,000 yards. This may, however, be amended
SAC can clarify by ordering “(CALL SIGN)
as dictated by sonar conditions, characteristics of
EAST, (CALL SIGN) WEST” or a similar delin-
weapons fitted, and compatibility of sonars.
eation. When ships are in station, they are to
(2) TACTICAL DIAMETER. With ships of report “LOCKED ON.” In Method A, assisting
similar characteristics, the attacking ship should ships comply with all maneuvering orders im-
pass the rudder, speed, and engine orders. With mediately. In Method B, assisting ships com-
ships of dissimilar characteristics, it is necessary for ply with the direction of turn and come to the
the SAC to signal the tactical diameter to be used. required course and speed. They are to be
prepared to assume duties of attacking ship at
(3) LOCK ON RANGE. The lock on
any time and should report if they find them-
range is the range from each unit of the SAU to the
selves in a good attack position. Ships are to
attacking ship.
acknowledge all maneuvering information
b. PROCEDURES with the single word “(Ship’s call sign)” in al-
phabetical sequence.
(1) ORDERING THE ATTACK. The SAC
orders “EXECUTE LOCK ON RANGE . . . (in hun- (4) REVERTING TO GEOGRAPH-
dreds of yards),” designates the attacking ship and, ICAL SECTOR ATTACK METHOD. The SAC
where applicable, the tactical diameter to be used. may revert to the Geographical Attack Method
Thereafter, the SAC executes tactical command at any time by ordering “Unlock” and then or-
and the attacking ship executes tactical control of dering the Geographic Sector Attack Method.
ships ordered to “LOCK ON” and directs the action. If more than one assisting ship is present, the
SAC must redesignate the assisting ship and
(2) ACTION BY ATTACKING SHIP. The
assign others to support stations.
attacking ship immediately informs the assisting
ship(s) of her present course and speed. If in a po- c. ACTION WHEN CONTACT IS LOST.
sition to attack, she does so. She then endeavors These attack procedures are repeated as ap-
to keep the submarine inside the attack formation, propriate until the submarine is destroyed or all
maneuvering the SAU by either of two methods. In ships have lost contact. When all ships have
In Method A, the lock on control ship passes rud- lost contact, the lost contact search plan speci-
der, speed, and engine orders over the tactical fied by the SAC is to be carried out
net. In Method B, the lock on control ship passes
direction of turn and the desired course and speed
over the tactical net. The attacking ship passes the

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 9-16. (NU) Attack Method 1A (Lock On)

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

ATTACK METHOD 2A
DEEP CREEP ATTACK

This method is designed for a two-ship depth assisting ship and the submarine and,
charge or short-range homing torpedo attack on a if possible, forward of the submarine
submarine which is using deep submergence and beam. If this is not possible, bring the
slow speeds for evasion. It is effective only when attacking ship up from astern of the
surprise can be achieved. submarine.
a. OCCASIONS FOR USE. This method 3. Vectors the attacking ship to the at-
may be used when ships have no effective depth tack position by ordering courses and
determining sonar and under any one, or any com- speeds at frequent intervals. Low
bination of, the following conditions. speed should be ordered whenever
possible.
1. When intelligence indicates that the sub-
marine is damaged and has gone deep. 4. Advises the attacking ship “Fifty yards
to go” to the attack position.
2. When one of the ships involved has the
only weapons available, but its sonar is 5. Orders the attacking ship to “Fire” at
inoperative. attack position.
3. When sonar conditions prevent attack by 6. Vectors attacking ship to a new ap-
other procedures. proach position for the next attack
when she has reported “Weapon
fired.”
CAUTION
(2) ATTACKING SHIP
Deep Creep Attack procedures 1. Takes position as directed by the as-
may place both ships in danger if sisting ship.
the submarine decides to take of- 2. Listens with sonar, but does not
fensive action. transmit.
3. Steers courses, and regulates speed
b. PROCEDURES
as ordered by the assisting ship.
(1) ASSISTING SHIP
4. Lays a depth charge pattern, or fires
1. Maneuvers to maintain a position in so- torpedo, as directed by the assisting
nar contact 1,000 to 2,000 yards from, ship.
and on the quarter of, the submarine.
5. On completion of attack reports
2. Vectors the attacking ship to start the run “Weapon fired.”
from a point about 800 yards at right an-
gles to the line of bearing between the

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 9-17. (NU) Attack Method 2A (Deep Creep Attack))

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 10-3. (NU) Convoy Formation Grid

10035 (NC) STATIONING CONVOY sea, the new positions should be drawn up on a fur-
SHIPS ther grid diagram, also to be issued before sailing.
Although it is technically possible to signal a com-
a. The convoy formation will be formu- pletely new formation by the grid system, it should
lated by the OCA, OTC, Commodore, and Naval be avoided because merchant ships are neither
Control of Shipping Officer (NCSO). Shown as trained nor practiced in complicated signaled ma-
positions on the grid diagram, it will be included in neuvers. However, the movement of individual
the Sailing Order Folder issued to each ship before ships within the formation, by signal, is perfectly
sailing. If a change of formation is to take place at feasible.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(1) Warships. When a warship occupies The size of the grid squares may be changed to
a station in a convoy formation, the station to be meet the requirements of the situation.
occupied will be detailed by OTC, who may
consult the Commodore. (a) Each vertical line of the grid is al-
located to a single letter in alphabetical se-
(2) Aircraft Carrier. An aircraft carrier quence (less I and O) starting at the left of
operating in a convoy may occupy a “box” the grid.
formed by omitting ships from stations in the
rear and center of the convoy. The size of the (b) Each row is allocated a number of
box will be governed by the requirements of the sequence starting with row 1 at the top.
carrier for operating aircraft and the spacing of
the ships in the convoy. (3) Individual Ship. Individual ship sta-
tions are indicated as shown in the following
b. Convoy station designators will be used examples.
as call signs on convoy tactical nets.
(a) Station J5 = the intersection of line
10036 (NC) FORMING UP A CONVOY J with row 5.

a. Departure Operations. The OTC, (b) Station FG3 = the point midway
after consulting the local naval authority, is to is- between lines F and G in row 3.
sue the necessary orders to escorts regarding de-
parture operations (see Chapter 3). He is also to (c) Station K6L7 = the point midway
detail screening ships to round up and direct indi- between the intersections of line K, row 6,
vidual merchant ships to their proper stations. and line L, row 7.

b. Intership Spacing. The ordering of (d) Station PP67 = the point midway
intership spacing is the responsibility of the OTC. between row 6 and 7 in line P.
In open water, the minimum distance between
ships in column and the interval between columns Note
is 1,000 yards of clear water. In restricted waters,
the minimum distance between ships in column In example d, it is necessary to repeat
may be reduced to 600 yards of clear water. When the line indicator to prevent confusion.
the primary threat is from pattern-running torpe- For example: PP12 = the point mid-
does, some increase in minimum convoy spacing way between rows 1 and 2 in line P,
may be justified. When the primary threat is from while P12 = the intersection of line P
kiloton nuclear weapons, the spacing of columns with row 12.
and ships in column should be at least 2,000 yards.
When the primary threat is from megaton nuclear (4) Columns. Columns, if appropriate,
weapons, spacing should be at least 10,000 yards. are numbered from left to right, with every
number prefixed with a zero, beginning with 01
c. Convoy Formation Grid Instruc- for the left-hand column. Lanes (the spaces be-
tions. tween columns, and to the left of the left-hand
column and the right of the right-hand column)
(1) Forming Up. The grid is oriented take their numbers from the adjacent columns
relative to the convoy’s base course on forming (12, 23, etc.), with the left-hand lane being
up. numbered 01 and the right-hand lane taking the
number of the right-hand column less the prefix
(2) Grid Square Size. Grid square size 0, but with suffix 0 (e.g., 90).
is to be 1,000 yards unless otherwise ordered.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

SEARCH PLAN 52S (Cont.)

BEETROOT

Example of REVERSE BEETROOT

EXECUTE REVERSE BEETROOT


LANE 12 CALL SIGN CE
LANE 23 DIPPER 15 (OR CALL SIGN AB)
LANE 34 CALL SIGN FX

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 10-4. (NU) Search Plan 52S BEETROOT (Sheet 2 of 3)

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

SEARCH PLAN 52S (Cont.)

BEETROOT

BEETROOT LEFT SIDESTEP

This example would be ordered by:

EXECUTE BEETROOT LEFT SIDESTEP


LANE 12 CALL SIGN CE
LANE 23 MARK DIP DIPPER 15 (OR CALL SIGN AB)
LANE 34 CALL SIGN FX

or by using appropriate signal groups from ATP 1, Vol. II.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 10-4. (NU) Search Plan 52S BEETROOT (Sheet 3 of 3)

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

SEARCH PLAN 53S

CARROT
An ASW search plan for use when escorts b. Screen units detailed are to proceed at
are stationed by the skeleton screen diagram optimum sonar speed, make broad weave, and
(see Chapter 3). It may be used by day or night fan outward from the convoy for 8 minutes un-
when the convoy is attacked by a submarine that less otherwise ordered. They are then to resume
is suspected of having fired from outside the their stations.
screen. Units execute this search plan as fol- c. Helicopters should continue as previ-
lows: ously employed, unless otherwise ordered.
a. Screen units in stations A and S are to
patrol their stations as shown in the diagram.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 10-5. (NU) Search Plan 53S CARROT

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(5) Protected Anchorages. When area protection, but gives greater protection to the
coastal shipping is required to anchor, it should unit(s) defended.
be routed to a protected anchorage. OCAs
should establish and promulgate details of pro- d. Choice of Protection. Choic e of
tected anchorages. Protection of these areas the type of protection will depend on the volume
presents special difficulties because of the large of coastal shipping, the relative importance of the
number of stationary ships concentrated in con- units to be protected, the availability and capabil-
fined waters for long periods. ity of assets, and intelligence and environmental
factors. If possible, area and individual protection
(6) Point Defense. Point defense in should be given to high-value units.
coastal operations is normally established for
the protection of the anchorages/harbors and 10070 (NU) CONVOY FORMATION
important offshore installations. The proximity SELECTION
of land-based weapon systems and the avail-
ability of air support will hamper enemy move- This section describes various convoy for-
ments in coastal areas and this confers a mations and gives guidance on their employment.
measure of area defense. Route selection for
coastal shipping should make full use of this ad- 10071 (NU) BROAD FRONT RECTANGU-
vantage. LAR (GRID) FORMATION

c. Individual Protection of Coastal a. See Figure 10-6.


Shipping. The protection of individual convoys
or ships is achieved by surface escorts screening, b. The broad front rectangular formation
the allocation of dedicated air effort, and imple- was designed primarily to counter the diesel sub-
mentation of lead-through MCM procedures (see marine. The effectiveness of this formation was
Chapter 13). It generally requires more assets than clearly demonstrated in World War II.

BROAD FRONT RECTANGULAR (GRID) FORMATION

MLA

A B C D E F G H J K L M N P

This example also demonstrates the allocation of escort


stations within the convoy and varying the ship spacing to
allow for the maneuvering characteristics of very large
ships.

(NATO-UNCLASSIFIED)

Figure 10-6. (NU) Broad Front Rectangular (Grid) Formation

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

CHAPTER 13

Mine Warfare
13000 (NR) INTRODUCTION b. During the initial stages of a mining cam-
paign, offensive operations are likely to be con-
Mine warfare includes the whole field of fined to ports, harbors, and focal points where
designing, producing, and laying mines and the traffic concentrations can be foreseen. Only wa-
parallel effort of designing, producing, and oper ters of 10 nm or less in width that cannot be readily
ating all forms of mine countermeasures to combat avoided by traffic should be considered during the
the enemy’s mining campaign. This chapter initial stages.
provides background knowledge and instructions
to commands and personnel not normally involved
in mine countermeasures and minelaying opera- 13003 (NC) TYPES OF MINES
tions. For more detailed information, refer to ATP
2, ATP 6, ATP 24, and AHP 1. a. Mines are explosive devices laid in the
water by aircraft, submarines, or surface ships.
13001 (NR) MINING They can be divided into two main categories:

The aim of minelaying operations is to as- (1) Controlled mines are controlled by the
sist in the dislocation of the enemy war effort to user and enable him to deny the use of certain
the maximum possible extent and to contribute to areas to the enemy while retaining freedom of
the security of our sea communications by the de- movement for his own forces.
struction — or threat of destruction — of the
enemy’s merchant and naval units. (2) Independent mines are not controlled
by the user after laying and create the same dan-
13002 (NC) MINEABLE WATERS ger to own and enemy shipping. Types of set-
tings used with these mines include:
a. Mineable waters are waters in which
mines may be effectively used against submarines (a) Ship counts, which allow a certain
or surface ships. The depth of the water may dictate number of ships to pass the mine before it
the use of either moored or ground mines. Drifting detonates.
mines can be encountered in any depth of water.
(b) Arming or rising delays, which
(1) Moored mines can normally be encoun- prevent the mine from becoming active be-
tered in waters with depths up to 1,000 meters, fore a preset time.
although this is not necessarily the technical
depth limitation. Mines used in antisubmarine (c) Sterilizing time, which renders the
minefields may be laid in depths down to the mine inoperative after a preset time.
case-crushing depth.
b. The mines described above may be ei-
(2) Ground mines can normally be encoun- ther mines that are fired by remote control, contact
tered in waters with depths up to 90 meters. mines, or influence mines. Contact mines will nor-
Ground mines used in antishipping minefields mally be moored mines, although drifting mines
are unlikely to be laid in depths of more than 55 can be used in this context. Influence mines can be
meters, except where these mines are laid against either moored or bottom mines.
surface targets whose draft exceeds 9 meters.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

13004 (NC) THE NATURE OF A 13006 (NC) JETTISONING MINES


MINEFIELD
The safety of the minelayer sometimes re-
As all minelaying operations will have a quires that the mines aboard be jettisoned. It is em-
lasting effect on enemy as well as own operations, phasized that jettisoned mines may become a
all sources of intelligence should be used by offi- serious hazard to friendly ships unless suitable
cers concerned with the planning of such an opera- precautions are taken. The optimum, but often un-
tion. Where independent mines have been laid, the available, places for jettisoning mines in armed
minefield presents the same danger to own forces condition are enemy shipping routes and other ar-
as to enemy forces. Operational advantages can be eas regularly used by enemy ships that will not be
achieved by the use of arming or rising delays and needed by friendly ships before the mines are ster-
sterilizers that will activate and deactivate the ilized. If the mines cannot be laid against en-
minefield at preset times. If sterilizers are not emy ships, they usually should be either
used, the minefield must be expected to create a dropped in water so deep that the mines will be
danger for years. crushed and destroyed by the pressure or dropped
in safe condition.
13005 (NR) TYPES OF MINING
13007 (NC) URGENT MINING
a. Mines. Mines can be used strategically
or tactically. Urgent mining is the laying of active mines
with correct spacing but not in the ordered or
(1) Strategic Mining would be con- planned positions. The mines may be laid inside or
ducted with the broad long-term aim of denying outside the planned area in such positions that they
the enemy free access to or use of sea areas and will hamper the movements of the enemy more
sea lines of communications considered vital to than those of own forces.
the defense of NATO territories and to the sup-
port of the war effort of the Alliance. 13008 — 13009 SPARE

(2) Tactical Mining may be conducted in 13010 (NC) MINELAYING OPERATIONS


support of a limited military objective, gener-
ally in a specified area of immediate tactical Normally the subarea commander issues or-
interest. ders for the operation. These consist of directives,
preparatory orders, and final operation orders. Mine-
b. Minefields. Mines can be used to lay laying intentions and plans must be coordinated
defensive protective fields or offensive fields. with subordinate commanders to ensure that min-
ing operations will not conflict with submarine and
(1) Defensive and Protective Mining surface force operations. Details of ordering
is normally conducted in coastal or territorial minelaying operations are given in ATP 24.
waters or in international waters and straits that
normally are under the control of a NATO na- 13011 (NC) INFORMATION TO
tion or the Alliance. FRIENDLY FORCES

(2) Offensive Mining may be conducted Although the distribution of orders should
in harbors or approaches thereto, straits, and be confined to units that are concerned directly,
territorial waters that normally are under the the position, nature, and extent of a new minefield,
control of the enemy, although under certain or an addition to an existing minefield, must be
circumstances, it may be conducted in neutral communicated to all other units that may transit
or international waters. the area. For this purpose the warning message
and worldwide Q-message systems have been in-
troduced. For details, see AHP 1.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

13034 (NC) ACTIVE MINE b. Active mine countermeasures in am-


COUNTERMEASURES phibious operations usually are the responsibility
of the advance force commander.
a. Active mine countermeasures are any
measures taken to attack a mine in its environment c. Operational command of active mine
after it has been laid. They are accomplished by countermeasures in ocean areas usually is exer-
laying out a pattern of tracks and towing or carry- cised by NATO commands.
ing equipment designed to:
d. Operational command of active mine
(1) Cut the wire of a moored mine by me- countermeasures in coastal areas is exercised by
chanical sweeping, special devices used by national authorities.
mine hunters, ordnance used by clearance
divers. e. The requirement for coordinating and
reporting MCM operations will vary from place to
(2) Detonate mines by influence sweeping place according to the local situation. However, in
(acoustic, magnetic and/or pressure). all circumstances, all commands concerned must
be kept informed of the status of the mine danger
(3) Detect mines by minehunting with so- and/or any employment of MCM gear/equipment
nar, magnetic, optical means, or clearance at a depth greater than 30 meters (98 feet).
diving. This is particularly valid for the appropriate
SUBOPAUTH.
b. These countermeasures aim at the de-
struction, neutralization, removing, or recovering f. Because of the special limitations im-
of the mines. posed on MCM units by their small size, support
of MCM operations must always be considered
c. The efficiency of active mine counter- along with command and control.
measures depends on numerous factors described
in ATP 6 and ATP 24; it is increased by use of a 13036 — 13039 SPARE
very accurate location system, good environmental
conditions, high effectiveness of the equipment, 13040 (NC) MCM OPERATIONS
and knowledge about the mines.
When enemy mining has been located,
d. Statistical methods are used for evalua- MCM forces will carry out operations to open
tion and planning of operations, but employment channels through mined waters if diversions can-
of active mine countermeasures is generally long not be established. Sometimes adverse weather,
and time-consuming for reaching an acceptable poor environmental conditions, and the use of
low level of risk. arming delays, ship counters, and other MCM-de-
feating devices, as well as mixing of mine types,
13035 (NC) COMMAND RESPONSIB- affect the clearing of a channel and make it a
ILITIES IN MINE COUNTER- time-consuming task. Channels are normally es-
MEASURES tablished to coincide with routes (for Q-routes,
see AHP 7), the centerline of the channel being
a. Self-protective mine countermeasures identical to the line connecting the route positions.
are the responsibility of the OTC and command- Channels will usually be marked by offset buoys,
ing officer. as shown in Figure 13-1. The details of ordering and
executing MCM operations are given in ATP 24.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

13060 (NC) TRANSIT OF SHIPS


THROUGH MINED AREAS —
LEAD THROUGH OPERATIONS

a. General Considerations. This article


provides convoy commodores, OTCs, and individ-
ual units with instructions for maneuvering via a lead
through operation (LTO) through mined waters.

(1) The object of a LTO is to pilot vessels


that are without the appropriate navigation ca-
pability through mined areas. The aim of the
Vessel Transiting the Minefield (VTM) is to
pass over the same ground as the lead through
vessel (LTV). To achieve this, a simple com-
munication code that can be used in all
EMCON states, by day or by night, both by
LTVs and other warships and merchant ships
alike, is contained in ATP 1, Vol. II.

