AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL WIRE TYPES

associated with

AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL FIRES

An aviation safety article

by

Alex PATERSON

http://www.vision.net.au/~apaterson/aviation/wire_types.htm

Last Updated: 22 July 2012

 MASTER INDEX of articles written, posted online, or recommended by Alex

Paterson

INTRODUCTION
This article provides a list of electrical wire types most commonly used in jet
transport aircraft. The articles lists both the positive and negative
characteristics of each wire type and the aircraft that these wires have been
installed in. It needs to be understood that the article is by necessity
incomplete because aircraft manufacturers and airlines have historically given
scant regard to the potential dangers posed by different wire types when
installing them in their aircraft and therefore have not kept accurate records
of what types of wire have been installed in the same. The complacency within
the aviation industry towards the dangers posed by electrical wire is endemic and is
best summed up by the comment of United States Federal Aviation Authority (FAA)
deputy head, Tom McSweeny, who is reported to have said before a Congressional
Committee in 19-- that "wire is wire". (more on Mr McSweeny's alleged comment
below)

 NOTE: This is a draft web page only, setup for discussion between contributors. It
undoubtedly contains omissions, and possibly some mistakes.  

Readers are invited to agree with, disagree with, seek clarification about or put their
point of view about any of the issues discussed in the article.

Alex Paterson (May 2007)

AIRCRAFT WIRE TABLE

The following table relates to general purpose aircraft electrical wire. It is important to
understand that all transport jet and turboprop aircraft have a mixture of the following
different wire types installed in them. The wire types listed in the table relate to the
predominant type of wire used in each aircraft. It would appear that even aircraft
manufacturers themselves are not completely sure as to what wire is installed in
individual aircraft as their attitude towards electrical wire in the past has been that
"wire is wire".

Table Colour code:

DANGEROUS WIRE
SAFETY UNKNOWN
PROBABLY SAFE
SAFE WIRE

NOTE: Wire is listed in the table by date of introduction into aircraft, with the oldest
wire typed listed at the top.

WIRE TYPE DESCRIPTION AIRCRAFT INSTALLED

IN

(some)
PVC/Nylon Fails Far 25 Installed in

(Polyvinyl-Chloride)  Weight 6.8 lbs. per 1,000 ft  Early DC-9s up until

(Heaviest and thickest) 1979
 Rated temperature low: (e.g. Valujet 592)
 105°C  Early B727s up until
Introduced 1950s  Flammable - burns readily 1976
creating copious amounts of  Early B737s up until
Specification No: 5086 thick, toxic smoke rendering 1976
it virtually impossible for
pilots to see their flight  Still used as general purpose
instruments or breathe. (e.g. replacement wire by sections
Valujet 592) of the aviation industry.
 Insulation when burning
turns to hydrochloric acid
when exposed to water.
 Outgasses onto electrical &
electronic contacts
 Soft - Susceptible to chafing
 Susceptible to aging in that it
dries out and becomes brittle.
 Banned by US Air Force.
 US Air Force had 800
autopilot anomalies due to
defective PVC in a 6 month
study in --?
 Still used as general purpose
replacement wire.
 Implicated in Valujet Flight
592 DC9 which crashed into
the Florida Everglades on 11
May 1996

Dangerous Wire
Kynar Fails Far 25 Installed in

Introduced in 1964  Thickness: 15 microns  DC9s from 1970 until

 Weight 5.5 lbs per 1,000 ft. 1976
Specification number:  Rated Temperature: 150°C
(fails temperature spec)
 81044/9  Poor fluid resistance
 No longer used