(2) The responsibility for the safety of mer-


(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
chant shipping rests with the appropriate OCA.
Figure 13-1. (NU) Normal Channel With The OCA of transiting units must decide
Offset Buoys whether merchant shipping will, or will not,
transit mined areas. The decision to pass naval
units through mined waters rests with their OTC.
Convoy commodores and OTCs of naval units
13050 (NC) SUPPORT OF MCM must ensure that their masters/captains are in-
OPERATIONS formed about lead through procedures. The
senior OTC of the naval forces afloat assigns
An MCM force will often need protection tactical control to MCM forces in order to
from a covering force. When operating in mined conduct the leadthrough phase. In the case of
water, MCM forces are limited in their ability to convoy independents, tactical control of the
maneuver in channels and avoiding action cannot lead through operation is to be assigned to LTV
be taken before the gear has been recovered. This forces by the OCA. MCM authorities provide
makes the MCM force vulnerable to enemy attack. information related to the transit.
The covering force should be able to provide close
antiair warfare protection for the MCM force and (3) Communications. It is important that
at the same time deny the approach of enemy sur- the MCM tasking authority and the OCA of
face forces. Warning should be issued in due time transiting units establish clear, reliable commu-
in order to enable the MCM force to take avoiding nications between themselves and their subor-
action. The OTC of the covering force will normally dinate units at sea. Figure 13-2 shows the
act in command relationship situation C. The OTCs sources and responsibilities for the flow of
must ensure that there is a clear understanding be- information in situations that may arise when
tween the two forces as to their relative move- units transit mined areas. Electronic emissions
ments, communications, tactical limitations, etc. should be reduced to the absolute minimum as
required by the tactical situation.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(a) General. In restricted or covert “ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE,” etc.,


EMCON states, the primary method of LTO should be added to “GUIDEDOG.”
communications may be limited to light or
flag hoist. However, rapid tactical commu- ii. If more than one LTV is oper-
nications by light with merchant vessels and ating in the same area, then suffix
indeed with some auxiliaries or warships is “ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE,” etc.,
likely to be difficult or even impossible at should be added to “SHEEP” to match
times for various technical or tactical rea- the respective “GUIDEDOG” suffix.
sons. The use of radios may be further re-
stricted according to the type fitted. iii. If more than one vessel is be-
ing led through, then suffix “ONE,
(b) Standardization. The table of TWO, THREE,” etc., should be added
signals in ATP 1, Vol. II, is to be used be- to “SHEEP.”
tween all vessels involved in LTO, irrespec-
tive of the means of transmission, thereby -EXAMPLE-
avoiding any misunderstanding among the
different nationalities involved. GUIDEDOG BRAVO, THIS IS SHEEP
BRAVO TWO, OVER.
(c) Amplification. Use may also be
made of other supplementary tactical signal (f) Merchant Vessels. Modern
groups from ATP 1, Vol. II, when operating merchant vessels do not carry UHF, nor are
with warships, or ATP 2, Vol. II, and the In- they configured for flag hoists or manned
ternational Code of Signals (INTERCO) for communications by light. Work has
when operating with merchant vessels. been conducted by the NATO Shipping
Work Group (NSWG), via SACLANT
(d) Security. Daily changing call (C-182) to identify viable alternative com-
signs should be used on all uncovered munication systems to VHF, but until such
communications circuits. Ship names or in- a system has been accepted into service,
ternational call signs may be used when IMM VHF remains the primary means of
communicating in the VHF (IMM) band in communication (1997).
the vicinity of merchant vessels, but only if
the COMSEC policy permits. Further de- (g) INTERCO. There is no special
tails are listed in ATP 1, ATP 2, and APP 1. “NEGAT” flag in the International Code of
flags. If visual INTERCO signals have to be
(e) When either the tactical situation or used, then Flag “N,” followed by “TACK,”
COMSEC policy precludes the overt use of is to be used for the purpose of expressing
ship names or international call signs on un- the converse meaning of a signal. However,
covered VHF/UHF voice circuits, the fol- if using voice INTERCO procedures, the
lowing brevity code words should be used: word “TACK” must NOT be used; Flag
“N” is to be substituted by using the pro-
Unit Call sign word “NEGAT.”

-EXAMPLES-
LTV “GUIDEDOG”
(1) Visual: N TACK XAX
VTM “SHEEP”
(2) Voice: NEGAT FLAG XRAY ALFA
i. If more than one LTV is operat-
XRAY
ing in the same area, then suffix

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Note: The International Flag outfit, as held intervals. In this case they will be warned in ad-
by merchant ships, contains numerical pen- vance by the OTC of the MCM force.
nants and NOT number flags. The first mer-
chant ship will repeat the signal for the benefit b. Safety Measures and Prepara-
of those ships astern; in the absence of such tions. Take action in accordance with paragraph
signals, subsequent ships should endeavor to 13033a.
pass over the same ground as the LTV or their
next ahead. (1) When a convoy is approaching:

(4) Units being led (VTM) and transiting a (a) The Convoy Commodore must form
swept/hunted channel should sail at minimum his convoy into a single column formation.
steerageway and keep station on the LTV or Intership spacing should be in accordance
lead unit, or navigate by radio direction finding with paragraph 13060a(4), depending on sizes of
(if available) or radar (if permitted by EMCON the ships and the navigational facilities. As
policy), in order to proceed on the centerline or a general rule, intership spacing should not
on another track as ordered. The LTV is to exceed 1,000 yards.
maintain distance between the first VTM and
distance between units being led should be the (b) A naval force should pass in a sin-
minimum feasible; it should be kept in mind gle column formation at standard distance
that the shorter the distance between the ships or less if possible.
in column, the less the danger from influence
mines with regard to the mines’ intercount dor- NOTE
mant period. Warships can be led at 250 yards,
whilst merchant ships should normally be led at Other distances may be indicated by
500 to 1,000 yards, depending on size. It should the OTC of the MCM force.
be noted that VLCCs rarely have clear visibil-
ity, ahead on the waterline, within 700 yards, (2) If an entry/departure screen has to be
and some merchant vessels lose steerageway established by escort forces, patrol sectors must
whilst at relatively high speeds. be at least 500 yards off the mine danger area.

(5) One LTV can lead a maximum of three (3) If rendezvous with an LTV/MCM force
VTMs through a mined area; a ratio of one LTV is expected during darkness, the first unit to be
to one VTM is ideal. led of the column is to show three white lights
displaced vertically at her bow for identifica-
(6) MCMVs may be used to lead, but this tion purposes. The LTV will point the rendez-
should not preclude the use of other units that vous position, showing a white light over red. If
have suitably qualified personnel, such as pilots, more than one LTV is employed, only the first
and navigation equipment that is accurate and LTV will show the lights mentioned. Other
repeatable, in particular DGPS. LTVs are to proceed to their assigned stations
and to show those lights after arrival.
(7) Navigation. The navigation of the
LTV must be accurate and repeatable. The Pre- (4) Proceed along the centerline (Figure
cise Navigation System (PNS) and Differential 13-1) or along another indicated track, each
Global Positioning System (DGPS), if avail- unit navigating independently.
able, are the preferred methods of navigation.
Radar danning is the best alternative method if (5) The LTV only is to adjust speed to
Radio Fixing Aids (RFAs) are not available. maintain the signaled distance (see paragraph
13060a(4)).
(8) In some MCM operations, units may
h av e t o t ransit t he channel at spe c ifie d (6) The speed ordered should not be
exceeded.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

c. Situations. Table 13-1 provides a list (a) Conduct the lead through operation.
of actions for transiting units that applies to situa-
tions involving: (b) Ensure that ordered distances are
maintained.
(1) Mine danger area known/not known.
(c) Ensure that Vessels Transiting the
(2) Channels established/not established. Minefield (VTMs) maintain the ordered
track or centerline.
(3) MCM forces available/not available.
e. Units Damaged by Mines. Units
d. Responsibilities. damaged by mine detonation and unable to pro-
ceed at the ordered speed should attempt to ma-
(1) Arrival Time. From 36 to 48 hours in neuver clear of the channel’s centerline. In narrow
advance of arrival, the OCA of the transiting and shallow channels, such as harbor entrances,
unit shall: heavily damaged or sinking units should be
grounded outside the main channel.
(a) Inform the respective MCM task-
ing authority about the ETA and composition f. Transit Instructions. A naval force,
of a convoy/naval force that has to transit a convoy, or independent unit about to be led
certain channel, using the Lead Through through, or transiting a channel without a LTV,
Order format of APP 4. will be passed relevant instructions using the Lead
Through Transit Instructions format of APP 4;
(b) Inform the OTC of transiting merchant vessels will use ATP 2, Vol. II.
units/Convoy Commodore about MCM
data, including valid Q-messages and 13061 (NC) TRANSIT OF SUBMARINES
NAVWARNs, using the Leadthrough Infor- THROUGH MINED AREAS
mation format of APP 4.
a. General Remarks.
(2) MCM Tasking Authority. The
MCM tasking authority shall: (1) Purpose. The purpose of this article
is to provide the commanding officer of a sub-
(a) In accordance with the Lead marine with instructions for maneuvering in
Through Order, give the appropriate order mine danger areas. The prescribed procedure can
to the OTC of the MCM force to execute the also be applied for a submarine passage be-
leadthrough operation. tween minefields, through an established chan-
nel in an enemy minefield or a gap in a friendly
(b) Provide information as shown by minefield, or in waters difficult to navigate.
Figure 13-2.
(2) If a Leadthrough Operation is Or-
(3) OTC of MCM Forces. The OTC of dered. The OTC of the MCM force is required
MCM forces shall provide information in ac- in accordance with paragraph 13060 to send the
cordance with paragraph 13060.f, 4 hours (2 Transit Instructions message to the SUBOP-
hours for coastal convoys) in advance. He may AUTH, who in due time will promulgate the
delegate this task to the LTV or MCMV that has message. The format must be amplified by the
been ordered to execute the leadthrough. SUBOPAUTH/OTC of the MCM force by a
new paragraph, as follows:
(4) The Lead Through Vessel (LTV).
The LTV shall:

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Table 13-1. (NU) Actions for Transiting Units in Mine Danger Areas

Situation LTV/MCM Forces Transiting Units


ONE May or may not be UNITS NEED NOT BE LED
available.
Mine danger area known 1. Conform with instructions in the latest appropriate:
and channel established,
promulgated, and marked. (a) Q message
(b) SUBAREA WARN
(c) MERSHIP WARN
(d) Routing/transit instructions
(e) Channel information.

2. Comply with appropriate safety measures.

TWO Available UNITS MUST BE LED

Mine danger area being es- 1. BEFORE ARRIVAL at danger area or channel entrance:
tablished, channel being
established, and channel (a) OTC or Convoy Commodore set watch on MCM
may be marked. tactical frequency (HF/UHF), establish communi-
cations 4 to 2 hours before ETA, and pass relevant
MCM operations information to units in company.
(b) Keep OTC of MCM force informed of first unit’s ETA.
(c) Prepare to comply with appropriate safety measures.

2. AFTER ARRIVAL at channel entrance:

(a) Comply with instructions from OTC of MCM force


and LTV.
(b) Maintain signaled distance on channel centerline
or ordered track.
(c) Comply with appropriate safety measures.

THREE Available SAME AS FOR SITUATION TWO


Mine danger area not estab-
lished and channel not Not available TRANSITING UNITS NOT YET IN A MINED AREA
established.
1. Consider diversion if permissible.
2. Comply with appropriate safety measures.
3. Inform the OCA.

TRANSITING UNITS IN A MINE DANGER AREA

1. Continue transit.
2. Comply with appropriate safety measures.
3. Inform the OCA, if appropriate.

FOUR Available SUBMARINE MUST BE LED


Navigational assistance for Comply with paragraph 13061.
submarines.

(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

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(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 13-2. (NU) Information Flow for Transits of Mined Waters

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 13-17 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

F. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR paragraph b.(2)(a) below, up to the moment


SUBMARINES when the submarine starts to communicate. The
1. Rendezvous area danrunner should mark the channel entrance in
2. Rendezvous period/alternate rendezvous a position very close to the first datum/danbuoy,
period and subsequently proceed on the datum line, tak-
3. Danrunner will be unit indicated ing up position abeam of the LTV.
4. Distance between danrunner and LTV,
in yards b. The Lead Through.
5. Communication instructions (frequencies;
UWT available/not available). (1) Initial Rendezvous/Rendezvous
Area. A geographical rendezvous area (ideally
(3) The Principle for a Lead Through circular with a radius of 2 nm) should be estab-
Operation. This should be to conceal the ini- lished well offset from the channel/gap en-
tial rendezvous between submarine and LTV trance. The actual location and shape of the
from the enemy. All measures that would dis- rendezvous area depend on various factors,
close the operation must be avoided. Only units such as time available, tactical situations, to-
equipped with underwater telephone (UWT) pography, and environmental conditions. Any
are suitable as LTVs/danrunners for submerged information in addition to that listed in the
submarines. Transit Instructions message should be ex-
changed prior to the lead through.
(4) Channel. The channel has to be estab-
lished in accordance with the appropriate mine (2) Establishing Rendezvous.
warfare publications. All positions in the chan-
nel at which a change of course is required must (a) Action to be taken by LTV.
be marked by either a navigational buoy or
a danbuoy. i. Be in rendezvous area during
rendezvous period/alternate rendez-
NOTE
vous period.
A typical MCM channel is shown in
ii. Keep watch on UWT, UHF,
Figure 13-1.
and VHF every 15 minutes.
(5) Responsibility for Submarine
iii. Cavitate for 3 to 5 minutes in
Safety. This rests with the commanding offi-
rendezvous period.
cer of the submarine. The decisions whether to
pass or not/whether to pass surfaced or sub-
iv. If necessary, after communi-
merged is also up to the commanding officer of
cations are established, pass to the sub-
the submarine. It is of paramount importance
marine additional information/orders,
that submarine and LTV act in agreement and
and any alterations to the original plan,
that mutual information does not create any
with reference to the Transit Instruc-
doubts about the actions to be taken. Tactical
tions message.
control, from the rendezvous until the end of
the passage, is assigned to the OTC of the MCM
v. When the submarine reports
forces/commanding officer of the LTV.
“In station,” proceed at speed previously
ordered.
(6) Identification of Lead Through
Vessels (LTVs). As long as the approaching NOTE
submarine has not positively identified its LTV,
it remains absolutely covert. After identifica- The LTV should endeavor by all suit-
tion, the submarine has to establish communi- able means to assist the submarine dur-
cations with the LTV by appropriate means, ing the difficult identification phase.
taking into account the secrecy of the lead-
through. The LTV has to act in accordance with

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL 13-18 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(b) Action to be taken by the – When it leaves the channel/


submarine. gap/safety lane.

i. Approach rendezvous area. – When it is released.

ii. Identify LTV by appropriate iii. Assist the submarine in main-


means. taining station, using all suitable
means, such as:
iii. Establish communication
with the LTV on UWT/UHF using – Showing a dimmed stern
authentication. light and top light at night.

iv. Take station astern of the – Using a danrunner (Situa-


LTV. tion ONE/TWO) as UWT relay
station in order to assist the sub-
v. Inform the LTV whether it will marine in measuring the distance
transit submerged, at periscope depth, to the LTV, if the latter is unable
or surfaced. to keep distance.

vi. Comply with transit instruc- iv. Report accomplishment of


tions received. mission to SU BO PA U TH by
OPCON.
vii. Report when “In station.”
(b) Responsibilities of the Submarine.
viii. Action to be taken on failure
to rendezvous. OTC of MCM forces to i. Maintain station ordered.
report to OPCON/SUBOPAUTH.
ii. Inform the LTV whether its in-
(3) Responsibilities During Transit. tention is to transit surfaced, at peri-
scope depth, or submerged during the
(a) Responsibilities of LTV. passage, if different from previous
intentions.
i. Provide the submarine with
up-to-date information: c. Independent Transit. The tactical
situation or the non-availability of LTVs may
– When it enters/leaves the force a submarine to transit a well-marked channel
swept channel/gap/safety lane. or a mine free gap (Situation ONE) without a
LTV. The SUBOPAUTH will order such inde-
– On altering course and/or pendent transits of a submarine.
speed.
(1) Responsibilities of the
– If there is any change to SUBOPAUTH.
previous instructions.
(a) Transmit Transit Instructions
– Action to be taken in the message to submarine in due time.
event of attack.
(b) Ensure own forces are informed
ii. Provide the submarine with an about submarine movement.
up-to-date position:

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

(2) Responsibilities of Submarine.

(a) Act in accordance with safety


measures and procedures prescribed in this
chapter.

(b) Request activation of navigational


lights in accordance with AHP 3, if feasible.

(c) Report ETA channel/gap entrance


if possible.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL)
d. Submarine Capabilities in Lead Figure 13-3. (NU) Measuring the Distance
Through Operations. of the Lead Vessel
(1) Submerged State. (b) Measure the distance of the LTV
by:
(a) The submarine is capable of:
i. A ngle me a suring by
i. Taking a bearing on the LTV: hydrophone array as shown above.
– By hydrophone array. ii. Mine detection sonar.
– By mine detection sonar. iii. Radar.
ii. Measuring the distance of the iv. Periscope.
LTV:
(3) Surfaced State. The submarine can:
– By angle measuring using
hydrophone array. The distance (a) Take a bearing on the LTV by:
between the submarine and the
LTV is calculated by measuring i. Hydrophone array.
the angle between danrunner and
LTV; e.g., if the distance ordered ii. Radar.
is 300 yards, this angle is to be 70°
at a distance of 900 yards between iii. Visual means.
danrunner and LTV. (See Figure
13-3.) (b) Measure the distance of the LTV
by:
– By mine detection sonar.
i. A ngle me a suring by
(2) Periscope Depth. The submarine can: hydrophone array as shown above.
(a) Take a bearing on the LTV by: ii. Radar.
i. Hydrophone array. iii. Visual means.
ii. Mine detection sonar. (4) Communications.
iii. Radar. (a) The submarine will use:
iv. Periscope.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

i. UWT as the primary commu- d. OPCON Authority. The OPCON au-


nication system. thority will detach MCMVs, if available, to con-
duct active mine countermeasures, preferably:
ii. UHF as ordered.
(1) Clearance diving in the vicinity of ships
(b) In case of interference with UWT at anchor.
traffic by the wake of the LTV, the
danrunner has to be used as relay station. If (2) Minehunting in link routes, exit chan-
this is not possible, switch to UHF frequency. nels, and close to ships at anchor.

13062 (NC) EVACUATION OF (3) Minesweeping in channels where they


ANCHORAGES are not endangering units at anchor.

a. Passive and Active Mine Counter- e. No MCM Vessels Available. If no


measures. The passive and active mine counter- MCMVs are available, the OPCON authority will signal
measures to protect merchant and naval ships further intentions.
from the danger of mines in anchorages, and mea-
sures to move those units to safe waters, are cov- 13063 (NC) REPORTING MINE
ered by the term, “evacuation.” EXPLOSIONS/DETECTIONS

b. Passive Mine Countermeasures. Ships Every ship detonating a mine or detecting a


caught in an anchorage by an enemy surprise min- moored mine or a drifting mine case, whether
ing campaign should remain there until further or- damaged or not, shall make a mine detection re-
ders, initiating passive mine countermeasures port (MINEDETREP) to the OPCON authority in-
immediately. forming the OTC of the MCM force if in contact
with that force. If doubt exists as to which unit ac-
c. Anchorage Standing Orders. All units tivated a particular mine, the nearest ship is to re-
will receive Anchorage Standing Orders (in accor- port. The report does not substitute for any other
dance with Chapter 4 of ATP 6, Vol. I), for infor- report requested. A structured MINEDETREP
mation about procedures in a mined area. message format can be found in APP 4.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

CHAPTER 14

Defense Against Underwater Attack in Harbor

14000 (NR) INTRODUCTION (3) Directional lanterns only to be used to


investigate suspicious activity.
In times of tension, as well as in war, ships
at anchor or at berths are liable to clandestine at- (4) Underwater illumination only to be used
tack. Such attack may take various forms (e.g., in vulnerable area during a defensive search or
underwater swimmers or floating mines). It is im- when it is known that an attack is in progress.
portant that provision be made within a force, as
well as in individual ships, for an organization to (5) Diver-borne lights to be used without
coordinate defense and establish degrees of readi- restriction during underwater searches.
ness against this threat. Command responsibilities
are in Chapter 1. c. Radar. Radars should be employed and
the sea area around the ship should be kept clear of
a. Diving. All operations involving divers, floating material to minimize false alerts. Tracks
including bottom search operations, must be con- should be maintained of all contacts, including
ducted in accordance with ADivP-1, Allied Guide friendly boats patroling the area.
to Diving Operations.
d. Sonar. High-power active sonars
should be employed to deter swimmers from clos-
14010 (NR) DEFENSE AGAINST ATTACK ing the ship. Passive sonars and underwater tele-
BY UNDERWATER SWIMMERS phone (UWT) may give warning of approaching
(OPERATION AWKWARD) swimmers and small craft.

14011 (NR) COUNTERMEASURES e. Boat Patrols. Boats equipped with


portable radio sets and carrying a supply of explo-
The following countermeasures should be sive scare charges should be used to patrol the area
taken whenever a threat of attack by underwater around the ships. Boats should also be fitted with
swimmers is deemed to exist: towed obstructors (e.g., barbed wire, grapnels) to
increase the danger to swimmers.
a. Sentries. Armed sentries (equipped
with directional lanterns at night) should be at the f. Scare Charges. Charges of approxi-
bow, amidships, and at the stern of each ship. They mately 1-pound weight should be dropped from
should be briefed to keep a good lookout near the boats and thrown well clear of the side of ship(s) at
ship's side, particularly in the vulnerable area irregular intervals. The rate of exploding charges
around the propellers and rudders, for swimmers will vary, depending on degree of threat and size
or any suspicious or unusual activity (e.g., bub- of ship (e.g., destroyer at AWKWARD State 1 —
bles, flotsam, or local boats passing close). approximately 30 charges per hour).

b. Illumination. Illumination policy g. Ship's Propellers. Propellers should


should be: be turned ahead or astern at random intervals to
hamper the operations of enemy swimmers.
(1) Ships darkened.
h. Helicopters. Helicopters are a most
(2) Ships anchored clear of shore lights to effective unit for use in AWKWARD. The OTC
avoid silhouetting. should provide a flight program to cover the three
AWKWARD states.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

14012 (NC) ORGANIZATION (2) Commanding Officer. The com-


manding officer (the OTC in the case of a group
a. Seaward Defense Organization of ships) shall contact the officer in charge of
Available. Upon arrival of one or more ships, ac- the Seaward Defense Organization with regard
tion to be taken shall be as follows: to countermeasures to be adopted, in particular:

(1) Officer in Charge of the Seaward (a) The use of radar, sonar, and hydro-
Defense Organization. He shall provide the phone by ships.
arriving ship(s) with the following material and
information if it is not already held by them: (b) The times at which scare charges
are to be dropped and the number of
(a) Chart showing fixed targets and charges.
facilities in the base (nets and booms, dry
docks, and so forth) and their identification (c) The intentions for silent routine.
symbols.
(d) Search of ship's bottom and adja-
(b) Chart showing the defense ar- cent sea bed by shipborne divers, times of
rangements and the location of seaward de- search, and number of divers employed by
fense weapons and facilities. each ship. Searches should be conducted at
random intervals.
(c) Chart showing berths and anchor
berths assigned to each ship. (e) The numbers of boats to be pro-
vided by ships for the surveillance of the
(d) Charts showing suitable positions waters surrounding them.
for beaching ships.
(f) The location of ships's lookout sta-
(e) Chart showing the track of perma- tions and assigned sectors to integrate with
nent or occasional patrols by Seaward De- the sectors covered by the stations to the
fense Organization boats. Seaward Defense Organization.

(f) Chart showing the location and (g) The channels available for quick
sectors assigned to the Seaward Defense communications with the Seaward Defense
Organization lookout stations. Organization.

(g) Rules governing the use of anti- (h) Area lighting conditions and
swimmer charges. recommendations.

(h) Communication plan for the Sea- b. Seaward Defense Organization


ward Defense Organization. Not Available. The commanding officer of a
ship (the OTC in the case of a group of ships) is re-
(i) Organize a flight program for sponsible for making all necessary arrangements
available helicopters. on the same lines as in paragraph a. to ensure the
safety of the ship(s).

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

14013 (NC) STATES OF READINESS (8) Prepare diving safety boat if available.

States of readiness (Operation AWK- b. State 2.


WARD states) which may be ordered either by the
OTC of an anchorage or by the operational com- (1) Each ship drop scare charges at irregu-
mander ashore are shown below: lar intervals. (Not more than 10 charges should
be dropped each hour.)
State When Ordered
(2) Assume second or third degree of dam-
1 1. Actual evidence of an attack has age control readiness as appropriate.
been obtained (e.g., sighting of swim-
mers or their bubble tracks). (3) Retain on board sufficient divers to
carry out a ship's bottom search.
2. Int el ligence report s a tta c k
imminent.
(4) Come to 1 hour's notice.
2 1. In ports known to contain hostile
elements. (5) Post further sentries.

2. Intelligence reports attack probable (6) Rig bottom lines if not already rigged.
at some unspecified time (e.g., not (Bottom lines are lines passing from one side of
imminent). the ship to the other, beneath the hull, for the as-
sistance of divers.)
3 On all occasions when ships may be
subjected to clandestine attack but (7) Send away one boat to carry out irregu-
which are not covered by States 1 or 2.
lar patrols in the vicinity of the ship.

14014 (NC) ACTION TO BE TAKEN (8) Set watch on the main harbor intercom-
BY INDIVIDUAL SHIPS WHEN munications net and/or appropriate local com-
OPERATION AWKWARD IS munications net as laid down in local orders.
ORDERED Set visual signaling (V/S) watch.

a. State 3. (9) Darken ship.

(1) Have scare charges readily available. (10) Helicopter, if available, airborne to
carry out:
(2) Assume appropriate degree of damage
control readiness. (a) Visual search of coastline and
breakwaters.
(3) Retain on board one watch of divers
sufficient to carry out a ship's bottom search. (b) Visual search for swimmers.

(4) Rig bottom lines. (c) Identification of boats.

(5) Post sentries as required. NOTE

( 6 ) M ai ntai n normal ha rbor Where underwater illuminations are


communications. required by local orders and are known
to be effective, they should be rigged
(7) Darken ship. at this stage.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

c. State 1. (d) Divers commence bottom search


schemes as appropriate.
(1) Commence dropping scare charges, ir-
regularly spaced and at random intervals. (e) Request assistance of explosive
ordnance disposal team (EODT) or under-
(2) Darken ship. water demolition team (UDT).

(3) Assume first degree of damage control NOTE


readiness.
Charges of explosive weight greater
(4) Send boats on irregular patrols in vicin- than 1 pound should not be fired
ity of the ship. within 400 yards of ships operating
divers.
(5) Come to immediate notice.
(11) Helicopter, if available, airborne to
(6) Ships move propellers slow astern (or carry out:
ahead if mooring prevents moving astern).
(a) Visual search of coastline and
(7) In ships equipped with high-powered breakwaters.
sonar, all-around transmissions should be car-
ried out and, in sets so fitted, range scale and/or (b) Visual search for swimmers.
pulse length should be changed at random as
frequently as possible. (c) Identification of boats.

(8) Be ready to commence search of ship's 14015 — 14019 SPARE


hull within 5 minutes.
14020 (NR) ACTION AFTER ATTACK
(9) Set watch on main harbor intercom-
munications net and/or appropriate local com- In warships, the search for limpet mines is
munications net as laid down in local orders. the responsibility of the ships' own divers. Any
Set visual signaling (V/S) watch. limpets found are to be dealt with by an officer
qualified in rendering mines safe if such an offi-
(10) If there are definite indications of at- cer is available. If no such officer is available,
tack on own ship: one of the ship's officers must undertake this
task in accordance with instructions based on
(a) Inform all ships. available knowledge of enemy limpet mines.
Clearing limpets from the hulls of merchant
(b) Stop firing scare charges and ships is the responsibility of EODTs. In either
cease sonar emissions from own ship prior case, speed is essential; every effort is to be
to divers entering the water. made to find and remove or render safe a limpet
mine after it is discovered on any part of the ship
(c) Warn all ships to stop firing scare as soon as possible. Ships are to take all appro-
charges within 200 yards of ship being priate measures to minimize the effect of an ex-
searched and to stop sonar emissions which plosion should such occur before a limpet can be
may prove dangerous to own divers. removed or rendered safe.

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NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

ANNEX A

List of Acronyms

A DLI. Deck-launched interceptor.


DLRP. Data link reference point
AAR. Air-to-air refueling DME. Distance measuring equipment
AAW (C&R). Combined AAW coordination and DS. Direct support
reporting voice circuit. DTAS. Depressed towed array system
AC. Air coordinator
ACM. Acoustic countermeasures E
ACU. Air control unit
AEW. Airborne early warning EAW. Electronic and acoustic warfare
APM. Acoustic protective measures ECM. Electronic countermeasures
ARCN. Air reporting and control net ELINT. Electronic intelligence
AREC. Air resource element coordinator EMC. Electromagnetic compatibility
ARM. Antiradiation missile EMCON. Emission control
AS. Associated support EMI. Electromagnetic interference
ASAG. Air surface action group EMSEC. Emission security
ASMD. Antiship missile defense EOB. Electronic order of battle
ASSM. Antisurface ship missile EP. Emission policy
ASW. Antisubmarine warfare EPM. Electronic protective measures
ASWC. Antisubmarine warfare commander ER. Extended range.
ASWFA. ASW free area ESM. Electronic warfare support measures
AW. Acoustic warfare ESOR. Emergency standoff range
AWNIS. Allied Worldwide Navigation Informa- ETA. Estimated time of arrival
tion System ETD. Estimated time of departure
AWSM. Acoustic warfare support measures EW. Electronic warfare
EWC. Electronic warfare coordinator
C EWCC. Electronic warfare coordination cell

CAP. Combat air patrol F


CATAS. Critical angle towed array system
CEO. Convoy escort oiler FEZ. Fighter engagement zone
CHOP. Change of operational control FL. Flight level
CMA. Contact motion analysis FLRP. Fighter link reference point.
COMINT. Communications intelligence FNCS. Full naval control of shipping
COMPLAN. Communication plan FTC - A. Force track coordinator (air)
COMSEC. Communications security FTC - S. Force track coordinator (surface)
CPA. Closest point of approach. FTC - SS. Force track coordinator (subsurface)
CWC. Composite warfare commander FW. Fixed wing

D H

DF. Direction finding HAG. Helicopter action group


DLA. Data link address. HEC. Helicopter element coordinator

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED A-1 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

HOJ. Home-on jam N


HRP. Helicopter reference point
HVU. High value unit NCS. Naval control of shipping; net control sta-
tion
I NCSO. Naval control of shipping officer
NCSORG. Naval control of shipping organization
ICAO. International Civil Aeronautical NCSRC. Naval control of shipping region
Organization commander
IFM. Instantaneous frequency measurements NEDB. NATO Emitter Data Base
IFR. Instrument flight rules NLO. Naval liaison officer
IMC. Instrument meteorological conditions NSA. National shipping authority
INS. Inertial navigation system. NSCC. NATO Surveillance Coordination Center
IR. Infrared
ISR. Identification safety range O

J OCA. Operational control authority


OPCON. Operational control
JAAWSC. Joint AAW support and coordination OSOR. Operational standoff range
JRFL. Joint Restricted Frequency OSSC. On-scene surveillance coordinator
JTAA. Joint action area OTHT. Over-the-horizon targeting
OTSR. Optimum track ship routing
L
P
LFAS. Low frequency active sonar
LPI. Low probability of intercept PIM. Position and intended movement
LRI. Limited range intercept PMI. Prevention of mutual interference
LTO. Lead through operations POB. Persons on board
LTV. Lead through vessel PRF. Pulse repetition frequency

M R

MACA. Maritime air control authority RAS. Replenishment at sea


MAD. Magnetic anomaly detector RNCS. Regional naval control of shipping
MADVEC. MAD verification run ROE. Rules of Engagement
MATELO. Maritime Air Communications RSI. Radiation status indicator
Organization RTC. Reduced tactical COMPLAN
MCM. Mine countermeasures RTF. Return to force
MEZ. Missile engagement zone RW. Rotary wing
MHN. Moving haven
MHQ. Maritime headquarters S
MIJI. Meaconing, intrusion, jamming and
interference SAA. Submarine action area
SAAWC. Sector antiair warfare commander
MLA. Mean line of advance
SAC. Scene-of-action commander
MNC. Major NATO commander
SAG. Surface action group
MPA. Maritime patrol aircraft
SAM. Surface-to-air missile
MRR. Minimum risk route
MTMS. Maritime Tactical Message System SAR. Search and rescue
SAT. Submarine advisory team
MWC. Mine warfare coordinator

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED A-2 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

SATCOM. Satellite communication TDA. Torpedo danger area


SAU. Search and attack unit TDS. Tactical display system
SC. Screen commander TDZ. Torpedo danger zone
SCP. Shipping control point TEM. Target engagement message
SEC. Submarine element coordinator TF. Task force
SGSA. Submarine-generated search area TG. Task group
SIGINT. Signals intelligence
SLOC. Sea line of communication U
SLOT. Submarine launched one-way tactical
ULLZZ. Ultra-long-leg zigzag
(buoy)
SOA. Speed of advance V
SOCA. Submarine operations coordinating
authority VDS. Variable depth sonar
SOG. Speed made good over ground VECTAC. Vectored attack
SPA. Submarine patrol area VERTREP. Vertical replenishment
SRA. Shipping risk area VFR. Visual flight rules
SSL. Submarine safety lane VLLZZ. Very-long-leg zigzag
STW. Speed made good over water VMC. Visual meteorological conditions
SUBOPAUTH. Submarine operating authority V/S. Visual signaling
SURTAS. Surveillance towed array system VTM. Vessel transiting the minefield

T W

TACON. Tactical control WSM. Water space management


TACTAS. Tactical towed array system

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED A-3 (Reverse Blank) CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

helicopter windline screen. A helicopter screen vicinity of the mine or on radiations ema-
provided for a carrier temporarily during nating from the mine.
flight operations, relative to the carrier’s
track into the wind. initial point. A well-defined point, easily distin-
guishable visually and/or electronically,
high probability intercept equipment. An in- used as a starting point for the run to the
tercept receiver which will detect any trans- target; a pre-selected point on the surface
mission which illuminates its antenna, within of the earth which is used as a reference.
the wide frequency band it is designed to
cover, as soon as that transmission is made inner defense zone (IDZ). A circle around each
within a certain limiting range. CV whose radius is normally 100 nm but
may be adjusted by the CWC based on ex-
HOVERTAC. An attack conducted by a dipping pected air threats and geographic
helicopter on its own target while maintain- considerations.
ing sonar contact.
inner defense zone coordinator (IDZC). The
I TDS tasked to coordinate fighter and mis-
sile engagements within the IDZ.
identification. The assignment of one of the six
standard identities, based upon available data intercepting search. A type of search designed
and the determined identification criteria. to intercept an enemy whose previous posi-
tion is known and the limits of whose subsequent
identification criteria. Criteria laid down by the course and speed can be assumed.
OTC or delegated authority to determine
which standard identity can be assigned to a J
detected contact based on the available lo-
calization and recognition data. joining (aircraft). The procedure whereby an air-
craft commander transfers tactical control
identification/recognition. The determination of his aircraft to the OTC.
by any means of the friendly or enemy char-
acter or of the individuality of another, or of joining (ships). A ship or group of ships which
objects such as aircraft and ships, or of phe- have sailed independently and subsequently
nomena such as communications-electronics rendezvous with a main body or convoy.
patterns.
joint action area (JTAA). An area in which a sin-
identification safety range (ISR). The mini- gle friendly submarine is operating in coor-
mum range to which an aircraft may close dination with air and/or surface forces. Air
an assumed friendly force without having and surface ASW weapon employment is
been positively identified to ensure that the prohibited throughout the JTAA unless a
force does not mistake the aircraft for enemy. NOTACK area or a submarine-generated
search area (SGSA) has been established.
identify. The process of determining identity by
either recognition or identification/ Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL). A list-
recognition. ing of frequencies which map the use of the
EM spectrum within the area of responsi-
identity. The friendly or hostile character or indi- bility. The JRFL is composed of Taboo,
viduality of a contact. Protected, and Guarded Frequencies.

independent. A merchant ship under naval joint zone. An air and sea area in which friendly
control sailed singly and unescorted air, surface, and subsurface forces operate
by a warship. simultaneously.

influence mine. A mine actuated by the effect of


a target or some physical condition in the

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL Glossary-11 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

L low-probability intercept equipment. An inter-


cept receiver which employs directional an-
lame duck. An aircraft in a minor state of emer- tennas and/or variable frequency and which
gency resulting from ordnance or radio fail- will not detect a transmission unless fre-
ure, oxygen leak, or other cause. quency, direction, and polarization are in
correct coincidence with the victim at the
large ship. A ship over 450 feet (or 137 meters) instant of transmission.
in length.
M
leaver. A section of the main convoy or an inde-
pendent ship which breaks off to pro- magnetic anomaly detector (MAD). A device
ceed separately to its own prearranged which detects the presence of magnetic ma-
terminal port. terials by recording the distortions they pro-
duce in the normal magnetic field of the
line. A formation in which ships are formed earth.
along a straight line extending in any direc-
tion from the line guide but not directly MAD verification run (MADVEC). A procedure
ahead or astern. in which aircraft are vectored by information
on radar methods to carry out MAD verifica-
line abreast. A line in which ships form directly tion of a contact to assist in classification.
abeam of the line guide.
main body. Any group of warships and naval
line guide. When ships are formed in a multiple auxiliaries, or a single ship escorted by war-
line formation, the line guide is the ship oc- ships and/or aircraft, and not designated a
cupying the station in her own line that cor- convoy.
responds to that of the Guide in the Guide’s
line, or, within any line in which no ship oc- maneuvering interval. When similar ships are
cupies the corresponding station, the ship formed in a multiple line formation, maneu-
designated by the OTC. vering interval is the sum of the standard dis-
tances in the longest line, plus one standard
line of bearing. A line in which ships form in a distance; with dissimilar ships, it is the sum of
straight line on a line guide in any direction the standard distances in the longest line, plus
except ahead, astern, or abeam. the longest standard distance in any line, in-
cluding the only ship in a line if the standard
link (communications). A general term used to distance for that ship is larger than that of any
indicate the existence of communications other ship present.
facilities between two points.
material torpedo countermeasures. Noise re-
localization. The determination of positional in- duction methods, decoys, noisemakers,
formation and the movements of a contact. jammers, degaussing equipment, and so
forth, designed to reduce the effectiveness
loose line abreast. A formation in which ships of torpedoes once they have been fired.
stay within 15° of the Guide or ship indi-
cated relative to the base course. maximum effective range. The maximum dis-
tance at which a weapon may be expected
loose line of bearing. A line of bearing assumed to fire accurately to achieve the desired
on the basis of either a true or relative line of result.
bearing in which ships stay within 15° of
the bearing or its reciprocal. maximum sonar speed. The maximum speed at
which an individual ship can proceed with-
loose line of column. An approximate line of out unacceptably degrading its sonar
bearing within 15° of column in which dis- performance.
tance may be increased to reduce yawing.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

maximum speed. The highest speed at which a mercantile convoy. A convoy consisting of mer-
ship is capable of proceeding when using chant ships controlled by the Naval Control
full power. of Shipping Organization (NCSO).

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

position and intended movement (PIM). A ref- radar picket. Any ship or aircraft stationed at a
erence position established by the OTC at a distance from the force protected, for the
given time and a forecast of the course(s) purpose of increasing the radar detection
and speed(s) expected to be made good over range.
the ground.
radar silence. An imposed discipline prohibiting
precedence. A designation assigned a message the transmission by radar of electromag-
by the originator to indicate to communica- netic signals on some or all frequencies.
tion personnel the relative order of han-
dling and to the addressee the order in radio silence. A period during which all or cer-
which the message is to be noted. tain radio equipment capable of radiation
is kept inoperative.
prevention of mutual interference.
range. The distance between any given point and
1. Procedures to prevent interference be- an object or target.
tween active or between active and passive
electromagnetic or acoustic sensors of receiving ship. The ship in a replenishment unit
friendly forces. that receives the rig(s).