Kapton Fails Far 25 Installed in

(complex aromatic  Thickness: 8.4 microns  Airbus A310 (all)

polyamide) (Very thin)  Airbus A320
 Weight: 4.6 lbs per 1,000 ft (currently) 2
Manufactured by Dupont (Very light weight)  Airbus A330 (currently)
  Rated temperature: 200°C
Chemical Co.  'Explodes' and burns
fiercely at flash-overduring
Introduced 1966 an arc tracking event due to
the production of free
Specification Numbers: hydrogen, severely damaging
adjacent wires and igniting
 81381/11 surrounding structure. (i.e.
 BMS 13-51 behaves like detonator
(Boeing) fuse.) 1
 High ignition temperature to
start burning (usually
associated with an electrical
short circuit of 5000°C), but
when it does finally ignite it
burns very fiercely
(explodes) creating virtually
no smoke.
 Fumes are clear and fairly
benign.
 Susceptible to wet and
dry Arc Tracking.
 Susceptible to aging in that it
dries out forming hairline
cracks which can lead to
micro current leakage (i.e.
electrical 'ticking' faults )
which in turn can eventually
culminate in an explosive arc
tracking event. (i.e. short
circuit) 1
 Stiffness (straight line
memory) makes it prone to
vibration chafing, (rubbing)
and stressed by bending.
 Abrasive to other wires. (due
to its hardness)
 Hygroscopic (i.e. absorbs
water ) rendering it
susceptible to wet arc
tracking.
 Installation difficulties
(difficult to strip and mark)
 Banned by
* US Air Force
 Airbus A340 (currently)
 B727 (after 1979, EB)
 B737 (after 1979 to
1990)
 B747-400 (some from
1989 - 1991)
 B757 (up until 1990)
 B767 (up until 1991)
 BAe 146 (unconfirmed
reports)
 DC-10
 MD-8x (all)
 MD-11 (up until early
1992)
 A300 -600 (with Teflon
top-coat)
 L-1011 Tristar
 Concorde SST
 B-707 (but not according
to EB)
 Dassault Mercure
 CL 600 Series
(but notRJ/CL604 or
Global Express
(Challenger)
 Shorts SD-330
 Gulfstream G-II, G-III
 HS125-700
 Bell 212, 214
 Sikorsky S-61, S-70B, S-
76
 Westland 606
 Plus 31 military types
such as P-3, C130, F-14,
F-18, Hawkeye, etc
 Still used by AIRBUS
in A319, A320, A330, A340
until about 2005
(see footnote 2 below)

VERY DANGEROUS WIRE
Teflon
(Polytetrafluoroethylene -
PTFE)
Introduced in 1969
Specification Numbers:
 22759/11
Poly-X
(alkane-imide)
an Aliphatic polyimide
Manufactured by
Raychem
Introduced in 1970
Specification Numbers:
 81044/16-29
* US Navy
* Canadian military
* Boeing in 1992 
* Bombardier?
Fails Far 25 Installed in
 Thickness: 10 microns  B747
 Weight 5.43 lbs/1,000 ft.  BAe146
 Rated temperature: 200°C
 Longitudinal splitting
problem due to
manufacturing process.
 Susceptible to cold-flow
(creeping of conductor).
 Type of insulation found as
ignition source on Apollo 13
 Type of insulation found
split in TWA 800-fuel tank
wires [Fuel Quantity
Indicating System] (FQIS)
 Banned by major
manufacturers in 1983
Fails Far 25 Installed in
 The first exotic blend of  Early 747s (e.g. TWA
insulation (due to oil 800)
embargo)  Early DC-10s
 Thickness: 10 microns
 Weight: 4.7 lbs. per 1,000 ft
(Light weight)
 Rated temperature: 150°C
 Susceptible to solvents
 Susceptible to radial
cracking. Projected service
life 60,000 hrs/but
circumferential cracks found
after just 2000 hrs by US
Navy.
 Susceptible to premature
aging. Banned by US Navy
in 1978 due to premature
 aging of insulation after
4000 hrs
 Brittle. Due to brittleness, 1"
bare spots not uncommon.
 Susceptible to chafing.
 Fails FAR 25 (airworthiness
testing standards)
 Caused 323 USN F-14s to be
re-wired
 Banned by US Navy.
 Implicated by Edward Block
(and others) in the downing
of TWA Flt 800 in 1996.  4
 No longer used in civilian
aircraft.