2. In submarine operations, a system of recognition. The determination of certain char-


procedures to prevent, on the one hand, sub- acteristics of a contact. (See also identifica-
merged collisions between friendly subma- tion/recognition.)
rines, between submerged submarines and
friendly ship towed bodies, or between sub- recognition confidence level. The degree of
merged submarines and any other underwa- probability with which the recognition
ter object, and, on the other hand, level is established.
interference with any underwater event.
recognition level. The level to which a contact
probe. Any aircraft which carries out the visual must be recognized as to platform type,
identification of a specific target which has class, or individuality.
previously been located by another means.
recognized picture. A compiled plot which satis-
prudent limit of endurance. The time during fies the established criteria: the result of the
which an aircraft can remain airborne and still picture compilation process.
retain a given safety margin of fuel.
reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to ob-
Q tain, by visual observation or by other
detection methods, information about
QQ. The standard position in the force for the the activities and resources of an enemy
center of the front of the main body or con- or potential enemy; or to secure data con-
voy when not in circular formation. cerning the meteorological, hydrographic,
or geographic characteristics of a particu-
R lar area.

radar. Radio detection and ranging equipment reference position. The OTC’s promulgated es-
that determines the distance and usually the timate of his navigational position at a
direction of objects by transmission and re- given time.
turn of electromagnetic energy.
Regional Naval Control of Shipping (RNCS).
radar coverage. The limits within which ob- Naval Control of Shipping measures intro-
jects can be detected by one or more ra- duced within a limited area. RNCS is vol-
dar stations. untary unless compulsion is imposed by
national authorities or written into a charter
party.

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL Glossary-15 CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

release criteria. Criteria laid down by the OTC or safety zone. An area (land, sea, or air) reserved
delegated authority to be satisfied before for noncombat operations of friendly air-
weapon employment is authorized. craft, surface ships, submarines, or ground
forces.
rendezvous. A pre-arranged meeting at a given
time and location from which to begin an scene of action commander (SAC). The officer
action or phase of an operation, or to which who assumes tactical control of assigned
to return after an operation. units in a limited area, operating against a
specific contact or datum. (Until such time
replenishment at sea (RAS). Those operations as a SAU is formally detached, the first unit
required to make a transfer at sea of person- reporting contact by any means (sonar, radar,
nel and/or materiel. visual, or ESM) shall be deemed to be the
scene of action commander.)
replenishment course and speed. The course
and speed ordered by the OTC for the re- screen. An arrangement of ships, aircraft,
plenishment unit’s guide. and/ or submarines to protect a main
body or convoy.
replenishment ships. Ships loaded with or sup-
plying certain supplies and services to war- screen center. The point on which screen units
ships at sea. are stationed, normally QQ or ZZ.

replenishment unit. A group of ships consisting screen unit. A surface ship, fixed-wing aircraft,
of one or more delivering ships with one or helicopter, or submarine employed in a
more receiving ships replenishing and ships screen.
in waiting and/or lifeguard stations.
search. A systematic investigation of a particu-
rescue combat air patrol. Combat air patrol lar area to establish the presence or the ab-
which provides cover for a search and res- sence of (a) specific contact(s).
cue operation.
search attack unit (SAU) . The designation
restricted area. An area or airspace of defined given to a unit separately organized or dis-
dimensions in which there are special re- patched from a formation to search for and
strictive measures to prevent or minimize attack submarines.
interference between friendly forces.
search axis. The reference bearing on which an
rhumb line. A line on the surface of the earth ASW search is oriented.
transecting all meridians at the same angle.
search center. The origin or reference point of
route. The prescribed course to be traveled from an ASW search when established at a point
a specific point of origin to a specific other than datum.
destination.
sector. A defense area designated by boundaries
S within which a unit operates, and for which
it is responsible.
safety lanes. Specified sea lanes designated
for use in transit by submarines and sur- sector method. The method of stationing units
face ships in order to prevent attack by by designating sectors defined by bound-
friendly forces. aries and depth limits from screen center.

safety sector. An airspace in the AAW area in sector screen. A screen in which individual
which aircraft are safe from attack by units are assigned particular sectors of re-
friendly fighters, missiles, or self-defense sponsibility according to their sensors and
weapons. capabilities.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

seduction. Measures taken to break or move an self-protection mine countermeasures. All


enemy weapon control or missile homing countermeasures, active or passive, taken by
system away from its selected target. ships underway for their self-protection.

self-identification. The indication by any act or SELFTAC. An attack conducted by a dipping he-
means of your own friendly character or licopter on its own target after the helicop-
individuality. ter has broken dip.

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

transfer. The distance gained by a ship at right although variable in depth, are not usually
angles to the original course while turning. included.

transfer station. A ship’s designated area vectored attack (VECTAC). An attack in which
equipped for replenishment at sea. a weapon-carrying unit (air, surface, or
subsurface) not holding contact on the tar-
TT. The standard position in the force for the get is vectored to the weapon delivery point
present position of the originator of the by a unit which holds contact on the target.
message.
vectoring (aircraft). The directional control of
turning circle. The path of a ship with a constant an inflight aircraft through transmissions of
rudder angle. azimuth headings.

turn-together. A maneuver in which all ships vertical replenishment (VERTREP). The use of
turn simultaneously, maintaining their true helicopters for the transfer of stores and/or
bearings and distances from the Guide. ammunition from ship-to-ship or
ship-to-shore.
type organization. The organization of units
normally of the same type into flotillas/ VICTOR LIMA (VL). A reference point used as an
groups, squadrons, divisions, and subdivi- AAW grid origin.
sions mainly for administrative and logistic
purposes. visual call sign. A call sign provided primarily
for visual signaling.
U
voice call sign. A call sign provided primarily
underway replenishment force. Replenish- for voice communications.
ment ships, together with their escort,
which provide replenishment services to a W
force at sea.
WARM. War Reserve Modes. Characteristics or
unit. A ship, aircraft, or submarine; or a small operating procedures of equipment or
group of ships and/or aircraft acting as an systems which are held in reserve for war or
entity. crisis.

unit guide. The ship in a unit that is the guide; the warning. The indication by any tactical informa-
guide in a replenishment unit. tion source of the presence of a threat.

urgent attack. An attack delivered with maxi- WATCHDOG. A surface picket whose main tasks
mum rapidity against an enemy submarine is AAW.
located in a position such that it is consid-
ered an immediate threat. watch zone. A sector in which the assigned ship
is responsible, subject to no overriding
UTM. The grid used for naval bombardment and weapon coordination instructions from the
similar purposes, especially when ground AAWC, to ensure that air attacks on the unit
forces and other forces are jointly engaged. or force do not take place unopposed.

V weapon danger area. An area measured in de-


grees either side of the weapon firing
variable depth sonar (VDS). The term is nor- bearing and extending to the maximum safe
mally used to describe a sonar whose trans- range and maximum safe trajectory height
ducer is towed beneath the parent ship with of the weapon in use. For torpedoes, a spe-
the object of improving sonar detection cific area based upon weapon entry point.
ranges. Helicopter and submarine sonars,

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NATO-CONFIDENTIAL ATP 1(C), Vol. I

weapon danger zone. In ASW operations, an X


area in which friendly units may be endan-
gered by a friendly ASW weapon. The area XX. The standard position in the force established
comprising the weapon danger zone is by the OTC on which a search, enemy report-
based upon the type of weapon, method of ing, and so forth, is to be based.
employment, run pattern of a properly oper-
ating weapon, and estimated acquisition Y
range. Upon launch of an ASW torpedo,
this area may be designated a DOGBOX. YY. The standard position in the force for the pres-
ent position of the addressee of a message.
weapon release point. The point where a single
weapon or the first weapon fired on a pat- Z
tern is released so that it enters the water at
the splash point. For aircraft attacks, it al- zero time. The exact hour immediately preced-
lows for the aircraft’s direction, speed, and ing the time of execution of a tactical action
altitude of approach, and the characteristics or maneuver from which time measurement
of the weapon. is recorded and reported in minutes. (If the
time of execution is exactly an hour, that
weapons system. A weapon and those compo- time will be zero time.)
nents required for its operation.
ZIPPO plan. A plan which provides for pre-
wheel. A maneuver to alter course in such a man- planned reactions to various maritime war-
ner that all ships will be in their former rela- fare threats.
tive positions on completion of the
maneuver. ZZ. The standard position in the force for the cen-
ter of the force (not to be used in a convoy).

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NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

INDEX
Page
No. Page
No.
Activation of naval control of shipping
A organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Active:
Acceleration and deceleration . . . . . . . 2-12 Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
Accompaniment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 Electronic protective measures
Accuracy of target data . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18 (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Acoustic: Mine countermeasures . . . . . . . . . 13-11
Arrays, ships towing acoustic . . . . . . 2-18 Sensors, use of active. . . . . . . . . . . 8-20
Countermeasures (definition) . . . . . . . 5-1 Sonar or sonobuoy contact . . . . . . . . 9-17
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14 Adjustable columnar unit formation . . . 10-21
Devices streamed, prevention of Advance force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
mutual interference between sub- Advisories, surface ship notices and . . . . 6-67
merged submarines and surface Advisory control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
ships with towed acoustic . . . . . . 6-79 After-action reports, engagement. . . . . . 6-16
Interference: Aided intercept by submarine . . . . . . . 9-14
From own force . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12 Air:
Own transmissions on search Anti-fast patrol boat operations . . . . . 8-22
equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Attacks:
Protective measures (definition) . . . . . . 5-2 Convoy protection against . . . . . . 10-14
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16 Protection of shipping against . . . . . 10-6
Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 Towed array ship defense against . . . . 9-5
Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14 Combat report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15
Delegation of functions . . . . . . . . . 5-2 Control:
Support measures (definition) . . . . . . 5-1 Combat air patrol aircraft procedures. . . 7-5
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Cooperation in antisurface warfare. . . . 8-10
Acronyms, list of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14, 6-28c
Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 Communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Antisubmarine warfare actions . . . . . . 9-21 Force air coordination area . . . . . . . 6-22
Ship actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37 Overlapping areas . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
Assistance is required, action when . . . 9-32 Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
Attack in harbor, action after . . . . . . . 14-4 Air resource element
Contact when direct support forces are coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17, 7-5
involved, action following . . . . . 9-31 Force track coordinator — air . . . . . 6-12
Danger, individual action to avoid . . . . 2-16 Corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Gaining contact, action on . . . . . . . . 9-24 Defense tactics, carrier battle group
Increased tension, action at time of . . . 6-78 air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20
Individual ship action when Operation Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
AWKWARD is ordered . . . . . . . 14-3 Forces:
Intercept of target or threat radar, Command of air forces . . . . . . . . . 6-42
action upon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20 Other air forces, support operations
Nuclear attack, action prior to . . . . . . 12-9 controlled by . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28c
Readiness for action . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19, 6-41
Suspected mutual interference, Outside tactical air support of
action on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77 maritime operations . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Units in vicinity of unit gaining Picture, local situation and air . . . . . . 6-15
contact, action by . . . . . . . . . . 9-24 Raid reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14
Safety procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b

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Page Page
No. No.

Support operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 Escort of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48


Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 Early warning aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
Traffic control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44 Employment in antiship missile
Transport group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13
Airborne coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-42 Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Aircraft: Emergency and rescue . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
Airplans, antisubmarine warfare Escape maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 to 9-8 Escort aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
Alert states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28 Flight of aircraft, commander of. . . . . . 1-6
Antiship missile defense, aircraft Flightpath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
employment in. . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Friendly aircraft approaching force . . . 6-25
Antisurface operations . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 Gains contact in cooperation with
Area operations. . . . . . . . . . . 1-12, 6-19 towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Arming policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-47 Identification and recognition:
Assists detecting unit . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24 By aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
Associated support by maritime Of support aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 Identification safety position,
Attack policy, antisubmarine warfare aircraft at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 Investigating contact in cooperation
Attacks, coordinated aircraft and with towed array ship . . . . . . . . 9-35
surface unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27
Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48 Shore-based aircraft joining
Authentication on antiair warfare nets. . . 7-7 procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b
Blind bombing zone, aircraft in . . . . . 6-58 Support aircraft joining a force. . . . . 6-25
Carrier (See Carrier) Lane, aircraft in submarine safety . . . . 6-76
Chemical attack, aircraft Lateral and vertical separation . . . . . . 6-33
operations in . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13 Launch and departure. . . . . . . . . . . 6-44
Combat air patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . . 7-5 Launching or recovering aircraft, ships
Air control procedures . . . . . . . . . . 7-5 engaged in . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Antiship missile defense Lights by ships and aircraft, use of . . . . 6-33
employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Locking non-tactical data system
Stationing tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22 aircraft into grid . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
Command of aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 Lost aircraft control . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
Communications: Low-altitude rules . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32
During aircraft emergencies . . . . . . 6-48 Mission designators . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
In towed array ship cooperation . . . . 9-34 NOTACK area, aircraft responsibility in
With maritime patrol aircraft. . . . . . 4-12 establishing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-75
Contact handover with submarine . . . . 9-33 Not involved to keep clear . . . . . . . . 6-48
Contaminated area, aircraft re-entry into . 9-53 Off-task/on-task time, aircraft
Contamination of aircraft . . . . . . . . 12-13 procedures at . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28b
Continuous watch on airborne aircraft. . . 6-48 Operating reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Control unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25 Passing information about contact . . . . 6-14
Antisubmarine warfare air control unit . 9-24 Procedures, antisubmarine warfare
Cooperation: aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Between aircraft and helicopters . . . . 8-11 Radar-fitted aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
With fixed-wing aircraft . . . . . . . 6-34a Reports to search attack unit . . . . . . . 9-30
Delays while operating aircraft, Requests for carrier aircraft and
antisubmarine warfare shipborne tactical aircraft . . . . . . 6-44
operations during . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 Rescue in vicinity of ships operating
Direct support (See Direct support) aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52
Distress, aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 Returning aircraft, procedures for . . . . 6-45

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NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Right of way of ships launching and Analysis of enemy emissions . . . . . 5-13


recovering aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 6-35 Anchorage:
Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b, 6-65 Evacuation of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-21
Shipborne aircraft operations. . . . . . . 6-35 Protected anchorage. . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
Ship control zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44 Readiness in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26
Signals, ships operating aircraft to Anchoring:
make . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52 In formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Support: Ship as anchoring reference . . . . . . . . 2-7
Antisubmarine warfare support Antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20f Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
Antisurface warfare operations Assets, employment of . . . . . . . . . . 7-13
support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 Call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
Towed-array ship support . . . . . . . . 9-8 Command and control in. . . . . . . . . . 7-1
Towed-array ship, aircraft Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
cooperation with . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Transit, aircraft in . . . . . . . . . 6-21, 9-53 Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Turnover procedures, maritime Specific delegation considerations . . . 1-15
patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28a Data links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
Units carrying aircraft, Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
responsibilities of . . . . . . . . . . 6-29 Measures, initiation of . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Vertical takeoff and landing Nets:
aircraft, ships operating . . . . . . . 6-35 Authentication on nets . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Airmove messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31 Combining nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Airplans: Reporting and coordination nets. . . . . 4-7
Accuracy of airplan origin . . . . . . . . . 9-8 Reports, special. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Anti-fast patrol boat operations, Stationing units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
airplans for . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22 Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8
Antisubmarine warfare airplans . . 9-7 to 9-8 Anti-fast patrol boat:
Towed array ship and aircraft Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
cooperation, airplan use in . . . . . 9-34 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22
Airspace: Anti-intruder activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Control during amphibious operation . . 11-8 Antiship missile defense . . . . . . 7-13 to 7-20
Controlled airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57 Antisubmarine warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
Air/submarine communications . . . . . . 4-13 Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Air/surface antisubmarine warfare Aircraft:
attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22 Control unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Alert: Gains initial contact . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44 Procedures for . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
State for aircraft and weapons . . . . . . 1-28 Relaying contact reports . . . . . . . . 9-20
Allocation of waterspace management Response to submarine contact. . . . . 9-32
areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64 Urgent attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Altitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3, 2-5 With inoperable navigation systems . . 9-22
Low-altitude rules . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32 Air effort, maximum effect from . . . . . 6-28
Separation in helicopter action Airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 to 9-8
group operations. . . . . . . 6-34a, 8-11 Area operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
Ammunition state reports. . . . . . . . . . 7-11 Attack:
Amphibious: Air/surface attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 Methods, ship and helicopter
Objective area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7 attack and support . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 Policy for units . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Command in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65

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Page Page
No. No.

Classification of contact . . . . . . . . . 9-17 Minelaying operation, approach


Collision hazard during operations . . . . 9-23 phase of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8b Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
Compensatory allowances . . . . . . . . 6-67 Tactics to contact or datum. . . . . . . . 9-27
Coordinated operations. . . . . . 9-23 to 9-24 Approaching force, friendly aircraft . . . . 6-25
Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 Area:
Search attack unit responsibilities . . . 9-25 Antisubmarine warfare:
Specific delegation considerations . . . 1-15 Area of interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Direct support operations . . . . . . . . . 9-1 Area of responsibility . . . . . . . . . 6-60
Free area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59 Free area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 Defense electronic countermeasures
Interest, procedures within area of . . . . 6-63 systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12
Mission designators . . . . . . . . 6-20, 6-27 Force air coordination area . . . . . . . . 6-22
Nuclear attack; action prior to, Overlapping areas . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
and tactics following . . . . . . . . 12-9 Joint action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60
Nuclear weapon: NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . 6-72 to 6-75
Control procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12, 9-1
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-41 By maritime aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 6-19
Yields and effectiveness . . . . . . . . 9-47 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Operation ordered . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28 Employment of submarines . . . . . . 9-10
Ranges, sensor and weapon . . . . . . . . 9-1 Patrol areas, adjacent . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Responsibility, area of . . . . . . . . . . 6-60 Protection of coastal shipping. . . . . . 10-19
Screen commanders . . . . . . . . . . . 9-43 Restricted areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Search plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23 Shipping risk area . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Sonobuoy interference avoidance plan,
Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 area operations and . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 Submarine action area . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
Support operations by aircraft . . . . . . 6-20f Submarine-generated search area:
Weapon: Configuration and duration. . . . . . . 6-70
Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58 Handover in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
State reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 Surveillance area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
Antisurface ship missiles . . . . . . . . . . 8-8 Waterspace management area . . . . . . 6-58
Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16 Allocations, considerations in area. . . 6-62
Antisurface warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 Areawide electronic warfare
Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
Specific delegation considerations . . . 1-15 Arming:
Operations by: Aircraft arming policy . . . . . . . . . . 9-47
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 Changes in helicopter arming . . . . . . 9-48
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 Screen helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-47
Pickets in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 Arrival:
Towed array ships in . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 And departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
With subsurface cooperation . . . . . . . 8-15 Estimated time of arrival . . . . . . . . 10-13
Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45 Instructions on arrival . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
Carrier approach procedures . . . . . . . 6-45 Rendezvous, arrival at . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
Contact or datum, search attack unit Reporting time of arrival . . . . . . . . . 2-11
approach to . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26 Assault, amphibious . . . . . . . . . 11-1, 11-2
Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23, 6-46 Assistance is required, action when . . . . 9-32
Methods; direct, offset, and intercept Assisting ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26 Associated support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
Maritime aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19

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NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Sonobuoy interference avoidance plan, Axis:


associated support and. . . . . . . . 9-10 Course and axis:
Submarine: Changes in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13 In replenishment formation . . . . . . 3-12
Message applications. . . . . . . . . . 9-33 Formation axis:
Attack: Formation center and axis . . . . . . . . 3-2
Antisubmarine warfare attack Rotating formation axis . . . . . . . . . 3-4
(See Antisubmarine warfare)
Coordinated attack: B
Aircraft/surface unit . . . . . . . . . . 6-75
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 Bad weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12
Missile attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Effect on screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Detecting and determining types of Bailout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-54
attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 BARNSTORM procedures . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Harbor, attack in . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
After attack in harbor. . . . . . . . . . 14-4 Base surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
Helicopter identification/recognition Spread of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49
and attack tactics . . . . . . . . . . 8-11 Bearing:
Independent localization and attack . . . . 9-5 Accuracy suffixes. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4a
Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43 Electronic warfare intercept bearing
Missile attack, defense against . . . . . . 7-13 accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Nuclear attack (See Nuclear) Distance, bearing and . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
Restrictions when operating with Passing target bearing and range . . . . . 8-20
support submarines . . . . . . . . . 9-22 Preserving true bearing and distance . . . 1-25
Rules, submarine-generated search area True bearings, courses and . . . . . . . 6-30b
attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72 Berth numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15 Biological hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10
Towed array ship against air attack, BLACK, DUSTBIN area . . . . . . . . . . 9-45
defense of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5 Blast and underwater shock . . . . . . . . 12-2
Vectored attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37 Blind bombing zones . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
Underwater swimmers, defense BLUEBELL, Airplan . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22
against attack by . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 Boat patrols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Urgent attacks by fixed-wing aircraft . . 9-21 Bomb:
Attacking ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 High-explosive 600-pound bomb . . . . 9-47
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5 Lines, shore bombardment and bomb . . 6-58
Aircraft authentication on antiair Breakdown:
warfare nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7 At sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Authorities: Salvage and breakdown . . . . . . . . . 10-13
Maritime authorities: Breaking:
Air control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13 Radio silence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 Silence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5
Submarine movement, authorities Brevity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a, 6-76 Code words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3, 6-56 Broadband contact by passive sonar or
Delegation of authority . . . . . . . 1-3, 1-15 sonobuoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18
Responsibility, authority and . . . . . . . 1-15 Broadcast control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Avoiding: Bulging the screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Collision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 Buoys, submarine communication . . . . . 4-11
Danger to other ships . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21 Bursts, nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
AWKWARD, Operation . . . . . . 14-1 to 14-3

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-5 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

C Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
When changing station . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Call signs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 Checklist for aircraft joining a force . . . . 6-26
Airborne early warning aircraft . . . . . . 7-4 Checkoff list, surface action . . . . . . . . . 8-8
Antiair warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 Check-sum digits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
Functional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 Chemical warfare threat . . . . . 12-11 to 12-15
Canceling: Circle, size of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-75 Circular:
Submarine-generated search Convoy formation . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24
area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71 to 6-72 Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29
Weapon control orders . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Carrier: Stationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Adjustment of movements by ships Classification:
relative to carrier . . . . . . . . . . 6-35 Antisubmarine warfare contact. . . . . . 9-17
Air defense tactics, carrier battle group . . 7-20 Initial reporting and classification . . . 9-19
Air operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41 Recognition, classification, and
Approach procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45 identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
Convoy, carrier operating aircraft in. . . . 6-41 Clearance to employ nuclear antisub-
Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 marine warfare weapons . . . . . . 9-41
Duties of carriers in a task group . . . . . 6-36 Close:
Principles affecting carrier group Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 Covering group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Requests for carrier aircraft . . . . . . . 6-44 Close, meaning of order to . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Screening carriers during flight Closing or rejoining, units . . . . . . . . . 2-15
operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46 Coastal convoy (See Convoy)
Stationing carrier in convoy formation . . 10-8 Collision:
Turns by carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 Avoiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12
Cartesian coordinate grid . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 Hazard during antisubmarine
CARTWHEEL disposition/formation . . . 3-31 warfare operations . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Casting ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 Combat air patrol aircraft (See Aircraft)
CERTSUB classification (definition) . . . 9-17 Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Chaff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 Aircraft, command of . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
Chain of command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Air forces, command of . . . . . . . . . 6-42
Parallel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a Allied forces, command of. . . . . . . . . 1-6
Chainsaw tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22 Amphibious:
Change in: Operations, command during . . . . . 11-7
Course and axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 Warfare, command in . . . . . . . . . 1-8a
Composition of force . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 Antiair warfare, command and
Helicopter arming . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48 control in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
Organization of force . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 Antiship missile defense, command and
Signaled speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14 control responsibilities for. . . . . . 7-15
Task organization assignments . . . . . . 1-1 Antisubmarine warfare, command in . . . 9-1
Change of: Antisurface warfare, command in . . . . . 8-1
Operational control . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 Chain of command. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Position and intended movement in Convoy, command of a . . . . . . . . . 10-11
relative airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 Delegation of command functions . . . . 1-13
Type of control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b Development of command structure . . . 1-12
Changing: Direct support submarine operations;
Scene of action commander . . . . . . . 9-31 command, control and communi-
Sectors or patrol lines . . . . . . . . . . 3-49 cations in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Size of tactical diameter . . . . . . . . . 2-12 Exercising command. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-6 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Full command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Commanding officers of Allied


Large forces, command of . . . . . . . . 1-12 warships, prerogatives of . . . . . . 10-1
Maritime forces, structure for Commodore, convoy . . . . . . . . . 1-10, 10-7
command of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
Mine countermeasures, command Air coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a
responsibility in. . . . . . . . 1-8, 13-11 Aircraft communications:
Officer in tactical command . . . . . . . . 1-5 Direct support operations. . . . . . . . 4-12
(See Officer in tactical command) Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
Operational command . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Towed array ship cooperation . . . . . 9-34
Operations, command during . . . . . . . 1-9 Amphibious operations . . . . . . . . . . 11-8
Options, command and control. . . . . . 1-13 Antiair warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
Parallel chains of command . . . . . . . 1-8a Antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . 4-8b
Readiness, command responsibility for . . 1-26 Decentralized command and control . . . 4-14
Replenishment at sea, command in . . . . 1-7 Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20
Seaward defense, command in. . . . . . . 1-8 Design of communication plan . . . . . . 4-1
Submarine operations, command in . . . . 1-8 Electronic warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Support operations, command Flashing light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 Helicopter communications . . . . . . . 4-13
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 In helicopter action group . . . . . . . 6-34a
Tactical command . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
At sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12 Liaison, communication and . . . . . . . 10-7
Transiting submarines, command Maritime patrol aircraft. . . . . . . . . . 4-12
relationships of . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 Over-the-horizon targeting . . . . . . . . 4-8a
Veto, command by. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2
Commander: Regional naval control of shipping. . . . 10-3
Aircraft, commander of . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Consultation between commanders and Search attack unit . . . . . . . . . . 4-9, 9-25
corresponding commanders . . . . . 1-9 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
In amphibious warfare . . . . . . . . . 11-8 Post-attack emission control and . . . . 5-5
Composite warfare commander . . . . . 1-16 Submarine communications . . . . . . . 8-17
Delegation to: Direct support operations . . . . . 9-9, 9-11
Functional group commanders . . . . . 1-19 Support submarines . . . . . . . . . . 4-8b
Principal warfare commanders . . . . . 1-16 Surface action group . . . . . . . . . 4-8a, 8-8
Screen commander . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 Surface warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
Designation of commanders . . . . . . . 1-8a Tactical communications plan . . . . 4-1, 5-2
For amphibious operation . . . . . . . 11-7 Task group operations, merger of
Escort commander . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 circuits in combined . . . . . . . . . 4-14
Flight of aircraft, commander of. . . . . . 1-6 Towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . 4-8b, 9-5
Nuclear antisubmarine warfare Windows:
operations, commander’s For submarine in associated support . . 9-13
responsibilities and intentions in . . . 9-42 Special communication windows . . . 4-10
Principal warfare commanders . . . . . . 1-16 ZIPPO communications . . . . . . . . . 7-20
Regional naval control of shipping Composite warfare commander . . . . . . 1-16
commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 Composition of surface action group . . . . 8-8
Scene of action commander . . . . . . . 9-29 Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56
Changing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31 Confidence levels:
Search attack unit commander . . . . . . 9-25 Electronic warfare reporting of . . . . . . 5-3
Strike commander . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-42 For POSSUB classification. . . . . . . . 9-18
Surface action group commander . . . . . 8-8 Contact:
Sweep commander . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43 Accuracy of airplan contact position . . . 9-8

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-7 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Antisubmarine warfare contact: Airspace control during amphibious


Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17 operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19 Air traffic control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44
Initial report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19 Assets, control and coordination of . . . 1-19
By support submarine . . . . . . . . 9-31 Change of:
Command responsibility for . . . . . . 9-19 Operational control . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17 Type of control . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b
Subsequent evaluation . . . . . . . . . 9-19 Command and control (See Command)
Support submarine gains initial Delegation to control units . . . . . . . . 1-20
contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31 Electronic jamming, control of . . . . . . 5-15
Approach tactics to contact or Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27 Helicopter control unit . . . . . . . 3-47, 9-24
Direct support forces are involved, Inability to exercise control . . . . . . . 6-30
action following contact when . . . 9-31 Lost aircraft control . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
Enemy contact: Naval control of shipping . . . . . . . . . 1-9
By aircraft in transit . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 Net for:
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 Helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
Gaining contact, action on . . . . . . . . 9-24 Maritime patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . 4-13
By aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28 Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a
On search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7 Nuclear antisubmarine warfare
In cooperation with towed array weapon,
ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 control procedures for. . . . 9-44 to 9-46
By towed array ship in cooperation Operational control . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
with aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 Qualifying weapon control status and
Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-33 orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
In submarine-generated search area Relinquishment of tactical control . . . . 9-12
during area operations . . . . . . . . 6-72 Screen helicopters, control of . . . . . . 3-47
Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 Shifting tactical control of direct
In towed array ship and aircraft support submarines . . . . . . . . . 9-11
cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 Shipping control points. . . . . . . . . . 10-3
Lost contact procedures . . . . . . . . . 9-35 Tactical control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
Passing information about contacts, Type of operations and control,
responsibility for . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 factors determining. . . . . . . . . 6-30b
Passive sonar capable surface ship gains Veto, control by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
initial contact . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-32 Weapon control status and orders . . . . 6-66
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 ZIPPO control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20
By towed-array ship . . . . . . . . . . 9-20 Controlled:
On enemy submarines . . . . . . . . . 9-32 Airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Search attack unit’s approach to Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
contact or datum . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26 Waterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
Support submarine contact reporting. . . 9-20 Convoy:
Turnover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17 Advice on convoy formation
Unit gaining contact, action by units in selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-20
vicinity of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24 Air operations in a convoy . . . . . . . . 6-41
Contaminated area, re-entry into . . . . . . 9-53 Altering convoy course . . . . . . . . . 10-12
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 Command of a convoy . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Air control: Commodore . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10, 10-8
Combat air patrol aircraft procedures. . . 7-5 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30 Discipline, maintaining convoy . . . . . 3-46
Aircraft control unit . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24 Emergency turn by convoy . . . . . . . 10-13
Evasive steering by convoy . . . . . . . 2-23

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-8 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Forming up convoy. . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 Electronic and acoustic warfare


Formation grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 coordination . . . . . . . . . . 1-14, 5-2
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8, 10-20 Force air coordination area . . . . . . . . 6-22
Changing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6 Overlapping areas . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
Maintaining. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47 Local coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Principles affecting . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 Mine warfare coordination . . . . . . . . 1-14
Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-20 Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . 1-14, 6-63
Joining at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 Submarine/air coordination. . . . . . . . 9-33
Mercantile, military, and unescorted Surveillance coordination and data
convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14 compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
Officer in tactical command’s Zone coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
responsibilities for convoy . . . . . 1-14 Coordinator:
Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11 Air resource element coordinator . . . . . 7-5
Protection of convoy . . . . . 10-13 to 10-14 Airborne coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . 6-42
Coastal convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19 Delegation to coordinators . . . . . . . . 1-16
Regrouping a convoy . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 Electronic warfare coordinator . . . . . 1-17
Replenishment of convoy escorts . . . . 10-12 functions delegated to . . . . . . . . 5-2
Rerouting a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 Force track coordinator:
Route position designators. . . . . . . . . 2-8 Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
Routing a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11 Subsurface and surface . . . . . . . 8-1, 9-1
Screens, instructions for convoy . . . . . 3-46 Inner defense zone coordinator. . . . . . 7-21
Stationing convoy ships . . . . . . . . . 10-9 Local antiair warfare coordinator . . . . . 7-2
Support force in situation A, convoy and 1-14 Outer defense zone coordinator . . . . . 7-21
Cooperation: Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Antisurface warfare with subsurface Sector antiair warfare coordinator . . . . . 7-1
cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15 Standard call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
Between aircraft and helicopters . . . . . 8-11 Corridor, approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23
Towed array ship/aircraft cooperation. . . 9-34 Corridors, air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
With fixed-wing aircraft. . . . . . . . . 6-34a CORTAC procedure message . . . . . . . 1-49
Coordinated: Countermarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10
Aircraft/surface unit attacks . . . . . . . 6-75 Countermeasures:
Antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . 9-23 to 9-24 Antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . 7-14
Antisurface operations . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 Electronic and acoustic . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
Attack methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Missile attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Torpedo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Prosecution of antisubmarine warfare By search attack unit . . . . . . . . . . 9-28
contact with support submarine . . . 9-32 Underwater swimmers . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Coordinating: Countershadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9
Antiship missile defense reactions . . . . 7-15 Course:
Authority/unit, submarine-generated Adjusting course in maneuvering
search area coordinating . . . 6-68, 6-70 Method B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-38
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 Alteration of course . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46
Aided intercept by submarine, Altering convoy course . . . . . . . . . 10-12
coordination required for . . . . . . 9-14 Axis, course and:
Air coordination. . . . . . . . . . 1-14, 6-28c Changes in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
Antiair warfare coordination. . . . . . . . 7-7 In replenishment formation . . . . . . 3-12
Antiship missile defense reaction Relative wind, course and . . . . . . . . 6-39
coordination. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15 Resuming course and station in
Area coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8 maneuvering Methods B and C. . . . 6-38
Assets, control and coordination of . . . 1-19 Speed, course and/course and speed
made good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-9 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

True bearings, course and . . . . . . . . 6-30b Missile-armed ships, defense against . . 8-20
Cover. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7, 7-11 Missile attack, defense against . . . . . . 7-13
Covert: Nuclear warfare defense concept . . . . . 12-8
Joining procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27 Towed array ship against air attack,
Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7 defense of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5
Cross-fixing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 Underwater swimmers, defense
Crossover zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9 against attack by . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Cruising: Defensive:
Antisubmarine warfare formations . . . . 3-4 Mine countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Wartime cruising precautions . . . . . . 2-23 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Cryptological activity . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 Definitions, terms and . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11
Degrees of readiness . . . . . . . . 1-24 to 1-25
D Delegation of:
Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3, 1-15
Daily changing call signs . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Damage, assessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22 Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
Damaged ship: Electronic and acoustic warfare . . . . . 5-2
Action when ship is damaged . . . . . . 3-47 Delegation to commanders,
Screen for damaged ship . . . . . . . . . 3-43 coordinators, and
Danger: control units . . . . . . . . 1-16 to 1-20
Individual action to avoid danger . . . . 2-16 Deliberate attack by screen
Navigational danger . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Dangerous to subsurface operations, Demonstration, amphibious . . . . . . . . 11-2
operations inherently . . . . . . . . 6-78 Departure:
Darkened ships, navigation lights on . . . . 2-22 Arrival and departure . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Darkening ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23 Launch and departure:
Data: Fixed-wing aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44
Antiair warfare data links . . . . . . . . . 4-8 Helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45
Compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
Link. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4, 6-16a Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8
Reference point . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 Officer in tactical command’s
Net control station. . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d responsibilities for . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
Datum: Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37, 3-42
Accuracy of airplan datum position . . . . 9-8 Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5
Approach tactics to contact or datum . . . 9-27 Designating datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Establishing and designating datum . . . . 9-23 Designation of:
Search attack unit’s approach to Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a
contact or datum . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26 For amphibious operation . . . . . . . 11-7
Deceleration, acceleration and . . . . . . . 2-12 Guide, new . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Decentralized command and control, Officer in tactical command for
communications for . . . . . . . . . 4-14 nuclear antisubmarine warfare
Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15 operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-42
Measures against deception . . . . . . . 5-17 Search attack unit . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Risk of imitative deception . . . . . . . . 4-5 Designator:
Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Aircraft mission designators . . . . . . . 6-20
In amphibious warfare . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 Antisubmarine warfare mission
Deck-launched interceptors. . . . . . . . . 7-22 designators . . . . . . . . . . 6-20, 6-28
Decontamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
Decoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 Task designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Defense: Destroyer:
Carrier battle group air defense tactics . . 7-20 Rescue destroyer . . . . . . . 1-19, 6-48, 6-50

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-10 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Type formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7 Stationing considerations. . . . . . . . . 7-13


Detached, units temporarily . . . . . . . . 2-15 Typical operational dispositions . . . . . 3-22
Detecting and determining types of Units, disposition of . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 DISROBE, Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15
Detection: Dissemination (picture compilation). . . . . 6-5
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 Distance:
Missile carriers, detection of . . . . . . . 8-20 Bearing and distance. . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
Picture compilation, detection in . . . . . 6-3 Interval, distance and . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Radar, detection of target/threat . . . . . 8-20 Preserving true bearing and distance . . . 1-25
Transmissions, detection of . . . . . . . 5-12 Standard distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Deviation from specified sensor . . . . . . 6-28 Unit of distance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Diagrams, emission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 Distress, aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Diameter, tactical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 Escort of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
Direct approach method . . . . . . . . . . 9-26 Ditching. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-54
Direct support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11 Diverse forces and tactical diameter . . . . 2-12
Action following contact when direct Diversion of ship to locate survivors . . . . 6-54
support forces are involved . . . . . . 9-31 Diving restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77
Antisubmarine warfare direct DOWNLINK considerations . . . . . . . . 4-11
support operations . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 DUSTBIN areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44
Communications with aircraft on Duties:
direct support operations . . . . . . 4-12 Of carriers in a task group . . . . . . . . 6-36
Employment of: Promulgation of duties . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Aircraft on direct support . . . . . . . 6-27 Duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
Submarines in direct support . . . . . . 9-11 Carrier system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36
Maritime aircraft, direct support by . . . 6-19
Sonobuoy interference avoidance plan, E
direct support and . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
Submarine message applications . . . . . 9-33 Ejection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-54
Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 Electromagnetic:
By higher authority . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7 Pulse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Electronic warfare, direction and Interference of search equipment on own
coordination of . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 transmissions . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12
Finding of transmissions . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Electronic:
Directive, initiating . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 Acoustic warfare, electronic and . . . . . 5-1
Disabled: Countermeasures (definition) . . . . . . . 5-1
Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21 Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Submarine, assisting disabled . . . . . . 6-76 Aircraft employment in antiship
Disguised targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18 missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13
Dispatch of search attack unit, Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
designation and . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25 Positive control . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 Reducing effectiveness of . . . . . . . 5-17
Disposition: Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11
2V, antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27 Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
2W, special . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-24 Reducing effectiveness of . . . . . . . 5-17
3V, antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29 Neutralization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
4W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33 Reducing effectiveness of . . . . . . . 5-18
Circular . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29 Order of battle (emitter list) . . . . . . . 5-10
General types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 Policy and detached units . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Planning factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36 Protective measures (definition) . . . . . . 5-1
Principles affecting . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27 Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-11 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Reporting of confidence levels . . . . . . 5-3 Enemy:


Warfare (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5
Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 By aircraft in transit . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6 Report on enemy submarines . . . . . 9-32
Areawide coordination . . . . . . . . . 5-14 Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14 Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
Coordination cell . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 Surface-to-surface missiles . . . . . . . . 8-8
Coordinator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17 Engagement:
Intercept bearing accuracy. . . . . . . . 5-3 After-action reports. . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
Satellite communications. . . . . . . . 4-15 Order of engagement . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . 8-8 Rules of engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Warfare support measures Engineering degrees of readiness. . . . . . 1-25
(definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 Entering:
Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 Fog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
Aircraft employment in antiship Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Entry:
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18 Gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10 Operations, officer in tactical com-
Elements: mand’s responsibilities for entry . . . 1-14
Picture compilation elements . . . . . . . 6-2 Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37, 3-42
Task elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Environmental conditions . . . . . . . . . 9-19
Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2 Escape maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52
Emergencies, aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31 Escort:
Communications during . . . . . . . . . 6-48 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
Emergency: Commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5
Acceleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
Aircraft emergency and rescue . . . . . . 6-47 Distress, escort of aircraft in . . . . . . . 6-48
Identification friend or foe . . . . . . . . 6-48 Replenishment of escorts . . . . . 3-16, 10-12
Landing: Establishing:
Ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47 Datum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-74
Visual signals for . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48 Stationing speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Rendezvous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 Submarine-generated search area . . . . 6-70
Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 Estimated time of arrival . . . . . . . . . 10-13
Stand-off range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50 Evacuation of anchorages . . . . . . . . . 13-21
Turn by convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13 Evaluation: . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4, 1-24, 6-4
Emission: Evasion:
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 Anti-fast patrol boat . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2, 5-5 Antisubmarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Post-attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 Evasive steering . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23, 10-12
Security and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18 Exchanging data on positions,
Sensors and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 reporting and . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Diagrams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3, 5-3 Specific target planning and
Silent emission policy . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 engagement execution . . . . . . . . 8-17
Emitter list (electronic order of battle) . . . 5-10 Exercising command. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Emitters, threat and target . . . . . . . . . 5-10 Exit gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
Endurance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 Exoatmospheric burst. . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-12 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Extended maneuvering interval . . . . . . 2-12 Principles affecting formations . . . . . 12-8


Random formation . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
F Rendezvous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Recovery of aircraft when in
Failure to rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19
Fallout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 Reverse arrow head formation . . . . . 10-15
Fast convoys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 Torpedo countermeasures formation . . . 2-24
Fighter engagement zone . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 Transport/logistic formations . . . . . . . 3-9
Filling a gap in the screen . . . . . . . . . 3-48 Typical operational formations . . . . . . 3-7
Final approach tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27 Forming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
Fire support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4 Convoy, forming up . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8
Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22
Fixed-wing aircraft (See Aircraft) Found report . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21, 6-26
Flags, speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 Free area, antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . 6-59
Flash and initial radiation effects . . . . . . 12-1 FREEWHEEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Flashing light communications . . . . . . . 6-39 Frequency management . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Flight of aircraft, commander of . . . . . . . 1-6 Friendly:
Flight operations: Air tracks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5
Maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36 Aircraft approaching the force . . . . . . 6-25
Screening aircraft carrier during . . . . . 3-46 Minefield information to friendly forces . 13-2
Ship movements during . . . . . . . . . 6-35 Search for friendly force . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Flightpath, aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 Full:
Flying sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36 Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Fog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22 Naval control of shipping . . . . . 10-2, 10-7
Force: Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
Air coordination area . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22 Delegation of functions. . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Overlapping areas . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34 Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
Antiair warfare nets . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 Electronic and acoustic warfare . . . . . 5-2
Change in composition of force . . . . . . 3-1 Functional:
Operations integral to a force. . . . . . . 6-20 Call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Support aircraft joining a force. . . . . . 6-25 Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Track coordinator — air . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 Delegation to commander . . . . . . . 1-19
Air picture compilation. . . . . . . . . 6-12
Track coordinator — surface/ G
subsurface . . . . . . . . . 6-13, 8-1, 9-1
Formation: Gates; handover, entry/exit, and
Adjustable column unit formation . . . 10-15 marshaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
Anchoring in formation . . . . . . . . . 2-11 Gateway unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d
Basic system of formations . . . . . . . . 3-1 General degrees of readiness . . . . . . . . 1-27
Broad front rectangular formation . . . 10-20 Geographic reference system, world. . . . . 2-1
Center and axis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 Getting underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25
Circular formation . . . . . . . . . 3-2, 10-18 GRASSHOPPER, Operation . . . . . . . . 6-64
Convoy formations . . . . 10-8, 10-14, 10-20 GREEN, DUSTBIN area . . . . . . . . . . 9-45
General types of formation . . . . . . . . 3-2 GREYHOUND, Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 Grid:
Group formation . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-26 Departure/entry screen . . . . . . . . . . 3-43
Maneuvering whole formation Formation grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8
together (Method A) . . . . . 6-36, 6-37 Lock procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d
Miscellaneous formations . . . . . . . . 3-22 Reference unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d
Operational formations . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 Group:
Passing through a formation . . . . . . . 2-18 Administrative group . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-13 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Fire support groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 Antisurface operations . . . . . . . . . . 8-10


Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-26 Arming of screen helicopters . . 9-47 to 9-48
Functional group . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 Assists detecting unit . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Delegation to commander . . . . . . . 1-19 Communications and control nets . . . . 4-13
Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 Control of screen helicopters . . . . . . . 3-47
Helicopter action group . . . . . . 6-34, 8-11 Control unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47, 9-24
Inshore undersea warfare group . . . . . 11-4 Cooperation between aircraft and
Naval beach group . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4 helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8 Dip or hover, helicopter in . . . . . . . . 2-17
Task group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Element coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
GROUSE, Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 Escape maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Guard ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27 Flying of helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32
GUERRILLA procedures . . . . . . . . . 4-10 Harbor, use of helicopters in . . . . . . . 14-1
Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16 Identification/recognition and attack
Automatic changes of Guide . . . . . . . 2-16 tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
In replenishment formation. . . . . . . . 3-12 In-flight refueling. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36
When maneuvering by Method A . . . . 6-37 Joining procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27
Screen unit as Guide in Method B . . . . 6-38 Joining/rejoining . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Lateral and vertical separation . . . . . . 6-33
H Launch and departure. . . . . . . . . . . 6-45
Low-altitude rules . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32
Handover: Position of ship operating helicopters . . 6-35
Contact handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-33 Reference point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6a
Gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22 Rescue helicopter. . . . . . . . . . 2-21, 6-48
Radar and nonradar handover . . . . . . 6-21 Rescue station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52
Submarine-generated search area Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
handover during area operations . . . 6-72 Screen, helicopter in . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47
Harbor: Sector screen, conduct of
Attack in harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 helicopters in . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46
Entering harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13 Self-attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46
Readiness in harbor. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27 Ship control zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44
Reference points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7 Stand-off ranges, operational and
States of readiness in harbor . . . . . . . 14-3 emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Havens, submarine and surface Station for helicopter ship operations . . 6-52
ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60 to 6-61 Station keeping in screen . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Hazard: Support of detecting unit . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Antisubmarine warfare operations, hazard Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31, 9-53
of collision during . . . . . . . . . . 9-23 Vectored attack by sonar-fitted ship . . . 9-46
Nuclear bursts, hazards from . . . . . . . 12-1 Windline screen . . . . . . . . . . 3-37, 3-42
Radiation hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67 High-altitude:
Heaving to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Helicopter: Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
Action group . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34, 8-11 High-explosive 600-pound bomb. . . . . . 9-47
Advanced screening or searching High-power transmitting equipment, ships
helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 fitted with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67
Antiship missile defense employment . . 7-14 Hygiene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
Antisubmarine warfare helicopter:
Airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 to 9-8 I
Attack policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 Identification:
Methods, attack and support. . . . . . 9-35 And recognition . . . . . . . . . . 6-16, 6-56

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No. No.

By aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28 Position in maneuvering Methods


Of support aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 B and C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-37
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23 Radiation effects, flash and initial . . . . 12-1
Emergency identification friend Responses to detection. . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
or foe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48 Support submarine, initial anti-
Helicopters, identification/ submarine warfare contact
recognition and attack report from . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
tactics for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11 Initiating directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Picture compilation, identification in . . . 6-4 Inner:
Recognition, and classification; Defense zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20
identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13 Screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38
Safety point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23 Ships in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19
Safety range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22 Towed array ship stations in . . . . . . 9-6
Identity maneuver and identification friend Warfare net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
or foe/selective identification Inoperable:
feature identity . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26
Illumination policy for ships in harbor . . . 14-1 Navigation systems (aircraft). . . . . . . 9-22
Imitative deception, risk of . . . . . . . . . 4-5 Inshore undersea warfare group . . . . . . 11-4
Implementation of naval control of Intentions, notice of. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77
shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 Intercept:
Independent: Aided intercept by submarine . . . . . . 9-14
Localization and attack . . . . . . . . . . 9-5 Approach method. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Method of maneuvering (Method B) . . . 6-37 Bearing accuracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30 Target or threat radars, actions on
Position and intended movement of intercept of . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20
independent unit . . . . . . . . . . 2-10 Interception of transmissions . . . . . . . . 5-12
Individual: Interest, procedures within area of . . . . . 6-63
Action to avoid danger . . . . . . . . . . 2-16 Interference (See Acoustic interference
Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 and Mutual interference)
Information: Intership spacing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8
Exchange between shadowing and Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 to 2-12
relieving units . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9
Fallout information, promulgating . . . . 12-9 J
Friendly forces, information about
minefields to . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 Jammers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
Required by officer in tactical Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 Reducing effectiveness of . . . . . . . . 5-17
Passing information about contacts . . . 6-14 Jettisoning mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
In search attack unit Jezebel pattern sonobuoy procedure . . . . . 9-9
operations . . . . . . . . . . 9-25 to 9-26 Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Informative vectored attack method . . . . 9-37 Convoys joining at sea . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
Informing officer in tactical command: Instructions message . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
About nuclear antisubmarine Procedures:
warfare operations . . . . . . . . . 9-42 Abbreviated joining procedure . . . . . 6-26
Of operations in his vicinity . . . . . . . 6-20 Covert joining procedure . . . . . . . . 6-27
Infringements in war . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34 Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27, 6-31
Initial: Shore-based aircraft. . . . . . . . . . 6-30b
Antisubmarine warfare contact Report on joining a screen . . . . . . . . 3-48
reporting and classification . . . . . 9-19 Support aircraft joining a force. . . . . . 6-25
Approach tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27 Units joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Contact, unit gains initial. . . . . 9-31 to 9-32

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NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

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No. No.

Joint: Broadcast unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d


Action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60, 6-63 Integration with standard tactical
For support submarine . . . . . 9-11 to 9-12 doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16a
Antiair warfare shore coordination net . . . 4-8 Link 4, tactical use of . . . . . . . . . . 6-16a
Service cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 Link 11, tactical use of . . . . . . . . . 6-16a
Waveform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16b
K Link 14 plotting procedures . . . . . . . 6-18
Management units. . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16b
Keep clear: Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18, 8-20
Aircraft not involved to. . . . . . . . . . 6-48 Types of data link . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
Senior officer’s orders to . . . . . . . . . 2-18 Wide-area link operations. . . . . . . . 6-16b
Kill characteristics, specific . . . . . . . . 9-47 Local:
Antiair warfare:
L Coordination net . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
Landing: Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35 Situation and air picture . . . . . . . . . 6-15
Ashore, responsibility for conduct of Warfare coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7 Localization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34
Emergency landing : Enemy emissions, localization of . . . . 5-13
Maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 Independent localization and attack . . . . 9-5
Ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47 Jamming transmitter, localization of . . . 5-15
Force: Picture compilation, localization in . . . . 6-3
In amphibious operation . . . . . . . . 11-4 Logistic functions and planning factors . . . 11-9
Naval authority over units . . . . 1-9, 11-8 Loose control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Lanes, submarine safety . . . . . . . 6-60, 6-66 Loss of submarine command and
Large forces, command of . . . . . . . . . 1-12 control, operations after . . . . . . 6-63
Lateral and vertical separation . . . . . . . 6-33 Lost:
Launch and: Aircraft control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
Departure: Contact procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Fixed-wing aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44 Low-altitude rules for aircraft . . . . . . . 6-32
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45 Low-visibility recovery operations . . . . 6-39
Recovery of aircraft:
Ships engaged in . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17 M
Unscheduled operations . . . . . . . . 6-45
Leaders, attack and escort . . . . . . . . . 6-43 Magnetic anomaly detection:
Leadthrough operation. . . . . . 13-12 to 13-21 Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18
Lead-time requirements . . . . . . . . . . 4-10 During vectored attack . . . . . . . . . . 9-41
Leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 Verification runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
Sequence in leaving . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 Main body:
Liaison, communication and . . . . . . . . 10-7 Evasive steering by main body . . . . . . 2-23
Lighting measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 Stationing by sector method . . . . . . . 3-38
Lights: Man overboard:
Man overboard lights . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21 Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Navigation lights, use of . . . . . . . . . 9-23 Standard procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
On darkened ships . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22 Maneuver:
Ships and aircraft, use of lights by . . . . 6-34 Escape maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52
Special lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24 Executing maneuver at prearranged
Limited strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43 time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Link: Identity maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24a
Antiair warfare data links . . . . . . . . . 4-8 Safety maneuvers. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23

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No. No.

Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 Mercantile convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14


Disabled ship, maneuvering to avoid. . . 2-21 Merchant ships, factors affecting . . . . . . 10-1
Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 Message:
Emergency landings, maneuvering for. . . 6-39 Airmove messages . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Fast patrol boats, maneuvering against. . 2-27 Joining instructions message . . . . . . . 6-25
Flight operations, maneuvering for. . . . 6-36 Ordering contact handover . . . . . . . . 9-33
Independent method of maneuvering Found and Not Found messages . . . . . 6-26
(Method B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-37 NOTACK area message . . . . . . . . . 6-75
Intervals and extended maneuvering Tactical messages, use of radio-
intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 teletype for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
Low-visibility recovery operations, Target engagement messages. . . . . . . 7-10
maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39 Tasking message for intercept by
Merchant ships in convoy, submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
maneuvering of . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 Miles, reporting bearing and
Methods A, B, and C for maneu- distance in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
vering with carrier . . . . . 6-36 to 6-38 Military convoy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
Method C, maneuvering to operate Stationing by sector method . . . . . . . 3-38
aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-38 Mine:
Principal rules for maneuvering . . . . . 2-11 Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Sector screen, maneuvering with . . . . . 3-46 Command in operations . . . . . 1-8, 13-11
Skeleton screen, maneuvering with . . . 3-46 Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Special maneuvering rules . . . . . . . . 2-16 Detection report . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
Speeds while maneuvering . . . . . . . . 2-14 Reporting mine explosions and
Whistle signals while maneuvering . . . 2-22 detections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-21
Whole formation together Self-protective measures . . . . . . . . . 13-4
(Method A), maneuvering . . 6-36, 6-37 Threat, localizing the mine . . . . . . . . 13-4
Maritime: Types of mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
Air control authorities . . . . . . . . . . 4-13 Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
Direct support by maritime aircraft . . . 6-19 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
Patrol aircraft: Coordinator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Attacking on own sensor Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
information. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-47 Mineable waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12 Mined area, transit through:
Turnover procedures . . . . . . . . . 6-28a Ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12
Vectored attack by sonar-fitted ship . . 9-46 Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-15
Rear link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10 Minefield:
Safety procedures for maritime air Locating the minefield . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b Nature of minefield. . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Support operations tasked by Minelaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2, 13-3
maritime authorities . . . . . . . . . 6-20 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1, 13-2
Structure for command of maritime Miscellaneous formations . . . . . . . . . 3-22
forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Missile:
Tactical Message System. . . . . . . . . 1-20 Arc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Tasking authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13
Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10 Detection of missile carriers . . . . . . . 8-20
Marshal procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45 Engagement zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Marshaling gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22 State reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
MAYDAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48 Missile-armed ships, defense against. . . . 8-20
Meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and Missile-launching platforms, early
interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 warning of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
MEADOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64

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NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Mission designators, aircraft and Net control station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2


anti-submarine warfare . . . . 6-20, 6-28 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16d
Modification of submarine-generated Nets, communication . . . . . . . . 4-6 to 4-10
search area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71 Neutralization, electronic . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
MORE HELP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7 Reducing effectiveness of . . . . . . . . 5-18
Movement: Night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
Amphibious objective area, Operations at night . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
movement to. . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2 NOCAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Position and intended movement. . . . . 2-10 Noise, own-force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
Preliminary movements for Nonarrival of relief . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28b
replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7 Nonradar handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Reporting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 Nonsonar contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Submarine movement . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 NONSUB classification (definition) . . . . 9-19
Moving haven: Non-tactical data system units,
Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60 execution of grid locks by . . . . . 6-17
Surface ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61 Not Found message. . . . . . . . . . 6-21, 6-26
Mutual interference: NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72 to 6-75
Action on suspected mutual Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26
interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77 Of intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77
Avoidance of sonobuoy mutual To get underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25
interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28 Notices, surface ship . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Measures to avoid mutual And advisories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67
interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55 Nuclear:
Prevention of mutual interference Action prior to nuclear attack . . . . . . 12-9
between submerged submarines Attack with nuclear antisub-
and surface ships with towed marine warfare weapon . . . 9-41 to 9-47
acoustic devices streamed . . . . . . 6-79 Bursts, types of nuclear. . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Mutual support for towed-array ship . . . . 9-5 Defense formations . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Tactics following nuclear attack . . . . . 12-9
N Warfare defense concept. . . . . . . . . . 12-2
Weapons, employing own nuclear . . . 12-10
Narrowband passive sonar contact . . . . . 9-18 Nuclear, biological, and chemical:
Naval: Degrees of defense readiness . . . . . . . 1-28
Authority over landing Graduated levels of threat and
force units . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9, 11-8 minimum individual
Beach group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4 protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-15
Control of shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9 Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Full . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2, 10-7 Numbering formations . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
Regional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 Numbers:
Forces in amphibious operation . . . . . 11-3 Berth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Navigation: Task force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Allied Worldwide Navigation
Information System . . . . . . . . . 10-6 O
Antisubmarine warfare aircraft with
inoperable navigation systems . . . 9-22 Offensive:
Lights on darkened ships . . . . . . . . . 2-22 Air operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41
Pilotage, navigation and . . . . . . . . . 1-25 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Use of navigation lights . . . . . . . . . 9-23 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
Navigational: Officer in tactical command . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Danger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 Chemical warfare, officer in tactical
Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49 command’s considerations in . . . 12-13

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No. No.

Commanders subordinate to officer in Patrol or search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8


tactical command, responsibilities of . 9-42 Replenishment formation. . . . . . . . . 3-16
Convoy, responsibility for . . . . . . . . 1-14 Orders, scope of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4
Departure and entry operations, Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27
responsibility for . . . . . . . . . . 1-14 Activation of naval control of
Emission policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 shipping organization . . . . . . . . 10-1
Information required by officer in Amphibious operation, organization
tactical command . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9 for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
Informing the officer in tactical Change in organization of force . . . . . . 3-1
command of operations in his Task, type, and warfare . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
vicinity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 Origin, accuracy of airplan. . . . . . . . . . 9-8
Nuclear antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . 9-42 Outer:
Passing information about contacts . . . 6-14 Defense zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20
Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13 Screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-44
Radar is detected, officer in tactical Towed array ship stations in. . . . . . . 9-6
command’s considerations when Warfare net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
target or threat . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22 Over-the-horizon targeting . . . . . . . . . 8-17
Search attack unit, responsibilities Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a
for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25 Overt tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6
Ship of officer in tactical command as Own-force:
Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16 Employment of nuclear weapons. . . . . 12-9
Towed array ship/aircraft cooperation, Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
officer in tactical command’s
role in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 P
Offensive mine countermeasures . . . . . . 13-3
Offset approach method . . . . . . . . . . 9-27 Parallel chains of command . . . . . . . . 1-8a
Off-task/on-task time, aircraft Particular degrees of readiness . . . . . . . 1-28
procedures at . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28b Passing:
On top. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17 Between ships in a line . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Radar and reverse radar . . . . . . . . . 9-30 Target bearing and range . . . . . . . . . 8-20
Visual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31 Through a formation . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Operational: Passive:
Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 Electronic protection measures
Change of operational control . . . . . . . 1-5 (definition). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Initial contact, passive sonar capable
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 surface ship gains . . . . . . . . . . 9-32
Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22 Mine countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Efficiency, report on operational . . . . . 12-9 Sonar contact, narrowband
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4, 3-7 passive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18
Stand-off range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49 Sonar or sonobuoy, broadband
Operations, factors determining type of. . . 6-30b contact by passive . . . . . . . . . 9-18
OPSTATs CARGO and UNIT. . . . . . . . 1-8 Sonobuoy procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
OPTASK: Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7
RAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7 Adjacent patrol areas . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
RNCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4 Plane group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
NUC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-43 Pattern mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Options, command and control . . . . . . . 1-13 Peacetime:
ORANGE, DUSTBIN area . . . . . . . . . 9-45 Precautions for submarine operations . . . 6-76
Ordering: Recovery maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19
Authentication policy . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5 Person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

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No. No.