Dangerous Wire
Stilan Fails Far 25 Installed in

Introduced 1972  Thickness: 10 microns  B-747s built in mid-to-

 Weight 4.7 lbs. per 1,000 ft late 1970s
Specification Numbers: (Light weight)  DC-10s built in mid-to-
 Rated Temperature: 150°C late 1970s
 81044/20  Insulation breaks down in
hydraulic and de-icing fluid
 Microscopic crazing problem
seen under microscope
 Cracks under stress
 Found to arc over
 Susceptible to spurious
signal generation
(EMIhazard)
 Absorbs water
(i.e. hygroscopic)
 No longer used

Tefzel Fails Far 25 Installed in

(ETFE)  Rated temperature 150°C Arcturus

 Soft at rated temperature
Introduced 1972  Used as general installation
wire but should neverbe
  mixed in bundle with other
Tefzel was found in Swiss Air
flight SR111's Inflight
Entertainment System (IFEN)
which was suspected as being

Specification numbers
 F-5
Cross Linked Tefzel
(XL-ETFE)
Manufactured by Judd
Wire and Raychem.
Known by some sections
of the aviation industry as
"Spec 55" wire.
Apparently the name
"Spec 55" has been
trademarked by
Raychem.
Introduced 1977
 Specification numbers
 MIL-W-22759/34
 Spec 55
 Spec 55A
 BMS 13-48
(Boeing)
TKT Boeing
(Teflon/Kapton/Teflon)
wire types due to its softness.
the cause of the inflight fire and
subsequent crash of the aircraft
off Nova Scotia in November
1998.
Fails Far 25 Installed in
 Thickness: 10 microns  B737 (currently)
 Weight: 5.0 lbs/1000' (light  B747 (currently)
weight)  B757 (currently)
 Rated temperature: 150°C  B767 (currently)
 Wet arc tracks  B777 (currently)
 Flammable producing  BAe146
copious amount of Dense  Airbus A320
toxic smoke (96%+ density)  Airbus A330
when it burns rendering it  Airbus A340
virtually impossible for flight
crew to see their flight  Still used by BOEING in
instruments. B737, B747, B757, B767, B777
 NASA states will fail and Airbus
flammability requirements in
30% oxygen.
 Toxicity - the worst of all
wires, banned for manned
aerospace use by major
manufacturer. (Grumman
Corporation banned it in
1982 and NASA followed
suit in 1983 due to its
toxicity)
 Soft at rated temperature
 Loses mechanical strength
properties at rated
temperature
 Fails FAR 25 (airworthiness
standards test)
 Projected life 50,000 hrs
 Notch propagation problems
Dangerous Wire
Passes FAR 25 Installed in
 Weight: 5.0 lbs. per 1,000 ft  B737s built after 1992
(Light weight)  B757s built after 1992

Introduced 1992
Boeing Specification No:
 MIL-W-22759
 BMS 13-60
(Boeing)
Tufflite brand
manufactured by
Tensolite
http://www.tensolite.com
 Arc-track resistant
 Abrasion resistant
 Superb insulation protection
 High heat tolerance
 Resists smoking when
burning (less than 2%
density)
 Displays all the positive
aspects of Kapton (i.e.
lightweight, resistance to
burning, no fumes when
burning etc) without any of
Kapton's negatives.
 No known problems
 Reported by some
LAMEs to
be partly installed in
some B747-400
aircraftmanufactured
between 1989 - 1999.
NOTE: Airbus Industries now
use their own version of TKT
(See below)

SAFE WIRE
KKF BAe FAR 25 attributes unknown Installed in

Two layers of Kapton Undoubtedly safer than Kapton if  BAe 146

within a FEP laquer only because it reduces Kaptons
topcoat. propensity to dry out and form Source: BAe Statement 7 July
cracks. 1999
Installed within the
pressure cabin of BAe Resistance to Arc Tracking
146 aircraft. unknown.