Picket ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19 Ship operating helicopters, position of . . 6-35


Pickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48 Standard positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
In antisurface warfare . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 Towed array ship zero position and
Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 intended movement operations. . . . . 9-6
Picture compilation . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 to 6-5 When force position differs from
And weapon employment . . . . . . . . 6-10 position and intended movement . . . 2-10
Pilot voice report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48 Positive control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Pilotage, navigation and . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 Electronic countermeasures . . . . . . . 7-10
Plan: POSSUB classification (definition) . . . . 9-18
Antisubmarine warfare search . . . . . . 9-23 Post-attack emission control and
Emission control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 communications security. . . . . . . 5-5
Picture compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 Precautions:
Sonobuoy interference avoidance . . . . . 9-9 Delays while operating aircraft,
Standard surface action . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 antisubmarine warfare
Tactical communications . . . . . . . . . 4-1 precautions during . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Planned: Submarine operations, precautions
Antiship missile defense reactions . . . . 7-15 for peacetime . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 Surface ship precautions . . . . . . . . . 6-67
Electronic countermeasures . . . . . . 5-12 Predicted sonar range . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Planning: Preparing for sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25
Amphibious operation . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 Preplanned responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16
Antiship missile defense reactions . . . . 7-15 Prerogatives of commanding officers
Antisubmarine warfare air operations . . . 9-7 of Allied warships . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Relationships during planning. . . . 1-9, 11-7 Prevention of mutual interference . . . . . 6-58
Scouting operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6 Between submerged submarines
Point: and surface ships with towed
A, X, O, and Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7 acoustic devices streamed . . . . . . 6-79
Identification safety point . . . . . . . . 6-23 Principal warfare:
Reference points . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6, 6-57 Area responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
Romeo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Shipping control point . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 Probability of success, highest . . . . . . . 9-47
Policy: PROBSUB classification (definition) . . . 9-17
Aircraft arming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48 Program, replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Antisubmarine warfare attack . . . . . . 9-21 Promulgation of:
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5 Antiair warfare coordination method . . . 7-9
Emission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3, 5-3 Antiship missile defense reactions . . . . 7-17
Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 Fallout information . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Position. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 Planned responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Accuracy suffixes. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4a Sonobuoy interference avoidance
Airplans, change of position and plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
intended movement in relative . . . . 9-8 Propellers in harbor, use of ship’s . . . . . 14-1
Designators, convoy route position . . . . 2-8 PROTAC amendment message. . . . . . . 1-49
Doubt of position . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
Exchanging data on positions, Convoy, protection of . . . . . 10-13 to 10-14
reporting and . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 Individual protection; levels of
Movement, position and intended . . . . 2-10 nuclear, biological, chemical
Own position, reporting . . . . . . . . . 6-18 threat and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-15
Reporting position . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 Shipping against threat of attack,
altitude or depth. . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 protection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 Shipping requiring protection . . . . . . 10-11

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Protective: Reactions; planning, promulgating,


Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5 and executing antiship
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 missile defense . . . . . . . 7-15 to 7-20
Publications, reference . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 Readiness:
Action, readiness for . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26
Q Degrees of readiness . . . . . . . 1-24 to 1-25
In antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
Qualifying weapon control status and Fallout transit, operational
orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 readiness for . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Quick reference system . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4a Harbor or anchorage,
readiness in . . . . . . . . . . 1-24, 14-3
R Self-protective measures in mine
warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Radar: Underway, readiness to get. . . . . . . . 1-25
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18 Ready:
Grid lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17 Deck system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36
Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
On top . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30 Recognition:
Vectored attack method . . . . . . . . . 9-37 Aircraft, recognition by . . . . . . . . . . 6-7
Use in harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 Classification, and identification;
Radar-fitted aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19 recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
Radiation: Identification/recognition. . . . . . . . . 6-56
Flash and initial radiation effects. . . . . 12-1 Picture compilation, recognition in . . . . 6-3
Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23
Residual radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 Support aircraft, recognition of. . . . . . 6-21
Status indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7
Radio silence, breaking . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18 Aircraft employment in antiship
Radioteletype: missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13
Direct support aircraft procedures . . . . 4-12 And underwater demolition group . . . . 11-3
Joining procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26 Recording enemy emissions . . . . . . . . 5-13
Tactical messages, use for . . . . . . . . . 4-3 Recovery:
Voice/radioteletype reporting . . . 8-18, 8-19 Aircraft, ships engaged in launch or
Raid: recovery of . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Amphibious raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2 Maneuvers:
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 to 6-15 Peacetime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19
RAINFORM messages . . . . . . . . 1-24, 9-7 Wartime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Random: Operations, maneuvering for low-
Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-22 visibility recovery . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3 Replenishment, recovery when
Range: engaged in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Antisubmarine warfare sensors and Unscheduled launch and recovery
weapons, range of. . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45
Identification safety range . . . . . . . . 6-22 Rectangle, size of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
Nuclear blast effects, range of . . . . . . 12-2 Reducing risk from mines . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Passing target bearing and range . . . . . 8-20 Re-entry into contaminated area . . . . . . 9-53
Predicted sonar range . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 Reference:
Safe stand-off ranges . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50 Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6, 6-57
Tactical sonar range . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 Data link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
Rapid amendment of tactics and Helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6a
procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49 Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7
Reaction time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4 Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

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Region, naval control of shipping . . . . . 10-2 Engagement after-action . . . . . . . . . 6-16


Regional naval control of shipping . . . . . 10-2 Mine detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
Regrouping a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 Missile state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
Rehearsal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2 Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Reinforcements to scene of action, Operational efficiency . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
sending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25 Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Rejoin, meaning of order to . . . . . . . . 2-15 Raid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
Rejoining: Screen, report on joining a . . . . . . . . 3-48
Helicopters, rejoining of . . . . . . . . . 6-31 Search attack unit, aircraft reports to . . . 9-30
Screen, rejoining the . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48 Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
Units closing or rejoining . . . . . . . . 2-15 Special antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Relative: Submarines, reports from. . . . . . . . . 9-13
Airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 Surface and subsurface raid . . . . . . . 6-15
Course and relative wind . . . . . . . . . 6-39 Tactical air support of maritime
Relaying of contact reports by operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
antisubmarine warfare aircraft . . . 9-20 Towed array ship contact. . . . . . . . . 9-20
Release of nuclear antisubmarine Warfare commander . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
warfare weapon:: Weapon state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7
Action by units after . . . . . . . . . . . 9-47 Reporting:
Criteria for use of . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45 Antiair warfare, reporting in . . . . . . . . 7-2
Relief, nonarrival of . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28b Choice of reporting method . . . . . . . 9-20
Relieving units, information exchange Contact reporting, initial antisub-
between shadowing and . . . . . . . 6-9 marine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
Relinquishment of tactical control . . . . . 9-12 Data on position, reporting and
Remote targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18 exchanging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Rendezvous: Emission control, reporting during
Arrival at rendezvous. . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 restricted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Emergency rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 Link reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20
Failure to rendezvous. . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 Mine explosions and detections,
Formation rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-21
Replenishment: Own position, reporting . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Command during replenishment. . . . . . 1-7 Position, reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27 Submarine reporting . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Escorts, replenishment of . . . . . 3-16, 10-12 Support submarine, contact
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12 reporting by . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Method of execution . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7 Target reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
Recovery when engaged in Time of arrival, reporting. . . . . . . . . 2-11
replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20 Voice reporting procedures . . . . . . . . 5-3
Screen units, replenishment of . . . . . . 3-48 Request for:
Ships engaged in replenishment . . . . . 2-17 Carrier and shipborne aircraft . . . . . . 6-44
Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12 NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-74
Report: Support submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Air combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15 Waterspace management area . . . . . . 6-64
Aircraft operating. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12 Rerouting a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12
Air raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 Rescue:
Ammunition state. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11 Aircraft emergency and rescue . . . . . . 6-47
Antisubmarine warfare: Destroyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19, 6-48
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 to 9-22 Distress, rescue of aircraft in . . . . . . . 6-39
Weapon state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 Helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50 to 6-52
Enemy contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 Survivors, rescue of . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47

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Reserve speed for station-keeping . . . . . 2-14 Reverse arrow head formation . . . . . . 10-22
Residual radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 Reverse radar:
Responses, planned . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 Grid lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13 On top . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30
Aircraft control unit . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25 Vectored attack method . . . . . . . . . 9-37
Antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . 7-15 Right of way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Commanders subordinate to officer in Ships launching/recovering aircraft . . . 6-35
tactical command . . . . . . . . . . 9-43 Ships over screen units . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14 Romeo, point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Departure and entry operations. . . . . . 1-14 Rotating formation axis . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Electronic warfare coordination Rough weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 Routes and reference points . . . . . . 2-7, 6-57
NOTACK area, establishing . . . . . . . 6-74 Routing, protective . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5
Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 Rudder used, amount of . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Scene of action commander . . . . . . . 9-29 Rules:
Search attack unit commander . . . 9-25, 9-29 Antisubmarine warfare attack rules . . . 6-65
Units carrying aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 6-29 Engagement, rules of . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Warfare commander and coordinator . . 1-16 Low-altitude rules . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32
Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . 1-3, 1-12, 6-56 Maneuvering, rules for . . . . . . . 2-11, 2-16
Antisubmarine warfare area of Road, special rules of the. . . . . . . . . 2-17
responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60 Vectored attack, rules for. . . . . . . . . 9-37
Authority and responsibility . . . . . . . 1-15
Command responsibility for anti- S
submarine warfare contacts . . . . . 9-19
Contacts, responsibility for passing Safe stand-off ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49
information about . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 Safety:
Disabled submarine, responsibility to . . 6-76 Aircraft, safety of . . . . . . . . . 6-30b, 6-66
Landing ashore, responsibility for Helicopters, safety of . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
conduct of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7 Identification safety point . . . . . . . . 6-23
Restricted: Identification safety range . . . . . . . . 6-22
Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57 Lanes, submarine safety . . . . . . 6-60, 6-66
Procedures for surface ships entering . . 6-65 Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Emission control, reporting during . . . 6-18 Maritime air operations, safety
Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18 procedures for . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30b
Screening in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39 Measures and preparations . . . . . . . 13-14
Restrictions: Precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Antiship missile defense reactions, Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
restrictions on planned . . . . . . . 7-19 Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
Antisubmarine warfare weapons, Submarine safety procedures . . . . . . . 6-65
restrictions on . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58 Sailing order folder . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5
Attack restrictions when operating with Salvage and breakdown . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
support submarines . . . . . . . . . 9-22 Satellite communication . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Diving restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77 Scare charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Subdivision, restriction on . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Scene of action:
Weapon restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 Commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
Resuming: Changing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
Course and station in maneuvering In nuclear antisubmarine warfare
Methods B and C . . . . . . . . . . 6-38 weapon attack . . . . . . . . 9-43, 9-46
Previous station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 Sending reinforcements to scene of
Return to force procedures . . . . . . . . . 7-22 action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Returning aircraft, procedure for . . . . . . 6-45

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Units at scene of action of nuclear Intended employment of units . . . . 9-29


antisubmarine warfare weapon Communications . . . . . . . . . 4-9, 9-25
drop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-43 Designation and dispatch of . . . . . . 9-25
Scouting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 to 6-8 Equipment on own transmissions,
Screen: interference of search . . . . . . . . 5-12
Adjusting the screen . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46 Friendly force, search for. . . . . . . . . 6-21
Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49 Plans, antisubmarine warfare search . . . 9-23
Bulging the screen . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49 Selection of search type for towed
Commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-43 array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
Delegation to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 Submarine-generated search
Convoy screens, instructions for . . . . . 3-46 area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68 to 6-72
Damaged ships, screen for . . . . . . . . 3-43 Searching helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Descriptions of screens . . . . . . . . . . 3-38 Seaward defense:
Equipment failure, effect on screen of . . . 3-48 Command in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8
Evasive steering by screen units . . . . . 2-23 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2
Filling a gap in the screen . . . . . . . . 3-48 Sector(s):
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47 Coordinator, sector antiair warfare . . . . 7-1
Arming screen helicopters . . . . . . . 9-47 Flying sectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-36
Control of helicopter in sector Nets, sector antiair warfare . . . . . . . . 4-7
screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47 Safety sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
Inner and outer screens . . . . . . . . . . 3-38 Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37, 3-38, 3-46
Instructions for individual screen Taking up or changing sectors . . . . . . 3-49
units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48 Security:
Operating within the screen in Communications security . . . . . . . . . 4-4
maneuvering Method C . . . . . . . 6-38 Emission control, security and . . . . . . 6-18
Rescue outside screen . . . . . . . . . . 6-52 Grid, security of the . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
Sector screen, sector size for units in. . . 3-39 Selection criteria for scouting . . . . . . . . 6-6
Selection and design . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37 Selection of:
Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17 Antiship missile defense
Stationing screen units . . . . . . . . . . 3-38 countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
Surface screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Convoy formation . . . . . . . . 10-14, 10-20
Towed array ship: Formation rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
In screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48 Station size and search type for
Screen station options . . . . . . . . . . 9-6 towed array ships. . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
Types of screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37 Target reporting unit . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
Unit as Guide in maneuvering Selective release of nuclear antisub-
Method B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-38 marine warfare weapons . . . . . . 9-41
Screening: Self-attack, helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46
Aircraft carrier during flight operations . . 3-46 Self-defense:
Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 Electronic countermeasures systems . . . 5-12
Helicopter: Responsibility in antiair warfare. . . . . . 7-2
Advanced screening helicopter. . . . . 9-21 Units with self-defense weapons . . . . . 7-4
Deliberate or urgent attack by Self-identification, initiation of. . . . . . . 6-56
screening helicopter . . . . . . . . . 9-23 Self-protective measures against mine
Sea manners and customs . . . . . . . . . 2-17 threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8 Senior officer’s orders to keep clear . . . . 2-18
Attack unit: Sensor:
Aircraft reports to . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30 Active sensors, use of . . . . . . . . . . 8-20
Approach to contact or datum . . . . . 9-27 Deviation from specified sensor . . . . . 6-28
Commander . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26, 9-31 Ranges of antisubmarine warfare
Change of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31 sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

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No. No.

Selecting sensors for scouting . . . . . . . 6-6 Formed units, general conduct of


Use of sensors and emission control . . . 7-14 ships in presence of . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Sentries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 Guide, designated ship as/ship which
Separation: is to be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Lateral and vertical separation . . . . . . 6-33 Helicopters, positioning of ships
Transit separation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32 operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35
Vertical separation in instrument Inner screen, ships in the . . . . . . . . . 1-19
meteorological conditions . . . . . . 6-34 Launching or recovering aircraft, ships
Sequence: engaged in . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
In leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25 Lights by ships and aircraft, use of . . . . 6-34
Of amphibious operations . . . . . . . . 11-2 Merchant ships, factors affecting. . . . . 10-1
Shadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9 Methods, ship and helicopter attack
Information exchange between and support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
shadowing and relieving units . . . . 6-9 Mined area:
Shifting tactical control of direct Conduct of surface ships in:
support submarines . . . . . . . . . 9-11 Ship at sea . . . . . . . . . 13-5 to 13-10
Ship: Ship at anchor or alongside . . . . 13-10
Acoustic arrays or other devices, ships Transit of ships through. . . . . . . . 13-12
towing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18 Not in station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Action by individual ship when Passing between ships in a line. . . . . . 2-18
Operation AWKWARD is Readiness of ships . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27
ordered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3 Replenishment, ships engaged in. . . . . 2-17
Adjustment of movements by ships Rescue destroyer . . . . . . . . . . 1-19, 6-48
relative to carrier . . . . . . . . . . 6-35 Right of way of ships launching or
Aircraft in distress, ship respon- recovering aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 6-35
sibility for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48 Screen ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Aircraft, responsibilities of ships Sector screen, conduct of ships in . . . . 3-46
carrying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29 Supporting ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36a
Aircraft, ships operating: Surface ship (See Surface ship)
Minor adjustments by . . . . . . . . . 6-37 Surface-to-air missile ships . . . . . . . . 7-3
Rescue in vicinity of . . . . . . . . . . 6-52 Surface-to-surface missile ships,
To make signals . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52 formations with . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Vertical takeoff and landing Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35 Torpedo countermeasures for single
Anchoring reference, ship as . . . . . . . 2-7 ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Antiair warfare responsibilities of Towed array ship
individual ship . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 (See Towed array ship)
Antisubmarine warfare ship . . . . . . . . 9-3 Transmitting equipment, ship fitted
Assisting and attacking ships . . 9-36 to 9-37 with high-powered . . . . . . . . . 6-67
Control zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44 Transport/logistic ships, intervals for . . . 3-9
Damaged ships, screen for . . . . . . . . 3-43 Shipborne aircraft operations . . . . . . . . 6-35
Darkened ships, navigation lights on. . . 2-22 Shipping:
Darkening ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23 Control point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
Disabled ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21 Naval control of shipping . . . . . . . . . 1-9
Diversion of ship to locate survivors . . . 6-54 Protection of shipping . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Electronic and acoustic warfare, Requiring protection . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
responsibilities of ships for . . . . . . 5-3 Risk areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
Emergency landing ship . . . . . . . . . 6-47 Shore:
Flight operations, ship movements Authority role in towed array ship/
during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35 aircraft cooperation . . . . . . . . . 9-34
Bombardment and bomb lines . . . . . . 6-58

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-25 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Signal: Interference avoidance plan . . . . . . . . 9-9


Disabled ship, signals from. . . . . . . . 2-21 Mutual interference, avoidance of
Emergency signals . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 sonobuoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
Fog signals, standard . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
Maneuvering Method A, signals Passive sonobuoy:
used in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-37 Broadband contact . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18
Position and intended movement Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10 Pattern (Jezebel pattern) procedure . . . . 9-9
Ship operating aircraft to make Turnover procedures . . . . . . . . . . 6-28c
signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52 Sound underwater signal . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
Signaled speed, change in . . . . . . . . . 2-14 Specific turnover procedures . . . . . . . 6-28b
Signaling: Speed:
Data for antiship missile defense Changing speed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
reaction table . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17 Course and speed/course and speed
Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 made good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9
Silence, breaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Silent: Force in joint action area, speed of . . . . 9-11
Emission policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 Ordering speed, method of . . . . . . . . 2-14
Surface-to-air missile missile Replenishment speed . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12
engagement zone . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9 Reserve speed for station keeping . . . . 2-14
Single: Signaled speed, change in . . . . . . . . 2-14
Letter visual signals for surface When taking or changing station . . . . . 2-14
action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a While maneuvering. . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Net information and plotting . . . . . . . 4-8 Spread of base surge . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49
Situation: Standard:
Appreciation of situation . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Call signs for warfare commanders
Report to operational control authority and coordinators . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
by maritime patrol aircraft . . . . . 4-13 Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Reports and summaries. . . . . . . . . . 6-16 Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
Size of: Surface action plans . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Joint action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12 Tactical diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-74 Stand-off ranges, safe. . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49
Tactical diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 Station:
Skeleton screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39 Circular formation, taking station in. . . . 3-4
Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39 Combat air patrol stations . . . . . . . . 7-22
Maneuvering with . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46 Helicopter rescue station . . . . . . . . . 6-51
SNIPE, Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 Resuming:
Soft-kill weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14 Previous station . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Sonar: Station in maneuvering Methods
Active sonar contact . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17 B and C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-38
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 Ships not in station . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Harbor, use of sonar in . . . . . . . . . . 14-1 Speed when taking or changing
Keyed sonar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11 station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Passive sonar contact: Towed array ship stations. . . . . . 9-5 to 9-6
Broadband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18 Stationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Narrowband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18 Airborne early warning aircraft . . . . . . 7-4
Ranges, predicted and tactical sonar. . . . 9-2 Antiair warfare units . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Sonar-fitted ship, aircraft/helicopter Combat air patrol aircraft . . . . . . 7-5, 7-22
vectored attack by . . . . . . . . . 9-46 Circular stationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Sonobuoy: Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13
Active sonobuoy contact . . . . . . . . . 9-17 Convoy ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

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Page Page
No. No.