Note: Source of info:

BAe Statement dated 7
July 1999
KT BAe FAR 25 attributes unknown Installed in

Single layer of Kapton Undoubtedly safer than Kapton if  BAe 146

overlaid by single wrap only because it reduces Kapton's
of PTFE (i.e. Teflon) propensity to dry out and form Source: BAe Statement 7 July
cracks. However, similar to Airbus' 1999
Installed outside the KTT (see below) which according to
pressure cabin of BAe the America's foremost independent
146 aircraft. aircraft wire expert, Edward Block,
"this type of wire is just Kapton with
Note: Source of info: a cosmetic coating of Teflon which
BAe Statement dated 7 is used for marking purposes only
July 1999 and does little to reduce Kapton's
propensity to explosively arc track".

Safety Unknown
KTT Airbus FAR 25 attributes unknown Used by Airbus to replace
Kapton as a general purpose
Kapton with two very Undoubtedly safer than Kapton, but wire.
thin outer layers of Airbus refuses to disclose
Teflon. performance attributes or Installed in Airbus FBW aircraft
specifications of this wire to up until mid 2006 when it was
Called by Airbus independent researchers. replaced by Airbus' TKT
Polimide/PTFE/PTFE specification EN2267-008 listed
According to specifications below. See footnote 3 below.
Airbus Specification No: available, this wire is made up of
25µm Kapton, sandwiched between
 ASNE0261CF two layers of 2.5µm FEP.

Safety Unknown
TKT Airbus Probably meets FAR 25 Reportedly now installed in
Airbus Aircraft as from mid
Called by Airbus Airbus refuses to fully disclose the 2006 as a general purpose wire.
PTFE/Polimide/PTFE performance attributes or
specifications of this wire to
Note: independent researchers.
PTFE/Polimide/PTFE is
just another name for  No known specifications
TKT as released by Airbus although
Teflon is a PTFE and suspected to be very similar
Kapton is a Polimide to Boeing's TKT wire listed
above.
Airbus Specification No:  Allegedly has a much thicker
outer layer of PTFE (i.e.
 EN2267-008 Teflon) than the KTT wire
used earlier by Airbus. (see
below)

Probably Safe

Sources:

 Edward Block (IASA) Edward B. Block is an international expert on aviation

and wiring, specialising in aircraft crash investigations. 
 Captain John Sampson (IASA)  Is a practicing airline pilot with extensive
experience in civil airline operations, helicopter piloting and military aviation.
Was editor of Aviation Safety Week for a period of time in the mid 2000s.
 Michael Murphy. Aviation safety auditor from Canada.
 Patrick Price (deceased) Ex-employee of Boeing Corporation tasked with
investigating aircraft electrical wiring issues.
NOTES
FAR 25 comprises clauses mandating aircraft design safety rules. However, there
are no specific clauses within FAR 25 pertaining to the flammability, toxicity or
smoke visibility criteria of electrical wire insulation. That said, FAR Section
601 mandates a general statement that;

FAR 25-601: "The airplane may not have design features or

details that experience has shown to be hazardous or unreliable.
The suitability of each questionable design detail and part must
be established by tests." 
Source: http://www.flightsimaviation.com/data/FARS/part_25-601.html

As argued in this document the suitability of aircraft electrical wire insulation

materials are "questionable", yet they have never been the subject of a
comprehensive formal testing program and as such are in breach of FAR 25-
601.

Only Boeing's TKT wire has no known problems and meets FAR 25 requirements.
Airbus' version of TKT probably meets FAR 25 requirements.

No specific standards spelt out by aircraft regulatory authorities such as US FAA or

European JAR regarding aircraft electrical wire. Specifically no standards defined or
any requirement to test wire for:

 Propensity of wire to wet or dry arc track.

 Propensity of wire to burn.
 the density of smoke and toxicity of fumes when wire burns.

Modern jet transport aircraft are required by law (FAA 25 & JAR 25) to
ensure all safety of flight items and aircraft systems have adequate backup systems
installed in the event of a failure of the main system, (and that includes aircraft
electrical systems), yet no thought was given to the failure of the aircraft wiring
system itself.
 Wire is deemed by most in the aviation industry (i.e. aircraft manufacturers, pilots,
airline management and regulatory authorities) as an "install and forget" item. This
attitude is best summed up by the comment of United States Federal Aviation
Authority (FAA) deputy head, Tom McSweeny, who is reported to have said before a
Congressional Committee that "Wire is wire". This attitude ignores the fact that:

 Modern jet transport aircraft contain literally hundreds of kilometers of wire.

 Wire is often damaged during manufacture and/or installation.
 Wire is often incorrectly installed in aircraft. (i.e. incorrectly routed near hot
equipment and/or bundled together with other incompatible wire types such as
soft wire laying adjacent hard wire etc)
 Wire (both the wire and its insulation) deteriorates with age. With regard to the
insulation, it dries out, becomes brittle forming cracks exposing the conductor
(i.e. wire) . Wire itself, oxidises especially associated with the widespread
electrolysis that occurs in aircraft leading to poor contacts and the generation of
local hot spots in the wire which has the potential to melt the surrounding
insulation material.
 All wire deteriorates in service due to environmental factors such as:
o extremes of heat & cold experienced by aircraft on the ground and in the
air. (i.e. wire can experience plus +200°C down to minus -70°C),
o water damage, (hydrolysis and the fact that some wire types
exhibit hygroscopic tendencies)
o salt damage associated with marine environments. (all aircraft operate
into airfields adjacent marine environments at least some time in their
operational lives)
o contamination by aircraft fluids such as fuel, oil, hydraulic fluid, deicing
fluid, cleaning chemicals, toilet residue, galley spillage etc.
o inflight vibration causing chafing of wires rubbing against other wires or
the structure of the aircraft. This is especially a problem with hard wire
such as Kapton laying adjacent a soft wire like Tefzel.
o All wire products display differing properties with regard to aging, but
practically all wire insulation material dries out, goes hard and then
develops hairline fractures which allow the ingress of water and other
aviation fluids leading to micro-discharges of current through the cracks
to surrounding wires or the aircraft structure. ('ticking' faults)
o All aircraft use their airframe as their electrical earth return pathway
resulting in significant constraints in the operation of protection devices
such as circuit breakers located in the cockpit. (see separate paper on this
issue)
According to Ed Block: "Only TKT wire insulation (BMS 13-60) meets FAR 25
Standards."

RECOMMENDATIONS
The aviation industry as a whole needs to acknowledge that the shortcomings
associated with different electrical wire types are a serious issue and potentially very
dangerous as evidenced by the information presented in this paper. The notion held by
many with in the aviation industry that "wire is just wire" is irresponsible.

Practical steps that the industry should take to begin to address the situation include:

 Aviation regulatory authorities need to specify rigorous performance standards

for electrical wire so that they conform to FAR 25 in that "insulation material is
not used that is hazardous, unreliable, or contributes smoke/fire". Any
promulgated standards for electrical wire would need to be rigorously enforced.

 Acknowledge that Kapton wire is a particularly dangerous hazard to aircraft

and insist upon its its removal from aircraft where practical. (this statement
acknowledges the fact that the complete removal of Kapton wire will be in
many cases an impossibility)

 Insist that electronic 'Fly by Wire' (FBW) aircraft be fitted with a completely
separate 'virgin' emergency electrical bus to allow pilots to remove all electrical
current from all 'normal' electrical wire circuits in the event of an electrical fire.
For more on this subject see 'Virgin Electrical Bus'