Screen units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38 Passing information about contact . . . . 6-14


Ships providing weapon carriers . . . . . 9-47 Peacetime submarine operations,
Speed, establishing stationing . . . . . . 2-14 special precautions for. . . . . . . . 6-76
Support submarines. . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12 Prevention of mutual interference
Surface-to-air missile ships . . . . . . . . 7-3 between submerged submarines and
Target reporting unit . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19 surface ships with towed acoustic
Towed array ship options . . . . . . . . . 9-6 devices streamed . . . . . . . . . . 6-79
Towed array units . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4 Procedures within submarine action
Units of more than one ship . . . . . . . . 3-4 area or joint action area . . . . . . . 6-63
Station keeping: Protection against submarine attack:
By helicopter in screen . . . . . . . . . . 3-49 Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
Reserve speed for station keeping . . . . 2-14 Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
STOVEPIPE procedures . . . . . . . . . . 9-13 Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5
Strategic: Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 Reports from submarines . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Use of satellites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15 Safe stand-off ranges . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
STRIKECAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22 Safety:
Strike commander, formations, Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60, 6-66
and operations. . . . . . . . 6-41 to 6-43 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Structure for command of maritime Shadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8
forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Support submarine:
Subdivision, restriction on . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Attack restrictions when operating
Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19 with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59, 6-62 Communications with . . . . . . . . . 4-8b
Aided intercept by submarine . . . . . . 9-14 Contact reporting by . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
Aircraft response to submarine contact . . 9-32 Coordinated contact prosecution
Antisubmarine warfare submarines . . . 9-10 with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-32
Area operations, submarine in . . . . . . 9-10 Gains initial contact . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
Associated support, submarine in . . . . 9-13 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 to 9-12
Blind bombing zone, submarine in . . . . 6-58 Requesting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Broadcast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9 Shifting tactical control of . . . . . . . 9-11
Command in submarine operations . . . . 1-8 Tactical communications . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9 Threat area, antisubmarine evasion in
Contact handover with aircraft . . . . . . 9-33 submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Coordinator, submarine element . . . . . 1-18 Transiting submarines, command
Direct support, submarine in . . . 6-20f, 9-11 relationships of . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Disabled submarine, responsibility to Units prosecuting submarine contact. . . 9-10
assist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 Windows:
Enemy submarine, contact report on . . . 9-32 For submarine in associated support . . 9-13
Exercise areas, mutual interference in Special communication windows . . . 4-10
submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77 Submarine/air coordination. . . . . . . . . 9-33
Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60 Submarine-generated search
Joint action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63 area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68 to 6-72
Mined area, submarine transit of . . . . 13-15 SUBNOTE procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77
Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 Subsurface:
Authorities for . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8a Antisurface warfare with subsurface
Moving haven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60 cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15
NOTACK area, submarine Force track coordinator —
responsibility in establishing . . . 6-74 subsurface . . . . . . . . . 6-13, 8-1, 9-1
Operations after loss of submarine Operations inherently dangerous to
command and control . . . . . . . . 6-63 subsurface operations . . . . . . . . 6-78

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-27 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Raid reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2


Suffixes, position/bearing accuracy . . . . 2-4a Protection against submarine attack:
Summary of decisions and actions . . . . . 9-53 Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
Support: Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
Aircraft (See Aircraft) Raid reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15
Air forces, support operations Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
controlled by other . . . . . . . . . 6-28c Ship (See Surface ship)
Air support operations . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 Success of surface action . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Associated support . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12 Surveillance by aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 6-5
Attack support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15 Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Carrier force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 Surface ship:
Command during support operations. . . 1-10 Attack policy, surface ship antisub-
Direct support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11 marine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Force and convoy in situation A . . . . . 1-14 Blind bombing zone, surface
Maritime authorities, support ship in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
operations tasked by . . . . . . . . 6-20 Contaminated area, surface ship
Methods, antisubmarine warfare ship re-entry into . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
and helicopter attack and support . . 9-35 Detecting unit, surface ship assists . . . . 9-24
Mine countermeasures operations, Escape maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52
support of . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12 Gains initial contact, passive sonar
Situations A, B, and C . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 capable surface ship . . . . . . . . . 9-32
Submarine (See Submarines) Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61
Surface minelaying operations, Notices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
support of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3 Passing information about contact . . . . 6-14
Supporting ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36a Precautions, special surface ship . . . . . 6-67
Surface: Prevention of mutual interference
Access of surface force to sub- between submerged submarines
marine action area or joint and surface ships with towed
action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62 acoustic devices streamed . . . . . . 6-79
Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 Procedures for entering restricted
Air coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Air/surface antisubmarine warfare Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5
attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 Safety lanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 Shadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8
Commander, surface action group . . . . . 8-8 Stand-off ranges, emergency and
Communications: operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a Submarine safety lane, surface
Surface warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 ship in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Coordinated aircraft/surface unit Towed arrays. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 Surface-to-air missile:
Emergency transit of surface force Missile engagement zone . . . . . . . . . 7-9
through submarine action area Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
or joint action area. . . . . . . . . . 6-64 Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14, 6-7
Force track coordinator — Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
surface . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13, 8-1, 9-1 Coordination and data compilation. . . . 6-12
Group, surface action . . . . . . . . 8-8 to 8-9 Survival of agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10
Minelaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3 Survivors:
Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a Diversion of ship to locate survivors . . . 6-54
Pickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 Rescue of survivors. . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47
Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15 Sweep commander, formations,
Plans, standard surface action . . . . . . . 8-9 and operations. . . . . . . . 6-41 to 6-44

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED Index-28 CHANGE 8


NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

Page Page
No. No.

Swimmers, defense against underwater . . 14-1 Targeting:


Aided intercept by submarine,
T targeting for . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
Third-party targeting . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17
Tacan method of grid lock . . . . . . . . . 6-17 Task:
Tactical: Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Aided intercept by submarine, Force numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
tactical control of . . . . . . . . . . 9-14 Group:
Air control groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 Duties of carriers in . . . . . . . . . . 6-36
Air support of maritime operations: Position and intended movement. . . . 2-10
Operations outside . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20 Groups, units, and elements . . . . . . . . 1-1
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15 Nets, task force/group reporting . . . . . 4-8a
Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
At sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12 Changes in assignments . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Officer in tactical command . . . . . . . 1-5 Tasking:
Communications plans. . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 Aircraft for antisubmarine warfare
Considerations in: operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7
Chemical warfare. . . . . . . . . . . 12-13 Electronic warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10
Nuclear warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 Message for aided intercept by
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
Data links, tactical use of . . . . . . . . 6-16a Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Deception group . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4 Objectives for electronic and
Diameter, standard tactical . . . . . . . . 2-12 acoustic warfare . . . . . . . . . . 5-10
Link 4 and 11, tactical use of . . . . . . 6-16a Tattletale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 Tension, action at time of increased . . . . 6-78
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29 Termination of amphibious operation . . . 11-2
Relinquishment of tactical control . . . . 9-12 Terms and definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11
Satellites, tactical use of . . . . . . . . . 4-15 Third-party targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17
Shifting tactical control of direct Threat:
support submarines . . . . . . . . . 9-11 Surface threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Sonar range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12, 7-14, 8-20
Tactics: Action upon interception of . . . . . . 8-20
Carrier battle group air defense tactics . . 7-20 Warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26, 1-29
Following nuclear attack . . . . . . . . . 12-9 Time:
Rapid amendment of tactics . . . . . . . 1-49 Prearranged time, executing
Overt and covert tactics . . . . . . . . . . 6-6 maneuver at . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Taking: Reaction time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4a
Sectors or patrol lines, taking up . . . . . 3-49 Torpedo countermeasures . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Station, speed when taking . . . . . . . . 2-14 By search attack unit . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28
Station in circular formation . . . . . . . . 3-4 In torpedo danger zone . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Target: When torpedo is detected. . . . . . . . . 2-26
Classification required for attack. . . . . 9-46 Towed acoustic devices streamed,
Data, accuracy of target . . . . . . . . . 8-18 prevention of mutual interference
Engagement messages . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 between submerged submarines
Motion analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34 and surface ships with . . . . . . . . 6-79
Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12, 7-14, 8-20 Towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19
Action upon interception of . . . . . . 8-20 Aircraft support of towed array ship. . . . 9-8
Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19 Antisurface warfare, towed array
Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18, 8-19 ship in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10
Submarine target priority list . . . . . . . 8-16 Communications. . . . . . . . . . . 4-8b, 9-5
Contact prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34

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Page Page
No. No.

Contact reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20 Units:


Investigation of contact in towed Closing or rejoining . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
array ship/aircraft cooperation . . . 9-35 Disposition of units. . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
Screen, towed array ship in. . . . . . . . 3-48 Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Stationing of towed array ships . . . 9-4 to 9-6 Selecting units for scouting . . . . . . . . 6-6
Towed arrays, surface ship. . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Stationing units of more than
Transfer of control of functions . . . . . . 11-8 one ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Transit: Temporarily detached . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Emergency transit of surface forces Task units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
through submarine action area or Universal transverse mercator grid . . . . . 2-3
joint action area . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64 UPLINK considerations . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
Fallout transit, operational readi- Unscheduled launch and recovery
ness for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9 operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45
Helicopters, transit of. . . . . . . . . . . 6-32 Urgent:
Instruction for aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 Attack by fixed-wing aircraft and
Mined area, transit through: screening helicopter . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-15
Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32 V
Transiting submarines, command
relationships of . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76 Variations to airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
Transmission speed versus security . . . . 6-18 Vector-assisted attack . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15
Transmissions; interference of, and Vectored attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
interception, detection, and VELOCIPEDE, Operation . . . . . . . . . 8-14
direction-finding of . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Verification runs, magnetic anomaly
Transmitting equipment, ships fitted detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-41
with high-power . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67 Vertical:
Transport groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 Separation, lateral and vertical . . . . . . 6-33
Transport/logistic formations . . . . . . . . 3-9 Takeoff and landing aircraft,
True: ships operating vertical . . . . . . . 6-35
Courses and true bearings . . . . . . . . 6-30b Veto:
Preserving true bearing and distance . . . 1-25 Command by. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
Turn by convoy, emergency. . . . . . . . 10-13 Control by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Turnover procedures: Visual:
Maritime patrol aircraft to maritime Contact between ship and aircraft
patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28a in distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
Sonobuoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28c On top . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
Turns used in maneuvering Method A . . . 6-37 Signals for:
Type organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Emergency landing . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . 4-8a
U Vectored attack method . . . . . . . . . 9-38
VL method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-23
Underwater: Voice:
Blast and underwater shock . . . . . . . 12-2 Joining procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-41, 12-1 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
Demolition group. . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3 Reporting procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Swimmers, defense against . . . . . . . 14-1 Voice/radioteletype reporting . . . . 8-18, 8-19
Underway, readiness to get underway . . . 1-25
Unescorted convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14 W
Unit of distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Waveform, Link 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16b

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Page Page
No. No.

Warfare: For antisubmarine warfare weapons . . . 9-2


Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16 Use of weapons by submarine . . . . . . 8-16
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 Whistle signals while maneuvering . . . . 2-22
Standard call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 Wide-area link operations . . . . . . . . . 6-16b
Nets, inner and outer. . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 Wind. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Windows:
Warning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26 For submarine in associated support . . . 9-13
Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26, 1-29 Special communication windows . . . . 4-10
Warship: Withdrawal, amphibious . . . . . . . . . . 11-1
Prerogatives of commanding officers World geographic reference system . . . . . 2-1
of Allied warships . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 Worldwide Navigation Information
Stationing warship in convoy . . . . . . 10-8 System, Allied . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
Wartime:
Cruising precautions . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23 Y
Recovery maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Watch zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 Yards, reporting bearing and distance in
Waterspace management . . . . . . . . . . 6-58 hundreds of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
Allocation procedures . . . . . . . . . . 6-62 Yields and effectiveness of nuclear
Weapon: antisubmarine warfare weapons . . . 9-47
Alert states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28
Assignment report . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 Z
Control status and orders . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Nuclear weapons (See Nuclear) Zero position and intended movement
Picture compilation and weapon operation, towed array ship . . . . . . 9-6
employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10 ZIPPO procedure . . . . . . . . . . 7-15 to 7-20
Policy on use of weapons by aircraft . . . 9-21 Zone(s):
Ranges of antisubmarine warfare Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
weapons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 Crossover and engagement zones . . . . . 7-9
Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66 Fighter engagement zone . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Self-defense weapons, units with . . . . . 7-4 Inner and outer defense zones . . . . . . 7-20
State reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7 Watch zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10

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NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ATP 1(C), Vol. I

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Effective Pages Page Numbers Effective Pages Page Numbers


Original I (Reverse Blank) Change 6 6-4a (Reverse Blank)
Original III (Reverse Blank) Change 5 6-5, 6-6
Change 6 V, VI Change 6 6-7, 6-8
Original VII (Reverse Blank) Change 7 6-9 thru 6-12
Original XIX, XX Change 6 6-13 thru 6-16
Change 8 XXI thru LII Change 7 6-16a, 6-16b
Change 6 LIII, LIV Change 8 6-16c, 6-16d
Change 4 LV (Reverse Blank) Change 7 6-17, 6-18
Change 6 1-1 thru 1-6 Change 8 6-19, 6-20
Change 7 1-7, 1-8 Change 8 6-20a thru 6-20f
Change 7 1-8a (Reverse Blank) Change 8 6-21 thru 6-26
Change 7 1-9, 1-10 Change 7 6-27, 6-28
Change 6 1-11, 1-12 Change 7 6-28a thru 6-28d
Change 8 1-13, 1-14 Change 7 6-29, 6-30
Change 6 1-15, 1-16 Change 7 6-30a, 6-30b
Change 8 1-17 thru 1-20 Change 8 6-31, 6-32
Change 6 1-21, 1-22 Change 7 6-33, 6-34
Change 7 1-23, 1-24 Change 7 6-34a (Reverse Blank)
Change 6 1-25 thru 1-28 Change 8 6-35, 6-36
Change 8 1-29 thru 1-32 Change 5 6-37 thru 6-40
Change 7 1-33 thru 1-36 Change 8 6-41 thru 6-44
Change 6 1-37 thru 1-46 Change 7 6-45, 6-46
Change 7 1-47, 1-48 Change 8 6-47, 6-48
Change 6 1-49 (Reverse Blank) Change 7 6-49, 6-50
Change 4 2-1 thru 2-4 Change 5 6-51, 6-52
Change 4 2-4a (Reverse Blank) Change 8 6-53 thru 6-64
Change 8 2-5, 2-6 Change 6 6-65, 6-66
Change 4 2-6a (Reverse Blank) Change 8 6-67 thru 6-80
Change 2 2-7 thru 2-10 Change 4 LVII (Reverse Blank)
Change 6 2-11, 2-12 Change 7 7-1 thru 7-4
Change 2 2-13, 2-14 Change 8 7-5, 7-6
Change 3 2-15, 2-16 Change 7 7-7, 7-8
Change 8 2-17, 2-18 Change 8 7-9 thru 7-12
Change 2 2-19 thru 2-22 Change 7 7-13 thru 7-23 (Reverse
Change 3 2-23, 2-24 Blank)
Change 8 2-25, 2-26 Change 8 8-1, 8-2
Change 8 2-27 (Reverse Blank) Change 6 8-3 thru 8-8
Change 4 2-29 (Reverse Blank) Change 8 8-9, 8-10
Change 8 3-1 thru 3-49 (Reverse Change 6 8-11 thru 8-14
Blank) Change 7 8-15 thru 8-18
Change 7 4-1 thru 4-6 Change 8 8-19, 8-20
Change 8 4-7, 4-8 Change 6 8-21, 8-22
Change 7 4-8a, 4-8b Change 7 8-23, 8-24
Change 8 4-9 thru 4-14 Change 6 8-25 thru 8-28
Change 6 4-15 (Reverse Blank) Change 8 8-29, 8-30
Change 8 5-1, 5-2 Change 7 9-1, 9-2
Change 6 5-3 thru 5-16 Change 8 9-3 thru 9-8
Change 8 5-17, 5-18 Change 6 9-9, 9-10
Change 6 5-19, 5-20 Change 7 9-11, 9-12
Change 8 6-1 thru 6-4 Change 6 9-13, 9-14

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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Effective Pages Page Numbers Effective Pages Page Numbers


Change 5 9-15, 9-16 Change 6 12-1, 12-2
Change 7 9-17, 9-18 Change 2 12-3, 12-4
Change 8 9-19 thru 9-22 Original 12-5, 12-6
Change 7 9-23 thru 9-26 Change 6 12-7, 12-8
Change 5 9-27, 9-28 Change 7 12-9, 12-10
Change 6 9-29 thru 9-34 Change 6 12-11 thru 12-16
Change 8 9-35, 9-36 Change 8 13-1, 13-2
Change 8 9-36a (Reverse Blank) Change 6 13-3 thru 13-10
Change 6 9-37, 9-38 Change 8 13-11 thru 13-21 (Reverse
Change 5 9-41 thru 9-48 Blank)
Change 6 9-49, 9-50 Change 8 14-1 thru 14-4
Change 5 9-51, 9-52 Change 8 A-1 thru A-3 (Reverse
Change 6 9-53 thru 9-58 Blank)
Change 2 9-59, 9-60 Change 6 Glossary-1, Glossary-2
Original 9-61, 9-62 Change 7 Glossary-3, Glossary-4
Change 4 9-63, 9-64 Change 6 Glossary-5 thru
Change 7 9-65 thru 9-68 Glossary-8
Original 9-69 thru 9-72 Change 7 Glossary-9, Glossary-10
Change 5 9-73, 9-74 Change 8 Glossary-11, Glossary-12
Change 6 9-75, 9-76 Change 8 Glossary-12a (Reverse
Change 8 9-77, 9-78 Blank)
Change 7 9-79 thru 9-84 Change 7 Glossary-13, Glossary-14
Change 5 9-85 thru 9-87 (Reverse Change 8 Glossary-15, Glossary-16
Blank) Change 8 Glossary-16a (Reverse
Change 7 10-1 thru 10-8 Blank)
Change 8 10-9, 10-10 Change 7 Glossary-17 thru
Change 7 10-11 thru 10-16 Glossary-20
Change 8 10-17 thru 10-20 Change 8 Glossary-21, Glossary-22
Change 7 10-21 thru 10-27 (Reverse Change 8 Index-1 thru Index-31
Blank) (Reverse Blank)
Change 6 11-1 thru 11-9 (Reverse Change 8 LEP-1 (Reverse Blank)
Blank) Change 8 LEP-3 (Reverse Blank)

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED LEP-3 (Reverse Blank) CHANGE 8


NATO-CONFIDENTIAL

CHANGE 8 TO ATP 1(C),


VOLUME I

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL

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